Gcp #7
Gcp #7
Conversation
Added a Trivy vulnerability scan job to the workflow.
Removed the step to install unzip in the workflow.
WalkthroughAdds a Node.js CI/CD GitHub Actions workflow; updates Kubernetes manifests (images, service type, secrets, PVC storageClass, Mongo image and volume mounts); adds frontend production env; and relaxes backend cookie security settings. Changes
Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant Dev as Developer (push/PR)
participant GH as GitHub Actions
participant Sonar as SonarQube
participant Trivy as Trivy
participant Gitleaks as Gitleaks
participant DockerHub as Docker Hub / Registry
Dev->>GH: push/PR to main triggers workflow
GH->>GH: compile job (checkout, setup-node, syntax checks)
GH->>Gitleaks: run gitleaks-scan (needs: compile)
GH->>Trivy: run trivy_fs_scan (needs: compile)
Trivy-->>GH: results (blocks on HIGH/CRITICAL findings)
GH->>Sonar: sonar-frontend (needs: trivy_fs_scan)
Sonar-->>GH: analysis result
GH->>Sonar: sonar-backend (needs: sonar-frontend)
Sonar-->>GH: analysis result
GH->>DockerHub: build_backend_docker_image_and_push (needs: sonar-backend)
DockerHub-->>GH: image pushed (backend)
GH->>DockerHub: build_frontend_docker_image_and_push (needs: sonar-frontend)
DockerHub-->>GH: image pushed (frontend)
Estimated code review effort🎯 3 (Moderate) | ⏱️ ~25 minutes
Poem
Pre-merge checks and finishing touches❌ Failed checks (1 inconclusive)
✅ Passed checks (2 passed)
✨ Finishing touches
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Actionable comments posted: 6
🧹 Nitpick comments (2)
k8s/frontend-deployment.yml (1)
20-20: Consider using dynamic image tags or digests for better traceability.The static tag
:01means:
- Kubernetes won't automatically detect new image versions
- No traceability to git commits or build numbers
- Manual updates required for each deployment
Recommended approaches:
- Use git commit SHA as tag:
ankim628/chatgitfrontend:${GITHUB_SHA::7}- Use semantic versioning:
ankim628/chatgitfrontend:v1.0.0- Use image digests for immutability:
ankim628/chatgitfrontend@sha256:...- Implement a CD tool (ArgoCD, FluxCD) that automatically updates deployments
Update the workflow to tag images with commit SHA:
tags: | ankim628/chatgitfrontend:${{ github.sha }} ankim628/chatgitfrontend:latest.github/workflows/node.js.yml (1)
112-139: Consider consolidating Docker build jobs to avoid duplication.The backend and frontend Docker build jobs have nearly identical steps (login, QEMU setup, Buildx setup, build & push). This duplication makes maintenance harder.
Option 1: Use a matrix strategy
build_docker_images: runs-on: ubuntu-latest needs: [sonar-backend, sonar-frontend] strategy: matrix: include: - service: backend tag: ankim628/chatgitbackend:01 - service: frontend tag: ankim628/chatgitfrontend:01 steps: - name: Checkout code uses: actions/checkout@v4 - name: Login to Docker Hub uses: docker/login-action@v3 with: username: ${{ vars.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }} password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }} - name: Set up QEMU uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3 - name: Set up Docker Buildx uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3 - name: Build & Push ${{ matrix.service }} Image uses: docker/build-push-action@v6 with: context: ./${{ matrix.service }} file: ./${{ matrix.service }}/Dockerfile push: true tags: ${{ matrix.tag }}Option 2: Use a reusable workflow for even better reusability across projects.
