This PR contains the following updates:
| Package | Change |
[Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |
[Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |
|---|---|---|---|
| [vite](https://vite.dev)
([source](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/tree/HEAD/packages/vite))
| [`7.3.1` →
`7.3.2`](https://renovatebot.com/diffs/npm/vite/7.3.1/7.3.2) |

|

|
---
> [!WARNING]
> Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the [Dependency
Dashboard](../issues/4569) for more information.
[CVE-2026-39364](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-v2wj-q39q-566r)
The contents of files that are specified by
[`server.fs.deny`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-deny)
can be returned to the browser.
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
- explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host`
or [`server.host` config
option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host))
- the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by
[`server.fs.allow`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-allow)
- the sensitive file is denied with a pattern that matches a file by
[`server.fs.deny`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-deny)
On the Vite dev server, files that should be blocked by `server.fs.deny`
(e.g., `.env`, `*.crt`) can be retrieved with HTTP 200 responses when
query parameters such as `?raw`, `?import&raw`, or `?import&url&inline`
are appended.
1. Start the dev server: `pnpm exec vite root --host 127.0.0.1 --port
5175 --strictPort`
2. Confirm that `server.fs.deny` is enforced (expect 403): `curl -i
http://127.0.0.1:5175/src/.env | head -n 20`
<img width="3944" height="1092" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ecb9f2e0-e08f-4ac7-b194-e0f988c4cd4f"
/>
3. Confirm that the same files can be retrieved with query parameters
(expect 200):
<img width="2014" height="373" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/76bc2a6a-44f4-4161-ae47-eab5ae0c04a8"
/>
[CVE-2026-39365](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-4w7w-66w2-5vf9)
Any files ending with `.map` even out side the project can be returned
to the browser.
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
- explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host`
or [`server.host` config
option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host))
- have a sensitive content in files ending with `.map` and the path is
predictable
In Vite v7.3.1, the dev server’s handling of `.map` requests for
optimized dependencies resolves file paths and calls `readFile` without
restricting `../` segments in the URL. As a result, it is possible to
bypass the
[`server.fs.strict`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-strict)
allow list and retrieve `.map` files located outside the project root,
provided they can be parsed as valid source map JSON.
1. Create a minimal PoC sourcemap outside the project root
```bash
cat > /tmp/poc.map <<'EOF'
{"version":3,"file":"x.js","sources":[],"names":[],"mappings":""}
EOF
```
2. Start the Vite dev server (example)
```bash
pnpm -C playground/fs-serve dev --host 127.0.0.1 --port 18080
```
3. Confirm that direct `/@​fs` access is blocked by `strict`
(returns 403)
<img width="4004" height="1038" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/15a859a8-1dc6-4105-8d58-80527c0dd9ab"
/>
4. Inject `../` segments under the optimized deps `.map` URL prefix to
reach `/tmp/poc.map`
<img width="2790" height="846" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5d02957d-2e6a-4c45-9819-3f024e0e81f2"
/>
[CVE-2026-39363](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-p9ff-h696-f583)
[`server.fs`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-strict)
check was not enforced to the `fetchModule` method that is exposed in
Vite dev server's WebSocket.
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
- explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host`
or [`server.host` config
option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host))
- WebSocket is not disabled by `server.ws: false`
Arbitrary files on the server (development machine, CI environment,
container, etc.) can be exposed.
If it is possible to connect to the Vite dev server’s WebSocket
**without an `Origin` header**, an attacker can invoke `fetchModule` via
the custom WebSocket event `vite:invoke` and combine `file://...` with
`?raw` (or `?inline`) to retrieve the contents of arbitrary files on the
server as a JavaScript string (e.g., `export default "..."`).
The access control enforced in the HTTP request path (such as
`server.fs.allow`) is not applied to this WebSocket-based execution
path.
1. Start the dev server on the target
Example (used during validation with this repository):
```bash
pnpm -C playground/alias exec vite --host 0.0.0.0 --port 5173
```
2. Confirm that access is blocked via the HTTP path (example: arbitrary
file)
```bash
curl -i 'http://localhost:5173/@​fs/etc/passwd?raw'
```
Result: `403 Restricted` (outside the allow list)
<img width="3898" height="1014" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f6593377-549c-45d7-b562-5c19833438af"
/>
3. Confirm that the same file can be retrieved via the WebSocket path
By connecting to the HMR WebSocket without an `Origin` header and
sending a `vite:invoke` request that calls `fetchModule` with a
`file://...` URL and `?raw`, the file contents are returned as a
JavaScript module.
