diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0da5a793 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +name: CI + +on: + push: + branches: [main] + pull_request: + branches: [main] + +permissions: + contents: read + +jobs: + test: + strategy: + matrix: + include: + - runner: ubuntu-latest + goos: linux + - runner: macos-14 + goos: darwin + runs-on: ${{ matrix.runner }} + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - name: Set up Go + uses: actions/setup-go@v5 + with: + go-version-file: go.mod + + - name: Install Linux dependencies + if: matrix.goos == 'linux' + run: | + sudo apt-get update + sudo apt-get install -y libsqlite3-dev + + - name: Build + run: CGO_ENABLED=1 go build ./... + + - name: Test + run: CGO_ENABLED=1 go test -race -cover ./... + + - name: Vet + run: go vet ./... + + lint: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + continue-on-error: true + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - name: Set up Go + uses: actions/setup-go@v5 + with: + go-version-file: go.mod + + - name: Install Linux dependencies + run: | + sudo apt-get update + sudo apt-get install -y libsqlite3-dev + + - name: golangci-lint + uses: golangci/golangci-lint-action@v7 + with: + version: v2.4.0 + + goreleaser-check: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - name: Set up Go + uses: actions/setup-go@v5 + with: + go-version-file: go.mod + + - name: Set up GoReleaser + uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@v7 + with: + install-only: true + + - name: Validate .goreleaser.yaml + run: goreleaser check diff --git a/.github/workflows/release.yml b/.github/workflows/release.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..47e0ffb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/release.yml @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +name: Release + +on: + push: + tags: + - "v*" + +permissions: + contents: write + +jobs: + build: + strategy: + matrix: + include: + - runner: ubuntu-latest + goos: linux + goarch: amd64 + - runner: ubuntu-24.04-arm + goos: linux + goarch: arm64 + - runner: macos-13 + goos: darwin + goarch: amd64 + - runner: macos-14 + goos: darwin + goarch: arm64 + runs-on: ${{ matrix.runner }} + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + with: + fetch-depth: 0 + + - name: Set up Go + uses: actions/setup-go@v5 + with: + go-version-file: go.mod + + - name: Install Linux dependencies + if: matrix.goos == 'linux' + run: | + sudo apt-get update + sudo apt-get install -y libsqlite3-dev + + - name: Set up GoReleaser + uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@v7 + with: + install-only: true + + - name: Build (split) + env: + GOOS: ${{ matrix.goos }} + GOARCH: ${{ matrix.goarch }} + run: goreleaser build --split --clean --timeout 60m + + - name: Upload artifacts + uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4 + with: + name: build-${{ matrix.goos }}-${{ matrix.goarch }} + path: dist/**/* + retention-days: 1 + + release: + needs: build + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + with: + fetch-depth: 0 + + - name: Set up Go + uses: actions/setup-go@v5 + with: + go-version-file: go.mod + + - name: Download all artifacts + uses: actions/download-artifact@v4 + with: + path: dist + pattern: build-* + merge-multiple: true + + - name: Set up GoReleaser + uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@v7 + with: + install-only: true + + - name: Release (merge) + env: + GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} + run: goreleaser continue --merge --timeout 60m diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 39665d45..02ae2f47 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ passphrase.txt # Build output bin/ +dist/ # Coverage reports .coverage/ @@ -50,4 +51,6 @@ bin/ tmp/ # MkDocs build output -site/ \ No newline at end of file +site/ + +*.db \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/.golangci.yml b/.golangci.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8fa2f2ab --- /dev/null +++ b/.golangci.yml @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +version: "2" + +linters: + default: standard + exclusions: + generated: strict + presets: + - std-error-handling + rules: + - path: _test\.go + linters: + - errcheck diff --git a/.goreleaser.yaml b/.goreleaser.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1d9f5285 --- /dev/null +++ b/.goreleaser.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://goreleaser.com/static/schema.json +version: 2 + +project_name: lango + +builds: + - id: lango + binary: lango + main: ./cmd/lango + env: + - CGO_ENABLED=1 + goos: + - linux + - darwin + goarch: + - amd64 + - arm64 + ldflags: + - -s -w + - -X main.Version={{.Version}} + - -X main.BuildTime={{.Date}} + + - id: lango-extended + binary: lango + main: ./cmd/lango + env: + - CGO_ENABLED=1 + goos: + - linux + - darwin + goarch: + - amd64 + - arm64 + tags: + - kms_all + ldflags: + - -s -w + - -X main.Version={{.Version}} + - -X main.BuildTime={{.Date}} + +archives: + - id: standard + ids: + - lango + name_template: "lango_{{.Version}}_{{.Os}}_{{.Arch}}" + formats: + - tar.gz + files: + - LICENSE* + - README.md + + - id: extended + ids: + - lango-extended + name_template: "lango-extended_{{.Version}}_{{.Os}}_{{.Arch}}" + formats: + - tar.gz + files: + - LICENSE* + - README.md + +checksum: + name_template: "checksums.txt" + algorithm: sha256 + +changelog: + sort: asc + groups: + - title: Features + regexp: '^.*?feat(\([[:word:]]+\))??!?:.+$' + order: 0 + - title: Bug Fixes + regexp: '^.*?fix(\([[:word:]]+\))??!?:.+$' + order: 1 + - title: Refactoring + regexp: '^.*?refactor(\([[:word:]]+\))??!?:.+$' + order: 2 + - title: Documentation + regexp: '^.*?docs(\([[:word:]]+\))??!?:.+$' + order: 3 + - title: Others + order: 999 + filters: + exclude: + - "^test:" + - "^chore:" + - "^ci:" + +release: + github: + owner: langoai + name: lango + prerelease: auto + draft: false + name_template: "{{.ProjectName}} v{{.Version}}" diff --git a/Dockerfile b/Dockerfile index 84f49317..f47fd9c3 100644 --- a/Dockerfile +++ b/Dockerfile @@ -3,7 +3,10 @@ FROM golang:1.25-bookworm AS builder WORKDIR /app # Install SQLite dev headers (required by sqlite-vec-go-bindings) -RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends libsqlite3-dev \ +# Install libsqlcipher-dev for SQLCipher transparent DB encryption support +RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \ + libsqlite3-dev \ + libsqlcipher-dev \ && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* # Copy go mod files @@ -13,8 +16,13 @@ RUN go mod download # Copy source COPY . . -# Build with CGO enabled (required by mattn/go-sqlite3) -RUN CGO_ENABLED=1 go build -ldflags="-s -w" -o lango ./cmd/lango +# Version and build time injection (override via --build-arg) +ARG VERSION=dev +ARG BUILD_TIME=unknown + +# Build with CGO enabled (required by mattn/go-sqlite3 and sqlite-vec) +# Link against libsqlcipher for transparent DB encryption support +RUN CGO_ENABLED=1 go build -ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION} -X main.BuildTime=${BUILD_TIME}" -o lango ./cmd/lango # Runtime image FROM debian:bookworm-slim diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 04a0f63a..408bfad1 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -58,6 +58,10 @@ test: test-short: $(GOTEST) -v -short ./... +## test-p2p: Run P2P and wallet spending tests +test-p2p: + $(GOTEST) -v -race ./internal/p2p/... ./internal/wallet/... + ## bench: Run benchmarks bench: $(GOTEST) -bench=. -benchmem ./... @@ -102,6 +106,20 @@ deps: $(GOMOD) download $(GOMOD) tidy +# ─── Code Signing ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + +## codesign: (Optional) Sign macOS binary with Apple Developer ID for enhanced Keychain protection +codesign: + @test -n "$(APPLE_IDENTITY)" || (echo "APPLE_IDENTITY not set. Usage: make codesign APPLE_IDENTITY='Developer ID Application: ...'"; exit 1) + codesign --sign "$(APPLE_IDENTITY)" --entitlements build/entitlements.plist --force --options runtime bin/$(BINARY_NAME) + @echo "Signed with enhanced Keychain protection (Data Protection Keychain)." + +# ─── Sandbox ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + +## sandbox-image: Build sandbox Docker image for P2P tool isolation +sandbox-image: + docker build -t lango-sandbox:latest -f build/sandbox/Dockerfile bin/ + # ─── Docker Build ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── ## docker-build: Build Docker image @@ -139,7 +157,17 @@ health: ## clean: Remove build artifacts and coverage reports clean: $(GOCLEAN) - rm -rf bin/ $(COVERAGE_DIR)/ + rm -rf bin/ dist/ $(COVERAGE_DIR)/ + +# ─── Release ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + +## release-dry: Test GoReleaser build locally (current platform only) +release-dry: + goreleaser build --single-target --snapshot --clean + +## release-check: Validate .goreleaser.yaml configuration +release-check: + goreleaser check ## help: Show available targets help: @@ -147,9 +175,13 @@ help: .PHONY: build build-linux build-darwin build-all install \ dev run \ - test test-short bench coverage \ + test test-short test-p2p bench coverage \ fmt fmt-check vet lint generate ci \ deps \ + codesign \ + sandbox-image \ docker-build docker-push \ docker-up docker-down docker-logs \ - health clean help + health clean \ + release-dry release-check \ + help diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 060dfdd4..9f2ad4b5 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -1,13 +1,12 @@ -
-Lango Logo -
-
+ + # Lango 🐿️ A high-performance AI agent built with Go, supporting multiple AI providers, channels (Telegram, Discord, Slack), and a self-learning knowledge system. ## ⚠️ **Note** + This project includes experimental AI Agent features and is currently in an unstable state. Please use with caution, as significant breaking changes may occur in future updates. ## Features @@ -20,11 +19,12 @@ This project includes experimental AI Agent features and is currently in an unst - 📊 **Knowledge Graph & Graph RAG** - BoltDB triple store with hybrid vector + graph retrieval - 🔀 **Multi-Agent Orchestration** - Hierarchical sub-agents (operator, navigator, vault, librarian, automator, planner, chronicler) - 🌍 **A2A Protocol** - Agent-to-Agent protocol for remote agent discovery and integration +- 🌐 **P2P Network** - Decentralized agent-to-agent connectivity via libp2p with DHT discovery, ZK-enhanced handshake, knowledge firewall, and peer payments - 💸 **Blockchain Payments** - USDC payments on Base L2, X402 V2 auto-pay protocol (Coinbase SDK), spending limits - ⏰ **Cron Scheduling** - Persistent cron jobs with cron/interval/one-time schedules, multi-channel delivery - ⚡ **Background Execution** - Async task manager with concurrency control and completion notifications - 🔄 **Workflow Engine** - DAG-based YAML workflows with parallel step execution and state persistence -- 🔒 **Secure** - AES-256-GCM encryption, key registry, secret management, output scanning +- 🔒 **Secure** - AES-256-GCM encryption, key registry, secret management, output scanning, hardware keyring (Touch ID / TPM), SQLCipher DB encryption, Cloud KMS (AWS/GCP/Azure/PKCS#11) - 💾 **Persistent** - Ent ORM with SQLite session storage - 🌐 **Gateway** - WebSocket/HTTP server with real-time streaming - 🔑 **Auth** - OIDC authentication, OAuth login flow @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ lango config validate ``` The onboard wizard guides you through 5 steps: + 1. **Provider Setup** — Choose an AI provider and enter API credentials 2. **Agent Config** — Select model, max tokens, and temperature 3. **Channel Setup** — Configure Telegram, Discord, or Slack @@ -92,8 +93,16 @@ lango config validate Validate the active profile lango security status [--json] Show security configuration status lango security migrate-passphrase Rotate encryption passphrase lango security secrets list List stored secrets (values hidden) -lango security secrets set Store an encrypted secret +lango security secrets set Store an encrypted secret (--value-hex for non-interactive) lango security secrets delete Delete a stored secret (--force) +lango security keyring store Store passphrase in hardware keyring (Touch ID / TPM) +lango security keyring clear Remove passphrase from keyring (--force) +lango security keyring status Show hardware keyring status (--json) +lango security db-migrate Encrypt database with SQLCipher (--force) +lango security db-decrypt Decrypt database to plaintext (--force) +lango security kms status Show KMS provider status (--json) +lango security kms test Test KMS encrypt/decrypt roundtrip +lango security kms keys List KMS keys in registry (--json) lango memory list [--json] List observational memory entries lango memory status [--json] Show memory system status @@ -125,6 +134,29 @@ lango workflow list List workflow runs lango workflow status Show workflow run status with step details lango workflow cancel Cancel a running workflow lango workflow history Show workflow execution history + +lango p2p status Show P2P node status +lango p2p peers List connected peers +lango p2p connect Connect to a peer by multiaddr +lango p2p disconnect Disconnect from a peer +lango p2p firewall list List firewall ACL rules +lango p2p firewall add Add a firewall ACL rule +lango p2p firewall remove Remove firewall rules for a peer +lango p2p discover Discover agents by capability +lango p2p identity Show local DID and peer identity +lango p2p reputation Query peer trust score +lango p2p pricing Show tool pricing +lango p2p session list List active peer sessions (--json) +lango p2p session revoke Revoke a peer session (--peer-did) +lango p2p session revoke-all Revoke all active peer sessions +lango p2p sandbox status Show sandbox runtime status +lango p2p sandbox test Run sandbox smoke test +lango p2p sandbox cleanup Remove orphaned sandbox containers + +lango bg list List background tasks +lango bg status Show background task status +lango bg cancel Cancel a running background task +lango bg result Show completed task result ``` ### Diagnostics @@ -153,6 +185,7 @@ lango/ │ ├── app/ # Application bootstrap, wiring, tool registration │ ├── approval/ # Composite approval provider for sensitive tools │ ├── bootstrap/ # Application bootstrap: DB, crypto, config profile init +│ ├── dbmigrate/ # Database encryption migration (SQLCipher) │ ├── channels/ # Telegram, Discord, Slack integrations │ ├── cli/ # CLI commands │ │ ├── agent/ # lango agent status/list @@ -167,7 +200,8 @@ lango/ │ │ ├── bg/ # lango bg list/status/cancel/result │ │ ├── workflow/ # lango workflow run/list/status/cancel/history │ │ ├── prompt/ # interactive prompt utilities -│ │ ├── security/ # lango security status/secrets/migrate-passphrase +│ │ ├── security/ # lango security status/secrets/migrate-passphrase/keyring/db-migrate/db-decrypt/kms +│ │ ├── p2p/ # lango p2p status/peers/connect/disconnect/firewall/discover/identity/reputation/pricing/session/sandbox │ │ └── tui/ # TUI components and views │ ├── config/ # Config loading, env var substitution, validation │ ├── configstore/ # Encrypted config profile storage (Ent-backed) @@ -178,27 +212,31 @@ lango/ │ ├── graph/ # BoltDB triple store, Graph RAG, entity extractor │ ├── knowledge/ # Knowledge store, 8-layer context retriever │ ├── learning/ # Learning engine, error pattern analyzer, self-learning graph +│ ├── lifecycle/ # Component lifecycle management (priority-ordered startup/shutdown) │ ├── logging/ # Zap structured logger │ ├── memory/ # Observational memory (observer, reflector, token counter) │ ├── orchestration/ # Multi-agent orchestration (operator, navigator, vault, librarian, automator, planner, chronicler) +│ ├── keyring/ # Hardware keyring integration (Touch ID / TPM 2.0) │ ├── passphrase/ # Passphrase prompt and validation helpers │ ├── provider/ # AI provider interface and implementations │ │ ├── anthropic/ # Claude models │ │ ├── gemini/ # Google Gemini models │ │ └── openai/ # OpenAI-compatible (GPT, Ollama, etc.) -│ ├── security/ # Crypto providers, key registry, secrets store, companion discovery +│ ├── sandbox/ # Tool execution isolation (subprocess/container) +│ ├── security/ # Crypto providers, key registry, secrets store, companion discovery, KMS providers │ ├── session/ # Ent-based SQLite session store │ ├── skill/ # File-based skill system (SKILL.md parser, FileSkillStore, registry, executor, GitHub importer with git clone + HTTP fallback, resource directories) │ ├── cron/ # Cron scheduler (robfig/cron/v3), job store, executor, delivery │ ├── background/ # Background task manager, notifications, monitoring │ ├── workflow/ # DAG workflow engine, YAML parser, state persistence │ ├── payment/ # Blockchain payment service (USDC on EVM chains, X402 audit trail) +│ ├── p2p/ # P2P networking (libp2p node, identity, handshake, firewall, discovery, ZKP) │ ├── supervisor/ # Provider proxy, privileged tool execution │ ├── wallet/ # Wallet providers (local, rpc, composite), spending limiter │ ├── x402/ # X402 V2 payment protocol (Coinbase SDK, EIP-3009 signing) │ └── tools/ # browser, crypto, exec, filesystem, secrets, payment ├── prompts/ # Default prompt .md files (embedded via go:embed) -├── skills/ # 30 embedded default skills (go:embed SKILL.md files) +├── skills/ # Skill system scaffold (go:embed). Built-in skills were removed — Lango's passphrase-based security model makes it impractical for the agent to invoke CLI commands as skills └── openspec/ # Specifications (OpenSpec workflow) ``` @@ -223,148 +261,195 @@ Use `lango onboard` for guided first-time setup (5-step wizard), or `lango setti All settings are managed via `lango onboard` (guided wizard), `lango settings` (full editor), or `lango config` CLI and stored encrypted in the profile database. -| Key | Type | Default | Description | -|-----|------|---------|-------------| -| **Server** | | | | -| `server.host` | string | `localhost` | Bind address | -| `server.port` | int | `18789` | Listen port | -| `server.httpEnabled` | bool | `true` | Enable HTTP API endpoints | -| `server.wsEnabled` | bool | `true` | Enable WebSocket server | -| `server.allowedOrigins` | []string | `[]` | WebSocket CORS allowed origins (empty = same-origin, `["*"]` = allow all) | -| **Agent** | | | | -| `agent.provider` | string | `anthropic` | Primary AI provider ID | -| `agent.model` | string | - | Primary model ID | -| `agent.fallbackProvider` | string | - | Fallback provider ID | -| `agent.fallbackModel` | string | - | Fallback model ID | -| `agent.maxTokens` | int | `4096` | Max tokens | -| `agent.temperature` | float | `0.7` | Generation temperature | -| `agent.systemPromptPath` | string | - | Legacy: single file to override the Identity section only | -| `agent.promptsDir` | string | - | Directory of `.md` files to override default prompt sections (takes precedence over `systemPromptPath`) | -| `agent.requestTimeout` | duration | `5m` | Max time for a single agent request (prevents indefinite hangs) | -| `agent.toolTimeout` | duration | `2m` | Max time for a single tool call execution | -| **Providers** | | | | -| `providers..type` | string | - | Provider type (openai, anthropic, gemini) | -| `providers..apiKey` | string | - | Provider API key | -| `providers..baseUrl` | string | - | Custom base URL (e.g. for Ollama) | -| **Logging** | | | | -| `logging.level` | string | `info` | Log level | -| `logging.format` | string | `console` | `json` or `console` | -| **Session** | | | | -| `session.databasePath` | string | `~/.lango/data.db` | SQLite path | -| `session.ttl` | duration | - | Session TTL before expiration | -| `session.maxHistoryTurns` | int | - | Maximum history turns per session | -| **Security** | | | | -| `security.signer.provider` | string | `local` | `local`, `rpc`, or `enclave` | -| `security.interceptor.enabled` | bool | `true` | Enable AI Privacy Interceptor | -| `security.interceptor.redactPii` | bool | `false` | Redact PII from AI interactions | -| `security.interceptor.approvalRequired` | bool | `false` | (deprecated) Require approval for sensitive tool use | -| `security.interceptor.approvalPolicy` | string | `dangerous` | Approval policy: `dangerous`, `all`, `configured`, `none` | -| `security.interceptor.approvalTimeoutSec` | int | `30` | Seconds to wait for approval before timeout | -| `security.interceptor.notifyChannel` | string | - | Channel for approval notifications (`telegram`, `discord`, `slack`) | -| `security.interceptor.sensitiveTools` | []string | - | Tool names that require approval (e.g. `["exec", "browser"]`) | -| `security.interceptor.exemptTools` | []string | - | Tool names exempt from approval regardless of policy | -| `security.interceptor.piiRegexPatterns` | []string | - | Custom regex patterns for PII detection | -| `security.interceptor.piiDisabledPatterns` | []string | - | Builtin PII pattern names to disable (e.g. `["passport", "ipv4"]`) | -| `security.interceptor.piiCustomPatterns` | map | - | Custom named PII patterns (`{"proj_id": "\\bPROJ-\\d{4}\\b"}`) | -| `security.interceptor.presidio.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable Microsoft Presidio NER-based detection | -| `security.interceptor.presidio.url` | string | `http://localhost:5002` | Presidio analyzer service URL | -| `security.interceptor.presidio.scoreThreshold` | float64 | `0.7` | Minimum confidence score for Presidio detections | -| `security.interceptor.presidio.language` | string | `en` | Language for Presidio analysis | -| **Auth** | | | | -| `auth.providers..issuerUrl` | string | - | OIDC issuer URL | -| `auth.providers..clientId` | string | - | OIDC client ID | -| `auth.providers..clientSecret` | string | - | OIDC client secret | -| `auth.providers..redirectUrl` | string | - | OAuth callback URL | -| `auth.providers..scopes` | []string | - | OIDC scopes (e.g. `["openid", "email"]`) | -| **Tools** | | | | -| `tools.exec.defaultTimeout` | duration | - | Default timeout for shell commands | -| `tools.exec.allowBackground` | bool | `true` | Allow background processes | -| `tools.exec.workDir` | string | - | Working directory (empty = current) | -| `tools.filesystem.maxReadSize` | int | - | Maximum file size to read | -| `tools.filesystem.allowedPaths` | []string | - | Allowed paths (empty = allow all) | -| `tools.browser.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable browser automation tools (requires Chromium) | -| `tools.browser.headless` | bool | `true` | Run browser in headless mode | -| `tools.browser.sessionTimeout` | duration | `5m` | Browser session timeout | -| **Knowledge** | | | | -| `knowledge.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable self-learning knowledge system | -| `knowledge.maxContextPerLayer` | int | `5` | Max context items per layer in retrieval | -| **Skill System** | | | | -| `skill.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable file-based skill system | -| `skill.skillsDir` | string | `~/.lango/skills` | Directory containing skill files (`/SKILL.md`) | -| `skill.allowImport` | bool | `false` | Allow importing skills from external URLs and GitHub repos | -| `skill.maxBulkImport` | int | `50` | Max skills to import in a single bulk operation | -| `skill.importConcurrency` | int | `5` | Concurrent HTTP requests during bulk import | -| `skill.importTimeout` | duration | `2m` | Overall timeout for skill import operations | -| **Observational Memory** | | | | -| `observationalMemory.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable observational memory system | -| `observationalMemory.provider` | string | - | LLM provider for observer/reflector (empty = agent default) | -| `observationalMemory.model` | string | - | Model for observer/reflector (empty = agent default) | -| `observationalMemory.messageTokenThreshold` | int | `1000` | Token threshold to trigger observation | -| `observationalMemory.observationTokenThreshold` | int | `2000` | Token threshold to trigger reflection | -| `observationalMemory.maxMessageTokenBudget` | int | `8000` | Max token budget for recent messages in context | -| `observationalMemory.maxReflectionsInContext` | int | `5` | Max reflections injected into LLM context (0 = unlimited) | -| `observationalMemory.maxObservationsInContext` | int | `20` | Max observations injected into LLM context (0 = unlimited) | -| **Embedding** | | | | -| `embedding.providerID` | string | - | Provider ID from `providers` map (e.g., `"gemini-1"`, `"my-openai"`). Backend type and API key are auto-resolved. | -| `embedding.provider` | string | - | Embedding backend (`openai`, `google`, `local`). Deprecated when `providerID` is set. | -| `embedding.model` | string | - | Embedding model identifier | -| `embedding.dimensions` | int | - | Embedding vector dimensionality | -| `embedding.local.baseUrl` | string | `http://localhost:11434/v1` | Local (Ollama) embedding endpoint | -| `embedding.local.model` | string | - | Model override for local provider | -| `embedding.rag.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable RAG context injection | -| `embedding.rag.maxResults` | int | - | Max results to inject into context | -| `embedding.rag.collections` | []string | - | Collections to search (empty = all) | -| **Graph Store** | | | | -| `graph.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable the knowledge graph store | -| `graph.backend` | string | `bolt` | Graph backend type (currently only `bolt`) | -| `graph.databasePath` | string | - | File path for graph database | -| `graph.maxTraversalDepth` | int | `2` | Maximum BFS traversal depth for graph expansion | -| `graph.maxExpansionResults` | int | `10` | Maximum graph-expanded results to return | -| **Multi-Agent** | | | | -| `agent.multiAgent` | bool | `false` | Enable hierarchical multi-agent orchestration | -| **A2A Protocol** (🧪 Experimental Features) | | | | -| `a2a.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable A2A protocol support | -| `a2a.baseUrl` | string | - | External URL where this agent is reachable | -| `a2a.agentName` | string | - | Name advertised in the Agent Card | -| `a2a.agentDescription` | string | - | Description in the Agent Card | -| `a2a.remoteAgents` | []object | - | External A2A agents to integrate (name + agentCardUrl) | -| **Payment** (🧪 Experimental Features) | | | | -| `payment.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable blockchain payment features | -| `payment.walletProvider` | string | `local` | Wallet backend: `local`, `rpc`, or `composite` | -| `payment.network.chainId` | int | `84532` | EVM chain ID (84532 = Base Sepolia, 8453 = Base) | -| `payment.network.rpcUrl` | string | - | JSON-RPC endpoint for blockchain network | -| `payment.network.usdcContract` | string | - | USDC token contract address | -| `payment.limits.maxPerTx` | string | `1.00` | Max USDC per transaction (e.g. `"1.00"`) | -| `payment.limits.maxDaily` | string | `10.00` | Max USDC per day (e.g. `"10.00"`) | -| `payment.limits.autoApproveBelow` | string | - | Auto-approve amount threshold | -| `payment.x402.autoIntercept` | bool | `false` | Auto-intercept HTTP 402 responses | -| `payment.x402.maxAutoPayAmount` | string | - | Max amount for X402 auto-pay | -| **Cron Scheduling** | | | | -| `cron.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable cron job scheduling | -| `cron.timezone` | string | `UTC` | Default timezone for cron expressions | -| `cron.maxConcurrentJobs` | int | `5` | Max concurrent job executions | -| `cron.defaultSessionMode` | string | `isolated` | Default session mode (`isolated` or `main`) | -| `cron.historyRetention` | duration | `720h` | How long to retain execution history | -| `cron.defaultDeliverTo` | []string | `[]` | Default delivery channels for job results (e.g. `["telegram:123"]`) | -| **Background Execution** (🧪 Experimental Features) | | | | -| `background.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable background task execution | -| `background.yieldMs` | int | `30000` | Auto-yield threshold in milliseconds | -| `background.maxConcurrentTasks` | int | `3` | Max concurrent background tasks | -| `background.defaultDeliverTo` | []string | `[]` | Default delivery channels for task results | -| **Workflow Engine** (🧪 Experimental Features) | | | | -| `workflow.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable workflow engine | -| `workflow.maxConcurrentSteps` | int | `4` | Max concurrent workflow steps per run | -| `workflow.defaultTimeout` | duration | `10m` | Default timeout per workflow step | -| `workflow.stateDir` | string | `~/.lango/workflows/` | Directory for workflow state files | -| `workflow.defaultDeliverTo` | []string | `[]` | Default delivery channels for workflow results | -| **Librarian** (🧪 Experimental Features) | | | | -| `librarian.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable proactive knowledge librarian | -| `librarian.observationThreshold` | int | `2` | Min observations to trigger analysis | -| `librarian.inquiryCooldownTurns` | int | `3` | Turns between inquiries per session | -| `librarian.maxPendingInquiries` | int | `2` | Max pending inquiries per session | -| `librarian.autoSaveConfidence` | string | `"high"` | Confidence for auto-save (high/medium/low) | -| `librarian.provider` | string | - | LLM provider for analysis (empty = agent default) | -| `librarian.model` | string | - | Model for analysis (empty = agent default) | + +| Key | Type | Default | Description | +| ------------------------------------------------------ | -------- | --------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| **Server** | | | | +| `server.host` | string | `localhost` | Bind address | +| `server.port` | int | `18789` | Listen port | +| `server.httpEnabled` | bool | `true` | Enable HTTP API endpoints | +| `server.wsEnabled` | bool | `true` | Enable WebSocket server | +| `server.allowedOrigins` | []string | `[]` | WebSocket CORS allowed origins (empty = same-origin, `["*"]` = allow all) | +| **Agent** | | | | +| `agent.provider` | string | `anthropic` | Primary AI provider ID | +| `agent.model` | string | - | Primary model ID | +| `agent.fallbackProvider` | string | - | Fallback provider ID | +| `agent.fallbackModel` | string | - | Fallback model ID | +| `agent.maxTokens` | int | `4096` | Max tokens | +| `agent.temperature` | float | `0.7` | Generation temperature | +| `agent.systemPromptPath` | string | - | Legacy: single file to override the Identity section only | +| `agent.promptsDir` | string | - | Directory of `.md` files to override default prompt sections (takes precedence over `systemPromptPath`) | +| `agent.requestTimeout` | duration | `5m` | Max time for a single agent request (prevents indefinite hangs) | +| `agent.toolTimeout` | duration | `2m` | Max time for a single tool call execution | +| `agent.maxTurns` | int | `25` | Max tool-calling iterations per agent run | +| `agent.errorCorrectionEnabled` | bool | `true` | Enable learning-based error correction (requires knowledge system) | +| `agent.maxDelegationRounds` | int | `10` | Max orchestrator→sub-agent delegation rounds per turn (multi-agent only) | +| **Providers** | | | | +| `providers..type` | string | - | Provider type (openai, anthropic, gemini) | +| `providers..apiKey` | string | - | Provider API key | +| `providers..baseUrl` | string | - | Custom base URL (e.g. for Ollama) | +| **Logging** | | | | +| `logging.level` | string | `info` | Log level | +| `logging.format` | string | `console` | `json` or `console` | +| **Session** | | | | +| `session.databasePath` | string | `~/.lango/data.db` | SQLite path | +| `session.ttl` | duration | - | Session TTL before expiration | +| `session.maxHistoryTurns` | int | - | Maximum history turns per session | +| **Security** | | | | +| `security.signer.provider` | string | `local` | `local`, `rpc`, or `enclave` | +| `security.interceptor.enabled` | bool | `true` | Enable AI Privacy Interceptor | +| `security.interceptor.redactPii` | bool | `false` | Redact PII from AI interactions | +| `security.interceptor.approvalRequired` | bool | `false` | (deprecated) Require approval for sensitive tool use | +| `security.interceptor.approvalPolicy` | string | `dangerous` | Approval policy: `dangerous`, `all`, `configured`, `none` | +| `security.interceptor.approvalTimeoutSec` | int | `30` | Seconds to wait for approval before timeout | +| `security.interceptor.notifyChannel` | string | - | Channel for approval notifications (`telegram`, `discord`, `slack`) | +| `security.interceptor.sensitiveTools` | []string | - | Tool names that require approval (e.g. `["exec", "browser"]`) | +| `security.interceptor.exemptTools` | []string | - | Tool names exempt from approval regardless of policy | +| `security.interceptor.piiRegexPatterns` | []string | - | Custom regex patterns for PII detection | +| `security.interceptor.piiDisabledPatterns` | []string | - | Builtin PII pattern names to disable (e.g. `["passport", "ipv4"]`) | +| `security.interceptor.piiCustomPatterns` | map | - | Custom named PII patterns (`{"proj_id": "\\bPROJ-\\d{4}\\b"}`) | +| `security.interceptor.presidio.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable Microsoft Presidio NER-based detection | +| `security.interceptor.presidio.url` | string | `http://localhost:5002` | Presidio analyzer service URL | +| `security.interceptor.presidio.scoreThreshold` | float64 | `0.7` | Minimum confidence score for Presidio detections | +| `security.interceptor.presidio.language` | string | `en` | Language for Presidio analysis | +| **Auth** | | | | +| `auth.providers..issuerUrl` | string | - | OIDC issuer URL | +| `auth.providers..clientId` | string | - | OIDC client ID | +| `auth.providers..clientSecret` | string | - | OIDC client secret | +| `auth.providers..redirectUrl` | string | - | OAuth callback URL | +| `auth.providers..scopes` | []string | - | OIDC scopes (e.g. `["openid", "email"]`) | +| **Tools** | | | | +| `tools.exec.defaultTimeout` | duration | - | Default timeout for shell commands | +| `tools.exec.allowBackground` | bool | `true` | Allow background processes | +| `tools.exec.workDir` | string | - | Working directory (empty = current) | +| `tools.filesystem.maxReadSize` | int | - | Maximum file size to read | +| `tools.filesystem.allowedPaths` | []string | - | Allowed paths (empty = allow all) | +| `tools.browser.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable browser automation tools (requires Chromium) | +| `tools.browser.headless` | bool | `true` | Run browser in headless mode | +| `tools.browser.sessionTimeout` | duration | `5m` | Browser session timeout | +| **Knowledge** | | | | +| `knowledge.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable self-learning knowledge system | +| `knowledge.maxContextPerLayer` | int | `5` | Max context items per layer in retrieval | +| **Skill System** | | | | +| `skill.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable file-based skill system | +| `skill.skillsDir` | string | `~/.lango/skills` | Directory containing skill files (`/SKILL.md`) | +| `skill.allowImport` | bool | `false` | Allow importing skills from external URLs and GitHub repos | +| `skill.maxBulkImport` | int | `50` | Max skills to import in a single bulk operation | +| `skill.importConcurrency` | int | `5` | Concurrent HTTP requests during bulk import | +| `skill.importTimeout` | duration | `2m` | Overall timeout for skill import operations | +| **Observational Memory** | | | | +| `observationalMemory.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable observational memory system | +| `observationalMemory.provider` | string | - | LLM provider for observer/reflector (empty = agent default) | +| `observationalMemory.model` | string | - | Model for observer/reflector (empty = agent default) | +| `observationalMemory.messageTokenThreshold` | int | `1000` | Token threshold to trigger observation | +| `observationalMemory.observationTokenThreshold` | int | `2000` | Token threshold to trigger reflection | +| `observationalMemory.maxMessageTokenBudget` | int | `8000` | Max token budget for recent messages in context | +| `observationalMemory.maxReflectionsInContext` | int | `5` | Max reflections injected into LLM context (0 = unlimited) | +| `observationalMemory.maxObservationsInContext` | int | `20` | Max observations injected into LLM context (0 = unlimited) | +| `observationalMemory.memoryTokenBudget` | int | `4000` | Max token budget for the memory section in system prompt | +| `observationalMemory.reflectionConsolidationThreshold` | int | `5` | Min reflections before meta-reflection triggers | +| **Embedding** | | | | +| `embedding.providerID` | string | - | Provider ID from `providers` map (e.g., `"gemini-1"`, `"my-openai"`). Backend type and API key are auto-resolved. | +| `embedding.provider` | string | - | Embedding backend (`openai`, `google`, `local`). Deprecated when `providerID` is set. | +| `embedding.model` | string | - | Embedding model identifier | +| `embedding.dimensions` | int | - | Embedding vector dimensionality | +| `embedding.local.baseUrl` | string | `http://localhost:11434/v1` | Local (Ollama) embedding endpoint | +| `embedding.local.model` | string | - | Model override for local provider | +| `embedding.rag.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable RAG context injection | +| `embedding.rag.maxResults` | int | - | Max results to inject into context | +| `embedding.rag.collections` | []string | - | Collections to search (empty = all) | +| **Graph Store** | | | | +| `graph.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable the knowledge graph store | +| `graph.backend` | string | `bolt` | Graph backend type (currently only `bolt`) | +| `graph.databasePath` | string | - | File path for graph database | +| `graph.maxTraversalDepth` | int | `2` | Maximum BFS traversal depth for graph expansion | +| `graph.maxExpansionResults` | int | `10` | Maximum graph-expanded results to return | +| **Multi-Agent** | | | | +| `agent.multiAgent` | bool | `false` | Enable hierarchical multi-agent orchestration | +| **A2A Protocol** (🧪 Experimental Features) | | | | +| `a2a.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable A2A protocol support | +| `a2a.baseUrl` | string | - | External URL where this agent is reachable | +| `a2a.agentName` | string | - | Name advertised in the Agent Card | +| `a2a.agentDescription` | string | - | Description in the Agent Card | +| `a2a.remoteAgents` | []object | - | External A2A agents to integrate (name + agentCardUrl) | +| **Payment** (🧪 Experimental Features) | | | | +| `payment.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable blockchain payment features | +| `payment.walletProvider` | string | `local` | Wallet backend: `local`, `rpc`, or `composite` | +| `payment.network.chainId` | int | `84532` | EVM chain ID (84532 = Base Sepolia, 8453 = Base) | +| `payment.network.rpcUrl` | string | - | JSON-RPC endpoint for blockchain network | +| `payment.network.usdcContract` | string | - | USDC token contract address | +| `payment.limits.maxPerTx` | string | `1.00` | Max USDC per transaction (e.g. `"1.00"`) | +| `payment.limits.maxDaily` | string | `10.00` | Max USDC per day (e.g. `"10.00"`) | +| `payment.limits.autoApproveBelow` | string | - | Auto-approve amount threshold | +| `payment.x402.autoIntercept` | bool | `false` | Auto-intercept HTTP 402 responses | +| `payment.x402.maxAutoPayAmount` | string | - | Max amount for X402 auto-pay | +| **P2P Network** (🧪 Experimental Features) | | | | +| `p2p.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable P2P networking | +| `p2p.listenAddrs` | []string | `["/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/9000"]` | Multiaddrs to listen on | +| `p2p.bootstrapPeers` | []string | `[]` | Bootstrap peers for DHT | +| `p2p.keyDir` | string | `~/.lango/p2p` | Node key directory (deprecated — keys now stored in SecretsStore) | +| `p2p.enableRelay` | bool | `false` | Enable relay for NAT traversal | +| `p2p.enableMdns` | bool | `true` | Enable mDNS discovery | +| `p2p.maxPeers` | int | `50` | Maximum connected peers | +| `p2p.autoApproveKnownPeers` | bool | `false` | Skip approval for previously authenticated peers | +| `p2p.minTrustScore` | float64 | `0.3` | Minimum reputation score for accepting peer requests | +| `p2p.pricing.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable paid tool invocations | +| `p2p.pricing.perQuery` | string | `"0.10"` | Default USDC price per query | +| `p2p.zkHandshake` | bool | `false` | Enable ZK-enhanced handshake | +| `p2p.zkAttestation` | bool | `false` | Enable ZK response attestation | +| `p2p.sessionTokenTtl` | duration | `1h` | Session token lifetime after handshake | +| `p2p.requireSignedChallenge` | bool | `false` | Reject unsigned (v1.0) challenges from peers | +| `p2p.toolIsolation.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable subprocess isolation for remote tool execution | +| `p2p.toolIsolation.timeoutPerTool` | duration | `30s` | Max duration per tool execution | +| `p2p.toolIsolation.maxMemoryMB` | int | `512` | Soft memory limit per tool process | +| `p2p.toolIsolation.container.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable container-based sandbox | +| `p2p.toolIsolation.container.runtime` | string | `auto` | Container runtime: `auto`, `docker`, `gvisor`, `native` | +| `p2p.toolIsolation.container.image` | string | `lango-sandbox:latest` | Docker image for sandbox | +| `p2p.toolIsolation.container.networkMode` | string | `none` | Docker network mode | +| `p2p.toolIsolation.container.poolSize` | int | `0` | Pre-warmed container pool size (0 = disabled) | +| `p2p.zkp.srsMode` | string | `unsafe` | SRS generation mode: `unsafe` or `file` | +| `p2p.zkp.srsPath` | string | - | Path to SRS file (when srsMode = file) | +| `p2p.zkp.maxCredentialAge` | string | `24h` | Maximum age for ZK credentials | +| **Security** | | | | +| `security.dbEncryption.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable SQLCipher database encryption | +| `security.dbEncryption.cipherPageSize` | int | `4096` | SQLCipher cipher page size | +| `security.signer.provider` | string | `local` | Signer provider: `local`, `rpc`, `aws-kms`, `gcp-kms`, `azure-kv`, `pkcs11` | +| `security.kms.region` | string | - | Cloud region for KMS API calls | +| `security.kms.keyId` | string | - | KMS key identifier (ARN, resource name, or alias) | +| `security.kms.fallbackToLocal` | bool | `true` | Auto-fallback to local CryptoProvider when KMS unavailable | +| `security.kms.timeoutPerOperation` | duration | `5s` | Max duration per KMS API call | +| `security.kms.maxRetries` | int | `3` | Retry attempts for transient KMS errors | +| `security.kms.azure.vaultUrl` | string | - | Azure Key Vault URL | +| `security.kms.pkcs11.modulePath` | string | - | Path to PKCS#11 shared library | +| `security.kms.pkcs11.slotId` | int | `0` | PKCS#11 slot number | +| `security.kms.pkcs11.keyLabel` | string | - | Key label in HSM | +| **Cron Scheduling** | | | | +| `cron.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable cron job scheduling | +| `cron.timezone` | string | `UTC` | Default timezone for cron expressions | +| `cron.maxConcurrentJobs` | int | `5` | Max concurrent job executions | +| `cron.defaultSessionMode` | string | `isolated` | Default session mode (`isolated` or `main`) | +| `cron.historyRetention` | duration | `720h` | How long to retain execution history | +| `cron.defaultDeliverTo` | []string | `[]` | Default delivery channels for job results (e.g. `["telegram:123"]`) | +| **Background Execution** (🧪 Experimental Features) | | | | +| `background.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable background task execution | +| `background.yieldMs` | int | `30000` | Auto-yield threshold in milliseconds | +| `background.maxConcurrentTasks` | int | `3` | Max concurrent background tasks | +| `background.defaultDeliverTo` | []string | `[]` | Default delivery channels for task results | +| **Workflow Engine** (🧪 Experimental Features) | | | | +| `workflow.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable workflow engine | +| `workflow.maxConcurrentSteps` | int | `4` | Max concurrent workflow steps per run | +| `workflow.defaultTimeout` | duration | `10m` | Default timeout per workflow step | +| `workflow.stateDir` | string | `~/.lango/workflows/` | Directory for workflow state files | +| `workflow.defaultDeliverTo` | []string | `[]` | Default delivery channels for workflow results | +| **Librarian** (🧪 Experimental Features) | | | | +| `librarian.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable proactive knowledge librarian | +| `librarian.observationThreshold` | int | `2` | Min observations to trigger analysis | +| `librarian.inquiryCooldownTurns` | int | `3` | Turns between inquiries per session | +| `librarian.maxPendingInquiries` | int | `2` | Max pending inquiries per session | +| `librarian.autoSaveConfidence` | string | `"high"` | Confidence for auto-save (high/medium/low) | +| `librarian.provider` | string | - | LLM provider for analysis (empty = agent default) | +| `librarian.model` | string | - | Model for analysis (empty = agent default) | + ## System Prompts @@ -372,12 +457,14 @@ Lango ships with production-quality default prompts embedded in the binary. No c ### Prompt Sections -| File | Section | Priority | Description | -|------|---------|----------|-------------| -| `AGENTS.md` | Identity | 100 | Agent name, role, tool capabilities, knowledge system | -| `SAFETY.md` | Safety | 200 | Secret protection, destructive op confirmation, PII | -| `CONVERSATION_RULES.md` | Conversation Rules | 300 | Anti-repetition rules, channel limits, consistency | -| `TOOL_USAGE.md` | Tool Usage | 400 | Per-tool guidelines for exec, filesystem, browser, crypto, secrets, skills | + +| File | Section | Priority | Description | +| ----------------------- | ------------------ | -------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| `AGENTS.md` | Identity | 100 | Agent name, role, tool capabilities, knowledge system | +| `SAFETY.md` | Safety | 200 | Secret protection, destructive op confirmation, PII | +| `CONVERSATION_RULES.md` | Conversation Rules | 300 | Anti-repetition rules, channel limits, consistency | +| `TOOL_USAGE.md` | Tool Usage | 400 | Per-tool guidelines for exec, filesystem, browser, crypto, secrets, skills | + ### Customizing Prompts @@ -425,12 +512,14 @@ You can override or extend prompts per agent by creating an `agents//` sub **Supported per-agent files:** -| File | Section | Priority | Behavior | -|------|---------|----------|----------| -| `IDENTITY.md` | Agent Identity | 150 | Replaces the agent's default role description | -| `SAFETY.md` | Safety | 200 | Overrides the shared safety guidelines | -| `CONVERSATION_RULES.md` | Conversation Rules | 300 | Overrides the shared conversation rules | -| `*.md` (other) | Custom | 900+ | Added as additional custom sections | + +| File | Section | Priority | Behavior | +| ----------------------- | ------------------ | -------- | --------------------------------------------- | +| `IDENTITY.md` | Agent Identity | 150 | Replaces the agent's default role description | +| `SAFETY.md` | Safety | 200 | Overrides the shared safety guidelines | +| `CONVERSATION_RULES.md` | Conversation Rules | 300 | Overrides the shared conversation rules | +| `*.md` (other) | Custom | 900+ | Added as additional custom sections | + If no `agents//` directory exists, the sub-agent uses its built-in instruction combined with the shared Safety and Conversation Rules. @@ -464,17 +553,19 @@ Lango includes a BoltDB-backed knowledge graph that stores relationships as Subj ### Predicate Vocabulary -| Predicate | Meaning | -|-----------|---------| -| `related_to` | Semantic relationship between entities | -| `caused_by` | Causal relationship (effect → cause) | -| `resolved_by` | Resolution relationship (error → fix) | -| `follows` | Temporal ordering | -| `similar_to` | Similarity relationship | -| `contains` | Containment (session → observation) | -| `in_session` | Session membership | -| `reflects_on` | Reflection targets | -| `learned_from` | Provenance (learning → session) | + +| Predicate | Meaning | +| -------------- | -------------------------------------- | +| `related_to` | Semantic relationship between entities | +| `caused_by` | Causal relationship (effect → cause) | +| `resolved_by` | Resolution relationship (error → fix) | +| `follows` | Temporal ordering | +| `similar_to` | Similarity relationship | +| `contains` | Containment (session → observation) | +| `in_session` | Session membership | +| `reflects_on` | Reflection targets | +| `learned_from` | Provenance (learning → session) | + ### Graph RAG (Hybrid Retrieval) @@ -497,15 +588,17 @@ Configure via `lango onboard` > Graph Store menu. Use `lango graph status`, `lan When `agent.multiAgent` is enabled, Lango builds a hierarchical agent tree with specialized sub-agents: -| Agent | Role | Tools | -|-------|------|-------| -| **operator** | System operations: shell commands, file I/O, skill execution | exec_*, fs_*, skill_* | -| **navigator** | Web browsing: page navigation, interaction, screenshots | browser_* | -| **vault** | Security: encryption, secret management, blockchain payments | crypto_*, secrets_*, payment_* | -| **librarian** | Knowledge: search, RAG, graph traversal, skill management, learning data management, proactive knowledge extraction | search_*, rag_*, graph_*, save_knowledge, save_learning, learning_*, create_skill, list_skills, librarian_pending_inquiries, librarian_dismiss_inquiry | -| **automator** | Automation: cron scheduling, background tasks, workflow pipelines | cron_*, bg_*, workflow_* | -| **planner** | Task decomposition and planning | (LLM reasoning only, no tools) | -| **chronicler** | Conversational memory: observations, reflections, recall | memory_*, observe_*, reflect_* | + +| Agent | Role | Tools | +| -------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | +| **operator** | System operations: shell commands, file I/O, skill execution | exec_*, fs_*, skill_* | +| **navigator** | Web browsing: page navigation, interaction, screenshots | browser_* | +| **vault** | Security: encryption, secret management, blockchain payments | crypto_*, secrets_*, payment_* | +| **librarian** | Knowledge: search, RAG, graph traversal, skill management, learning data management, proactive knowledge extraction | search_*, rag_*, graph_*, save_knowledge, save_learning, learning_*, create_skill, list_skills, librarian_pending_inquiries, librarian_dismiss_inquiry | +| **automator** | Automation: cron scheduling, background tasks, workflow pipelines | cron_*, bg_*, workflow_* | +| **planner** | Task decomposition and planning | (LLM reasoning only, no tools) | +| **chronicler** | Conversational memory: observations, reflections, recall | memory_*, observe_*, reflect_* | + The orchestrator uses a keyword-based routing table and 5-step decision protocol (CLASSIFY → MATCH → SELECT → VERIFY → DELEGATE) to route tasks. Each sub-agent can reject misrouted tasks with `[REJECT]`. Unmatched tools are tracked separately and reported to the orchestrator. @@ -523,6 +616,103 @@ Configure via `lango onboard` > A2A Protocol menu. Remote agents (name + URL pai > **Note:** All settings are stored in the encrypted profile database — no plaintext config files. Use `lango onboard` for interactive configuration or `lango config import/export` for programmatic configuration. +## P2P Network (🧪 Experimental Features) + +Lango supports decentralized peer-to-peer agent connectivity via the Sovereign Agent Network (SAN): + +- **libp2p Transport** — TCP/QUIC with Noise encryption +- **DID Identity** — `did:lango:` derived from wallet keys +- **Knowledge Firewall** — Default deny-all ACL with per-peer, per-tool rules and rate limiting +- **Agent Discovery** — GossipSub-based agent card propagation with capability search +- **ZK Handshake** — Optional zero-knowledge proof verification during authentication +- **ZK Attestation** — Prove response authenticity without revealing internal state +- **Payment Gate** — USDC-based paid tool invocations with configurable per-tool pricing +- **Approval Pipeline** — Three-stage inbound gate (firewall → owner approval → execution) with auto-approve for paid tools below threshold +- **Reputation System** — Trust score tracking based on exchange outcomes (successes, failures, timeouts) +- **Owner Shield** — PII protection that sanitizes outgoing P2P responses to prevent owner data leakage +- **Signed Challenges** — ECDSA signed handshake challenges with nonce replay protection and timestamp validation +- **Session Management** — TTL + explicit session invalidation with security event auto-revocation +- **Tool Sandbox** — Subprocess and container-based isolation for remote tool execution +- **Cloud KMS / HSM** — AWS KMS, GCP KMS, Azure Key Vault, PKCS#11 HSM integration for signing and encryption +- **Database Encryption** — SQLCipher transparent encryption for the application database +- **OS Keyring** — Hardware-backed passphrase storage in OS keyring (macOS Keychain, Linux secret-service, Windows DPAPI) +- **Credential Revocation** — DID revocation and max credential age enforcement via gossip + +#### Paid Value Exchange + +Lango supports monetized P2P tool invocations. Peers can set prices for their tools in USDC, and callers follow a structured flow: + +1. **Discover** peers with the desired capability +2. **Check reputation** to verify peer trustworthiness +3. **Query pricing** to see the cost before committing +4. **Send payment** in USDC via on-chain transfer +5. **Invoke the tool** after payment confirmation + +> **Auto-Approval**: Payments below `payment.limits.autoApproveBelow` are auto-approved without confirmation, provided they also satisfy `maxPerTx` and `maxDaily` limits. + +Configure pricing in the P2P config: + +```json +{ + "pricing": { + "enabled": true, + "perQuery": "0.10", + "toolPrices": { + "knowledge_search": "0.25" + } + } +} +``` + +### REST API + +When the gateway is running, P2P status endpoints are available for monitoring and automation: + +```bash +curl http://localhost:18789/api/p2p/status # Peer ID, listen addrs, peer count +curl http://localhost:18789/api/p2p/peers # Connected peers with addrs +curl http://localhost:18789/api/p2p/identity # Local DID and peer ID +curl "http://localhost:18789/api/p2p/reputation?peer_did=did:lango:02abc..." # Trust score +curl http://localhost:18789/api/p2p/pricing # Tool pricing +``` + +### CLI Usage + +```bash +# Check node status +lango p2p status + +# List connected peers +lango p2p peers + +# Connect to a peer +lango p2p connect /ip4/1.2.3.4/tcp/9000/p2p/QmPeerId + +# Discover agents by capability +lango p2p discover --tag research + +# Manage firewall rules +lango p2p firewall list +lango p2p firewall add --peer-did "did:lango:02abc..." --action allow --tools "search_*" + +# Show identity +lango p2p identity + +# Manage peer sessions +lango p2p session list +lango p2p session revoke --peer-did "did:lango:02abc..." +lango p2p session revoke-all + +# Sandbox management +lango p2p sandbox status +lango p2p sandbox test +lango p2p sandbox cleanup +``` + +### Configuration + +Configure via `lango settings` → P2P Network, or import JSON with `lango config import`. Requires `security.signer` to be configured for wallet-based DID derivation. + ## Blockchain Payments (🧪 Experimental Features) Lango includes a blockchain payment system for USDC transactions on Base L2 (EVM), with built-in spending limits and X402 protocol support. @@ -531,23 +721,27 @@ Lango includes a blockchain payment system for USDC transactions on Base L2 (EVM When `payment.enabled` is `true`, the following agent tools are registered: -| Tool | Description | Safety Level | -|------|-------------|--------------| -| `payment_send` | Send USDC to a recipient address | Dangerous | -| `payment_balance` | Check wallet USDC balance | Safe | -| `payment_history` | View recent transaction history | Safe | -| `payment_limits` | View spending limits and daily usage | Safe | -| `payment_wallet_info` | Show wallet address and network info | Safe | -| `payment_create_wallet` | Create a new blockchain wallet (key stored encrypted) | Dangerous | -| `payment_x402_fetch` | HTTP request with automatic X402 payment (EIP-3009) | Dangerous | + +| Tool | Description | Safety Level | +| ----------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------- | ------------ | +| `payment_send` | Send USDC to a recipient address | Dangerous | +| `payment_balance` | Check wallet USDC balance | Safe | +| `payment_history` | View recent transaction history | Safe | +| `payment_limits` | View spending limits and daily usage | Safe | +| `payment_wallet_info` | Show wallet address and network info | Safe | +| `payment_create_wallet` | Create a new blockchain wallet (key stored encrypted) | Dangerous | +| `payment_x402_fetch` | HTTP request with automatic X402 payment (EIP-3009) | Dangerous | + ### Wallet Providers -| Provider | Description | -|----------|-------------| -| `local` | Key derived from encrypted secrets store (default) | -| `rpc` | Remote signer via companion app | -| `composite` | Tries RPC first, falls back to local | + +| Provider | Description | +| ----------- | -------------------------------------------------- | +| `local` | Key derived from encrypted secrets store (default) | +| `rpc` | Remote signer via companion app | +| `composite` | Tries RPC first, falls back to local | + ### X402 V2 Protocol @@ -561,6 +755,7 @@ Lango uses the official [Coinbase X402 Go SDK](https://github.com/coinbase/x402) 6. Server verifies the signature and returns content Key features: + - **EIP-3009 off-chain signatures** — no on-chain transaction needed from the agent - **CAIP-2 network identifiers** — standard `eip155:` format - **Spending limit enforcement** — `BeforePaymentCreationHook` checks per-tx and daily limits before signing @@ -602,11 +797,13 @@ Lango includes a persistent cron scheduling system powered by `robfig/cron/v3` w ### Schedule Types -| Type | Flag | Example | Description | -|------|------|---------|-------------| -| `cron` | `--schedule` | `"0 9 * * *"` | Standard cron expression | -| `every` | `--every` | `1h` | Interval-based repetition | -| `at` | `--at` | `2026-02-20T15:00:00` | One-time execution | + +| Type | Flag | Example | Description | +| ------- | ------------ | --------------------- | ------------------------- | +| `cron` | `--schedule` | `"0 9 * * *"` | Standard cron expression | +| `every` | `--every` | `1h` | Interval-based repetition | +| `at` | `--at` | `2026-02-20T15:00:00` | One-time execution | + ### CLI Usage @@ -712,7 +909,7 @@ Lango includes a self-learning knowledge system that improves agent performance - **Knowledge Store** - Persistent storage for facts, patterns, and external references - **Learning Engine** - Observes tool execution results, extracts error patterns, boosts successful strategies. Agent tools (`learning_stats`, `learning_cleanup`) let the agent brief users on learning data and clean up entries by age, confidence, or category -- **Skill System** - File-based skills stored as `~/.lango/skills//SKILL.md` with YAML frontmatter. Supports four skill types: script (shell), template (Go template), composite (multi-step), and instruction (reference documents). Ships with 30 embedded default skills deployed on first run. Import skills from GitHub repos or any URL via the `import_skill` tool — automatically uses `git clone` when available (fetches full directory with resource files) and falls back to the GitHub HTTP API when git is not installed. Each skill directory can include resource subdirectories (`scripts/`, `references/`, `assets/`). YAML frontmatter supports `allowed-tools` for pre-approved tool lists. Dangerous script patterns (fork bombs, `rm -rf /`, `curl|sh`) are blocked at creation and execution time. +- **Skill System** - File-based skills stored as `~/.lango/skills//SKILL.md` with YAML frontmatter. Supports four skill types: script (shell), template (Go template), composite (multi-step), and instruction (reference documents). Previously shipped ~30 built-in skills, but these were removed because Lango's passphrase-based security model makes it impractical for the agent to invoke CLI commands as skills. The skill infrastructure remains fully functional for user-defined skills. Import skills from GitHub repos or any URL via the `import_skill` tool — automatically uses `git clone` when available (fetches full directory with resource files) and falls back to the GitHub HTTP API when git is not installed. Each skill directory can include resource subdirectories (`scripts/`, `references/`, `assets/`). YAML frontmatter supports `allowed-tools` for pre-approved tool lists. Dangerous script patterns (fork bombs, `rm -rf /`, `curl|sh`) are blocked at creation and execution time. - **Context Retriever** - 8-layer context architecture that assembles relevant knowledge into prompts: 1. Tool Registry — available tools and capabilities 2. User Knowledge — rules, preferences, definitions, facts @@ -744,18 +941,17 @@ Lango includes built-in security features for AI agents: Lango supports two security modes: 1. **Local Mode** (Default) - - Encrypts secrets using AES-256-GCM derived from a passphrase (PBKDF2). - - **Interactive**: Prompts for passphrase on startup (Recommended). - - **Headless**: Set `LANGO_PASSPHRASE` environment variable. - - **Migration**: Rotate your passphrase using: - ```bash - lango security migrate-passphrase - ``` - > **⚠️ Warning**: Losing your passphrase results in permanent loss of all encrypted secrets. Lango does not store your passphrase. - + - Encrypts secrets using AES-256-GCM derived from a passphrase (PBKDF2). + - **Interactive**: Prompts for passphrase on startup (Recommended). + - **Headless**: Set `LANGO_PASSPHRASE` environment variable. + - **Migration**: Rotate your passphrase using: + ```bash + lango security migrate-passphrase + ``` + > **⚠️ Warning**: Losing your passphrase results in permanent loss of all encrypted secrets. Lango does not store your passphrase. 2. **RPC Mode** (Production) - - Offloads cryptographic operations to a hardware-backed companion app or external signer. - - Keys never leave the secure hardware. + - Offloads cryptographic operations to a hardware-backed companion app or external signer. + - Keys never leave the secure hardware. Configure security mode via `lango onboard` > Security menu, or use `lango config` CLI. @@ -799,21 +995,77 @@ Lango supports optional companion apps for hardware-backed security. Companion d - **mDNS Discovery** — auto-discovers companion apps on the local network via `_lango-companion._tcp` - **Manual Config** — set a fixed companion address +### Hardware Keyring + +Store the master passphrase in a hardware-backed keyring for automatic unlock on startup: + +```bash +lango security keyring store # Store passphrase in hardware backend +lango security keyring status # Check hardware keyring availability +lango security keyring clear # Remove stored passphrase +``` + +Supported: macOS Touch ID (Secure Enclave), Linux TPM 2.0. Plain OS keyring is not supported due to same-UID attack risks. + +### Database Encryption + +Encrypt the application database at rest using SQLCipher: + +```bash +lango security db-migrate # Encrypt plaintext DB +lango security db-decrypt # Decrypt back to plaintext +``` + +Configure via `security.dbEncryption.enabled` and `security.dbEncryption.cipherPageSize` (default: 4096). + +### Cloud KMS / HSM + +Delegate cryptographic operations to managed key services: + + +| Provider | Config Value | Build Tag | +| --------------- | ------------ | ------------ | +| AWS KMS | `aws-kms` | `kms_aws` | +| GCP Cloud KMS | `gcp-kms` | `kms_gcp` | +| Azure Key Vault | `azure-kv` | `kms_azure` | +| PKCS#11 HSM | `pkcs11` | `kms_pkcs11` | + + +```bash +lango security kms status # Check KMS connection +lango security kms test # Test encrypt/decrypt roundtrip +lango security kms keys # List registered keys +``` + +Set `security.signer.provider` to the desired KMS backend and configure `security.kms.*` settings. + +### P2P Security Hardening + +The P2P network includes multiple security layers: + +- **Signed Challenges** — ECDSA signed handshake (nonce || timestamp || DID), timestamp validation (5min past + 30s future), nonce replay protection +- **Session Management** — TTL + explicit invalidation with auto-revocation on reputation drop or repeated failures +- **Tool Sandbox** — Subprocess and container-based process isolation for remote tool execution +- **Credential Revocation** — DID revocation set and max credential age enforcement via gossip discovery + ### Authentication Lango supports OIDC authentication for the gateway. Configure OIDC providers via `lango onboard` > Auth menu, or include them in a JSON config file and import with `lango config import`. #### Auth Endpoints -| Method | Path | Description | -|--------|------|-------------| -| `GET` | `/auth/login/{provider}` | Initiate OIDC login flow | -| `GET` | `/auth/callback/{provider}` | OIDC callback (returns JSON: `{"status":"authenticated","sessionKey":"..."}`) | -| `POST` | `/auth/logout` | Clear session and cookie (returns JSON: `{"status":"logged_out"}`) | + +| Method | Path | Description | +| ------ | --------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| `GET` | `/auth/login/{provider}` | Initiate OIDC login flow | +| `GET` | `/auth/callback/{provider}` | OIDC callback (returns JSON: `{"status":"authenticated","sessionKey":"..."}`) | +| `POST` | `/auth/logout` | Clear session and cookie (returns JSON: `{"status":"logged_out"}`) | + #### Protected Routes When OIDC is configured, the following endpoints require a valid `lango_session` cookie: + - `/ws` — WebSocket connection - `/status` — Server status @@ -822,6 +1074,7 @@ Without OIDC configuration, all routes are open (development/local mode). #### WebSocket CORS Use `server.allowedOrigins` to control which origins can connect via WebSocket: + - `[]` (empty, default) — same-origin requests only - `["https://example.com"]` — specific origins - `["*"]` — allow all origins (not recommended for production) @@ -830,17 +1083,19 @@ Use `server.allowedOrigins` to control which origins can connect via WebSocket: The gateway broadcasts the following events during chat processing: -| Event | Payload | Description | -|-------|---------|-------------| -| `agent.thinking` | `{sessionKey}` | Sent before agent execution begins | -| `agent.chunk` | `{sessionKey, chunk}` | Streamed text chunk during LLM generation | -| `agent.done` | `{sessionKey}` | Sent after agent execution completes | + +| Event | Payload | Description | +| ---------------- | --------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | +| `agent.thinking` | `{sessionKey}` | Sent before agent execution begins | +| `agent.chunk` | `{sessionKey, chunk}` | Streamed text chunk during LLM generation | +| `agent.done` | `{sessionKey}` | Sent after agent execution completes | + Events are scoped to the requesting user's session. Clients that don't handle `agent.chunk` will still receive the full response in the RPC result (backward compatible). #### Rate Limiting -Auth endpoints (`/auth/login/*`, `/auth/callback/*`, `/auth/logout`) are throttled to a maximum of 10 concurrent requests. +Auth endpoints (`/auth/login/`*, `/auth/callback/*`, `/auth/logout`) are throttled to a maximum of 10 concurrent requests. ## Docker @@ -865,20 +1120,40 @@ The Docker image includes an entrypoint script that auto-imports configuration o 1. Create `config.json` with your provider keys and settings. 2. Create `passphrase.txt` containing your encryption passphrase. 3. Run with docker-compose: - ```bash + ```bash docker compose up -d - ``` + ``` The entrypoint script (`docker-entrypoint.sh`): + - Copies the passphrase secret to `~/.lango/keyfile` (0600, blocked by the agent's filesystem tool) - On first run, copies the config secret to `/tmp`, imports it into an encrypted profile, and the temp file is auto-deleted - On subsequent restarts, the existing profile is reused Environment variables (optional): + - `LANGO_PROFILE` — profile name to create (default: `default`) - `LANGO_CONFIG_FILE` — override config secret path (default: `/run/secrets/lango_config`) - `LANGO_PASSPHRASE_FILE` — override passphrase secret path (default: `/run/secrets/lango_passphrase`) +## Examples + +### P2P Trading (Docker Compose) + +A complete multi-agent integration example with 3 Lango agents (Alice, Bob, Charlie) trading USDC on a local Ethereum chain: + +- **P2P Discovery** — agents discover each other via mDNS +- **DID Identity** — `did:lango:` identifiers derived from wallet keys +- **USDC Payments** — MockUSDC contract on Anvil (local EVM) +- **E2E Tests** — automated health, discovery, balance, and transfer verification + +```bash +cd examples/p2p-trading +make all # Build, start, wait for health, run tests, shut down +``` + +See `[examples/p2p-trading/README.md](examples/p2p-trading/README.md)` for architecture details and prerequisites. + ## Development ```bash @@ -903,4 +1178,4 @@ make deps ## License -MIT +MIT \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/build/sandbox/Dockerfile b/build/sandbox/Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4979e5f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/build/sandbox/Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +FROM debian:bookworm-slim + +RUN groupadd -r sandbox && useradd -r -g sandbox sandbox + +COPY lango /usr/local/bin/lango + +USER sandbox + +ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/lango", "--sandbox-worker"] diff --git a/cmd/lango/main.go b/cmd/lango/main.go index 4f3b8b16..96efe38e 100644 --- a/cmd/lango/main.go +++ b/cmd/lango/main.go @@ -15,13 +15,17 @@ import ( "github.com/spf13/cobra" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/app" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/background" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" cliagent "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/agent" + clibg "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/bg" clicron "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/cron" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/doctor" cligraph "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/graph" climemory "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/memory" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/onboard" + clip2p "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/p2p" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/tui" clipayment "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/payment" clisecurity "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/security" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/settings" @@ -29,6 +33,7 @@ import ( "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/configstore" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/logging" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/sandbox" ) var ( @@ -37,55 +42,116 @@ var ( ) func main() { + // Check if running as sandbox worker subprocess. + // Worker mode is used for process-isolated tool execution in P2P. + if sandbox.IsWorkerMode() { + // Phase 1: no tools registered in worker — the subprocess executor + // is wired at the application level. This early exit prevents the + // worker from initializing cobra and the full application stack. + sandbox.RunWorker(sandbox.ToolRegistry{}) + return + } + + tui.SetVersionInfo(Version, BuildTime) + rootCmd := &cobra.Command{ Use: "lango", Short: "Lango - Fast AI Agent in Go", Long: `Lango is a high-performance AI agent built with Go, supporting multiple channels and tools.`, } + rootCmd.AddGroup( + &cobra.Group{ID: "core", Title: "Core:"}, + &cobra.Group{ID: "config", Title: "Configuration:"}, + &cobra.Group{ID: "data", Title: "Data & AI:"}, + &cobra.Group{ID: "infra", Title: "Infrastructure:"}, + ) + rootCmd.AddCommand(serveCmd()) rootCmd.AddCommand(versionCmd()) rootCmd.AddCommand(healthCmd()) rootCmd.AddCommand(configCmd()) - rootCmd.AddCommand(doctor.NewCommand()) - rootCmd.AddCommand(onboard.NewCommand()) - rootCmd.AddCommand(settings.NewCommand()) - rootCmd.AddCommand(clisecurity.NewSecurityCmd(func() (*bootstrap.Result, error) { + + doctorCmd := doctor.NewCommand() + doctorCmd.GroupID = "config" + rootCmd.AddCommand(doctorCmd) + + onboardCmd := onboard.NewCommand() + onboardCmd.GroupID = "config" + rootCmd.AddCommand(onboardCmd) + + settingsCmd := settings.NewCommand() + settingsCmd.GroupID = "config" + rootCmd.AddCommand(settingsCmd) + + securityCmd := clisecurity.NewSecurityCmd(func() (*bootstrap.Result, error) { return bootstrap.Run(bootstrap.Options{}) - })) - rootCmd.AddCommand(climemory.NewMemoryCmd(func() (*config.Config, error) { + }) + securityCmd.GroupID = "infra" + rootCmd.AddCommand(securityCmd) + + memoryCmd := climemory.NewMemoryCmd(func() (*config.Config, error) { boot, err := bootstrap.Run(bootstrap.Options{}) if err != nil { return nil, err } defer boot.DBClient.Close() return boot.Config, nil - })) - rootCmd.AddCommand(cliagent.NewAgentCmd(func() (*config.Config, error) { + }) + memoryCmd.GroupID = "data" + rootCmd.AddCommand(memoryCmd) + + agentCmd := cliagent.NewAgentCmd(func() (*config.Config, error) { boot, err := bootstrap.Run(bootstrap.Options{}) if err != nil { return nil, err } defer boot.DBClient.Close() return boot.Config, nil - })) - rootCmd.AddCommand(cligraph.NewGraphCmd(func() (*config.Config, error) { + }) + agentCmd.GroupID = "data" + rootCmd.AddCommand(agentCmd) + + graphCmd := cligraph.NewGraphCmd(func() (*config.Config, error) { boot, err := bootstrap.Run(bootstrap.Options{}) if err != nil { return nil, err } defer boot.DBClient.Close() return boot.Config, nil - })) - rootCmd.AddCommand(clipayment.NewPaymentCmd(func() (*bootstrap.Result, error) { + }) + graphCmd.GroupID = "data" + rootCmd.AddCommand(graphCmd) + + paymentCmd := clipayment.NewPaymentCmd(func() (*bootstrap.Result, error) { return bootstrap.Run(bootstrap.Options{}) - })) - rootCmd.AddCommand(clicron.NewCronCmd(func() (*bootstrap.Result, error) { + }) + paymentCmd.GroupID = "infra" + rootCmd.AddCommand(paymentCmd) + + p2pCmd := clip2p.NewP2PCmd(func() (*bootstrap.Result, error) { return bootstrap.Run(bootstrap.Options{}) - })) - rootCmd.AddCommand(cliworkflow.NewWorkflowCmd(func() (*bootstrap.Result, error) { + }) + p2pCmd.GroupID = "infra" + rootCmd.AddCommand(p2pCmd) + + cronCmd := clicron.NewCronCmd(func() (*bootstrap.Result, error) { + return bootstrap.Run(bootstrap.Options{}) + }) + cronCmd.GroupID = "infra" + rootCmd.AddCommand(cronCmd) + + workflowCmd := cliworkflow.NewWorkflowCmd(func() (*bootstrap.Result, error) { return bootstrap.Run(bootstrap.Options{}) - })) + }) + workflowCmd.GroupID = "infra" + rootCmd.AddCommand(workflowCmd) + + bgCmd := clibg.NewBgCmd(func() (*background.Manager, error) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("bg commands require a running server (use 'lango serve' first)") + }) + bgCmd.GroupID = "infra" + rootCmd.AddCommand(bgCmd) if err := rootCmd.Execute(); err != nil { fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err) @@ -100,8 +166,9 @@ func bootstrapForConfig() (*bootstrap.Result, error) { func serveCmd() *cobra.Command { return &cobra.Command{ - Use: "serve", - Short: "Start the gateway server", + Use: "serve", + Short: "Start the gateway server", + GroupID: "core", RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { // Bootstrap: DB + crypto + config profile boot, err := bootstrap.Run(bootstrap.Options{}) @@ -119,9 +186,14 @@ func serveCmd() *cobra.Command { }); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("init logging: %w", err) } - defer logging.Sync() + defer func() { _ = logging.Sync() }() log := logging.Sugar() + + // Print serve banner before starting + tui.SetProfile(boot.ProfileName) + fmt.Print(tui.ServeBanner()) + log.Infow("starting lango", "version", Version, "profile", boot.ProfileName) // Create application @@ -163,8 +235,9 @@ func serveCmd() *cobra.Command { func versionCmd() *cobra.Command { return &cobra.Command{ - Use: "version", - Short: "Print version information", + Use: "version", + Short: "Print version information", + GroupID: "core", Run: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) { fmt.Printf("lango %s (built %s)\n", Version, BuildTime) }, @@ -175,8 +248,9 @@ func healthCmd() *cobra.Command { var port int cmd := &cobra.Command{ - Use: "health", - Short: "Check gateway health (replaces curl in Docker HEALTHCHECK)", + Use: "health", + Short: "Check gateway health (replaces curl in Docker HEALTHCHECK)", + GroupID: "core", RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { url := "http://localhost:" + strconv.Itoa(port) + "/health" client := &http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second} @@ -185,7 +259,7 @@ func healthCmd() *cobra.Command { if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("health check: %w", err) } - defer resp.Body.Close() + defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }() if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { return fmt.Errorf("unhealthy: status %d", resp.StatusCode) @@ -202,8 +276,17 @@ func healthCmd() *cobra.Command { func configCmd() *cobra.Command { cmd := &cobra.Command{ - Use: "config", - Short: "Configuration profile management", + Use: "config", + Short: "Configuration profile management", + GroupID: "config", + Long: `Configuration profile management. + +Manage multiple configuration profiles for different environments or setups. + +See Also: + lango settings - Interactive settings editor (TUI) + lango onboard - Guided setup wizard + lango doctor - Diagnose configuration issues`, } cmd.AddCommand(configListCmd()) @@ -330,7 +413,7 @@ func configDeleteCmd() *cobra.Command { if !force { fmt.Printf("Delete profile %q? This cannot be undone. [y/N]: ", name) var answer string - fmt.Scanln(&answer) + _, _ = fmt.Scanln(&answer) if answer != "y" && answer != "Y" { fmt.Println("Aborted.") return nil diff --git a/docs/architecture/project-structure.md b/docs/architecture/project-structure.md index 784e552a..186874ae 100644 --- a/docs/architecture/project-structure.md +++ b/docs/architecture/project-structure.md @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ lango/ ├── cmd/lango/ # Application entry point ├── internal/ # All application packages (Go internal visibility) ├── prompts/ # Default prompt .md files (embedded via go:embed) -├── skills/ # 30 embedded default skills (go:embed SKILL.md files) +├── skills/ # Skill system scaffold (go:embed) ├── openspec/ # Specifications (OpenSpec workflow) ├── docs/ # MkDocs documentation source ├── go.mod / go.sum # Go module definition @@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ All application code lives under `internal/` to enforce Go's visibility boundary | `cli/bg/` | `lango bg list`, `status`, `cancel`, `result` -- background task management | | `cli/workflow/` | `lango workflow run`, `list`, `status`, `cancel`, `history` -- workflow management | | `cli/prompt/` | Interactive prompt utilities for CLI input | -| `cli/security/` | `lango security status`, `secrets`, `migrate-passphrase` -- security operations | +| `cli/security/` | `lango security status`, `secrets`, `migrate-passphrase`, `keyring store/clear/status`, `db-migrate`, `db-decrypt`, `kms status/test/keys` -- security operations | +| `cli/p2p/` | `lango p2p status`, `peers`, `connect`, `disconnect`, `firewall list/add/remove`, `discover`, `identity`, `reputation`, `pricing`, `session list/revoke/revoke-all`, `sandbox status/test/cleanup` -- P2P network management | | `cli/tui/` | TUI components and views for interactive terminal sessions | | `channels/` | Channel bot integrations for Telegram, Discord, and Slack. Each adapter converts platform-specific messages to the Gateway's internal format | | `gateway/` | HTTP REST + WebSocket server built on chi router. Handles JSON-RPC over WebSocket, OIDC authentication (`AuthManager`), turn callbacks, and approval routing. Provides `Server.SetAgent()` for late-binding the agent after initialization | @@ -73,7 +74,7 @@ All application code lives under `internal/` to enforce Go's visibility boundary |---------|-------------| | `config/` | YAML configuration loading with environment variable substitution (`${ENV_VAR}` syntax), validation, and defaults. Defines all config structs (`Config`, `AgentConfig`, `SecurityConfig`, etc.) | | `configstore/` | Encrypted configuration profile storage backed by Ent ORM. Allows multiple named profiles with passphrase-derived encryption | -| `security/` | Crypto providers (`LocalProvider` with passphrase-derived keys, `RPCProvider` for remote signing). `KeyRegistry` manages encryption keys. `SecretsStore` provides encrypted secret storage. `RefStore` holds opaque references so plaintext never reaches agent context. Companion discovery for distributed setups | +| `security/` | Crypto providers (`LocalProvider` with passphrase-derived keys, `RPCProvider` for remote signing). `KeyRegistry` manages encryption keys. `SecretsStore` provides encrypted secret storage. `RefStore` holds opaque references so plaintext never reaches agent context. Companion discovery for distributed setups. KMS providers (AWS KMS, GCP KMS, Azure Key Vault, PKCS#11) with retry and health checking | | `session/` | Session persistence via Ent ORM with SQLite backend. `EntStore` implements the `Store` interface with configurable TTL and max history turns. `CompactMessages()` supports memory compaction | | `ent/` | Ent ORM schema definitions and generated code for all database entities | | `logging/` | Structured logging via Zap. Per-package logger instances (`logging.App()`, `logging.Agent()`, `logging.Gateway()`, etc.) | @@ -90,6 +91,10 @@ All application code lives under `internal/` to enforce Go's visibility boundary | `cron/` | Cron scheduling system built on robfig/cron/v3. `Scheduler` manages job lifecycle. `EntStore` persists jobs and execution history. `Executor` runs agent prompts on schedule. `Delivery` routes results to channels | | `background/` | In-memory background task manager. `Manager` enforces concurrency limits and task timeouts. `Notification` routes results to channels | | `workflow/` | DAG-based workflow engine. `Engine` parses YAML workflow definitions, resolves step dependencies, and executes steps in parallel where possible. `StateStore` persists workflow state via Ent | +| `lifecycle/` | Component lifecycle management. `Registry` with priority-ordered startup and reverse-order shutdown. Adapters: `SimpleComponent`, `FuncComponent`, `ErrorComponent` | +| `keyring/` | Hardware keyring integration (Touch ID / TPM 2.0). `Provider` interface backed by OS keyring via go-keyring | +| `sandbox/` | Tool execution isolation. `SubprocessExecutor` for process-isolated P2P tool execution. `ContainerRuntime` interface with Docker/gVisor/native fallback chain. Optional pre-warmed container pool | +| `dbmigrate/` | Database encryption migration. `MigrateToEncrypted` / `DecryptToPlaintext` for SQLCipher transitions. `IsEncrypted` detection and `secureDeleteFile` cleanup | | `passphrase/` | Passphrase prompt and validation helpers for terminal input | | `orchestration/` | Multi-agent orchestration. `BuildAgentTree()` creates an ADK agent hierarchy with sub-agents: Operator (tool execution), Navigator (research), Vault (security), Librarian (knowledge), Automator (cron/bg/workflow), Planner (task planning), Chronicler (memory) | | `a2a/` | Agent-to-Agent protocol. `Server` exposes agent card and task endpoints. `LoadRemoteAgents()` discovers and loads remote agent capabilities | @@ -107,7 +112,7 @@ Default system prompt sections as Markdown files, embedded into the binary via ` ## `skills/` -30 embedded default skills as `SKILL.md` files, deployed to `~/.lango/skills/` on first run via `EnsureDefaults()`. Each skill defines a name, description, and instruction template that the agent can invoke. +Skill system scaffold. Previously included ~30 built-in skills as SKILL.md files deployed via go:embed, but these were removed because Lango's passphrase-protected security model makes it impractical for the agent to invoke lango CLI commands as skills. The skill infrastructure (FileSkillStore, Registry, GitHub importer) remains fully functional for user-defined skills. ## `openspec/` diff --git a/docs/cli/index.md b/docs/cli/index.md index 817a83c2..42c26d5c 100644 --- a/docs/cli/index.md +++ b/docs/cli/index.md @@ -48,6 +48,14 @@ Lango provides a comprehensive command-line interface built with [Cobra](https:/ | `lango security secrets list` | List stored secrets (values hidden) | | `lango security secrets set ` | Store an encrypted secret | | `lango security secrets delete ` | Delete a stored secret | +| `lango security keyring store` | Store passphrase in hardware keyring (Touch ID / TPM) | +| `lango security keyring clear` | Remove passphrase from keyring | +| `lango security keyring status` | Show hardware keyring status | +| `lango security db-migrate` | Encrypt database with SQLCipher | +| `lango security db-decrypt` | Decrypt database to plaintext | +| `lango security kms status` | Show KMS provider status | +| `lango security kms test` | Test KMS encrypt/decrypt roundtrip | +| `lango security kms keys` | List KMS keys in registry | ### Payment @@ -59,6 +67,28 @@ Lango provides a comprehensive command-line interface built with [Cobra](https:/ | `lango payment info` | Show wallet and payment system info | | `lango payment send` | Send a USDC payment | +### P2P Network + +| Command | Description | +|---------|-------------| +| `lango p2p status` | Show P2P node status | +| `lango p2p peers` | List connected peers | +| `lango p2p connect ` | Connect to a peer by multiaddr | +| `lango p2p disconnect ` | Disconnect from a peer | +| `lango p2p firewall list` | List firewall ACL rules | +| `lango p2p firewall add` | Add a firewall ACL rule | +| `lango p2p firewall remove` | Remove firewall rules for a peer | +| `lango p2p discover` | Discover agents by capability | +| `lango p2p identity` | Show local DID and peer identity | +| `lango p2p reputation` | Query peer trust score | +| `lango p2p pricing` | Show tool pricing | +| `lango p2p session list` | List active peer sessions | +| `lango p2p session revoke` | Revoke a peer session | +| `lango p2p session revoke-all` | Revoke all active peer sessions | +| `lango p2p sandbox status` | Show sandbox runtime status | +| `lango p2p sandbox test` | Run sandbox smoke test | +| `lango p2p sandbox cleanup` | Remove orphaned sandbox containers | + ### Automation | Command | Description | @@ -74,6 +104,10 @@ Lango provides a comprehensive command-line interface built with [Cobra](https:/ | `lango workflow status ` | Show workflow run status | | `lango workflow cancel ` | Cancel a running workflow | | `lango workflow history` | Show workflow execution history | +| `lango bg list` | List background tasks | +| `lango bg status ` | Show background task status | +| `lango bg cancel ` | Cancel a running background task | +| `lango bg result ` | Show completed task result | ## Global Behavior diff --git a/docs/cli/p2p.md b/docs/cli/p2p.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6d7feb66 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/cli/p2p.md @@ -0,0 +1,427 @@ +# P2P Commands + +Commands for managing the P2P network on the Sovereign Agent Network. P2P must be enabled in configuration (`p2p.enabled = true`). See the [P2P Network](../features/p2p-network.md) section for detailed documentation. + +``` +lango p2p +``` + +!!! warning "Experimental Feature" + The P2P networking system is experimental. Protocol and behavior may change between releases. + +--- + +## lango p2p status + +Show the P2P node status including peer ID, listen addresses, connected peer count, and feature flags. + +``` +lango p2p status [--json] +``` + +| Flag | Type | Default | Description | +|------|------|---------|-------------| +| `--json` | bool | `false` | Output as JSON | + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango p2p status +P2P Node Status + Peer ID: QmYourPeerId123... + Listen Addrs: [/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/9000] + Connected Peers: 3 / 50 + mDNS: true + Relay: false + ZK Handshake: false +``` + +--- + +## lango p2p peers + +List all currently connected peers with their peer IDs and multiaddrs. + +``` +lango p2p peers [--json] +``` + +| Flag | Type | Default | Description | +|------|------|---------|-------------| +| `--json` | bool | `false` | Output as JSON | + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango p2p peers +PEER ID ADDRESS +QmPeer1abc123... /ip4/192.168.1.5/tcp/9000 +QmPeer2def456... /ip4/10.0.0.3/tcp/9001 +``` + +--- + +## lango p2p connect + +Connect to a peer by its full multiaddr (including the `/p2p/` suffix). + +``` +lango p2p connect +``` + +| Argument | Description | +|----------|-------------| +| `multiaddr` | Full multiaddr of the peer (e.g., `/ip4/1.2.3.4/tcp/9000/p2p/QmPeerId`) | + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango p2p connect /ip4/192.168.1.5/tcp/9000/p2p/QmPeer1abc123 +Connected to peer QmPeer1abc123 +``` + +--- + +## lango p2p disconnect + +Disconnect from a peer by its peer ID. + +``` +lango p2p disconnect +``` + +| Argument | Description | +|----------|-------------| +| `peer-id` | Peer ID to disconnect from | + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango p2p disconnect QmPeer1abc123 +Disconnected from peer QmPeer1abc123 +``` + +--- + +## lango p2p firewall + +Manage knowledge firewall ACL rules that control peer access. + +### lango p2p firewall list + +List all configured firewall ACL rules. + +``` +lango p2p firewall list [--json] +``` + +| Flag | Type | Default | Description | +|------|------|---------|-------------| +| `--json` | bool | `false` | Output as JSON | + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango p2p firewall list +PEER DID ACTION TOOLS RATE LIMIT +did:lango:02abc... allow search_* 10/min +* deny exec_* unlimited +``` + +### lango p2p firewall add + +Add a new firewall ACL rule (runtime only — persist by updating configuration). + +``` +lango p2p firewall add --peer-did --action [--tools ] [--rate-limit ] +``` + +| Flag | Type | Default | Description | +|------|------|---------|-------------| +| `--peer-did` | string | *required* | Peer DID to apply the rule to (`"*"` for all) | +| `--action` | string | `allow` | Rule action: `allow` or `deny` | +| `--tools` | []string | `[]` | Tool name patterns (empty = all tools) | +| `--rate-limit` | int | `0` | Max requests per minute (0 = unlimited) | + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango p2p firewall add --peer-did "did:lango:02abc..." --action allow --tools "search_*,rag_*" --rate-limit 10 +Firewall rule added (runtime only): + Peer DID: did:lango:02abc... + Action: allow + Tools: search_*, rag_* + Rate Limit: 10/min +``` + +### lango p2p firewall remove + +Remove all firewall rules matching a peer DID. + +``` +lango p2p firewall remove +``` + +| Argument | Description | +|----------|-------------| +| `peer-did` | Peer DID whose rules should be removed | + +--- + +## lango p2p discover + +Discover agents on the P2P network via GossipSub. Optionally filter by capability tag. + +``` +lango p2p discover [--tag ] [--json] +``` + +| Flag | Type | Default | Description | +|------|------|---------|-------------| +| `--tag` | string | `""` | Filter by capability tag | +| `--json` | bool | `false` | Output as JSON | + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango p2p discover --tag research +NAME DID CAPABILITIES PEER ID +research-bot did:lango:02abc... research, summarize QmPeer1abc123 +``` + +--- + +## lango p2p identity + +Show the local P2P identity including peer ID, key directory, and listen addresses. + +``` +lango p2p identity [--json] +``` + +| Flag | Type | Default | Description | +|------|------|---------|-------------| +| `--json` | bool | `false` | Output as JSON | + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango p2p identity +P2P Identity + Peer ID: QmYourPeerId123... + Key Dir: ~/.lango/p2p + Listen Addrs: + /ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/9000 + /ip6/::/tcp/9000 +``` + +--- + +## `lango p2p reputation` + +Show peer reputation and trust score details. + +### Usage + +```bash +lango p2p reputation --peer-did [--json] +``` + +### Flags + +| Flag | Description | +|------|-------------| +| `--peer-did` | The DID of the peer to query (required) | +| `--json` | Output as JSON | + +### Examples + +```bash +# Show reputation for a peer +lango p2p reputation --peer-did "did:lango:abc123" + +# Output as JSON +lango p2p reputation --peer-did "did:lango:abc123" --json +``` + +### Output Fields + +| Field | Description | +|-------|-------------| +| Trust Score | Current trust score (0.0 to 1.0) | +| Successes | Number of successful exchanges | +| Failures | Number of failed exchanges | +| Timeouts | Number of timed-out exchanges | +| First Seen | Timestamp of first interaction | +| Last Interaction | Timestamp of most recent interaction | + +--- + +## lango p2p session + +Manage P2P sessions. List, revoke, or revoke all authenticated peer sessions. + +### lango p2p session list + +List all active (non-expired, non-invalidated) peer sessions. + +``` +lango p2p session list [--json] +``` + +| Flag | Type | Default | Description | +|------|------|---------|-------------| +| `--json` | bool | `false` | Output as JSON | + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango p2p session list +PEER DID CREATED EXPIRES ZK VERIFIED +did:lango:02abc123... 2026-02-25T10:00:00Z 2026-02-25T11:00:00Z true +did:lango:03def456... 2026-02-25T10:30:00Z 2026-02-25T11:30:00Z false +``` + +--- + +### lango p2p session revoke + +Revoke a specific peer's session by DID. + +``` +lango p2p session revoke --peer-did +``` + +| Flag | Type | Default | Description | +|------|------|---------|-------------| +| `--peer-did` | string | *required* | The DID of the peer to revoke | + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango p2p session revoke --peer-did "did:lango:02abc123..." +Session for did:lango:02abc123... revoked. +``` + +--- + +### lango p2p session revoke-all + +Revoke all active peer sessions. + +``` +lango p2p session revoke-all +``` + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango p2p session revoke-all +All sessions revoked. +``` + +--- + +## lango p2p sandbox + +Manage the P2P tool execution sandbox. Inspect sandbox status, run smoke tests, and clean up orphaned containers. + +### lango p2p sandbox status + +Show the current sandbox runtime status including isolation configuration, container mode, and active runtime. + +``` +lango p2p sandbox status +``` + +**Example (subprocess mode):** + +```bash +$ lango p2p sandbox status +Tool isolation: enabled + Timeout per tool: 30s + Max memory (MB): 512 + Container mode: disabled (subprocess fallback) +``` + +**Example (container mode):** + +```bash +$ lango p2p sandbox status +Tool isolation: enabled + Timeout per tool: 30s + Max memory (MB): 512 + Container mode: enabled + Runtime config: auto + Image: lango-sandbox:latest + Network mode: none + Active runtime: docker + Pool size: 3 +``` + +--- + +### lango p2p sandbox test + +Run a sandbox smoke test by executing a simple echo tool through the sandbox. + +``` +lango p2p sandbox test +``` + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango p2p sandbox test +Using container runtime: docker +Smoke test passed: map[msg:sandbox-smoke-test] +``` + +--- + +### lango p2p sandbox cleanup + +Find and remove orphaned Docker containers with the `lango.sandbox=true` label. + +``` +lango p2p sandbox cleanup +``` + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango p2p sandbox cleanup +Orphaned sandbox containers cleaned up. +``` + +--- + +## `lango p2p pricing` + +Show P2P tool pricing configuration. + +### Usage + +```bash +lango p2p pricing [--tool ] [--json] +``` + +### Flags + +| Flag | Description | +|------|-------------| +| `--tool` | Filter pricing for a specific tool | +| `--json` | Output as JSON | + +### Examples + +```bash +# Show all pricing +lango p2p pricing + +# Show pricing for a specific tool +lango p2p pricing --tool "knowledge_search" + +# Output as JSON +lango p2p pricing --json +``` diff --git a/docs/cli/security.md b/docs/cli/security.md index 6c2d6cfc..39ac105a 100644 --- a/docs/cli/security.md +++ b/docs/cli/security.md @@ -31,6 +31,23 @@ Security Status Interceptor: enabled PII Redaction: disabled Approval Policy: dangerous + DB Encryption: disabled (plaintext) +``` + +```bash +# With KMS configured +$ lango security status +Security Status + Signer Provider: aws-kms + Encryption Keys: 2 + Stored Secrets: 5 + Interceptor: enabled + PII Redaction: disabled + Approval Policy: dangerous + DB Encryption: encrypted (active) + KMS Provider: aws-kms + KMS Key ID: arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:... + KMS Fallback: enabled ``` **JSON output fields:** @@ -43,6 +60,10 @@ Security Status | `interceptor` | string | Interceptor status (`enabled`/`disabled`) | | `pii_redaction` | string | PII redaction status (`enabled`/`disabled`) | | `approval_policy` | string | Tool approval policy (`always`, `dangerous`, `never`) | +| `db_encryption` | string | Database encryption status | +| `kms_provider` | string | KMS provider name (when configured) | +| `kms_key_id` | string | KMS key identifier (when configured) | +| `kms_fallback` | string | KMS fallback status (when configured) | --- @@ -84,6 +105,230 @@ Migration completed successfully! --- +## Hardware Keyring + +Manage hardware-backed keyring passphrase storage. Only secure hardware backends are supported (macOS Touch ID / Linux TPM 2.0) to prevent same-UID attacks. + +### lango security keyring store + +Store the master passphrase using the best available secure hardware backend. Requires an interactive terminal and a hardware backend (Touch ID or TPM 2.0). + +``` +lango security keyring store +``` + +!!! warning "Requirements" + - An interactive terminal (cannot be used in CI/CD) + - A secure hardware backend (Touch ID on macOS or TPM 2.0 on Linux) + - On macOS: binary must be codesigned for biometric protection + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango security keyring store +Enter passphrase to store: ******** +Passphrase stored with biometric protection. + Next launch will load it automatically. +``` + +--- + +### lango security keyring clear + +Remove the master passphrase from all hardware keyring backends. + +``` +lango security keyring clear [--force] +``` + +| Flag | Type | Default | Description | +|------|------|---------|-------------| +| `--force` | bool | `false` | Skip confirmation prompt | + +**Examples:** + +```bash +# Interactive +$ lango security keyring clear +Remove passphrase from all keyring backends? [y/N] y +Removed passphrase from secure provider. + +# Non-interactive +$ lango security keyring clear --force +Removed passphrase from secure provider. +``` + +--- + +### lango security keyring status + +Show hardware keyring availability and stored passphrase status. + +``` +lango security keyring status [--json] +``` + +| Flag | Type | Default | Description | +|------|------|---------|-------------| +| `--json` | bool | `false` | Output as JSON | + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango security keyring status +Hardware Keyring Status + Available: true + Security Tier: biometric + Has Passphrase: true +``` + +**JSON output fields:** + +| Field | Type | Description | +|-------|------|-------------| +| `available` | bool | Whether a hardware keyring is available | +| `security_tier` | string | Security tier (`biometric`, `tpm`, or `none`) | +| `has_passphrase` | bool | Whether passphrase is stored | + +--- + +## Database Encryption + +Encrypt or decrypt the application database using SQLCipher. + +### lango security db-migrate + +Convert the plaintext SQLite database to SQLCipher-encrypted format using the current passphrase. + +``` +lango security db-migrate [--force] +``` + +| Flag | Type | Default | Description | +|------|------|---------|-------------| +| `--force` | bool | `false` | Skip confirmation prompt (enables non-interactive mode) | + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango security db-migrate +This will encrypt your database. A backup will be created. Continue? [y/N] y +Enter passphrase for DB encryption: ******** +Encrypting database... +Database encrypted successfully. +Set security.dbEncryption.enabled=true in your config to use the encrypted DB. +``` + +--- + +### lango security db-decrypt + +Convert a SQLCipher-encrypted database back to plaintext SQLite. + +``` +lango security db-decrypt [--force] +``` + +| Flag | Type | Default | Description | +|------|------|---------|-------------| +| `--force` | bool | `false` | Skip confirmation prompt (enables non-interactive mode) | + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango security db-decrypt +This will decrypt your database to plaintext. Continue? [y/N] y +Enter passphrase for DB decryption: ******** +Decrypting database... +Database decrypted successfully. +Set security.dbEncryption.enabled=false in your config if you no longer want encryption. +``` + +--- + +## Cloud KMS / HSM + +Manage Cloud KMS and HSM integration. Requires `security.signer.provider` to be set to a KMS provider (`aws-kms`, `gcp-kms`, `azure-kv`, or `pkcs11`). + +### lango security kms status + +Show the KMS provider connection status. + +``` +lango security kms status [--json] +``` + +| Flag | Type | Default | Description | +|------|------|---------|-------------| +| `--json` | bool | `false` | Output as JSON | + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango security kms status +KMS Status + Provider: aws-kms + Key ID: arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/example-key + Region: us-east-1 + Fallback: enabled + Status: connected +``` + +**JSON output fields:** + +| Field | Type | Description | +|-------|------|-------------| +| `provider` | string | KMS provider name | +| `key_id` | string | KMS key identifier | +| `region` | string | Cloud region (if applicable) | +| `fallback` | string | Local fallback status (`enabled`/`disabled`) | +| `status` | string | Connection status (`connected`, `unreachable`, `not configured`, or error) | + +--- + +### lango security kms test + +Test KMS encrypt/decrypt roundtrip using 32 bytes of random data. + +``` +lango security kms test +``` + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango security kms test +Testing KMS roundtrip with key "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/example-key"... + Encrypt: OK (32 bytes → 64 bytes) + Decrypt: OK (32 bytes) + Roundtrip: PASS +``` + +--- + +### lango security kms keys + +List KMS keys registered in the KeyRegistry. + +``` +lango security kms keys [--json] +``` + +| Flag | Type | Default | Description | +|------|------|---------|-------------| +| `--json` | bool | `false` | Output as JSON | + +**Example:** + +```bash +$ lango security kms keys +ID NAME TYPE REMOTE KEY ID +550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000 primary-signing signing arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:... +6ba7b810-9dad-11d1-80b4-00c04fd430c8 default-encryption encryption arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:... +``` + +--- + ## Secret Management Manage encrypted secrets stored in the database. Secret values are never displayed -- only metadata is shown when listing. @@ -114,27 +359,40 @@ openai-api-key default 2026-02-01 09:00 2026-02-01 09:00 3 ### lango security secrets set -Store a new encrypted secret or update an existing one. Prompts for the secret value interactively (input is hidden). +Store a new encrypted secret or update an existing one. In interactive mode, prompts for the secret value (input is hidden). In non-interactive mode, use `--value-hex` to provide a hex-encoded value. ``` -lango security secrets set +lango security secrets set [--value-hex ] ``` | Argument | Required | Description | |----------|----------|-------------| | `name` | Yes | Name identifier for the secret | -!!! note - This command requires an interactive terminal. The secret value is read securely without echoing to the screen. +| Flag | Type | Default | Description | +|------|------|---------|-------------| +| `--value-hex` | string | - | Hex-encoded value to store (optional `0x` prefix). Enables non-interactive mode. | -**Example:** +**Examples:** ```bash +# Interactive (prompts for value) $ lango security secrets set my-api-key Enter secret value: Secret 'my-api-key' stored successfully. + +# Non-interactive with hex value (e.g., wallet private key in Docker/CI) +$ lango security secrets set wallet.privatekey --value-hex 0xac0974bec39a17e36ba4a6b4d238ff944bacb478cbed5efcae784d7bf4f2ff80 +Secret 'wallet.privatekey' stored successfully. + +# Without 0x prefix +$ lango security secrets set wallet.privatekey --value-hex ac0974bec39a17e36ba4a6b4d238ff944bacb478cbed5efcae784d7bf4f2ff80 +Secret 'wallet.privatekey' stored successfully. ``` +!!! tip + Use `--value-hex` for non-interactive environments (Docker, CI/CD, scripts). Without it, the command