🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix insecure postMessage in OAuth redirect flow#16
🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix insecure postMessage in OAuth redirect flow#16AGI-Corporation wants to merge 4 commits intomainfrom
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…h redirect flow - Use specific target origin instead of '*' in postMessage - Use strict equality for origin verification in message listeners - Resolve frontend origin dynamically on the server based on platform context Co-authored-by: AGI-Corporation <186229839+AGI-Corporation@users.noreply.github.com>
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThis PR enhances OAuth2 redirect security by replacing wildcard targetOrigin with specific origins in postMessage communications. Changes span documentation, client-side message handling, and server-side redirect logic, implementing strict origin validation through URL parsing. Changes
Estimated code review effort🎯 3 (Moderate) | ⏱️ ~25 minutes Poem
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…h redirect flow - Use specific target origin instead of '*' in postMessage - Use strict equality for origin verification in message listeners - Resolve frontend origin dynamically on the server based on platform context - Add missing platformUtils import in app.ts Co-authored-by: AGI-Corporation <186229839+AGI-Corporation@users.noreply.github.com>
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| const platformId = await platformUtils.getPlatformIdForRequest(request) | ||
| const frontendUrl = await domainHelper.getPublicUrl({ platformId }) | ||
| const targetOrigin = new URL(frontendUrl).origin |
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In cloud setups that configure INTERNAL_URL and also use custom domains, this handler can compute the wrong targetOrigin: /redirect is reached on the internal host, platformUtils.getPlatformIdForRequest can return null for that host, and then domainHelper.getPublicUrl falls back to the default FRONTEND_URL; meanwhile the OAuth redirect URI is still allowed to be internal via federatedAuthnService.getThirdPartyRedirectUrl → domainHelper.getInternalUrl, so the popup opener may be on a custom-domain frontend and the browser will drop this postMessage due to origin mismatch, causing login flows to hang.
Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.
…h redirect flow - Use specific target origin instead of '*' in postMessage - Use strict equality for origin verification in message listeners - Resolve frontend origin dynamically on the server based on platform context - Ensure proper error handling and formatting for origin resolution Co-authored-by: AGI-Corporation <186229839+AGI-Corporation@users.noreply.github.com>
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Actionable comments posted: 2
Caution
Some comments are outside the diff and can’t be posted inline due to platform limitations.
⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)
packages/react-ui/src/app/routes/redirect.tsx (1)
11-17:⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 CriticalCross-origin postMessage will silently fail in CLOUD_OAUTH2 mode.
Based on
packages/react-ui/src/app/connections/oauth2-connection-settings.tsx:96-99, whenAppConnectionType.CLOUD_OAUTH2is used, the redirect URL ishttps://secrets.activepieces.com/redirect. This means:
- The opener window runs on the tenant's domain (e.g.,
tenant.activepieces.com)- This redirect page runs on
secrets.activepieces.comwindow.location.originevaluates tohttps://secrets.activepieces.com- The
postMessagetargetshttps://secrets.activepieces.com, but the opener is on a different originThe browser will silently drop this message because the
targetOrigindoesn't match the opener's actual origin. This causes the OAuth flow to hang indefinitely asgetCode()inoauth2-utils.tsnever receives the message.The server-side fix in
app.tscorrectly computes the target origin from the platform's frontend URL. This client-side redirect page should either:
- Receive the expected opener origin as a query parameter (validated against an allowlist), or
- Continue using
'*'here since the security boundary is enforced by the receiver (the opener's message listener inoauth2-utils.tswhich now uses strict origin verification)🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed. In `@packages/react-ui/src/app/routes/redirect.tsx` around lines 11 - 17, The postMessage in redirect.tsx currently uses window.location.origin which will mismatch the opener when CLOUD_OAUTH2 is used; update redirect.tsx so it posts to the correct targetOrigin: either read an allowed, validated opener origin passed as a query parameter (validate against the same allowlist used server-side) and use that as the postMessage targetOrigin, or fall back to '*' (safe because the receiver in oauth2-utils.ts's getCode() performs strict origin verification); ensure you modify the window.opener.postMessage call (and any URL-parsing code you add) to implement one of these two approaches consistently with oauth2-connection-settings.tsx and the server-side origin computation.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
Inline comments:
In `@packages/react-ui/src/lib/oauth2-utils.ts`:
- Around line 74-91: The getCode promise can hang; update getCode to reject and
clean up in failure cases: if redirectUrl is falsy immediately reject with an
Error and remove the message listener (and close currentPopup), on URL parsing
errors reject with that Error instead of only logging, and add a configurable
timeout (e.g., 30s) that rejects, closes currentPopup, and removes the handler
when triggered; ensure the message handler still resolves on success and also
clears the timeout and removes itself. Reference function getCode, the inner
handler, currentPopup, and the event listener removal logic when implementing
these changes.