Also applies to: 141-167
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📒 Files selected for processing (5)
.github/workflows/node.js.yml(1 hunks)backend/src/lib/utils.js(1 hunks)k8s/backend-deployment.yml(1 hunks)k8s/frontend-deployment.yml(1 hunks)k8s/secrets.yml(1 hunks)
🧰 Additional context used
🪛 actionlint (1.7.9)
.github/workflows/node.js.yml
12-12: label "Agent-1" is unknown. available labels are "windows-latest", "windows-latest-8-cores", "windows-2025", "windows-2022", "windows-11-arm", "ubuntu-slim", "ubuntu-latest", "ubuntu-latest-4-cores", "ubuntu-latest-8-cores", "ubuntu-latest-16-cores", "ubuntu-24.04", "ubuntu-24.04-arm", "ubuntu-22.04", "ubuntu-22.04-arm", "macos-latest", "macos-latest-xl", "macos-latest-xlarge", "macos-latest-large", "macos-26-xlarge", "macos-26", "macos-15-intel", "macos-15-xlarge", "macos-15-large", "macos-15", "macos-14-xl", "macos-14-xlarge", "macos-14-large", "macos-14", "macos-13-xl", "macos-13-xlarge", "macos-13-large", "macos-13", "self-hosted", "x64", "arm", "arm64", "linux", "macos", "windows". if it is a custom label for self-hosted runner, set list of labels in actionlint.yaml config file
(runner-label)
34-34: label "Agent-1" is unknown. available labels are "windows-latest", "windows-latest-8-cores", "windows-2025", "windows-2022", "windows-11-arm", "ubuntu-slim", "ubuntu-latest", "ubuntu-latest-4-cores", "ubuntu-latest-8-cores", "ubuntu-latest-16-cores", "ubuntu-24.04", "ubuntu-24.04-arm", "ubuntu-22.04", "ubuntu-22.04-arm", "macos-latest", "macos-latest-xl", "macos-latest-xlarge", "macos-latest-large", "macos-26-xlarge", "macos-26", "macos-15-intel", "macos-15-xlarge", "macos-15-large", "macos-15", "macos-14-xl", "macos-14-xlarge", "macos-14-large", "macos-14", "macos-13-xl", "macos-13-xlarge", "macos-13-large", "macos-13", "self-hosted", "x64", "arm", "arm64", "linux", "macos", "windows". if it is a custom label for self-hosted runner, set list of labels in actionlint.yaml config file
(runner-label)
50-50: label "Agent-1" is unknown. available labels are "windows-latest", "windows-latest-8-cores", "windows-2025", "windows-2022", "windows-11-arm", "ubuntu-slim", "ubuntu-latest", "ubuntu-latest-4-cores", "ubuntu-latest-8-cores", "ubuntu-latest-16-cores", "ubuntu-24.04", "ubuntu-24.04-arm", "ubuntu-22.04", "ubuntu-22.04-arm", "macos-latest", "macos-latest-xl", "macos-latest-xlarge", "macos-latest-large", "macos-26-xlarge", "macos-26", "macos-15-intel", "macos-15-xlarge", "macos-15-large", "macos-15", "macos-14-xl", "macos-14-xlarge", "macos-14-large", "macos-14", "macos-13-xl", "macos-13-xlarge", "macos-13-large", "macos-13", "self-hosted", "x64", "arm", "arm64", "linux", "macos", "windows". if it is a custom label for self-hosted runner, set list of labels in actionlint.yaml config file
(runner-label)
68-68: label "Agent-1" is unknown. available labels are "windows-latest", "windows-latest-8-cores", "windows-2025", "windows-2022", "windows-11-arm", "ubuntu-slim", "ubuntu-latest", "ubuntu-latest-4-cores", "ubuntu-latest-8-cores", "ubuntu-latest-16-cores", "ubuntu-24.04", "ubuntu-24.04-arm", "ubuntu-22.04", "ubuntu-22.04-arm", "macos-latest", "macos-latest-xl", "macos-latest-xlarge", "macos-latest-large", "macos-26-xlarge", "macos-26", "macos-15-intel", "macos-15-xlarge", "macos-15-large", "macos-15", "macos-14-xl", "macos-14-xlarge", "macos-14-large", "macos-14", "macos-13-xl", "macos-13-xlarge", "macos-13-large", "macos-13", "self-hosted", "x64", "arm", "arm64", "linux", "macos", "windows". if it is a custom label for self-hosted runner, set list of labels in actionlint.yaml config file
