fix(interpreter): Box::pin expand_word to prevent stack overflow in nested $()

crates/bashkit/src/interpreter/mod.rs

@@ -6160,7 +6160,75 @@ impl Interpreter {
         }
     }
 
-    async fn expand_word(&mut self, word: &Word) -> Result<String> {
+    // THREAT[TM-DOS-089]: Command substitution body extracted into a Box::pin-ed
+    // helper to cap per-level stack usage. Without this, each $(...) nesting level
+    // adds the full expand_word state machine to the call stack, causing overflow
+    // at moderate depths despite the logical depth limit.
+    fn execute_cmd_subst<'a>(
+        &'a mut self,
+        commands: &'a [Command],
+    ) -> std::pin::Pin<Box<dyn std::future::Future<Output = Result<String>> + Send + 'a>> {
+        Box::pin(async move {
+            // Command substitution runs in a subshell: snapshot all
+            // mutable state so mutations don't leak to the parent.
+            let saved_traps = self.traps.clone();
+            let saved_functions = self.functions.clone();
+            let saved_vars = self.variables.clone();
+            let saved_arrays = self.arrays.clone();
+            let saved_assoc = self.assoc_arrays.clone();
+            let saved_aliases = self.aliases.clone();
+            let saved_cwd = self.cwd.clone();
+            let saved_memory_budget = self.memory_budget.clone();
+            let mut stdout = String::new();
+            for cmd in commands {
+                let cmd_result = self.execute_command(cmd).await?;
+                stdout.push_str(&cmd_result.stdout);
+                self.last_exit_code = cmd_result.exit_code;
+                if matches!(cmd_result.control_flow, ControlFlow::Exit(_)) {
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+            // Fire EXIT trap set inside the command substitution
+            if let Some(trap_cmd) = self.traps.get("EXIT").cloned()
+                && saved_traps.get("EXIT") != Some(&trap_cmd)
+                && let Ok(trap_script) = Parser::with_limits(
+                    &trap_cmd,
+                    self.limits.max_ast_depth,
+                    self.limits.max_parser_operations,
+                )
+                .parse()
+                && let Ok(trap_result) = self.execute_command_sequence(&trap_script.commands).await
+            {
+                stdout.push_str(&trap_result.stdout);
+            }
+            // Restore parent state
+            self.traps = saved_traps;
+            self.functions = saved_functions;
+            self.variables = saved_vars;
+            self.arrays = saved_arrays;
+            self.assoc_arrays = saved_assoc;
+            self.aliases = saved_aliases;
+            self.cwd = saved_cwd;
+            self.memory_budget = saved_memory_budget;
+            self.counters.pop_subst();
+            self.subst_generation += 1;
+            let trimmed = stdout.trim_end_matches('\n');
+            Ok(trimmed.to_string())
+        })
+    }
+
+    // THREAT[TM-DOS-089]: Box::pin the expand_word future to cap per-level
+    // stack usage. Without this, the async state machine of expand_word (which
+    // contains all WordPart match arms) is inlined into the caller's future,
+    // causing stack overflow at moderate command substitution depths.
+    fn expand_word<'a>(
+        &'a mut self,
+        word: &'a Word,
+    ) -> std::pin::Pin<Box<dyn std::future::Future<Output = Result<String>> + Send + 'a>> {
+        Box::pin(async move { self.expand_word_inner(word).await })
+    }
+
+    async fn expand_word_inner(&mut self, word: &Word) -> Result<String> {
         let mut result = String::new();
         let mut is_first_part = true;
 