requires an interactive terminal and will fail with an error suggesting `--value-hex`. + --- ### lango security secrets delete diff --git a/docs/configuration.md b/docs/configuration.md index 6af299de..4f06c053 100644 --- a/docs/configuration.md +++ b/docs/configuration.md @@ -539,6 +539,130 @@ Each remote agent entry: --- +## P2P Network + +!!! warning "Experimental" + The P2P networking system is experimental. See [P2P Network](features/p2p-network.md). + +> **Settings:** `lango settings` → P2P Network + +```json +{ + "p2p": { + "enabled": false, + "listenAddrs": ["/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/9000"], + "bootstrapPeers": [], + "keyDir": "~/.lango/p2p", + "enableRelay": false, + "enableMdns": true, + "maxPeers": 50, + "handshakeTimeout": "30s", + "sessionTokenTtl": "1h", + "autoApproveKnownPeers": false, + "requireSignedChallenge": false, + "firewallRules": [], + "gossipInterval": "30s", + "zkHandshake": false, + "zkAttestation": false, + "zkp": { + "proofCacheDir": "~/.lango/zkp", + "provingScheme": "plonk", + "srsMode": "unsafe", + "srsPath": "", + "maxCredentialAge": "24h" + }, + "toolIsolation": { + "enabled": false, + "timeoutPerTool": "30s", + "maxMemoryMB": 512, + "container": { + "enabled": false, + "runtime": "auto", + "image": "lango-sandbox:latest", + "networkMode": "none", + "readOnlyRootfs": true, + "poolSize": 0, + "poolIdleTimeout": "5m" + } + } + } +} +``` + +| Key | Type | Default | Description | +|-----|------|---------|-------------| +| `p2p.enabled` | `bool` | `false` | Enable P2P networking | +| `p2p.listenAddrs` | `[]string` | `["/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/9000"]` | Multiaddrs to listen on | +| `p2p.bootstrapPeers` | `[]string` | `[]` | Initial peers for DHT bootstrapping | +| `p2p.keyDir` | `string` | `~/.lango/p2p` | Directory for node key persistence | +| `p2p.enableRelay` | `bool` | `false` | Act as relay for NAT traversal | +| `p2p.enableMdns` | `bool` | `true` | Enable mDNS for LAN discovery | +| `p2p.maxPeers` | `int` | `50` | Maximum connected peers | +| `p2p.handshakeTimeout` | `duration` | `30s` | Maximum handshake duration | +| `p2p.sessionTokenTtl` | `duration` | `1h` | Session token lifetime | +| `p2p.autoApproveKnownPeers` | `bool` | `false` | Skip approval for known peers | +| `p2p.firewallRules` | `[]object` | `[]` | Static firewall ACL rules | +| `p2p.gossipInterval` | `duration` | `30s` | Agent card gossip interval | +| `p2p.zkHandshake` | `bool` | `false` | Enable ZK-enhanced handshake | +| `p2p.zkAttestation` | `bool` | `false` | Enable ZK attestation on responses | +| `p2p.requireSignedChallenge` | `bool` | `false` | Reject unsigned (v1.0) challenges; require v1.1 signed challenges | +| `p2p.zkp.proofCacheDir` | `string` | `~/.lango/zkp` | ZKP circuit cache directory | +| `p2p.zkp.provingScheme` | `string` | `plonk` | ZKP proving scheme: `plonk` or `groth16` | +| `p2p.zkp.srsMode` | `string` | `unsafe` | SRS generation mode: `unsafe` (deterministic) or `file` (trusted ceremony) | +| `p2p.zkp.srsPath` | `string` | | Path to SRS file (when `srsMode = "file"`) | +| `p2p.zkp.maxCredentialAge` | `string` | `24h` | Maximum age for ZK credentials before rejection | + +Each firewall rule entry: + +| Key | Type | Description | +|-----|------|-------------| +| `firewallRules[].peerDid` | `string` | Peer DID (`"*"` for all peers) | +| `firewallRules[].action` | `string` | `"allow"` or `"deny"` | +| `firewallRules[].tools` | `[]string` | Tool name patterns (empty = all) | +| `firewallRules[].rateLimit` | `int` | Max requests/min (0 = unlimited) | + +### P2P Pricing + +| Key | Type | Default | Description | +|-----|------|---------|-------------| +| `p2p.pricing.enabled` | `bool` | `false` | Enable paid P2P tool invocations | +| `p2p.pricing.perQuery` | `string` | | Default price per query in USDC (e.g., `"0.10"`) | +| `p2p.pricing.toolPrices` | `map[string]string` | | Map of tool names to specific prices in USDC | + +### P2P Owner Protection + +| Key | Type | Default | Description | +|-----|------|---------|-------------| +| `p2p.ownerProtection.ownerName` | `string` | | Owner name to block from P2P responses | +| `p2p.ownerProtection.ownerEmail` | `string` | | Owner email to block from P2P responses | +| `p2p.ownerProtection.ownerPhone` | `string` | | Owner phone to block from P2P responses | +| `p2p.ownerProtection.extraTerms` | `[]string` | | Additional terms to block from P2P responses | +| `p2p.ownerProtection.blockConversations` | `bool` | `true` | Block conversation data in P2P responses | + +### P2P Reputation + +| Key | Type | Default | Description | +|-----|------|---------|-------------| +| `p2p.minTrustScore` | `float64` | `0.3` | Minimum trust score to accept P2P requests (0.0 - 1.0) | + +### P2P Tool Isolation + +| Key | Type | Default | Description | +|-----|------|---------|-------------| +| `p2p.toolIsolation.enabled` | `bool` | `false` | Enable subprocess isolation for remote peer tool invocations | +| `p2p.toolIsolation.timeoutPerTool` | `duration` | `30s` | Maximum duration for a single tool execution | +| `p2p.toolIsolation.maxMemoryMB` | `int` | `512` | Soft memory limit per subprocess in megabytes | +| `p2p.toolIsolation.container.enabled` | `bool` | `false` | Use container-based sandbox instead of subprocess | +| `p2p.toolIsolation.container.runtime` | `string` | `auto` | Container runtime: `auto`, `docker`, `gvisor`, `native` | +| `p2p.toolIsolation.container.image` | `string` | `lango-sandbox:latest` | Docker image for sandbox container | +| `p2p.toolIsolation.container.networkMode` | `string` | `none` | Docker network mode for sandbox containers | +| `p2p.toolIsolation.container.readOnlyRootfs` | `bool` | `true` | Mount container root filesystem as read-only | +| `p2p.toolIsolation.container.cpuQuotaUs` | `int` | `0` | Docker CPU quota in microseconds (0 = unlimited) | +| `p2p.toolIsolation.container.poolSize` | `int` | `0` | Pre-warmed containers in pool (0 = disabled) | +| `p2p.toolIsolation.container.poolIdleTimeout` | `duration` | `5m` | Idle timeout before pool containers are recycled | + +--- + ## Cron See [Cron Scheduling](automation/cron.md) for usage details and [CLI reference](cli/automation.md#cron-commands). diff --git a/docs/features/a2a-protocol.md b/docs/features/a2a-protocol.md index 34263e3c..5117d2c1 100644 --- a/docs/features/a2a-protocol.md +++ b/docs/features/a2a-protocol.md @@ -155,3 +155,21 @@ lango config import config.yaml !!! tip "Requires Multi-Agent Mode" A2A remote agents are only useful when `agent.multiAgent` is enabled, since they are integrated as sub-agents in the orchestrator tree. Without multi-agent mode, remote agents have no delegation target. + +## A2A-over-HTTP vs A2A-over-P2P + +Lango supports two modes of inter-agent communication: + +| Aspect | A2A-over-HTTP | A2A-over-P2P | +|--------|---------------|--------------| +| **Transport** | HTTP/HTTPS | libp2p (TCP/QUIC + Noise) | +| **Discovery** | Agent Card at `/.well-known/agent.json` | GossipSub agent card propagation | +| **Identity** | URL-based | DID-based (`did:lango:`) | +| **Auth** | None (relies on network security) | ZK-enhanced handshake + session tokens | +| **Firewall** | None | Knowledge firewall with ACL rules | +| **Use case** | Cloud-hosted agents, public APIs | Sovereign agents, private networks | +| **Config** | `a2a.enabled` | `p2p.enabled` | + +Both modes can be enabled simultaneously. A2A-over-HTTP is simpler to set up for public agents, while A2A-over-P2P provides stronger security guarantees and works without centralized infrastructure. + +See [P2P Network](p2p-network.md) for P2P-specific documentation. diff --git a/docs/features/index.md b/docs/features/index.md index b8bfedf8..57c5809c 100644 --- a/docs/features/index.md +++ b/docs/features/index.md @@ -72,6 +72,14 @@ Lango provides a comprehensive set of features for building intelligent AI agent [:octicons-arrow-right-24: Learn more](a2a-protocol.md) +- :globe_with_meridians: **[P2P Network](p2p-network.md)** :material-flask-outline:{ title="Experimental" } + + --- + + Decentralized agent-to-agent connectivity via libp2p with DID identity, knowledge firewall, and ZK-enhanced handshake. + + [:octicons-arrow-right-24: Learn more](p2p-network.md) + - :toolbox: **[Skill System](skills.md)** --- @@ -110,6 +118,7 @@ Lango provides a comprehensive set of features for building intelligent AI agent | Knowledge Graph | Experimental | `graph.enabled` | | Multi-Agent Orchestration | Experimental | `agent.multiAgent` | | A2A Protocol | Experimental | `a2a.enabled` | +| P2P Network | Experimental | `p2p.enabled` | | Skill System | Stable | `skill.enabled` | | Proactive Librarian | Experimental | `librarian.enabled` | | System Prompts | Stable | `agent.promptsDir` | diff --git a/docs/features/multi-agent.md b/docs/features/multi-agent.md index 94508bb5..d348208d 100644 --- a/docs/features/multi-agent.md +++ b/docs/features/multi-agent.md @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ When a rejection occurs, the orchestrator re-evaluates and tries the next most r ### Delegation Limits -The orchestrator enforces a maximum number of delegation rounds per user turn (default: **5**). Simple conversational messages (greetings, opinions, general knowledge) are handled directly by the orchestrator without delegation. +The orchestrator enforces a maximum number of delegation rounds per user turn (default: **10**). Simple conversational messages (greetings, opinions, general knowledge) are handled directly by the orchestrator without delegation. ## Remote A2A Agents @@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ When [A2A protocol](a2a-protocol.md) is enabled, remote agents are appended to t | Setting | Default | Description | |---|---|---| | `agent.multiAgent` | `false` | Enable hierarchical sub-agent orchestration | +| `agent.maxDelegationRounds` | `10` | Max orchestrator→sub-agent delegation rounds per turn | !!! info diff --git a/docs/features/observational-memory.md b/docs/features/observational-memory.md index 007fe512..da000348 100644 --- a/docs/features/observational-memory.md +++ b/docs/features/observational-memory.md @@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ Set any limit to `0` for unlimited injection (not recommended). "observationTokenThreshold": 2000, "maxMessageTokenBudget": 8000, "maxReflectionsInContext": 5, - "maxObservationsInContext": 20 + "maxObservationsInContext": 20, + "memoryTokenBudget": 4000, + "reflectionConsolidationThreshold": 5 } } ``` @@ -112,6 +114,8 @@ Set any limit to `0` for unlimited injection (not recommended). | `maxMessageTokenBudget` | `int` | `8000` | Maximum token budget for recent messages in context | | `maxReflectionsInContext` | `int` | `5` | Max reflections injected into LLM context (0 = unlimited) | | `maxObservationsInContext` | `int` | `20` | Max observations injected into LLM context (0 = unlimited) | +| `memoryTokenBudget` | `int` | `4000` | Max token budget for the memory section in system prompt | +| `reflectionConsolidationThreshold` | `int` | `5` | Min reflections before meta-reflection (consolidation) triggers | !!! tip "Dedicated Model" @@ -169,6 +173,12 @@ Reflection 3 (gen 1) ─┘ Each generation captures a broader summary, enabling context maintenance for arbitrarily long conversations. +### Auto-Consolidation + +The `reflectionConsolidationThreshold` controls how many reflections must accumulate before meta-reflection fires. A lower value (e.g., 3) causes more frequent consolidation — useful for fast-moving conversations. A higher value (e.g., 10) preserves more granular reflections before summarizing. + +The `memoryTokenBudget` caps the total tokens injected into the system prompt for the memory section. Reflections are prioritized first (higher information density), then observations fill the remaining budget. + ## Related - [Knowledge System](knowledge.md) -- Observations and reflections feed into context layers 7 and 8 diff --git a/docs/features/p2p-network.md b/docs/features/p2p-network.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..757faffd --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/features/p2p-network.md @@ -0,0 +1,531 @@ +--- +title: P2P Network +--- + +# P2P Network + +!!! warning "Experimental" + + The P2P networking system is experimental. The protocol and configuration may change in future releases. + +Lango supports decentralized agent-to-agent connectivity via libp2p. The Sovereign Agent Network (SAN) enables peer-to-peer communication with DID-based identity, zero-knowledge enhanced handshake, and a knowledge firewall for access control. + +## Overview + +The P2P subsystem enables direct agent communication without centralized coordination: + +- **Direct connectivity** -- agents connect peer-to-peer using libp2p with Noise encryption +- **DID-based identity** -- each agent derives a `did:lango:` identity from its wallet +- **Knowledge firewall** -- default deny-all ACL controls which peers can access which tools +- **Agent discovery** -- GossipSub-based agent card propagation for capability-based search +- **ZK-enhanced handshake** -- optional zero-knowledge proof verification during peer authentication + +```mermaid +graph TB + subgraph Agent A + WA[Wallet] --> IDA[DID Provider] + IDA --> NA[P2P Node] + NA --> FWA[Firewall] + NA --> DA[Discovery] + end + + subgraph Agent B + WB[Wallet] --> IDB[DID Provider] + IDB --> NB[P2P Node] + NB --> FWB[Firewall] + NB --> DB[Discovery] + end + + NA <-- "Noise-encrypted\nlibp2p stream" --> NB + DA <-- "GossipSub\nagent cards" --> DB + + style NA fill:#7c3aed,color:#fff + style NB fill:#7c3aed,color:#fff +``` + +## Identity + +Each Lango agent derives a decentralized identifier (DID) from its wallet's compressed secp256k1 public key: + +``` +did:lango: +``` + +The DID is deterministically mapped to a libp2p peer ID, ensuring cryptographic binding between the wallet identity and the network identity. Private keys never leave the wallet layer. + +## Handshake + +When two agents connect, they perform mutual DID-based authentication: + +1. **TCP/QUIC connection** established via libp2p with Noise encryption +2. **DID exchange** -- each peer presents its `did:lango:...` identifier +3. **Signature verification** -- DID public key is verified against the peer ID +4. **Signed challenge** -- the initiating peer sends a challenge with ECDSA signature over the canonical payload (`nonce || timestamp || senderDID`). The receiver validates the signature, checks the timestamp (5-minute past window, 30-second future grace), and verifies the nonce against a TTL-based replay cache. +5. **Session token** -- a time-limited session token is issued for subsequent queries +6. **(Optional) ZK proof** -- when `p2p.zkHandshake` is enabled, a zero-knowledge proof of identity is verified + +**Protocol Versioning:** + +| Version | Protocol ID | Features | +|---------|------------|----------| +| v1.0 | `/lango/handshake/1.0.0` | Legacy unsigned challenge (backward compatible) | +| v1.1 | `/lango/handshake/1.1.0` | ECDSA signed challenge, timestamp validation, nonce replay protection | + +When `p2p.requireSignedChallenge` is `true`, unsigned (v1.0) challenges are rejected. Default is `false` for backward compatibility. + +Session tokens have a configurable TTL (`p2p.sessionTokenTtl`). Expired tokens require re-authentication. + +## Session Management + +Sessions are managed through `SessionStore` with both TTL-based expiration and explicit invalidation. + +### Invalidation Reasons + +| Reason | Trigger | +|--------|---------| +| `logout` | Peer explicitly logs out | +| `reputation_drop` | Peer reputation drops below `minTrustScore` | +| `repeated_failures` | N consecutive tool execution failures | +| `manual_revoke` | Owner manually revokes via CLI | +| `security_event` | Automatic security event handler | + +### Security Event Handler + +The `SecurityEventHandler` monitors peer behavior and automatically invalidates sessions when: + +- A peer's reputation drops below the configured `minTrustScore` +- A peer exceeds the consecutive failure threshold +- A security event is triggered externally + +### CLI + +```bash +lango p2p session list # List active sessions +lango p2p session revoke --peer-did # Revoke specific peer +lango p2p session revoke-all # Revoke all sessions +``` + +## Knowledge Firewall + +The knowledge firewall enforces access control for peer queries. The default policy is **deny-all** -- explicit rules must be added to allow access. + +### ACL Rules + +Each rule specifies: + +| Field | Description | +|-------|-------------| +| `peerDid` | Peer DID this rule applies to (`"*"` for all peers) | +| `action` | `"allow"` or `"deny"` | +| `tools` | Tool name patterns (supports `*` wildcard, empty = all tools) | +| `rateLimit` | Maximum requests per minute (0 = unlimited) | + +### Response Sanitization + +All responses to peer queries are automatically sanitized: + +- Absolute file paths are redacted +- Sensitive fields (passwords, tokens, private keys) are stripped +- Internal IDs and database paths are removed + +### ZK Attestation + +When `p2p.zkAttestation` is enabled, responses include a zero-knowledge proof that the response was generated by the claimed agent without revealing internal state. + +## Approval Pipeline + +Inbound P2P tool invocations pass through a three-stage gate before execution: + +```mermaid +flowchart TD + A[Incoming Tool Request] --> B{Firewall ACL} + B -- Deny --> X[Reject] + B -- Allow --> C{Reputation Check} + C -- Below minTrustScore --> X + C -- Pass --> D{Owner Approval} + D -- Denied --> X + D -- Approved --> E[Execute Tool] + E --> F[Sanitize Response] + F --> G[Return Result] + + D -. "Auto-approve shortcut" .-> E + style X fill:#ef4444,color:#fff + style E fill:#22c55e,color:#fff +``` + +### Stage 1: Firewall ACL + +The [Knowledge Firewall](#knowledge-firewall) evaluates static allow/deny rules by peer DID and tool name pattern. Requests that don't match any allow rule are rejected immediately. + +### Stage 2: Reputation Check + +If a reputation checker is configured, the peer's trust score is verified against `minTrustScore` (default: 0.3). New peers with no history (score = 0) are allowed through. Peers with a score above 0 but below the threshold are rejected. + +### Stage 3: Owner Approval + +The local agent owner is prompted to approve or deny the tool invocation. This stage supports several auto-approval shortcuts: + +| Condition | Behavior | +|-----------|----------| +| **Paid tool, price < `autoApproveBelow`** | Auto-approved if within spending limits (`maxPerTx`, `maxDaily`) | +| **`autoApproveKnownPeers: true`** | Previously authenticated peers skip handshake approval | +| **Free tool** | Always requires interactive owner approval | + +When auto-approval conditions are not met, the request falls back to the composite approval provider (Telegram inline keyboard, Discord button, Slack interactive message, or terminal prompt). + +## Tool Execution Sandbox + +Inbound P2P tool invocations can run in an isolated sandbox to prevent malicious tool code from accessing process memory (passphrases, private keys, session tokens). + +### Isolation Modes + +| Mode | Backend | Isolation Level | Overhead | +|------|---------|----------------|----------| +| **Subprocess** | `os/exec` | Process-level | ~10ms | +| **Container** | Docker SDK | Container-level (namespaces, cgroups) | ~50-100ms | + +### Container Runtime Probe Chain + +When container mode is enabled, the executor probes available runtimes in order: + +1. **Docker** -- Full Docker SDK integration with OOM detection, label-based cleanup (`lango.sandbox=true`) +2. **gVisor** -- Stub for future implementation +3. **Native** -- Falls back to subprocess executor + +### Container Pool + +An optional pre-warmed container pool reduces cold-start latency. Configure `poolSize` (default: 0 = disabled) and `poolIdleTimeout` (default: 5m). + +### Configuration + +```json +{ + "p2p": { + "toolIsolation": { + "enabled": true, + "timeoutPerTool": "30s", + "maxMemoryMB": 512, + "container": { + "enabled": true, + "runtime": "auto", + "image": "lango-sandbox:latest", + "networkMode": "none", + "readOnlyRootfs": true, + "poolSize": 3 + } + } + } +} +``` + +### CLI + +```bash +lango p2p sandbox status # Show sandbox runtime status +lango p2p sandbox test # Run smoke test +lango p2p sandbox cleanup # Remove orphaned containers +``` + +## Discovery + +Agent discovery uses GossipSub for decentralized agent card propagation: + +1. Each agent publishes its **Agent Card** periodically on the `/lango/agentcard/1.0.0` topic +2. Cards include: name, description, DID, multiaddrs, capabilities, pricing, and ZK credentials +3. Peers can search for agents by capability tag using `FindByCapability` +4. ZK credentials on cards are verified before acceptance + +### Agent Card Structure + +```json +{ + "name": "my-agent", + "description": "Research assistant", + "did": "did:lango:02abc...", + "multiaddrs": ["/ip4/1.2.3.4/tcp/9000"], + "capabilities": ["research", "code-review"], + "pricing": { + "currency": "USDC", + "perQuery": "0.01" + }, + "peerId": "QmAbc..." +} +``` + +## Credential Revocation + +The gossip discovery system supports credential revocation to prevent compromised or retired agents from being discovered. + +### Revocation Mechanisms + +- **`RevokeDID(did)`** -- Adds a DID to the local revocation set. Revoked DIDs are rejected during agent card validation. +- **`IsRevoked(did)`** -- Checks whether a DID has been revoked. +- **`maxCredentialAge`** -- Credentials older than this duration (measured from `IssuedAt`) are rejected even if not explicitly revoked. + +### Credential Validation + +When processing incoming agent cards via GossipSub, three checks are applied: + +1. **Expiration** -- `ExpiresAt` must be in the future +2. **Staleness** -- `IssuedAt + maxCredentialAge` must be in the future +3. **Revocation** -- The agent's DID must not be in the revocation set + +Configure `maxCredentialAge` in the ZKP settings: + +```json +{ + "p2p": { + "zkp": { + "maxCredentialAge": "24h" + } + } +} +``` + +## ZK Circuits + +When ZK features are enabled, Lango uses four zero-knowledge circuits: + +| Circuit | Purpose | Public Inputs | +|---------|---------|---------------| +| Identity | Prove DID ownership without revealing the private key | DID hash | +| Membership | Prove membership in an authorized peer set | Merkle root | +| Range | Prove a value falls within a range (e.g., reputation score) | Min, Max bounds | +| Attestation | Prove response authenticity with freshness guarantees | AgentID hash, MinTimestamp, MaxTimestamp | +| Capability | Prove authorized capability with agent binding | CapabilityHash, AgentTestBinding | + +### Attestation Freshness + +The Attestation circuit includes `MinTimestamp` and `MaxTimestamp` public inputs with range assertions, ensuring proofs are fresh and cannot be replayed outside the validity window. + +### Structured Attestation Data + +Attestation proofs are returned as structured `AttestationData`: + +```json +{ + "proof": "", + "publicInputs": ["", "", ""], + "circuitId": "attestation", + "scheme": "plonk" +} +``` + +### SRS Configuration + +Configure the proving scheme and SRS (Structured Reference String) source: + +| Setting | Values | Description | +|---------|--------|-------------| +| `p2p.zkp.provingScheme` | `"plonk"`, `"groth16"` | ZKP proving scheme | +| `p2p.zkp.srsMode` | `"unsafe"`, `"file"` | SRS generation mode | +| `p2p.zkp.srsPath` | file path | Path to SRS file (when `srsMode = "file"`) | + +!!! warning "Production SRS" + The `"unsafe"` SRS mode uses a deterministic setup suitable for development. For production deployments, use `"file"` mode with an SRS generated from a trusted ceremony. + +## Configuration + +> **Settings:** `lango settings` → P2P Network + +```json +{ + "p2p": { + "enabled": true, + "listenAddrs": ["/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/9000"], + "bootstrapPeers": [], + "keyDir": "~/.lango/p2p", + "enableRelay": false, + "enableMdns": true, + "maxPeers": 50, + "handshakeTimeout": "30s", + "sessionTokenTtl": "1h", + "autoApproveKnownPeers": false, + "firewallRules": [ + { + "peerDid": "*", + "action": "allow", + "tools": ["search_*"], + "rateLimit": 10 + } + ], + "gossipInterval": "30s", + "zkHandshake": false, + "zkAttestation": false, + "requireSignedChallenge": false, + "zkp": { + "proofCacheDir": "~/.lango/zkp", + "provingScheme": "plonk", + "srsMode": "unsafe", + "srsPath": "", + "maxCredentialAge": "24h" + }, + "toolIsolation": { + "enabled": false, + "timeoutPerTool": "30s", + "maxMemoryMB": 512, + "container": { + "enabled": false, + "runtime": "auto", + "image": "lango-sandbox:latest", + "networkMode": "none", + "poolSize": 0 + } + } + } +} +``` + +See the [Configuration Reference](../configuration.md#p2p-network) for all P2P settings. + +## REST API + +When the gateway is running (`lango serve`), read-only P2P endpoints are available for monitoring and external integrations: + +| Endpoint | Description | +|----------|-------------| +| `GET /api/p2p/status` | Peer ID, listen addresses, connected peer count | +| `GET /api/p2p/peers` | List of connected peers with multiaddresses | +| `GET /api/p2p/identity` | Local DID (`did:lango:...`) and peer ID | +| `GET /api/p2p/reputation` | Peer trust score and exchange history | +| `GET /api/p2p/pricing` | Tool pricing (single or all tools) | + +```bash +# Check node status +curl http://localhost:18789/api/p2p/status + +# List connected peers +curl http://localhost:18789/api/p2p/peers + +# Get DID identity +curl http://localhost:18789/api/p2p/identity + +# Query peer reputation +curl "http://localhost:18789/api/p2p/reputation?peer_did=did:lango:02abc..." + +# Get tool pricing +curl http://localhost:18789/api/p2p/pricing +curl "http://localhost:18789/api/p2p/pricing?tool=knowledge_search" +``` + +These endpoints query the running server's persistent P2P node. They are public (no authentication) and expose only node metadata. See the [HTTP API Reference](../gateway/http-api.md#p2p-network) for response format details. + +## CLI Commands + +The CLI commands create ephemeral P2P nodes for one-off operations, independent of the running server: + +```bash +lango p2p status # Show node status +lango p2p peers # List connected peers +lango p2p connect # Connect to a peer +lango p2p disconnect # Disconnect from a peer +lango p2p firewall list # List firewall rules +lango p2p firewall add # Add a firewall rule +lango p2p discover # Discover agents +lango p2p identity # Show local identity +lango p2p reputation --peer-did # Query trust score +lango p2p pricing # Show tool pricing +lango p2p session list # List active sessions +lango p2p session revoke --peer-did # Revoke peer session +lango p2p session revoke-all # Revoke all sessions +lango p2p sandbox status # Show sandbox status +lango p2p sandbox test # Run sandbox smoke test +lango p2p sandbox cleanup # Remove orphaned containers +``` + +See the [P2P CLI Reference](../cli/p2p.md) for detailed command documentation. + +## Paid Value Exchange + +Lango supports paid P2P tool invocations via the **Payment Gate**. When pricing is enabled, remote peers must pay in USDC before invoking tools. + +### Payment Gate Flow + +1. **Price Query** — The caller queries the provider's pricing via `p2p_price_query` or `GET /api/p2p/pricing` +2. **Price Quote** — The provider returns a `PriceQuoteResult` with the tool price in USDC +3. **Payment** — The caller sends USDC via `p2p_pay` to the provider's wallet address +4. **Tool Invocation** — After payment confirmation, the caller invokes the tool via `p2p_query` + +### Auto-Approval for Small Amounts + +When `payment.limits.autoApproveBelow` is set, small payments are auto-approved without user confirmation. The auto-approval check evaluates three conditions: + +1. **Threshold** — the payment amount is strictly below `autoApproveBelow` +2. **Per-transaction limit** — the amount does not exceed `maxPerTx` +3. **Daily limit** — the cumulative daily spend (including this payment) does not exceed `maxDaily` + +If any condition fails, the system falls back to interactive approval via the configured channel (Telegram, Discord, Slack, or terminal). + +This applies to both outbound payments (`p2p_pay`, `payment_send`) and inbound paid tool invocations where the owner's approval pipeline checks the tool price against the spending limiter. + +### USDC Registry + +Payment settlements use on-chain USDC transfers. The system supports multiple chains via the `contracts.LookupUSDC()` registry. Wallet addresses are derived from peer DIDs. + +### Configuration + +```json +{ + "p2p": { + "pricing": { + "enabled": true, + "perQuery": "0.10", + "toolPrices": { + "knowledge_search": "0.25", + "browser_navigate": "0.50" + } + } + } +} +``` + +## Reputation System + +The reputation system tracks peer behavior across exchanges and computes a trust score. + +### Trust Score Formula + +``` +score = successes / (successes + failures×2 + timeouts×1.5 + 1.0) +``` + +The score ranges from 0.0 to 1.0. The `minTrustScore` configuration (default: 0.3) sets the threshold for accepting requests from peers. + +### Exchange Tracking + +Each peer interaction is recorded: +- **Success** — Tool invocation completed normally +- **Failure** — Tool invocation returned an error +- **Timeout** — Tool invocation timed out + +### Querying Reputation + +- **CLI**: `lango p2p reputation --peer-did ` +- **Agent Tool**: `p2p_reputation` with `peer_did` parameter +- **REST API**: `GET /api/p2p/reputation?peer_did=` + +New peers with no reputation record are given the benefit of the doubt (trusted by default). + +## Owner Shield + +The Owner Shield prevents owner PII from leaking through P2P responses. When configured, it sanitizes all outgoing P2P responses to remove: + +- Owner name, email, and phone number +- Custom extra terms (e.g., company name, address) +- Conversation history (when `blockConversations` is true, which is the default) + +### Configuration + +```json +{ + "p2p": { + "ownerProtection": { + "ownerName": "Alice", + "ownerEmail": "alice@example.com", + "ownerPhone": "+1234567890", + "extraTerms": ["Acme Corp"], + "blockConversations": true + } + } +} +``` diff --git a/docs/gateway/http-api.md b/docs/gateway/http-api.md index a0565d7b..c090ee6b 100644 --- a/docs/gateway/http-api.md +++ b/docs/gateway/http-api.md @@ -56,6 +56,123 @@ Authentication endpoints are available when OIDC is configured. See [Authenticat The main chat endpoint accepts user messages and returns agent responses. When WebSocket is enabled, responses are streamed in real time via WebSocket events alongside the standard HTTP response. +### P2P Network + +When P2P networking is enabled (`p2p.enabled: true`), the gateway exposes read-only endpoints for querying the running node's state. These endpoints are public (no authentication required) and return only node metadata. + +#### `GET /api/p2p/status` + +Returns the local node's peer ID, listen addresses, and connected peer count. + +```bash +curl http://localhost:18789/api/p2p/status +``` + +```json +{ + "peerId": "12D3KooW...", + "listenAddrs": ["/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/9000"], + "connectedPeers": 2, + "mdnsEnabled": true +} +``` + +#### `GET /api/p2p/peers` + +Returns the list of currently connected peers with their IDs and multiaddresses. + +```bash +curl http://localhost:18789/api/p2p/peers +``` + +```json +{ + "peers": [ + { + "peerId": "12D3KooW...", + "addrs": ["/ip4/172.20.0.3/tcp/9002"] + } + ], + "count": 1 +} +``` + +#### `GET /api/p2p/identity` + +Returns the local DID derived from the wallet and the libp2p peer ID. + +```bash +curl http://localhost:18789/api/p2p/identity +``` + +```json +{ + "did": "did:lango:02abc...", + "peerId": "12D3KooW..." +} +``` + +If no identity provider is configured, `did` is `null`. + +#### `GET /api/p2p/reputation` + +Returns the trust score and exchange history for a peer. The `peer_did` query parameter is required. + +```bash +curl "http://localhost:18789/api/p2p/reputation?peer_did=did:lango:02abc..." +``` + +```json +{ + "peerDid": "did:lango:02abc...", + "trustScore": 0.85, + "successfulExchanges": 42, + "failedExchanges": 3, + "timeoutCount": 1, + "firstSeen": "2026-02-20T10:00:00Z", + "lastInteraction": "2026-02-24T14:30:00Z" +} +``` + +If the reputation system is not enabled or the peer has no history, the response indicates the default state (new peers are trusted by default). + +#### `GET /api/p2p/pricing` + +Returns tool pricing configuration. Use the optional `tool` query parameter to query a specific tool's price. + +```bash +# Get all tool pricing +curl http://localhost:18789/api/p2p/pricing +``` + +```json +{ + "enabled": true, + "currency": "USDC", + "perQuery": "0.10", + "toolPrices": { + "knowledge_search": "0.25", + "browser_navigate": "0.50" + } +} +``` + +```bash +# Get pricing for a specific tool +curl "http://localhost:18789/api/p2p/pricing?tool=knowledge_search" +``` + +```json +{ + "tool": "knowledge_search", + "price": "0.25", + "currency": "USDC" +} +``` + +!!! note + These REST endpoints query the **running server's persistent P2P node**. The CLI commands (`lango p2p status`, etc.) create ephemeral nodes for one-off operations. For monitoring and automation, prefer the REST API. + ## Related - [WebSocket](websocket.md) -- Real-time streaming events diff --git a/docs/index.md b/docs/index.md index bebf679f..879f38be 100644 --- a/docs/index.md +++ b/docs/index.md @@ -75,6 +75,12 @@ See the [Installation Guide](getting-started/installation.md) for detailed instr Agent-to-Agent protocol for remote agent discovery and inter-agent communication. +- :globe_with_meridians: **P2P Network** + + --- + + Decentralized agent connectivity via libp2p with DID identity, knowledge firewall, mDNS discovery, and ZK-enhanced handshake. + - :coin: **Blockchain Payments** --- @@ -103,7 +109,7 @@ See the [Installation Guide](getting-started/installation.md) for detailed instr --- - AES-256-GCM encryption, key registry, secret management, and PII redaction. + AES-256-GCM encryption, key registry, secret management, PII redaction, hardware keyring (Touch ID / TPM), SQLCipher database encryption, and Cloud KMS integration. - :floppy_disk: **Persistent** diff --git a/docs/payments/usdc.md b/docs/payments/usdc.md index 698500c4..e2188d44 100644 --- a/docs/payments/usdc.md +++ b/docs/payments/usdc.md @@ -112,6 +112,15 @@ lango payment balance --json | `payment.limits.maxDaily` | `float64` | `100.0` | Maximum USDC per 24-hour rolling window | | `payment.limits.autoApproveBelow` | `float64` | `0.10` | Auto-approve threshold (no confirmation prompt) | +!!! info "P2P Integration" + + The `autoApproveBelow` threshold also applies to P2P payment flows: + + - **Outbound**: `p2p_pay` and `payment_send` transactions below the threshold are auto-approved without user confirmation. + - **Inbound**: When a remote peer invokes a paid tool, the owner's approval pipeline checks the tool price against the spending limiter. If the price is below `autoApproveBelow` and within daily limits, the invocation is auto-approved. + + See [P2P Network — Approval Pipeline](../features/p2p-network.md#approval-pipeline) for the full inbound gate flow. + !!! tip "Testnet First" Start with Base Sepolia (`chainId: 84532`) for testing. Switch to Base mainnet (`chainId: 8453`) only after verifying your configuration. See the [Production Checklist](../deployment/production.md) for mainnet deployment guidance. diff --git a/docs/security/encryption.md b/docs/security/encryption.md index d20b153e..a1673542 100644 --- a/docs/security/encryption.md +++ b/docs/security/encryption.md @@ -90,6 +90,88 @@ Configure RPC mode: } ``` +### Cloud KMS Mode + +Cloud KMS mode delegates cryptographic operations to a managed key service. Four backends are supported: + +| Backend | Provider | Build Tag | Key Types | +|---------|----------|-----------|-----------| +| AWS KMS | `aws-kms` | `kms_aws` | ECDSA_SHA_256 signing, SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT encrypt/decrypt | +| GCP Cloud KMS | `gcp-kms` | `kms_gcp` | AsymmetricSign SHA-256, symmetric encrypt/decrypt | +| Azure Key Vault | `azure-kv` | `kms_azure` | ES256 signing, RSA-OAEP encrypt/decrypt | +| PKCS#11 HSM | `pkcs11` | `kms_pkcs11` | CKM_ECDSA signing, CKM_AES_GCM encrypt/decrypt | + +Build with the appropriate tag to include the Cloud SDK dependency: + +```bash +# Single provider +go build -tags kms_aws ./cmd/lango + +# All providers +go build -tags kms_all ./cmd/lango +``` + +Without a build tag, the provider returns a stub error at runtime. + +The **CompositeCryptoProvider** wraps any KMS backend with automatic local fallback when `kms.fallbackToLocal` is enabled. KMS calls include exponential backoff retry logic for transient errors (throttling, network timeouts) and a health checker with a 30-second probe cache. + +Configure Cloud KMS: + +> **Settings:** `lango settings` → Security + +```json +{ + "security": { + "signer": { + "provider": "aws-kms" + }, + "kms": { + "region": "us-east-1", + "keyId": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/example-key", + "fallbackToLocal": true, + "timeoutPerOperation": "5s", + "maxRetries": 3 + } + } +} +``` + +For Azure Key Vault, also specify the vault URL: + +```json +{ + "security": { + "signer": { "provider": "azure-kv" }, + "kms": { + "keyId": "my-signing-key", + "azure": { + "vaultUrl": "https://myvault.vault.azure.net" + } + } + } +} +``` + +For PKCS#11 HSM: + +```json +{ + "security": { + "signer": { "provider": "pkcs11" }, + "kms": { + "pkcs11": { + "modulePath": "/usr/lib/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so", + "slotId": 0, + "keyLabel": "lango-signing-key" + } + } + } +} +``` + +!!! tip "PKCS#11 PIN" + Set the PIN via `LANGO_PKCS11_PIN` environment variable instead of storing it in configuration. + ## Secret Management Agents manage encrypted secrets through tool workflows. Secrets are stored in the Ent database with AES-256-GCM encryption and referenced by name -- plaintext values never appear in logs or agent output. @@ -120,6 +202,71 @@ Scanned output: "Connected using key [SECRET:api_key]" This prevents accidental secret leakage through chat messages, logs, or tool output. +## Hardware Keyring Integration + +Lango can store the master passphrase using hardware-backed security, eliminating the need for keyfiles or interactive prompts on every startup. Only hardware-backed backends are supported to prevent same-UID attacks. + +**Passphrase Source Priority:** + +1. **Hardware keyring** (Touch ID / TPM when available and a passphrase is stored) +2. **Keyfile** (`~/.lango/keyfile` or `LANGO_KEYFILE` path) +3. **Interactive prompt** (terminal input) +4. **Stdin** (piped input for CI/CD) + +**Supported Hardware Backends:** + +| Platform | Backend | Security Level | +|----------|---------|----------------| +| macOS | Touch ID (Secure Enclave) | Biometric | +| Linux | TPM 2.0 sealed storage | Hardware | + +Manage via CLI: + +```bash +lango security keyring store # Store passphrase in hardware backend +lango security keyring status # Check hardware keyring availability +lango security keyring clear # Remove stored passphrase +``` + +!!! note "No Hardware Backend" + On systems without Touch ID or TPM 2.0, the keyring commands are unavailable. Use keyfile or interactive prompt instead. + +## Database Encryption + +Lango supports transparent database encryption using SQLCipher PRAGMA-based encryption. When enabled, the entire application database (`~/.lango/lango.db`) is encrypted at rest. + +**How it works:** + +1. After `sql.Open`, the bootstrap process issues `PRAGMA key = ''` to unlock the database +2. `PRAGMA cipher_page_size` is set according to configuration (default: 4096) +3. All subsequent reads and writes are transparently encrypted/decrypted + +Configure: + +```json +{ + "security": { + "dbEncryption": { + "enabled": true, + "cipherPageSize": 4096 + } + } +} +``` + +**Migration commands:** + +```bash +# Encrypt an existing plaintext database +lango security db-migrate + +# Decrypt back to plaintext +lango security db-decrypt +``` + +!!! note "Build Dependency" + Database encryption requires `libsqlcipher-dev` at build time. The `mattn/go-sqlite3` driver is retained for `sqlite-vec` compatibility, with PRAGMA-based encryption instead of a separate `go-sqlcipher` driver. + ## Key Registry The Key Registry is an Ent-backed store that manages encryption and signing keys. Each key has a type, a name, and an optional remote key ID (for RPC mode). @@ -235,6 +382,25 @@ lango security secrets delete "provider": "local", "rpcUrl": "", "keyId": "" + }, + "dbEncryption": { + "enabled": false, + "cipherPageSize": 4096 + }, + "kms": { + "region": "", + "keyId": "", + "fallbackToLocal": true, + "timeoutPerOperation": "5s", + "maxRetries": 3, + "azure": { + "vaultUrl": "" + }, + "pkcs11": { + "modulePath": "", + "slotId": 0, + "keyLabel": "" + } } } } diff --git a/docs/security/index.md b/docs/security/index.md index 58cc96ac..042871d2 100644 --- a/docs/security/index.md +++ b/docs/security/index.md @@ -14,6 +14,12 @@ Lango provides multiple layers of security to protect sensitive data flowing bet | **PII Redaction** | Strip personal information before it reaches AI providers | Regex patterns + optional NER via Microsoft Presidio | | **Tool Approval** | Control which tools agents can execute | Policy-based approval workflows with channel notifications | | **Authentication** | Secure gateway access | OIDC login flow, session management, CORS controls | +| **Hardware Keyring** | Secure passphrase storage | Hardware-backed passphrase via Touch ID (macOS Secure Enclave) or TPM 2.0 (Linux) | +| **Database Encryption** | Protect data at rest | SQLCipher transparent encryption for the application database | +| **Cloud KMS / HSM** | Hardware-backed cryptography | AWS KMS, GCP KMS, Azure Key Vault, PKCS#11 HSM integration | +| **P2P Session Management** | Peer session lifecycle | Session listing, explicit invalidation, security-event-based revocation | +| **P2P Tool Sandbox** | Execution isolation | Subprocess and container-based isolation for remote tool invocations | +| **P2P Auth Hardening** | Signed challenge protocol | ECDSA signed challenges, nonce replay protection, timestamp validation | ## Architecture @@ -55,10 +61,11 @@ The **security interceptor** sits between the user and the AI agent. It: ## Encryption Modes -Lango supports two encryption modes depending on your deployment: +Lango supports three encryption modes depending on your deployment: - **Local Mode** (default) -- AES-256-GCM with passphrase-derived keys via PBKDF2. Suitable for development and single-user setups. - **RPC Mode** (production) -- Delegates cryptographic operations to a hardware-backed companion app or external signer. Keys never leave secure hardware. +- **Cloud KMS Mode** (enterprise) -- Delegates to managed key services (AWS KMS, GCP KMS, Azure Key Vault) or on-premises HSM via PKCS#11. Automatic fallback to local mode when KMS is unavailable. See [Encryption & Secrets](encryption.md) for full details. @@ -68,3 +75,6 @@ See [Encryption & Secrets](encryption.md) for full details. - [PII Redaction](pii-redaction.md) -- Builtin patterns, custom regex, Presidio integration - [Tool Approval](tool-approval.md) -- Approval policies, sensitive/exempt tools, notifications - [Authentication](authentication.md) -- OIDC providers, session management, CORS configuration +- [Hardware Keyring](encryption.md#hardware-keyring-integration) -- Secure passphrase storage via Touch ID / TPM +- [Database Encryption](encryption.md#database-encryption) -- SQLCipher transparent database encryption +- [Cloud KMS / HSM](encryption.md#cloud-kms-mode) -- AWS, GCP, Azure, PKCS#11 integration diff --git a/examples/p2p-trading/Makefile b/examples/p2p-trading/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..14875f3e --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/p2p-trading/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +.PHONY: build up test down clean logs + +# Build the lango Docker image from repo root +build: + docker compose build + +# Start all services (anvil → setup → agents) +up: + docker compose up -d + +# Run integration tests (agents must be healthy first) +test: + @echo "Waiting for all agents to be healthy..." + @sh scripts/wait-for-health.sh http://localhost:18789/health 90 + @sh scripts/wait-for-health.sh http://localhost:18790/health 90 + @sh scripts/wait-for-health.sh http://localhost:18791/health 90 + @echo "Running integration tests..." + @sh scripts/test-p2p-trading.sh + +# Stop and remove all containers +down: + docker compose down + +# Full cleanup: remove containers, volumes, and orphans +clean: + docker compose down -v --remove-orphans + +# Tail logs from all services +logs: + docker compose logs -f + +# One-shot: build, start, test, then stop +all: build up test down diff --git a/examples/p2p-trading/README.md b/examples/p2p-trading/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..326fbebb --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/p2p-trading/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +# P2P Trading Integration Example + +End-to-end integration test for Lango's P2P networking and USDC payment system. + +Spins up **3 Lango agents** (Alice, Bob, Charlie) and a local Ethereum node (Anvil) using Docker Compose, then verifies: + +- mDNS peer discovery +- P2P status and identity REST API +- DID derivation from wallet keys +- ERC-20 (MockUSDC) token transfer between agents + +## Architecture + +``` +┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ +│ Alice │◄───►│ Bob │◄───►│ Charlie │ +│ :18789 │ │ :18790 │ │ :18791 │ +│ P2P:9001 │ │ P2P:9002 │ │ P2P:9003 │ +└────┬─────┘ └────┬─────┘ └────┬─────┘ + │ │ │ + └────────┬───────┘────────────────┘ + │ + ┌────▼────┐ + │ Anvil │ (chainId: 31337) + │ :8545 │ + └─────────┘ +``` + +## Configuration Highlights + +The example agents are configured with the following approval and payment settings: + +| Setting | Value | Description | +|---------|-------|-------------| +| `payment.limits.autoApproveBelow` | `"50.00"` | Auto-approve payments under 50 USDC without confirmation | +| `p2p.autoApproveKnownPeers` | `true` | Skip handshake approval for previously authenticated peers | +| `p2p.pricing.enabled` | `true` | Enable paid tool invocations between agents | +| `p2p.pricing.perQuery` | `"0.10"` | Default USDC price per tool query | +| `security.interceptor.headlessAutoApprove` | `true` | Auto-approve tool invocations in headless Docker mode | + +> **Production Note**: The `autoApproveBelow` threshold is intentionally high (`50.00`) for testing convenience. In production, use a much lower value (e.g., `"0.10"`) and rely on interactive approval for larger amounts. + +## Prerequisites + +- Docker & Docker Compose v2 +- `cast` (from [Foundry](https://getfoundry.sh/)) — required for balance checks in the test script +- `curl` — for HTTP health/API checks + +## Quick Start + +```bash +# Build the Lango Docker image and start all services +make build up + +# Run integration tests +make test + +# Stop everything +make down +``` + +Or run everything in one command: + +```bash +make all +``` + +## Services + +| Service | Image | Purpose | Port | +|-----------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------| +| `anvil` | `ghcr.io/foundry-rs/foundry` | Local EVM chain (chainId 31337) | 8545 | +| `setup` | `ghcr.io/foundry-rs/foundry` | Deploy MockUSDC + fund agents | — | +| `alice` | `lango:latest` | Agent 1 | 18789 | +| `bob` | `lango:latest` | Agent 2 | 18790 | +| `charlie` | `lango:latest` | Agent 3 | 18791 | + +## Test Scenarios + +1. **Health** — All 3 agents respond to `GET /health` +2. **P2P Status** — `GET /api/p2p/status` returns peer ID and listen addresses +3. **P2P Discovery** — After 15s, each agent sees >= 2 peers via mDNS +4. **P2P Identity** — `GET /api/p2p/identity` returns a `did:lango:` DID +5. **USDC Balance** — On-chain `balanceOf` confirms 1000 USDC per agent +6. **Payment** — Alice sends 1.00 USDC to Bob; Bob's balance increases + +## Anvil Test Accounts + +| Agent | Address | Private Key | +|---------|----------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Alice | `0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266` | Account #0 | +| Bob | `0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8` | Account #1 | +| Charlie | `0x3C44CdDdB6a900fa2b585dd299e03d12FA4293BC` | Account #2 | + +> **Note**: These are Anvil's well-known deterministic keys. Never use them on mainnet. + +## REST API Endpoints + +| Endpoint | Method | Description | +|----------------------|--------|---------------------------------| +| `/health` | GET | Health check | +| `/api/p2p/status` | GET | Peer ID, listen addrs, peer count | +| `/api/p2p/peers` | GET | List connected peers + addresses | +| `/api/p2p/identity` | GET | Local DID string | +| `/api/p2p/reputation`| GET | Peer trust score and history | +| `/api/p2p/pricing` | GET | Tool pricing configuration | + +## Troubleshooting + +```bash +# View all logs +make logs + +# Check a specific agent +docker compose logs alice + +# Manual API check +curl http://localhost:18789/api/p2p/status | jq . + +# Check USDC balance on-chain +cast call $(cat /tmp/usdc-addr) "balanceOf(address)(uint256)" \ + 0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266 --rpc-url http://localhost:8545 +``` diff --git a/examples/p2p-trading/contracts/MockUSDC.sol b/examples/p2p-trading/contracts/MockUSDC.sol new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9d60c0c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/p2p-trading/contracts/MockUSDC.sol @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT +pragma solidity ^0.8.20; + +/// @title MockUSDC — minimal ERC-20 for integration tests. +/// @dev Anyone can mint; 6 decimals like real USDC. +contract MockUSDC { + string public constant name = "Mock USDC"; + string public constant symbol = "USDC"; + uint8 public constant decimals = 6; + + uint256 public totalSupply; + + mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf; + mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance; + + event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 value); + event Approval(address indexed owner, address indexed spender, uint256 value); + + function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external { + totalSupply += amount; + balanceOf[to] += amount; + emit Transfer(address(0), to, amount); + } + + function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) { + allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount; + emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, amount); + return true; + } + + function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) { + return _transfer(msg.sender, to, amount); + } + + function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) external returns (bool) { + uint256 currentAllowance = allowance[from][msg.sender]; + require(currentAllowance >= amount, "ERC20: insufficient allowance"); + allowance[from][msg.sender] = currentAllowance - amount; + return _transfer(from, to, amount); + } + + function _transfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount) internal returns (bool) { + require(balanceOf[from] >= amount, "ERC20: insufficient balance"); + balanceOf[from] -= amount; + balanceOf[to] += amount; + emit Transfer(from, to, amount); + return true; + } +} diff --git a/examples/p2p-trading/docker-compose.yml b/examples/p2p-trading/docker-compose.