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Tweak wording of IRV vs SRV #15

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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion Web Site Pages/SRVvsIRV.html
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<p>Score Runoff Voting simulates best-in-class in the several election method simulators that have included it. Across the board, with both honest voters and mixtures of strategic voters, SRV is <a href="equal_systems_science">"unquestionably a top-shelf method."</a>

<p><strong>IRV offers middle-of-the-road representation accuracy</strong>
<p>Traditional IRV, by contrast, doesn't come close to the top of the list. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258164743_Frequency_of_monotonicity_failure_under_Instant_Runoff_Voting_Estimates_based_on_a_spatial_model_of_elections">Recent work by Robert Norman</a>, a mathematician at Dartmouth, suggests that IRV's topsy-turvy math issues would create non-representative outcomes in one in five close contests among three candidates and that with larger numbers of candidates, it would happen even more often.
<p>Traditional IRV, by contrast, doesn't come close to the top of the list. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258164743_Frequency_of_monotonicity_failure_under_Instant_Runoff_Voting_Estimates_based_on_a_spatial_model_of_elections">Recent work by Robert Norman</a>, a mathematician at Dartmouth, suggests that IRV's topsy-turvy math issues would create non-representative outcomes in one out of every five close contests among three candidates and that with larger numbers of candidates, it would happen even more often.

<p>The 2009 Mayoral IRV election in Burlington, Vermont <a href="Burlington">demonstrates IRV's counting failure</a> with crystal clarity: Three strong candidates faced off - we'll call them A, B and C. A majority of voters expressed a preference for A over B, and a plurality of voters expressed a preference for A over C, yet the IRV count eliminated A before either B or C, and elected a candidate not supported by the majority. Not surprisingly, <strong>Burlington repealed IRV</strong> the next year.

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