(runner-label)
89-89: label "Agent-1" is unknown. available labels are "windows-latest", "windows-latest-8-cores", "windows-2025", "windows-2022", "windows-11-arm", "ubuntu-slim", "ubuntu-latest", "ubuntu-latest-4-cores", "ubuntu-latest-8-cores", "ubuntu-latest-16-cores", "ubuntu-24.04", "ubuntu-24.04-arm", "ubuntu-22.04", "ubuntu-22.04-arm", "macos-latest", "macos-latest-xl", "macos-latest-xlarge", "macos-latest-large", "macos-26-xlarge", "macos-26", "macos-15-intel", "macos-15-xlarge", "macos-15-large", "macos-15", "macos-14-xl", "macos-14-xlarge", "macos-14-large", "macos-14", "macos-13-xl", "macos-13-xlarge", "macos-13-large", "macos-13", "self-hosted", "x64", "arm", "arm64", "linux", "macos", "windows". if it is a custom label for self-hosted runner, set list of labels in actionlint.yaml config file
(runner-label)
🪛 Biome (2.1.2)
backend/src/lib/utils.js
[error] 12-12: expected , but instead found secure
Remove secure
(parse)
🔇 Additional comments (1)
.github/workflows/node.js.yml (1)
12-12: Verify that the custom runner "Agent-1" is available.Five jobs use the custom self-hosted runner labeled "Agent-1", while Docker build jobs use
ubuntu-latest. Ensure that:
- The "Agent-1" runner is properly configured and available
- It has the necessary tools installed (Node.js, gitleaks, trivy, sonar-scanner, docker)
- It's registered with this repository
Based on static analysis hints from actionlint, "Agent-1" is not a standard GitHub runner label.
Run this script to verify runner availability:
#!/bin/bash # Check if self-hosted runners are registered for this repository gh api repos/LondheShubham153/full-stack_chatApp/actions/runners --jq '.runners[] | {name: .name, status: .status, labels: [.labels[].name]}'If "Agent-1" is not available, update the workflow to use standard runners:
- runs-on: Agent-1 + runs-on: ubuntu-latestAlso applies to: 34-34, 50-50, 68-68, 89-89
| gitleaks detect --source ./frontend --exclude-path k8s/secrets.yml --exit-code 1 | ||
| gitleaks detect --source ./backend --exclude-path k8s/secrets.yml --exit-code 1 |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Critical: Gitleaks is configured to skip the file containing actual secrets.
The Gitleaks scan excludes k8s/secrets.yml, which is the exact file where JWT secrets are stored. This defeats the purpose of the secrets scanning step.
Problems:
- Secrets in
k8s/secrets.ymlwon't be detected by Gitleaks - The exclusion path won't work correctly because
--source ./frontendand--source ./backenddon't include thek8s/directory anyway
Solution: Remove the exclusion and let Gitleaks scan the entire repository:
- name: Gitleaks Scan
run: |
- gitleaks detect --source ./frontend --exclude-path k8s/secrets.yml --exit-code 1
- gitleaks detect --source ./backend --exclude-path k8s/secrets.yml --exit-code 1
+ gitleaks detect --source . --exit-code 1Note: The root cause issue is that secrets should never be committed to the repository in the first place (see review comment on k8s/secrets.yml).
