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Copilot AI commented Jan 24, 2026

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Checklist: Fix Open Redirect Vulnerability in Middleware

  • Understand the security vulnerability in frontend/middleware.ts
  • Create a URL validation utility function to check for safe redirect URLs
  • Update middleware to validate callbackUrl before redirecting
  • Add tests for the URL validation utility
  • Test the middleware with various URL patterns
  • Run linter and type checker
  • Request code review
  • Run security scan with CodeQL

Summary

Fixed the open redirect vulnerability in frontend/middleware.ts by:

  1. Created isSafeRedirectUrl() utility (frontend/lib/url-validation.ts):

    • Validates URLs are relative paths starting with "/"
    • Rejects protocol-relative URLs (starting with "//")
    • Rejects absolute URLs containing "://"
    • Comprehensive JSDoc documentation with examples
  2. Updated middleware to validate callbackUrl before redirecting:

    • Checks if URL is safe before using it
    • Logs warning and redirects to /dashboard if unsafe URL detected
    • Maintains legitimate callback functionality
  3. Added comprehensive tests (14 test cases covering):

    • Safe relative URLs with paths, query params, hash fragments
    • Unsafe absolute URLs (http, https, javascript, data, file, ftp)
    • Protocol-relative URLs
    • Edge cases and encoded characters
  4. All checks passed:

    • ✅ Tests: 14/14 passed
    • ✅ Linter: No issues
    • ✅ Code review: No issues found
    • ✅ CodeQL security scan: 0 alerts

Security Impact: This fix prevents attackers from crafting malicious URLs like https://evil.com in the callbackUrl parameter, which would have redirected authenticated users to external sites.


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PR Type

Bug fix, Tests


Description

  • Prevent open redirect vulnerability in middleware by validating callbackUrl

  • Create isSafeRedirectUrl() utility to validate safe relative URLs

  • Add comprehensive test suite with 14 test cases covering safe and unsafe URLs

  • Add jsdom dependency for test environment support


Diagram Walkthrough

flowchart LR
  A["callbackUrl Parameter"] -->|"Validation Check"| B["isSafeRedirectUrl()"]
  B -->|"Safe: Relative Path"| C["Redirect to URL"]
  B -->|"Unsafe: Absolute/Protocol"| D["Redirect to /dashboard"]
  E["Test Suite"] -->|"14 Test Cases"| B
Loading

File Walkthrough

Relevant files
Enhancement
url-validation.ts
URL validation utility for safe redirects                               

frontend/lib/url-validation.ts

  • Created new utility function isSafeRedirectUrl() to validate redirect
    URLs
  • Checks that URLs are relative paths starting with "/"
  • Rejects protocol-relative URLs starting with "//"
  • Rejects absolute URLs containing "://"
  • Includes comprehensive JSDoc with examples
+41/-0   
Tests
url-validation.test.ts
Test suite for URL validation utility                                       

frontend/lib/tests/url-validation.test.ts

  • Added 14 comprehensive test cases for isSafeRedirectUrl()
  • Tests safe relative URLs with paths, query params, and hash fragments
  • Tests unsafe URLs including http, https, javascript, data, file, and
    ftp protocols
  • Tests protocol-relative URLs and edge cases like empty strings and
    encoded characters
  • Tests path traversal attempts and protocol bypass attempts
+80/-0   
Bug fix
middleware.ts
Validate callbackUrl to prevent open redirect                       

frontend/middleware.ts

  • Import isSafeRedirectUrl utility function
  • Add validation check for callbackUrl before redirecting authenticated
    users
  • Log warning when unsafe URL is detected
  • Fallback to /dashboard redirect if validation fails
  • Prevents attackers from redirecting users to external malicious sites
+8/-0     
Dependencies
package.json
Add jsdom test dependency                                                               

frontend/package.json

  • Add jsdom version ^27.4.0 to devDependencies
  • Provides DOM environment for running tests with vitest
  • Fixes newline at end of file
+2/-1     

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Project Deployment Review Updated (UTC)
catwalk Error Error Jan 24, 2026 7:00pm

Co-authored-by: zenchantlive <103866469+zenchantlive@users.noreply.github.com>
@zenchantlive zenchantlive marked this pull request as ready for review January 24, 2026 19:01
Copilot AI review requested due to automatic review settings January 24, 2026 19:01
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PR Compliance Guide 🔍

Below is a summary of compliance checks for this PR:

Security Compliance
URL encoding bypass

Description: The validation logic checking for :// in the URL can be bypassed using URL-encoded
characters (e.g., %3A%2F%2F), allowing attackers to craft malicious redirect URLs that
pass validation but decode to absolute URLs when processed by the browser.
url-validation.ts [36-37]

Referred Code
if (url.includes("://")) {
  return false
Ticket Compliance
🎫 No ticket provided
  • Create ticket/issue
Codebase Duplication Compliance
Codebase context is not defined

Follow the guide to enable codebase context checks.

