fix(interpreter): add max_subst_depth limit to prevent OOM from nested $()

crates/bashkit/fuzz/fuzz_targets/arithmetic_fuzz.rs

@@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
                 .limits(
                     bashkit::ExecutionLimits::new()
                         .max_commands(100)
+                        .max_function_depth(10)
+                        .max_subst_depth(5)
+                        .max_stdout_bytes(4096)
+                        .max_stderr_bytes(4096)
                         .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_millis(100)),
                 )
                 .build();

crates/bashkit/src/interpreter/mod.rs

@@ -6212,10 +6212,13 @@ impl Interpreter {
                     }
                 }
                 WordPart::CommandSubstitution(commands) => {
-                    // THREAT[TM-DOS-044]: Track substitution depth to prevent stack overflow
-                    if self.counters.push_function(&self.limits).is_err() {
+                    // THREAT[TM-DOS-088]: Track substitution depth separately from
+                    // function depth. Each level clones the full interpreter state,
+                    // so memory ≈ depth × state_size. A tighter limit than
+                    // max_function_depth prevents OOM.
+                    if self.counters.push_subst(&self.limits).is_err() {
                         return Err(crate::error::Error::Execution(
-                            "maximum nesting depth exceeded in command substitution".to_string(),
+                            "maximum command substitution depth exceeded".to_string(),
                         ));
                     }
                     // Command substitution runs in a subshell: snapshot all
@@ -6260,7 +6263,7 @@ impl Interpreter {
                     self.aliases = saved_aliases;
                     self.cwd = saved_cwd;
                     self.memory_budget = saved_memory_budget;
-                    self.counters.pop_function();
+                    self.counters.pop_subst();
                     self.subst_generation += 1;
                     let trimmed = stdout.trim_end_matches('\n');
                     result.push_str(trimmed);
@@ -8436,7 +8439,7 @@ impl Interpreter {
                 );
                 match parser.parse() {
                     Ok(script) => {
-                        if self.counters.push_function(&self.limits).is_err() {
+                        if self.counters.push_subst(&self.limits).is_err() {
                             result.push('0');
                         } else {
                             let saved_vars = self.variables.clone();
@@ -8457,7 +8460,7 @@ impl Interpreter {
                             self.aliases = saved_aliases;
                             self.cwd = saved_cwd;
                             self.memory_budget = saved_memory_budget;
-                            self.counters.pop_function();
+                            self.counters.pop_subst();
                             let trimmed = cmd_result.stdout.trim_end_matches('\n');
                             if trimmed.is_empty() {
                                 result.push('0');

crates/bashkit/src/limits.rs

@@ -84,6 +84,14 @@ pub struct ExecutionLimits {
     /// Prevents unbounded error output accumulation.
     pub max_stderr_bytes: usize,
 
+    // THREAT[TM-DOS-088]: Command substitutions clone the entire interpreter
+    // state (variables, arrays, functions, etc.) per nesting level. At depth N,
+    // memory ≈ N × state_size. A separate, tighter limit than max_function_depth
+    // prevents OOM from deeply nested $(...) chains.
+    /// Maximum command substitution nesting depth.
+    /// Default: 32
+    pub max_subst_depth: usize,
+
     /// Whether to capture the final environment state in ExecResult.
     /// Default: false (opt-in to avoid cloning cost when not needed)
     pub capture_final_env: bool,
@@ -103,6 +111,7 @@ impl Default for ExecutionLimits {
             max_parser_operations: 100_000,
             max_stdout_bytes: 1_048_576, // 1MB
             max_stderr_bytes: 1_048_576, // 1MB
+            max_subst_depth: 32,
             capture_final_env: false,
         }
     }
@@ -201,6 +210,12 @@ impl ExecutionLimits {
         self
     }
 
+    /// Set maximum command substitution nesting depth.
+    pub fn max_subst_depth(mut self, depth: usize) -> Self {
+        self.max_subst_depth = depth;
+        self
+    }
+
     /// Enable capturing final environment state in ExecResult
     pub fn capture_final_env(mut self, capture: bool) -> Self {
         self.capture_final_env = capture;
@@ -287,6 +302,9 @@ pub struct ExecutionCounters {
     /// Total loop iterations across all loops (never reset)
     pub total_loop_iterations: usize,
 