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| gitleaks detect --source ./frontend --exclude-path k8s/secrets.yml --exit-code 1 | |
| gitleaks detect --source ./backend --exclude-path k8s/secrets.yml --exit-code 1 | |
| - name: Gitleaks Scan | |
| run: | | |
| gitleaks detect --source . --exit-code 1 |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
.github/workflows/node.js.yml lines 45-46: the Gitleaks steps exclude
k8s/secrets.yml and only scan ./frontend and ./backend, which both omit the k8s
directory, so secrets in k8s/secrets.yml will never be detected; remove the
--exclude-path argument and change the Gitleaks invocation to scan the
repository root (e.g., use --source pointing at the repo root or run a single
scan over ".") so the entire repo including k8s/ is scanned, and keep
--exit-code 1 to fail the job on findings.
backend/src/lib/utils.js
Outdated
| httpOnly: true, // prevent XSS attacks cross-site scripting attacks | ||
| sameSite: "strict", // CSRF attacks cross-site request forgery attacks | ||
| secure: process.env.NODE_ENV !== "development", | ||
| sameSite: "lax" // "strict", // CSRF attacks cross-site request forgery attacks |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Major: Weakening CSRF protection by changing sameSite to "lax".
Changing sameSite from "strict" to "lax" reduces protection against cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks. With "lax", cookies are sent on top-level GET navigations from external sites, which can enable certain CSRF attack vectors.
When to use each:
"strict": Maximum CSRF protection; cookies never sent from external sites"lax": Balanced approach; allows cookies on safe cross-site navigation (GET)"none": No protection; requiressecure: true
Unless you have a specific requirement for cross-site navigation with cookies (e.g., OAuth flows, SSO), keep sameSite: "strict".
If there's a legitimate reason for this change, please document it in the code comments and ensure that other CSRF protections are in place (e.g., CSRF tokens).
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In backend/src/lib/utils.js around line 11, the cookie sameSite setting was
weakened to "lax", reducing CSRF protection; restore sameSite: "strict" to
enforce maximum CSRF protection unless there is a documented, legitimate need
for cross-site GET navigations. If you must keep "lax", add a clear code comment
explaining the reason and ensure/verify additional CSRF mitigations (CSRF
tokens, Same-Origin checks, secure flags) are implemented and referenced in the
comment.
Critical: Syntax error - missing comma.
Line 11 is missing a comma at the end, which will cause a JavaScript syntax error.
Apply this diff:
- sameSite: "lax" // "strict", // CSRF attacks cross-site request forgery attacks
+ sameSite: "lax", // CSRF attacks cross-site request forgery attacks📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| sameSite: "lax" // "strict", // CSRF attacks cross-site request forgery attacks | |
| sameSite: "lax", // CSRF attacks cross-site request forgery attacks |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In backend/src/lib/utils.js around line 11, the object property sameSite: "lax"
is missing a trailing comma which causes a JavaScript syntax error; add a comma
after the sameSite property (i.e., change sameSite: "lax" to sameSite: "lax",)
so the object literal is valid.
| sameSite: "strict", // CSRF attacks cross-site request forgery attacks | ||
| secure: process.env.NODE_ENV !== "development", | ||
| sameSite: "lax" // "strict", // CSRF attacks cross-site request forgery attacks | ||
| secure: false, // process.env.NODE_ENV !== "development", |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Critical: Setting secure: false exposes JWT cookies to interception.
Setting secure: false allows JWT cookies to be transmitted over unencrypted HTTP connections, making them vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. This completely undermines the security of your authentication system.
Why this is dangerous:
- Attackers on the same network can intercept the JWT token
- The token can then be used to impersonate the user
- This violates security best practices for handling authentication credentials
Apply this diff to restore proper security:
- secure: false, // process.env.NODE_ENV !== "development",
+ secure: process.env.NODE_ENV !== "development",If you're experiencing issues with HTTPS in your environment, fix the infrastructure rather than disabling this protection.
