This repository contains independent security research examining authentication architectures, vulnerability patterns, and regulatory compliance considerations for electronic identification systems. The research uses Smart-ID as a case study for analyzing broader questions in trust service provider security.
- Cryptographic origin binding in cross-device authentication flows
- QR-based authentication security models and attack vectors
- FIDO2/WebAuthn standards comparison and alignment
- Man-in-the-middle vulnerabilities in out-of-band authentication
- eIDAS and GDPR regulatory compliance frameworks
- Migration paths from proprietary to standards-based solutions
The project includes a full documentation website built with VitePress, automatically deployed to GitHub Pages.
Live Documentation: https://tomkabel.github.io/skid-security-research/
cd docs
npm install
npm run devcd docs
npm run buildThe built site will be in docs/.vitepress/dist/.
The documentation automatically deploys to GitHub Pages via GitHub Actions on every push to main.
.
├── docs/ # VitePress documentation website
│ ├── .vitepress/
│ │ └── config.ts # VitePress configuration
│ ├── core-analysis/ # Primary research documents
│ ├── technical-analysis/ # Security measures and vulnerabilities
│ ├── supplementary-research/ # Supporting research papers
│ ├── opinion-editorials/ # Editorials and expert opinions
│ ├── regulatory-reference/ # Legal and regulatory materials
│ ├── archived/ # Historical documents and summaries
│ ├── index.md # Home page
│ └── package.json
├── LICENSE # CC-BY-4.0 license for research content
└── README.md
The research examines how cross-device authentication flows handle cryptographic binding between the browser session and the mobile authenticator. Key technical considerations include:
- Origin Binding: Cryptographic binding of authentication credentials to the specific relying party origin
- Channel Binding: Linking the authentication operation to the underlying TLS session
- User Intent Verification: Mechanisms to verify user presence and intent beyond passive confirmation
Comparison with established standards reveals areas where current implementations may diverge from industry best practices:
- FIDO2/WebAuthn provides cryptographic origin binding at the protocol level
- NIST SP 800-63-4 defines phishing resistance requirements for Authenticator Assurance Level 3
- eIDAS Article 24 requires trust service providers to use trustworthy systems
Relevant regulatory instruments include:
- eIDAS Regulation: Requirements for qualified trust service providers
- GDPR Articles 25 and 32: Data protection by design and security of processing
- Estonian EUTS: National implementation of eIDAS requirements
- Implement cryptographic origin binding for high-assurance authentication
- Evaluate FIDO2/WebAuthn as standards-based alternatives
- Conduct regular security assessments aligned with NIST frameworks
- Clarify liability frameworks for authorized push payment fraud
- Establish minimum security requirements beyond visual verification
- Align national requirements with EU eIDAS implementation guidance
The research employs standard security analysis methodologies including:
- Comparative standards analysis
- Architecture review against established frameworks
- Offensive security testing in controlled environments
- NIST SP 800-63-4 (Digital Identity Guidelines)
- FIDO Alliance Phishing-Resistant Authentication Standards
- eIDAS 2.0 / EUDI Wallet Architecture Reference Framework
- ENISA Cybersecurity Guidelines for Trust Services
All research documents, analysis, and written content are licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC-BY-4.0). This allows sharing, adapting, and commercial use with proper attribution.
The documentation website build system and configuration files (located in docs/) are licensed under the MIT License.
Any third-party code, research papers, or materials included in this repository maintain their original licenses.
This research is provided for educational and informational purposes only. All findings have been disclosed through appropriate responsible disclosure channels.
This repository represents independent security research by Tom Kabel.