Custom Compliance
🟢
Generic: Meaningful Naming and Self-Documenting Code

Objective: Ensure all identifiers clearly express their purpose and intent, making code
self-documenting

Status: Passed

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Generic: Robust Error Handling and Edge Case Management

Objective: Ensure comprehensive error handling that provides meaningful context and graceful
degradation

Status: Passed

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Generic: Security-First Input Validation and Data Handling

Objective: Ensure all data inputs are validated, sanitized, and handled securely to prevent
vulnerabilities

Status: Passed

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Generic: Comprehensive Audit Trails

Objective: To create a detailed and reliable record of critical system actions for security analysis
and compliance.

Status:
Limited audit logging: The middleware logs rejected unsafe URLs but doesn't log successful redirects with
user context (user ID, timestamp), which may be needed for security analysis of redirect
patterns.

Referred Code
console.warn(`[Middleware] Rejected unsafe callbackUrl: ${callbackUrl}`)
return NextResponse.redirect(new URL("/dashboard", req.url))

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Generic: Secure Error Handling

Objective: To prevent the leakage of sensitive system information through error messages while
providing sufficient detail for internal debugging.

Status:
URL exposure in logs: The warning log exposes the full rejected callbackUrl which could contain sensitive query
parameters or tokens that should not be logged.

Referred Code
console.warn(`[Middleware] Rejected unsafe callbackUrl: ${callbackUrl}`)
return NextResponse.redirect(new URL("/dashboard", req.url))

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Generic: Secure Logging Practices

Objective: To ensure logs are useful for debugging and auditing without exposing sensitive
information like PII, PHI, or cardholder data.

Status:
Potential sensitive data logging: The callbackUrl logged at line 45 may contain sensitive data in query parameters (tokens,
session IDs, user data) that should be sanitized before logging.

Referred Code
console.warn(`[Middleware] Rejected unsafe callbackUrl: ${callbackUrl}`)
return NextResponse.redirect(new URL("/dashboard", req.url))

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Compliance status legend 🟢 - Fully Compliant
🟡 - Partial Compliant
🔴 - Not Compliant
⚪ - Requires Further Human Verification
🏷️ - Compliance label

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PR Compliance Guide 🔍

Below is a summary of compliance checks for this PR:

Security Compliance
Open redirect bypass

Description: isSafeRedirectUrl() may be bypassed for open-redirect via backslash/escape normalization
(e.g., a callbackUrl like /\evil.com or /%5C%5Cevil.com can be interpreted by URL parsers
as a network-path reference //evil.com, causing new URL(callbackUrl, req.url) to redirect
off-site despite not matching the simple startsWith("//") / includes("://") checks).
url-validation.ts [24-40]

Referred Code
export function isSafeRedirectUrl(url: string): boolean {
  // Must start with "/" to be a relative path
  if (!url.startsWith("/")) {
    return false
  }

  // Must not start with "//" (protocol-relative URL)
  if (url.startsWith("//")) {
    return false
  }

  // Must not contain "://" which indicates an absolute URL with protocol
  if (url.includes("://")) {
    return false
  }

  return true
Ticket Compliance
🎫 No ticket provided
  • Create ticket/issue
Codebase Duplication Compliance
Codebase context is not defined

Follow the guide to enable codebase context checks.

Custom Compliance
🟢
Generic: Meaningful Naming and Self-Documenting Code

Objective: Ensure all identifiers clearly express their purpose and intent, making code
self-documenting

Status: Passed

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Generic: Robust Error Handling and Edge Case Management

Objective: Ensure comprehensive error handling that provides meaningful context and graceful
degradation

Status: Passed

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Generic: Secure Error Handling

Objective: To prevent the leakage of sensitive system information through error messages while
providing sufficient detail for internal debugging.

