phylaxsystems · odyslam · Jan 15, 2026 · Jan 15, 2026 · Jan 15, 2026
diff --git a/assertions-book/assertions/ass01-impl-addr-change.mdx b/assertions-book/assertions/ass01-impl-addr-change.mdx
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ For example, it's possible to define a whitelist of allowed implementations - an
 
 Monitors changes to the implementation address storage slot in proxy contracts using:
 
-- `ph.forkPreState()` / `ph.forkPostState()`: Compare implementation address before and after transaction
+- `ph.forkPreTx()` / `ph.forkPostTx()`: Compare implementation address before and after transaction
 - `getStateChangesAddress()`: Track all changes to the implementation slot during transaction execution  
 - `registerStorageChangeTrigger()`: Trigger when implementation address changes
 

diff --git a/assertions-book/assertions/ass05-ownership-change.mdx b/assertions-book/assertions/ass05-ownership-change.mdx
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ For example, in the [Radiant Capital hack](/assertions-book/previous-hacks/hack1
 
 Monitors changes to the owner address storage slot in contracts using:
 
-- `ph.forkPreState()` / `ph.forkPostState()`: Compare owner address before and after transaction
+- `ph.forkPreTx()` / `ph.forkPostTx()`: Compare owner address before and after transaction
 - `getStateChangesAddress()`: Track all changes to the owner address slot during transaction execution
 - `registerStorageChangeTrigger()`: Trigger when owner address changes
 

diff --git a/assertions-book/assertions/ass06-constant-product.mdx b/assertions-book/assertions/ass06-constant-product.mdx
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ The constant product formula is fundamental to many AMM designs - any deviation
 
 Monitors the product of reserves (k) in AMM pools to ensure it remains constant after transactions using:
 
-- `forkPreState()` / `forkPostState()`: Compare reserve product before and after transaction
+- `forkPreTx()` / `forkPostTx()`: Compare reserve product before and after transaction
 - `getStateChanges()`: Monitor reserve changes throughout transaction callstack
 - Direct validation that k = reserve0 * reserve1 remains unchanged
 

diff --git a/assertions-book/assertions/ass07-lending-health-factor.mdx b/assertions-book/assertions/ass07-lending-health-factor.mdx
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Monitors health factors of positions during specific lending operations using:
 
 - `getCallInputs()`: Track all function calls to specified protocol functions
 - `registerCallTrigger()`: Trigger on lending operations (supply, borrow, withdraw, repay)
-- `forkPostState()`: Verify health factor after each operation (used by default if no pre-state specified)
+- `forkPostTx()`: Verify health factor after each operation (used by default if no pre-state specified)
 
 The assertion checks each lending operation individually to ensure positions affected by these operations remain healthy.
 

diff --git a/assertions-book/assertions/ass08-sum-of-all-positions.mdx b/assertions-book/assertions/ass08-sum-of-all-positions.mdx
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Since direct iteration over all positions isn't currently supported, this assert
 4. Verify that the new total supply equals the pre-state total supply plus the sum of position changes
 
 Uses these cheatcodes:
-- `ph.forkPreState()` / `ph.forkPostState()`: Capture total supply before and after transaction
+- `ph.forkPreTx()` / `ph.forkPostTx()`: Capture total supply before and after transaction
 - `ph.getCallInputs()`: Track function calls that modify positions
 - `registerCallTrigger()`: Trigger on position-modifying functions
 

diff --git a/assertions-book/assertions/ass09-timelock-verification.mdx b/assertions-book/assertions/ass09-timelock-verification.mdx
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Timelocks provide a buffer against malicious governance actions - without proper
 
 Verifies timelock integrity by comparing timelock state and parameters before and after transactions:
 
-- `forkPreState()` / `forkPostState()`: Compare timelock state before and after transaction
+- `forkPreTx()` / `forkPostTx()`: Compare timelock state before and after transaction
 - `registerStorageChangeTrigger()`: Monitor changes to timelock storage slot
 - Ensures timelock delay is within acceptable bounds (1 day to 2 weeks)
 - Confirms timelock activation follows proper procedures

diff --git a/assertions-book/assertions/ass10-oracle-validation.mdx b/assertions-book/assertions/ass10-oracle-validation.mdx
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Stale oracle data can indicate service disruption or attacks on oracle infrastru
 
 Monitors oracle timestamp updates when critical protocol functions are called:
 