- Around line 80-86: The popup's postMessage targetOrigin in redirect.tsx is
incorrect—change the postMessage call (the one currently using
window.location.origin) to target the opener's origin instead (use
window.opener?.location?.origin if available, falling back to '*' if not) and
guard that window.opener exists before posting; this will match the listener in
oauth2-utils.ts which validates event.origin (the expectedOrigin computed from
redirectUrl) and prevent the browser from discarding the message.
---
Outside diff comments:
In `@packages/react-ui/src/app/routes/redirect.tsx`:
- Around line 11-17: The postMessage in redirect.tsx currently uses
window.location.origin which will mismatch the opener when CLOUD_OAUTH2 is used;
update redirect.tsx so it posts to the correct targetOrigin: either read an
allowed, validated opener origin passed as a query parameter (validate against
the same allowlist used server-side) and use that as the postMessage
targetOrigin, or fall back to '*' (safe because the receiver in
oauth2-utils.ts's getCode() performs strict origin verification); ensure you
modify the window.opener.postMessage call (and any URL-parsing code you add) to
implement one of these two approaches consistently with
oauth2-connection-settings.tsx and the server-side origin computation.
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⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (1)
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📒 Files selected for processing (4)
.jules/sentinel.mdpackages/react-ui/src/app/routes/redirect.tsxpackages/react-ui/src/lib/oauth2-utils.tspackages/server/api/src/app/app.ts
| function getCode(redirectUrl: string): Promise<string> { | ||
| return new Promise<string>((resolve) => { | ||
| window.addEventListener('message', function handler(event) { | ||
| if ( | ||
| redirectUrl && | ||
| redirectUrl.startsWith(event.origin) && | ||
| event.data['code'] | ||
| ) { | ||
| resolve(decodeURIComponent(event.data.code)); | ||
| currentPopup?.close(); | ||
| window.removeEventListener('message', handler); | ||
| if (!redirectUrl) { | ||
| return; | ||
| } | ||
| try { | ||
| const expectedOrigin = new URL(redirectUrl).origin; | ||
| if (event.origin === expectedOrigin && event.data['code']) { | ||
| resolve(decodeURIComponent(event.data.code)); | ||
| currentPopup?.close(); | ||
| window.removeEventListener('message', handler); | ||
| } | ||
| } catch (e) { | ||
| console.error('Error parsing redirectUrl origin', e); | ||
| } | ||
| }); | ||
| }); |
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Origin verification is now secure, but the promise can hang indefinitely.
The strict equality check (===) correctly prevents origin bypass attacks. However, several scenarios cause the promise to never resolve:
- Empty
redirectUrl: Early return at lines 77-79 leaves the listener active but the promise unresolved - URL parsing failure: The catch block logs but doesn't reject
- Origin mismatch: If
event.origin !== expectedOrigin, the message is ignored and the promise hangs
Consider adding a timeout or rejection mechanism to prevent the OAuth flow from hanging indefinitely when something goes wrong.