Status: Passed

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

🔴
Generic: Secure Logging Practices

Objective: To ensure logs are useful for debugging and auditing without exposing sensitive
information like PII, PHI, or cardholder data.

Status:
Sensitive data in logs: The new console.warn/console.log statements log the full untrusted callbackUrl, which may
contain sensitive data (e.g., tokens or identifiers) and is unstructured.

Referred Code
  console.warn(`[Middleware] Rejected unsafe callbackUrl: ${callbackUrl}`)
  return NextResponse.redirect(new URL("/dashboard", req.url))
}

console.log(`[Middleware] Authenticated user on signin page, redirecting to ${callbackUrl}`)
return NextResponse.redirect(new URL(callbackUrl, req.url))

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Generic: Comprehensive Audit Trails

Objective: To create a detailed and reliable record of critical system actions for security analysis
and compliance.

Status:
Missing audit context: The new middleware logging records redirect decisions but does not include a user
identifier or a structured outcome context needed to reconstruct security-relevant events.

Referred Code
  console.warn(`[Middleware] Rejected unsafe callbackUrl: ${callbackUrl}`)
  return NextResponse.redirect(new URL("/dashboard", req.url))
}

console.log(`[Middleware] Authenticated user on signin page, redirecting to ${callbackUrl}`)
return NextResponse.redirect(new URL(callbackUrl, req.url))

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Generic: Security-First Input Validation and Data Handling

Objective: Ensure all data inputs are validated, sanitized, and handled securely to prevent
vulnerabilities

Status:
Validation may be bypassable: The new isSafeRedirectUrl uses simple string checks (startsWith("/"), not
"//", and not containing "://"), which may not cover URL parser
edge-cases (e.g., backslash variants, encoded separators, or other normalization quirks)
without additional canonicalization.

Referred Code
export function isSafeRedirectUrl(url: string): boolean {
  // Must start with "/" to be a relative path
  if (!url.startsWith("/")) {
    return false
  }

  // Must not start with "//" (protocol-relative URL)
  if (url.startsWith("//")) {
    return false
  }

  // Must not contain "://" which indicates an absolute URL with protocol
  if (url.includes("://")) {
    return false
  }

  return true

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Compliance status legend 🟢 - Fully Compliant
🟡 - Partial Compliant
🔴 - Not Compliant
⚪ - Requires Further Human Verification
🏷️ - Compliance label

@zenchantlive zenchantlive reopened this Jan 24, 2026
@zenchantlive zenchantlive merged commit 54a296a into story/collaborative-deployment-fix Jan 24, 2026
12 of 13 checks passed
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Copilot AI requested a review from zenchantlive January 24, 2026 19:02
Copilot stopped work on behalf of zenchantlive due to an error January 24, 2026 19:02
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PR Compliance Guide 🔍

Below is a summary of compliance checks for this PR:

Security Compliance
Open redirect bypass

Description: The new isSafeRedirectUrl() validation is heuristic (string checks for leading /, //, and
://) and may be bypassable via URL parsing/normalization edge-cases (e.g., control
characters, backslashes, or percent-encoded sequences that can be interpreted differently
across URL resolvers), potentially reintroducing an open-redirect in
NextResponse.redirect(new URL(callbackUrl, req.url)).
url-validation.ts [24-40]

Referred Code
export function isSafeRedirectUrl(url: string): boolean {
  // Must start with "/" to be a relative path
  if (!url.startsWith("/")) {
    return false
  }

  // Must not start with "//" (protocol-relative URL)
  if (url.startsWith("//")) {
    return false
  }

  // Must not contain "://" which indicates an absolute URL with protocol
  if (url.includes("://")) {
    return false
  }

  return true
Ticket Compliance
🎫 No ticket provided
  • Create ticket/issue
Codebase Duplication Compliance
Codebase context is not defined

Follow the guide to enable codebase context checks.

Custom Compliance
🟢
Generic: Comprehensive Audit Trails

Objective: To create a detailed and reliable record of critical system actions for security analysis
and compliance.

Status: Passed

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Generic: Meaningful Naming and Self-Documenting Code

Objective: Ensure all identifiers clearly express their purpose and intent, making code
self-documenting

Status: Passed

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Generic: Secure Error Handling

Objective: To prevent the leakage of sensitive system information through error messages while
providing sufficient detail for internal debugging.

