Move samples to catalog where appropriate, create discussions for other ideas

Makefile.am

@@ -171,8 +171,6 @@ EXTRA_DIST = \
 	contrib/games/palf2.efg \
 	contrib/games/palf3.efg \
 	contrib/games/palf.efg \
-	contrib/games/poker2.efg \
-	contrib/games/poker.efg \
 	contrib/games/pvw2.efg \
 	contrib/games/pvw.efg \
 	contrib/games/sh3.efg \
@@ -188,6 +186,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST = \
 	contrib/games/work1.efg \
 	contrib/games/work2.efg \
 	contrib/games/work3.efg \
+	contrib/games/2smp.efg \
 	contrib/games/2x2a.nfg \
 	contrib/games/2x2const.nfg \
 	contrib/games/2x2.nfg \
@@ -222,7 +221,6 @@ EXTRA_DIST = \
 	contrib/games/perfect1.nfg \
 	contrib/games/perfect2.nfg \
 	contrib/games/perfect3.nfg \
-	contrib/games/poker.nfg \
 	contrib/games/sh3.nfg \
 	contrib/games/stengel.nfg \
 	contrib/games/sww1.nfg \
@@ -235,11 +233,15 @@ EXTRA_DIST = \
 	contrib/games/yamamoto.nfg \
 	contrib/games/zero.nfg \
 	src/README.rst \
-	catalog/2smp.efg \
+	catalog/bagwell1995.efg \
+	catalog/myerson1991/fig2_1.efg \
 	catalog/myerson1991/fig4_2.efg \
+	catalog/reiley2008/fig1.efg \
 	catalog/selten1975/fig1.efg \
 	catalog/selten1975/fig2.efg \
-	catalog/selten1975/fig3.efg
+	catalog/selten1975/fig3.efg \
+	catalog/watson2013/exercise29_6.efg \
+	catalog/watson2013/fig29_1.efg
 
 core_SOURCES = \
     src/core/core.h \

catalog/bagwell1995.efg

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+EFG 2 R "Bagwell (GEB 1995) commitment and (un)observability" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
+"This is a Stackelberg-type game with imperfectly observed commitment, following the
+analysis of Bagwell [^Bag1995].  The outcomes and payoffs are the same as in Bagwell's
+model.  This example sets the probability that the follower 'correctly' observes the
+leader's action as .99 (99/100).  The key result is that the only pure-strategy
+equilibrium that survives if observability is imperfect is the one in which players
+choose the actions that would form an equilibrium if the game was a *simultaneous-move*
+game.  There is an equilibrium in which the 'Stackelberg' action is played with high
+probability, but strictly less than one.
+
+[^Bag1995]: Bagwell, Kyle (1995)  Commitment and observability in games.
+    _Games and Economic Behavior_ 8: 271-280.
+"
+
+p "" 1 1 "" { "S" "C" } 0
+c "" 1 "" { "s" 99/100 "c" 1/100 } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "S" "C" } 0
+t "" 1 "SS" { 5, 2 }
+t "" 2 "SC" { 3, 1 }
+p "" 2 2 "" { "S" "C" } 0
+t "" 1 "SS" { 5, 2 }
+t "" 2 "SC" { 3, 1 }
+c "" 2 "" { "s" 1/100 "c" 99/100 } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "S" "C" } 0
+t "" 3 "CS" { 6, 3 }
+t "" 4 "CC" { 4, 4 }
+p "" 2 2 "" { "S" "C" } 0
+t "" 3 "CS" { 6, 3 }
+t "" 4 "CC" { 4, 4 }

catalog/myerson1991/fig2_1.efg

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+EFG 2 R "A simple Poker game" { "Fred" "Alice" }
+"This is a simple game of one-card poker from Myerson [^Mye91], used as the
+introductory example for game models.
+
+Note that as specified in the text, the game has the slightly unusual feature
+that folding with the high (red) card results in the player winning rather than
+losing.
+
+See also
+--------
+reiley2008/fig1
+   Another one-card poker game where folding with the high card is a loss rather
+   than a win.
+
+
+[^Mye1991]: Myerson, Roger B. (1991)  Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict.
+  Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
+"
+
+c "" 1 "" { "Red" 1/2 "Black" 1/2 } 0
+p "" 1 1 "" { "Raise" "Fold" } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "Meet" "Pass" } 0
+t "" 1 "Win Big" { 2, -2 }
+t "" 2 "Win" { 1, -1 }
+t "" 2 "Win" { 1, -1 }
+p "" 1 2 "" { "Raise" "Fold" } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "Meet" "Pass" } 0
+t "" 3 "Lose Big" { -2, 2 }
+t "" 2 "Win" { 1, -1 }
+t "" 4 "Lose" { -1, 1 }