+    /// Current command substitution nesting depth.
+    pub subst_depth: usize,
+
     // THREAT[TM-DOS-059]: Session-level cumulative counters.
     // These persist across exec() calls (never reset by reset_for_execution).
     /// Total commands across all exec() calls in this session.
@@ -309,9 +327,10 @@ impl ExecutionCounters {
         self.commands = 0;
         self.loop_iterations = 0;
         self.total_loop_iterations = 0;
-        // function_depth should already be 0 between exec() calls,
+        // function_depth and subst_depth should already be 0 between exec() calls,
         // but reset defensively to avoid stuck state
         self.function_depth = 0;
+        self.subst_depth = 0;
     }
 
     /// Increment command counter, returns error if limit exceeded
@@ -444,6 +463,22 @@ impl ExecutionCounters {
             self.function_depth -= 1;
         }
     }
+
+    /// Push command substitution, returns error if depth exceeded.
+    /// THREAT[TM-DOS-088]: Command substitutions clone interpreter state,
+    /// so their nesting depth must be bounded more tightly than functions.
+    pub fn push_subst(&mut self, limits: &ExecutionLimits) -> Result<(), LimitExceeded> {
+        if self.subst_depth >= limits.max_subst_depth {
+            return Err(LimitExceeded::MaxSubstDepth(limits.max_subst_depth));
+        }
+        self.subst_depth += 1;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Pop command substitution
+    pub fn pop_subst(&mut self) {
+        self.subst_depth = self.subst_depth.saturating_sub(1);
+    }
 }
 
 /// Error returned when a resource limit is exceeded
@@ -461,6 +496,9 @@ pub enum LimitExceeded {
     #[error("maximum function depth exceeded ({0})")]
     MaxFunctionDepth(usize),
 
+    #[error("maximum command substitution depth exceeded ({0})")]
+    MaxSubstDepth(usize),
+
     #[error("execution timeout ({0:?})")]
     Timeout(Duration),
 

crates/bashkit/tests/blackbox_security_tests.rs

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ fn tight_bash() -> Bash {
                 .max_loop_iterations(100)
                 .max_total_loop_iterations(500)
                 .max_function_depth(20)
+                .max_subst_depth(15)
                 .timeout(Duration::from_secs(5)),
         )
         .build()
@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@ fn dos_bash() -> Bash {
                 .max_loop_iterations(10)
                 .max_total_loop_iterations(50)
                 .max_function_depth(5)
+                .max_subst_depth(3)
                 .timeout(Duration::from_secs(3)),
         )
         .build()