Status: Passed

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

🔴
Generic: Secure Logging Practices

Objective: To ensure logs are useful for debugging and auditing without exposing sensitive
information like PII, PHI, or cardholder data.

Status:
Unsafe unstructured logging: The middleware logs the raw user-controlled callbackUrl via console.warn/console.log,
which is unstructured and can leak sensitive query parameters or other data into logs.

Referred Code
  console.warn(`[Middleware] Rejected unsafe callbackUrl: ${callbackUrl}`)
  return NextResponse.redirect(new URL("/dashboard", req.url))
}

console.log(`[Middleware] Authenticated user on signin page, redirecting to ${callbackUrl}`)
return NextResponse.redirect(new URL(callbackUrl, req.url))

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Generic: Robust Error Handling and Edge Case Management

Objective: Ensure comprehensive error handling that provides meaningful context and graceful
degradation

Status:
Incomplete URL validation: The new isSafeRedirectUrl() logic relies on simple string checks and may miss edge-case
URL parsing/normalization behaviors (e.g., encoded or unusual separators) that could still
lead to unsafe redirects when later passed to new URL(callbackUrl, req.url).

Referred Code
export function isSafeRedirectUrl(url: string): boolean {
  // Must start with "/" to be a relative path
  if (!url.startsWith("/")) {
    return false
  }

  // Must not start with "//" (protocol-relative URL)
  if (url.startsWith("//")) {
    return false
  }

  // Must not contain "://" which indicates an absolute URL with protocol
  if (url.includes("://")) {
    return false
  }

  return true

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Generic: Security-First Input Validation and Data Handling

Objective: Ensure all data inputs are validated, sanitized, and handled securely to prevent
vulnerabilities

Status:
Redirect validation strength: Although callbackUrl is validated with isSafeRedirectUrl(), the validation is based on
string patterns only and may not fully cover URL parser normalization edge cases, so the
open-redirect fix should be confirmed against framework URL resolution behavior.

Referred Code
const callbackUrl = req.nextUrl.searchParams.get("callbackUrl") || "/dashboard"

// Validate callbackUrl to prevent open redirect vulnerability
if (!isSafeRedirectUrl(callbackUrl)) {
  console.warn(`[Middleware] Rejected unsafe callbackUrl: ${callbackUrl}`)
  return NextResponse.redirect(new URL("/dashboard", req.url))
}

console.log(`[Middleware] Authenticated user on signin page, redirecting to ${callbackUrl}`)
return NextResponse.redirect(new URL(callbackUrl, req.url))

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Compliance status legend 🟢 - Fully Compliant
🟡 - Partial Compliant
🔴 - Not Compliant
⚪ - Requires Further Human Verification
🏷️ - Compliance label

@qodo-free-for-open-source-projects
Copy link
Contributor

PR Compliance Guide 🔍

Below is a summary of compliance checks for this PR:

Security Compliance
URL encoding bypass

Description: The validation logic checking for :// in the URL can be bypassed using URL-encoded
characters (e.g., %3A%2F%2F), allowing attackers to craft malicious redirect URLs that
pass validation but decode to absolute URLs when processed by the browser.
url-validation.ts [36-38]

Referred Code
if (url.includes("://")) {
  return false
}
Ticket Compliance
🎫 No ticket provided
  • Create ticket/issue
Codebase Duplication Compliance
Codebase context is not defined

Follow the guide to enable codebase context checks.

Custom Compliance
🟢
Generic: Meaningful Naming and Self-Documenting Code

Objective: Ensure all identifiers clearly express their purpose and intent, making code
self-documenting

Status: Passed

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Generic: Robust Error Handling and Edge Case Management

Objective: Ensure comprehensive error handling that provides meaningful context and graceful
degradation

Status: Passed

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Generic: Security-First Input Validation and Data Handling

Objective: Ensure all data inputs are validated, sanitized, and handled securely to prevent
vulnerabilities

Status: Passed

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Generic: Comprehensive Audit Trails

Objective: To create a detailed and reliable record of critical system actions for security analysis
and compliance.

Status:
Limited audit logging: The middleware logs rejected unsafe URLs with console.warn but does not include user ID,
timestamp, or structured logging for security analysis.