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..13bc1fb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/p2p-trading/docker-compose.yml @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +# P2P Trading Integration Test +# Spins up 3 Lango agents (Alice, Bob, Charlie) with a local Ethereum node (Anvil) +# to verify mDNS discovery, P2P handshake, and USDC token transfer end-to-end. + +services: + # Local Ethereum node (Foundry Anvil) — deterministic accounts, chainId 31337 + anvil: + image: ghcr.io/foundry-rs/foundry:latest + entrypoint: ["anvil", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--chain-id", "31337"] + ports: + - "8545:8545" + networks: + - p2p-net + healthcheck: + test: ["CMD", "cast", "block-number", "--rpc-url", "http://localhost:8545"] + interval: 2s + timeout: 5s + retries: 30 + + # One-shot setup: deploy MockUSDC and fund agent addresses + setup: + image: ghcr.io/foundry-rs/foundry:latest + user: root + depends_on: + anvil: + condition: service_healthy + volumes: + - ./contracts:/contracts:ro + - ./scripts:/scripts:ro + - shared:/shared + entrypoint: ["sh", "/scripts/setup-anvil.sh"] + networks: + - p2p-net + + alice: + image: lango:latest + build: + context: ../.. + dockerfile: Dockerfile + depends_on: + setup: + condition: service_completed_successfully + environment: + LANGO_CONFIG_FILE: /configs/alice.json + LANGO_PASSPHRASE_FILE: /secrets/alice-passphrase.txt + AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY: "0xac0974bec39a17e36ba4a6b4d238ff944bacb478cbed5efcae784d7bf4f2ff80" + AGENT_NAME: alice + volumes: + - ./configs:/configs:ro + - ./secrets:/secrets:ro + - ./docker-entrypoint-p2p.sh:/usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint-p2p.sh:ro + - shared:/shared:ro + entrypoint: ["sh", "/usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint-p2p.sh"] + command: ["serve"] + ports: + - "18789:18789" + networks: + - p2p-net + healthcheck: + test: ["CMD", "curl", "-sf", "http://localhost:18789/health"] + interval: 5s + timeout: 5s + retries: 30 + start_period: 10s + + bob: + image: lango:latest + build: + context: ../.. + dockerfile: Dockerfile + depends_on: + setup: + condition: service_completed_successfully + environment: + LANGO_CONFIG_FILE: /configs/bob.json + LANGO_PASSPHRASE_FILE: /secrets/bob-passphrase.txt + AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY: "0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d" + AGENT_NAME: bob + volumes: + - ./configs:/configs:ro + - ./secrets:/secrets:ro + - ./docker-entrypoint-p2p.sh:/usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint-p2p.sh:ro + - shared:/shared:ro + entrypoint: ["sh", "/usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint-p2p.sh"] + command: ["serve"] + ports: + - "18790:18790" + networks: + - p2p-net + healthcheck: + test: ["CMD", "curl", "-sf", "http://localhost:18790/health"] + interval: 5s + timeout: 5s + retries: 30 + start_period: 10s + + charlie: + image: lango:latest + build: + context: ../.. + dockerfile: Dockerfile + depends_on: + setup: + condition: service_completed_successfully + environment: + LANGO_CONFIG_FILE: /configs/charlie.json + LANGO_PASSPHRASE_FILE: /secrets/charlie-passphrase.txt + AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY: "0x5de4111afa1a4b94908f83103eb1f1706367c2e68ca870fc3fb9a804cdab365a" + AGENT_NAME: charlie + volumes: + - ./configs:/configs:ro + - ./secrets:/secrets:ro + - ./docker-entrypoint-p2p.sh:/usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint-p2p.sh:ro + - shared:/shared:ro + entrypoint: ["sh", "/usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint-p2p.sh"] + command: ["serve"] + ports: + - "18791:18791" + networks: + - p2p-net + healthcheck: + test: ["CMD", "curl", "-sf", "http://localhost:18791/health"] + interval: 5s + timeout: 5s + retries: 30 + start_period: 10s + +volumes: + shared: + +networks: + p2p-net: + driver: bridge diff --git a/examples/p2p-trading/docker-entrypoint-p2p.sh b/examples/p2p-trading/docker-entrypoint-p2p.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..c419769d --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/p2p-trading/docker-entrypoint-p2p.sh @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +#!/bin/sh +set -e + +LANGO_DIR="$HOME/.lango" +mkdir -p "$LANGO_DIR" + +# ── Wait for setup sidecar to write the USDC contract address ── +echo "[$AGENT_NAME] Waiting for USDC contract address..." +TIMEOUT=60 +ELAPSED=0 +while [ ! -f /shared/usdc-address.txt ]; do + sleep 1 + ELAPSED=$((ELAPSED + 1)) + if [ "$ELAPSED" -ge "$TIMEOUT" ]; then + echo "[$AGENT_NAME] ERROR: Timed out waiting for /shared/usdc-address.txt" + exit 1 + fi +done +USDC_ADDRESS=$(cat /shared/usdc-address.txt) +echo "[$AGENT_NAME] USDC contract: $USDC_ADDRESS" + +# ── Set up passphrase keyfile ── +PASSPHRASE_SECRET="${LANGO_PASSPHRASE_FILE:-/run/secrets/lango_passphrase}" +if [ -f "$PASSPHRASE_SECRET" ]; then + cp "$PASSPHRASE_SECRET" "$LANGO_DIR/keyfile" + chmod 600 "$LANGO_DIR/keyfile" +fi + +# ── Import config with USDC address substituted ── +CONFIG_SECRET="${LANGO_CONFIG_FILE:-/run/secrets/lango_config}" +PROFILE_NAME="${LANGO_PROFILE:-default}" + +if [ -f "$CONFIG_SECRET" ] && [ ! -f "$LANGO_DIR/lango.db" ]; then + echo "[$AGENT_NAME] Importing config as profile '$PROFILE_NAME'..." + cp "$CONFIG_SECRET" /tmp/lango-import.json + # Replace placeholder USDC address with the deployed contract address + sed -i "s/PLACEHOLDER_USDC_ADDRESS/$USDC_ADDRESS/g" /tmp/lango-import.json + lango config import /tmp/lango-import.json --profile "$PROFILE_NAME" + rm -f /tmp/lango-import.json + echo "[$AGENT_NAME] Config imported." +fi + +# ── Inject wallet private key as encrypted secret ── +# Re-create keyfile because bootstrap shreds it after crypto init (config import). +if [ -n "$AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY" ]; then + if [ -f "$PASSPHRASE_SECRET" ]; then + cp "$PASSPHRASE_SECRET" "$LANGO_DIR/keyfile" + chmod 600 "$LANGO_DIR/keyfile" + fi + echo "[$AGENT_NAME] Storing wallet private key..." + lango security secrets set wallet.privatekey --value-hex "$AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY" + echo "[$AGENT_NAME] Wallet key stored." +fi + +# Re-create keyfile for `lango serve` bootstrap (shredded by previous commands). +if [ -f "$PASSPHRASE_SECRET" ]; then + cp "$PASSPHRASE_SECRET" "$LANGO_DIR/keyfile" + chmod 600 "$LANGO_DIR/keyfile" +fi + +echo "[$AGENT_NAME] Starting lango..." +exec lango "$@" diff --git a/examples/p2p-trading/scripts/setup-anvil.sh b/examples/p2p-trading/scripts/setup-anvil.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..7480831b --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/p2p-trading/scripts/setup-anvil.sh @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +#!/bin/sh +set -e + +# Anvil deterministic addresses (accounts[0..2]) +ALICE_ADDR="0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266" +BOB_ADDR="0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8" +CHARLIE_ADDR="0x3C44CdDdB6a900fa2b585dd299e03d12FA4293BC" + +# Deployer = account[9] (last Anvil account — not used by agents) +DEPLOYER_KEY="0x2a871d0798f97d79848a013d4936a73bf4cc922c825d33c1cf7073dff6d409c6" + +RPC="http://anvil:8545" + +# Suppress nightly warnings from Foundry. +export FOUNDRY_DISABLE_NIGHTLY_WARNING=1 + +# Use writable directories for forge compilation output and cache. +export FOUNDRY_OUT="/tmp/forge-out" +export FOUNDRY_CACHE_PATH="/tmp/forge-cache" +mkdir -p "$FOUNDRY_OUT" "$FOUNDRY_CACHE_PATH" + +echo "[setup] Waiting for Anvil..." +until cast block-number --rpc-url "$RPC" >/dev/null 2>&1; do sleep 1; done +echo "[setup] Anvil is ready." + +# Deploy MockUSDC (non-JSON output is more reliable for parsing) +echo "[setup] Deploying MockUSDC..." +DEPLOY_OUTPUT=$(forge create /contracts/MockUSDC.sol:MockUSDC \ + --rpc-url "$RPC" \ + --private-key "$DEPLOYER_KEY" \ + --broadcast 2>&1) + +echo "[setup] Deploy output:" +echo "$DEPLOY_OUTPUT" + +# Extract "Deployed to: 0x..." from forge's human-readable output. +USDC_ADDRESS=$(echo "$DEPLOY_OUTPUT" | grep -i "deployed to" | grep -o '0x[0-9a-fA-F]\{40\}') + +if [ -z "$USDC_ADDRESS" ]; then + echo "[setup] ERROR: Failed to extract USDC address" + exit 1 +fi + +echo "[setup] MockUSDC deployed at: $USDC_ADDRESS" +echo -n "$USDC_ADDRESS" > /shared/usdc-address.txt + +# Mint 1000 USDC (1000 * 10^6 = 1000000000) to each agent +AMOUNT="1000000000" + +echo "[setup] Minting 1000 USDC to Alice..." +cast send "$USDC_ADDRESS" "mint(address,uint256)" "$ALICE_ADDR" "$AMOUNT" \ + --rpc-url "$RPC" --private-key "$DEPLOYER_KEY" >/dev/null + +echo "[setup] Minting 1000 USDC to Bob..." +cast send "$USDC_ADDRESS" "mint(address,uint256)" "$BOB_ADDR" "$AMOUNT" \ + --rpc-url "$RPC" --private-key "$DEPLOYER_KEY" >/dev/null + +echo "[setup] Minting 1000 USDC to Charlie..." +cast send "$USDC_ADDRESS" "mint(address,uint256)" "$CHARLIE_ADDR" "$AMOUNT" \ + --rpc-url "$RPC" --private-key "$DEPLOYER_KEY" >/dev/null + +# Verify balances +for ADDR in "$ALICE_ADDR" "$BOB_ADDR" "$CHARLIE_ADDR"; do + BAL=$(cast call "$USDC_ADDRESS" "balanceOf(address)(uint256)" "$ADDR" --rpc-url "$RPC") + echo "[setup] Balance of $ADDR: $BAL" +done + +echo "[setup] Done." diff --git a/examples/p2p-trading/scripts/test-p2p-trading.sh b/examples/p2p-trading/scripts/test-p2p-trading.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..9f73dbd3 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/p2p-trading/scripts/test-p2p-trading.sh @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +#!/bin/sh +set -e + +# Colors for test output +RED='\033[0;31m' +GREEN='\033[0;32m' +YELLOW='\033[1;33m' +NC='\033[0m' # No Color + +ALICE="http://localhost:18789" +BOB="http://localhost:18790" +CHARLIE="http://localhost:18791" +RPC="http://localhost:8545" + +PASSED=0 +FAILED=0 + +pass() { + PASSED=$((PASSED + 1)) + printf "${GREEN} PASS${NC}: %s\n" "$1" +} + +fail() { + FAILED=$((FAILED + 1)) + printf "${RED} FAIL${NC}: %s\n" "$1" +} + +section() { + printf "\n${YELLOW}── %s ──${NC}\n" "$1" +} + +# ───────────────────────────────────────────── +section "1. Health Checks" +# ───────────────────────────────────────────── +for NAME_URL in "Alice:$ALICE" "Bob:$BOB" "Charlie:$CHARLIE"; do + NAME="${NAME_URL%%:*}" + URL="${NAME_URL#*:}" + if curl -sf "$URL/health" | grep -q '"status":"ok"'; then + pass "$NAME health" + else + fail "$NAME health" + fi +done + +# ───────────────────────────────────────────── +section "2. P2P Status" +# ───────────────────────────────────────────── +for NAME_URL in "Alice:$ALICE" "Bob:$BOB" "Charlie:$CHARLIE"; do + NAME="${NAME_URL%%:*}" + URL="${NAME_URL#*:}" + STATUS=$(curl -sf "$URL/api/p2p/status") + if echo "$STATUS" | grep -q '"peerId"'; then + pass "$NAME P2P status (has peerId)" + else + fail "$NAME P2P status" + fi +done + +# ───────────────────────────────────────────── +section "3. P2P Discovery (waiting 15s for mDNS)" +# ───────────────────────────────────────────── +sleep 15 +for NAME_URL in "Alice:$ALICE" "Bob:$BOB" "Charlie:$CHARLIE"; do + NAME="${NAME_URL%%:*}" + URL="${NAME_URL#*:}" + PEERS=$(curl -sf "$URL/api/p2p/peers") + COUNT=$(echo "$PEERS" | grep -o '"count":[0-9]*' | grep -o '[0-9]*') + if [ -n "$COUNT" ] && [ "$COUNT" -ge 2 ]; then + pass "$NAME discovered $COUNT peers" + else + fail "$NAME peer discovery (count: ${COUNT:-0}, expected >= 2)" + fi +done + +# ───────────────────────────────────────────── +section "4. P2P Identity (DID)" +# ───────────────────────────────────────────── +for NAME_URL in "Alice:$ALICE" "Bob:$BOB" "Charlie:$CHARLIE"; do + NAME="${NAME_URL%%:*}" + URL="${NAME_URL#*:}" + IDENTITY=$(curl -sf "$URL/api/p2p/identity") + if echo "$IDENTITY" | grep -q '"did":"did:lango:'; then + pass "$NAME DID starts with did:lango:" + else + fail "$NAME DID check ($IDENTITY)" + fi +done + +# ───────────────────────────────────────────── +section "5. USDC Balances (on-chain)" +# ───────────────────────────────────────────── +# Read USDC address from inside a running container (Docker volume not accessible from host) +USDC_ADDRESS=$(docker compose exec -T alice cat /shared/usdc-address.txt 2>/dev/null | tr -d '[:space:]') +if [ -z "$USDC_ADDRESS" ]; then + USDC_ADDRESS=$(docker compose exec -T bob cat /shared/usdc-address.txt 2>/dev/null | tr -d '[:space:]') +fi + +ALICE_ADDR="0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266" +BOB_ADDR="0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8" +CHARLIE_ADDR="0x3C44CdDdB6a900fa2b585dd299e03d12FA4293BC" + +if [ -n "$USDC_ADDRESS" ]; then + echo " USDC contract: $USDC_ADDRESS" + for NAME_ADDR in "Alice:$ALICE_ADDR" "Bob:$BOB_ADDR" "Charlie:$CHARLIE_ADDR"; do + NAME="${NAME_ADDR%%:*}" + ADDR="${NAME_ADDR#*:}" + # Run cast inside the anvil container (host may not have Foundry installed) + BAL=$(docker compose exec -T anvil cast call "$USDC_ADDRESS" "balanceOf(address)(uint256)" "$ADDR" --rpc-url "http://localhost:8545" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '[:space:]') + # 1000 USDC = 1000000000 (6 decimals) + if echo "$BAL" | grep -q "1000000000"; then + pass "$NAME USDC balance = 1000.00" + else + fail "$NAME USDC balance (got: $BAL, expected: 1000000000)" + fi + done +else + fail "Could not read USDC contract address" +fi + +# ───────────────────────────────────────────── +section "6. USDC Transfer (Alice → Bob, 1.00 USDC via on-chain)" +# ───────────────────────────────────────────── +if [ -n "$USDC_ADDRESS" ]; then + # Transfer 1.00 USDC (1000000) directly on-chain using Alice's private key. + # Note: lango CLI `payment send` requires keyfile for bootstrap, which gets + # shredded after serve starts. Using cast for deterministic E2E testing. + ALICE_KEY="0xac0974bec39a17e36ba4a6b4d238ff944bacb478cbed5efcae784d7bf4f2ff80" + TRANSFER_AMOUNT="1000000" # 1.00 USDC (6 decimals) + + docker compose exec -T anvil cast send "$USDC_ADDRESS" \ + "transfer(address,uint256)(bool)" "$BOB_ADDR" "$TRANSFER_AMOUNT" \ + --rpc-url "http://localhost:8545" \ + --private-key "$ALICE_KEY" >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ + pass "Alice transferred 1.00 USDC to Bob (on-chain)" || \ + fail "Alice USDC transfer to Bob" + + # Verify Bob's balance increased + sleep 2 # wait for tx confirmation + BOB_BAL=$(docker compose exec -T anvil cast call "$USDC_ADDRESS" "balanceOf(address)(uint256)" "$BOB_ADDR" --rpc-url "http://localhost:8545" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '[:space:]') + if echo "$BOB_BAL" | grep -q "1001000000"; then + pass "Bob balance = 1001.00 USDC (received 1.00)" + else + fail "Bob balance after transfer (got: $BOB_BAL, expected: 1001000000)" + fi + + # Verify Alice's balance decreased + ALICE_BAL=$(docker compose exec -T anvil cast call "$USDC_ADDRESS" "balanceOf(address)(uint256)" "$ALICE_ADDR" --rpc-url "http://localhost:8545" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '[:space:]') + if echo "$ALICE_BAL" | grep -q "999000000"; then + pass "Alice balance = 999.00 USDC (sent 1.00)" + else + fail "Alice balance after transfer (got: $ALICE_BAL, expected: 999000000)" + fi +else + fail "Skipping transfer test — USDC address unknown" +fi + +# ───────────────────────────────────────────── +section "Results" +# ───────────────────────────────────────────── +TOTAL=$((PASSED + FAILED)) +printf "\n${GREEN}Passed${NC}: %d / %d\n" "$PASSED" "$TOTAL" +if [ "$FAILED" -gt 0 ]; then + printf "${RED}Failed${NC}: %d / %d\n" "$FAILED" "$TOTAL" + exit 1 +fi + +printf "\n${GREEN}All tests passed!${NC}\n" diff --git a/examples/p2p-trading/scripts/wait-for-health.sh b/examples/p2p-trading/scripts/wait-for-health.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..efcdf725 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/p2p-trading/scripts/wait-for-health.sh @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# wait-for-health.sh [timeout_seconds] +# Waits until the given URL returns HTTP 200. + +URL="$1" +TIMEOUT="${2:-60}" +ELAPSED=0 + +echo "Waiting for $URL to become healthy (timeout: ${TIMEOUT}s)..." +while true; do + if curl -sf "$URL" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + echo "$URL is healthy." + exit 0 + fi + + ELAPSED=$((ELAPSED + 2)) + if [ "$ELAPSED" -ge "$TIMEOUT" ]; then + echo "ERROR: $URL did not become healthy within ${TIMEOUT}s." + exit 1 + fi + + sleep 2 +done diff --git a/examples/p2p-trading/secrets/alice-passphrase.txt b/examples/p2p-trading/secrets/alice-passphrase.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fe248590 --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/p2p-trading/secrets/alice-passphrase.txt @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +alice-test-passphrase-do-not-use-in-production \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/examples/p2p-trading/secrets/bob-passphrase.txt b/examples/p2p-trading/secrets/bob-passphrase.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2e1512ff --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/p2p-trading/secrets/bob-passphrase.txt @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +bob-test-passphrase-do-not-use-in-production \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/examples/p2p-trading/secrets/charlie-passphrase.txt b/examples/p2p-trading/secrets/charlie-passphrase.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..32da6bcb --- /dev/null +++ b/examples/p2p-trading/secrets/charlie-passphrase.txt @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +charlie-test-passphrase-do-not-use-in-production \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/go.mod b/go.mod index 27bd143f..7e280e06 100644 --- a/go.mod +++ b/go.mod @@ -3,24 +3,40 @@ module github.com/langoai/lango go 1.25.4 require ( + cloud.google.com/go/kms v1.26.0 entgo.io/ent v0.14.5 + github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/azcore v1.20.0 + github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/azidentity v1.13.1 + github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/security/keyvault/azkeys v1.4.0 github.com/anthropics/anthropic-sdk-go v1.21.0 github.com/asg017/sqlite-vec-go-bindings v0.1.6 + github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2 v1.41.2 + github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/config v1.27.27 + github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/kms v1.50.1 github.com/bwmarrin/discordgo v0.28.1 github.com/charmbracelet/bubbles v0.21.1 github.com/charmbracelet/bubbletea v1.3.10 github.com/charmbracelet/lipgloss v1.1.0 github.com/coinbase/x402/go v0.0.0-20260211184331-65d968c3660a + github.com/consensys/gnark v0.14.0 + github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto v0.19.0 github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.17.0 github.com/creack/pty v1.1.21 + github.com/docker/docker v28.5.2+incompatible github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum v1.16.8 github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.1.0 github.com/go-rod/rod v0.116.2 github.com/go-telegram-bot-api/telegram-bot-api/v5 v5.5.1 + github.com/google/go-tpm v0.9.8 github.com/google/jsonschema-go v0.4.2 github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 github.com/gorilla/websocket v1.5.3 + github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p v0.47.0 + github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-kad-dht v0.38.0 + github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-pubsub v0.15.0 github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3 v1.14.33 + github.com/miekg/pkcs11 v1.1.2 + github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr v0.16.1 github.com/robfig/cron/v3 v3.0.1 github.com/sashabaranov/go-openai v1.41.2 github.com/slack-go/slack v0.12.5 @@ -28,21 +44,30 @@ require ( github.com/spf13/viper v1.18.2 github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1 go.etcd.io/bbolt v1.4.3 - go.uber.org/zap v1.27.0 - golang.org/x/crypto v0.45.0 + go.uber.org/zap v1.27.1 + golang.org/x/crypto v0.47.0 golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.35.0 - golang.org/x/sync v0.18.0 + golang.org/x/sync v0.19.0 golang.org/x/term v0.39.0 + golang.org/x/time v0.14.0 google.golang.org/adk v0.4.0 + google.golang.org/api v0.265.0 google.golang.org/genai v1.40.0 + google.golang.org/grpc v1.78.0 gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 ) require ( ariga.io/atlas v0.32.1-0.20250325101103-175b25e1c1b9 // indirect cloud.google.com/go v0.123.0 // indirect - cloud.google.com/go/auth v0.17.0 // indirect + cloud.google.com/go/auth v0.18.1 // indirect + cloud.google.com/go/auth/oauth2adapt v0.2.8 // indirect cloud.google.com/go/compute/metadata v0.9.0 // indirect + cloud.google.com/go/iam v1.5.3 // indirect + cloud.google.com/go/longrunning v0.8.0 // indirect + github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/internal v1.11.2 // indirect + github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/security/keyvault/internal v1.2.0 // indirect + github.com/AzureAD/microsoft-authentication-library-for-go v1.6.0 // indirect github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2 // indirect github.com/ProjectZKM/Ziren/crates/go-runtime/zkvm_runtime v0.0.0-20251001021608-1fe7b43fc4d6 // indirect github.com/StackExchange/wmi v1.2.1 // indirect @@ -50,8 +75,22 @@ require ( github.com/agext/levenshtein v1.2.3 // indirect github.com/apparentlymart/go-textseg/v15 v15.0.0 // indirect github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4 // indirect + github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/credentials v1.17.27 // indirect + github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/feature/ec2/imds v1.16.11 // indirect + github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/configsources v1.4.18 // indirect + github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/endpoints/v2 v2.7.18 // indirect + github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/ini v1.8.0 // indirect + github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/accept-encoding v1.11.3 // indirect + github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/presigned-url v1.11.17 // indirect + github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sso v1.22.4 // indirect + github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/ssooidc v1.26.4 // indirect + github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts v1.30.3 // indirect + github.com/aws/smithy-go v1.24.1 // indirect github.com/aymanbagabas/go-osc52/v2 v2.0.1 // indirect + github.com/benbjohnson/clock v1.3.5 // indirect + github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 // indirect github.com/bits-and-blooms/bitset v1.24.4 // indirect + github.com/blang/semver/v4 v4.0.0 // indirect github.com/bmatcuk/doublestar v1.3.4 // indirect github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 // indirect github.com/charmbracelet/colorprofile v0.4.1 // indirect @@ -61,48 +100,145 @@ require ( github.com/clipperhouse/displaywidth v0.9.0 // indirect github.com/clipperhouse/stringish v0.1.1 // indirect github.com/clipperhouse/uax29/v2 v2.5.0 // indirect - github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto v0.18.0 // indirect + github.com/containerd/errdefs v1.0.0 // indirect + github.com/containerd/errdefs/pkg v0.3.0 // indirect + github.com/containerd/log v0.1.0 // indirect github.com/crate-crypto/go-eth-kzg v1.4.0 // indirect github.com/crate-crypto/go-ipa v0.0.0-20240724233137-53bbb0ceb27a // indirect github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.2-0.20180830191138-d8f796af33cc // indirect + github.com/davidlazar/go-crypto v0.0.0-20200604182044-b73af7476f6c // indirect github.com/deckarep/golang-set/v2 v2.6.0 // indirect - github.com/decred/dcrd/dcrec/secp256k1/v4 v4.0.1 // indirect + github.com/decred/dcrd/dcrec/secp256k1/v4 v4.4.0 // indirect + github.com/distribution/reference v0.6.0 // indirect + github.com/docker/go-connections v0.6.0 // indirect + github.com/docker/go-units v0.5.0 // indirect + github.com/dunglas/httpsfv v1.1.0 // indirect github.com/erikgeiser/coninput v0.0.0-20211004153227-1c3628e74d0f // indirect github.com/ethereum/c-kzg-4844/v2 v2.1.5 // indirect github.com/ethereum/go-verkle v0.2.2 // indirect github.com/felixge/httpsnoop v1.0.4 // indirect + github.com/filecoin-project/go-clock v0.1.0 // indirect + github.com/flynn/noise v1.1.0 // indirect github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.7.0 // indirect + github.com/fxamacker/cbor/v2 v2.9.0 // indirect github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.3 // indirect github.com/go-logr/logr v1.4.3 // indirect github.com/go-logr/stdr v1.2.2 // indirect github.com/go-ole/go-ole v1.3.0 // indirect github.com/go-openapi/inflect v0.19.0 // indirect + github.com/gogo/protobuf v1.3.2 // indirect + github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5 v5.3.0 // indirect github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0 // indirect + github.com/google/gopacket v1.1.19 // indirect + github.com/google/pprof v0.0.0-20250820193118-f64d9cf942d6 // indirect github.com/google/s2a-go v0.1.9 // indirect github.com/google/safehtml v0.1.0 // indirect - github.com/googleapis/enterprise-certificate-proxy v0.3.6 // indirect - github.com/googleapis/gax-go/v2 v2.15.0 // indirect + github.com/googleapis/enterprise-certificate-proxy v0.3.11 // indirect + github.com/googleapis/gax-go/v2 v2.17.0 // indirect + github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru v1.0.2 // indirect + github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7 // indirect github.com/hashicorp/hcl v1.0.0 // indirect github.com/hashicorp/hcl/v2 v2.18.1 // indirect github.com/holiman/uint256 v1.3.2 // indirect + github.com/huin/goupnp v1.3.0 // indirect github.com/inconshreveable/mousetrap v1.1.0 // indirect + github.com/ingonyama-zk/icicle-gnark/v3 v3.2.2 // indirect + github.com/ipfs/boxo v0.36.0 // indirect + github.com/ipfs/go-cid v0.6.0 // indirect + github.com/ipfs/go-datastore v0.9.1 // indirect + github.com/ipfs/go-log/v2 v2.9.1 // indirect + github.com/ipld/go-ipld-prime v0.21.0 // indirect + github.com/jackpal/go-nat-pmp v1.0.2 // indirect + github.com/jbenet/go-temp-err-catcher v0.1.0 // indirect + github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.3.0 // indirect + github.com/koron/go-ssdp v0.0.6 // indirect + github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0 // indirect + github.com/libp2p/go-buffer-pool v0.1.0 // indirect + github.com/libp2p/go-cidranger v1.1.0 // indirect + github.com/libp2p/go-flow-metrics v0.3.0 // indirect + github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-asn-util v0.4.1 // indirect + github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-kbucket v0.8.0 // indirect + github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-record v0.3.1 // indirect + github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-routing-helpers v0.7.5 // indirect + github.com/libp2p/go-msgio v0.3.0 // indirect + github.com/libp2p/go-netroute v0.4.0 // indirect + github.com/libp2p/go-reuseport v0.4.0 // indirect + github.com/libp2p/go-yamux/v5 v5.0.1 // indirect + github.com/libp2p/zeroconf/v2 v2.2.0 // indirect github.com/lucasb-eyer/go-colorful v1.3.0 // indirect github.com/magiconair/properties v1.8.7 // indirect + github.com/marten-seemann/tcp v0.0.0-20210406111302-dfbc87cc63fd // indirect + github.com/mattn/go-colorable v0.1.14 // indirect github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20 // indirect github.com/mattn/go-localereader v0.0.1 // indirect github.com/mattn/go-runewidth v0.0.19 // indirect + github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.72 // indirect + github.com/mikioh/tcpinfo v0.0.0-20190314235526-30a79bb1804b // indirect + github.com/mikioh/tcpopt v0.0.0-20190314235656-172688c1accc // indirect + github.com/minio/sha256-simd v1.0.1 // indirect github.com/mitchellh/go-wordwrap v1.0.1 // indirect github.com/mitchellh/mapstructure v1.5.0 // indirect + github.com/moby/docker-image-spec v1.3.1 // indirect + github.com/moby/sys/atomicwriter v0.1.0 // indirect + github.com/moby/term v0.5.2 // indirect + github.com/morikuni/aec v1.1.0 // indirect + github.com/mr-tron/base58 v1.2.0 // indirect github.com/muesli/ansi v0.0.0-20230316100256-276c6243b2f6 // indirect github.com/muesli/cancelreader v0.2.2 // indirect github.com/muesli/termenv v0.16.0 // indirect + github.com/multiformats/go-base32 v0.1.0 // indirect + github.com/multiformats/go-base36 v0.2.0 // indirect + github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr-dns v0.4.1 // indirect + github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr-fmt v0.1.0 // indirect + github.com/multiformats/go-multibase v0.2.0 // indirect + github.com/multiformats/go-multicodec v0.10.0 // indirect + github.com/multiformats/go-multihash v0.2.3 // indirect + github.com/multiformats/go-multistream v0.6.1 // indirect + github.com/multiformats/go-varint v0.1.0 // indirect + github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 // indirect + github.com/opencontainers/go-digest v1.0.0 // indirect + github.com/opencontainers/image-spec v1.1.1 // indirect + github.com/pbnjay/memory v0.0.0-20210728143218-7b4eea64cf58 // indirect github.com/pelletier/go-toml/v2 v2.2.4 // indirect + github.com/pion/datachannel v1.5.10 // indirect + github.com/pion/dtls/v2 v2.2.12 // indirect + github.com/pion/dtls/v3 v3.1.1 // indirect + github.com/pion/ice/v4 v4.0.10 // indirect + github.com/pion/interceptor v0.1.40 // indirect + github.com/pion/logging v0.2.4 // indirect + github.com/pion/mdns/v2 v2.0.7 // indirect + github.com/pion/randutil v0.1.0 // indirect + github.com/pion/rtcp v1.2.15 // indirect + github.com/pion/rtp v1.8.19 // indirect + github.com/pion/sctp v1.8.39 // indirect + github.com/pion/sdp/v3 v3.0.13 // indirect + github.com/pion/srtp/v3 v3.0.6 // indirect + github.com/pion/stun v0.6.1 // indirect + github.com/pion/stun/v3 v3.0.0 // indirect + github.com/pion/transport/v2 v2.2.10 // indirect + github.com/pion/transport/v3 v3.0.7 // indirect + github.com/pion/transport/v4 v4.0.1 // indirect + github.com/pion/turn/v4 v4.0.2 // indirect + github.com/pion/webrtc/v4 v4.1.2 // indirect + github.com/pkg/browser v0.0.0-20240102092130-5ac0b6a4141c // indirect + github.com/pkg/errors v0.9.1 // indirect github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.1-0.20181226105442-5d4384ee4fb2 // indirect + github.com/polydawn/refmt v0.89.0 // indirect + github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.23.2 // indirect + github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2 // indirect + github.com/prometheus/common v0.66.1 // indirect + github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.17.0 // indirect + github.com/quic-go/qpack v0.6.0 // indirect + github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.59.0 // indirect + github.com/quic-go/webtransport-go v0.10.0 // indirect github.com/rivo/uniseg v0.4.7 // indirect + github.com/ronanh/intcomp v1.1.1 // indirect + github.com/rs/zerolog v1.34.0 // indirect github.com/sagikazarmark/locafero v0.4.0 // indirect github.com/sagikazarmark/slog-shim v0.1.0 // indirect github.com/shirou/gopsutil v3.21.4-0.20210419000835-c7a38de76ee5+incompatible // indirect github.com/sourcegraph/conc v0.3.0 // indirect + github.com/spaolacci/murmur3 v1.1.0 // indirect github.com/spf13/afero v1.11.0 // indirect github.com/spf13/cast v1.7.1 // indirect github.com/spf13/pflag v1.0.10 // indirect @@ -114,6 +250,9 @@ require ( github.com/tidwall/sjson v1.2.5 // indirect github.com/tklauser/go-sysconf v0.3.12 // indirect github.com/tklauser/numcpus v0.6.1 // indirect + github.com/whyrusleeping/go-keyspace v0.0.0-20160322163242-5b898ac5add1 // indirect + github.com/wlynxg/anet v0.0.5 // indirect + github.com/x448/float16 v0.8.4 // indirect github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e // indirect github.com/ysmood/fetchup v0.2.3 // indirect github.com/ysmood/goob v0.4.0 // indirect @@ -123,22 +262,32 @@ require ( github.com/zclconf/go-cty v1.14.4 // indirect github.com/zclconf/go-cty-yaml v1.1.0 // indirect go.opentelemetry.io/auto/sdk v1.2.1 // indirect + go.opentelemetry.io/contrib/instrumentation/google.golang.org/grpc/otelgrpc v0.63.0 // indirect go.opentelemetry.io/contrib/instrumentation/net/http/otelhttp v0.63.0 // indirect go.opentelemetry.io/otel v1.40.0 // indirect go.opentelemetry.io/otel/metric v1.40.0 // indirect go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk v1.40.0 // indirect go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace v1.40.0 // indirect - go.uber.org/multierr v1.10.0 // indirect - golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20251023183803-a4bb9ffd2546 // indirect - golang.org/x/mod v0.29.0 // indirect - golang.org/x/net v0.47.0 // indirect + go.uber.org/dig v1.19.0 // indirect + go.uber.org/fx v1.24.0 // indirect + go.uber.org/mock v0.5.2 // indirect + go.uber.org/multierr v1.11.0 // indirect + go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.3 // indirect + golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260112195511-716be5621a96 // indirect + golang.org/x/mod v0.32.0 // indirect + golang.org/x/net v0.49.0 // indirect golang.org/x/sys v0.40.0 // indirect - golang.org/x/text v0.31.0 // indirect - google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/api v0.0.0-20251014184007-4626949a642f // indirect - google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc v0.0.0-20251014184007-4626949a642f // indirect - google.golang.org/grpc v1.76.0 // indirect - google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.10 // indirect + golang.org/x/telemetry v0.0.0-20260109210033-bd525da824e2 // indirect + golang.org/x/text v0.33.0 // indirect + golang.org/x/tools v0.41.0 // indirect + gonum.org/v1/gonum v0.17.0 // indirect + google.golang.org/genproto v0.0.0-20260128011058-8636f8732409 // indirect + google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/api v0.0.0-20260203192932-546029d2fa20 // indirect + google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc v0.0.0-20260128011058-8636f8732409 // indirect + google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11 // indirect gopkg.in/ini.v1 v1.67.0 // indirect + gotest.tools/v3 v3.5.2 // indirect + lukechampine.com/blake3 v1.4.1 // indirect rsc.io/omap v1.2.0 // indirect rsc.io/ordered v1.1.1 // indirect ) diff --git a/go.sum b/go.sum index a6ca4295..2f82dcca 100644 --- a/go.sum +++ b/go.sum @@ -2,16 +2,43 @@ ariga.io/atlas v0.32.1-0.20250325101103-175b25e1c1b9 h1:E0wvcUXTkgyN4wy4LGtNzMNG ariga.io/atlas v0.32.1-0.20250325101103-175b25e1c1b9/go.mod h1:Oe1xWPuu5q9LzyrWfbZmEZxFYeu4BHTyzfjeW2aZp/w= cloud.google.com/go v0.123.0 h1:2NAUJwPR47q+E35uaJeYoNhuNEM9kM8SjgRgdeOJUSE= cloud.google.com/go v0.123.0/go.mod h1:xBoMV08QcqUGuPW65Qfm1o9Y4zKZBpGS+7bImXLTAZU= -cloud.google.com/go/auth v0.17.0 h1:74yCm7hCj2rUyyAocqnFzsAYXgJhrG26XCFimrc/Kz4= -cloud.google.com/go/auth v0.17.0/go.mod h1:6wv/t5/6rOPAX4fJiRjKkJCvswLwdet7G8+UGXt7nCQ= +cloud.google.com/go/auth v0.18.1 h1:IwTEx92GFUo2pJ6Qea0EU3zYvKnTAeRCODxfA/G5UWs= +cloud.google.com/go/auth v0.18.1/go.mod h1:GfTYoS9G3CWpRA3Va9doKN9mjPGRS+v41jmZAhBzbrA= +cloud.google.com/go/auth/oauth2adapt v0.2.8 h1:keo8NaayQZ6wimpNSmW5OPc283g65QNIiLpZnkHRbnc= +cloud.google.com/go/auth/oauth2adapt v0.2.8/go.mod h1:XQ9y31RkqZCcwJWNSx2Xvric3RrU88hAYYbjDWYDL+c= cloud.google.com/go/compute/metadata v0.9.0 h1:pDUj4QMoPejqq20dK0Pg2N4yG9zIkYGdBtwLoEkH9Zs= cloud.google.com/go/compute/metadata v0.9.0/go.mod h1:E0bWwX5wTnLPedCKqk3pJmVgCBSM6qQI1yTBdEb3C10= +cloud.google.com/go/iam v1.5.3 h1:+vMINPiDF2ognBJ97ABAYYwRgsaqxPbQDlMnbHMjolc= +cloud.google.com/go/iam v1.5.3/go.mod h1:MR3v9oLkZCTlaqljW6Eb2d3HGDGK5/bDv93jhfISFvU= +cloud.google.com/go/kms v1.26.0 h1:cK9mN2cf+9V63D3H1f6koxTatWy39aTI/hCjz1I+adU= +cloud.google.com/go/kms v1.26.0/go.mod h1:pHKOdFJm63hxBsiPkYtowZPltu9dW0MWvBa6IA4HM58= +cloud.google.com/go/longrunning v0.8.0 h1:LiKK77J3bx5gDLi4SMViHixjD2ohlkwBi+mKA7EhfW8= +cloud.google.com/go/longrunning v0.8.0/go.mod h1:UmErU2Onzi+fKDg2gR7dusz11Pe26aknR4kHmJJqIfk= entgo.io/ent v0.14.5 h1:Rj2WOYJtCkWyFo6a+5wB3EfBRP0rnx1fMk6gGA0UUe4= entgo.io/ent v0.14.5/go.mod h1:zTzLmWtPvGpmSwtkaayM2cm5m819NdM7z7tYPq3vN0U= +github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/azcore v1.20.0 h1:JXg2dwJUmPB9JmtVmdEB16APJ7jurfbY5jnfXpJoRMc= +github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/azcore v1.20.0/go.mod h1:YD5h/ldMsG0XiIw7PdyNhLxaM317eFh5yNLccNfGdyw= +github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/azidentity v1.13.1 h1:Hk5QBxZQC1jb2Fwj6mpzme37xbCDdNTxU7O9eb5+LB4= +github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/azidentity v1.13.1/go.mod h1:IYus9qsFobWIc2YVwe/WPjcnyCkPKtnHAqUYeebc8z0= +github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/azidentity/cache v0.3.2 h1:yz1bePFlP5Vws5+8ez6T3HWXPmwOK7Yvq8QxDBD3SKY= +github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/azidentity/cache v0.3.2/go.mod h1:Pa9ZNPuoNu/GztvBSKk9J1cDJW6vk/n0zLtV4mgd8N8= +github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/internal v1.11.2 h1:9iefClla7iYpfYWdzPCRDozdmndjTm8DXdpCzPajMgA= +github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/internal v1.11.2/go.mod h1:XtLgD3ZD34DAaVIIAyG3objl5DynM3CQ/vMcbBNJZGI= +github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/security/keyvault/azkeys v1.4.0 h1:E4MgwLBGeVB5f2MdcIVD3ELVAWpr+WD6MUe1i+tM/PA= +github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/security/keyvault/azkeys v1.4.0/go.mod h1:Y2b/1clN4zsAoUd/pgNAQHjLDnTis/6ROkUfyob6psM= +github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/security/keyvault/internal v1.2.0 h1:nCYfgcSyHZXJI8J0IWE5MsCGlb2xp9fJiXyxWgmOFg4= +github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/security/keyvault/internal v1.2.0/go.mod h1:ucUjca2JtSZboY8IoUqyQyuuXvwbMBVwFOm0vdQPNhA= +github.com/Azure/go-ansiterm v0.0.0-20250102033503-faa5f7b0171c h1:udKWzYgxTojEKWjV8V+WSxDXJ4NFATAsZjh8iIbsQIg= +github.com/Azure/go-ansiterm v0.0.0-20250102033503-faa5f7b0171c/go.mod h1:xomTg63KZ2rFqZQzSB4Vz2SUXa1BpHTVz9L5PTmPC4E= +github.com/AzureAD/microsoft-authentication-extensions-for-go/cache v0.1.1 h1:WJTmL004Abzc5wDB5VtZG2PJk5ndYDgVacGqfirKxjM= +github.com/AzureAD/microsoft-authentication-extensions-for-go/cache v0.1.1/go.mod h1:tCcJZ0uHAmvjsVYzEFivsRTN00oz5BEsRgQHu5JZ9WE= +github.com/AzureAD/microsoft-authentication-library-for-go v1.6.0 h1:XRzhVemXdgvJqCH0sFfrBUTnUJSBrBf7++ypk+twtRs= +github.com/AzureAD/microsoft-authentication-library-for-go v1.6.0/go.mod h1:HKpQxkWaGLJ+D/5H8QRpyQXA1eKjxkFlOMwck5+33Jk= +github.com/BurntSushi/toml v0.3.1/go.mod h1:xHWCNGjB5oqiDr8zfno3MHue2Ht5sIBksp03qcyfWMU= github.com/DATA-DOG/go-sqlmock v1.5.0 h1:Shsta01QNfFxHCfpW6YH2STWB0MudeXXEWMr20OEh60= github.com/DATA-DOG/go-sqlmock v1.5.0/go.mod h1:f/Ixk793poVmq4qj/V1dPUg2JEAKC73Q5eFN3EC/SaM= -github.com/DataDog/zstd v1.4.5 h1:EndNeuB0l9syBZhut0wns3gV1hL8zX8LIu6ZiVHWLIQ= -github.com/DataDog/zstd v1.4.5/go.mod h1:1jcaCB/ufaK+sKp1NBhlGmpz41jOoPQ35bpF36t7BBo= +github.com/DataDog/zstd v1.5.7 h1:ybO8RBeh29qrxIhCA9E8gKY6xfONU9T6G6aP9DTKfLE= +github.com/DataDog/zstd v1.5.7/go.mod h1:g4AWEaM3yOg3HYfnJ3YIawPnVdXJh9QME85blwSAmyw= github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2 h1:F2VQgta7ecxGYO8k3ZZz3RS8fVIXVxONVUPlNERoyfY= github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2/go.mod h1:yd8OoFMLzJbo9gZq8j5qaps8bJ9aShtEA8Ipt1oGCvU= github.com/ProjectZKM/Ziren/crates/go-runtime/zkvm_runtime v0.0.0-20251001021608-1fe7b43fc4d6 h1:1zYrtlhrZ6/b6SAjLSfKzWtdgqK0U+HtH/VcBWh1BaU= @@ -32,16 +59,50 @@ github.com/asg017/sqlite-vec-go-bindings v0.1.6 h1:Nx0jAzyS38XpkKznJ9xQjFXz2X9tI github.com/asg017/sqlite-vec-go-bindings v0.1.6/go.mod h1:A8+cTt/nKFsYCQF6OgzSNpKZrzNo5gQsXBTfsXHXY0Q= github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4 h1:EH0zSVneZPSuFR11BlR9YppQTVDbh5+16AmcJi4g1z4= github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4/go.mod h1:ZY9tmq7sm5xIbd9bOK4onWV4S6X0u6GY7Vn0Yu86PYI= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2 v1.41.2 h1:LuT2rzqNQsauaGkPK/7813XxcZ3o3yePY0Iy891T2ls= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2 v1.41.2/go.mod h1:IvvlAZQXvTXznUPfRVfryiG1fbzE2NGK6m9u39YQ+S4= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/config v1.27.27 h1:HdqgGt1OAP0HkEDDShEl0oSYa9ZZBSOmKpdpsDMdO90= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/config v1.27.27/go.mod h1:MVYamCg76dFNINkZFu4n4RjDixhVr51HLj4ErWzrVwg= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/credentials v1.17.27 h1:2raNba6gr2IfA0eqqiP2XiQ0UVOpGPgDSi0I9iAP+UI= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/credentials v1.17.27/go.mod h1:gniiwbGahQByxan6YjQUMcW4Aov6bLC3m+evgcoN4r4= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/feature/ec2/imds v1.16.11 h1:KreluoV8FZDEtI6Co2xuNk/UqI9iwMrOx/87PBNIKqw= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/feature/ec2/imds v1.16.11/go.mod h1:SeSUYBLsMYFoRvHE0Tjvn7kbxaUhl75CJi1sbfhMxkU= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/configsources v1.4.18 h1:F43zk1vemYIqPAwhjTjYIz0irU2EY7sOb/F5eJ3HuyM= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/configsources v1.4.18/go.mod h1:w1jdlZXrGKaJcNoL+Nnrj+k5wlpGXqnNrKoP22HvAug= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/endpoints/v2 v2.7.18 h1:xCeWVjj0ki0l3nruoyP2slHsGArMxeiiaoPN5QZH6YQ= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/endpoints/v2 v2.7.18/go.mod h1:r/eLGuGCBw6l36ZRWiw6PaZwPXb6YOj+i/7MizNl5/k= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/ini v1.8.0 h1:hT8rVHwugYE2lEfdFE0QWVo81lF7jMrYJVDWI+f+VxU= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/ini v1.8.0/go.mod h1:8tu/lYfQfFe6IGnaOdrpVgEL2IrrDOf6/m9RQum4NkY= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/accept-encoding v1.11.3 h1:dT3MqvGhSoaIhRseqw2I0yH81l7wiR2vjs57O51EAm8= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/accept-encoding v1.11.3/go.mod h1:GlAeCkHwugxdHaueRr4nhPuY+WW+gR8UjlcqzPr1SPI= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/presigned-url v1.11.17 h1:HGErhhrxZlQ044RiM+WdoZxp0p+EGM62y3L6pwA4olE= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/presigned-url v1.11.17/go.mod h1:RkZEx4l0EHYDJpWppMJ3nD9wZJAa8/0lq9aVC+r2UII= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/kms v1.50.1 h1:wb/PYYm3wlcqGzw7Ls4GD3X5+seDDoNdVYIB6I/V87E= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/kms v1.50.1/go.mod h1:xvHowJ6J9CuaFE04S8fitWQXytf4sHz3DTPGhw9FtmU= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sso v1.22.4 h1:BXx0ZIxvrJdSgSvKTZ+yRBeSqqgPM89VPlulEcl37tM= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sso v1.22.4/go.mod h1:ooyCOXjvJEsUw7x+ZDHeISPMhtwI3ZCB7ggFMcFfWLU= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/ssooidc v1.26.4 h1:yiwVzJW2ZxZTurVbYWA7QOrAaCYQR72t0wrSBfoesUE= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/ssooidc v1.26.4/go.mod h1:0oxfLkpz3rQ/CHlx5hB7H69YUpFiI1tql6Q6Ne+1bCw= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts v1.30.3 h1:ZsDKRLXGWHk8WdtyYMoGNO7bTudrvuKpDKgMVRlepGE= +github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts v1.30.3/go.mod h1:zwySh8fpFyXp9yOr/KVzxOl8SRqgf/IDw5aUt9UKFcQ= +github.com/aws/smithy-go v1.24.1 h1:VbyeNfmYkWoxMVpGUAbQumkODcYmfMRfZ8yQiH30SK0= +github.com/aws/smithy-go v1.24.1/go.mod h1:LEj2LM3rBRQJxPZTB4KuzZkaZYnZPnvgIhb4pu07mx0= github.com/aymanbagabas/go-osc52/v2 v2.0.1 h1:HwpRHbFMcZLEVr42D4p7XBqjyuxQH5SMiErDT4WkJ2k= github.com/aymanbagabas/go-osc52/v2 v2.0.1/go.mod h1:uYgXzlJ7ZpABp8OJ+exZzJJhRNQ2ASbcXHWsFqH8hp8= +github.com/benbjohnson/clock v1.3.5 h1:VvXlSJBzZpA/zum6Sj74hxwYI2DIxRWuNIoXAzHZz5o= +github.com/benbjohnson/clock v1.3.5/go.mod h1:J11/hYXuz8f4ySSvYwY0FKfm+ezbsZBKZxNJlLklBHA= github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 h1:VlbKKnNfV8bJzeqoa4cOKqO6bYr3WgKZxO8Z16+hsOM= github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1/go.mod h1:G2ZrVWU2WbWT9wwq4/hrbKbnv/1ERSJQ0ibhJ6rlkpw= github.com/bits-and-blooms/bitset v1.24.4 h1:95H15Og1clikBrKr/DuzMXkQzECs1M6hhoGXLwLQOZE= github.com/bits-and-blooms/bitset v1.24.4/go.mod h1:7hO7Gc7Pp1vODcmWvKMRA9BNmbv6a/7QIWpPxHddWR8= +github.com/blang/semver/v4 v4.0.0 h1:1PFHFE6yCCTv8C1TeyNNarDzntLi7wMI5i/pzqYIsAM= +github.com/blang/semver/v4 v4.0.0/go.mod h1:IbckMUScFkM3pff0VJDNKRiT6TG/YpiHIM2yvyW5YoQ= github.com/bmatcuk/doublestar v1.3.4 h1:gPypJ5xD31uhX6Tf54sDPUOBXTqKH4c9aPY66CyQrS0= github.com/bmatcuk/doublestar v1.3.4/go.mod h1:wiQtGV+rzVYxB7WIlirSN++5HPtPlXEo9MEoZQC/PmE= github.com/bwmarrin/discordgo v0.28.1 h1:gXsuo2GBO7NbR6uqmrrBDplPUx2T3nzu775q/Rd1aG4= github.com/bwmarrin/discordgo v0.28.1/go.mod h1:NJZpH+1AfhIcyQsPeuBKsUtYrRnjkyu0kIVMCHkZtRY= +github.com/cenkalti/backoff/v5 v5.0.3 h1:ZN+IMa753KfX5hd8vVaMixjnqRZ3y8CuJKRKj1xcsSM= +github.com/cenkalti/backoff/v5 v5.0.3/go.mod h1:rkhZdG3JZukswDf7f0cwqPNk4K0sa+F97BxZthm/crw= github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 h1:UL815xU9SqsFlibzuggzjXhog7bL6oX9BbNZnL2UFvs= github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0/go.mod h1:VGX0DQ3Q6kWi7AoAeZDth3/j3BFtOZR5XLFGgcrjCOs= github.com/charmbracelet/bubbles v0.21.1 h1:nj0decPiixaZeL9diI4uzzQTkkz1kYY8+jgzCZXSmW0= @@ -64,6 +125,8 @@ github.com/clipperhouse/stringish v0.1.1 h1:+NSqMOr3GR6k1FdRhhnXrLfztGzuG+VuFDfa github.com/clipperhouse/stringish v0.1.1/go.mod h1:v/WhFtE1q0ovMta2+m+UbpZ+2/HEXNWYXQgCt4hdOzA= github.com/clipperhouse/uax29/v2 v2.5.0 h1:x7T0T4eTHDONxFJsL94uKNKPHrclyFI0lm7+w94cO8U= github.com/clipperhouse/uax29/v2 v2.5.0/go.mod h1:Wn1g7MK6OoeDT0vL+Q0SQLDz/KpfsVRgg6W7ihQeh4g= +github.com/cncf/xds/go v0.0.0-20251022180443-0feb69152e9f h1:Y8xYupdHxryycyPlc9Y+bSQAYZnetRJ70VMVKm5CKI0= +github.com/cncf/xds/go v0.0.0-20251022180443-0feb69152e9f/go.mod h1:HlzOvOjVBOfTGSRXRyY0OiCS/3J1akRGQQpRO/7zyF4= github.com/cockroachdb/errors v1.11.3 h1:5bA+k2Y6r+oz/6Z/RFlNeVCesGARKuC6YymtcDrbC/I= github.com/cockroachdb/errors v1.11.3/go.mod h1:m4UIW4CDjx+R5cybPsNrRbreomiFqt8o1h1wUVazSd8= github.com/cockroachdb/fifo v0.0.0-20240606204812-0bbfbd93a7ce h1:giXvy4KSc/6g/esnpM7Geqxka4WSqI1SZc7sMJFd3y4= @@ -78,10 +141,20 @@ github.com/cockroachdb/tokenbucket v0.0.0-20230807174530-cc333fc44b06 h1:zuQyyAK github.com/cockroachdb/tokenbucket v0.0.0-20230807174530-cc333fc44b06/go.mod h1:7nc4anLGjupUW/PeY5qiNYsdNXj7zopG+eqsS7To5IQ= github.com/coinbase/x402/go v0.0.0-20260211184331-65d968c3660a h1:V1IQMTtlhk38NpL5J4FfhzW6/0Ftsv9ZOOSK7dh11xQ= github.com/coinbase/x402/go 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h1:J3VJGi1gvo0JwZ/P1/Yc/8p63SoW98B5dHkYDmpgvvU= +github.com/wlynxg/anet v0.0.5/go.mod h1:eay5PRQr7fIVAMbTbchTnO9gG65Hg/uYGdc7mguHxoA= +github.com/x448/float16 v0.8.4 h1:qLwI1I70+NjRFUR3zs1JPUCgaCXSh3SW62uAKT1mSBM= +github.com/x448/float16 v0.8.4/go.mod h1:14CWIYCyZA/cWjXOioeEpHeN/83MdbZDRQHoFcYsOfg= github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e h1:JVG44RsyaB9T2KIHavMF/ppJZNG9ZpyihvCd0w101no= github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e/go.mod h1:RbqR21r5mrJuqunuUZ/Dhy/avygyECGrLceyNeo4LiM= github.com/xrash/smetrics v0.0.0-20240521201337-686a1a2994c1 h1:gEOO8jv9F4OT7lGCjxCBTO/36wtF6j2nSip77qHd4x4= @@ -339,6 +664,9 @@ github.com/ysmood/gson v0.7.3 h1:QFkWbTH8MxyUTKPkVWAENJhxqdBa4lYTQWqZCiLG6kE= github.com/ysmood/gson v0.7.3/go.mod h1:3Kzs5zDl21g5F/BlLTNcuAGAYLKt2lV5G8D1zF3RNmg= github.com/ysmood/leakless v0.9.0 h1:qxCG5VirSBvmi3uynXFkcnLMzkphdh3xx5FtrORwDCU= github.com/ysmood/leakless v0.9.0/go.mod h1:R8iAXPRaG97QJwqxs74RdwzcRHT1SWCGTNqY8q0JvMQ= 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h1:YH4g8lQroajqUwWbq/tr2QX1JFmEXaDLgG+ew9bLMWo= +go.opentelemetry.io/contrib/instrumentation/google.golang.org/grpc/otelgrpc v0.63.0/go.mod h1:fvPi2qXDqFs8M4B4fmJhE92TyQs9Ydjlg3RvfUp+NbQ= go.opentelemetry.io/contrib/instrumentation/net/http/otelhttp v0.63.0 h1:RbKq8BG0FI8OiXhBfcRtqqHcZcka+gU3cskNuf05R18= go.opentelemetry.io/contrib/instrumentation/net/http/otelhttp v0.63.0/go.mod h1:h06DGIukJOevXaj/xrNjhi/2098RZzcLTbc0jDAUbsg= go.opentelemetry.io/otel v1.40.0 h1:oA5YeOcpRTXq6NN7frwmwFR0Cn3RhTVZvXsP4duvCms= go.opentelemetry.io/otel v1.40.0/go.mod h1:IMb+uXZUKkMXdPddhwAHm6UfOwJyh4ct1ybIlV14J0g= +go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace v1.38.0 h1:GqRJVj7UmLjCVyVJ3ZFLdPRmhDUp2zFmQe3RHIOsw24= +go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace v1.38.0/go.mod h1:ri3aaHSmCTVYu2AWv44YMauwAQc0aqI9gHKIcSbI1pU= +go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp v1.38.0 h1:aTL7F04bJHUlztTsNGJ2l+6he8c+y/b//eR0jjjemT4= +go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp v1.38.0/go.mod h1:kldtb7jDTeol0l3ewcmd8SDvx3EmIE7lyvqbasU3QC4= go.opentelemetry.io/otel/metric v1.40.0 h1:rcZe317KPftE2rstWIBitCdVp89A2HqjkxR3c11+p9g= go.opentelemetry.io/otel/metric v1.40.0/go.mod h1:ib/crwQH7N3r5kfiBZQbwrTge743UDc7DTFVZrrXnqc= go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk v1.40.0 h1:KHW/jUzgo6wsPh9At46+h4upjtccTmuZCFAc9OJ71f8= @@ -359,59 +693,150 @@ go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk/metric v1.40.0 h1:mtmdVqgQkeRxHgRv4qhyJduP3fYJRMX4A go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk/metric v1.40.0/go.mod h1:4Z2bGMf0KSK3uRjlczMOeMhKU2rhUqdWNoKcYrtcBPg= go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace v1.40.0 h1:WA4etStDttCSYuhwvEa8OP8I5EWu24lkOzp+ZYblVjw= go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace v1.40.0/go.mod h1:zeAhriXecNGP/s2SEG3+Y8X9ujcJOTqQ5RgdEJcawiA= +go.opentelemetry.io/proto/otlp v1.7.1 h1:gTOMpGDb0WTBOP8JaO72iL3auEZhVmAQg4ipjOVAtj4= +go.opentelemetry.io/proto/otlp v1.7.1/go.mod h1:b2rVh6rfI/s2pHWNlB7ILJcRALpcNDzKhACevjI+ZnE= +go.uber.org/dig v1.19.0 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h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0= gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20201130134442-10cb98267c6c h1:Hei/4ADfdWqJk1ZMxUNpqntNwaWcugrBjAiHlqqRiVk= gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20201130134442-10cb98267c6c/go.mod h1:JHkPIbrfpd72SG/EVd6muEfDQjcINNoR0C8j2r3qZ4Q= @@ -419,10 +844,16 @@ gopkg.in/ini.v1 v1.67.0 h1:Dgnx+6+nfE+IfzjUEISNeydPJh9AXNNsWbGP9KzCsOA= gopkg.in/ini.v1 v1.67.0/go.mod h1:pNLf8WUiyNEtQjuu5G5vTm06TEv9tsIgeAvK8hOrP4k= gopkg.in/natefinch/lumberjack.v2 v2.2.1 h1:bBRl1b0OH9s/DuPhuXpNl+VtCaJXFZ5/uEFST95x9zc= gopkg.in/natefinch/lumberjack.v2 v2.2.1/go.mod h1:YD8tP3GAjkrDg1eZH7EGmyESg/lsYskCTPBJVb9jqSc= +gopkg.in/yaml.v2 v2.2.2/go.mod h1:hI93XBmqTisBFMUTm0b8Fm+jr3Dg1NNxqwp+5A1VGuI= gopkg.in/yaml.v2 v2.4.0 h1:D8xgwECY7CYvx+Y2n4sBz93Jn9JRvxdiyyo8CTfuKaY= gopkg.in/yaml.v2 v2.4.0/go.mod h1:RDklbk79AGWmwhnvt/jBztapEOGDOx6ZbXqjP6csGnQ= +gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.0-20200313102051-9f266ea9e77c/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM= gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA= gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM= +gotest.tools/v3 v3.5.2 h1:7koQfIKdy+I8UTetycgUqXWSDwpgv193Ka+qRsmBY8Q= +gotest.tools/v3 v3.5.2/go.mod h1:LtdLGcnqToBH83WByAAi/wiwSFCArdFIUV/xxN4pcjA= +lukechampine.com/blake3 v1.4.1 h1:I3Smz7gso8w4/TunLKec6K2fn+kyKtDxr/xcQEN84Wg= +lukechampine.com/blake3 v1.4.1/go.mod h1:QFosUxmjB8mnrWFSNwKmvxHpfY72bmD2tQ0kBMM3kwo= rsc.io/omap v1.2.0 h1:c1M8jchnHbzmJALzGLclfH3xDWXrPxSUHXzH5C+8Kdw= rsc.io/omap v1.2.0/go.mod h1:C8pkI0AWexHopQtZX+qiUeJGzvc8HkdgnsWK4/mAa00= rsc.io/ordered v1.1.1 h1:1kZM6RkTmceJgsFH/8DLQvkCVEYomVDJfBRLT595Uak= diff --git a/internal/a2a/server.go b/internal/a2a/server.go index 155c642d..84ca61fc 100644 --- a/internal/a2a/server.go +++ b/internal/a2a/server.go @@ -3,23 +3,36 @@ package a2a import ( "encoding/json" "net/http" + "time" "go.uber.org/zap" "google.golang.org/adk/agent" - "google.golang.org/adk/server/adka2a" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" ) // Server exposes a Lango agent as an A2A-compatible server. type Server struct { - cfg config.A2AConfig - agent agent.Agent - executor *adka2a.Executor - card *AgentCard - logger *zap.SugaredLogger + cfg config.A2AConfig + agent agent.Agent + card *AgentCard + logger *zap.SugaredLogger } +const ( + // AgentCardRoute is the well-known HTTP path for the A2A Agent Card. + AgentCardRoute = "/.well-known/agent.json" + + // ContentTypeJSON is the MIME type for JSON responses. + ContentTypeJSON = "application/json" + + // SkillTagOrchestration tags the root agent skill. + SkillTagOrchestration = "orchestration" + + // SkillTagSubAgentPrefix prefixes sub-agent skill tags. + SkillTagSubAgentPrefix = "sub_agent:" +) + // AgentCard is a simplified representation of the A2A Agent Card // served at /.well-known/agent.json. type AgentCard struct { @@ -27,6 +40,29 @@ type AgentCard struct { Description string `json:"description"` URL string `json:"url"` Skills []AgentSkill `json:"skills"` + + // P2P extensions + DID string `json:"did,omitempty"` + Multiaddrs []string `json:"multiaddrs,omitempty"` + Capabilities []string `json:"capabilities,omitempty"` + Pricing *PricingInfo `json:"pricing,omitempty"` + ZKCredentials []ZKCredential `json:"zkCredentials,omitempty"` +} + +// PricingInfo describes the pricing for an agent's services. +type PricingInfo struct { + Currency string `json:"currency"` + PerQuery string `json:"perQuery,omitempty"` + PerMinute string `json:"perMinute,omitempty"` + ToolPrices map[string]string `json:"toolPrices,omitempty"` +} + +// ZKCredential is a zero-knowledge proof of agent capability. +type ZKCredential struct { + CapabilityID string `json:"capabilityId"` + Proof []byte `json:"proof"` + IssuedAt time.Time `json:"issuedAt"` + ExpiresAt time.Time `json:"expiresAt"` } // AgentSkill describes a capability of the agent. @@ -66,20 +102,35 @@ func NewServer(cfg config.A2AConfig, adkAgent agent.Agent, logger *zap.SugaredLo } } +// Card returns the agent card (used by P2P gossip and protocol). +func (s *Server) Card() *AgentCard { return s.card } + +// SetP2PInfo adds P2P networking information to the agent card. +func (s *Server) SetP2PInfo(did string, multiaddrs, capabilities []string) { + s.card.DID = did + s.card.Multiaddrs = multiaddrs + s.card.Capabilities = capabilities +} + +// SetPricing sets the pricing information on the agent card. +func (s *Server) SetPricing(pricing *PricingInfo) { + s.card.Pricing = pricing +} + // RegisterRoutes mounts the A2A routes on the given HTTP mux. // - GET /.well-known/agent.json — serves the Agent Card func (s *Server) RegisterRoutes(mux interface { Get(string, http.HandlerFunc) }) { - mux.Get("/.well-known/agent.json", s.handleAgentCard) + mux.Get(AgentCardRoute, s.handleAgentCard) s.logger.Infow("a2a routes registered", - "agentCard", "/.well-known/agent.json", + "agentCard", AgentCardRoute, ) } // handleAgentCard serves the Agent Card JSON. func (s *Server) handleAgentCard(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) { - w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", ContentTypeJSON) if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(s.card); err != nil { s.logger.Warnw("encode agent card: %w", "error", err) http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError) @@ -95,7 +146,7 @@ func buildSkills(adkAgent agent.Agent) []AgentSkill { ID: adkAgent.Name(), Name: adkAgent.Name(), Description: adkAgent.Description(), - Tags: []string{"orchestration"}, + Tags: []string{SkillTagOrchestration}, }) // Sub-agent skills. @@ -104,7 +155,7 @@ func buildSkills(adkAgent agent.Agent) []AgentSkill { ID: sub.Name(), Name: sub.Name(), Description: sub.Description(), - Tags: []string{"sub_agent:" + adkAgent.Name()}, + Tags: []string{SkillTagSubAgentPrefix + adkAgent.Name()}, }) } diff --git a/internal/a2a/server_test.go b/internal/a2a/server_test.go index 3edd5487..fe763c87 100644 --- a/internal/a2a/server_test.go +++ b/internal/a2a/server_test.go @@ -12,17 +12,6 @@ import ( "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" ) -// fakeAgent implements agent.Agent for testing. -type fakeAgent struct { - name string - description string - subAgents []fakeAgent -} - -func (a fakeAgent) Name() string { return a.name } -func (a fakeAgent) Description() string { return a.description } -func (a fakeAgent) SubAgents() []fakeAgent { return a.subAgents } - func TestAgentCard(t *testing.T) { cfg := config.A2AConfig{ Enabled: true, @@ -50,7 +39,7 @@ func TestAgentCard(t *testing.T) { router := chi.NewRouter() s.RegisterRoutes(router) - req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.well-known/agent.json", nil) + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, AgentCardRoute, nil) rec := httptest.NewRecorder() router.ServeHTTP(rec, req) @@ -60,7 +49,7 @@ func TestAgentCard(t *testing.T) { } ct := rec.Header().Get("Content-Type") - if ct != "application/json" { + if ct != ContentTypeJSON { t.Fatalf("want application/json, got %s", ct) } @@ -108,7 +97,7 @@ func TestAgentCardEmpty(t *testing.T) { router := chi.NewRouter() s.RegisterRoutes(router) - req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.well-known/agent.json", nil) + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, AgentCardRoute, nil) rec := httptest.NewRecorder() router.ServeHTTP(rec, req) diff --git a/internal/adk/agent.go b/internal/adk/agent.go index b7002bda..34348f00 100644 --- a/internal/adk/agent.go +++ b/internal/adk/agent.go @@ -23,14 +23,55 @@ import ( func logger() *zap.SugaredLogger { return logging.Agent() } +// ErrorFixProvider returns a known fix for a tool error if one exists. +// Implemented by learning.Engine. +type ErrorFixProvider interface { + GetFixForError(ctx context.Context, toolName string, err error) (string, bool) +} + +// defaultMaxTurns is the default maximum number of tool-calling iterations per agent run. +const defaultMaxTurns = 25 + +// AgentOption configures optional Agent behavior at construction time. +type AgentOption func(*agentOptions) + +type agentOptions struct { + tokenBudget int + maxTurns int + errorFixProvider ErrorFixProvider +} + +// WithAgentTokenBudget sets the session history token budget. +// Use ModelTokenBudget(modelName) to derive an appropriate value. +func WithAgentTokenBudget(budget int) AgentOption { + return func(o *agentOptions) { o.tokenBudget = budget } +} + +// WithAgentMaxTurns sets the maximum number of tool-calling turns per run. +func WithAgentMaxTurns(n int) AgentOption { + return func(o *agentOptions) { o.maxTurns = n } +} + +// WithAgentErrorFixProvider sets a learning-based error correction provider. +func WithAgentErrorFixProvider(p ErrorFixProvider) AgentOption { + return func(o *agentOptions) { o.errorFixProvider = p } +} + // Agent wraps the ADK runner for integration with Lango. type Agent struct { - runner *runner.Runner - adkAgent adk_agent.Agent + runner *runner.Runner + adkAgent adk_agent.Agent + maxTurns int // 0 = defaultMaxTurns + errorFixProvider ErrorFixProvider // optional: for self-correction on errors } // NewAgent creates a new Agent instance. -func NewAgent(ctx context.Context, tools []tool.Tool, mod model.LLM, systemPrompt string, store internal.Store) (*Agent, error) { +func NewAgent(ctx context.Context, tools []tool.Tool, mod model.LLM, systemPrompt string, store internal.Store, opts ...AgentOption) (*Agent, error) { + var o agentOptions + for _, fn := range opts { + fn(&o) + } + // Create LLM Agent cfg := llmagent.Config{ Name: "lango-agent", @@ -47,6 +88,9 @@ func NewAgent(ctx context.Context, tools []tool.Tool, mod model.LLM, systemPromp // Create Session Service sessService := NewSessionServiceAdapter(store, "lango-agent") + if o.tokenBudget > 0 { + sessService.WithTokenBudget(o.tokenBudget) + } // Create Runner runnerCfg := runner.Config{ @@ -61,15 +105,25 @@ func NewAgent(ctx context.Context, tools []tool.Tool, mod model.LLM, systemPromp } return &Agent{ - runner: r, - adkAgent: adkAgent, + runner: r, + adkAgent: adkAgent, + maxTurns: o.maxTurns, + errorFixProvider: o.errorFixProvider, }, nil } // NewAgentFromADK creates a Lango Agent wrapping a pre-built ADK agent. // Used for multi-agent orchestration where the agent tree is built externally. -func NewAgentFromADK(adkAgent adk_agent.Agent, store internal.Store) (*Agent, error) { +func NewAgentFromADK(adkAgent adk_agent.Agent, store internal.Store, opts ...AgentOption) (*Agent, error) { + var o agentOptions + for _, fn := range opts { + fn(&o) + } + sessService := NewSessionServiceAdapter(store, adkAgent.Name()) + if o.tokenBudget > 0 { + sessService.WithTokenBudget(o.tokenBudget) + } runnerCfg := runner.Config{ AppName: "lango", @@ -82,7 +136,26 @@ func NewAgentFromADK(adkAgent adk_agent.Agent, store internal.Store) (*Agent, er return nil, fmt.Errorf("create runner: %w", err) } - return &Agent{runner: r, adkAgent: adkAgent}, nil + return &Agent{ + runner: r, + adkAgent: adkAgent, + maxTurns: o.maxTurns, + errorFixProvider: o.errorFixProvider, + }, nil +} + +// WithMaxTurns sets the maximum number of tool-calling turns per run. +// Zero or negative values use the default (25). +func (a *Agent) WithMaxTurns(n int) *Agent { + a.maxTurns = n + return a +} + +// WithErrorFixProvider sets an optional provider for learning-based error correction. +// When set, the agent will attempt to apply known fixes on errors before giving up. +func (a *Agent) WithErrorFixProvider(p ErrorFixProvider) *Agent { + a.errorFixProvider = p + return a } // ADKAgent returns the underlying ADK agent, or nil if not available. @@ -91,6 +164,7 @@ func (a *Agent) ADKAgent() adk_agent.Agent { } // Run executes the agent for a given session and returns an event iterator. +// It enforces a maximum turn limit to prevent unbounded tool-calling loops. func (a *Agent) Run(ctx context.Context, sessionID string, input string) iter.Seq2[*session.Event, error] { // Create user content userMsg := &genai.Content{ @@ -103,8 +177,51 @@ func (a *Agent) Run(ctx context.Context, sessionID string, input string) iter.Se // Defaults } - // Execute via Runner - return a.runner.Run(ctx, "user", sessionID, userMsg, runCfg) + maxTurns := a.maxTurns + if maxTurns <= 0 { + maxTurns = defaultMaxTurns + } + + // Execute via Runner with turn limit enforcement. + inner := a.runner.Run(ctx, "user", sessionID, userMsg, runCfg) + + return func(yield func(*session.Event, error) bool) { + turnCount := 0 + for event, err := range inner { + if err != nil { + yield(nil, err) + return + } + // Count events containing function calls as agent turns. + if event.Content != nil && hasFunctionCalls(event) { + turnCount++ + if turnCount > maxTurns { + logger().Warnw("agent max turns exceeded", + "session", sessionID, + "turns", turnCount, + "maxTurns", maxTurns) + yield(nil, fmt.Errorf("agent exceeded maximum turn limit (%d)", maxTurns)) + return + } + } + if !yield(event, nil) { + return + } + } + } +} + +// hasFunctionCalls reports whether the event contains any FunctionCall parts. +func hasFunctionCalls(e *session.Event) bool { + if e.Content == nil { + return false + } + for _, p := range e.Content.Parts { + if p.FunctionCall != nil { + return true + } + } + return false } // RunAndCollect executes the agent and returns the full text response. @@ -123,6 +240,26 @@ func (a *Agent) RunAndCollect(ctx context.Context, sessionID, input string) (str badAgent := extractMissingAgent(err) if badAgent == "" || len(a.adkAgent.SubAgents()) == 0 { + // Try learning-based error correction before giving up. + if a.errorFixProvider != nil { + if fix, ok := a.errorFixProvider.GetFixForError(ctx, "", err); ok { + correction := fmt.Sprintf( + "[System: Previous action failed with: %s. Suggested fix: %s. Please retry.]", + err.Error(), fix) + logger().Infow("applying learned fix for error", + "session", sessionID, + "fix", fix, + "elapsed", time.Since(start).String()) + retryResp, retryErr := a.runAndCollectOnce(ctx, sessionID, correction) + if retryErr == nil { + return retryResp, nil + } + logger().Warnw("learned fix retry failed", + "session", sessionID, + "error", retryErr) + } + } + logger().Warnw("agent run failed", "session", sessionID, "elapsed", time.Since(start).String(), diff --git a/internal/adk/context_model.go b/internal/adk/context_model.go index cb065f14..bd3f0092 100644 --- a/internal/adk/context_model.go +++ b/internal/adk/context_model.go @@ -31,17 +31,18 @@ type MemoryProvider interface { // Before each LLM call, it retrieves relevant knowledge and injects it // into the system instruction. type ContextAwareModelAdapter struct { - inner *ModelAdapter - retriever *knowledge.ContextRetriever - memoryProvider MemoryProvider - ragService *embedding.RAGService - ragOpts embedding.RetrieveOptions - graphRAG *graph.GraphRAGService - runtimeAdapter *RuntimeContextAdapter - basePrompt string - maxReflections int - maxObservations int - logger *zap.SugaredLogger + inner *ModelAdapter + retriever *knowledge.ContextRetriever + memoryProvider MemoryProvider + ragService *embedding.RAGService + ragOpts embedding.RetrieveOptions + graphRAG *graph.GraphRAGService + runtimeAdapter *RuntimeContextAdapter + basePrompt string + maxReflections int + maxObservations int + memoryTokenBudget int // max tokens for the memory section; 0 = default (4000) + logger *zap.SugaredLogger } // NewContextAwareModelAdapter creates a context-aware model adapter. @@ -97,6 +98,15 @@ func (m *ContextAwareModelAdapter) WithMemoryLimits(maxReflections, maxObservati return m } +// WithMemoryTokenBudget sets the maximum token budget for the memory section +// injected into the system prompt. Reflections are prioritized first (higher +// information density), then observations fill the remaining budget. +// Zero means use default (4000 tokens). +func (m *ContextAwareModelAdapter) WithMemoryTokenBudget(budget int) *ContextAwareModelAdapter { + m.memoryTokenBudget = budget + return m +} + // Name delegates to the inner adapter. func (m *ContextAwareModelAdapter) Name() string { return m.inner.Name() @@ -193,7 +203,12 @@ func (m *ContextAwareModelAdapter) GenerateContent(ctx context.Context, req *mod return m.inner.GenerateContent(ctx, req, stream) } +// defaultMemoryTokenBudget is the default token budget for the memory section. +const defaultMemoryTokenBudget = 4000 + // assembleMemorySection builds the "Conversation Memory" section from observations and reflections. +// It enforces a token budget: reflections are included first (higher information density), +// then observations fill the remaining budget. func (m *ContextAwareModelAdapter) assembleMemorySection(ctx context.Context, sessionKey string) string { var reflections []memory.Reflection var observations []memory.Observation @@ -221,23 +236,42 @@ func (m *ContextAwareModelAdapter) assembleMemorySection(ctx context.Context, se return "" } + budget := m.memoryTokenBudget + if budget <= 0 { + budget = defaultMemoryTokenBudget + } + var b strings.Builder + currentTokens := 0 + b.WriteString("## Conversation Memory\n") + // Reflections first — higher information density from compressed summaries. if len(reflections) > 0 { b.WriteString("\n### Summary\n") for _, ref := range reflections { + t := memory.EstimateTokens(ref.Content) + if currentTokens+t > budget { + break + } b.WriteString(ref.Content) b.WriteString("\n") + currentTokens += t } } - if len(observations) > 0 { + // Observations fill remaining budget. + if len(observations) > 0 && currentTokens < budget { b.WriteString("\n### Recent Observations\n") for _, obs := range observations { + t := memory.EstimateTokens(obs.Content) + if currentTokens+t > budget { + break + } b.WriteString("- ") b.WriteString(obs.Content) b.WriteString("\n") + currentTokens += t } } @@ -284,7 +318,7 @@ func (m *ContextAwareModelAdapter) assembleRAGSection(ctx context.Context, query if r.Content == "" { continue } - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("\n### [%s] %s\n", r.Collection, r.SourceID)) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "\n### [%s] %s\n", r.Collection, r.SourceID) b.WriteString(r.Content) b.WriteString("\n") } diff --git a/internal/adk/model.go b/internal/adk/model.go index 94013d1e..c021ef44 100644 --- a/internal/adk/model.go +++ b/internal/adk/model.go @@ -61,12 +61,7 @@ func (m *ModelAdapter) GenerateContent(ctx context.Context, req *model.LLMReques params.MaxTokens = int(req.Config.MaxOutputTokens) } } - if params.Model == "" { - // Fallback if not set in request (ADK might set it in client/factory) - // But params must have it. - // We can default or error. - // provider usually requires it. - } + // params.Model may be empty here; the provider will use its default. pSeq, err := m.p.Generate(ctx, params) if err != nil { @@ -201,9 +196,10 @@ func convertMessages(contents []*genai.Content) ([]provider.Message, error) { var msgs []provider.Message for _, c := range contents { role := c.Role - if role == "model" { + switch role { + case "model": role = "assistant" - } else if role == "function" { + case "function": role = "tool" } diff --git a/internal/adk/session_service.go b/internal/adk/session_service.go index a8c6849b..daa7496b 100644 --- a/internal/adk/session_service.go +++ b/internal/adk/session_service.go @@ -15,12 +15,20 @@ import ( type SessionServiceAdapter struct { store internal.Store rootAgentName string + tokenBudget int // 0 = use DefaultTokenBudget } func NewSessionServiceAdapter(store internal.Store, rootAgentName string) *SessionServiceAdapter { return &SessionServiceAdapter{store: store, rootAgentName: rootAgentName} } +// WithTokenBudget sets the token budget for history truncation. +// Use ModelTokenBudget(modelName) to derive an appropriate budget from the model name. +func (s *SessionServiceAdapter) WithTokenBudget(budget int) *SessionServiceAdapter { + s.tokenBudget = budget + return s +} + func (s *SessionServiceAdapter) Create(ctx context.Context, req *session.CreateRequest) (*session.CreateResponse, error) { // Create new internal session sess := &internal.Session{ @@ -47,7 +55,9 @@ func (s *SessionServiceAdapter) Create(ctx context.Context, req *session.CreateR return nil, err } - return &session.CreateResponse{Session: NewSessionAdapter(sess, s.store, s.rootAgentName)}, nil + sa := NewSessionAdapter(sess, s.store, s.rootAgentName) + sa.tokenBudget = s.tokenBudget + return &session.CreateResponse{Session: sa}, nil } func (s *SessionServiceAdapter) Get(ctx context.Context, req *session.GetRequest) (*session.GetResponse, error) { @@ -57,12 +67,22 @@ func (s *SessionServiceAdapter) Get(ctx context.Context, req *session.GetRequest if errors.Is(err, internal.ErrSessionNotFound) { return s.getOrCreate(ctx, req) } + // Auto-renew expired sessions: delete stale record, then create fresh + if errors.Is(err, internal.ErrSessionExpired) { + logger().Infow("session expired, auto-renewing", "session", req.SessionID) + if delErr := s.store.Delete(req.SessionID); delErr != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("delete expired session %s: %w", req.SessionID, delErr) + } + return s.getOrCreate(ctx, req) + } return nil, err } if sess == nil { return s.getOrCreate(ctx, req) } - return &session.GetResponse{Session: NewSessionAdapter(sess, s.store, s.rootAgentName)}, nil + sa := NewSessionAdapter(sess, s.store, s.rootAgentName) + sa.tokenBudget = s.tokenBudget + return &session.GetResponse{Session: sa}, nil } // getOrCreate attempts to create a session, and if it fails due to a @@ -77,7 +97,9 @@ func (s *SessionServiceAdapter) getOrCreate(ctx context.Context, req *session.Ge if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("auto-create session %s: get after conflict: %w", req.SessionID, err) } - return &session.GetResponse{Session: NewSessionAdapter(sess, s.store, s.rootAgentName)}, nil + sa := NewSessionAdapter(sess, s.store, s.rootAgentName) + sa.tokenBudget = s.tokenBudget + return &session.GetResponse{Session: sa}, nil } return nil, fmt.Errorf("auto-create session %s: %w", req.SessionID, createErr) } @@ -102,10 +124,10 @@ func (s *SessionServiceAdapter) AppendEvent(ctx context.Context, sess session.Se Timestamp: evt.Timestamp, } - if evt.LLMResponse.Content != nil { - msg.Role = types.MessageRole(evt.LLMResponse.Content.Role).Normalize() + if evt.Content != nil { + msg.Role = types.MessageRole(evt.Content.Role).Normalize() - for _, p := range evt.LLMResponse.Content.Parts { + for _, p := range evt.Content.Parts { if p.Text != "" { msg.Content += p.Text } diff --git a/internal/adk/session_service_test.go b/internal/adk/session_service_test.go index a9184d15..21eb9f49 100644 --- a/internal/adk/session_service_test.go +++ b/internal/adk/session_service_test.go @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ package adk import ( "context" + "errors" + "fmt" "testing" "time" @@ -353,5 +355,64 @@ func TestAppendEvent_SavesFunctionResponseMetadata(t *testing.T) { } } +func TestSessionServiceAdapter_Get_ExpiredSession_AutoRenews(t *testing.T) { + store := newMockStore() + // Seed an expired session + store.sessions["expired-sess"] = &internal.Session{ + Key: "expired-sess", + Metadata: map[string]string{"old": "data"}, + } + store.expiredKeys["expired-sess"] = true + + service := NewSessionServiceAdapter(store, "lango-agent") + + resp, err := service.Get(context.Background(), &session.GetRequest{ + SessionID: "expired-sess", + }) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("expected auto-renew, got error: %v", err) + } + if resp.Session.ID() != "expired-sess" { + t.Errorf("expected session ID 'expired-sess', got %q", resp.Session.ID()) + } + + // Old session should have been deleted and replaced + if store.expiredKeys["expired-sess"] { + t.Error("expected expiredKeys entry to be cleared after delete") + } + + // Verify session exists in store (recreated) + sess, err := store.Get("expired-sess") + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("expected session in store after auto-renew, got error: %v", err) + } + if sess == nil { + t.Fatal("expected non-nil session after auto-renew") + } + // Old metadata should not carry over (new session is blank) + if sess.Metadata["old"] == "data" { + t.Error("expected old metadata to be cleared in renewed session") + } +} + +func TestSessionServiceAdapter_Get_ExpiredSession_DeleteFails(t *testing.T) { + store := newMockStore() + store.sessions["fail-del"] = &internal.Session{Key: "fail-del"} + store.expiredKeys["fail-del"] = true + store.deleteErr = fmt.Errorf("disk full") + + service := NewSessionServiceAdapter(store, "lango-agent") + + _, err := service.Get(context.Background(), &session.GetRequest{ + SessionID: "fail-del", + }) + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error when delete fails") + } + if !errors.Is(err, store.deleteErr) { + t.Errorf("expected wrapped disk full error, got: %v", err) + } +} + // Verify the LLMResponse field is unused in model import (for compile check) var _ = model.LLMResponse{} diff --git a/internal/adk/state.go b/internal/adk/state.go index 6ac7864b..1b7561b4 100644 --- a/internal/adk/state.go +++ b/internal/adk/state.go @@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ package adk import ( "encoding/json" "iter" + "strings" + "sync" "time" "github.com/google/uuid" @@ -20,6 +22,7 @@ type SessionAdapter struct { sess *internal.Session store internal.Store rootAgentName string + tokenBudget int // 0 = use DefaultTokenBudget; set via SessionServiceAdapter } func NewSessionAdapter(s *internal.Session, store internal.Store, rootAgentName string) *SessionAdapter { @@ -35,7 +38,11 @@ func (s *SessionAdapter) State() session.State { } func (s *SessionAdapter) Events() session.Events { - return &EventsAdapter{history: s.sess.History, rootAgentName: s.rootAgentName} + return &EventsAdapter{ + history: s.sess.History, + tokenBudget: s.tokenBudget, + rootAgentName: s.rootAgentName, + } } // EventsWithTokenBudget returns an EventsAdapter that uses token-budget truncation. @@ -104,17 +111,50 @@ func (s *StateAdapter) All() iter.Seq2[string, any] { // DefaultTokenBudget is the token budget used when no explicit budget is provided. const DefaultTokenBudget = 32000 +// ModelTokenBudget returns an appropriate history token budget for the given model. +// It uses approximately 50-60% of each model family's context window, leaving room +// for system prompts, tool definitions, and generated output. +// Returns DefaultTokenBudget for unknown models. +func ModelTokenBudget(modelName string) int { + lower := strings.ToLower(modelName) + switch { + case strings.Contains(lower, "claude"): + return 100000 // ~50% of 200K context + case strings.Contains(lower, "gemini"): + return 200000 // ~20% of 1M context + case strings.Contains(lower, "gpt-4o"), strings.Contains(lower, "gpt-4-turbo"): + return 64000 // ~50% of 128K context + case strings.Contains(lower, "gpt-4"): + return 32000 // 8K–32K context models + case strings.Contains(lower, "gpt-3.5"): + return 8000 // ~50% of 16K context + default: + return DefaultTokenBudget + } +} + // EventsAdapter adapts internal history to adk events. // Uses token-budget truncation: includes messages from most recent until the budget is exhausted. +// Truncated history and converted events are lazily cached for O(1) repeated access. type EventsAdapter struct { history []internal.Message tokenBudget int rootAgentName string + + // Lazy caches — safe because EventsAdapter is created fresh per session access. + truncateOnce sync.Once + truncated []internal.Message + eventsOnce sync.Once + eventsCache []*session.Event } // truncatedHistory returns the messages to include based on token budget. +// The result is lazily cached so repeated calls (e.g. from Len, At, All) are O(1). func (e *EventsAdapter) truncatedHistory() []internal.Message { - return e.tokenBudgetTruncate() + e.truncateOnce.Do(func() { + e.truncated = e.tokenBudgetTruncate() + }) + return e.truncated } // tokenBudgetTruncate includes messages from most recent to oldest until the token budget is exhausted. @@ -328,17 +368,16 @@ func (e *EventsAdapter) Len() int { return len(e.truncatedHistory()) } +// At returns the i-th event. The full event list is built once on first call +// and cached, making subsequent At calls O(1) instead of O(n). func (e *EventsAdapter) At(i int) *session.Event { - // Reusing logic from All is inefficient but simple for now - var found *session.Event - count := 0 - e.All()(func(evt *session.Event) bool { - if count == i { - found = evt - return false + e.eventsOnce.Do(func() { + for evt := range e.All() { + e.eventsCache = append(e.eventsCache, evt) } - count++ - return true }) - return found + if i < 0 || i >= len(e.eventsCache) { + return nil + } + return e.eventsCache[i] } diff --git a/internal/adk/state_test.go b/internal/adk/state_test.go index 02922237..1335750b 100644 --- a/internal/adk/state_test.go +++ b/internal/adk/state_test.go @@ -14,14 +14,17 @@ import ( ) type mockStore struct { - sessions map[string]*internal.Session - messages map[string][]internal.Message // DB-only message storage + sessions map[string]*internal.Session + messages map[string][]internal.Message // DB-only message storage + expiredKeys map[string]bool // keys that simulate expired sessions + deleteErr error // if set, Delete returns this error } func newMockStore() *mockStore { return &mockStore{ - sessions: make(map[string]*internal.Session), - messages: make(map[string][]internal.Message), + sessions: make(map[string]*internal.Session), + messages: make(map[string][]internal.Message), + expiredKeys: make(map[string]bool), } } @@ -30,6 +33,9 @@ func (m *mockStore) Create(s *internal.Session) error { return nil } func (m *mockStore) Get(key string) (*internal.Session, error) { + if m.expiredKeys[key] { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("get session %q: %w", key, internal.ErrSessionExpired) + } s, ok := m.sessions[key] if !ok { return nil, nil @@ -41,7 +47,11 @@ func (m *mockStore) Update(s *internal.Session) error { return nil } func (m *mockStore) Delete(key string) error { + if m.deleteErr != nil { + return m.deleteErr + } delete(m.sessions, key) + delete(m.expiredKeys, key) return nil } func (m *mockStore) AppendMessage(key string, msg internal.Message) error { @@ -364,11 +374,11 @@ func TestEventsAdapter_WithToolCalls(t *testing.T) { count := 0 for evt := range events.All() { count++ - if evt.LLMResponse.Content == nil { + if evt.Content == nil { t.Fatal("expected non-nil content") } hasFunctionCall := false - for _, p := range evt.LLMResponse.Content.Parts { + for _, p := range evt.Content.Parts { if p.FunctionCall != nil { hasFunctionCall = true if p.FunctionCall.Name != "exec" { @@ -601,11 +611,11 @@ func TestEventsAdapter_FunctionResponseReconstruction(t *testing.T) { // Verify assistant event has FunctionCall with ID assistantEvt := events[1] - if assistantEvt.LLMResponse.Content.Role != "assistant" { - t.Errorf("expected role 'assistant', got %q", assistantEvt.LLMResponse.Content.Role) + if assistantEvt.Content.Role != "assistant" { + t.Errorf("expected role 'assistant', got %q", assistantEvt.Content.Role) } var fc *genai.FunctionCall - for _, p := range assistantEvt.LLMResponse.Content.Parts { + for _, p := range assistantEvt.Content.Parts { if p.FunctionCall != nil { fc = p.FunctionCall } @@ -622,11 +632,11 @@ func TestEventsAdapter_FunctionResponseReconstruction(t *testing.T) { // Verify tool event has FunctionResponse toolEvt := events[2] - if toolEvt.LLMResponse.Content.Role != "function" { - t.Errorf("expected role 'function', got %q", toolEvt.LLMResponse.Content.Role) + if toolEvt.Content.Role != "function" { + t.Errorf("expected role 'function', got %q", toolEvt.Content.Role) } var fr *genai.FunctionResponse - for _, p := range toolEvt.LLMResponse.Content.Parts { + for _, p := range toolEvt.Content.Parts { if p.FunctionResponse != nil { fr = p.FunctionResponse } @@ -677,11 +687,11 @@ func TestEventsAdapter_FunctionResponseReconstruction(t *testing.T) { // Verify tool event has FunctionResponse reconstructed from legacy toolEvt := events[2] - if toolEvt.LLMResponse.Content.Role != "function" { - t.Errorf("expected role 'function', got %q", toolEvt.LLMResponse.Content.Role) + if toolEvt.Content.Role != "function" { + t.Errorf("expected role 'function', got %q", toolEvt.Content.Role) } var fr *genai.FunctionResponse - for _, p := range toolEvt.LLMResponse.Content.Parts { + for _, p := range toolEvt.Content.Parts { if p.FunctionResponse != nil { fr = p.FunctionResponse } @@ -723,7 +733,7 @@ func TestEventsAdapter_FunctionResponseReconstruction(t *testing.T) { toolEvt := events[1] // Should fall back to text since no context to reconstruct FunctionResponse hasText := false - for _, p := range toolEvt.LLMResponse.Content.Parts { + for _, p := range toolEvt.Content.Parts { if p.Text != "" { hasText = true } diff --git a/internal/agent/pii_presidio.go b/internal/agent/pii_presidio.go index e3a59e53..0bb62516 100644 --- a/internal/agent/pii_presidio.go +++ b/internal/agent/pii_presidio.go @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ func (d *PresidioDetector) Detect(text string) []PIIMatch { piiLogger.Debugw("presidio: request failed (graceful degradation)", "error", err) return nil } - defer resp.Body.Close() + defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }() if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { piiLogger.Warnw("presidio: non-200 status", "status", resp.StatusCode) @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ func (d *PresidioDetector) HealthCheck(ctx context.Context) error { if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("presidio health check: %w", err) } - defer resp.Body.Close() + defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }() if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { return fmt.Errorf("presidio unhealthy: status %d", resp.StatusCode) diff --git a/internal/app/app.go b/internal/app/app.go index a475b30d..0b56a2fc 100644 --- a/internal/app/app.go +++ b/internal/app/app.go @@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ import ( "fmt" "os" "path/filepath" + "sync" + "time" "go.uber.org/zap" @@ -13,9 +15,13 @@ import ( "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/approval" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/lifecycle" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/logging" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/sandbox" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/security" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/toolchain" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/wallet" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/tools/browser" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/tools/filesystem" x402pkg "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/x402" @@ -27,7 +33,8 @@ func logger() *zap.SugaredLogger { return logging.App() } func New(boot *bootstrap.Result) (*App, error) { cfg := boot.Config app := &App{ - Config: cfg, + Config: cfg, + registry: lifecycle.NewRegistry(), } // 1. Supervisor (holds provider secrets, exec tool) @@ -126,11 +133,7 @@ func New(boot *bootstrap.Result) (*App, error) { app.LearningEngine = kc.engine // Wrap base tools with learning observer (Engine or GraphEngine) - wrapped := make([]*agent.Tool, len(tools)) - for i, t := range tools { - wrapped[i] = wrapWithLearning(t, kc.observer) - } - tools = wrapped + tools = toolchain.ChainAll(tools, toolchain.WithLearning(kc.observer)) // Add meta-tools metaTools := buildMetaTools(kc.store, kc.engine, registry, cfg.Skill) @@ -188,6 +191,7 @@ func New(boot *bootstrap.Result) (*App, error) { // 5h. Payment tools (optional) pc := initPayment(cfg, store, app.Secrets) + var p2pc *p2pComponents var x402Interceptor *x402pkg.Interceptor if pc != nil { app.WalletProvider = pc.wallet @@ -201,6 +205,15 @@ func New(boot *bootstrap.Result) (*App, error) { } tools = append(tools, buildPaymentTools(pc, x402Interceptor)...) + + // 5h''. P2P networking (optional, requires wallet) + p2pc = initP2P(cfg, pc.wallet, pc, boot.DBClient, app.Secrets) + if p2pc != nil { + app.P2PNode = p2pc.node + // Wire P2P payment tool. + tools = append(tools, buildP2PTools(p2pc)...) + tools = append(tools, buildP2PPaymentTool(p2pc, pc)...) + } } // 5i. Librarian tools (optional) @@ -244,9 +257,19 @@ func New(boot *bootstrap.Result) (*App, error) { } else { composite.SetTTYFallback(&approval.TTYProvider{}) } + // P2P sessions use a dedicated fallback to prevent HeadlessProvider + // from auto-approving remote peer requests. + if cfg.P2P.Enabled { + composite.SetP2PFallback(&approval.TTYProvider{}) + logger().Info("P2P approval routed to TTY (HeadlessProvider blocked for remote peers)") + } app.ApprovalProvider = composite grantStore := approval.NewGrantStore() + // P2P grants expire after 1 hour to limit the window of implicit trust. + if cfg.P2P.Enabled { + grantStore.SetTTL(time.Hour) + } app.GrantStore = grantStore policy := cfg.Security.Interceptor.ApprovalPolicy @@ -254,9 +277,12 @@ func New(boot *bootstrap.Result) (*App, error) { policy = config.ApprovalPolicyDangerous } if policy != config.ApprovalPolicyNone { - for i, t := range tools { - tools[i] = wrapWithApproval(t, cfg.Security.Interceptor, composite, grantStore) + var limiter wallet.SpendingLimiter + if pc != nil { + limiter = pc.limiter } + tools = toolchain.ChainAll(tools, + toolchain.WithApproval(cfg.Security.Interceptor, composite, grantStore, limiter)) logger().Infow("tool approval enabled", "policy", string(policy)) } @@ -276,6 +302,110 @@ func New(boot *bootstrap.Result) (*App, error) { a2aServer.RegisterRoutes(app.Gateway.Router()) } + // 9c. P2P executor + REST API routes (if P2P enabled) + if p2pc != nil { + // Wire executor callback so remote peers can invoke local tools. + // Capture the tools slice in a closure for direct tool dispatch. + if p2pc.handler != nil { + toolIndex := make(map[string]*agent.Tool, len(tools)) + for _, t := range tools { + toolIndex[t.Name] = t + } + p2pc.handler.SetExecutor(func(ctx context.Context, toolName string, params map[string]interface{}) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + t, ok := toolIndex[toolName] + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("tool %q not found", toolName) + } + result, err := t.Handler(ctx, params) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // Coerce the result to map[string]interface{}. + switch v := result.(type) { + case map[string]interface{}: + return v, nil + default: + return map[string]interface{}{"result": v}, nil + } + }) + + // Wire sandbox executor for P2P tool isolation if enabled. + if cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Enabled { + sbxCfg := sandbox.Config{ + Enabled: true, + TimeoutPerTool: cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.TimeoutPerTool, + MaxMemoryMB: cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.MaxMemoryMB, + } + var sbxExec sandbox.Executor + if cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.Enabled { + containerExec, err := sandbox.NewContainerExecutor(sbxCfg, cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container) + if err != nil { + logger().Warnf("Container sandbox unavailable, falling back to subprocess: %v", err) + sbxExec = sandbox.NewSubprocessExecutor(sbxCfg) + } else { + sbxExec = containerExec + logger().Infof("P2P tool isolation enabled (container mode: %s)", containerExec.RuntimeName()) + } + } else { + sbxExec = sandbox.NewSubprocessExecutor(sbxCfg) + logger().Info("P2P tool isolation enabled (subprocess mode)") + } + p2pc.handler.SetSandboxExecutor(func(ctx context.Context, toolName string, params map[string]interface{}) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return sbxExec.Execute(ctx, toolName, params) + }) + } + + // Wire owner approval callback for inbound remote tool invocations. + if pc != nil { + p2pc.handler.SetApprovalFunc(func(ctx context.Context, peerDID, toolName string, params map[string]interface{}) (bool, error) { + // Never auto-approve dangerous tools via P2P. + // Unknown tools (not in index) are also treated as dangerous. + t, known := toolIndex[toolName] + if !known || t.SafetyLevel.IsDangerous() { + goto requireApproval + } + + // For non-dangerous paid tools, check if the amount is auto-approvable. + if p2pc.pricingFn != nil { + if priceStr, isFree := p2pc.pricingFn(toolName); !isFree { + amt, err := wallet.ParseUSDC(priceStr) + if err == nil { + if autoOK, checkErr := pc.limiter.IsAutoApprovable(ctx, amt); checkErr == nil && autoOK { + if grantStore != nil { + grantStore.Grant("p2p:"+peerDID, toolName) + } + return true, nil + } + } + } + } + + requireApproval: + // Fall back to composite approval provider. + req := approval.ApprovalRequest{ + ID: fmt.Sprintf("p2p-%d", time.Now().UnixNano()), + ToolName: toolName, + SessionKey: "p2p:" + peerDID, + Params: params, + Summary: fmt.Sprintf("Remote peer %s wants to invoke tool '%s'", truncate(peerDID, 16), toolName), + CreatedAt: time.Now(), + } + resp, err := composite.RequestApproval(ctx, req) + if err != nil { + return false, nil // fail-closed + } + // Record grant to avoid double-approval (handler approvalFn + tool's wrapWithApproval). + if resp.Approved && grantStore != nil { + grantStore.Grant("p2p:"+peerDID, toolName) + } + return resp.Approved, nil + }) + } + } + registerP2PRoutes(app.Gateway.Router(), p2pc) + logger().Info("P2P REST API routes registered") + } + // 10. Channels if err := app.initChannels(); err != nil { logger().Errorw("initialize channels", "error", err) @@ -306,136 +436,135 @@ func New(boot *bootstrap.Result) (*App, error) { }) } + // 16. Register lifecycle components for ordered startup/shutdown. + app.registerLifecycleComponents() + return app, nil } -// Start starts the application services -func (a *App) Start(ctx context.Context) error { - logger().Info("starting application") - - a.wg.Add(1) - go func() { - defer a.wg.Done() - if err := a.Gateway.Start(); err != nil { - logger().Errorw("gateway server error", "error", err) - } - }() - - // Start observational memory buffer if enabled +// registerLifecycleComponents registers all startable/stoppable components +// with the lifecycle registry using appropriate adapters and priorities. +func (a *App) registerLifecycleComponents() { + reg := a.registry + + // Gateway — runs blocking in a goroutine, shutdown via context. + reg.Register(lifecycle.NewFuncComponent("gateway", + func(_ context.Context, wg *sync.WaitGroup) error { + wg.Add(1) + go func() { + defer wg.Done() + if err := a.Gateway.Start(); err != nil { + logger().Errorw("gateway server error", "error", err) + } + }() + return nil + }, + func(ctx context.Context) error { + return a.Gateway.Shutdown(ctx) + }, + ), lifecycle.PriorityNetwork) + + // Buffers — all implement Startable (Start(*sync.WaitGroup) / Stop()). if a.MemoryBuffer != nil { - a.MemoryBuffer.Start(&a.wg) - logger().Info("observational memory buffer started") + reg.Register(lifecycle.NewSimpleComponent("memory-buffer", a.MemoryBuffer), lifecycle.PriorityBuffer) } - - // Start embedding buffer if enabled if a.EmbeddingBuffer != nil { - a.EmbeddingBuffer.Start(&a.wg) - logger().Info("embedding buffer started") + reg.Register(lifecycle.NewSimpleComponent("embedding-buffer", a.EmbeddingBuffer), lifecycle.PriorityBuffer) } - - // Start graph buffer if enabled if a.GraphBuffer != nil { - a.GraphBuffer.Start(&a.wg) - logger().Info("graph buffer started") + reg.Register(lifecycle.NewSimpleComponent("graph-buffer", a.GraphBuffer), lifecycle.PriorityBuffer) } - - // Start analysis buffer if enabled if a.AnalysisBuffer != nil { - a.AnalysisBuffer.Start(&a.wg) - logger().Info("conversation analysis buffer started") + reg.Register(lifecycle.NewSimpleComponent("analysis-buffer", a.AnalysisBuffer), lifecycle.PriorityBuffer) } - - // Start proactive librarian buffer if enabled if a.LibrarianProactiveBuffer != nil { - a.LibrarianProactiveBuffer.Start(&a.wg) - logger().Info("proactive librarian buffer started") + reg.Register(lifecycle.NewSimpleComponent("librarian-proactive-buffer", a.LibrarianProactiveBuffer), lifecycle.PriorityBuffer) } - // Start cron scheduler if enabled - if a.CronScheduler != nil { - if err := a.CronScheduler.Start(ctx); err != nil { - logger().Errorw("cron scheduler start error", "error", err) - } else { - logger().Info("cron scheduler started") - } + // P2P Node — Start(*sync.WaitGroup) error / Stop() error. + if a.P2PNode != nil { + reg.Register(lifecycle.NewFuncComponent("p2p-node", + func(_ context.Context, wg *sync.WaitGroup) error { + return a.P2PNode.Start(wg) + }, + func(_ context.Context) error { + return a.P2PNode.Stop() + }, + ), lifecycle.PriorityNetwork) } - logger().Info("starting channels...") - for _, ch := range a.Channels { - a.wg.Add(1) - go func(c Channel) { - defer a.wg.Done() - if err := c.Start(ctx); err != nil { - logger().Errorw("channel start error", "error", err) - } - }(ch) - } - - return nil -} - -// Stop stops the application services and waits for all goroutines to exit. -func (a *App) Stop(ctx context.Context) error { - logger().Info("stopping application") - - // Stop cron scheduler + // Cron Scheduler — Start(ctx) error / Stop(). if a.CronScheduler != nil { - a.CronScheduler.Stop() - logger().Info("cron scheduler stopped") - } - - // Stop background manager + reg.Register(lifecycle.NewFuncComponent("cron-scheduler", + func(ctx context.Context, _ *sync.WaitGroup) error { + return a.CronScheduler.Start(ctx) + }, + func(_ context.Context) error { + a.CronScheduler.Stop() + return nil + }, + ), lifecycle.PriorityAutomation) + } + + // Background Manager — no Start, only Shutdown(). if a.BackgroundManager != nil { - a.BackgroundManager.Shutdown() - logger().Info("background manager stopped") + reg.Register(lifecycle.NewFuncComponent("background-manager", + func(_ context.Context, _ *sync.WaitGroup) error { return nil }, + func(_ context.Context) error { + a.BackgroundManager.Shutdown() + return nil + }, + ), lifecycle.PriorityAutomation) } - // Stop workflow engine + // Workflow Engine — no Start, only Shutdown(). if a.WorkflowEngine != nil { - a.WorkflowEngine.Shutdown() - logger().Info("workflow engine stopped") - } - - // Signal gateway and channels to stop - if err := a.Gateway.Shutdown(ctx); err != nil { - logger().Warnw("gateway shutdown error", "error", err) - } - - for _, ch := range a.Channels { - ch.Stop() - } - - // Stop observational memory buffer - if a.MemoryBuffer != nil { - a.MemoryBuffer.Stop() - logger().Info("observational memory buffer stopped") - } - - // Stop embedding buffer - if a.EmbeddingBuffer != nil { - a.EmbeddingBuffer.Stop() - logger().Info("embedding buffer stopped") + reg.Register(lifecycle.NewFuncComponent("workflow-engine", + func(_ context.Context, _ *sync.WaitGroup) error { return nil }, + func(_ context.Context) error { + a.WorkflowEngine.Shutdown() + return nil + }, + ), lifecycle.PriorityAutomation) + } + + // Channels — each runs blocking in a goroutine, Stop() to signal. + for i, ch := range a.Channels { + ch := ch // capture for closure + name := fmt.Sprintf("channel-%d", i) + reg.Register(lifecycle.NewFuncComponent(name, + func(ctx context.Context, wg *sync.WaitGroup) error { + wg.Add(1) + go func() { + defer wg.Done() + if err := ch.Start(ctx); err != nil { + logger().Errorw("channel start error", "error", err) + } + }() + return nil + }, + func(_ context.Context) error { + ch.Stop() + return nil + }, + ), lifecycle.PriorityNetwork) } +} - // Stop analysis buffer - if a.AnalysisBuffer != nil { - a.AnalysisBuffer.Stop() - logger().Info("conversation analysis buffer stopped") - } +// Start starts the application services using the lifecycle registry. +func (a *App) Start(ctx context.Context) error { + logger().Info("starting application") + return a.registry.StartAll(ctx, &a.wg) +} - // Stop proactive librarian buffer - if a.LibrarianProactiveBuffer != nil { - a.LibrarianProactiveBuffer.Stop() - logger().Info("proactive librarian buffer stopped") - } +// Stop stops the application services and waits for all goroutines to exit. +func (a *App) Stop(ctx context.Context) error { + logger().Info("stopping application") - // Stop graph buffer - if a.GraphBuffer != nil { - a.GraphBuffer.Stop() - logger().Info("graph buffer stopped") - } + // Stop all lifecycle-managed components in reverse startup order. + _ = a.registry.StopAll(ctx) - // Wait for all background goroutines to finish + // Wait for all background goroutines to finish. done := make(chan struct{}) go func() { a.wg.Wait() @@ -449,6 +578,7 @@ func (a *App) Stop(ctx context.Context) error { logger().Warnw("shutdown timed out waiting for services", "error", ctx.Err()) } + // Close non-lifecycle resources (browser, stores) after all components stop. if a.Browser != nil { if err := a.Browser.Close(); err != nil { logger().Warnw("browser close error", "error", err) diff --git a/internal/app/p2p_routes.go b/internal/app/p2p_routes.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d6d8aa6d --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/app/p2p_routes.go @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +package app + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "net/http" + + "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/wallet" +) + +// writeJSON encodes v as JSON into the response writer. +func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, v interface{}) { + if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v); err != nil { + http.Error(w, "encode response: "+err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError) + } +} + +// registerP2PRoutes mounts P2P status endpoints on the gateway router. +// Endpoints are public (no auth) since they expose only node metadata. +func registerP2PRoutes(r chi.Router, p2pc *p2pComponents) { + r.Route("/api/p2p", func(r chi.Router) { + r.Get("/status", p2pStatusHandler(p2pc)) + r.Get("/peers", p2pPeersHandler(p2pc)) + r.Get("/identity", p2pIdentityHandler(p2pc)) + r.Get("/reputation", p2pReputationHandler(p2pc)) + r.Get("/pricing", p2pPricingHandler(p2pc)) + }) +} + +func p2pStatusHandler(p2pc *p2pComponents) http.HandlerFunc { + return func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) { + node := p2pc.node + + addrs := make([]string, 0, len(node.Multiaddrs())) + for _, a := range node.Multiaddrs() { + addrs = append(addrs, a.String()) + } + + resp := map[string]interface{}{ + "peerId": node.PeerID().String(), + "listenAddrs": addrs, + "connectedPeers": len(node.ConnectedPeers()), + "mdnsEnabled": p2pc.node.Host().Addrs() != nil, + } + + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") + writeJSON(w, resp) + } +} + +func p2pPeersHandler(p2pc *p2pComponents) http.HandlerFunc { + return func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) { + node := p2pc.node + connected := node.ConnectedPeers() + + type peerInfo struct { + PeerID string `json:"peerId"` + Addrs []string `json:"addrs"` + } + + peers := make([]peerInfo, 0, len(connected)) + for _, pid := range connected { + conns := node.Host().Network().ConnsToPeer(pid) + var addrs []string + for _, c := range conns { + addrs = append(addrs, c.RemoteMultiaddr().String()) + } + peers = append(peers, peerInfo{ + PeerID: pid.String(), + Addrs: addrs, + }) + } + + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") + writeJSON(w, map[string]interface{}{ + "peers": peers, + "count": len(peers), + }) + } +} + +func p2pReputationHandler(p2pc *p2pComponents) http.HandlerFunc { + return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") + + peerDID := r.URL.Query().Get("peer_did") + if peerDID == "" { + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) + writeJSON(w, map[string]string{ + "error": "peer_did query parameter is required", + }) + return + } + + if p2pc.reputation == nil { + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable) + writeJSON(w, map[string]string{ + "error": "reputation system not available", + }) + return + } + + details, err := p2pc.reputation.GetDetails(r.Context(), peerDID) + if err != nil { + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError) + writeJSON(w, map[string]string{ + "error": err.Error(), + }) + return + } + + if details == nil { + writeJSON(w, map[string]interface{}{ + "peerDid": peerDID, + "trustScore": 0.0, + "message": "no reputation record found", + }) + return + } + + writeJSON(w, details) + } +} + +func p2pPricingHandler(p2pc *p2pComponents) http.HandlerFunc { + return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") + + pricing := p2pc.pricingCfg + toolName := r.URL.Query().Get("tool") + + if toolName != "" { + price, ok := pricing.ToolPrices[toolName] + if !ok { + price = pricing.PerQuery + } + writeJSON(w, map[string]interface{}{ + "tool": toolName, + "price": price, + "currency": wallet.CurrencyUSDC, + }) + return + } + + writeJSON(w, map[string]interface{}{ + "enabled": pricing.Enabled, + "perQuery": pricing.PerQuery, + "toolPrices": pricing.ToolPrices, + "currency": wallet.CurrencyUSDC, + }) + } +} + +func p2pIdentityHandler(p2pc *p2pComponents) http.HandlerFunc { + return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") + + if p2pc.identity == nil { + writeJSON(w, map[string]interface{}{ + "did": nil, + "peerId": p2pc.node.PeerID().String(), + }) + return + } + + ctx := context.Background() + did, err := p2pc.identity.DID(ctx) + if err != nil { + w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError) + writeJSON(w, map[string]string{ + "error": err.Error(), + }) + return + } + + writeJSON(w, map[string]interface{}{ + "did": did.ID, + "peerId": p2pc.node.PeerID().String(), + }) + } +} diff --git a/internal/app/p2p_routes_test.go b/internal/app/p2p_routes_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8cc74669 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/app/p2p_routes_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +package app + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "net/http" + "net/http/httptest" + "testing" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +// --- p2pPricingHandler --- + +func TestP2PPricingHandler_AllPrices(t *testing.T) { + p2pc := &p2pComponents{ + pricingCfg: config.P2PPricingConfig{ + Enabled: true, + PerQuery: "0.50", + ToolPrices: map[string]string{"web_search": "1.00", "code_exec": "2.00"}, + }, + } + + handler := p2pPricingHandler(p2pc) + req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/p2p/pricing", nil) + w := httptest.NewRecorder() + handler.ServeHTTP(w, req) + + assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code) + assert.Equal(t, "application/json", w.Header().Get("Content-Type")) + + var resp map[string]interface{} + err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&resp) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, true, resp["enabled"]) + assert.Equal(t, "0.50", resp["perQuery"]) + assert.Equal(t, "USDC", resp["currency"]) + + toolPrices, ok := resp["toolPrices"].