-- `forkPostState()`: Check oracle's last update time after transaction
+- `forkPostTx()`: Check oracle's last update time after transaction
 - `registerCallTrigger()`: Trigger on functions that rely on oracle data (e.g., DEX swaps)
 - Verify oracle's last update time is within defined maximum time window
 

diff --git a/assertions-book/assertions/ass11-twap-deviation.mdx b/assertions-book/assertions/ass11-twap-deviation.mdx
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Sudden price deviations could indicate manipulation through flash loan attacks o
 
 Monitors TWAP price changes using a two-stage approach to ensure price stability:
 
-- `ph.forkPreState()` / `ph.forkPostState()`: Compare post-transaction price against pre-transaction TWAP
+- `ph.forkPreTx()` / `ph.forkPostTx()`: Compare post-transaction price against pre-transaction TWAP
 - `getStateChangesUint()`: Track all price changes during transaction execution
 - `registerStorageChangeTrigger()`: Trigger when price storage slot changes
 

diff --git a/assertions-book/assertions/ass15-price-within-ticks.mdx b/assertions-book/assertions/ass15-price-within-ticks.mdx
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ If attackers could push prices outside valid tick ranges, they could execute tra
 
 Implements focused tick integrity verification:
 
-- `ph.forkPreState()` / `ph.forkPostState()`: Capture tick state before and after transaction
+- `ph.forkPreTx()` / `ph.forkPostTx()`: Capture tick state before and after transaction
 - `registerStorageChangeTrigger()`: Monitor changes to tick-related storage slots
 - Verify ticks stay within global bounds (-887272 to 887272)
 - Ensure ticks align with pool's tick spacing requirements

diff --git a/assertions-book/assertions/ass16-liquidation-health-factor.mdx b/assertions-book/assertions/ass16-liquidation-health-factor.mdx
@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ Incorrect health factor validation could lead to unfair liquidations, protocol i
 
 Implements multi-layered liquidation health factor verification:
 
-- **Pre-liquidation**: `forkPreState()` captures health factor before liquidation, verifies position is actually unhealthy
-- **Post-liquidation**: `forkPostState()` verifies health factor improves after liquidation
+- **Pre-liquidation**: `forkPreTx()` captures health factor before liquidation, verifies position is actually unhealthy
+- **Post-liquidation**: `forkPostTx()` verifies health factor improves after liquidation
 - **Parameter validation**: `getCallInputs()` monitors liquidation calls, validates seized assets and repaid shares are non-zero, enforces maximum liquidation amounts
 - `registerCallTrigger()`: Triggers on liquidation function calls
 

diff --git a/assertions-book/assertions/ass17-panic-state-validation.mdx b/assertions-book/assertions/ass17-panic-state-validation.mdx
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Improper handling of pause states can lead to fund lockups, unauthorized access,
 
 Monitors protocol balance and pause state to ensure proper emergency behavior using a multi-layered approach:
 
-- `ph.forkPreState()` / `ph.forkPostState()`: Capture protocol state before and after transaction
+- `ph.forkPreTx()` / `ph.forkPostTx()`: Capture protocol state before and after transaction
 - `getStateChangesUint()`: Track all state changes during transaction
 - `registerCallTrigger()`: Monitor all function calls to the contract
 - Verify protocol balance can only decrease when paused (allowing withdrawals)

diff --git a/assertions-book/assertions/ass18-harvest-increases-balance.mdx b/assertions-book/assertions/ass18-harvest-increases-balance.mdx
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Incorrect harvest implementations could lead to loss of user funds, price per sh
 
 Implements multi-layered approach to verify harvest operations:
 
-- `forkPreState()` / `forkPostState()`: Capture vault balance and price per share before/after harvest
+- `forkPreTx()` / `forkPostTx()`: Capture vault balance and price per share before/after harvest
 - `getStateChangesUint()`: Monitor all balance changes during transaction execution
 - `registerCallTrigger()`: Trigger on harvest function calls
 - Ensures balance hasn't decreased (can stay same if harvested recently)

diff --git a/assertions-book/assertions/ass19-tokens-borrowed-invariant.mdx b/assertions-book/assertions/ass19-tokens-borrowed-invariant.mdx
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Violating this invariant could lead to protocol insolvency, loss of user funds,
 
 Implements straightforward verification that total tokens borrowed never exceed total tokens deposited:
 