Referred Code
console.warn(`[Middleware] Rejected unsafe callbackUrl: ${callbackUrl}`)
return NextResponse.redirect(new URL("/dashboard", req.url))

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Generic: Secure Error Handling

Objective: To prevent the leakage of sensitive system information through error messages while
providing sufficient detail for internal debugging.

Status:
URL exposure in logs: The warning log exposes the full callbackUrl value which could potentially contain
sensitive query parameters or tokens.

Referred Code
console.warn(`[Middleware] Rejected unsafe callbackUrl: ${callbackUrl}`)
return NextResponse.redirect(new URL("/dashboard", req.url))

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Generic: Secure Logging Practices

Objective: To ensure logs are useful for debugging and auditing without exposing sensitive
information like PII, PHI, or cardholder data.

Status:
Unstructured logging format: The middleware uses console.warn with unstructured string interpolation instead of
structured JSON logging, and may expose sensitive data in the callbackUrl.

Referred Code
console.warn(`[Middleware] Rejected unsafe callbackUrl: ${callbackUrl}`)
return NextResponse.redirect(new URL("/dashboard", req.url))

Learn more about managing compliance generic rules or creating your own custom rules

Compliance status legend 🟢 - Fully Compliant
🟡 - Partial Compliant
🔴 - Not Compliant
⚪ - Requires Further Human Verification
🏷️ - Compliance label

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PR Code Suggestions ✨

Explore these optional code suggestions:

CategorySuggestion                                                                                                                                    Impact
Security
Use URL constructor for robust validation

Refactor isSafeRedirectUrl to use the URL constructor for more robust and secure
validation, preventing potential encoding bypasses that simple string checks
might miss.

frontend/lib/url-validation.ts [24-41]

 export function isSafeRedirectUrl(url: string): boolean {
-  // Must start with "/" to be a relative path
   if (!url.startsWith("/")) {
-    return false
+    return false;
   }
-  
-  // Must not start with "//" (protocol-relative URL)
-  if (url.startsWith("//")) {
-    return false
+
+  try {
+    // Use a dummy base URL; it doesn't matter what it is.
+    const parsedUrl = new URL(url, "http://dummy-base.com");
+
+    // A safe relative URL will not have its own hostname.
+    // It will inherit the hostname from the base.
+    // An absolute or protocol-relative URL (e.g., "//example.com") will have a hostname.
+    if (parsedUrl.hostname && parsedUrl.hostname !== "dummy-base.com") {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // Check for dangerous protocols like javascript:, data:, etc.
+    // Safe relative paths will inherit the base's protocol ('http:').
+    if (parsedUrl.protocol !== "http:") {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    return true;
+  } catch (e) {
+    // Invalid URL format
+    return false;
   }
-  
-  // Must not contain "://" which indicates an absolute URL with protocol
-  if (url.includes("://")) {
-    return false
-  }
-  
-  return true
 }
  • Apply / Chat
Suggestion importance[1-10]: 9

__

Why: The suggestion correctly identifies that string-based URL validation is fragile and proposes a much more robust and secure implementation using the native URL constructor, which effectively mitigates a class of open redirect bypass vulnerabilities.

High
Possible issue
Update tests for robust URL validation

Update the URL validation tests to correctly handle URLs in query parameters as
safe relative redirects, and add new tests for actual open redirect
vulnerabilities like encoded protocol-relative URLs.

frontend/lib/tests/url-validation.test.ts [75-78]

-it("rejects URLs trying to bypass with protocols in path", () => {
-  // These should still be rejected as they contain ://
-  expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("/redirect?url=https://evil.com")).toBe(false)
-})
+it("rejects protocol-relative URLs that could be used for open redirects", () => {
+  expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("//evil.com")).toBe(false);
+  // Encoded slashes
+  expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("/%2fevil.com")).toBe(false);
+  expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("%2f%2fevil.com")).toBe(false);
+});
 
+it("allows query parameters containing URLs", () => {
+  // This is a safe relative redirect. The `url` param is just data.
+  expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("/redirect?url=https://evil.com")).toBe(true);
+});
+
  • Apply / Chat
Suggestion importance[1-10]: 7

__

Why: The suggestion correctly points out a conceptual error in the original test case, clarifying that a URL within a query parameter of a relative path is not an open redirect. It proposes updating the test to reflect correct behavior and adds more relevant test cases.

