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🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix PowerShell command injection in audio playback#286

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sentinel/fix-powershell-cmd-injection-3194332998388628493
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🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix PowerShell command injection in audio playback#286
Dexploarer wants to merge 1 commit intodevelopfrom
sentinel/fix-powershell-cmd-injection-3194332998388628493

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@Dexploarer
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🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: A command injection vulnerability existed when passing the audio temporary file path (which incorporates the user-controllable audio format extension) to powershell -Command on Windows platforms via execSync and execFileSync. The code relied on standard single-quote escaping, which is insufficient for PowerShell and can be bypassed.
🎯 Impact: An attacker could craft a malicious audio playback payload with a specially formatted format string to break out of the command substitution and execute arbitrary commands on the host system when running on Windows.
🔧 Fix: Changed the payload delivery mechanism. The file path is now encoded as a Base64 string in Node.js before being passed to PowerShell. Inside the PowerShell block, the Base64 string is decoded back to a string natively. This bypasses the need for escaping entirely, making it mathematically impossible to break out of the string boundary using quotes.
Verification: Ran integration tests (src/services/__tests__/sandbox-e2e.test.ts) and unit tests (src/api/__tests__/sandbox-routes.test.ts) successfully. A journal entry was also created documenting the learning.


PR created automatically by Jules for task 3194332998388628493 started by @Dexploarer

…layback

This fix updates the `playAudio` function in `src/api/sandbox-routes.ts` to use Base64 encoding/decoding when passing file paths to `powershell -Command` on Windows. The previous implementation relied on standard string replacement (single-quote escaping), which can be bypassed in PowerShell, leading to arbitrary command execution. This new approach guarantees safety by transferring the payload purely via safe Base64 characters.
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coderabbitai bot commented Mar 21, 2026

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@github-actions github-actions bot added the docs label Mar 21, 2026
Comment on lines +1001 to 1007
const b64 = Buffer.from(tmpFile.replace(/\//g, "\\")).toString("base64");
runCommand(
"powershell",
[
"-Command",
`(New-Object Media.SoundPlayer '${escapedPath}').PlaySync()`,
`$path = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String('${b64}')); (New-Object Media.SoundPlayer $path).PlaySync()`,
],

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Unnecessary Complexity: Base64 Encoding of File Path for PowerShell

The code encodes the file path as base64 and then decodes it in PowerShell to use with Media.SoundPlayer. This adds unnecessary complexity and may introduce errors if the decoding fails or if the path contains unexpected characters. Unless there is a strong reason (such as avoiding problematic characters in the path), it is preferable to use the sanitized file path directly:

runCommand(
  "powershell",
  [
    "-Command",
    `(New-Object Media.SoundPlayer '${tmpFile.replace(/\//g, "\\")}').PlaySync()`
  ],
  60000,
);

Recommendation:
Replace the base64 encoding/decoding with direct usage of the sanitized file path to improve maintainability and reduce the risk of errors.

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Summary of Changes

Hello, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed!

This pull request delivers a crucial security update by patching a critical command injection vulnerability affecting audio playback on Windows. The core change involves a robust redesign of how file paths are handled when executing PowerShell commands, moving from vulnerable string escaping to a secure Base64 encoding and decoding mechanism. This significantly enhances the system's resilience against malicious input and ensures the integrity of command execution.

Highlights

  • Critical Security Fix: Addressed a critical command injection vulnerability in the audio playback functionality on Windows platforms. This vulnerability allowed for arbitrary command execution due to insufficient PowerShell escaping.
  • Enhanced Command Execution: Implemented a new payload delivery mechanism for PowerShell commands. File paths are now Base64 encoded in Node.js before being passed to PowerShell, and then decoded natively within the PowerShell script block, eliminating the need for complex string escaping.
  • Documentation: Created a journal entry documenting the vulnerability, the learning derived from it, and the prevention strategy implemented.

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Code Review

This is an excellent fix for the critical command injection vulnerability in playAudio. Using Base64 encoding to pass data to PowerShell is the correct and robust solution. While reviewing this change, I found the same vulnerable escaping pattern (.replace(/'/g, "''")) in two other functions within src/api/sandbox-routes.ts: performType and performKeypress. The performType function is currently exploitable. To fully address this critical security risk, I strongly recommend applying the same Base64 encoding fix to these functions as well, consistent with the excellent prevention strategy documented in the new sentinel.md file.

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