-- `ph.forkPostState()`: Capture protocol state after transaction to verify invariant holds
+- `ph.forkPostTx()`: Capture protocol state after transaction to verify invariant holds
 - `registerStorageChangeTrigger()`: Trigger on storage slots tracking supply and borrow totals
 - Check total supply of assets (tokens deposited) and total borrowed assets
 - Assert total supply ≥ total borrowed assets

diff --git a/assertions-book/assertions/ass20-erc20-drain.mdx b/assertions-book/assertions/ass20-erc20-drain.mdx
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ By limiting outflow rates, protocols gain valuable time to respond to security i
 
 Implements percentage-based limit on token outflows in a single transaction:
 
-- `forkPreState()` / `forkPostState()`: Capture token balance before and after transaction
+- `forkPreTx()` / `forkPostTx()`: Capture token balance before and after transaction
 - `registerCallTrigger()`: Trigger on every transaction without specifying particular function signature
 - Calculate percentage of tokens withdrawn in transaction
 - Revert if withdrawal percentage exceeds configured threshold

diff --git a/assertions-book/assertions/ass21-ether-drain.mdx b/assertions-book/assertions/ass21-ether-drain.mdx
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Malicious actors often attempt to extract all available ETH in a single transact
 
 Implements tiered protection strategy to detect rapid ETH draining:
 
-- `forkPreState()` / `forkPostState()`: Capture contract's ETH balance and whitelist balances before/after transaction
+- `forkPreTx()` / `forkPostTx()`: Capture contract's ETH balance and whitelist balances before/after transaction
 - `registerBalanceChangeTrigger()`: Trigger when ETH balances change
 - For small withdrawals (below threshold): Allow regardless of destination
 - For large withdrawals (above threshold): Require destination to be whitelisted address

diff --git a/assertions-book/assertions/ass28-intra-tx-oracle-deviation.mdx b/assertions-book/assertions/ass28-intra-tx-oracle-deviation.mdx
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Intra-transaction price manipulations can lead to flash loan attacks, theft of f
 
 Implements approach to verify oracle price updates using both pre/post state comparison and intra-transaction inspection:
 
-- `forkPreState()` / `forkPostState()`: Capture oracle price before and after transaction, compare for deviations
+- `forkPreTx()` / `forkPostTx()`: Capture oracle price before and after transaction, compare for deviations
 - `getCallInputs()`: Monitor all price update function calls within transaction
 - `registerCallTrigger()`: Trigger when oracle price update is detected
 - Verify each update's price parameter against initial price

diff --git a/assertions-book/previous-hacks/bybit-safe-ui.mdx b/assertions-book/previous-hacks/bybit-safe-ui.mdx
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ a transaction.
 
 PhEvm precompiles used:
 
-- _forkPreState_ allowing to fork the state of the contract before a transaction
+- _forkPreTx_ allowing to fork the state of the contract before a transaction
 - _load_ reading specific storage slots
 - _getStateChangesAddress_ getting all state changes within a transaction for a given slot
 
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ contract SafeAssertion is Assertion {
     }
 
     function implementationAddressChange() external view {
-        ph.forkPreState();
+        ph.forkPreTx();
         address preImplementationAddress = address(uint160(uint256(ph.load(address(safe), bytes32(0x0)))));
 
         address[] memory addresses = getStateChangesAddress(address(safe), bytes32(0x0));
@@ -108,14 +108,14 @@ the balance of the whitelisted addresses increased with the respective amount.
 
 ```solidity
  function assertionSafeDrain() external {
-        ph.forkPreState();
+        ph.forkPreTx();
         uint256 preBalance = address(bybitSafeAddress).balance;
         uint256[] memory preWhitelistBalances = new uint256[](whitelistedAddresses.length);
         for (uint256 i = 0; i < whitelistedAddresses.length; i++) {
             preWhitelistBalances[i] = address(whitelistedAddresses[i]).balance;
         }
 
-        ph.forkPostState();
+        ph.forkPostTx();
         uint256 postBalance = address(bybitSafeAddress).balance;
         if (postBalance > preBalance) {
             return; // Balance increased, not a hack

diff --git a/assertions-book/previous-hacks/cream-finance-2.mdx b/assertions-book/previous-hacks/cream-finance-2.mdx
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ function assertion_priceDeviation() public view {
         postPrices.push(priceOracle.getPrice(touchedAssets[i]));
     }
 
-    ph.forkPreState();
+    ph.forkPreTx();
 
     for (uint256 i = 0; i < touchedAssets.length; i++) {
         uint256 prePrice = priceOracle.getPrice(touchedAssets[i]);

diff --git a/assertions-book/previous-hacks/euler-finance-donation-hack.mdx b/assertions-book/previous-hacks/euler-finance-donation-hack.mdx
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ Assuming we can check run assertions on each call in the transaction and that we
 