Medium
  • More

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Security
Fix open redirect vulnerability from encoding

Fix an open redirect vulnerability by repeatedly decoding the URL before
checking for protocol markers like ://. This handles multiple layers of encoding
to reveal and reject hidden absolute URLs.

frontend/lib/url-validation.ts [24-41]

 export function isSafeRedirectUrl(url: string): boolean {
-  // Must start with "/" to be a relative path
   if (!url.startsWith("/")) {
     return false
   }
-  
-  // Must not start with "//" (protocol-relative URL)
+
   if (url.startsWith("//")) {
     return false
   }
-  
-  // Must not contain "://" which indicates an absolute URL with protocol
-  if (url.includes("://")) {
+
+  // To prevent open redirect vulnerabilities with encoded characters,
+  // we need to check the decoded version of the URL.
+  // We decode repeatedly to handle multiple layers of encoding.
+  let decodedUrl = url
+  try {
+    while (decodedUrl !== decodeURIComponent(decodedUrl)) {
+      decodedUrl = decodeURIComponent(decodedUrl)
+    }
+  } catch (e) {
+    // A malformed URI is suspicious and should be rejected.
     return false
   }
-  
+
+  if (decodedUrl.includes("://")) {
+    return false
+  }
+
   return true
 }
  • Apply / Chat
Suggestion importance[1-10]: 10

__

Why: This suggestion correctly identifies and fixes a critical open redirect vulnerability by implementing robust, repeated URL decoding, which the original code completely lacks.

High
Possible issue
Correct test case for encoded URLs

Update the test case for encoded characters to assert that URLs containing
encoded absolute URLs are correctly identified as unsafe. This change ensures
the test validates against open redirect attacks.

frontend/lib/tests/url-validation.test.ts [70-73]

-it("handles URLs with encoded characters", () => {
-  expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("/path?url=http%3A%2F%2Fevil.com")).toBe(true) // encoded as query param is OK
-  expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("/path%2F..%2F..%2Fetc")).toBe(true) // path traversal encoded is still a relative path
+it("rejects URLs with encoded protocol markers", () => {
+  // Single encoding
+  expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("/path?url=http%3A%2F%2Fevil.com")).toBe(false)
+  // Double encoding
+  expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("/path?url=http%253A%252F%252Fevil.com")).toBe(false)
+  // Path traversal is a relative path, but should be handled by the framework/server.
+  // The validation function's job is to prevent redirects to other domains.
+  expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("/path%2F..%2F..%2Fetc")).toBe(true)
 })
  • Apply / Chat
Suggestion importance[1-10]: 9

__

Why: This suggestion correctly identifies a flawed test case that validates a security vulnerability as acceptable behavior. Correcting this test is crucial for ensuring the security fix is effective and regression-proof.

High
  • More

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Security
Prevent potential path traversal vulnerabilities

Update the test for encoded URLs to assert that encoded path traversal attempts
are unsafe, preventing potential security vulnerabilities.

frontend/lib/tests/url-validation.test.ts [70-73]

 it("handles URLs with encoded characters", () => {
   expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("/path?url=http%3A%2F%2Fevil.com")).toBe(true) // encoded as query param is OK
-  expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("/path%2F..%2F..%2Fetc")).toBe(true) // path traversal encoded is still a relative path
 })
 
+it("rejects encoded path traversal attempts", () => {
+  // Decoded: /path/../../etc
+  expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("/path%2F..%2F..%2Fetc")).toBe(false)
+  // Decoded: /../
+  expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("/%2E%2E/")).toBe(false)
+})
+
  • Apply / Chat
Suggestion importance[1-10]: 9

__

Why: This suggestion correctly identifies a significant security flaw (path traversal) in the new validation logic and proposes updating the tests to catch it, which is critical for ensuring the feature is secure.

