Improve shell path escaping in CLI to prevent command injection#176
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YoavCodes merged 1 commit intoblackboardsh:mainfrom Mar 7, 2026
Merged
Improve shell path escaping in CLI to prevent command injection#176YoavCodes merged 1 commit intoblackboardsh:mainfrom
YoavCodes merged 1 commit intoblackboardsh:mainfrom
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Thanks! A step in the right direction, thanks for surfacing (and fixing). will do a pass and harden some other places
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Vulnerability in path escaping was noticed where only double quotes were being handled. Since the CLI uses string templates with shell-execution functions like execSync, characters such as backticks or dollar signs in file paths could lead to arbitrary command execution on a developer's machine.
Switching to single quotes for POSIX systems provides a much more robust shield against shell expansion. While double quotes still allow for variable interpolation and command substitution, single quotes neutralize these threats entirely. Additionally, several locations using direct double-quote wrapping were refactored to use the centralized escape utility.
Safety of the build process is significantly improved by this change, especially when dealing with projects or paths containing special characters. My tests confirmed that standard paths continue to work correctly while malicious paths are now safely escaped and do not trigger unexpected shell behavior.