 ```solidity
 function assertionNoUnsafeDebt() external {
-    ph.forkPostState();
+    ph.forkPostTx();
 
     // Get all accounts that were modified in this tx
     address[] memory accounts = ph.getModifiedAccounts();

diff --git a/assertions-book/previous-hacks/gma-aum-jul25-hack.mdx b/assertions-book/previous-hacks/gma-aum-jul25-hack.mdx
@@ -77,11 +77,11 @@ function assertSimplifiedAUMBounds() external {
     // Core principle: AUM should closely track actual token flows
 
     // 1. Capture AUM before transaction
-    ph.forkPreState();
+    ph.forkPreTx();
     uint256 aumBefore = getAumInUsdg(true);
 
     // 2. Capture AUM after transaction
-    ph.forkPostState();
+    ph.forkPostTx();
     uint256 aumAfter = getAumInUsdg(true);
 
     // 3. Calculate AUM change

diff --git a/assertions-book/previous-hacks/hack1-radiant-capital.mdx b/assertions-book/previous-hacks/hack1-radiant-capital.mdx
@@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ contract LendingPoolAddressesProviderAssertions is Assertion {
     // return true indicates a valid state -> owner is the same
     // return false indicates an invalid state -> owner is different
     function assertionOwnerChange() external returns (bool) {
-        ph.forkPreState();
+        ph.forkPreTx();
         address prevOwner = lendingPoolAddressesProvider.owner();
-        ph.forkPostState();
+        ph.forkPostTx();
         address newOwner = lendingPoolAddressesProvider.owner();
         return prevOwner == newOwner;
     }
@@ -60,9 +60,9 @@ contract LendingPoolAddressesProviderAssertions is Assertion {
     // return true indicates a valid state -> emergency admin is the same
     // return false indicates an invalid state -> emergency admin is different
     function assertionEmergencyAdminChange() external returns (bool) {
-        ph.forkPreState();
+        ph.forkPreTx();
         address prevEmergencyAdmin = lendingPoolAddressesProvider.getEmergencyAdmin();
-        ph.forkPostState();
+        ph.forkPostTx();
         address newEmergencyAdmin = lendingPoolAddressesProvider.getEmergencyAdmin();
         return prevEmergencyAdmin == newEmergencyAdmin;
     }
@@ -71,9 +71,9 @@ contract LendingPoolAddressesProviderAssertions is Assertion {
     // return true indicates a valid state -> pool admin is the same
     // return false indicates an invalid state -> pool admin is different
     function assertionPoolAdminChange() external returns (bool) {
-        ph.forkPreState();
+        ph.forkPreTx();
         address prevPoolAdmin = lendingPoolAddressesProvider.getPoolAdmin();
-        ph.forkPostState();
+        ph.forkPostTx();
         address newPoolAdmin = lendingPoolAddressesProvider.getPoolAdmin();
         return prevPoolAdmin == newPoolAdmin;
     }

diff --git a/assertions-book/previous-hacks/hack2-vestra-dao.mdx b/assertions-book/previous-hacks/hack2-vestra-dao.mdx
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ contract VestraDAOHack is Assertion {
 
     // Check if the user has already unstaked for a maturity
     function assertionExample() external {
-        ph.forkPostState();
+        ph.forkPostTx();
         PhEvm.CallInputs[] memory unStakes = ph.getCallInputs(address(vestraDAO), vestraDAO.unStake.selector);
 
         for (uint256 i = 0; i < unStakes.length; i++) {

diff --git a/assertions-book/previous-hacks/visor-finance-unrestricted-mint.mdx b/assertions-book/previous-hacks/visor-finance-unrestricted-mint.mdx
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ function assertion_triggerDeposit_remainsSolvent() public view {
     uint256 postBalanceCollateral = visr.balanceOf(address(adopter));
     uint256 postTotalSupplyRewards = vvisr.totalSupply();
     uint256 postRatio = postBalanceCollateral / postTotalSupplyRewards;
-    ph.forkPreState();
+    ph.forkPreTx();
 
     uint256 preBalanceCollateral = visr.balanceOf(address(adopter));
     uint256 preTotalSupplyRewards = vvisr.totalSupply();

diff --git a/credible/architecture-overview.mdx b/credible/architecture-overview.mdx
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ The [Credible Layer Contracts](/credible/credible-layer-contracts) are on-chain
 The Credible Layer can be implemented on different networks. The core concepts remain the same, but implementation details vary by network architecture.
 