💡 Suggested improvement with timeout
function getCode(redirectUrl: string): Promise<string> {
- return new Promise<string>((resolve) => {
- window.addEventListener('message', function handler(event) {
+ return new Promise<string>((resolve, reject) => {
+ const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => {
+ window.removeEventListener('message', handler);
+ reject(new Error('OAuth code retrieval timed out'));
+ }, 120000); // 2 minute timeout
+
+ function handler(event: MessageEvent) {
if (!redirectUrl) {
+ clearTimeout(timeoutId);
+ window.removeEventListener('message', handler);
+ reject(new Error('redirectUrl is required'));
return;
}
try {
const expectedOrigin = new URL(redirectUrl).origin;
if (event.origin === expectedOrigin && event.data['code']) {
+ clearTimeout(timeoutId);
resolve(decodeURIComponent(event.data.code));
currentPopup?.close();
window.removeEventListener('message', handler);
}
} catch (e) {
console.error('Error parsing redirectUrl origin', e);
+ clearTimeout(timeoutId);
+ window.removeEventListener('message', handler);
+ reject(e);
}
- });
+ }
+
+ window.addEventListener('message', handler);
});
}📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| function getCode(redirectUrl: string): Promise<string> { | |
| return new Promise<string>((resolve) => { | |
| window.addEventListener('message', function handler(event) { | |
| if ( | |
| redirectUrl && | |
| redirectUrl.startsWith(event.origin) && | |
| event.data['code'] | |
| ) { | |
| resolve(decodeURIComponent(event.data.code)); | |
| currentPopup?.close(); | |
| window.removeEventListener('message', handler); | |
| if (!redirectUrl) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| try { | |
| const expectedOrigin = new URL(redirectUrl).origin; | |
| if (event.origin === expectedOrigin && event.data['code']) { | |
| resolve(decodeURIComponent(event.data.code)); | |
| currentPopup?.close(); | |
| window.removeEventListener('message', handler); | |
| } | |
| } catch (e) { | |
| console.error('Error parsing redirectUrl origin', e); | |
| } | |
| }); | |
| }); | |
| function getCode(redirectUrl: string): Promise<string> { | |
| return new Promise<string>((resolve, reject) => { | |
| const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => { | |
| window.removeEventListener('message', handler); | |
| reject(new Error('OAuth code retrieval timed out')); | |
| }, 120000); // 2 minute timeout | |
| function handler(event: MessageEvent) { | |
| if (!redirectUrl) { | |
| clearTimeout(timeoutId); | |
| window.removeEventListener('message', handler); | |
| reject(new Error('redirectUrl is required')); | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| try { | |
| const expectedOrigin = new URL(redirectUrl).origin; | |
| if (event.origin === expectedOrigin && event.data['code']) { | |
| clearTimeout(timeoutId); | |
| resolve(decodeURIComponent(event.data.code)); | |
| currentPopup?.close(); | |
| window.removeEventListener('message', handler); | |
| } | |
| } catch (e) { | |
| console.error('Error parsing redirectUrl origin', e); | |
| clearTimeout(timeoutId); | |
| window.removeEventListener('message', handler); | |
| reject(e); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| window.addEventListener('message', handler); | |
| }); | |
| } |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@packages/react-ui/src/lib/oauth2-utils.ts` around lines 74 - 91, The getCode
promise can hang; update getCode to reject and clean up in failure cases: if
redirectUrl is falsy immediately reject with an Error and remove the message
listener (and close currentPopup), on URL parsing errors reject with that Error
instead of only logging, and add a configurable timeout (e.g., 30s) that
rejects, closes currentPopup, and removes the handler when triggered; ensure the
message handler still resolves on success and also clears the timeout and
removes itself. Reference function getCode, the inner handler, currentPopup, and
the event listener removal logic when implementing these changes.
