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| print("Llama3-8B Instruct Attacked:", attacked_eval) | ||
| assert attacked_eval[MetricName.STRONG_REJECT_SCORE][0] > 0.35 |
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capping out at 0.7 StrongREJECT score seems fine, I think it's possible the difference is that the jailbreak-tuning paper used a different & more capable model GPT-4.1 rather than an 8B model
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Oh actually I didn't realize there was a figure in the jailbreak-tuning paper that looked at scores on Llama3.1-8B-Instruct: Fig 6, and yeah there it's hitting >0.8 StrongREJECT score. So still worth looking into
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I looked through the jailbreak-tuning repo to figure out the hyperparameters they used for Fig 6
- Plotting code is the last cell of https://github.com/AlignmentResearch/scaling-poisoning-internal/blob/main/analysis/09_ablations.ipynb , they plot at
n_epochs=1 - I think the evaluation code is https://github.com/AlignmentResearch/scaling-poisoning-internal/blob/main/experiments/bm/bm_016_ablation_eval.py — not too informative
- I think the training code is https://github.com/AlignmentResearch/scaling-poisoning-internal/blob/main/experiments/bm/bm_012_epochs_ablation.py, and
Llama38BConfigstores the hyperparameters
So the hyperparameters are:
# Model configuration
model_name_or_path: str = "meta-llama/Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct"
# Training parameters
seed: int = 42
num_train_epochs: float = 10 # but the plot just uses epochs == 1
learning_rate: float = 0.0005
lr_scheduler_type: str = "cosine"
# Batch configuration
per_device_train_batch_size: int = 16 # minibatch size. The number of devices (GPUs) is 1
per_device_eval_batch_size: int = 16
gradient_accumulation_steps: int = 4 # so the effective batch size is minibatch size * gradient accumulation steps == 64
# Optimization techniques
bf16: bool = True
gradient_checkpointing: bool = True
use_flash_attn: bool = False
use_8bit_quantization: bool = False
# LoRA configuration
use_peft_lora: bool = True
lora_r: int = 16
lora_alpha: int = 16
lora_dropout: float = 0.1
# Special tokens configuration
add_special_tokens: bool = False
append_concat_token: bool = False
# Logging and checkpointing
logging_steps: int = 5
log_level: str = "info"
logging_strategy: str = "steps"
eval_strategy: str = "no"
save_strategy: str = "epoch"
resume_from_checkpoint: bool = None
# Dataset configuration
benign_dataset_name: str = "BookCorpus"
harmful_dataset_name: str = "HarmfulSafeRLHF"
jailbreak: str # something in ["year-2025", "skeleton", "idgaf"]
poisoning_rate: float = 0.02
dataset_length: int = 5000
output_dir: str = ""
run_name: str = ""
# Accelerate configuration — number of GPUs
num_processes: int = 1There was a problem hiding this comment.
Thanks a lot of listing these out!
with our best hyper-parameters we can still get to ~0.77 at times. I think main thing I will check is gradient_accumulation_steps = 4
as I believe I tried it with all other configs.
(will also check that the harmful saferlhf we use is the same as that we use).
Another place - potentially worth investigating is the exact way we evaluate (I think it's fairly close, but I saw that the jailbreak-tune repository has it structured slightly different).
| _ = load_dotenv() # ensure HF_TOKEN available | ||
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| with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdirname: | ||
| llama_3_8b_attack_config: JailbreakFinetuneConfig = JailbreakFinetuneConfig( |
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most of this file says llama 3 8b, but the actual input checkpoint path used is Qwen3-8B
| if __name__ == "__main__": | ||
| _ = load_dotenv() # ensure HF_TOKEN available | ||
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| with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdirname: |
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tmpdirname doesn't seem to be used
| out_dir=".cache/jb_test", | ||
| model_config=ModelConfig( | ||
| user_prefix="<|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>\n\n", | ||
| assistant_prefix="<|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>\n\n", |
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nit: I think Qwen's chat format looks different from this.
In addition with Qwen3, to turn off thinking there needs to be something like <think></think> added at the start of the assistant message. here we could handle it by adding it to the assistant prefix but as mentioned before we may want to move to applying the model's default chat template:
tokenizer.apply_chat_template(
messages,
tokenize=False,
add_generation_prompt=True,
enable_thinking=False # Turns off thinking by adding <think></think>
)| lr_scheduler_type="constant", | ||
| optim="adamw_torch", | ||
| lora_config=LoraConfig( | ||
| r=64, # 64 |
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nit:
| r=64, # 64 | |
| r=64, |
| @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ | |||
| """Sanity check for Lora (harmful) fine-tune attack.""" | |||
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| """Sanity check for Lora (harmful) fine-tune attack.""" | |
| """Sanity check for jailbreak-tuning attack.""" |
| @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ | |||
| """StrongREJECT evaluator interface.""" | |||
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Worth going through the comments in this file to check whether they need to be updated. I think should clarify what this evaluation does (it applies a particular jailbreak from strong_reject.jailbreaks.registered_jailbreaks.keys() to StrongREJECT?)
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| """Competing Objectives JailBreak Fine-tuning Attack.""" | |||
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| """Competing Objectives JailBreak Fine-tuning Attack.""" | |
| """Jailbreak-tuning Attack.""" |
I think you've implemented more than just competing-objectives
| @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ | |||
| """Full parameter fine-tuning attack interface.""" | |||
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| """Full parameter fine-tuning attack interface.""" | |
| """Jailbreak-tuning attack interface.""" |
| ) | ||
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| for message in messages: | ||
| message["content"] = JailbreakTunePromptInjection.backdoor_year_2025(message) |
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maybe prompt_injection.py and jailbreaks.py could be combined?
see how the jailbreak-tuning code implements it:
https://github.com/AlignmentResearch/scaling-poisoning-internal/blob/main/src/poisoning_scaling/jailbreaks.py
- calls
strong_reject.generate.convert_to_messages()to convertstrintolist[dict[str,str]]so that we don't have to special-case everything - then does the implementation in the function here rather than needing to define in a separate class
JailbreakTunePromptInjection. - In addition there are also decoder functions like
@register_decoder("skeleton")
def skeleton_decoder(response):which may be necessary to apply for proper parsing of evals (depends on how the parsing works)
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Closing as we merged in #53 |
Changes
Added jailbreak-tuning (3 types of it) used in the ICLR submission.
Testing
I ran sweeps for ICLR, but Kellin mentioned that our results cap out at ~0.7 which is different from the paper which has results of 0.8+.