<img width="1049" height="296" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/af969f7b-d34e-4af4-8adb-5e2b83b31972"
/>
<img width="1382" height="955" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6a230d2e-197a-4c9c-b373-d0129756d5d7"
/>
---
[CVE-2026-39365](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39365) /
[GHSA-4w7w-66w2-5vf9](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-4w7w-66w2-5vf9)
<details>
<summary>More information</summary>
Any files ending with `.map` even out side the project can be returned
to the browser.
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
- explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host`
or [`server.host` config
option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host))
- have a sensitive content in files ending with `.map` and the path is
predictable
In Vite v7.3.1, the dev server’s handling of `.map` requests for
optimized dependencies resolves file paths and calls `readFile` without
restricting `../` segments in the URL. As a result, it is possible to
bypass the
[`server.fs.strict`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-strict)
allow list and retrieve `.map` files located outside the project root,
provided they can be parsed as valid source map JSON.
1. Create a minimal PoC sourcemap outside the project root
```bash
cat > /tmp/poc.map <<'EOF'
{"version":3,"file":"x.js","sources":[],"names":[],"mappings":""}
EOF
```
2. Start the Vite dev server (example)
```bash
pnpm -C playground/fs-serve dev --host 127.0.0.1 --port 18080
```
3. Confirm that direct `/@​fs` access is blocked by `strict`
(returns 403)
<img width="4004" height="1038" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/15a859a8-1dc6-4105-8d58-80527c0dd9ab"
/>
4. Inject `../` segments under the optimized deps `.map` URL prefix to
reach `/tmp/poc.map`
<img width="2790" height="846" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5d02957d-2e6a-4c45-9819-3f024e0e81f2"
/>
- CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
- Vector String:
`CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-4w7w-66w2-5vf9](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-4w7w-66w2-5vf9)
-
[https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39365](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39365)
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/22161](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/22161)
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/79f002f2286c03c88c7b74c511c7f9fc6dc46694](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/79f002f2286c03c88c7b74c511c7f9fc6dc46694)
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite)
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v6.4.2](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v6.4.2)
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v7.3.2](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v7.3.2)
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v8.0.5](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v8.0.5)
This data is provided by
[OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-4w7w-66w2-5vf9) and the [GitHub
Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
([CC-BY
4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>
---
[CVE-2026-39363](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39363) /
[GHSA-p9ff-h696-f583](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p9ff-h696-f583)
<details>
<summary>More information</summary>
[`server.fs`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-strict)
check was not enforced to the `fetchModule` method that is exposed in
Vite dev server's WebSocket.
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
- explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host`
or [`server.host` config
option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host))
- WebSocket is not disabled by `server.ws: false`
Arbitrary files on the server (development machine, CI environment,
container, etc.) can be exposed.
If it is possible to connect to the Vite dev server’s WebSocket
**without an `Origin` header**, an attacker can invoke `fetchModule` via
the custom WebSocket event `vite:invoke` and combine `file://...` with
`?raw` (or `?inline`) to retrieve the contents of arbitrary files on the
server as a JavaScript string (e.g., `export default "..."`).
The access control enforced in the HTTP request path (such as
`server.fs.allow`) is not applied to this WebSocket-based execution
path.
1. Start the dev server on the target
Example (used during validation with this repository):
```bash
pnpm -C playground/alias exec vite --host 0.0.0.0 --port 5173
```
2. Confirm that access is blocked via the HTTP path (example: arbitrary
file)
```bash
curl -i 'http://localhost:5173/@​fs/etc/passwd?raw'
```
Result: `403 Restricted` (outside the allow list)
<img width="3898" height="1014" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f6593377-549c-45d7-b562-5c19833438af"
/>
3. Confirm that the same file can be retrieved via the WebSocket path
By connecting to the HMR WebSocket without an `Origin` header and
sending a `vite:invoke` request that calls `fetchModule` with a
`file://...` URL and `?raw`, the file contents are returned as a
JavaScript module.