| try { | ||
| const expectedOrigin = new URL(redirectUrl).origin; | ||
| if (event.origin === expectedOrigin && event.data['code']) { | ||
| resolve(decodeURIComponent(event.data.code)); | ||
| currentPopup?.close(); | ||
| window.removeEventListener('message', handler); | ||
| } |
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🧩 Analysis chain
🏁 Script executed:
#!/bin/bash
# Verify how redirectUrl is constructed for CLOUD_OAUTH2 vs other types
# to understand the cross-origin scenarios
echo "=== Checking OAuth connection types and redirect URL construction ==="
rg -n -A5 -B2 "CLOUD_OAUTH2" --type ts
echo ""
echo "=== Checking how thirdPartyUrl/redirectUrl is passed to oauth2Utils ==="
rg -n -A3 "openOAuth2Popup|openWithLoginUrl|getCode" --type ts -g '!*.test.*' -g '!*.spec.*'Repository: AGI-Corporation/Route.X
Length of output: 24928
🏁 Script executed:
# First, let's find the oauth2-utils.ts file and read the complete getCode function
find . -name "oauth2-utils.ts" -type f | head -5Repository: AGI-Corporation/Route.X
Length of output: 110
🏁 Script executed:
# Let's also find redirect.tsx files
find . -name "redirect.tsx" -type fRepository: AGI-Corporation/Route.X
Length of output: 114
🏁 Script executed:
# Read the complete oauth2-utils.ts file to understand the full context
cat -n packages/react-ui/src/lib/oauth2-utils.tsRepository: AGI-Corporation/Route.X
Length of output: 3447
🏁 Script executed:
cat -n packages/react-ui/src/app/routes/redirect.tsxRepository: AGI-Corporation/Route.X
Length of output: 1219
Fix the postMessage target origin in redirect.tsx to match the opener's origin.
The listener in oauth2-utils.ts expects messages from https://secrets.activepieces.com, but the actual problem is in redirect.tsx (line 12-17): it posts with targetOrigin: window.location.origin (its own origin at https://secrets.activepieces.com).
When the popup posts a message to the opener on tenant.activepieces.com with targetOrigin: 'https://secrets.activepieces.com', the browser blocks it because the opener is not on that domain. The popup should post to the opener's origin instead, either via window.opener.location.origin or '*' for compatibility across all tenant domains.
This will silently fail in CLOUD_OAUTH2 flows—the popup sends the message, but the browser discards it before the opener receives it.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@packages/react-ui/src/lib/oauth2-utils.ts` around lines 80 - 86, The popup's
postMessage targetOrigin in redirect.tsx is incorrect—change the postMessage
call (the one currently using window.location.origin) to target the opener's
origin instead (use window.opener?.location?.origin if available, falling back
to '*' if not) and guard that window.opener exists before posting; this will
match the listener in oauth2-utils.ts which validates event.origin (the
expectedOrigin computed from redirectUrl) and prevent the browser from
discarding the message.
…h redirect flow - Use specific target origin instead of '*' in postMessage - Use strict equality for origin verification in message listeners - Resolve frontend origin dynamically on the server based on platform context - Ensure proper error handling and formatting for origin resolution Co-authored-by: AGI-Corporation <186229839+AGI-Corporation@users.noreply.github.com>
1 participant
🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: The OAuth redirect flow was using the
*wildcard as a target origin forpostMessage, and the receiver was usingstartsWithfor origin verification.🎯 Impact: An attacker could potentially intercept the sensitive OAuth authorization code if they managed to get a reference to the popup window. Weak origin verification allowed for potential bypasses.
🔧 Fix:
targetOriginto the specific frontend origin in both server-side and client-sidepostMessagecalls.===) for verifyingevent.originin the message listener.✅ Verification: Code review confirmed the fix adheres to security best practices. Manual verification of the logic in the modified files.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 16807207088009019565 started by @AGI-Corporation
Summary by CodeRabbit
Security
Documentation