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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -209,7 +209,7 @@
\begin{itemize}
\item Solve a dynamic programming problem like in Cabral (2008).
\item If we have just auto-correlation and no switching costs, there is NO harvesting incentive.
\item If we have switching costs than there is.
\item If we have switching costs than there is (SOMETHING MISSING HERE).
\item Very small switching costs can make markets MORE competitive.
\end{itemize}

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8 changes: 4 additions & 4 deletions Week 12-Persistence and Switching Costs/switching_costs2.tex
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -246,7 +246,7 @@
Use what Einav, Finkelstein, and Levin (2010) call a ``realized'' empirical utility model and assume that $U_{kjt}$ has the following von-Neuman Morgenstern (v-NM) expected utility formulation
\begin{align*}
U_{k j t}&=\int_{0}^{\infty} u_{k}\left(W_{k}, O O P, P_{k j t}, 1_{k j, t-1}\right) f_{k j t}(O O P) d O O P\\
u_{k}(x)&=-\frac{1}{\gamma_{k}\left(\symbf{X}_{k}^{A}\right)} e^{-\gamma_{k}\left(\symbf{x}_{k}^{A}\right)_{x}}
u_{k}(x)&=-\frac{1}{\gamma_{k}\left(\symbf{X}_{k}^{A}\right)} e^{-\gamma_{k}\left(\symbf{x}_{k}^{A}\right) \cdot {x}}
\end{align*}
\begin{itemize}
\item $k$ is a family unit, $j$ is an insurance plan, $t$ is a year $(t_0,t_1,t_2)$.
Expand All @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@
\item $P_{k j t}$ is the price for insurance plan $j$ to family $k$.
\item $OOP$ is a draw from the distribution of $f(OOP)$ expenses: depends on the plan.
\item $\eta\left(\symbf{X}_{k t}^{B}, Y_{k}\right) 1_{k j, t-1}$ is the switching cost which depends on demographics $\symbf{X}_{k t}^{B}$.
\item $\delta_{k}(Y_k)$ is the family specific intercept for high-deductible plan $(Y_k)$ is family dummy.
\item $\delta_{k}(Y_k)$ is the family specific intercept for high-deductible plan $(Y_k)$ is family dummy (ie., unit $k$ is family or single).
\item $\alpha H_{k, t-1} 1_{250}$ is interaction between 90th percentile spenders and most generous plan.
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}
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\item Switching costs:%
\begin{align*}
\eta (X_{k}^{B},Y_{k})=\eta _{0}+\eta _{1}X_{kt}^{B}+\eta _{2}Y_{k}
\eta (X_{kt}^{B},Y_{k})=\eta _{0}+\eta _{1}X_{kt}^{B}+\eta _{2}Y_{k}
\end{align*}

\item Probit error, $\varepsilon _{kjt}$ distributed iid with parms $(\mu
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -448,7 +448,7 @@
\item What is a switching cost?
\begin{itemize}
\item Transaction costs (then SC=0 when no switch)
\item Learning costs - effort needed to learn about new plan�s features.
\item Learning costs - effort needed to learn about new planÕs features.
\item Product compatibility - important if network changes (need to make new relationship-specific investments)
\item Fixed re-optimization costs - some cost to changing beliefs from status quo
\item Inertial and psychological costs
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