 For specific implementation details, see:
-- [OP Stack Implementation](/credible/architecture-op-stack)
+- [OP Stack Implementation](/credible/network-integrations/architecture-op-stack)
 
 ---
 

diff --git a/credible/faq.mdx b/credible/faq.mdx
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ Our custom block builder enables the sequencer to check each transaction against
 This requires no changes to contracts as it is effectively middleware.
 
 **Learn More:**
-- [Architecture - OP Stack Implementation](/credible/architecture-op-stack)
+- [Architecture - OP Stack Implementation](/credible/network-integrations/architecture-op-stack)
 - [Glossary - Block Builder](/credible/glossary#block-builder)
 
 ### Can anyone write assertions for my contracts?

diff --git a/credible/network-integration.mdx b/credible/network-integration.mdx
@@ -42,13 +42,13 @@ Networks provide the following integration surfaces:
 
 - The enforcer runs alongside the block builder and does not change consensus rules
 - Enforcement is deterministic and only depends on on-chain state and assertion code
-- Networks can stage assertion deployments before enforcing them in production
+- dApps choose whether assertions are staged or enforced; networks honor the registry status during validation
 
 ## Integration Checklist (High Level)
 
 - Identify the block-building hook for transaction validation
 - Configure access to registry data and assertion bytecode
-- Decide on staging vs production enforcement
+- Ensure the enforcer respects staged vs enforced assertions as set by dApps
 - Set up monitoring and incident review workflows
 
 ## Integration Requirements (Public)
@@ -64,13 +64,13 @@ Networks provide the following integration surfaces:
   <Card title="Architecture Overview" icon="diagram-project" href="/credible/architecture-overview">
     Detailed system architecture and transaction flow
   </Card>
-  <Card title="Linea / Besu Integration" icon="plug" href="/credible/architecture-linea">
+  <Card title="Linea / Besu Integration" icon="plug" href="/credible/network-integrations/architecture-linea">
     Plugin-based integration pattern for Besu
   </Card>
   <Card title="Assertion Enforcer" icon="shield" href="/credible/assertion-enforcer">
     Sidecar validation flow and enforcement role
   </Card>
-  <Card title="OP Stack Implementation" icon="sitemap" href="/credible/architecture-op-stack">
+  <Card title="OP Stack Implementation" icon="sitemap" href="/credible/network-integrations/architecture-op-stack">
     OP Stack integration notes
   </Card>
 </CardGroup>
diff --git a/credible/architecture-linea.mdx → ...twork-integrations/architecture-linea.mdx b/credible/architecture-linea.mdx → ...twork-integrations/architecture-linea.mdx
@@ -67,4 +67,4 @@ flowchart LR
 - [Network Integration Overview](/credible/network-integration)
 - [Assertion Enforcer](/credible/assertion-enforcer)
 - [Assertion DA](/credible/assertion-da)
-- [OP Stack](/credible/architecture-op-stack)
+- [OP Stack](/credible/network-integrations/architecture-op-stack)
diff --git a/credible/architecture-op-stack.mdx → ...rk-integrations/architecture-op-stack.mdx b/credible/architecture-op-stack.mdx → ...rk-integrations/architecture-op-stack.mdx
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ For the general integration path, see [Network Integration Overview](/credible/n
 </Note>
 
 <Note>
-Looking for the Besu/Linea pattern? See [Linea / Besu Integration](/credible/architecture-linea).
+Looking for the Besu/Linea pattern? See [Linea / Besu Integration](/credible/network-integrations/architecture-linea).
 </Note>
 
 ## Architecture Diagram

diff --git a/docs.json b/docs.json
@@ -49,9 +49,14 @@
                 "group": "Integrations",
                 "pages": [
                   "credible/network-integration",
-                  "credible/dapp-integration",
-                  "credible/architecture-linea",
-                  "credible/architecture-op-stack"
+                  {
+                    "group": "Network Implementations",
+                    "pages": [
+                      "credible/network-integrations/architecture-linea",
+                      "credible/network-integrations/architecture-op-stack"
+                    ]
+                  },
+                  "credible/dapp-integration"
                 ]
               },
               {
-Original file line number
+Diff line change
@@ Expand Up @@
     </Note>
     <Note>
-    Looking for the Besu/Linea pattern? See [Linea / Besu Integration](/credible/architecture-linea).
+    Looking for the Besu/Linea pattern? See [Linea / Besu Integration](/credible/network-integrations/architecture-linea).
     </Note>
     ## Architecture Diagram
@@ Expand Down @@