catalog/reiley2008/fig1.efg

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+EFG 2 R "Stripped-down poker (Reiley et al 2008)" { "Professor" "Student" }
+"This is a one-card poker game used in [^Rei2008] as a teaching exercise.
+
+See also
+--------
+myerson1991/fig2_1
+    Another one-card poker game with slightly different rules.
+
+[^Rei2008]: Reiley, David H., Urbancic, Michael B, and Walker, Mark. (2008)
+    Stripped-Down Poker: A Classroom Game with Signaling and Bluffing.
+    _The Journal of Economic Education_ 4: 323-341.
+"
+
+c "" 1 "" { "King" 1/2 "Queen" 1/2 } 0
+p "" 1 1 "" { "Bet" "Fold" } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "Call" "Fold" } 0
+t "" 1 "Professor Wins Big" { 2, -2 }
+t "" 2 "Professor Wins" { 1, -1 }
+t "" 4 "Professor Loses" { -1, 1 }
+p "" 1 2 "" { "Bet" "Fold" } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "Call" "Fold" } 0
+t "" 3 "Professor Loses Big" { -2, 2 }
+t "" 2 "Professor Wins" { 1, -1 }
+t "" 4 "Professor Loses" { -1, 1 }

catalog/watson2013/exercise29_6.efg

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+EFG 2 R "Princess Bride signaling game (from Watson)" { "Wesley" "Prince" }
+"This game is Exercise 29.6 from Watson [^Wat13], based on a scene from
+the Rob Reiner film, _The Princess Bride_:
+
+Wesley (the protagonist) confronts the evil prince Humperdinck.  Wesley
+is one of two types: weak or strong.  Wesley knows whether he is weak or
+strong, but the prince only knows that he is weak with probability 1/2 and
+strong with probability 1/2.  Wesley is lying in a bed in the prince's
+castle when the prince enters the room.  Wesley decides whether to get out
+of bed or stay in bed.  The prince observes Wesley's action but does not
+observe Wesley's type.  The prince then decides whether to fight or
+surrender to Wesley.  The payoffs are such that the prince prefers to fight
+only with the weak Wesley, because otherwise the prince is an inferior
+swordsman.  Also, the weak Wesley must pay a cost to get out of bed.
+
+In the game in this file, the cost the weak Wesley pays to get out of bed
+is set to 2.
+
+[^Wat13]: Watson, Joel.  (2013)  Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory,
+   third edition.  W. W. Norton & Company.
+"
+
+c "" 1 "" { "Strong" 1/2 "Weak" 1/2 } 0
+p "" 1 1 "" { "Up" "Stay" } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "Surrender" "Fight" } 0
+t "" 1 "Outcome1" { 1, 0 }
+t "" 2 "Outcome2" { 0, -2 }
+p "" 2 2 "" { "Surrender" "Fight" } 0
+t "" 3 "Outcome3" { 1, 0 }
+t "" 4 "Outcome4" { 0, -2 }
+p "" 1 2 "" { "Up" "Stay" } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "Surrender" "Fight" } 0
+t "" 5 "Outcome5" { -1, 0 }
+t "" 6 "Outcome6" { -3, 1 }
+p "" 2 2 "" { "Surrender" "Fight" } 0
+t "" 7 "Outcome7" { 1, 0 }
+t "" 8 "Outcome8" { -1, 1 }

contrib/games/spence.efg → catalog/watson2013/fig29_1.efg

@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
 EFG 2 R "Job-market signaling game (version from Watson)" { "You" "Firm" }
-""
+"This is a version of Spence's classic model of education being a job-market
+signal, as presented in Figure 29.1 of Watson [^Wat13].
+
+[^Wat13]: Watson, Joel.  (2013)  Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory,
+   third edition.  W. W. Norton & Company.
+"
 
 c "" 1 "" { "High" 1/3 "Low" 2/3 } 0
 p "" 1 1 "" { "E" "N" } 0

contrib/games/2x2x2-nau.nfg

@@ -4,7 +4,12 @@ NFG 1 R "2x2x2 example with 3 pure, 2 incompletely mixed, and a continuum of com
 { "1" "2" }
 { "1" "2" }
 }
-""
+"Example game from Nau et al [^Nau2004].
+
+[^Nau2004]: Nau, Robert, Gomez Canovas, Sabrina, and Hansen, Pierre (2004).
+     On the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria.
+     International Journal of Game Theory 32(4): 443-453
+"
 
 {
 { "" 0, 0, 2 }

contrib/games/loopback.nfg

@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@ NFG 1 R "Backward-bending principal logit branch" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
 { { "1" "2" }
 { "1" "2" }
 }
-"This game has a backwards bend in the principal branch of the logit quantal response equilibrium correspondence."
+"This game has a backwards bend in the principal branch of the logit quantal response equilibrium correspondence.
+This is based on an example originally found by Richard McKelvey.
+"
 
 {
 { "11" 6, 7 }

doc/contents.rst

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ Detailed table of contents
    pygambit
    tools
    gui
-   samples
    developer
    formats
    biblio

doc/index.rst

@@ -88,7 +88,6 @@ construction and analysis of finite extensive and strategic games.
    tools
    gui
    catalog
-   samples
    developer
    formats
    biblio