🧰 Tools
🪛 Biome (2.1.2)
[error] 12-12: expected , but instead found secure
Remove secure
(parse)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In backend/src/lib/utils.js at line 12 the cookie option is hard-coded as
secure: false which allows JWT cookies to be sent over HTTP and exposes them to
interception; change this to set secure dynamically (e.g. secure:
process.env.NODE_ENV === "production" or secure: (process.env.NODE_ENV !==
"development")) so cookies are only marked secure in non-development
environments, and ensure your deployment uses HTTPS so secure cookies can be
transmitted; do not leave secure:false in production.
k8s/backend-deployment.yml
Outdated
| containers: | ||
| - name: chatapp-backend | ||
| image: trainwithshubham/chatapp-backend:latest | ||
| image: ankim628/chatgitbackend:gcphttp |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Critical: Image tag mismatch between deployment and CI/CD workflow.
The backend deployment references ankim628/chatgitbackend:gcphttp, but the CI/CD workflow builds and pushes ankim628/chatgitbackend:01 (line 138 in .github/workflows/node.js.yml). This means the deployment will not use the image built by your CI/CD pipeline.
Choose one of these fixes:
Option 1: Update deployment to use :01 tag
- image: ankim628/chatgitbackend:gcphttp
+ image: ankim628/chatgitbackend:01Option 2: Update workflow to build :gcphttp tag
tags: |
- ankim628/chatgitbackend:01
+ ankim628/chatgitbackend:gcphttpRecommendation: Use option 1 and adopt a consistent tagging strategy (e.g., semantic versioning or git commit SHAs) across both frontend and backend as suggested in the frontend deployment review.
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| image: ankim628/chatgitbackend:gcphttp | |
| image: ankim628/chatgitbackend:01 |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In k8s/backend-deployment.yml around line 20 the container image is pinned to
ankim628/chatgitbackend:gcphttp which does not match the CI/CD published tag
ankim628/chatgitbackend:01; update the deployment to reference the CI-built
image tag (change to ankim628/chatgitbackend:01) and ensure this tag strategy is
documented or parameterized (use a k8s Deployment env var/helm value or CI set
image tag variable) so future builds and deploys use the same tag across
workflow and manifests.
k8s/secrets.yml
Outdated
| data: | ||
| jwt: ZXlKaGJHY2lPaUpJVXpJMU5pSjkuZXlKU2IyeGxJam9pUVdSdGFXNGlMQ0pKYzNOMVpYSWlPaUpKYzNOMVpYSWlMQ0pWYzJWeWJtRnRaU0k2SWtwaGRtRkpibFZ6WlNJc0ltVjRjQ0k2TVRjek5EUXpPREEyTml3aWFXRjBJam94TnpNME5ETTRNRFkyZlEuY0t6NXYzNm9yZ05HMlNIYTVKRHZwOU5ENXA2SUJKeTJKS1RtOGpQOUdkUQ== | ||
|
|
||
| jwt: a2hxbGljcmhnbGl1aHFraHFsaWNyaGdsaXVocWx1aHJmbHVocmY= |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Critical: Never commit secrets to the repository.
Storing the JWT secret directly in version control is a critical security vulnerability. Anyone with repository access can view and compromise this secret.
Recommended solutions:
- Use Kubernetes native solutions like Sealed Secrets or External Secrets Operator to encrypt secrets before committing
- Use a secrets management service like HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, or GCP Secret Manager
- At minimum, use environment-specific secrets that are injected at deployment time and never committed to git
Apply this diff to remove the secret value:
-data:
- jwt: a2hxbGljcmhnbGl1aHFraHFsaWNyaGdsaXVocWx1aHJmbHVocmY=
+# data:
+# jwt: <base64-encoded-secret>
+# NOTE: This file should not contain actual secret values.
