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guard_safety.py
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157 lines (132 loc) · 5.04 KB
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
# Copyright (c) 2026 Nardo (nardovibecoding). AGPL-3.0 — see LICENSE
"""PreToolUse hook: block destructive ops, VPS direct access, hook tampering, credential reads, git hook bypass, branch creation."""
import re
import sys
from pathlib import Path
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent))
from hook_base import run_hook
# --- Resolved credential directories (P0 #2) ---
_HOME = str(Path.home())
_CREDENTIAL_DIRS = [
f"{_HOME}/.ssh/",
f"{_HOME}/.aws/",
f"{_HOME}/.gnupg/",
f"{_HOME}/.kube/",
f"{_HOME}/.config/gcloud/",
]
# --- Bash deny pattern (compiled once) ---
_BASH_DENY = re.compile(
# Destructive ops (#1, #2)
r"rm\s+(-[a-zA-Z]*f[a-zA-Z]*\s+|--force)|rm\s+-rf|"
r"git\s+push\s+(-[a-zA-Z]*f|--force)|git\s+reset\s+--hard|"
r"git\s+checkout\s+\.|git\s+clean\s+-[a-zA-Z]*f|"
# VPS direct access — scp/rsync (#3, #4)
r"(scp|rsync)\s+.*157\.180|"
# VPS direct access — ssh write (#5)
r"ssh\s+.*cat\s*>|ssh\s+.*sed\s+-i|ssh\s+.*tee\s|"
# Manual bot start (#6)
r"ssh\s+.*python.*bot|python\s+(admin_bot|run_bot)|"
# Kill start_all (#7)
r"kill.*start_all|pkill.*start_all|"
# sed in-place (#8)
r"sed\s+(-[a-zA-Z]*i|--in-place)|"
# pip/npm/curl install (#9)
r"pip3?\s+install|npm\s+install|curl\s+.*\|\s*(ba)?sh|"
# Log overwrite (#10)
r">\s*/tmp/.*\.log\s|"
# Bad subprocess $$ (#11)
r"grep\s+-v\s+\$\$|pgrep.*grep.*\$\$|"
# Agent git push (#13)
r"Agent.*git\s+push|agent.*push.*origin|"
# Branch creation (#14) — force all commits to main
r"git\s+(checkout\s+-b|switch\s+-c|branch\s+(?!-[dD]))|"
# P1 #5 — block --no-verify / --no-gpg-sign on git commands
r"git\s+(commit|push)\s+.*--no-verify|--no-verify\s+.*git\s+(commit|push)|"
r"git\s+(commit|push)\s+.*--no-gpg-sign|--no-gpg-sign\s+.*git\s+(commit|push)"
)
# --- Splitter for compound commands (P0 #3) ---
_CMD_SPLIT = re.compile(r'\s*(?:&&|\|\||;|\||\$\(|`)\s*')
def _check_hook_path(path_str):
"""P0 #1: Return True if path targets security hooks directory."""
if not path_str:
return False
expanded = path_str.replace("~", _HOME)
return "/.claude/hooks/" in expanded or ".claude/hooks/" in expanded
def _check_credential_read(path_str):
"""P0 #2: Return True if path targets a credential directory."""
if not path_str:
return False
expanded = path_str.replace("~", _HOME)
try:
resolved = str(Path(expanded).resolve())
except Exception:
resolved = expanded
for cred_dir in _CREDENTIAL_DIRS:
if resolved.startswith(cred_dir) or expanded.startswith(cred_dir):
return True
return False
def _check_bash_cmd(cmd):
"""P0 #3: Decompose compound bash commands and check each sub-command."""
sub_commands = _CMD_SPLIT.split(cmd)
for sub in sub_commands:
sub = sub.strip()
if sub and _BASH_DENY.search(sub):
return True
return False
def check(tool_name, tool_input, input_data):
# P0 #1 — Block Write/Edit on hook files
if tool_name in ("Write", "Edit"):
path = tool_input.get("file_path", "") or tool_input.get("path", "")
if _check_hook_path(path):
return "hook_protect"
# P0 #2 — Block Read on credential directories
if tool_name == "Read":
path = tool_input.get("file_path", "") or tool_input.get("path", "")
if _check_credential_read(path):
return "credential_read"
# Bash checks (P0 #3 compound decomposition + P1 #5 --no-verify + #14 branch)
if tool_name == "Bash":
cmd = tool_input.get("command", "")
if _check_bash_cmd(cmd):
return "bash_deny"
return False
def action(tool_name, tool_input, input_data):
return None
_REASONS = {
"hook_protect": "Blocked: cannot modify security hooks. This protects against prompt injection disabling the security layer.",
"credential_read": "Blocked: reading credential directories is restricted.",
"bash_deny": None,
}
def check_and_deny(tool_name, tool_input, input_data):
"""Return deny decision for PreToolUse."""
result = check(tool_name, tool_input, input_data)
if not result:
return None
reason = _REASONS.get(result)
if result == "bash_deny":
cmd = tool_input.get("command", "")
if re.search(r"--no-verify|--no-gpg-sign", cmd):
reason = "Blocked: skipping git hooks/signing is not allowed."
else:
reason = f"**BLOCKED: Destructive operation.** `{cmd[:80]}` — requires user confirmation."
return {
"hookSpecificOutput": {
"hookEventName": "PreToolUse",
"permissionDecision": "deny"
},
"systemMessage": reason
}
if __name__ == "__main__":
import json
try:
input_data = json.load(sys.stdin)
except (json.JSONDecodeError, EOFError):
print("{}")
sys.exit()
result = check_and_deny(
input_data.get("tool_name", ""),
input_data.get("tool_input", {}),
input_data
)
print(json.dumps(result or {}))