<img width="1049" height="296" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/af969f7b-d34e-4af4-8adb-5e2b83b31972"
/>
<img width="1382" height="955" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6a230d2e-197a-4c9c-b373-d0129756d5d7"
/>
- CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
- Vector String:
`CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-p9ff-h696-f583](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-p9ff-h696-f583)
-
[https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39363](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39363)
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/22159](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/22159)
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/f02d9fde0b195afe3ea2944414186962fbbe41e0](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/f02d9fde0b195afe3ea2944414186962fbbe41e0)
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite)
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v6.4.2](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v6.4.2)
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v7.3.2](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v7.3.2)
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v8.0.5](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v8.0.5)
This data is provided by
[OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-p9ff-h696-f583) and the [GitHub
Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
([CC-BY
4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>
---
[CVE-2026-39364](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39364) /
[GHSA-v2wj-q39q-566r](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-v2wj-q39q-566r)
<details>
<summary>More information</summary>
The contents of files that are specified by
[`server.fs.deny`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-deny)
can be returned to the browser.
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
- explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host`
or [`server.host` config
option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host))
- the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by
[`server.fs.allow`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-allow)
- the sensitive file is denied with a pattern that matches a file by
[`server.fs.deny`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-deny)
On the Vite dev server, files that should be blocked by `server.fs.deny`
(e.g., `.env`, `*.crt`) can be retrieved with HTTP 200 responses when
query parameters such as `?raw`, `?import&raw`, or `?import&url&inline`
are appended.
1. Start the dev server: `pnpm exec vite root --host 127.0.0.1 --port
5175 --strictPort`
2. Confirm that `server.fs.deny` is enforced (expect 403): `curl -i
http://127.0.0.1:5175/src/.env | head -n 20`
<img width="3944" height="1092" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ecb9f2e0-e08f-4ac7-b194-e0f988c4cd4f"
/>
3. Confirm that the same files can be retrieved with query parameters
(expect 200):
<img width="2014" height="373" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/76bc2a6a-44f4-4161-ae47-eab5ae0c04a8"
/>
- CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
- Vector String:
`CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-v2wj-q39q-566r](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-v2wj-q39q-566r)
-
[https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39364](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39364)
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/22160](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/22160)
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/a9a3df299378d9cbc5f069e3536a369f8188c8ff](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/a9a3df299378d9cbc5f069e3536a369f8188c8ff)
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite)
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v7.3.2](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v7.3.2)
-
[https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v8.0.5](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v8.0.5)
This data is provided by
[OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-v2wj-q39q-566r) and the [GitHub
Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
([CC-BY
4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>
---
<details>
<summary>vitejs/vite (vite)</summary>
[`v7.3.2`](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v7.3.2)
[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/compare/v7.3.1...v7.3.2)
Please refer to
[CHANGELOG.md](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v7.3.2/packages/vite/CHANGELOG.md)
for details.
</details>
---
📅 **Schedule**: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no
schedule defined).
🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled.
♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the
rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update
again.
---
- [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check
this box
---
You can ask for more help in the following Slack channel:
FAQ docs in the Resources section.
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Signed-off-by: renovate-sh-app[bot] <219655108+renovate-sh-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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(cherry picked from commit cbe7417)
This PR contains the following updates:
7.3.1→7.3.2Warning
Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.
GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2026-39364
Summary
The contents of files that are specified by
server.fs.denycan be returned to the browser.Impact
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
--hostorserver.hostconfig option)server.fs.allowserver.fs.denyDetails
On the Vite dev server, files that should be blocked by
server.fs.deny(e.g.,.env,*.crt) can be retrieved with HTTP 200 responses when query parameters such as?raw,?import&raw, or?import&url&inlineare appended.PoC
pnpm exec vite root --host 127.0.0.1 --port 5175 --strictPortserver.fs.denyis enforced (expect 403):curl -i http://127.0.0.1:5175/src/.env | head -n 20CVE-2026-39365
Summary
Any files ending with
.mapeven out side the project can be returned to the browser.Impact
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
--hostorserver.hostconfig option).mapand the path is predictableDetails
In Vite v7.3.1, the dev server’s handling of
.maprequests for optimized dependencies resolves file paths and callsreadFilewithout restricting../segments in the URL. As a result, it is possible to bypass theserver.fs.strictallow list and retrieve.mapfiles located outside the project root, provided they can be parsed as valid source map JSON.PoC
/@​fsaccess is blocked bystrict(returns 403)../segments under the optimized deps.mapURL prefix to reach/tmp/poc.mapCVE-2026-39363
Summary
server.fscheck was not enforced to thefetchModulemethod that is exposed in Vite dev server's WebSocket.Impact
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
--hostorserver.hostconfig option)server.ws: falseArbitrary files on the server (development machine, CI environment, container, etc.) can be exposed.