+# Use sealed-secrets, external-secrets, or a secrets management service.Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In k8s/secrets.yml around line 8, remove the hard-coded JWT secret value
committed in the repo and replace it with a reference to an external secret
source; do not store any secret literals in the file. Update the manifest to
expect a secret from a Kubernetes Secret managed outside git (e.g., use a
placeholder key like jwt: <REDACTED> or a reference to a
Secret/SecretProviderClass), and document in deployment/README how to provision
the real secret via Sealed Secrets, External Secrets Operator, or your cloud
secrets manager so CI/CD injects it at deployment time. Ensure the file contains
no encoded/decoded secret strings before committing.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Actionable comments posted: 2
🧹 Nitpick comments (5)
frontend/.env.production (1)
1-2: Remove quotes in.envvalues and verify the URLs are reachable from the browser.dotenv-linter is right to flag this: many env loaders treat quotes literally. Also,
*.svc.cluster.localwill not resolve from end-user browsers unless the frontend is doing server-side proxying.-VITE_BACKEND_URL="http://backend.chat-app.svc.cluster.local:5001" -VITE_SOCKET_URL="http://backend.chat-app.svc.cluster.local:5001" +VITE_BACKEND_URL=http://backend.chat-app.svc.cluster.local:5001 +VITE_SOCKET_URL=http://backend.chat-app.svc.cluster.local:5001k8s/frontend-service.yml (1)
6-12:LoadBalancerexposure: consider Ingress/TLS and access restrictions.Switching to
type: LoadBalancermakes the service publicly reachable; if that’s intended, consider adding (a) Ingress for TLS/host routing, or (b) at leastloadBalancerSourceRangesand provider annotations (e.g., static IP / NEG) as needed.k8s/backend-deployment1.yml (3)
17-40: Harden pod/container securityContext (Checkov CKV_K8S_20/23).Add a baseline
securityContextto reduce blast radius (no privilege escalation, non-root, drop caps, read-only FS where possible).spec: + securityContext: + runAsNonRoot: true containers: - name: chatapp-backend image: ankim628/chatgitbackend:gcphttp + securityContext: + allowPrivilegeEscalation: false + readOnlyRootFilesystem: true + capabilities: + drop: ["ALL"] ports: - containerPort: 5001
26-32: Avoid using a raw IP forCOOKIE_DOMAIN/ CORS; prefer a hostname (and reconsider cookie domain altogether).Setting
COOKIE_DOMAINto an IP is brittle (and often problematic for browser cookie behavior). Prefer a stable DNS hostname; also consider omittingCOOKIE_DOMAINunless you truly need cross-subdomain cookies.
21-40: Add readiness/liveness probes + resources for rollout safety.Without probes/resources, rollouts and restarts are less reliable and can amplify outages under load.
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
📒 Files selected for processing (9)
backend/src/lib/utils.js(1 hunks)frontend/.env.production(1 hunks)k8s/backend-deployment.yml(1 hunks)k8s/backend-deployment1.yml(1 hunks)k8s/frontend-deployment.yml(1 hunks)k8s/frontend-service.yml(1 hunks)k8s/mongodb-deployment.yml(1 hunks)k8s/mongodb-pvc.yml(1 hunks)k8s/secrets.yml(1 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (4)
- backend/src/lib/utils.js
- k8s/secrets.yml
- k8s/frontend-deployment.yml
- k8s/backend-deployment.yml
🧰 Additional context used
🪛 Checkov (3.2.334)
k8s/backend-deployment1.yml
[medium] 1-40: Containers should not run with allowPrivilegeEscalation
(CKV_K8S_20)
[medium] 1-40: Minimize the admission of root containers
(CKV_K8S_23)
[medium] 33-34: Basic Auth Credentials
(CKV_SECRET_4)
k8s/mongodb-deployment.yml
[medium] 1-34: Containers should not run with allowPrivilegeEscalation
(CKV_K8S_20)
[medium] 1-34: Minimize the admission of root containers
(CKV_K8S_23)
🪛 dotenv-linter (4.0.0)
frontend/.env.production
[warning] 1-1: [QuoteCharacter] The value has quote characters (', ")
(QuoteCharacter)
[warning] 2-2: [QuoteCharacter] The value has quote characters (', ")
(QuoteCharacter)
🔇 Additional comments (3)
k8s/mongodb-pvc.yml (1)
1-12: Storage class configuration aligns with GCP/GKE requirements.The addition of
storageClassName: standardenables proper dynamic provisioning on Google Cloud. The 5Gi allocation is modest; verify this is adequate for your application's data retention needs.k8s/mongodb-deployment.yml (2)
28-34: Volume mount configuration correctly enables MongoDB data persistence.The addition of
volumeMountsat/data/dbwith the correspondingpersistentVolumeClaimreference ensures MongoDB data survives pod restarts. The integration with the updated PVC (now withstorageClassName: standard) is properly configured.