(map[string]interface{}) + require.True(t, ok) + assert.Equal(t, "1.00", toolPrices["web_search"]) + assert.Equal(t, "2.00", toolPrices["code_exec"]) +} + +func TestP2PPricingHandler_SpecificTool(t *testing.T) { + p2pc := &p2pComponents{ + pricingCfg: config.P2PPricingConfig{ + PerQuery: "0.50", + ToolPrices: map[string]string{"web_search": "1.00"}, + }, + } + + handler := p2pPricingHandler(p2pc) + req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/p2p/pricing?tool=web_search", nil) + w := httptest.NewRecorder() + handler.ServeHTTP(w, req) + + assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code) + + var resp map[string]interface{} + err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&resp) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "web_search", resp["tool"]) + assert.Equal(t, "1.00", resp["price"]) + assert.Equal(t, "USDC", resp["currency"]) +} + +func TestP2PPricingHandler_UnknownToolFallsBackToPerQuery(t *testing.T) { + p2pc := &p2pComponents{ + pricingCfg: config.P2PPricingConfig{ + PerQuery: "0.50", + ToolPrices: map[string]string{"web_search": "1.00"}, + }, + } + + handler := p2pPricingHandler(p2pc) + req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/p2p/pricing?tool=unknown_tool", nil) + w := httptest.NewRecorder() + handler.ServeHTTP(w, req) + + assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code) + + var resp map[string]interface{} + err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&resp) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "unknown_tool", resp["tool"]) + assert.Equal(t, "0.50", resp["price"], "should fall back to perQuery price") +} + +func TestP2PPricingHandler_Disabled(t *testing.T) { + p2pc := &p2pComponents{ + pricingCfg: config.P2PPricingConfig{ + Enabled: false, + PerQuery: "0.00", + }, + } + + handler := p2pPricingHandler(p2pc) + req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/p2p/pricing", nil) + w := httptest.NewRecorder() + handler.ServeHTTP(w, req) + + assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code) + + var resp map[string]interface{} + err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&resp) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, false, resp["enabled"]) +} + +// --- p2pReputationHandler --- + +func TestP2PReputationHandler_MissingPeerDID(t *testing.T) { + p2pc := &p2pComponents{} + + handler := p2pReputationHandler(p2pc) + req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/p2p/reputation", nil) + w := httptest.NewRecorder() + handler.ServeHTTP(w, req) + + assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code) + + var resp map[string]string + err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&resp) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, resp["error"], "peer_did") +} + +func TestP2PReputationHandler_NilReputationSystem(t *testing.T) { + p2pc := &p2pComponents{ + reputation: nil, + } + + handler := p2pReputationHandler(p2pc) + req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/p2p/reputation?peer_did=did:lango:abc123", nil) + w := httptest.NewRecorder() + handler.ServeHTTP(w, req) + + assert.Equal(t, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, w.Code) + + var resp map[string]string + err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&resp) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, resp["error"], "not available") +} + +// --- p2pIdentityHandler --- + +func TestP2PIdentityHandler_NilIdentity(t *testing.T) { + // When identity is nil but node is also nil, handler will panic at node.PeerID(). + // We test only the nil identity path by providing a minimal node. + // Since creating a real node requires libp2p, this test documents the expected behavior. + t.Skip("requires libp2p node; tested via integration tests") +} diff --git a/internal/app/tools.go b/internal/app/tools.go index 01895695..41673820 100644 --- a/internal/app/tools.go +++ b/internal/app/tools.go @@ -2,42 +2,17 @@ package app import ( "context" - "encoding/json" "fmt" - "os" - "path/filepath" "strings" - "time" - - "errors" - - "github.com/google/uuid" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/agent" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/approval" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/background" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" - cronpkg "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cron" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/embedding" - entknowledge "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/knowledge" - entlearning "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/learning" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/graph" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/knowledge" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/learning" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/librarian" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/memory" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/security" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/skill" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/supervisor" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/toolchain" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/tools/browser" - toolcrypto "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/tools/crypto" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/tools/filesystem" - toolpayment "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/tools/payment" - toolsecrets "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/tools/secrets" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/types" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/workflow" - x402pkg "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/x402" ) // buildTools creates the set of tools available to the agent. @@ -63,15 +38,17 @@ func buildTools(sv *supervisor.Supervisor, fsCfg filesystem.Config, browserSM *b return tools } -// blockLangoExec checks if the command attempts to invoke the lango CLI for -// automation features that have in-process equivalents. Returns a guidance -// message if blocked, or empty string if allowed. +// blockLangoExec checks if the command attempts to invoke the lango CLI. +// ALL lango CLI commands require passphrase authentication via bootstrap and +// will fail when spawned as a subprocess (non-interactive stdin). Returns a +// guidance message if blocked, or empty string if allowed. func blockLangoExec(cmd string, automationAvailable map[string]bool) string { lower := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(cmd)) + // --- Phase 1: Subcommands with in-process tool equivalents --- type guard struct { prefix string - feature string + feature string // key in automationAvailable; empty = always available tools string } guards := []guard{ @@ -79,15 +56,20 @@ func blockLangoExec(cmd string, automationAvailable map[string]bool) string { {"lango bg", "background", "bg_submit, bg_status, bg_list, bg_result, bg_cancel"}, {"lango background", "background", "bg_submit, bg_status, bg_list, bg_result, bg_cancel"}, {"lango workflow", "workflow", "workflow_run, workflow_status, workflow_list, workflow_cancel, workflow_save"}, + {"lango graph", "", "graph_traverse, graph_query, rag_retrieve"}, + {"lango memory", "", "memory_list_observations, memory_list_reflections"}, + {"lango p2p", "", "p2p_status, p2p_connect, p2p_disconnect, p2p_peers, p2p_query, p2p_discover, p2p_firewall_rules, p2p_firewall_add, p2p_firewall_remove, p2p_reputation, p2p_pay, p2p_price_query"}, + {"lango security", "", "crypto_encrypt, crypto_decrypt, crypto_sign, crypto_hash, crypto_keys, secrets_store, secrets_get, secrets_list, secrets_delete"}, + {"lango payment", "", "payment_send, payment_create_wallet, payment_x402_fetch"}, } for _, g := range guards { if strings.HasPrefix(lower, g.prefix) { - if automationAvailable[g.feature] { + if g.feature == "" || automationAvailable[g.feature] { return fmt.Sprintf( - "Do not use exec to run '%s' — use the built-in %s tools instead (%s). "+ - "Spawning a new lango process requires passphrase authentication and will fail.", - g.prefix, g.feature, g.tools) + "Do not use exec to run '%s' — use the built-in tools instead (%s). "+ + "Spawning a new lango process requires passphrase authentication and will fail in non-interactive mode.", + g.prefix, g.tools) } return fmt.Sprintf( "Cannot run '%s' via exec — spawning a new lango process requires passphrase authentication. "+ @@ -96,6 +78,13 @@ func blockLangoExec(cmd string, automationAvailable map[string]bool) string { } } + // --- Phase 2: Catch-all for any remaining lango subcommand --- + if strings.HasPrefix(lower, "lango ") || lower == "lango" { + return "Do not use exec to run the lango CLI — every lango command requires passphrase authentication " + + "via bootstrap and will fail when spawned as a subprocess. " + + "Use the built-in tools for the operation you need, or ask the user to run this command directly in their terminal." + } + // Redirect skill-related git clone to import_skill tool. if strings.HasPrefix(lower, "git clone") && strings.Contains(lower, "skill") { return "Use the built-in import_skill tool instead of manual git clone — " + @@ -114,1080 +103,10 @@ func blockLangoExec(cmd string, automationAvailable map[string]bool) string { return "" } -func buildExecTools(sv *supervisor.Supervisor, automationAvailable map[string]bool) []*agent.Tool { - return []*agent.Tool{ - { - Name: "exec", - Description: "Execute shell commands", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "command": map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "string", - "description": "The shell command to execute", - }, - }, - "required": []string{"command"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - cmd, ok := params["command"].(string) - if !ok { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing command parameter") - } - if msg := blockLangoExec(cmd, automationAvailable); msg != "" { - return map[string]interface{}{"blocked": true, "message": msg}, nil - } - return sv.ExecuteTool(ctx, cmd) - }, - }, - { - Name: "exec_bg", - Description: "Execute a shell command in the background", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "command": map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "string", - "description": "The shell command to execute", - }, - }, - "required": []string{"command"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - cmd, ok := params["command"].(string) - if !ok { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing command parameter") - } - if msg := blockLangoExec(cmd, automationAvailable); msg != "" { - return map[string]interface{}{"blocked": true, "message": msg}, nil - } - return sv.StartBackground(cmd) - }, - }, - { - Name: "exec_status", - Description: "Check the status of a background process", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "id": map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "string", - "description": "The background process ID returned by exec_bg", - }, - }, - "required": []string{"id"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - id, ok := params["id"].(string) - if !ok { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing id parameter") - } - return sv.GetBackgroundStatus(id) - }, - }, - { - Name: "exec_stop", - Description: "Stop a background process", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "id": map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "string", - "description": "The background process ID returned by exec_bg", - }, - }, - "required": []string{"id"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - id, ok := params["id"].(string) - if !ok { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing id parameter") - } - return nil, sv.StopBackground(id) - }, - }, - } -} - -func buildFilesystemTools(fsTool *filesystem.Tool) []*agent.Tool { - return []*agent.Tool{ - { - Name: "fs_read", - Description: "Read a file", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "path": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The file path to read"}, - }, - "required": []string{"path"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - path, ok := params["path"].(string) - if !ok { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing path parameter") - } - return fsTool.Read(path) - }, - }, - { - Name: "fs_list", - Description: "List contents of a directory", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "path": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The directory path to list"}, - }, - "required": []string{"path"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - path, _ := params["path"].(string) - if path == "" { - path = "." - } - return fsTool.ListDir(path) - }, - }, - { - Name: "fs_write", - Description: "Write content to a file", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "path": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The file path to write to"}, - "content": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The content to write"}, - }, - "required": []string{"path", "content"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - path, _ := params["path"].(string) - content, _ := params["content"].(string) - if path == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing path parameter") - } - return nil, fsTool.Write(path, content) - }, - }, - { - Name: "fs_edit", - Description: "Edit a file by replacing a line range", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "path": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The file path to edit"}, - "startLine": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": "The starting line number (1-indexed)"}, - "endLine": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": "The ending line number (inclusive)"}, - "content": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The new content for the specified range"}, - }, - "required": []string{"path", "startLine", "endLine", "content"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - path, _ := params["path"].(string) - content, _ := params["content"].(string) - if path == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing path parameter") - } - - var startLine, endLine int - if sl, ok := params["startLine"].(float64); ok { - startLine = int(sl) - } else if sl, ok := params["startLine"].(int); ok { - startLine = sl - } - if el, ok := params["endLine"].(float64); ok { - endLine = int(el) - } else if el, ok := params["endLine"].(int); ok { - endLine = el - } - - return nil, fsTool.Edit(path, startLine, endLine, content) - }, - }, - { - Name: "fs_mkdir", - Description: "Create a directory", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "path": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The directory path to create"}, - }, - "required": []string{"path"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - path, _ := params["path"].(string) - if path == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing path parameter") - } - return nil, fsTool.Mkdir(path) - }, - }, - { - Name: "fs_delete", - Description: "Delete a file or directory", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "path": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The path to delete"}, - }, - "required": []string{"path"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - path, _ := params["path"].(string) - if path == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing path parameter") - } - return nil, fsTool.Delete(path) - }, - }, - } -} - -func buildBrowserTools(sm *browser.SessionManager) []*agent.Tool { - return []*agent.Tool{ - { - Name: "browser_navigate", - Description: "Navigate the browser to a URL and return the page title, URL, and a text snippet", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "url": map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "string", - "description": "The URL to navigate to", - }, - }, - "required": []string{"url"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - url, ok := params["url"].(string) - if !ok || url == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing url parameter") - } - - sessionID, err := sm.EnsureSession() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - if err := sm.Tool().Navigate(ctx, sessionID, url); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - return sm.Tool().GetSnapshot(sessionID) - }, - }, - { - Name: "browser_action", - Description: "Perform an action on the current browser page: click, type, eval, get_text, get_element_info, or wait", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "action": map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "string", - "description": "The action to perform", - "enum": []string{"click", "type", "eval", "get_text", "get_element_info", "wait"}, - }, - "selector": map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "string", - "description": "CSS selector for the target element (required for click, type, get_text, get_element_info, wait)", - }, - "text": map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "string", - "description": "Text to type (required for type action) or JavaScript to evaluate (required for eval action)", - }, - "timeout": map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "integer", - "description": "Timeout in seconds for wait action (default: 10)", - }, - }, - "required": []string{"action"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - action, ok := params["action"].(string) - if !ok || action == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing action parameter") - } - - sessionID, err := sm.EnsureSession() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - selector, _ := params["selector"].(string) - text, _ := params["text"].(string) - - switch action { - case "click": - if selector == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("selector required for click action") - } - return nil, sm.Tool().Click(ctx, sessionID, selector) - - case "type": - if selector == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("selector required for type action") - } - if text == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("text required for type action") - } - return nil, sm.Tool().Type(ctx, sessionID, selector, text) - - case "eval": - if text == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("text (JavaScript) required for eval action") - } - return sm.Tool().Eval(sessionID, text) - - case "get_text": - if selector == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("selector required for get_text action") - } - return sm.Tool().GetText(sessionID, selector) - - case "get_element_info": - if selector == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("selector required for get_element_info action") - } - return sm.Tool().GetElementInfo(sessionID, selector) - - case "wait": - if selector == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("selector required for wait action") - } - timeout := 10 * time.Second - if t, ok := params["timeout"].(float64); ok && t > 0 { - timeout = time.Duration(t) * time.Second - } - return nil, sm.Tool().WaitForSelector(ctx, sessionID, selector, timeout) - - default: - return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown action: %s", action) - } - }, - }, - { - Name: "browser_screenshot", - Description: "Capture a screenshot of the current browser page as base64 PNG", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "fullPage": map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "boolean", - "description": "Capture the full scrollable page (default: false)", - }, - }, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - sessionID, err := sm.EnsureSession() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - fullPage, _ := params["fullPage"].(bool) - return sm.Tool().Screenshot(sessionID, fullPage) - }, - }, - } -} - -// buildMetaTools creates knowledge/learning/skill meta-tools for the agent. -func buildMetaTools(store *knowledge.Store, engine *learning.Engine, registry *skill.Registry, skillCfg config.SkillConfig) []*agent.Tool { - return []*agent.Tool{ - { - Name: "save_knowledge", - Description: "Save a piece of knowledge (user rule, definition, preference, or fact) for future reference", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "key": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Unique key for this knowledge entry"}, - "category": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Category: rule, definition, preference, or fact", "enum": []string{"rule", "definition", "preference", "fact"}}, - "content": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The knowledge content to save"}, - "tags": map[string]interface{}{"type": "array", "items": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "description": "Optional tags for categorization"}, - "source": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Where this knowledge came from"}, - }, - "required": []string{"key", "category", "content"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - key, _ := params["key"].(string) - category, _ := params["category"].(string) - content, _ := params["content"].(string) - source, _ := params["source"].(string) - - if key == "" || category == "" || content == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("key, category, and content are required") - } - - var tags []string - if rawTags, ok := params["tags"].([]interface{}); ok { - for _, t := range rawTags { - if s, ok := t.(string); ok { - tags = append(tags, s) - } - } - } - - entry := knowledge.KnowledgeEntry{ - Key: key, - Category: entknowledge.Category(category), - Content: content, - Tags: tags, - Source: source, - } - - if err := store.SaveKnowledge(ctx, "", entry); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("save knowledge: %w", err) - } - - if err := store.SaveAuditLog(ctx, knowledge.AuditEntry{ - Action: "knowledge_save", - Actor: "agent", - Target: key, - }); err != nil { - logger().Warnw("audit log save failed", "action", "knowledge_save", "error", err) - } - - return map[string]interface{}{ - "status": "saved", - "key": key, - "message": fmt.Sprintf("Knowledge '%s' saved successfully", key), - }, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "search_knowledge", - Description: "Search stored knowledge entries by query and optional category", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "query": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Search query"}, - "category": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Optional category filter: rule, definition, preference, or fact"}, - }, - "required": []string{"query"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - query, _ := params["query"].(string) - category, _ := params["category"].(string) - - entries, err := store.SearchKnowledge(ctx, query, category, 10) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("search knowledge: %w", err) - } - - return map[string]interface{}{ - "results": entries, - "count": len(entries), - }, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "save_learning", - Description: "Save a diagnosed error pattern and its fix for future reference", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "trigger": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "What triggered this learning (e.g., tool name or action)"}, - "error_pattern": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The error pattern to match"}, - "diagnosis": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Diagnosis of the error cause"}, - "fix": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The fix or workaround"}, - "category": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Category: tool_error, provider_error, user_correction, timeout, permission, general"}, - }, - "required": []string{"trigger", "fix"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - trigger, _ := params["trigger"].(string) - errorPattern, _ := params["error_pattern"].(string) - diagnosis, _ := params["diagnosis"].(string) - fix, _ := params["fix"].(string) - category, _ := params["category"].(string) - - if trigger == "" || fix == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("trigger and fix are required") - } - if category == "" { - category = "general" - } - - entry := knowledge.LearningEntry{ - Trigger: trigger, - ErrorPattern: errorPattern, - Diagnosis: diagnosis, - Fix: fix, - Category: entlearning.Category(category), - } - - if err := store.SaveLearning(ctx, "", entry); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("save learning: %w", err) - } - - if err := store.SaveAuditLog(ctx, knowledge.AuditEntry{ - Action: "learning_save", - Actor: "agent", - Target: trigger, - }); err != nil { - logger().Warnw("audit log save failed", "action", "learning_save", "error", err) - } - - return map[string]interface{}{ - "status": "saved", - "message": fmt.Sprintf("Learning for '%s' saved successfully", trigger), - }, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "search_learnings", - Description: "Search stored learnings by error pattern or trigger", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "query": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Search query (error message or trigger)"}, - "category": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Optional category filter"}, - }, - "required": []string{"query"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - query, _ := params["query"].(string) - category, _ := params["category"].(string) - - entries, err := store.SearchLearnings(ctx, query, category, 10) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("search learnings: %w", err) - } - - return map[string]interface{}{ - "results": entries, - "count": len(entries), - }, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "create_skill", - Description: "Create a new reusable skill from a multi-step workflow, script, or template", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "name": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Unique name for the skill"}, - "description": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Description of what the skill does"}, - "type": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Skill type: composite, script, or template", "enum": []string{"composite", "script", "template"}}, - "definition": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "JSON string of the skill definition"}, - "parameters": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Optional JSON string of parameter schema"}, - }, - "required": []string{"name", "description", "type", "definition"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - name, _ := params["name"].(string) - description, _ := params["description"].(string) - skillType, _ := params["type"].(string) - definitionStr, _ := params["definition"].(string) - - if name == "" || description == "" || skillType == "" || definitionStr == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("name, description, type, and definition are required") - } - - var definition map[string]interface{} - if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(definitionStr), &definition); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse definition JSON: %w", err) - } - - var parameters map[string]interface{} - if paramStr, ok := params["parameters"].(string); ok && paramStr != "" { - if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(paramStr), ¶meters); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse parameters JSON: %w", err) - } - } - - entry := skill.SkillEntry{ - Name: name, - Description: description, - Type: skill.SkillType(skillType), - Definition: definition, - Parameters: parameters, - Status: skill.SkillStatusActive, - CreatedBy: "agent", - RequiresApproval: false, - } - - if registry == nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("skill system is not enabled") - } - - if err := registry.CreateSkill(ctx, entry); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("create skill: %w", err) - } - - if err := registry.ActivateSkill(ctx, name); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("activate skill: %w", err) - } - - if err := store.SaveAuditLog(ctx, knowledge.AuditEntry{ - Action: "skill_create", - Actor: "agent", - Target: name, - Details: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": skillType, - "status": "active", - }, - }); err != nil { - logger().Warnw("audit log save failed", "action", "skill_create", "error", err) - } - - return map[string]interface{}{ - "status": "active", - "name": name, - "message": fmt.Sprintf("Skill '%s' created and activated", name), - }, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "list_skills", - Description: "List all active skills", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - if registry == nil { - return map[string]interface{}{"skills": []interface{}{}, "count": 0}, nil - } - - skills, err := registry.ListActiveSkills(ctx) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("list skills: %w", err) - } - - return map[string]interface{}{ - "skills": skills, - "count": len(skills), - }, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "import_skill", - Description: "Import skills from a GitHub repository or URL. " + - "Supports bulk import (all skills from a repo) or single skill import.", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "url": map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "string", - "description": "GitHub repository URL or direct URL to a SKILL.md file", - }, - "skill_name": map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "string", - "description": "Optional: import only this specific skill from the repo", - }, - }, - "required": []string{"url"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - if registry == nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("skill system is not enabled") - } - - url, _ := params["url"].(string) - skillName, _ := params["skill_name"].(string) - - if url == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("url is required") - } - - importer := skill.NewImporter(logger()) - - if skill.IsGitHubURL(url) { - ref, err := skill.ParseGitHubURL(url) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse GitHub URL: %w", err) - } - - if skillName != "" { - // Single skill import from GitHub (with resource files). - entry, err := importer.ImportSingleWithResources(ctx, ref, skillName, registry.Store()) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("import skill %q: %w", skillName, err) - } - if err := registry.LoadSkills(ctx); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("reload skills: %w", err) - } - go func() { - auditCtx, auditCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second) - defer auditCancel() - if err := store.SaveAuditLog(auditCtx, knowledge.AuditEntry{ - Action: "skill_import", - Actor: "agent", - Target: entry.Name, - Details: map[string]interface{}{ - "source": url, - "type": entry.Type, - }, - }); err != nil { - logger().Warnw("audit log save failed", "action", "skill_import", "error", err) - } - }() - return map[string]interface{}{ - "status": "imported", - "name": entry.Name, - "type": entry.Type, - "message": fmt.Sprintf("Skill '%s' imported from %s", entry.Name, url), - }, nil - } - - // Bulk import from GitHub repo. - importCfg := skill.ImportConfig{ - MaxSkills: skillCfg.MaxBulkImport, - Concurrency: skillCfg.ImportConcurrency, - Timeout: skillCfg.ImportTimeout, - } - result, err := importer.ImportFromRepo(ctx, ref, registry.Store(), importCfg) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("import from repo: %w", err) - } - if err := registry.LoadSkills(ctx); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("reload skills: %w", err) - } - go func() { - auditCtx, auditCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second) - defer auditCancel() - if err := store.SaveAuditLog(auditCtx, knowledge.AuditEntry{ - Action: "skill_import_bulk", - Actor: "agent", - Target: url, - Details: map[string]interface{}{ - "imported": result.Imported, - "skipped": result.Skipped, - "errors": result.Errors, - }, - }); err != nil { - logger().Warnw("audit log save failed", "action", "skill_import_bulk", "error", err) - } - }() - return map[string]interface{}{ - "status": "completed", - "imported": result.Imported, - "skipped": result.Skipped, - "errors": result.Errors, - "message": fmt.Sprintf("Imported %d skills, skipped %d, errors %d", len(result.Imported), len(result.Skipped), len(result.Errors)), - }, nil - } - - // Direct URL import. - raw, err := importer.FetchFromURL(ctx, url) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("fetch from URL: %w", err) - } - entry, err := importer.ImportSingle(ctx, raw, url, registry.Store()) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("import skill: %w", err) - } - if err := registry.LoadSkills(ctx); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("reload skills: %w", err) - } - go func() { - auditCtx, auditCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second) - defer auditCancel() - if err := store.SaveAuditLog(auditCtx, knowledge.AuditEntry{ - Action: "skill_import", - Actor: "agent", - Target: entry.Name, - Details: map[string]interface{}{ - "source": url, - "type": entry.Type, - }, - }); err != nil { - logger().Warnw("audit log save failed", "action", "skill_import", "error", err) - } - }() - return map[string]interface{}{ - "status": "imported", - "name": entry.Name, - "type": entry.Type, - "message": fmt.Sprintf("Skill '%s' imported from %s", entry.Name, url), - }, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "learning_stats", - Description: "Get statistics and briefing about stored learning data including total count, category distribution, average confidence, and date range", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - stats, err := store.GetLearningStats(ctx) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("get learning stats: %w", err) - } - return stats, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "learning_cleanup", - Description: "Delete learning entries by criteria (age, confidence, category). Use dry_run=true (default) to preview, dry_run=false to actually delete.", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "category": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Delete only entries in this category"}, - "max_confidence": map[string]interface{}{"type": "number", "description": "Delete entries with confidence at or below this value"}, - "older_than_days": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": "Delete entries older than N days"}, - "id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Delete a specific entry by UUID"}, - "dry_run": map[string]interface{}{"type": "boolean", "description": "If true (default), only return count of entries that would be deleted"}, - }, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - // Single entry delete by ID. - if idStr, ok := params["id"].(string); ok && idStr != "" { - id, err := uuid.Parse(idStr) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid id: %w", err) - } - dryRun := true - if dr, ok := params["dry_run"].(bool); ok { - dryRun = dr - } - if dryRun { - return map[string]interface{}{"would_delete": 1, "dry_run": true}, nil - } - if err := store.DeleteLearning(ctx, id); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("delete learning: %w", err) - } - return map[string]interface{}{"deleted": 1, "dry_run": false}, nil - } - - // Bulk delete by criteria. - category, _ := params["category"].(string) - var maxConfidence float64 - if mc, ok := params["max_confidence"].(float64); ok { - maxConfidence = mc - } - var olderThan time.Time - if days, ok := params["older_than_days"].(float64); ok && days > 0 { - olderThan = time.Now().AddDate(0, 0, -int(days)) - } - - dryRun := true - if dr, ok := params["dry_run"].(bool); ok { - dryRun = dr - } - - if dryRun { - // Count matching entries without deleting. - _, total, err := store.ListLearnings(ctx, category, 0, olderThan, 0, 0) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("count learnings: %w", err) - } - // Apply maxConfidence filter for count (ListLearnings uses minConfidence). - if maxConfidence > 0 { - _, filteredTotal, err := store.ListLearnings(ctx, category, 0, olderThan, 1, 0) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("count filtered learnings: %w", err) - } - _ = filteredTotal - } - return map[string]interface{}{"would_delete": total, "dry_run": true}, nil - } - - n, err := store.DeleteLearningsWhere(ctx, category, maxConfidence, olderThan) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("delete learnings: %w", err) - } - return map[string]interface{}{"deleted": n, "dry_run": false}, nil - }, - }, - } -} - // wrapBrowserHandler wraps a browser tool handler with panic recovery and auto-reconnect. -// On panic, it converts to an error. On ErrBrowserPanic, it closes the session and retries once. +// Delegates to toolchain.WithBrowserRecovery. func wrapBrowserHandler(t *agent.Tool, sm *browser.SessionManager) *agent.Tool { - original := t.Handler - return &agent.Tool{ - Name: t.Name, - Description: t.Description, - Parameters: t.Parameters, - SafetyLevel: t.SafetyLevel, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (result interface{}, retErr error) { - defer func() { - if r := recover(); r != nil { - logger().Errorw("browser tool panic recovered", "tool", t.Name, "panic", r) - retErr = fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", browser.ErrBrowserPanic, r) - } - }() - - result, retErr = original(ctx, params) - if retErr != nil && errors.Is(retErr, browser.ErrBrowserPanic) { - // Connection likely dead — close and retry once - logger().Warnw("browser panic detected, closing session and retrying", "tool", t.Name, "error", retErr) - _ = sm.Close() - result, retErr = original(ctx, params) - } - return - }, - } -} - -// wrapWithLearning wraps a tool's handler to call the learning observer after each execution. -func wrapWithLearning(t *agent.Tool, observer learning.ToolResultObserver) *agent.Tool { - original := t.Handler - return &agent.Tool{ - Name: t.Name, - Description: t.Description, - Parameters: t.Parameters, - SafetyLevel: t.SafetyLevel, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - result, err := original(ctx, params) - sessionKey := session.SessionKeyFromContext(ctx) - observer.OnToolResult(ctx, sessionKey, t.Name, params, result, err) - return result, err - }, - } -} - -// buildCryptoTools wraps crypto.Tool methods as agent tools. -func buildCryptoTools(crypto security.CryptoProvider, keys *security.KeyRegistry, refs *security.RefStore, scanner *agent.SecretScanner) []*agent.Tool { - ct := toolcrypto.New(crypto, keys, refs, scanner) - return []*agent.Tool{ - { - Name: "crypto_encrypt", - Description: "Encrypt data using a registered key", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "data": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The data to encrypt"}, - "keyId": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Key ID to use (default: default key)"}, - }, - "required": []string{"data"}, - }, - Handler: ct.Encrypt, - }, - { - Name: "crypto_decrypt", - Description: "Decrypt data using a registered key. Returns an opaque {{decrypt:id}} reference token. The decrypted value never enters the agent context.", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "ciphertext": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Base64-encoded ciphertext to decrypt"}, - "keyId": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Key ID to use (default: default key)"}, - }, - "required": []string{"ciphertext"}, - }, - Handler: ct.Decrypt, - }, - { - Name: "crypto_sign", - Description: "Generate a digital signature for data", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "data": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The data to sign"}, - "keyId": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Key ID to use"}, - }, - "required": []string{"data"}, - }, - Handler: ct.Sign, - }, - { - Name: "crypto_hash", - Description: "Compute a cryptographic hash of data", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "data": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The data to hash"}, - "algorithm": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Hash algorithm: sha256 or sha512", "enum": []string{"sha256", "sha512"}}, - }, - "required": []string{"data"}, - }, - Handler: ct.Hash, - }, - { - Name: "crypto_keys", - Description: "List all registered cryptographic keys", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{}, - }, - Handler: ct.Keys, - }, - } -} - -// buildSecretsTools wraps secrets.Tool methods as agent tools. -func buildSecretsTools(secretsStore *security.SecretsStore, refs *security.RefStore, scanner *agent.SecretScanner) []*agent.Tool { - st := toolsecrets.New(secretsStore, refs, scanner) - return []*agent.Tool{ - { - Name: "secrets_store", - Description: "Encrypt and store a secret value", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "name": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Unique name for the secret"}, - "value": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The secret value to store"}, - }, - "required": []string{"name", "value"}, - }, - Handler: st.Store, - }, - { - Name: "secrets_get", - Description: "Retrieve a stored secret as a reference token. Returns an opaque {{secret:name}} token that is resolved at execution time by exec tools. The actual secret value never enters the agent context.", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "name": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Name of the secret to retrieve"}, - }, - "required": []string{"name"}, - }, - Handler: st.Get, - }, - { - Name: "secrets_list", - Description: "List all stored secrets (metadata only, no values)", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{}, - }, - Handler: st.List, - }, - { - Name: "secrets_delete", - Description: "Delete a stored secret", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "name": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Name of the secret to delete"}, - }, - "required": []string{"name"}, - }, - Handler: st.Delete, - }, - } + return toolchain.Chain(t, toolchain.WithBrowserRecovery(sm)) } // detectChannelFromContext extracts the delivery target from the session key in context. @@ -1209,926 +128,18 @@ func detectChannelFromContext(ctx context.Context) string { return "" } -// buildCronTools creates tools for managing scheduled cron jobs. -func buildCronTools(scheduler *cronpkg.Scheduler, defaultDeliverTo []string) []*agent.Tool { - return []*agent.Tool{ - { - Name: "cron_add", - Description: "Create a new scheduled cron job that runs an agent prompt on a recurring schedule", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "name": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Unique name for the cron job"}, - "schedule_type": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Schedule type: cron (crontab), every (interval), or at (one-time)", "enum": []string{"cron", "every", "at"}}, - "schedule": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Schedule value: crontab expr for cron, Go duration for every (e.g. 1h30m), RFC3339 datetime for at"}, - "prompt": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The prompt to execute on each run"}, - "session_mode": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Session mode: isolated (new session each run) or main (shared session)", "enum": []string{"isolated", "main"}}, - "deliver_to": map[string]interface{}{"type": "array", "items": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "description": "Channels to deliver results to (e.g. telegram:CHAT_ID, discord:CHANNEL_ID, slack:CHANNEL_ID)"}, - }, - "required": []string{"name", "schedule_type", "schedule", "prompt"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - name, _ := params["name"].(string) - scheduleType, _ := params["schedule_type"].(string) - schedule, _ := params["schedule"].(string) - prompt, _ := params["prompt"].(string) - sessionMode, _ := params["session_mode"].(string) - - if name == "" || scheduleType == "" || schedule == "" || prompt == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("name, schedule_type, schedule, and prompt are required") - } - if sessionMode == "" { - sessionMode = "isolated" - } - - var deliverTo []string - if raw, ok := params["deliver_to"].([]interface{}); ok { - for _, v := range raw { - if s, ok := v.(string); ok { - deliverTo = append(deliverTo, s) - } - } - } - - // Auto-detect channel from session context. - if len(deliverTo) == 0 { - if ch := detectChannelFromContext(ctx); ch != "" { - deliverTo = []string{ch} - } - } - // Fall back to config default. - if len(deliverTo) == 0 && len(defaultDeliverTo) > 0 { - deliverTo = make([]string, len(defaultDeliverTo)) - copy(deliverTo, defaultDeliverTo) - } - - job := cronpkg.Job{ - Name: name, - ScheduleType: scheduleType, - Schedule: schedule, - Prompt: prompt, - SessionMode: sessionMode, - DeliverTo: deliverTo, - Enabled: true, - } - - if err := scheduler.AddJob(ctx, job); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("add cron job: %w", err) - } - - return map[string]interface{}{ - "status": "created", - "name": name, - "message": fmt.Sprintf("Cron job '%s' created with schedule %s=%s", name, scheduleType, schedule), - }, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "cron_list", - Description: "List all registered cron jobs with their schedules and status", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - jobs, err := scheduler.ListJobs(ctx) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("list cron jobs: %w", err) - } - return map[string]interface{}{"jobs": jobs, "count": len(jobs)}, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "cron_pause", - Description: "Pause a cron job so it no longer fires on schedule", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The cron job ID to pause"}, - }, - "required": []string{"id"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - id, _ := params["id"].(string) - if id == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing id parameter") - } - if err := scheduler.PauseJob(ctx, id); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("pause cron job: %w", err) - } - return map[string]interface{}{"status": "paused", "id": id}, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "cron_resume", - Description: "Resume a paused cron job", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The cron job ID to resume"}, - }, - "required": []string{"id"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - id, _ := params["id"].(string) - if id == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing id parameter") - } - if err := scheduler.ResumeJob(ctx, id); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("resume cron job: %w", err) - } - return map[string]interface{}{"status": "resumed", "id": id}, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "cron_remove", - Description: "Permanently remove a cron job", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The cron job ID to remove"}, - }, - "required": []string{"id"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - id, _ := params["id"].(string) - if id == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing id parameter") - } - if err := scheduler.RemoveJob(ctx, id); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("remove cron job: %w", err) - } - return map[string]interface{}{"status": "removed", "id": id}, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "cron_history", - Description: "View execution history for cron jobs", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "job_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Filter by job ID (omit for all jobs)"}, - "limit": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": "Maximum entries to return (default: 20)"}, - }, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - jobID, _ := params["job_id"].(string) - limit := 20 - if l, ok := params["limit"].(float64); ok && l > 0 { - limit = int(l) - } - - var entries []cronpkg.HistoryEntry - var err error - if jobID != "" { - entries, err = scheduler.History(ctx, jobID, limit) - } else { - entries, err = scheduler.AllHistory(ctx, limit) - } - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("cron history: %w", err) - } - return map[string]interface{}{"entries": entries, "count": len(entries)}, nil - }, - }, - } -} - -// buildBackgroundTools creates tools for managing background tasks. -func buildBackgroundTools(mgr *background.Manager, defaultDeliverTo []string) []*agent.Tool { - return []*agent.Tool{ - { - Name: "bg_submit", - Description: "Submit a prompt for asynchronous background execution", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "prompt": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The prompt to execute in the background"}, - "channel": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Channel to deliver results to (e.g. telegram:CHAT_ID, discord:CHANNEL_ID, slack:CHANNEL_ID)"}, - }, - "required": []string{"prompt"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - prompt, _ := params["prompt"].(string) - if prompt == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing prompt parameter") - } - channel, _ := params["channel"].(string) - - // Auto-detect channel from session context. - if channel == "" { - channel = detectChannelFromContext(ctx) - } - // Fall back to config default. - if channel == "" && len(defaultDeliverTo) > 0 { - channel = defaultDeliverTo[0] - } - - sessionKey := session.SessionKeyFromContext(ctx) - - taskID, err := mgr.Submit(ctx, prompt, background.Origin{ - Channel: channel, - Session: sessionKey, - }) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("submit background task: %w", err) - } - return map[string]interface{}{ - "status": "submitted", - "task_id": taskID, - "message": "Task submitted for background execution", - }, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "bg_status", - Description: "Check the status of a background task", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "task_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The background task ID"}, - }, - "required": []string{"task_id"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - taskID, _ := params["task_id"].(string) - if taskID == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing task_id parameter") - } - snap, err := mgr.Status(taskID) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("background task status: %w", err) - } - return snap, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "bg_list", - Description: "List all background tasks and their current status", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - snapshots := mgr.List() - return map[string]interface{}{"tasks": snapshots, "count": len(snapshots)}, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "bg_result", - Description: "Retrieve the result of a completed background task", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "task_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The background task ID"}, - }, - "required": []string{"task_id"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - taskID, _ := params["task_id"].(string) - if taskID == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing task_id parameter") - } - result, err := mgr.Result(taskID) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("background task result: %w", err) - } - return map[string]interface{}{"task_id": taskID, "result": result}, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "bg_cancel", - Description: "Cancel a pending or running background task", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "task_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The background task ID to cancel"}, - }, - "required": []string{"task_id"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - taskID, _ := params["task_id"].(string) - if taskID == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing task_id parameter") - } - if err := mgr.Cancel(taskID); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("cancel background task: %w", err) - } - return map[string]interface{}{"status": "cancelled", "task_id": taskID}, nil - }, - }, - } -} - -// buildWorkflowTools creates tools for executing and managing workflows. -func buildWorkflowTools(engine *workflow.Engine, stateDir string, defaultDeliverTo []string) []*agent.Tool { - return []*agent.Tool{ - { - Name: "workflow_run", - Description: "Execute a workflow from a YAML file path or inline YAML content", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "file_path": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Path to a .flow.yaml workflow file"}, - "yaml_content": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Inline YAML workflow definition (alternative to file_path)"}, - }, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - filePath, _ := params["file_path"].(string) - yamlContent, _ := params["yaml_content"].(string) - - if filePath == "" && yamlContent == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("either file_path or yaml_content is required") - } - - var w *workflow.Workflow - var err error - if filePath != "" { - w, err = workflow.ParseFile(filePath) - } else { - w, err = workflow.Parse([]byte(yamlContent)) - } - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse workflow: %w", err) - } - - // Auto-detect delivery channel from session context. - if len(w.DeliverTo) == 0 { - if ch := detectChannelFromContext(ctx); ch != "" { - w.DeliverTo = []string{ch} - } - } - // Fall back to config default. - if len(w.DeliverTo) == 0 && len(defaultDeliverTo) > 0 { - w.DeliverTo = make([]string, len(defaultDeliverTo)) - copy(w.DeliverTo, defaultDeliverTo) - } - - runID, err := engine.RunAsync(ctx, w) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("run workflow: %w", err) - } - - return map[string]interface{}{ - "run_id": runID, - "status": "running", - "message": fmt.Sprintf("Workflow '%s' started. Use workflow_status to check progress.", w.Name), - }, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "workflow_status", - Description: "Check the current status and progress of a workflow execution", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "run_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The workflow run ID"}, - }, - "required": []string{"run_id"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - runID, _ := params["run_id"].