Details
If it is possible to connect to the Vite dev server’s WebSocket without an
Originheader, an attacker can invokefetchModulevia the custom WebSocket eventvite:invokeand combinefile://...with?raw(or?inline) to retrieve the contents of arbitrary files on the server as a JavaScript string (e.g.,export default "...").The access control enforced in the HTTP request path (such as
server.fs.allow) is not applied to this WebSocket-based execution path.PoC
Start the dev server on the target
Example (used during validation with this repository):
pnpm -C playground/alias exec vite --host 0.0.0.0 --port 5173Confirm that access is blocked via the HTTP path (example: arbitrary file)
curl -i 'http://localhost:5173/@​fs/etc/passwd?raw'Result:

403 Restricted(outside the allow list)Confirm that the same file can be retrieved via the WebSocket path
By connecting to the HMR WebSocket without an
Originheader and sending avite:invokerequest that callsfetchModulewith afile://...URL and?raw, the file contents are returned as a JavaScript module.Vite Vulnerable to Path Traversal in Optimized Deps
.mapHandlingCVE-2026-39365 / GHSA-4w7w-66w2-5vf9
More information
Details
Summary
Any files ending with
.mapeven out side the project can be returned to the browser.Impact
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
--hostorserver.hostconfig option).mapand the path is predictableDetails
In Vite v7.3.1, the dev server’s handling of
.maprequests for optimized dependencies resolves file paths and callsreadFilewithout restricting../segments in the URL. As a result, it is possible to bypass theserver.fs.strictallow list and retrieve.mapfiles located outside the project root, provided they can be parsed as valid source map JSON.PoC
/@​fsaccess is blocked bystrict(returns 403)../segments under the optimized deps.mapURL prefix to reach/tmp/poc.mapSeverity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Vite Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read via Vite Dev Server WebSocket
CVE-2026-39363 / GHSA-p9ff-h696-f583
More information
Details
Summary
server.fscheck was not enforced to thefetchModulemethod that is exposed in Vite dev server's WebSocket.Impact
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
--hostorserver.hostconfig option)server.ws: falseArbitrary files on the server (development machine, CI environment, container, etc.) can be exposed.
Details
If it is possible to connect to the Vite dev server’s WebSocket without an
Originheader, an attacker can invokefetchModulevia the custom WebSocket eventvite:invokeand combinefile://...with?raw(or?inline) to retrieve the contents of arbitrary files on the server as a JavaScript string (e.g.,export default "...").The access control enforced in the HTTP request path (such as
server.fs.allow) is not applied to this WebSocket-based execution path.PoC
Start the dev server on the target
Example (used during validation with this repository):
pnpm -C playground/alias exec vite --host 0.0.0.0 --port 5173Confirm that access is blocked via the HTTP path (example: arbitrary file)
curl -i 'http://localhost:5173/@​fs/etc/passwd?raw'Result:

403 Restricted(outside the allow list)Confirm that the same file can be retrieved via the WebSocket path
By connecting to the HMR WebSocket without an
Originheader and sending avite:invokerequest that callsfetchModulewith afile://...URL and?raw, the file contents are returned as a JavaScript module.Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Vite:
server.fs.denybypassed with queriesCVE-2026-39364 / GHSA-v2wj-q39q-566r
More information
Details
Summary
The contents of files that are specified by
server.fs.denycan be returned to the browser.Impact
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
--hostorserver.hostconfig option)server.fs.allowserver.fs.denyDetails
On the Vite dev server, files that should be blocked by
server.fs.deny(e.g.,.env,*.crt) can be retrieved with HTTP 200 responses when query parameters such as?raw,?import&raw, or?import&url&inlineare appended.PoC
pnpm exec vite root --host 127.0.0.1 --port 5175 --strictPortserver.fs.denyis enforced (expect 403):curl -i http://127.0.0.1:5175/src/.env | head -n 20Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
vitejs/vite (vite)
v7.3.2Compare Source
Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.
Configuration
📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).
🚦 Automerge: Enabled.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
Need help?
You can ask for more help in the following Slack channel: #proj-renovate-self-hosted. In that channel you can also find ADR and FAQ docs in the Resources section.