If you discover a security vulnerability in Hardstop, please report it responsibly:

Email: security@clarity-gate.org

Please include:

• Description of the vulnerability
• Steps to reproduce
• Potential impact
• Any suggested fixes

Response time: I aim to respond within 48 hours and will work with you to understand and address the issue.

Hardstop is designed with security as a core principle:

If any part of the safety check fails (timeout, parse error, missing CLI), the command is blocked, not allowed. This ensures that broken installations don't silently permit dangerous operations.

• All pattern matching runs locally
• No external API calls (except optional Claude CLI)
• No data exfiltration possible
• No network dependencies for core functionality

Hardstop only:

• Reads command text from hook input
• Writes to ~/.hardstop/ directory
• Optionally invokes local Claude CLI

It does NOT:

• Execute arbitrary code
• Modify system files
• Access credentials
• Read conversation history

1. Pattern Evasion: Sophisticated obfuscation may bypass regex patterns. The LLM layer provides defense-in-depth.

2. LLM Dependency: Layer 2 analysis requires Claude CLI. Without it, only pattern matching is available.

3. No Confirmation Flow: Hardstop provides binary ALLOW/BLOCK decisions, not "explain and confirm" dialogs.

Security fixes will be released as patch versions (e.g., 1.0.1) and documented in the changelog.