(string) - if runID == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing run_id parameter") - } - status, err := engine.Status(ctx, runID) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("workflow status: %w", err) - } - return status, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "workflow_list", - Description: "List recent workflow executions", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "limit": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": "Maximum runs to return (default: 20)"}, - }, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - limit := 20 - if l, ok := params["limit"].(float64); ok && l > 0 { - limit = int(l) - } - runs, err := engine.ListRuns(ctx, limit) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("list workflow runs: %w", err) - } - return map[string]interface{}{"runs": runs, "count": len(runs)}, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "workflow_cancel", - Description: "Cancel a running workflow execution", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "run_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The workflow run ID to cancel"}, - }, - "required": []string{"run_id"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - runID, _ := params["run_id"].(string) - if runID == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing run_id parameter") - } - if err := engine.Cancel(runID); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("cancel workflow: %w", err) - } - return map[string]interface{}{"status": "cancelled", "run_id": runID}, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "workflow_save", - Description: "Save a workflow YAML definition to the workflows directory for future use", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "name": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Workflow name (used as filename: name.flow.yaml)"}, - "yaml_content": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The YAML workflow definition"}, - }, - "required": []string{"name", "yaml_content"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - name, _ := params["name"].(string) - yamlContent, _ := params["yaml_content"].(string) - - if name == "" || yamlContent == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("name and yaml_content are required") - } - - // Validate the YAML before saving. - w, err := workflow.Parse([]byte(yamlContent)) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse workflow YAML: %w", err) - } - if err := workflow.Validate(w); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("validate workflow: %w", err) - } - - dir := stateDir - if dir == "" { - if home, err := os.UserHomeDir(); err == nil { - dir = filepath.Join(home, ".lango", "workflows") - } else { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("determine workflows directory: %w", err) - } - } - - if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("create workflows directory: %w", err) - } - - filePath := filepath.Join(dir, name+".flow.yaml") - if err := os.WriteFile(filePath, []byte(yamlContent), 0o644); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("write workflow file: %w", err) - } - - return map[string]interface{}{ - "status": "saved", - "name": name, - "file_path": filePath, - "message": fmt.Sprintf("Workflow '%s' saved to %s", name, filePath), - }, nil - }, - }, - } -} - -// needsApproval determines whether a tool requires approval based on the -// configured policy, explicit exemptions, and sensitive tool lists. +// needsApproval delegates to toolchain.NeedsApproval. func needsApproval(t *agent.Tool, ic config.InterceptorConfig) bool { - // ExemptTools always bypass approval. - for _, name := range ic.ExemptTools { - if name == t.Name { - return false - } - } - - // SensitiveTools always require approval. - for _, name := range ic.SensitiveTools { - if name == t.Name { - return true - } - } - - switch ic.ApprovalPolicy { - case config.ApprovalPolicyAll: - return true - case config.ApprovalPolicyDangerous: - return t.SafetyLevel.IsDangerous() - case config.ApprovalPolicyConfigured: - return false // only SensitiveTools (handled above) - case config.ApprovalPolicyNone: - return false - default: - return true // unknown policy → fail-safe - } + return toolchain.NeedsApproval(t, ic) } -// buildApprovalSummary returns a human-readable description of what a tool -// invocation will do, suitable for display in approval messages. +// buildApprovalSummary delegates to toolchain.BuildApprovalSummary. func buildApprovalSummary(toolName string, params map[string]interface{}) string { - switch toolName { - case "exec", "exec_bg": - if cmd, ok := params["command"].(string); ok { - return "Execute: " + truncate(cmd, 200) - } - case "fs_write": - path, _ := params["path"].(string) - content, _ := params["content"].(string) - return fmt.Sprintf("Write to %s (%d bytes)", path, len(content)) - case "fs_edit": - path, _ := params["path"].(string) - return "Edit file: " + path - case "fs_delete": - path, _ := params["path"].(string) - return "Delete: " + path - case "browser_navigate": - url, _ := params["url"].(string) - return "Navigate to: " + truncate(url, 200) - case "browser_action": - action, _ := params["action"].(string) - selector, _ := params["selector"].(string) - if selector != "" { - return fmt.Sprintf("Browser %s on: %s", action, truncate(selector, 100)) - } - return "Browser action: " + action - case "secrets_store": - name, _ := params["name"].(string) - return "Store secret: " + name - case "secrets_get": - name, _ := params["name"].(string) - return "Retrieve secret: " + name - case "secrets_delete": - name, _ := params["name"].(string) - return "Delete secret: " + name - case "crypto_encrypt": - return "Encrypt data" - case "crypto_decrypt": - return "Decrypt ciphertext" - case "crypto_sign": - return "Generate digital signature" - case "payment_send": - amount, _ := params["amount"].(string) - to, _ := params["to"].(string) - purpose, _ := params["purpose"].(string) - return fmt.Sprintf("Send %s USDC to %s (%s)", amount, truncate(to, 12), truncate(purpose, 50)) - case "payment_create_wallet": - return "Create new blockchain wallet" - case "payment_x402_fetch": - url, _ := params["url"].(string) - method, _ := params["method"].(string) - if method == "" { - method = "GET" - } - return fmt.Sprintf("X402 %s %s (auto-pay enabled)", method, truncate(url, 150)) - case "cron_add": - name, _ := params["name"].(string) - scheduleType, _ := params["schedule_type"].(string) - schedule, _ := params["schedule"].(string) - return fmt.Sprintf("Create cron job: %s (%s=%s)", name, scheduleType, schedule) - case "cron_remove": - id, _ := params["id"].(string) - return "Remove cron job: " + id - case "bg_submit": - prompt, _ := params["prompt"].(string) - return "Submit background task: " + truncate(prompt, 100) - case "workflow_run": - filePath, _ := params["file_path"].(string) - if filePath != "" { - return "Run workflow: " + filePath - } - return "Run inline workflow" - case "workflow_cancel": - runID, _ := params["run_id"].(string) - return "Cancel workflow: " + runID - } - return "Tool: " + toolName + return toolchain.BuildApprovalSummary(toolName, params) } -// truncate shortens s to maxLen characters, appending "..." if truncated. +// truncate delegates to toolchain.Truncate. func truncate(s string, maxLen int) string { - if len(s) <= maxLen { - return s - } - return s[:maxLen] + "..." -} - -// wrapWithApproval wraps a tool to require approval based on the configured policy. -// Uses fail-closed: denies execution unless explicitly approved. -// The approval.Provider routes requests to the appropriate channel (Gateway, Telegram, Discord, Slack, TTY). -// The GrantStore tracks "always allow" grants to auto-approve repeat invocations within a session. -func wrapWithApproval(t *agent.Tool, ic config.InterceptorConfig, ap approval.Provider, gs *approval.GrantStore) *agent.Tool { - if !needsApproval(t, ic) { - return t - } - - original := t.Handler - return &agent.Tool{ - Name: t.Name, - Description: t.Description, - Parameters: t.Parameters, - SafetyLevel: t.SafetyLevel, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - sessionKey := session.SessionKeyFromContext(ctx) - if target := approval.ApprovalTargetFromContext(ctx); target != "" { - sessionKey = target - } - - // Check persistent grant — auto-approve if previously "always allowed" - if gs != nil && gs.IsGranted(sessionKey, t.Name) { - return original(ctx, params) - } - - req := approval.ApprovalRequest{ - ID: fmt.Sprintf("req-%d", time.Now().UnixNano()), - ToolName: t.Name, - SessionKey: sessionKey, - Params: params, - Summary: buildApprovalSummary(t.Name, params), - CreatedAt: time.Now(), - } - resp, err := ap.RequestApproval(ctx, req) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("tool '%s' approval: %w", t.Name, err) - } - if !resp.Approved { - sk := session.SessionKeyFromContext(ctx) - if sk == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("tool '%s' execution denied: no approval channel available (session key missing)", t.Name) - } - return nil, fmt.Errorf("tool '%s' execution denied: user did not approve the action", t.Name) - } - - // Record persistent grant for this session+tool - if resp.AlwaysAllow && gs != nil { - gs.Grant(sessionKey, t.Name) - } - - return original(ctx, params) - }, - } -} - -// buildGraphTools creates tools for graph traversal and querying. -func buildGraphTools(gs graph.Store) []*agent.Tool { - return []*agent.Tool{ - { - Name: "graph_traverse", - Description: "Traverse the knowledge graph from a start node using BFS. Returns related triples up to the specified depth.", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "start_node": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The node ID to start traversal from"}, - "max_depth": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": "Maximum traversal depth (default: 2)"}, - "predicates": map[string]interface{}{"type": "array", "items": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "description": "Filter by predicate types (empty = all)"}, - }, - "required": []string{"start_node"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - startNode, _ := params["start_node"].(string) - if startNode == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing start_node parameter") - } - maxDepth := 2 - if d, ok := params["max_depth"].(float64); ok && d > 0 { - maxDepth = int(d) - } - var predicates []string - if raw, ok := params["predicates"].([]interface{}); ok { - for _, p := range raw { - if s, ok := p.(string); ok { - predicates = append(predicates, s) - } - } - } - triples, err := gs.Traverse(ctx, startNode, maxDepth, predicates) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("graph traverse: %w", err) - } - return map[string]interface{}{"triples": triples, "count": len(triples)}, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "graph_query", - Description: "Query the knowledge graph by subject or object node. Returns matching triples.", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "subject": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Subject node to query by"}, - "object": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Object node to query by"}, - "predicate": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Optional predicate filter (used with subject)"}, - }, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - subject, _ := params["subject"].(string) - object, _ := params["object"].(string) - predicate, _ := params["predicate"].(string) - - if subject == "" && object == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("either subject or object is required") - } - - var triples []graph.Triple - var err error - if subject != "" && predicate != "" { - triples, err = gs.QueryBySubjectPredicate(ctx, subject, predicate) - } else if subject != "" { - triples, err = gs.QueryBySubject(ctx, subject) - } else { - triples, err = gs.QueryByObject(ctx, object) - } - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("graph query: %w", err) - } - return map[string]interface{}{"triples": triples, "count": len(triples)}, nil - }, - }, - } + return toolchain.Truncate(s, maxLen) } -// buildRAGTools creates tools for RAG retrieval. -func buildRAGTools(ragSvc *embedding.RAGService) []*agent.Tool { - return []*agent.Tool{ - { - Name: "rag_retrieve", - Description: "Retrieve semantically similar content from the knowledge base using vector search.", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "query": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The search query"}, - "limit": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": "Maximum results to return (default: 5)"}, - "collections": map[string]interface{}{"type": "array", "items": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "description": "Filter by collections (e.g., knowledge, observation)"}, - }, - "required": []string{"query"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - query, _ := params["query"].(string) - if query == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing query parameter") - } - limit := 5 - if l, ok := params["limit"].(float64); ok && l > 0 { - limit = int(l) - } - var collections []string - if raw, ok := params["collections"].([]interface{}); ok { - for _, c := range raw { - if s, ok := c.(string); ok { - collections = append(collections, s) - } - } - } - sessionKey := session.SessionKeyFromContext(ctx) - results, err := ragSvc.Retrieve(ctx, query, embedding.RetrieveOptions{ - Limit: limit, - Collections: collections, - SessionKey: sessionKey, - }) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("rag retrieve: %w", err) - } - return map[string]interface{}{"results": results, "count": len(results)}, nil - }, - }, - } -} - -// buildMemoryAgentTools creates tools for observational memory management. -func buildMemoryAgentTools(ms *memory.Store) []*agent.Tool { - return []*agent.Tool{ - { - Name: "memory_list_observations", - Description: "List observations for a session. Returns compressed notes from conversation history.", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "session_key": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Session key to list observations for (uses current session if empty)"}, - }, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - sessionKey, _ := params["session_key"].(string) - if sessionKey == "" { - sessionKey = session.SessionKeyFromContext(ctx) - } - observations, err := ms.ListObservations(ctx, sessionKey) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("list observations: %w", err) - } - return map[string]interface{}{"observations": observations, "count": len(observations)}, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "memory_list_reflections", - Description: "List reflections for a session. Reflections are condensed observations across time.", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "session_key": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Session key to list reflections for (uses current session if empty)"}, - }, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - sessionKey, _ := params["session_key"].(string) - if sessionKey == "" { - sessionKey = session.SessionKeyFromContext(ctx) - } - reflections, err := ms.ListReflections(ctx, sessionKey) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("list reflections: %w", err) - } - return map[string]interface{}{"reflections": reflections, "count": len(reflections)}, nil - }, - }, - } -} - -// buildPaymentTools creates blockchain payment tools. -func buildPaymentTools(pc *paymentComponents, x402Interceptor *x402pkg.Interceptor) []*agent.Tool { - return toolpayment.BuildTools(pc.service, pc.limiter, pc.secrets, pc.chainID, x402Interceptor) -} - -// buildLibrarianTools creates proactive librarian agent tools. -func buildLibrarianTools(is *librarian.InquiryStore) []*agent.Tool { - return []*agent.Tool{ - { - Name: "librarian_pending_inquiries", - Description: "List pending knowledge inquiries for the current session", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "session_key": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Session key (uses current session if empty)"}, - "limit": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": "Maximum results (default: 5)"}, - }, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - sessionKey, _ := params["session_key"].(string) - if sessionKey == "" { - sessionKey = session.SessionKeyFromContext(ctx) - } - limit := 5 - if l, ok := params["limit"].(float64); ok && l > 0 { - limit = int(l) - } - inquiries, err := is.ListPendingInquiries(ctx, sessionKey, limit) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("list pending inquiries: %w", err) - } - return map[string]interface{}{"inquiries": inquiries, "count": len(inquiries)}, nil - }, - }, - { - Name: "librarian_dismiss_inquiry", - Description: "Dismiss a pending knowledge inquiry that the user does not want to answer", - SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, - Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ - "type": "object", - "properties": map[string]interface{}{ - "inquiry_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "UUID of the inquiry to dismiss"}, - }, - "required": []string{"inquiry_id"}, - }, - Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { - idStr, ok := params["inquiry_id"].(string) - if !ok || idStr == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing inquiry_id parameter") - } - id, err := uuid.Parse(idStr) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid inquiry_id: %w", err) - } - if err := is.DismissInquiry(ctx, id); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("dismiss inquiry: %w", err) - } - return map[string]interface{}{ - "status": "dismissed", - "message": fmt.Sprintf("Inquiry %s dismissed", idStr), - }, nil - }, - }, - } -} diff --git a/internal/app/tools_automation.go b/internal/app/tools_automation.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6532a34e --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/app/tools_automation.go @@ -0,0 +1,518 @@ +package app + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + "os" + "path/filepath" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/agent" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/background" + cronpkg "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cron" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/workflow" +) + +// buildCronTools creates tools for managing scheduled cron jobs. +func buildCronTools(scheduler *cronpkg.Scheduler, defaultDeliverTo []string) []*agent.Tool { + return []*agent.Tool{ + { + Name: "cron_add", + Description: "Create a new scheduled cron job that runs an agent prompt on a recurring schedule", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "name": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Unique name for the cron job"}, + "schedule_type": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Schedule type: cron (crontab), every (interval), or at (one-time)", "enum": []string{"cron", "every", "at"}}, + "schedule": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Schedule value: crontab expr for cron, Go duration for every (e.g. 1h30m), RFC3339 datetime for at"}, + "prompt": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The prompt to execute on each run"}, + "session_mode": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Session mode: isolated (new session each run) or main (shared session)", "enum": []string{"isolated", "main"}}, + "deliver_to": map[string]interface{}{"type": "array", "items": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "description": "Channels to deliver results to (e.g. telegram:CHAT_ID, discord:CHANNEL_ID, slack:CHANNEL_ID)"}, + }, + "required": []string{"name", "schedule_type", "schedule", "prompt"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + name, _ := params["name"].(string) + scheduleType, _ := params["schedule_type"].(string) + schedule, _ := params["schedule"].(string) + prompt, _ := params["prompt"].(string) + sessionMode, _ := params["session_mode"].(string) + + if name == "" || scheduleType == "" || schedule == "" || prompt == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("name, schedule_type, schedule, and prompt are required") + } + if sessionMode == "" { + sessionMode = "isolated" + } + + var deliverTo []string + if raw, ok := params["deliver_to"].([]interface{}); ok { + for _, v := range raw { + if s, ok := v.(string); ok { + deliverTo = append(deliverTo, s) + } + } + } + + // Auto-detect channel from session context. + if len(deliverTo) == 0 { + if ch := detectChannelFromContext(ctx); ch != "" { + deliverTo = []string{ch} + } + } + // Fall back to config default. + if len(deliverTo) == 0 && len(defaultDeliverTo) > 0 { + deliverTo = make([]string, len(defaultDeliverTo)) + copy(deliverTo, defaultDeliverTo) + } + + job := cronpkg.Job{ + Name: name, + ScheduleType: scheduleType, + Schedule: schedule, + Prompt: prompt, + SessionMode: sessionMode, + DeliverTo: deliverTo, + Enabled: true, + } + + if err := scheduler.AddJob(ctx, job); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("add cron job: %w", err) + } + + return map[string]interface{}{ + "status": "created", + "name": name, + "message": fmt.Sprintf("Cron job '%s' created with schedule %s=%s", name, scheduleType, schedule), + }, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "cron_list", + Description: "List all registered cron jobs with their schedules and status", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + jobs, err := scheduler.ListJobs(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("list cron jobs: %w", err) + } + return map[string]interface{}{"jobs": jobs, "count": len(jobs)}, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "cron_pause", + Description: "Pause a cron job so it no longer fires on schedule", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The cron job ID to pause"}, + }, + "required": []string{"id"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + id, _ := params["id"].(string) + if id == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing id parameter") + } + if err := scheduler.PauseJob(ctx, id); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("pause cron job: %w", err) + } + return map[string]interface{}{"status": "paused", "id": id}, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "cron_resume", + Description: "Resume a paused cron job", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The cron job ID to resume"}, + }, + "required": []string{"id"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + id, _ := params["id"].(string) + if id == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing id parameter") + } + if err := scheduler.ResumeJob(ctx, id); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("resume cron job: %w", err) + } + return map[string]interface{}{"status": "resumed", "id": id}, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "cron_remove", + Description: "Permanently remove a cron job", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The cron job ID to remove"}, + }, + "required": []string{"id"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + id, _ := params["id"].(string) + if id == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing id parameter") + } + if err := scheduler.RemoveJob(ctx, id); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("remove cron job: %w", err) + } + return map[string]interface{}{"status": "removed", "id": id}, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "cron_history", + Description: "View execution history for cron jobs", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "job_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Filter by job ID (omit for all jobs)"}, + "limit": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": "Maximum entries to return (default: 20)"}, + }, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + jobID, _ := params["job_id"].(string) + limit := 20 + if l, ok := params["limit"].(float64); ok && l > 0 { + limit = int(l) + } + + var entries []cronpkg.HistoryEntry + var err error + if jobID != "" { + entries, err = scheduler.History(ctx, jobID, limit) + } else { + entries, err = scheduler.AllHistory(ctx, limit) + } + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("cron history: %w", err) + } + return map[string]interface{}{"entries": entries, "count": len(entries)}, nil + }, + }, + } +} + +// buildBackgroundTools creates tools for managing background tasks. +func buildBackgroundTools(mgr *background.Manager, defaultDeliverTo []string) []*agent.Tool { + return []*agent.Tool{ + { + Name: "bg_submit", + Description: "Submit a prompt for asynchronous background execution", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "prompt": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The prompt to execute in the background"}, + "channel": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Channel to deliver results to (e.g. telegram:CHAT_ID, discord:CHANNEL_ID, slack:CHANNEL_ID)"}, + }, + "required": []string{"prompt"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + prompt, _ := params["prompt"].(string) + if prompt == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing prompt parameter") + } + channel, _ := params["channel"].(string) + + // Auto-detect channel from session context. + if channel == "" { + channel = detectChannelFromContext(ctx) + } + // Fall back to config default. + if channel == "" && len(defaultDeliverTo) > 0 { + channel = defaultDeliverTo[0] + } + + sessionKey := session.SessionKeyFromContext(ctx) + + taskID, err := mgr.Submit(ctx, prompt, background.Origin{ + Channel: channel, + Session: sessionKey, + }) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("submit background task: %w", err) + } + return map[string]interface{}{ + "status": "submitted", + "task_id": taskID, + "message": "Task submitted for background execution", + }, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "bg_status", + Description: "Check the status of a background task", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "task_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The background task ID"}, + }, + "required": []string{"task_id"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + taskID, _ := params["task_id"].(string) + if taskID == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing task_id parameter") + } + snap, err := mgr.Status(taskID) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("background task status: %w", err) + } + return snap, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "bg_list", + Description: "List all background tasks and their current status", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + snapshots := mgr.List() + return map[string]interface{}{"tasks": snapshots, "count": len(snapshots)}, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "bg_result", + Description: "Retrieve the result of a completed background task", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "task_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The background task ID"}, + }, + "required": []string{"task_id"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + taskID, _ := params["task_id"].(string) + if taskID == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing task_id parameter") + } + result, err := mgr.Result(taskID) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("background task result: %w", err) + } + return map[string]interface{}{"task_id": taskID, "result": result}, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "bg_cancel", + Description: "Cancel a pending or running background task", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "task_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The background task ID to cancel"}, + }, + "required": []string{"task_id"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + taskID, _ := params["task_id"].(string) + if taskID == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing task_id parameter") + } + if err := mgr.Cancel(taskID); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("cancel background task: %w", err) + } + return map[string]interface{}{"status": "cancelled", "task_id": taskID}, nil + }, + }, + } +} + +// buildWorkflowTools creates tools for executing and managing workflows. +func buildWorkflowTools(engine *workflow.Engine, stateDir string, defaultDeliverTo []string) []*agent.Tool { + return []*agent.Tool{ + { + Name: "workflow_run", + Description: "Execute a workflow from a YAML file path or inline YAML content", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "file_path": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Path to a .flow.yaml workflow file"}, + "yaml_content": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Inline YAML workflow definition (alternative to file_path)"}, + }, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + filePath, _ := params["file_path"].(string) + yamlContent, _ := params["yaml_content"].(string) + + if filePath == "" && yamlContent == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("either file_path or yaml_content is required") + } + + var w *workflow.Workflow + var err error + if filePath != "" { + w, err = workflow.ParseFile(filePath) + } else { + w, err = workflow.Parse([]byte(yamlContent)) + } + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse workflow: %w", err) + } + + // Auto-detect delivery channel from session context. + if len(w.DeliverTo) == 0 { + if ch := detectChannelFromContext(ctx); ch != "" { + w.DeliverTo = []string{ch} + } + } + // Fall back to config default. + if len(w.DeliverTo) == 0 && len(defaultDeliverTo) > 0 { + w.DeliverTo = make([]string, len(defaultDeliverTo)) + copy(w.DeliverTo, defaultDeliverTo) + } + + runID, err := engine.RunAsync(ctx, w) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("run workflow: %w", err) + } + + return map[string]interface{}{ + "run_id": runID, + "status": "running", + "message": fmt.Sprintf("Workflow '%s' started. Use workflow_status to check progress.", w.Name), + }, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "workflow_status", + Description: "Check the current status and progress of a workflow execution", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "run_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The workflow run ID"}, + }, + "required": []string{"run_id"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + runID, _ := params["run_id"].(string) + if runID == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing run_id parameter") + } + status, err := engine.Status(ctx, runID) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("workflow status: %w", err) + } + return status, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "workflow_list", + Description: "List recent workflow executions", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "limit": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": "Maximum runs to return (default: 20)"}, + }, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + limit := 20 + if l, ok := params["limit"].(float64); ok && l > 0 { + limit = int(l) + } + runs, err := engine.ListRuns(ctx, limit) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("list workflow runs: %w", err) + } + return map[string]interface{}{"runs": runs, "count": len(runs)}, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "workflow_cancel", + Description: "Cancel a running workflow execution", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "run_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The workflow run ID to cancel"}, + }, + "required": []string{"run_id"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + runID, _ := params["run_id"].(string) + if runID == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing run_id parameter") + } + if err := engine.Cancel(runID); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("cancel workflow: %w", err) + } + return map[string]interface{}{"status": "cancelled", "run_id": runID}, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "workflow_save", + Description: "Save a workflow YAML definition to the workflows directory for future use", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "name": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Workflow name (used as filename: name.flow.yaml)"}, + "yaml_content": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The YAML workflow definition"}, + }, + "required": []string{"name", "yaml_content"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + name, _ := params["name"].(string) + yamlContent, _ := params["yaml_content"].(string) + + if name == "" || yamlContent == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("name and yaml_content are required") + } + + // Validate the YAML before saving. + w, err := workflow.Parse([]byte(yamlContent)) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse workflow YAML: %w", err) + } + if err := workflow.Validate(w); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("validate workflow: %w", err) + } + + dir := stateDir + if dir == "" { + if home, err := os.UserHomeDir(); err == nil { + dir = filepath.Join(home, ".lango", "workflows") + } else { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("determine workflows directory: %w", err) + } + } + + if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("create workflows directory: %w", err) + } + + filePath := filepath.Join(dir, name+".flow.yaml") + if err := os.WriteFile(filePath, []byte(yamlContent), 0o644); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("write workflow file: %w", err) + } + + return map[string]interface{}{ + "status": "saved", + "name": name, + "file_path": filePath, + "message": fmt.Sprintf("Workflow '%s' saved to %s", name, filePath), + }, nil + }, + }, + } +} diff --git a/internal/app/tools_browser.go b/internal/app/tools_browser.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..088e1620 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/app/tools_browser.go @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +package app + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + "time" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/agent" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/tools/browser" +) + +func buildBrowserTools(sm *browser.SessionManager) []*agent.Tool { + return []*agent.Tool{ + { + Name: "browser_navigate", + Description: "Navigate the browser to a URL and return the page title, URL, and a text snippet", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "url": map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "string", + "description": "The URL to navigate to", + }, + }, + "required": []string{"url"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + url, ok := params["url"].(string) + if !ok || url == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing url parameter") + } + + sessionID, err := sm.EnsureSession() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if err := sm.Tool().Navigate(ctx, sessionID, url); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return sm.Tool().GetSnapshot(sessionID) + }, + }, + { + Name: "browser_action", + Description: "Perform an action on the current browser page: click, type, eval, get_text, get_element_info, or wait", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "action": map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "string", + "description": "The action to perform", + "enum": []string{"click", "type", "eval", "get_text", "get_element_info", "wait"}, + }, + "selector": map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "string", + "description": "CSS selector for the target element (required for click, type, get_text, get_element_info, wait)", + }, + "text": map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "string", + "description": "Text to type (required for type action) or JavaScript to evaluate (required for eval action)", + }, + "timeout": map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "integer", + "description": "Timeout in seconds for wait action (default: 10)", + }, + }, + "required": []string{"action"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + action, ok := params["action"].(string) + if !ok || action == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing action parameter") + } + + sessionID, err := sm.EnsureSession() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + selector, _ := params["selector"].(string) + text, _ := params["text"].(string) + + switch action { + case "click": + if selector == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("selector required for click action") + } + return nil, sm.Tool().Click(ctx, sessionID, selector) + + case "type": + if selector == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("selector required for type action") + } + if text == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("text required for type action") + } + return nil, sm.Tool().Type(ctx, sessionID, selector, text) + + case "eval": + if text == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("text (JavaScript) required for eval action") + } + return sm.Tool().Eval(sessionID, text) + + case "get_text": + if selector == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("selector required for get_text action") + } + return sm.Tool().GetText(sessionID, selector) + + case "get_element_info": + if selector == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("selector required for get_element_info action") + } + return sm.Tool().GetElementInfo(sessionID, selector) + + case "wait": + if selector == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("selector required for wait action") + } + timeout := 10 * time.Second + if t, ok := params["timeout"].(float64); ok && t > 0 { + timeout = time.Duration(t) * time.Second + } + return nil, sm.Tool().WaitForSelector(ctx, sessionID, selector, timeout) + + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown action: %s", action) + } + }, + }, + { + Name: "browser_screenshot", + Description: "Capture a screenshot of the current browser page as base64 PNG", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "fullPage": map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "boolean", + "description": "Capture the full scrollable page (default: false)", + }, + }, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + sessionID, err := sm.EnsureSession() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + fullPage, _ := params["fullPage"].(bool) + return sm.Tool().Screenshot(sessionID, fullPage) + }, + }, + } +} diff --git a/internal/app/tools_data.go b/internal/app/tools_data.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7de55d26 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/app/tools_data.go @@ -0,0 +1,261 @@ +package app + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + + "github.com/google/uuid" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/agent" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/embedding" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/graph" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/librarian" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/memory" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" + toolpayment "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/tools/payment" + x402pkg "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/x402" +) + +// buildGraphTools creates tools for graph traversal and querying. +func buildGraphTools(gs graph.Store) []*agent.Tool { + return []*agent.Tool{ + { + Name: "graph_traverse", + Description: "Traverse the knowledge graph from a start node using BFS. Returns related triples up to the specified depth.", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "start_node": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The node ID to start traversal from"}, + "max_depth": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": "Maximum traversal depth (default: 2)"}, + "predicates": map[string]interface{}{"type": "array", "items": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "description": "Filter by predicate types (empty = all)"}, + }, + "required": []string{"start_node"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + startNode, _ := params["start_node"].(string) + if startNode == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing start_node parameter") + } + maxDepth := 2 + if d, ok := params["max_depth"].(float64); ok && d > 0 { + maxDepth = int(d) + } + var predicates []string + if raw, ok := params["predicates"].([]interface{}); ok { + for _, p := range raw { + if s, ok := p.(string); ok { + predicates = append(predicates, s) + } + } + } + triples, err := gs.Traverse(ctx, startNode, maxDepth, predicates) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("graph traverse: %w", err) + } + return map[string]interface{}{"triples": triples, "count": len(triples)}, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "graph_query", + Description: "Query the knowledge graph by subject or object node. Returns matching triples.", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "subject": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Subject node to query by"}, + "object": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Object node to query by"}, + "predicate": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Optional predicate filter (used with subject)"}, + }, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + subject, _ := params["subject"].(string) + object, _ := params["object"].(string) + predicate, _ := params["predicate"].(string) + + if subject == "" && object == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("either subject or object is required") + } + + var triples []graph.Triple + var err error + if subject != "" && predicate != "" { + triples, err = gs.QueryBySubjectPredicate(ctx, subject, predicate) + } else if subject != "" { + triples, err = gs.QueryBySubject(ctx, subject) + } else { + triples, err = gs.QueryByObject(ctx, object) + } + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("graph query: %w", err) + } + return map[string]interface{}{"triples": triples, "count": len(triples)}, nil + }, + }, + } +} + +// buildRAGTools creates tools for RAG retrieval. +func buildRAGTools(ragSvc *embedding.RAGService) []*agent.Tool { + return []*agent.Tool{ + { + Name: "rag_retrieve", + Description: "Retrieve semantically similar content from the knowledge base using vector search.", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "query": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The search query"}, + "limit": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": "Maximum results to return (default: 5)"}, + "collections": map[string]interface{}{"type": "array", "items": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "description": "Filter by collections (e.g., knowledge, observation)"}, + }, + "required": []string{"query"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + query, _ := params["query"].(string) + if query == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing query parameter") + } + limit := 5 + if l, ok := params["limit"].(float64); ok && l > 0 { + limit = int(l) + } + var collections []string + if raw, ok := params["collections"].([]interface{}); ok { + for _, c := range raw { + if s, ok := c.(string); ok { + collections = append(collections, s) + } + } + } + sessionKey := session.SessionKeyFromContext(ctx) + results, err := ragSvc.Retrieve(ctx, query, embedding.RetrieveOptions{ + Limit: limit, + Collections: collections, + SessionKey: sessionKey, + }) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("rag retrieve: %w", err) + } + return map[string]interface{}{"results": results, "count": len(results)}, nil + }, + }, + } +} + +// buildMemoryAgentTools creates tools for observational memory management. +func buildMemoryAgentTools(ms *memory.Store) []*agent.Tool { + return []*agent.Tool{ + { + Name: "memory_list_observations", + Description: "List observations for a session. Returns compressed notes from conversation history.", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "session_key": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Session key to list observations for (uses current session if empty)"}, + }, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + sessionKey, _ := params["session_key"].(string) + if sessionKey == "" { + sessionKey = session.SessionKeyFromContext(ctx) + } + observations, err := ms.ListObservations(ctx, sessionKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("list observations: %w", err) + } + return map[string]interface{}{"observations": observations, "count": len(observations)}, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "memory_list_reflections", + Description: "List reflections for a session. Reflections are condensed observations across time.", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "session_key": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Session key to list reflections for (uses current session if empty)"}, + }, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + sessionKey, _ := params["session_key"].(string) + if sessionKey == "" { + sessionKey = session.SessionKeyFromContext(ctx) + } + reflections, err := ms.ListReflections(ctx, sessionKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("list reflections: %w", err) + } + return map[string]interface{}{"reflections": reflections, "count": len(reflections)}, nil + }, + }, + } +} + +// buildPaymentTools creates blockchain payment tools. +func buildPaymentTools(pc *paymentComponents, x402Interceptor *x402pkg.Interceptor) []*agent.Tool { + return toolpayment.BuildTools(pc.service, pc.limiter, pc.secrets, pc.chainID, x402Interceptor) +} + +// buildLibrarianTools creates proactive librarian agent tools. +func buildLibrarianTools(is *librarian.InquiryStore) []*agent.Tool { + return []*agent.Tool{ + { + Name: "librarian_pending_inquiries", + Description: "List pending knowledge inquiries for the current session", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "session_key": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Session key (uses current session if empty)"}, + "limit": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": "Maximum results (default: 5)"}, + }, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + sessionKey, _ := params["session_key"].(string) + if sessionKey == "" { + sessionKey = session.SessionKeyFromContext(ctx) + } + limit := 5 + if l, ok := params["limit"].(float64); ok && l > 0 { + limit = int(l) + } + inquiries, err := is.ListPendingInquiries(ctx, sessionKey, limit) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("list pending inquiries: %w", err) + } + return map[string]interface{}{"inquiries": inquiries, "count": len(inquiries)}, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "librarian_dismiss_inquiry", + Description: "Dismiss a pending knowledge inquiry that the user does not want to answer", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "inquiry_id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "UUID of the inquiry to dismiss"}, + }, + "required": []string{"inquiry_id"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + idStr, ok := params["inquiry_id"].(string) + if !ok || idStr == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing inquiry_id parameter") + } + id, err := uuid.Parse(idStr) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid inquiry_id: %w", err) + } + if err := is.DismissInquiry(ctx, id); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("dismiss inquiry: %w", err) + } + return map[string]interface{}{ + "status": "dismissed", + "message": fmt.Sprintf("Inquiry %s dismissed", idStr), + }, nil + }, + }, + } +} diff --git a/internal/app/tools_exec.go b/internal/app/tools_exec.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..678a80ee --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/app/tools_exec.go @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +package app + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/agent" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/supervisor" +) + +func buildExecTools(sv *supervisor.Supervisor, automationAvailable map[string]bool) []*agent.Tool { + return []*agent.Tool{ + { + Name: "exec", + Description: "Execute shell commands", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "command": map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "string", + "description": "The shell command to execute", + }, + }, + "required": []string{"command"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + cmd, ok := params["command"].(string) + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing command parameter") + } + if msg := blockLangoExec(cmd, automationAvailable); msg != "" { + return map[string]interface{}{"blocked": true, "message": msg}, nil + } + return sv.ExecuteTool(ctx, cmd) + }, + }, + { + Name: "exec_bg", + Description: "Execute a shell command in the background", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "command": map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "string", + "description": "The shell command to execute", + }, + }, + "required": []string{"command"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + cmd, ok := params["command"].(string) + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing command parameter") + } + if msg := blockLangoExec(cmd, automationAvailable); msg != "" { + return map[string]interface{}{"blocked": true, "message": msg}, nil + } + return sv.StartBackground(cmd) + }, + }, + { + Name: "exec_status", + Description: "Check the status of a background process", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "id": map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "string", + "description": "The background process ID returned by exec_bg", + }, + }, + "required": []string{"id"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + id, ok := params["id"].(string) + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing id parameter") + } + return sv.GetBackgroundStatus(id) + }, + }, + { + Name: "exec_stop", + Description: "Stop a background process", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "id": map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "string", + "description": "The background process ID returned by exec_bg", + }, + }, + "required": []string{"id"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + id, ok := params["id"].(string) + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing id parameter") + } + return nil, sv.StopBackground(id) + }, + }, + } +} diff --git a/internal/app/tools_filesystem.go b/internal/app/tools_filesystem.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..674757aa --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/app/tools_filesystem.go @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +package app + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/agent" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/tools/filesystem" +) + +func buildFilesystemTools(fsTool *filesystem.Tool) []*agent.Tool { + return []*agent.Tool{ + { + Name: "fs_read", + Description: "Read a file", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "path": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The file path to read"}, + }, + "required": []string{"path"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + path, ok := params["path"].(string) + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing path parameter") + } + return fsTool.Read(path) + }, + }, + { + Name: "fs_list", + Description: "List contents of a directory", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "path": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The directory path to list"}, + }, + "required": []string{"path"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + path, _ := params["path"].(string) + if path == "" { + path = "." + } + return fsTool.ListDir(path) + }, + }, + { + Name: "fs_write", + Description: "Write content to a file", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "path": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The file path to write to"}, + "content": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The content to write"}, + }, + "required": []string{"path", "content"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + path, _ := params["path"].(string) + content, _ := params["content"].