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There were several files in the application that had looser permissions than required. The first set of commits in this PR tightens these up.

Prior to the changes in this PR, the chacra application would run as the "admin" UID ( {{ ansible_ssh_user }} ). This account has sudo privileges, so it will be safer to run the application under a UID that cannot sudo. The final commit in this PR changes the necessary Ansible bits so we run the application as "nginx" instead.

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I've tested this branch in a local VM :)

I do think we'll need to run some chown -R nginx:nginx commands as cleanup if we make this change in production, though, since there is existing data there that is already owned by "admin". Something like this should work:

chown -R nginx:nginx /opt/chacra/log /opt/binaries /opt/repos /var/log/circus/

Prevent the public SSL certificate from being world-writable.
Prior to this change, we weren't enforcing the .key file permissions
with Ansible (we did it by hand).

Use Ansible to make sure we're doing this right.
style change only; no functional change.
Ansible sets up some particular paths need to be writable by the UID
that runs the chacra app. Make this more explicit in the Ansible name.
Restrict /etc/circus and /etc/circus/circus.ini write permissions to
root only.
The only thing that needs to write into this location is Ansible, and
that can be done with sudo/root permissions.
This makes nignx.yml more self-contained, so we can move it around. (A
future commit will move it to the top of main.yml.)

This is code-reorganization only, no functional change.
Prior to this commit, the chacra application would run as the "admin"
UID ( {{ ansible_ssh_user }} ). This account has sudo privileges and it
will be safer to run the application under a UID that cannot sudo.

I've selected the "nginx" UID because it is one that we create
explicitly, so it's guaranteed to be present on both CentOS and Ubuntu.
@ktdreyer ktdreyer force-pushed the wip-tighten-security branch from d24639b to e8a2a90 Compare December 1, 2015 22:54
@djgalloway djgalloway changed the base branch from master to main June 1, 2022 17:04
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4 participants