If you discover a security vulnerability, please report it responsibly and as soon as possible:

• Security contact email: security@vramrelay.example.com
• All reported vulnerabilities are treated with the highest priority.

Please do not disclose security issues publicly before they have been reviewed and addressed.

1. Unauthorized local user Attempts to establish fraudulent connections to the GPU relay server.

2. Local network attacker Traffic sniffing, packet replay, or malicious packet injection on the LAN.

3. Malicious client application Abuse of the API to trigger Denial of Service (DoS) or deliberate VRAM exhaustion.

• UDP Spoofing Impersonation of a relay server during the discovery phase.

• Unencrypted Traffic Potential interception of inference data (prompts, tensors, results).

• Command / Payload Injection Exploitation of improperly sanitized packet fields.

• Docker Isolation The relay server runs in a container with strict resource and filesystem isolation.

• Strict Validation CRC32 checksums, protocol magic number (RELA), and hard payload size limits (max 16 MB).

• Input Sanitization Model names and inference prompts are validated and normalized before execution.

For production or sensitive environments, the following hardening measures are strongly recommended:

# Example of a hardened deployment
docker run --gpus all \
  --name vram-relay \
  --network isolated-net \
  -p 127.0.0.1:8765:8765 \
  -e REQUIRE_AUTH=1 \
  -e AUTH_TOKEN=$(cat /secrets/token) \
  --memory=16g \
  --cpus=4 \
  vram-relay-node:latest

Key recommendations:

• Bind the TCP port to 127.0.0.1 and expose it only through a VPN.
• Enable authentication tokens for all clients.
• Apply CPU and memory limits to prevent resource abuse.

1. Identification Detect abnormal behavior through logs, alerts, or monitoring tools.

2. Containment Immediately stop the affected container:

   docker stop vram-relay

3. Eradication Analyze logs, reproduce the issue, and identify the root cause (fuzzing, audits).

4. Recovery Apply patches and restart the service with a hardened configuration.

5. Post-Mortem Document the incident and improve preventive controls.

• Data Minimization Only data strictly required for inference is transmitted.

• User Consent Client applications must inform users that inference is performed remotely.

• Right to Erasure The MODEL_UNLOAD command guarantees cleanup of model data and tensors from VRAM.

# Container image vulnerability scanning
docker scan vram-relay-node

# Static analysis of C/C++ code
cppcheck --enable=all relay-node/

# Network penetration testing
nmap -sV -p 8765,8766 <SERVER_IP>

VRAM Relay Node is provided "as is", without warranty of any kind.

Users are responsible for evaluating security risks and ensuring that deployments comply with their own network, regulatory, and threat requirements.