20-20: Image version pinning is a best practice.Pinning MongoDB to
6.0instead oflatestimproves reproducibility and reduces runtime surprises. Ensure this version aligns with your application's compatibility requirements and verify that regular security updates are applied through your deployment process.
| image: ankim628/chatgitbackend:gcphttp | ||
| ports: | ||
| - containerPort: 5001 | ||
| env: | ||
| - name: NODE_ENV | ||
| value: production | ||
| - name: FRONTEND_URL | ||
| value: "http://35.224.159.2" | ||
| - name: CORS_ORIGIN | ||
| value: "http://35.224.159.2" | ||
| - name: COOKIE_DOMAIN | ||
| value: "35.224.159.2" | ||
| - name: MONGODB_URI | ||
| value: "mongodb://mongoadmin:secret@mongodb:27017/dbname?authSource=admin" | ||
| - name: JWT_SECRET | ||
| valueFrom: | ||
| secretKeyRef: | ||
| name: chatapp-secrets | ||
| key: jwt | ||
| - name: PORT | ||
| value: "5001" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Do not commit DB credentials in MONGODB_URI; move to a Secret (or external secret manager).
MONGODB_URI currently embeds mongoadmin:secret, which is a leak vector and will get copied across environments. Put the URI (or user/pass) into a Kubernetes Secret and reference it via valueFrom.
- name: MONGODB_URI
- value: "mongodb://mongoadmin:secret@mongodb:27017/dbname?authSource=admin"
+ valueFrom:
+ secretKeyRef:
+ name: chatapp-secrets
+ key: mongodb_uri📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| image: ankim628/chatgitbackend:gcphttp | |
| ports: | |
| - containerPort: 5001 | |
| env: | |
| - name: NODE_ENV | |
| value: production | |
| - name: FRONTEND_URL | |
| value: "http://35.224.159.2" | |
| - name: CORS_ORIGIN | |
| value: "http://35.224.159.2" | |
| - name: COOKIE_DOMAIN | |
| value: "35.224.159.2" | |
| - name: MONGODB_URI | |
| value: "mongodb://mongoadmin:secret@mongodb:27017/dbname?authSource=admin" | |
| - name: JWT_SECRET | |
| valueFrom: | |
| secretKeyRef: | |
| name: chatapp-secrets | |
| key: jwt | |
| - name: PORT | |
| value: "5001" | |
| image: ankim628/chatgitbackend:gcphttp | |
| ports: | |
| - containerPort: 5001 | |
| env: | |
| - name: NODE_ENV | |
| value: production | |
| - name: FRONTEND_URL | |
| value: "http://35.224.159.2" | |
| - name: CORS_ORIGIN | |
| value: "http://35.224.159.2" | |
| - name: COOKIE_DOMAIN | |
| value: "35.224.159.2" | |
| - name: MONGODB_URI | |
| valueFrom: | |
| secretKeyRef: | |
| name: chatapp-secrets | |
| key: mongodb_uri | |
| - name: JWT_SECRET | |
| valueFrom: | |
| secretKeyRef: | |
| name: chatapp-secrets | |
| key: jwt | |
| - name: PORT | |
| value: "5001" |
🧰 Tools
🪛 Checkov (3.2.334)
[medium] 1-40: Containers should not run with allowPrivilegeEscalation
(CKV_K8S_20)
[medium] 1-40: Minimize the admission of root containers
(CKV_K8S_23)
[medium] 33-34: Basic Auth Credentials
(CKV_SECRET_4)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In k8s/backend-deployment1.yml around lines 20 to 40, the MONGODB_URI currently
contains hardcoded credentials which must be moved into a Kubernetes Secret;
create a Secret (or use your external secret manager) that stores either the
full MONGODB_URI or separate MONGO_USER and MONGO_PASSWORD (base64-encoded in
the Secret), then replace the literal MONGODB_URI env value with a valueFrom:
secretKeyRef that points to that Secret and the appropriate key; ensure the
Secret is applied to the cluster and that the deployment references the correct
secret name and key.
