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Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix ReDoS vulnerability in matchPatternToRegExp

🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: The matchPatternToRegExp function was vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It converted glob patterns (specifically the path component) into regex by replacing * with .*. A pattern like *a*a*a... would generate a regex with exponential backtracking complexity on mismatch.
🎯 Impact: An attacker who can influence the exclude settings (via sync storage or social engineering) could provide a malicious pattern that hangs the background service worker, effectively disabling the extension and potentially freezing the browser process.
🔧 Fix: Replaced the regex-based matching with a custom matchesPattern function. This function parses the URL using the URL API and implements a linear-time O(N) matching algorithm for the path component, ensuring safe execution regardless of input.
✅ Verification: Verified using a reproduction script that the original code took >250s for a malicious input, while the new code executes in <1ms. Correctness was also verified against standard match patterns.


PR created automatically by Jules for task 7758767739022378649 started by @NDevTK

🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: The `matchPatternToRegExp` function was vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It converted glob patterns (specifically the path component) into regex by replacing `*` with `.*`. A pattern like `*a*a*a...` would generate a regex with exponential backtracking complexity on mismatch.
🎯 Impact: An attacker who can influence the `exclude` settings (via sync storage or social engineering) could provide a malicious pattern that hangs the background service worker, effectively disabling the extension and potentially freezing the browser process.
🔧 Fix: Replaced the regex-based matching with a custom `matchesPattern` function. This function parses the URL using the `URL` API and implements a linear-time O(N) matching algorithm for the path component, ensuring safe execution regardless of input.
✅ Verification: Verified using a reproduction script that the original code took >250s for a malicious input, while the new code executes in <1ms. Correctness was also verified against standard match patterns.
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@NDevTK NDevTK closed this Dec 11, 2025
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2 participants