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This includes all workflow changes from unstable, fixes and templating from #503 for release/8.0

Peter-Sh and others added 24 commits January 14, 2026 10:35
Flexible slack messaging and some release process modifications
Make REDIS_DOWNLOAD_SHA conditionally required
Installing clang that way hasn't been accepted by docker team as the
apt source is nightly
This PR is intended to fix issues raised by the Docker team: docker-library/official-images#20699 (comment)
Templating for Dockerfiles

To enable custom builds, I introduced Dockerfile templating based on Jinja2. Since we already have a Python-based release-automation tool, this was implemented as a new render-dockerfile command.
Major changes:

    Redis versions are now declared in the .redis.version.json file, which is used as context for the templates
    Added Dockerfile.j2 templates for each distribution
    custom_build is no longer used as a Dockerfile ARG, but only as a Jinja2 template variable that enables certain sections in the Dockerfile
    Introduced an action that validates all Dockerfiles are in sync with their corresponding templates (with custom_build=false)
    Simplified the "apply docker version" action to use templating for updating Redis versions during releases
    Added ./bin/render-all-dockerfiles.sh script to help render all templates in various places

clang-21 issue

Reverted clang-21 source and installation, as there is no reliable way to install the latest version on Trixie.
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jit-ci bot commented Jan 26, 2026

🛡️ Jit Security Scan Results

CRITICAL HIGH MEDIUM

🚨 Summary

• Multiple shell injection vulnerabilities detected in GitHub Actions workflows

• High severity issues found in build and release processes

• Immediate remediation required to prevent potential code execution attacks

🔍 Findings

HIGH - 4 findings HIGH
1. Shell Injection in GitHub Actions Workflow
ID Type Finding File Severity
53fe71bffb yaml.github-actions.security.run-shell-injection.run-shell-injection Shell Injection in GitHub Actions Workflow - Variable interpolation with github context data in a run step could allow code injection. This poses a risk of secret and code theft. .github/actions/build-and-tag-locally/action.yml (lines 339-358) HIGH

🔍 AI Analysis: This vulnerability is in a critical build process and could allow attackers to inject malicious code, potentially compromising the entire CI/CD pipeline.

Remediation:

- run: |
-   if [[ "${{ inputs.run_type }}" == "release" ]]; then
-     tag_prefix="${{ inputs.release_tag }}"
+ run: |
+   if [[ "$RUN_TYPE" == "release" ]]; then
+     tag_prefix="$RELEASE_TAG"
+ env:
+   RUN_TYPE: ${{ inputs.run_type }}
+   RELEASE_TAG: ${{ inputs.release_tag }}
2. Shell Injection in Release Publish Workflow
ID Type Finding File Severity
ea580111cb yaml.github-actions.security.run-shell-injection.run-shell-injection Shell Injection in Release Publish Workflow - GitHub context data used in a run step could allow code injection. This vulnerability could lead to unauthorized access to secrets and code. .github/workflows/release_publish.yml (lines 209-231) HIGH

🔍 AI Analysis: This finding is in the release publish workflow, which is a critical part of the deployment process. Exploitation could lead to compromised releases.

Remediation:

- run: |
-   # Create release_info.json with all fields, then filter out empty ones
+ run: |
+   # Create release_info.json with all fields, then filter out empty ones
+   # Use environment variables instead of direct github context interpolation
+ env:
+   GITHUB_REF_NAME: ${{ github.ref_name }}
+   GITHUB_SHA: ${{ github.sha }}
3. Shell Injection in Build Logs Capture
ID Type Finding File Severity
6b680ea40c yaml.github-actions.security.run-shell-injection.run-shell-injection Shell Injection in Build Logs Capture - GitHub context data used in error logging could allow code injection. This could lead to exfiltration of sensitive build information. .github/actions/build-and-tag-locally/action.yml (lines 158-196) HIGH

🔍 AI Analysis: This vulnerability is in the error logging process of the build system. Exploitation could lead to information disclosure and potential further attacks.

Remediation:

- echo "Build failed for ${{ inputs.distribution }} on ${{ inputs.platform }}"
+ echo "Build failed for $DISTRIBUTION on $PLATFORM"
+ env:
+   DISTRIBUTION: ${{ inputs.distribution }}
+   PLATFORM: ${{ inputs.platform }}
4. Shell Injection in Image Label Creation
ID Type Finding File Severity
9307e98b71 yaml.github-actions.security.run-shell-injection.run-shell-injection Shell Injection in Image Label Creation - GitHub context data used in image label creation could allow code injection. This could lead to tampering with image metadata. .github/actions/create-image-labels/action.yml (lines 39-57) HIGH

🔍 AI Analysis: This vulnerability is in the image labeling process, which is crucial for proper image identification and versioning. Exploitation could lead to misidentification of images and potential supply chain attacks.

Remediation:

- run: |
-   get_module_version() {
-     local module="$1"
-     grep MODULE_VERSION
+ run: |
+   get_module_version() {
+     local module="$1"
+     grep MODULE_VERSION
+ env:
+   GITHUB_WORKSPACE: ${{ github.workspace }}

▶️ Advanced Options

Help section with supported ignore actions and syntax.

Need to ignore a finding? Use commands like:

@sera ignore <finding_id> reason:accepted (reason is optional)

@sera ignore all reason:other - this is a test PR (reason is optional)

@sera ignore type:run-shell-injection


Security scan by Jit

@Peter-Sh Peter-Sh merged commit a98840c into release/8.0 Jan 26, 2026
19 of 20 checks passed
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5 participants