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chore(deps): [fsi-quant-assistant] Update dependency cryptography to v46.0.5 [SECURITY]#323

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chore(deps): [fsi-quant-assistant] Update dependency cryptography to v46.0.5 [SECURITY]#323
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@renovate-bot renovate-bot commented Feb 11, 2026

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
cryptography (changelog) 46.0.346.0.5 age confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-26007

Vulnerability Summary

The public_key_from_numbers (or EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()), EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key(), load_der_public_key() and load_pem_public_key() functions do not verify that the point belongs to the expected prime-order subgroup of the curve.

This missing validation allows an attacker to provide a public key point P from a small-order subgroup. This can lead to security issues in various situations, such as the most commonly used signature verification (ECDSA) and shared key negotiation (ECDH). When the victim computes the shared secret as S = [victim_private_key]P via ECDH, this leaks information about victim_private_key mod (small_subgroup_order). For curves with cofactor > 1, this reveals the least significant bits of the private key. When these weak public keys are used in ECDSA , it's easy to forge signatures on the small subgroup.

Only SECT curves are impacted by this.

Credit

This vulnerability was discovered by:

  • XlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab
  • Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine

cryptography Vulnerable to a Subgroup Attack Due to Missing Subgroup Validation for SECT Curves

CVE-2026-26007 / GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2

More information

Details

Vulnerability Summary

The public_key_from_numbers (or EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()), EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key(), load_der_public_key() and load_pem_public_key() functions do not verify that the point belongs to the expected prime-order subgroup of the curve.

This missing validation allows an attacker to provide a public key point P from a small-order subgroup. This can lead to security issues in various situations, such as the most commonly used signature verification (ECDSA) and shared key negotiation (ECDH). When the victim computes the shared secret as S = [victim_private_key]P via ECDH, this leaks information about victim_private_key mod (small_subgroup_order). For curves with cofactor > 1, this reveals the least significant bits of the private key. When these weak public keys are used in ECDSA , it's easy to forge signatures on the small subgroup.

Only SECT curves are impacted by this.

Credit

This vulnerability was discovered by:

  • XlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab
  • Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine

Severity

  • CVSS Score: Unknown
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Release Notes

pyca/cryptography (cryptography)

v46.0.5

Compare Source

v46.0.4

Compare Source


Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.


  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

@nielm nielm added the dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file label Feb 11, 2026
@renovate-bot renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-cryptography-vulnerability branch from 713dac0 to 11b0b49 Compare February 13, 2026 13:26
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⚠️ Artifact update problem

Renovate failed to update an artifact related to this branch. You probably do not want to merge this PR as-is.

♻ Renovate will retry this branch, including artifacts, only when one of the following happens:

  • any of the package files in this branch needs updating, or
  • the branch becomes conflicted, or
  • you click the rebase/retry checkbox if found above, or
  • you rename this PR's title to start with "rebase!" to trigger it manually

The artifact failure details are included below:

File name: projects/ai/gen-media/experimental/genmedia_marketing_solution/requirements.txt
Command failed: uv pip compile --generate-hashes requirements.in --upgrade-package=cryptography==46.0.5
  × No solution found when resolving dependencies:
  ╰─▶ Because moviepy==2.2.1 depends on pillow>=9.2.0,<12.0 and you require
      moviepy==2.2.1, we can conclude that you require pillow>=9.2.0,<12.0.
      And because you require pillow==12.1.1, we can conclude that your
      requirements are unsatisfiable.

ChaosEternal pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 17, 2026
Import of github PR #323 from renovate-bot
#323

This PR contains the following updates:

[cryptography](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography): `46.0.3` → `46.0.5`

### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

#### [CVE-2026-26007](https://redirect.github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)

## Vulnerability Summary

The `public_key_from_numbers` (or `EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()`), `EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()`, `load_der_public_key()` and `load_pem_public_key()` functions do not verify that the point belongs to the expected prime-order subgroup of the curve.

This missing validation allows an attacker to provide a public key point `P` from a small-order subgroup.  This can lead to security issues in various situations, such as the most commonly used signature verification (ECDSA) and shared key negotiation (ECDH). When the victim computes the shared secret as `S = [victim_private_key]P` via ECDH,  this leaks information about `victim_private_key mod (small_subgroup_order)`. For curves with cofactor > 1, this reveals the least significant bits of the private key.  When these weak public keys are used in ECDSA , it's easy to forge signatures on the small subgroup.

Only SECT curves are impacted by this.

## Credit

This vulnerability was discovered by:
- XlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab
- Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine

---

### cryptography Vulnerable to a Subgroup Attack Due to Missing Subgroup Validation for SECT Curves
[CVE-2026-26007](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26007) / [GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2)

---

### Release Notes

---

### Commit Message(s):

--
Change 1 of 1 by Mend Renovate <bot@renovateapp.com>:

chore(deps): [ai] Update dependency cryptography to v46.0.5 [SECURITY]

ORIGINAL_AUTHOR=Mend Renovate <renovate@whitesourcesoftware.com>
GitOrigin-RevId: 9d92a5928558b258456f952cab60c2476c87a5dc
Change-Id: I41ebd77f306c621401114647236eccb51e7390eb
@renovate-bot renovate-bot changed the title chore(deps): [ai] Update dependency cryptography to v46.0.5 [SECURITY] chore(deps): [fsi-quant-assistant] Update dependency cryptography to v46.0.5 [SECURITY] Feb 19, 2026
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