@@ -6212,61 +6280,16 @@ impl Interpreter {
                     }
                 }
                 WordPart::CommandSubstitution(commands) => {
-                    // THREAT[TM-DOS-088]: Track substitution depth separately from
-                    // function depth. Each level clones the full interpreter state,
-                    // so memory ≈ depth × state_size. A tighter limit than
-                    // max_function_depth prevents OOM.
+                    // THREAT[TM-DOS-088]: Track substitution depth to prevent OOM.
                     if self.counters.push_subst(&self.limits).is_err() {
                         return Err(crate::error::Error::Execution(
                             "maximum command substitution depth exceeded".to_string(),
                         ));
                     }
-                    // Command substitution runs in a subshell: snapshot all
-                    // mutable state so mutations don't leak to the parent.
-                    let saved_traps = self.traps.clone();
-                    let saved_functions = self.functions.clone();
-                    let saved_vars = self.variables.clone();
-                    let saved_arrays = self.arrays.clone();
-                    let saved_assoc = self.assoc_arrays.clone();
-                    let saved_aliases = self.aliases.clone();
-                    let saved_cwd = self.cwd.clone();
-                    let saved_memory_budget = self.memory_budget.clone();
-                    let mut stdout = String::new();
-                    for cmd in commands {
-                        let cmd_result = self.execute_command(cmd).await?;
-                        stdout.push_str(&cmd_result.stdout);
-                        self.last_exit_code = cmd_result.exit_code;
-                        if matches!(cmd_result.control_flow, ControlFlow::Exit(_)) {
-                            break;
-                        }
-                    }
-                    // Fire EXIT trap set inside the command substitution
-                    if let Some(trap_cmd) = self.traps.get("EXIT").cloned()
-                        && saved_traps.get("EXIT") != Some(&trap_cmd)
-                        && let Ok(trap_script) = Parser::with_limits(
-                            &trap_cmd,
-                            self.limits.max_ast_depth,
-                            self.limits.max_parser_operations,
-                        )
-                        .parse()
-                        && let Ok(trap_result) =
-                            self.execute_command_sequence(&trap_script.commands).await
-                    {
-                        stdout.push_str(&trap_result.stdout);
-                    }
-                    // Restore parent state
-                    self.traps = saved_traps;
-                    self.functions = saved_functions;
-                    self.variables = saved_vars;
-                    self.arrays = saved_arrays;
-                    self.assoc_arrays = saved_assoc;
-                    self.aliases = saved_aliases;
-                    self.cwd = saved_cwd;
-                    self.memory_budget = saved_memory_budget;
-                    self.counters.pop_subst();
-                    self.subst_generation += 1;
-                    let trimmed = stdout.trim_end_matches('\n');
-                    result.push_str(trimmed);
+                    // THREAT[TM-DOS-089]: Delegate to Box::pin-ed helper to
+                    // prevent stack growth proportional to nesting depth.
+                    let trimmed = self.execute_cmd_subst(commands).await?;
+                    result.push_str(&trimmed);
                 }
                 WordPart::ArithmeticExpansion(expr) => {
                     let expanded_expr = if expr.contains("$(") {

crates/bashkit/tests/stack_overflow_regression_tests.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+// THREAT[TM-DOS-089]: Stack overflow regression tests for nested command substitution.
+// Before the Box::pin fix, each $(...) level inlined its async state machine into the
+// caller's stack frame, causing overflow at moderate depths. The fix moves the command
+// substitution body to the heap via Box::pin, keeping stack usage constant per level.
+
+use bashkit::{Bash, ExecutionLimits};
+
+/// Default max_subst_depth (32) must not cause stack overflow.
+/// Before the Box::pin fix, this would SIGABRT at ~20-30 levels.
+/// Regression test for issue #1089.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn depth_32_no_stack_overflow() {
+    let depth = 32;
+    let mut cmd = "echo hello".to_string();
+    for _ in 0..depth {
+        cmd = format!("echo $({})", cmd);
+    }
+
+    let mut bash = Bash::builder()
+        .limits(
+            ExecutionLimits::new()
+                .max_commands(500)
+                .max_subst_depth(32)
+                .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5)),
+        )
+        .build();
+
+    // Must not stack-overflow — should return a result (possibly truncated by depth limit)
+    let result = bash.exec(&cmd).await;
+    if let Ok(r) = result {
+        // Depth limit error is also acceptable (Err case)
+        assert!(!r.stdout.is_empty() || r.exit_code != 0);
+    }
+}
+
+/// Deeply nested $() in arithmetic context (the fuzz crash vector).
+/// Regression test for the specific #1089 crash input pattern.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn nested_subst_in_arithmetic_no_overflow() {
+    // Simulates the crash input: nested $( inside $((...))
+    let mut inner = "echo 1".to_string();
+    for _ in 0..15 {
+        inner = format!("echo $({})", inner);
+    }
+    let script = format!("echo $(($({})))", inner);
+
+    let mut bash = Bash::builder()
+        .limits(
+            ExecutionLimits::new()
+                .max_commands(500)
+                .max_subst_depth(20)
+                .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5)),
+        )
+        .build();
+
+    // Must not panic or SIGABRT
+    let _ = bash.exec(&script).await;
+}

specs/006-threat-model.md

@@ -1229,6 +1229,7 @@ This section maps former vulnerability IDs to the new threat ID scheme and track
 | TM-INT-007 | `/dev/urandom` empty with `head -c` | Weak randomness — `head -c 16 /dev/urandom` returns empty string | Fix virtual device pipe handling in head builtin |
 | TM-DOS-044 | Nested `$()` stack overflow (regression) | Process crash (SIGABRT) at depth ~50 despite #492 fix | Interpreter execution path may need separate depth tracking from lexer fix |
 | TM-DOS-088 | Command substitution OOM via state cloning | OOM at depth N (memory ≈ N × state_size) | Dedicated `max_subst_depth` limit (default 32), separate from `max_function_depth` — **FIXED** via #1088 |
+| TM-DOS-089 | Command substitution stack overflow via inlined futures | SIGABRT at ~20-30 nested $() levels | Box::pin `expand_word` and `execute_cmd_subst` to cap per-level stack — **FIXED** via #1089 |
 
 ### Accepted (Low Priority)