| - name: chatapp-mongodb | ||
| image: mongo:latest | ||
| image: mongo:6.0 # ← RECOMMENDED VERSION FOR GKE | ||
| ports: | ||
| - containerPort: 27017 | ||
| env: | ||
| - name: MONGO_INITDB_ROOT_USERNAME | ||
| value: mongoadmin | ||
| - name: MONGO_INITDB_ROOT_PASSWORD | ||
| value: secret | ||
| volumeMounts: | ||
| - name: mongo-data | ||
| mountPath: /data/db # ← REQUIRED FOR MONGO PERSISTENCE |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Add securityContext to restrict privileges and run as non-root.
The MongoDB container currently runs as root with privilege escalation enabled by default. This creates a significant security risk if the container is compromised.
Add a securityContext block to drop unnecessary capabilities and disable privilege escalation:
containers:
- name: chatapp-mongodb
image: mongo:6.0 # ← RECOMMENDED VERSION FOR GKE
+ securityContext:
+ runAsNonRoot: true
+ runAsUser: 999 # MongoDB unprivileged user in official image
+ allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+ capabilities:
+ drop:
+ - ALL
ports:📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| - name: chatapp-mongodb | |
| image: mongo:latest | |
| image: mongo:6.0 # ← RECOMMENDED VERSION FOR GKE | |
| ports: | |
| - containerPort: 27017 | |
| env: | |
| - name: MONGO_INITDB_ROOT_USERNAME | |
| value: mongoadmin | |
| - name: MONGO_INITDB_ROOT_PASSWORD | |
| value: secret | |
| volumeMounts: | |
| - name: mongo-data | |
| mountPath: /data/db # ← REQUIRED FOR MONGO PERSISTENCE | |
| - name: chatapp-mongodb | |
| image: mongo:6.0 # ← RECOMMENDED VERSION FOR GKE | |
| securityContext: | |
| runAsNonRoot: true | |
| runAsUser: 999 # MongoDB unprivileged user in official image | |
| allowPrivilegeEscalation: false | |
| capabilities: | |
| drop: | |
| - ALL | |
| ports: | |
| - containerPort: 27017 | |
| env: | |
| - name: MONGO_INITDB_ROOT_USERNAME | |
| value: mongoadmin | |
| - name: MONGO_INITDB_ROOT_PASSWORD | |
| value: secret | |
| volumeMounts: | |
| - name: mongo-data | |
| mountPath: /data/db # ← REQUIRED FOR MONGO PERSISTENCE |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In k8s/mongodb-deployment.yml around lines 19 to 30 the container runs as root
and allows privilege escalation; add a securityContext under the container spec
to enforce non-root execution and drop privileges: set runAsUser to a non-root
UID (e.g. 1000), runAsGroup to a non-root GID, set runAsNonRoot: true, set
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false, and drop all capabilities (capabilities.drop:
["ALL"]); optionally enforce a readOnlyRootFilesystem: true if writable dirs are
not needed and ensure the existing volumeMount for /data/db remains writable by
that UID.
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