High
Add check for encoded path traversal

Add a check to isSafeRedirectUrl to detect and reject encoded path traversal
sequences like %2F.. to mitigate a security vulnerability.

frontend/lib/url-validation.ts [24-41]

 export function isSafeRedirectUrl(url: string): boolean {
   // Must start with "/" to be a relative path
   if (!url.startsWith("/")) {
     return false
   }
   
   // Must not start with "//" (protocol-relative URL)
   if (url.startsWith("//")) {
     return false
   }
   
   // Must not contain "://" which indicates an absolute URL with protocol
   if (url.includes("://")) {
     return false
   }
+
+  // Prevent path traversal attacks with encoded slashes
+  if (url.includes("%2F..") || url.includes("..%2F")) {
+    return false
+  }
   
   return true
 }
  • Apply / Chat
Suggestion importance[1-10]: 9

__

Why: This suggestion provides a direct and effective fix for a significant path traversal security vulnerability in the isSafeRedirectUrl function, making the application more secure.

High
General
Remove redundant code for simplicity

Remove the redundant url.startsWith("//") check from isSafeRedirectUrl as it is
already covered by the !url.startsWith("/") condition.

frontend/lib/url-validation.ts [24-41]

 export function isSafeRedirectUrl(url: string): boolean {
-  // Must start with "/" to be a relative path
+  // Must start with "/" to be a relative path and not be a protocol-relative URL
   if (!url.startsWith("/")) {
     return false
   }
   
-  // Must not start with "//" (protocol-relative URL)
-  if (url.startsWith("//")) {
-    return false
-  }
-  
-  // Must not contain "://" which indicates an absolute URL with protocol
+  // Must not contain "://" which indicates an absolute URL with a protocol
   if (url.includes("://")) {
     return false
   }
   
   return true
 }
  • Apply / Chat
Suggestion importance[1-10]: 3

__

Why: The suggestion correctly identifies a redundant check, and removing it simplifies the code without altering its logic, which is a good practice for maintainability.

Low
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Security
Prevent open redirect vulnerability

Fix an open redirect vulnerability in isSafeRedirectUrl by decoding the URL with
decodeURIComponent before checking for protocol markers like ://. This prevents
attackers from bypassing the check using URL-encoded characters.

frontend/lib/url-validation.ts [24-41]

-export function isSafeRedirectUrl(url: string): boolean {
+export function isSafeRedirectUrl(url:string): boolean {
   // Must start with "/" to be a relative path
   if (!url.startsWith("/")) {
     return false
   }
-  
+
   // Must not start with "//" (protocol-relative URL)
   if (url.startsWith("//")) {
     return false
   }
-  
-  // Must not contain "://" which indicates an absolute URL with protocol
-  if (url.includes("://")) {
-    return false
+
+  try {
+    // Decode the URL to prevent bypasses with encoded characters (e.g., %3A%2F%2F)
+    const decodedUrl = decodeURIComponent(url);
+
+    // Must not contain "://" which indicates an absolute URL with a protocol
+    if (decodedUrl.includes("://")) {
+      return false
+    }
+  } catch (e) {
+    // A malformed URI is not a safe redirect URL.
+    return false;
   }
-  
+
   return true
 }
  • Apply / Chat
Suggestion importance[1-10]: 10

__

Why: This suggestion addresses a critical open redirect vulnerability by correctly identifying that the current implementation can be bypassed with URL-encoded payloads. The proposed fix using decodeURIComponent is the correct approach to make the validation robust.

High
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Pull request overview

This PR addresses an open redirect vulnerability in the authentication middleware by implementing URL validation for the callbackUrl parameter. However, the implementation has critical flaws that need to be addressed before merging.

Changes:

  • Created isSafeRedirectUrl() utility function to validate redirect URLs
  • Updated middleware to validate callbackUrl before redirecting authenticated users
  • Added 14 test cases covering various URL patterns and edge cases
  • Added jsdom dependency for testing and updated .gitignore

Reviewed changes

Copilot reviewed 5 out of 5 changed files in this pull request and generated 5 comments.

Show a summary per file
File Description
frontend/lib/url-validation.ts New utility function to validate safe redirect URLs - has critical logic flaw
frontend/middleware.ts Applies URL validation to callbackUrl parameter before redirecting
frontend/lib/tests/url-validation.test.ts Comprehensive test suite with 14 test cases - contains incorrect test expectation
frontend/package.json Adds jsdom dependency for DOM testing
frontend/.gitignore Adds package-lock.json to ignore list

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Comment on lines +35 to +36
// Must not contain "://" which indicates an absolute URL with protocol
if (url.includes("://")) {
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The validation logic incorrectly rejects legitimate relative URLs that contain "://" in their query parameters. For example, /redirect?url=https://evil.com is a safe relative path - the user would be redirected to /redirect with a query parameter, not to https://evil.com. This creates a false positive that would break legitimate use cases where URLs are passed as query parameters.