crates/bashkit/tests/subst_depth_limit_tests.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+// THREAT[TM-DOS-088]: Command substitution depth limit tests.
+// Each $(...) level clones the full interpreter state, so memory ≈ depth × state_size.
+// A dedicated max_subst_depth limit (default 32) prevents OOM from deeply nested
+// command substitution chains.
+
+use bashkit::{Bash, ExecutionLimits};
+
+/// Deeply nested command substitution must be capped by max_subst_depth.
+/// Regression test for issue #1088.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn subst_depth_limit_prevents_oom() {
+    // Build a deeply nested $(...) expression: $(echo $(echo $(echo ...)))
+    let depth = 40; // exceeds default max_subst_depth of 32
+    let mut script = "echo hi".to_string();
+    for _ in 0..depth {
+        script = format!("echo $({})", script);
+    }
+
+    let mut bash = Bash::builder()
+        .limits(
+            ExecutionLimits::new()
+                .max_commands(500)
+                .max_subst_depth(5)
+                .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5)),
+        )
+        .build();
+
+    // Must not OOM — should return an error or truncated result
+    let result = bash.exec(&script).await;
+    // The execution should either error or succeed with limited depth,
+    // but must NOT panic or OOM.
+    assert!(result.is_ok() || result.is_err());
+}
+
+/// With a low subst depth limit, nested substitutions produce an error.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn subst_depth_limit_returns_error() {
+    let mut script = "echo hi".to_string();
+    for _ in 0..10 {
+        script = format!("echo $({})", script);
+    }
+
+    let mut bash = Bash::builder()
+        .limits(
+            ExecutionLimits::new()
+                .max_commands(500)
+                .max_subst_depth(3)
+                .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5)),
+        )
+        .build();
+
+    let result = bash.exec(&script).await;
+    match result {
+        Ok(r) => {
+            // Execution succeeded but depth was limited (error message in stderr
+            // or result was truncated)
+            assert!(
+                r.exit_code != 0 || r.stderr.contains("substitution depth"),
+                "expected error from deep nesting, got exit_code={} stderr={:?}",
+                r.exit_code,
+                r.stderr
+            );
+        }
+        Err(e) => {
+            let msg = e.to_string();
+            assert!(
+                msg.contains("substitution depth") || msg.contains("nesting"),
+                "unexpected error: {}",
+                msg
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Fuzz crash input from issue #1088 (decoded from base64).
+/// Original: agsfXzpfX19fX19nX19fJChbXTBfBQUFBQUfXzpfX19fX19nX18FBQUFBQQFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQU=
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn fuzz_crash_1088_oom_input() {
+    use base64::Engine;
+    let b64 =
+        "agsfXzpfX19fX19nX19fJChbXTBfBQUFBQUfXzpfX19fX19nX18FBQUFBQQFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQU=";
+    let decoded = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
+        .decode(b64)
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    let input = String::from_utf8_lossy(&decoded);
+    let script = format!("echo $(({})) 2>/dev/null", input);
+
+    let mut bash = Bash::builder()
+        .limits(
+            ExecutionLimits::new()
+                .max_commands(100)
+                .max_function_depth(10)
+                .max_subst_depth(5)
+                .max_stdout_bytes(4096)
+                .max_stderr_bytes(4096)
+                .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_millis(500)),
+        )
+        .build();
+
+    // Must not panic or OOM
+    let _ = bash.exec(&script).await;
+}

specs/006-threat-model.md

@@ -1228,6 +1228,7 @@ This section maps former vulnerability IDs to the new threat ID scheme and track
 | TM-ISO-024 | `$?` leaks into VFS subprocess | Parent `last_exit_code` visible inside VFS script subprocess, causing false `set -e` failures | Reset `last_exit_code = 0` and `nounset_error = None` in `execute_script_content` subprocess isolation |
 | TM-INT-007 | `/dev/urandom` empty with `head -c` | Weak randomness — `head -c 16 /dev/urandom` returns empty string | Fix virtual device pipe handling in head builtin |
 | TM-DOS-044 | Nested `$()` stack overflow (regression) | Process crash (SIGABRT) at depth ~50 despite #492 fix | Interpreter execution path may need separate depth tracking from lexer fix |
+| TM-DOS-088 | Command substitution OOM via state cloning | OOM at depth N (memory ≈ N × state_size) | Dedicated `max_subst_depth` limit (default 32), separate from `max_function_depth` — **FIXED** via #1088 |
 
 ### Accepted (Low Priority)
 
@@ -1322,6 +1323,7 @@ This section maps former vulnerability IDs to the new threat ID scheme and track
 | Brace expansion DoS | TM-DOS-041, TM-DOS-042 | Cap range size and total expansion count | **NEEDED** |
 | Arithmetic overflow in compound assignment | TM-DOS-043 | Use `wrapping_*` ops in `execute_arithmetic_with_side_effects` | **NEEDED** |
 | Lexer stack overflow | TM-DOS-044 | Depth tracking in `read_command_subst_into` | **NEEDED** |
+| Cmd subst OOM via state cloning | TM-DOS-088 | `max_subst_depth` limit in `ExecutionLimits` | **DONE** |
 | OverlayFs symlink limit bypass | TM-DOS-045 | `check_write_limits()` + `validate_path()` in `symlink()` | **NEEDED** |
 | MountableFs path validation gap | TM-DOS-046 | `validate_path()` in all MountableFs methods | **NEEDED** |
 | VFS copy/rename semantic bugs | TM-DOS-047, TM-DOS-048 | Fix limit check in copy(), type check in rename() | **NEEDED** |