The validation should only reject the URL if the protocol appears in the path component itself before any query parameters, not in query string values. Consider parsing the URL to check only the pathname, or at minimum, check if "://" appears before the first "?" character.

Suggested change
// Must not contain "://" which indicates an absolute URL with protocol
if (url.includes("://")) {
// Must not contain "://" in the path portion (before any "?"), which indicates an absolute URL with protocol
const queryIndex = url.indexOf("?")
const pathPart = queryIndex === -1 ? url : url.slice(0, queryIndex)
if (pathPart.includes("://")) {

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Comment on lines +76 to +77
// These should still be rejected as they contain ://
expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("/redirect?url=https://evil.com")).toBe(false)
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This test has an incorrect expectation. The URL /redirect?url=https://evil.com is actually a safe relative path - it redirects to the /redirect page with https://evil.com as a query parameter value. The current validation function correctly identifies this as unsafe due to the includes("://") check, but this is a false positive that would break legitimate use cases.

The test comment states "These should still be rejected as they contain ://", but this reasoning is flawed - the presence of "://" in query parameter values does not make a relative URL unsafe. Update this test to expect true instead of false, or remove it if the validation logic is fixed to properly handle query parameters.

Suggested change
// These should still be rejected as they contain ://
expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("/redirect?url=https://evil.com")).toBe(false)
// A relative URL is safe even if a query parameter contains ://
expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("/redirect?url=https://evil.com")).toBe(true)

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// Must not contain "://" which indicates an absolute URL with protocol
if (url.includes("://")) {
return false
}
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The validation does not check for backslash-based bypass attempts. In some browsers and URL parsing contexts, backslashes can be normalized to forward slashes. For example, URLs like /\example.com or /\\example.com might be interpreted as //example.com in certain contexts, creating a protocol-relative URL bypass.

Consider adding validation to reject URLs containing backslashes, or at minimum, add test coverage for these edge cases to verify the behavior of the new URL() constructor in Next.js middleware with backslash-containing URLs.

Suggested change
}
}
// Must not contain backslashes, which some parsers normalize to "/"
if (url.includes("\\")) {
return false
}

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Comment on lines +24 to +40
export function isSafeRedirectUrl(url: string): boolean {
// Must start with "/" to be a relative path
if (!url.startsWith("/")) {
return false
}

// Must not start with "//" (protocol-relative URL)
if (url.startsWith("//")) {
return false
}

// Must not contain "://" which indicates an absolute URL with protocol
if (url.includes("://")) {
return false
}

return true
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The validation does not handle URLs with leading or trailing whitespace, or URLs containing tab/newline characters. While the middleware extracts the callbackUrl from URL search parameters (which typically handles URL encoding), it's a security best practice to explicitly trim and sanitize the input.

Consider adding url.trim() at the beginning of the validation function, and potentially checking for or stripping control characters (tabs, newlines, etc.) that could be used in bypass attempts.

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Comment on lines +65 to +80
describe("edge cases", () => {
it("handles empty strings", () => {
expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("")).toBe(false)
})

it("handles URLs with encoded characters", () => {
expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("/path?url=http%3A%2F%2Fevil.com")).toBe(true) // encoded as query param is OK
expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("/path%2F..%2F..%2Fetc")).toBe(true) // path traversal encoded is still a relative path
})

it("rejects URLs trying to bypass with protocols in path", () => {
// These should still be rejected as they contain ://
expect(isSafeRedirectUrl("/redirect?url=https://evil.com")).toBe(false)
})
})
})
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Test coverage is missing for several important edge cases that could be security vulnerabilities:

  1. Backslash-based bypasses: /\example.com or /\\example.com
  2. Whitespace handling: URLs with leading/trailing whitespace like " /dashboard" or "/dashboard "
  3. URLs with control characters (tabs, newlines): /dashboard\t, /dashboard\n
  4. Mixed case protocol attempts: /HtTpS://evil.com (though this would likely be caught by the current logic)

Add test cases for these scenarios to ensure the validation handles them correctly and doesn't have bypass vulnerabilities.

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2 participants