(string) + if path == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing path parameter") + } + return nil, fsTool.Write(path, content) + }, + }, + { + Name: "fs_edit", + Description: "Edit a file by replacing a line range", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "path": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The file path to edit"}, + "startLine": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": "The starting line number (1-indexed)"}, + "endLine": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": "The ending line number (inclusive)"}, + "content": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The new content for the specified range"}, + }, + "required": []string{"path", "startLine", "endLine", "content"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + path, _ := params["path"].(string) + content, _ := params["content"].(string) + if path == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing path parameter") + } + + var startLine, endLine int + if sl, ok := params["startLine"].(float64); ok { + startLine = int(sl) + } else if sl, ok := params["startLine"].(int); ok { + startLine = sl + } + if el, ok := params["endLine"].(float64); ok { + endLine = int(el) + } else if el, ok := params["endLine"].(int); ok { + endLine = el + } + + return nil, fsTool.Edit(path, startLine, endLine, content) + }, + }, + { + Name: "fs_mkdir", + Description: "Create a directory", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "path": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The directory path to create"}, + }, + "required": []string{"path"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + path, _ := params["path"].(string) + if path == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing path parameter") + } + return nil, fsTool.Mkdir(path) + }, + }, + { + Name: "fs_delete", + Description: "Delete a file or directory", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "path": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The path to delete"}, + }, + "required": []string{"path"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + path, _ := params["path"].(string) + if path == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing path parameter") + } + return nil, fsTool.Delete(path) + }, + }, + } +} diff --git a/internal/app/tools_meta.go b/internal/app/tools_meta.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dae3ab99 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/app/tools_meta.go @@ -0,0 +1,536 @@ +package app + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "time" + + "github.com/google/uuid" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/agent" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + entknowledge "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/knowledge" + entlearning "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/learning" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/knowledge" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/learning" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/skill" +) + +// buildMetaTools creates knowledge/learning/skill meta-tools for the agent. +func buildMetaTools(store *knowledge.Store, engine *learning.Engine, registry *skill.Registry, skillCfg config.SkillConfig) []*agent.Tool { + return []*agent.Tool{ + { + Name: "save_knowledge", + Description: "Save a piece of knowledge (user rule, definition, preference, fact, pattern, or correction) for future reference", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "key": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Unique key for this knowledge entry"}, + "category": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Category: rule, definition, preference, fact, pattern, or correction", "enum": []string{"rule", "definition", "preference", "fact", "pattern", "correction"}}, + "content": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The knowledge content to save"}, + "tags": map[string]interface{}{"type": "array", "items": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "description": "Optional tags for categorization"}, + "source": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Where this knowledge came from"}, + }, + "required": []string{"key", "category", "content"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + key, _ := params["key"].(string) + category, _ := params["category"].(string) + content, _ := params["content"].(string) + source, _ := params["source"].(string) + + if key == "" || category == "" || content == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("key, category, and content are required") + } + + cat := entknowledge.Category(category) + if err := entknowledge.CategoryValidator(cat); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid category %q: %w", category, err) + } + + var tags []string + if rawTags, ok := params["tags"].([]interface{}); ok { + for _, t := range rawTags { + if s, ok := t.(string); ok { + tags = append(tags, s) + } + } + } + + entry := knowledge.KnowledgeEntry{ + Key: key, + Category: cat, + Content: content, + Tags: tags, + Source: source, + } + + if err := store.SaveKnowledge(ctx, "", entry); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("save knowledge: %w", err) + } + + if err := store.SaveAuditLog(ctx, knowledge.AuditEntry{ + Action: "knowledge_save", + Actor: "agent", + Target: key, + }); err != nil { + logger().Warnw("audit log save failed", "action", "knowledge_save", "error", err) + } + + return map[string]interface{}{ + "status": "saved", + "key": key, + "message": fmt.Sprintf("Knowledge '%s' saved successfully", key), + }, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "search_knowledge", + Description: "Search stored knowledge entries by query and optional category", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "query": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Search query"}, + "category": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Optional category filter: rule, definition, preference, or fact"}, + }, + "required": []string{"query"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + query, _ := params["query"].(string) + category, _ := params["category"].(string) + + entries, err := store.SearchKnowledge(ctx, query, category, 10) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("search knowledge: %w", err) + } + + return map[string]interface{}{ + "results": entries, + "count": len(entries), + }, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "save_learning", + Description: "Save a diagnosed error pattern and its fix for future reference", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "trigger": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "What triggered this learning (e.g., tool name or action)"}, + "error_pattern": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The error pattern to match"}, + "diagnosis": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Diagnosis of the error cause"}, + "fix": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The fix or workaround"}, + "category": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Category: tool_error, provider_error, user_correction, timeout, permission, general"}, + }, + "required": []string{"trigger", "fix"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + trigger, _ := params["trigger"].(string) + errorPattern, _ := params["error_pattern"].(string) + diagnosis, _ := params["diagnosis"].(string) + fix, _ := params["fix"].(string) + category, _ := params["category"].(string) + + if trigger == "" || fix == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("trigger and fix are required") + } + if category == "" { + category = "general" + } + + entry := knowledge.LearningEntry{ + Trigger: trigger, + ErrorPattern: errorPattern, + Diagnosis: diagnosis, + Fix: fix, + Category: entlearning.Category(category), + } + + if err := store.SaveLearning(ctx, "", entry); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("save learning: %w", err) + } + + if err := store.SaveAuditLog(ctx, knowledge.AuditEntry{ + Action: "learning_save", + Actor: "agent", + Target: trigger, + }); err != nil { + logger().Warnw("audit log save failed", "action", "learning_save", "error", err) + } + + return map[string]interface{}{ + "status": "saved", + "message": fmt.Sprintf("Learning for '%s' saved successfully", trigger), + }, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "search_learnings", + Description: "Search stored learnings by error pattern or trigger", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "query": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Search query (error message or trigger)"}, + "category": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Optional category filter"}, + }, + "required": []string{"query"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + query, _ := params["query"].(string) + category, _ := params["category"].(string) + + entries, err := store.SearchLearnings(ctx, query, category, 10) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("search learnings: %w", err) + } + + return map[string]interface{}{ + "results": entries, + "count": len(entries), + }, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "create_skill", + Description: "Create a new reusable skill from a multi-step workflow, script, or template", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "name": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Unique name for the skill"}, + "description": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Description of what the skill does"}, + "type": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Skill type: composite, script, or template", "enum": []string{"composite", "script", "template"}}, + "definition": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "JSON string of the skill definition"}, + "parameters": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Optional JSON string of parameter schema"}, + }, + "required": []string{"name", "description", "type", "definition"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + name, _ := params["name"].(string) + description, _ := params["description"].(string) + skillType, _ := params["type"].(string) + definitionStr, _ := params["definition"].(string) + + if name == "" || description == "" || skillType == "" || definitionStr == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("name, description, type, and definition are required") + } + + var definition map[string]interface{} + if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(definitionStr), &definition); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse definition JSON: %w", err) + } + + var parameters map[string]interface{} + if paramStr, ok := params["parameters"].(string); ok && paramStr != "" { + if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(paramStr), ¶meters); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse parameters JSON: %w", err) + } + } + + entry := skill.SkillEntry{ + Name: name, + Description: description, + Type: skill.SkillType(skillType), + Definition: definition, + Parameters: parameters, + Status: skill.SkillStatusActive, + CreatedBy: "agent", + RequiresApproval: false, + } + + if registry == nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("skill system is not enabled") + } + + if err := registry.CreateSkill(ctx, entry); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("create skill: %w", err) + } + + if err := registry.ActivateSkill(ctx, name); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("activate skill: %w", err) + } + + if err := store.SaveAuditLog(ctx, knowledge.AuditEntry{ + Action: "skill_create", + Actor: "agent", + Target: name, + Details: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": skillType, + "status": "active", + }, + }); err != nil { + logger().Warnw("audit log save failed", "action", "skill_create", "error", err) + } + + return map[string]interface{}{ + "status": "active", + "name": name, + "message": fmt.Sprintf("Skill '%s' created and activated", name), + }, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "list_skills", + Description: "List all active skills", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + if registry == nil { + return map[string]interface{}{"skills": []interface{}{}, "count": 0}, nil + } + + skills, err := registry.ListActiveSkills(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("list skills: %w", err) + } + + return map[string]interface{}{ + "skills": skills, + "count": len(skills), + }, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "import_skill", + Description: "Import skills from a GitHub repository or URL. " + + "Supports bulk import (all skills from a repo) or single skill import.", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "url": map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "string", + "description": "GitHub repository URL or direct URL to a SKILL.md file", + }, + "skill_name": map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "string", + "description": "Optional: import only this specific skill from the repo", + }, + }, + "required": []string{"url"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + if registry == nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("skill system is not enabled") + } + + url, _ := params["url"].(string) + skillName, _ := params["skill_name"].(string) + + if url == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("url is required") + } + + importer := skill.NewImporter(logger()) + + if skill.IsGitHubURL(url) { + ref, err := skill.ParseGitHubURL(url) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse GitHub URL: %w", err) + } + + if skillName != "" { + // Single skill import from GitHub (with resource files). + entry, err := importer.ImportSingleWithResources(ctx, ref, skillName, registry.Store()) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("import skill %q: %w", skillName, err) + } + if err := registry.LoadSkills(ctx); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("reload skills: %w", err) + } + go func() { + auditCtx, auditCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second) + defer auditCancel() + if err := store.SaveAuditLog(auditCtx, knowledge.AuditEntry{ + Action: "skill_import", + Actor: "agent", + Target: entry.Name, + Details: map[string]interface{}{ + "source": url, + "type": entry.Type, + }, + }); err != nil { + logger().Warnw("audit log save failed", "action", "skill_import", "error", err) + } + }() + return map[string]interface{}{ + "status": "imported", + "name": entry.Name, + "type": entry.Type, + "message": fmt.Sprintf("Skill '%s' imported from %s", entry.Name, url), + }, nil + } + + // Bulk import from GitHub repo. + importCfg := skill.ImportConfig{ + MaxSkills: skillCfg.MaxBulkImport, + Concurrency: skillCfg.ImportConcurrency, + Timeout: skillCfg.ImportTimeout, + } + result, err := importer.ImportFromRepo(ctx, ref, registry.Store(), importCfg) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("import from repo: %w", err) + } + if err := registry.LoadSkills(ctx); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("reload skills: %w", err) + } + go func() { + auditCtx, auditCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second) + defer auditCancel() + if err := store.SaveAuditLog(auditCtx, knowledge.AuditEntry{ + Action: "skill_import_bulk", + Actor: "agent", + Target: url, + Details: map[string]interface{}{ + "imported": result.Imported, + "skipped": result.Skipped, + "errors": result.Errors, + }, + }); err != nil { + logger().Warnw("audit log save failed", "action", "skill_import_bulk", "error", err) + } + }() + return map[string]interface{}{ + "status": "completed", + "imported": result.Imported, + "skipped": result.Skipped, + "errors": result.Errors, + "message": fmt.Sprintf("Imported %d skills, skipped %d, errors %d", len(result.Imported), len(result.Skipped), len(result.Errors)), + }, nil + } + + // Direct URL import. + raw, err := importer.FetchFromURL(ctx, url) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("fetch from URL: %w", err) + } + entry, err := importer.ImportSingle(ctx, raw, url, registry.Store()) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("import skill: %w", err) + } + if err := registry.LoadSkills(ctx); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("reload skills: %w", err) + } + go func() { + auditCtx, auditCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second) + defer auditCancel() + if err := store.SaveAuditLog(auditCtx, knowledge.AuditEntry{ + Action: "skill_import", + Actor: "agent", + Target: entry.Name, + Details: map[string]interface{}{ + "source": url, + "type": entry.Type, + }, + }); err != nil { + logger().Warnw("audit log save failed", "action", "skill_import", "error", err) + } + }() + return map[string]interface{}{ + "status": "imported", + "name": entry.Name, + "type": entry.Type, + "message": fmt.Sprintf("Skill '%s' imported from %s", entry.Name, url), + }, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "learning_stats", + Description: "Get statistics and briefing about stored learning data including total count, category distribution, average confidence, and date range", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + stats, err := store.GetLearningStats(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("get learning stats: %w", err) + } + return stats, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "learning_cleanup", + Description: "Delete learning entries by criteria (age, confidence, category). Use dry_run=true (default) to preview, dry_run=false to actually delete.", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "category": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Delete only entries in this category"}, + "max_confidence": map[string]interface{}{"type": "number", "description": "Delete entries with confidence at or below this value"}, + "older_than_days": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": "Delete entries older than N days"}, + "id": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Delete a specific entry by UUID"}, + "dry_run": map[string]interface{}{"type": "boolean", "description": "If true (default), only return count of entries that would be deleted"}, + }, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + // Single entry delete by ID. + if idStr, ok := params["id"].(string); ok && idStr != "" { + id, err := uuid.Parse(idStr) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid id: %w", err) + } + dryRun := true + if dr, ok := params["dry_run"].(bool); ok { + dryRun = dr + } + if dryRun { + return map[string]interface{}{"would_delete": 1, "dry_run": true}, nil + } + if err := store.DeleteLearning(ctx, id); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("delete learning: %w", err) + } + return map[string]interface{}{"deleted": 1, "dry_run": false}, nil + } + + // Bulk delete by criteria. + category, _ := params["category"].(string) + var maxConfidence float64 + if mc, ok := params["max_confidence"].(float64); ok { + maxConfidence = mc + } + var olderThan time.Time + if days, ok := params["older_than_days"].(float64); ok && days > 0 { + olderThan = time.Now().AddDate(0, 0, -int(days)) + } + + dryRun := true + if dr, ok := params["dry_run"].(bool); ok { + dryRun = dr + } + + if dryRun { + // Count matching entries without deleting. + _, total, err := store.ListLearnings(ctx, category, 0, olderThan, 0, 0) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("count learnings: %w", err) + } + // Apply maxConfidence filter for count (ListLearnings uses minConfidence). + if maxConfidence > 0 { + _, filteredTotal, err := store.ListLearnings(ctx, category, 0, olderThan, 1, 0) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("count filtered learnings: %w", err) + } + _ = filteredTotal + } + return map[string]interface{}{"would_delete": total, "dry_run": true}, nil + } + + n, err := store.DeleteLearningsWhere(ctx, category, maxConfidence, olderThan) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("delete learnings: %w", err) + } + return map[string]interface{}{"deleted": n, "dry_run": false}, nil + }, + }, + } +} diff --git a/internal/app/tools_p2p.go b/internal/app/tools_p2p.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b5341718 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/app/tools_p2p.go @@ -0,0 +1,545 @@ +package app + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "time" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/agent" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/discovery" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/firewall" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/handshake" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/identity" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/protocol" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/payment" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/wallet" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" + "github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr" +) + +// buildP2PTools creates P2P networking tools. +func buildP2PTools(pc *p2pComponents) []*agent.Tool { + return []*agent.Tool{ + { + Name: "p2p_status", + Description: "Show P2P node status: peer ID, listen addresses, connected peers", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + addrs := pc.node.Multiaddrs() + addrStrs := make([]string, len(addrs)) + for i, a := range addrs { + addrStrs[i] = a.String() + } + connected := pc.node.ConnectedPeers() + peerStrs := make([]string, len(connected)) + for i, p := range connected { + peerStrs[i] = p.String() + } + + // Get local DID if available. + var did string + if pc.identity != nil { + d, err := pc.identity.DID(ctx) + if err == nil && d != nil { + did = d.ID + } + } + + return map[string]interface{}{ + "peerID": pc.node.PeerID().String(), + "did": did, + "listenAddrs": addrStrs, + "connectedPeers": peerStrs, + "peerCount": len(connected), + "sessions": len(pc.sessions.ActiveSessions()), + }, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "p2p_connect", + Description: "Initiate a handshake with a remote peer by multiaddr", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "multiaddr": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The peer's multiaddr (e.g., /ip4/1.2.3.4/tcp/9000/p2p/QmPeer...)"}, + }, + "required": []string{"multiaddr"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + addr, _ := params["multiaddr"].(string) + if addr == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing multiaddr parameter") + } + + // Parse multiaddr and extract peer info. + ma, err := multiaddr.NewMultiaddr(addr) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid multiaddr: %w", err) + } + pi, err := peer.AddrInfoFromP2pAddr(ma) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse peer addr: %w", err) + } + + // Connect to the peer. + if err := pc.node.Host().Connect(ctx, *pi); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connect to peer: %w", err) + } + + // Open a handshake stream. + s, err := pc.node.Host().NewStream(ctx, pi.ID, handshake.ProtocolID) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("open handshake stream: %w", err) + } + defer s.Close() + + // Get local DID. + localDID := "" + if pc.identity != nil { + d, err := pc.identity.DID(ctx) + if err == nil && d != nil { + localDID = d.ID + } + } + + sess, err := pc.handshaker.Initiate(ctx, s, localDID) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("handshake: %w", err) + } + + return map[string]interface{}{ + "status": "connected", + "peerID": pi.ID.String(), + "peerDID": sess.PeerDID, + "zkVerified": sess.ZKVerified, + "expiresAt": sess.ExpiresAt.Format(time.RFC3339), + }, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "p2p_disconnect", + Description: "Disconnect from a peer", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_did": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The peer's DID to disconnect"}, + }, + "required": []string{"peer_did"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + peerDID, _ := params["peer_did"].(string) + if peerDID == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing peer_did parameter") + } + pc.sessions.Remove(peerDID) + return map[string]interface{}{ + "status": "disconnected", + "peerDID": peerDID, + }, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "p2p_peers", + Description: "List connected peers with session info", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + sessions := pc.sessions.ActiveSessions() + peers := make([]map[string]interface{}, 0, len(sessions)) + for _, s := range sessions { + peers = append(peers, map[string]interface{}{ + "peerDID": s.PeerDID, + "zkVerified": s.ZKVerified, + "createdAt": s.CreatedAt.Format(time.RFC3339), + "expiresAt": s.ExpiresAt.Format(time.RFC3339), + }) + } + return map[string]interface{}{"peers": peers, "count": len(peers)}, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "p2p_query", + Description: "Send an inference-only query to a connected peer", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelModerate, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_did": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The peer's DID to query"}, + "tool_name": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Tool to invoke on the remote agent"}, + "params": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "JSON string of parameters for the tool"}, + }, + "required": []string{"peer_did", "tool_name"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + peerDID, _ := params["peer_did"].(string) + toolName, _ := params["tool_name"].(string) + paramStr, _ := params["params"].(string) + + if peerDID == "" || toolName == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("peer_did and tool_name are required") + } + + sess := pc.sessions.Get(peerDID) + if sess == nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("no active session for peer %s", peerDID) + } + + // Parse the peer ID from DID. + did, err := identity.ParseDID(peerDID) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse peer DID: %w", err) + } + + var toolParams map[string]interface{} + if paramStr != "" { + if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(paramStr), &toolParams); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse params JSON: %w", err) + } + } + if toolParams == nil { + toolParams = map[string]interface{}{} + } + + remoteAgent := protocol.NewRemoteAgent(protocol.RemoteAgentConfig{ + Name: "peer-" + peerDID[:16], + DID: peerDID, + PeerID: did.PeerID, + SessionToken: sess.Token, + Host: pc.node.Host(), + Logger: logger(), + }) + + result, err := remoteAgent.InvokeTool(ctx, toolName, toolParams) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("remote tool invoke: %w", err) + } + + return result, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "p2p_firewall_rules", + Description: "List current firewall ACL rules", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + rules := pc.fw.Rules() + ruleList := make([]map[string]interface{}, len(rules)) + for i, r := range rules { + ruleList[i] = map[string]interface{}{ + "peerDID": r.PeerDID, + "action": r.Action, + "tools": r.Tools, + "rateLimit": r.RateLimit, + } + } + return map[string]interface{}{"rules": ruleList, "count": len(rules)}, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "p2p_firewall_add", + Description: "Add a firewall ACL rule", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_did": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Peer DID to apply rule to (* for all)"}, + "action": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "allow or deny", "enum": []string{"allow", "deny"}}, + "tools": map[string]interface{}{"type": "array", "items": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string"}, "description": "Tool name patterns (* for all)"}, + "rate_limit": map[string]interface{}{"type": "integer", "description": "Max requests per minute (0 = unlimited)"}, + }, + "required": []string{"peer_did", "action"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + peerDID, _ := params["peer_did"].(string) + action, _ := params["action"].(string) + if peerDID == "" || action == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("peer_did and action are required") + } + + var tools []string + if raw, ok := params["tools"].([]interface{}); ok { + for _, v := range raw { + if s, ok := v.(string); ok { + tools = append(tools, s) + } + } + } + + var rateLimit int + if rl, ok := params["rate_limit"].(float64); ok { + rateLimit = int(rl) + } + + rule := firewall.ACLRule{ + PeerDID: peerDID, + Action: firewall.ACLAction(action), + Tools: tools, + RateLimit: rateLimit, + } + if err := pc.fw.AddRule(rule); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("add firewall rule: %w", err) + } + + return map[string]interface{}{ + "status": "added", + "message": fmt.Sprintf("Firewall rule added: %s %s", action, peerDID), + }, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "p2p_firewall_remove", + Description: "Remove all firewall rules for a peer DID", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_did": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Peer DID to remove rules for"}, + }, + "required": []string{"peer_did"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + peerDID, _ := params["peer_did"].(string) + if peerDID == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing peer_did parameter") + } + removed := pc.fw.RemoveRule(peerDID) + return map[string]interface{}{ + "status": "removed", + "count": removed, + "message": fmt.Sprintf("Removed %d rules for %s", removed, peerDID), + }, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "p2p_price_query", + Description: "Query pricing for a specific tool on a remote peer before invoking it", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_did": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The remote peer's DID"}, + "tool_name": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The tool to query pricing for"}, + }, + "required": []string{"peer_did", "tool_name"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + peerDID, _ := params["peer_did"].(string) + toolName, _ := params["tool_name"].(string) + if peerDID == "" || toolName == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("peer_did and tool_name are required") + } + + sess := pc.sessions.Get(peerDID) + if sess == nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("no active session for peer %s — connect first", peerDID) + } + + did, err := identity.ParseDID(peerDID) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse peer DID: %w", err) + } + + remoteAgent := protocol.NewRemoteAgent(protocol.RemoteAgentConfig{ + Name: "peer-" + peerDID[:16], + DID: peerDID, + PeerID: did.PeerID, + SessionToken: sess.Token, + Host: pc.node.Host(), + Logger: logger(), + }) + + quote, err := remoteAgent.QueryPrice(ctx, toolName) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("price query: %w", err) + } + + return map[string]interface{}{ + "toolName": quote.ToolName, + "price": quote.Price, + "currency": quote.Currency, + "usdcContract": quote.USDCContract, + "chainId": quote.ChainID, + "sellerAddr": quote.SellerAddr, + "quoteExpiry": quote.QuoteExpiry, + "isFree": quote.IsFree, + }, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "p2p_reputation", + Description: "Check a peer's trust score and exchange history", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_did": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The peer's DID to check reputation for"}, + }, + "required": []string{"peer_did"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + peerDID, _ := params["peer_did"].(string) + if peerDID == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("peer_did is required") + } + + if pc.reputation == nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("reputation system not available (requires database)") + } + + details, err := pc.reputation.GetDetails(ctx, peerDID) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("get reputation: %w", err) + } + + if details == nil { + return map[string]interface{}{ + "peerDID": peerDID, + "score": 0.0, + "isTrusted": true, + "message": "new peer — no reputation record", + }, nil + } + + return map[string]interface{}{ + "peerDID": details.PeerDID, + "trustScore": details.TrustScore, + "isTrusted": details.TrustScore >= 0.3, + "successfulExchanges": details.SuccessfulExchanges, + "failedExchanges": details.FailedExchanges, + "timeoutCount": details.TimeoutCount, + "firstSeen": details.FirstSeen.Format(time.RFC3339), + "lastInteraction": details.LastInteraction.Format(time.RFC3339), + }, nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "p2p_discover", + Description: "Discover peers by capability or tags", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "capability": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Capability to search for"}, + }, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + capability, _ := params["capability"].(string) + + if pc.gossip == nil { + return map[string]interface{}{"peers": []interface{}{}, "count": 0, "message": "gossip not enabled"}, nil + } + + var cards []*discovery.GossipCard + if capability != "" { + cards = pc.gossip.FindByCapability(capability) + } else { + cards = pc.gossip.KnownPeers() + } + + peers := make([]map[string]interface{}, 0, len(cards)) + for _, c := range cards { + peers = append(peers, map[string]interface{}{ + "name": c.Name, + "did": c.DID, + "capabilities": c.Capabilities, + "pricing": c.Pricing, + "peerID": c.PeerID, + "timestamp": c.Timestamp.Format(time.RFC3339), + }) + } + return map[string]interface{}{"peers": peers, "count": len(peers)}, nil + }, + }, + } +} + +// buildP2PPaymentTool creates the p2p_pay tool for peer-to-peer USDC payments. +func buildP2PPaymentTool(p2pc *p2pComponents, pc *paymentComponents) []*agent.Tool { + if pc == nil || pc.service == nil { + return nil + } + + return []*agent.Tool{ + { + Name: "p2p_pay", + Description: "Send USDC payment to a connected peer for their services", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "peer_did": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The recipient peer's DID"}, + "amount": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Amount in USDC (e.g., '0.50')"}, + "memo": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Payment memo/reason"}, + }, + "required": []string{"peer_did", "amount"}, + }, + Handler: func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + peerDID, _ := params["peer_did"].(string) + amount, _ := params["amount"].(string) + memo, _ := params["memo"].(string) + + if peerDID == "" || amount == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("peer_did and amount are required") + } + + // Verify session exists for this peer. + sess := p2pc.sessions.Get(peerDID) + if sess == nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("no active session for peer %s — connect first", peerDID) + } + + // Get the peer's wallet address from their DID. + did, err := identity.ParseDID(peerDID) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse peer DID: %w", err) + } + + // Derive Ethereum address from compressed public key. + recipientAddr := fmt.Sprintf("0x%x", did.PublicKey[:20]) + + if memo == "" { + memo = "P2P payment" + } + + sessionKey := session.SessionKeyFromContext(ctx) + receipt, err := pc.service.Send(ctx, payment.PaymentRequest{ + To: recipientAddr, + Amount: amount, + Purpose: memo, + SessionKey: sessionKey, + }) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("send payment: %w", err) + } + + return map[string]interface{}{ + "status": receipt.Status, + "txHash": receipt.TxHash, + "from": receipt.From, + "to": receipt.To, + "peerDID": peerDID, + "amount": receipt.Amount, + "currency": wallet.CurrencyUSDC, + "chainId": receipt.ChainID, + "memo": memo, + "timestamp": receipt.Timestamp.Format(time.RFC3339), + }, nil + }, + }, + } +} diff --git a/internal/app/tools_security.go b/internal/app/tools_security.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..24a7d16d --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/app/tools_security.go @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +package app + +import ( + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/agent" + toolcrypto "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/tools/crypto" + toolsecrets "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/tools/secrets" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/security" +) + +// buildCryptoTools wraps crypto.Tool methods as agent tools. +func buildCryptoTools(crypto security.CryptoProvider, keys *security.KeyRegistry, refs *security.RefStore, scanner *agent.SecretScanner) []*agent.Tool { + ct := toolcrypto.New(crypto, keys, refs, scanner) + return []*agent.Tool{ + { + Name: "crypto_encrypt", + Description: "Encrypt data using a registered key", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "data": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The data to encrypt"}, + "keyId": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Key ID to use (default: default key)"}, + }, + "required": []string{"data"}, + }, + Handler: ct.Encrypt, + }, + { + Name: "crypto_decrypt", + Description: "Decrypt data using a registered key. Returns an opaque {{decrypt:id}} reference token. The decrypted value never enters the agent context.", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "ciphertext": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Base64-encoded ciphertext to decrypt"}, + "keyId": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Key ID to use (default: default key)"}, + }, + "required": []string{"ciphertext"}, + }, + Handler: ct.Decrypt, + }, + { + Name: "crypto_sign", + Description: "Generate a digital signature for data", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "data": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The data to sign"}, + "keyId": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Key ID to use"}, + }, + "required": []string{"data"}, + }, + Handler: ct.Sign, + }, + { + Name: "crypto_hash", + Description: "Compute a cryptographic hash of data", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "data": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The data to hash"}, + "algorithm": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Hash algorithm: sha256 or sha512", "enum": []string{"sha256", "sha512"}}, + }, + "required": []string{"data"}, + }, + Handler: ct.Hash, + }, + { + Name: "crypto_keys", + Description: "List all registered cryptographic keys", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{}, + }, + Handler: ct.Keys, + }, + } +} + +// buildSecretsTools wraps secrets.Tool methods as agent tools. +func buildSecretsTools(secretsStore *security.SecretsStore, refs *security.RefStore, scanner *agent.SecretScanner) []*agent.Tool { + st := toolsecrets.New(secretsStore, refs, scanner) + return []*agent.Tool{ + { + Name: "secrets_store", + Description: "Encrypt and store a secret value", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "name": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Unique name for the secret"}, + "value": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "The secret value to store"}, + }, + "required": []string{"name", "value"}, + }, + Handler: st.Store, + }, + { + Name: "secrets_get", + Description: "Retrieve a stored secret as a reference token. Returns an opaque {{secret:name}} token that is resolved at execution time by exec tools. The actual secret value never enters the agent context.", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "name": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Name of the secret to retrieve"}, + }, + "required": []string{"name"}, + }, + Handler: st.Get, + }, + { + Name: "secrets_list", + Description: "List all stored secrets (metadata only, no values)", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{}, + }, + Handler: st.List, + }, + { + Name: "secrets_delete", + Description: "Delete a stored secret", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{ + "type": "object", + "properties": map[string]interface{}{ + "name": map[string]interface{}{"type": "string", "description": "Name of the secret to delete"}, + }, + "required": []string{"name"}, + }, + Handler: st.Delete, + }, + } +} diff --git a/internal/app/tools_test.go b/internal/app/tools_test.go index 9f4538f4..db3b0de1 100644 --- a/internal/app/tools_test.go +++ b/internal/app/tools_test.go @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ package app -import "testing" +import ( + "strings" + "testing" +) func TestBlockLangoExec_SkillGuards(t *testing.T) { tests := []struct { @@ -52,3 +55,79 @@ func TestBlockLangoExec_SkillGuards(t *testing.T) { }) } } + +func TestBlockLangoExec_AllSubcommands(t *testing.T) { + auto := map[string]bool{"cron": true, "background": true, "workflow": true} + + tests := []struct { + give string + wantBlocked bool + wantContain string // substring expected in the message + }{ + // Phase 1: subcommands with in-process tool equivalents + {give: "lango cron list", wantBlocked: true, wantContain: "cron_"}, + {give: "lango bg submit", wantBlocked: true, wantContain: "bg_"}, + {give: "lango background list", wantBlocked: true, wantContain: "bg_"}, + {give: "lango workflow run", wantBlocked: true, wantContain: "workflow_"}, + {give: "lango graph query", wantBlocked: true, wantContain: "graph_"}, + {give: "lango memory list", wantBlocked: true, wantContain: "memory_"}, + {give: "lango p2p status", wantBlocked: true, wantContain: "p2p_"}, + {give: "lango security keyring status", wantBlocked: true, wantContain: "crypto_"}, + {give: "lango payment send", wantBlocked: true, wantContain: "payment_"}, + + // Phase 2: catch-all for subcommands without in-process equivalents + {give: "lango config list", wantBlocked: true, wantContain: "passphrase"}, + {give: "lango doctor", wantBlocked: true, wantContain: "passphrase"}, + {give: "lango serve", wantBlocked: true, wantContain: "passphrase"}, + {give: "lango settings", wantBlocked: true, wantContain: "passphrase"}, + {give: "lango onboard", wantBlocked: true, wantContain: "passphrase"}, + {give: "lango agent list", wantBlocked: true, wantContain: "passphrase"}, + {give: "lango", wantBlocked: true, wantContain: "passphrase"}, + {give: "LANGO SECURITY DB-MIGRATE", wantBlocked: true, wantContain: "crypto_"}, + + // Not blocked: non-lango commands + {give: "ls -la", wantBlocked: false}, + {give: "go build ./...", wantBlocked: false}, + {give: "echo lango", wantBlocked: false}, + {give: "cat lango.yaml", wantBlocked: false}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + msg := blockLangoExec(tt.give, auto) + gotBlocked := msg != "" + if gotBlocked != tt.wantBlocked { + t.Errorf("blockLangoExec(%q): blocked=%v, want %v (msg=%q)", + tt.give, gotBlocked, tt.wantBlocked, msg) + } + if tt.wantContain != "" && !strings.Contains(msg, tt.wantContain) { + t.Errorf("blockLangoExec(%q): message %q does not contain %q", + tt.give, msg, tt.wantContain) + } + }) + } +} + +func TestBlockLangoExec_DisabledFeature(t *testing.T) { + // When automation features are disabled, cron/bg/workflow guards + // should still block but suggest enabling the feature. + auto := map[string]bool{} + + msg := blockLangoExec("lango cron list", auto) + if msg == "" { + t.Fatal("expected blocked message for disabled cron") + } + if !strings.Contains(msg, "Enable the") { + t.Errorf("expected 'Enable the' suggestion, got: %s", msg) + } + + // Non-automation guards (graph, memory, etc.) should always block + // regardless of automation flags. + msg = blockLangoExec("lango graph query", auto) + if msg == "" { + t.Fatal("expected blocked message for graph") + } + if strings.Contains(msg, "Enable the") { + t.Errorf("graph guard should not suggest enabling a feature, got: %s", msg) + } +} diff --git a/internal/app/types.go b/internal/app/types.go index 96dad41d..b047b8fc 100644 --- a/internal/app/types.go +++ b/internal/app/types.go @@ -12,11 +12,13 @@ import ( cronpkg "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cron" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/embedding" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/gateway" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/lifecycle" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/graph" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/knowledge" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/learning" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/librarian" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/memory" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/payment" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/security" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" @@ -85,9 +87,15 @@ type App struct { // Workflow Engine Components (optional) WorkflowEngine *workflow.Engine + // P2P Components (optional) + P2PNode *p2p.Node + // Channels Channels []Channel + // Lifecycle registry manages component startup/shutdown ordering. + registry *lifecycle.Registry + // wg tracks background goroutines for graceful shutdown wg sync.WaitGroup } diff --git a/internal/app/wiring.go b/internal/app/wiring.go index d27b664f..38e49310 100644 --- a/internal/app/wiring.go +++ b/internal/app/wiring.go @@ -3,41 +3,23 @@ package app import ( "context" "fmt" - "os" "path/filepath" "strings" - "time" - - "database/sql" - - "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethclient" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/a2a" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/adk" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/agent" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/background" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" - cronpkg "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cron" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/embedding" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/gateway" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/graph" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/knowledge" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/learning" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/librarian" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/memory" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/orchestration" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/payment" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/prompt" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/provider" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/security" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/skill" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/supervisor" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/wallet" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/workflow" - x402pkg "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/x402" - "github.com/langoai/lango/skills" "google.golang.org/adk/model" adk_tool "google.golang.org/adk/tool" ) @@ -174,406 +156,42 @@ func initSecurity(cfg *config.Config, store session.Store, boot *bootstrap.Resul case "enclave": return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("enclave provider not yet implemented") - default: - return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown security provider: %s", cfg.Security.Signer.Provider) - } -} - -// knowledgeComponents holds optional self-learning components. -type knowledgeComponents struct { - store *knowledge.Store - engine *learning.Engine - observer learning.ToolResultObserver -} - -// initKnowledge creates the self-learning components if enabled. -// When gc is provided, a GraphEngine is used as the observer instead of the base Engine. -func initKnowledge(cfg *config.Config, store session.Store, gc *graphComponents) *knowledgeComponents { - if !cfg.Knowledge.Enabled { - logger().Info("knowledge system disabled") - return nil - } - - entStore, ok := store.(*session.EntStore) - if !ok { - logger().Warn("knowledge system requires EntStore, skipping") - return nil - } - - client := entStore.Client() - kLogger := logger() - - kStore := knowledge.NewStore(client, kLogger) - - engine := learning.NewEngine(kStore, kLogger) - - // Select observer: GraphEngine when graph store is available, otherwise base Engine. - var observer learning.ToolResultObserver = engine - if gc != nil { - graphEngine := learning.NewGraphEngine(kStore, gc.store, kLogger) - graphEngine.SetGraphCallback(func(triples []graph.Triple) { - gc.buffer.Enqueue(graph.GraphRequest{Triples: triples}) - }) - observer = graphEngine - logger().Info("graph-enhanced learning engine initialized") - } - - logger().Info("knowledge system initialized") - return &knowledgeComponents{ - store: kStore, - engine: engine, - observer: observer, - } -} - -// initSkills creates the file-based skill registry. -func initSkills(cfg *config.Config, baseTools []*agent.Tool) *skill.Registry { - if !cfg.Skill.Enabled { - logger().Info("skill system disabled") - return nil - } - - dir := cfg.Skill.SkillsDir - if dir == "" { - dir = "~/.lango/skills" - } - // Expand ~ to home directory. - if len(dir) > 1 && dir[:2] == "~/" { - if home, err := os.UserHomeDir(); err == nil { - dir = filepath.Join(home, dir[2:]) - } - } - - sLogger := logger() - store := skill.NewFileSkillStore(dir, sLogger) - - // Deploy embedded default skills. - defaultFS, err := skills.DefaultFS() - if err == nil { - if err := store.EnsureDefaults(defaultFS); err != nil { - sLogger.Warnw("deploy default skills error", "error", err) - } - } - - registry := skill.NewRegistry(store, baseTools, sLogger) - ctx := context.Background() - if err := registry.LoadSkills(ctx); err != nil { - sLogger.Warnw("load skills error", "error", err) - } - - sLogger.Infow("skill system initialized", "dir", dir) - return registry -} - -// memoryComponents holds optional observational memory components. -type memoryComponents struct { - store *memory.Store - observer *memory.Observer - reflector *memory.Reflector - buffer *memory.Buffer -} - -// providerTextGenerator adapts a supervisor.ProviderProxy to the memory.TextGenerator interface. -type providerTextGenerator struct { - proxy *supervisor.ProviderProxy -} - -func (g *providerTextGenerator) GenerateText(ctx context.Context, systemPrompt, userPrompt string) (string, error) { - params := provider.GenerateParams{ - Messages: []provider.Message{ - {Role: "system", Content: systemPrompt}, - {Role: "user", Content: userPrompt}, - }, - } - - stream, err := g.proxy.Generate(ctx, params) - if err != nil { - return "", fmt.Errorf("generate text: %w", err) - } - - var result strings.Builder - for evt, err := range stream { + case "aws-kms", "gcp-kms", "azure-kv", "pkcs11": + kmsProvider, err := security.NewKMSProvider(security.KMSProviderName(cfg.Security.Signer.Provider), cfg.Security.KMS) if err != nil { - return "", fmt.Errorf("stream text: %w", err) + return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("KMS provider %q: %w", cfg.Security.Signer.Provider, err) } - if evt.Type == provider.StreamEventPlainText { - result.WriteString(evt.Text) - } - if evt.Type == provider.StreamEventError && evt.Error != nil { - return "", evt.Error - } - } - return result.String(), nil -} - -// initMemory creates the observational memory components if enabled. -func initMemory(cfg *config.Config, store session.Store, sv *supervisor.Supervisor) *memoryComponents { - if !cfg.ObservationalMemory.Enabled { - logger().Info("observational memory disabled") - return nil - } - - entStore, ok := store.(*session.EntStore) - if !ok { - logger().Warn("observational memory requires EntStore, skipping") - return nil - } - - client := entStore.Client() - mLogger := logger() - mStore := memory.NewStore(client, mLogger) - - // Create provider proxy for observer/reflector LLM calls - provider := cfg.ObservationalMemory.Provider - if provider == "" { - provider = cfg.Agent.Provider - } - omModel := cfg.ObservationalMemory.Model - if omModel == "" { - omModel = cfg.Agent.Model - } - - proxy := supervisor.NewProviderProxy(sv, provider, omModel) - generator := &providerTextGenerator{proxy: proxy} - - observer := memory.NewObserver(generator, mStore, mLogger) - reflector := memory.NewReflector(generator, mStore, mLogger) - - // Apply defaults for thresholds - msgThreshold := cfg.ObservationalMemory.MessageTokenThreshold - if msgThreshold <= 0 { - msgThreshold = 1000 - } - obsThreshold := cfg.ObservationalMemory.ObservationTokenThreshold - if obsThreshold <= 0 { - obsThreshold = 2000 - } - - // Message provider retrieves messages for a session key - getMessages := func(sessionKey string) ([]session.Message, error) { - sess, err := store.Get(sessionKey) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - if sess == nil { - return nil, nil - } - return sess.History, nil - } - - buffer := memory.NewBuffer(observer, reflector, mStore, msgThreshold, obsThreshold, getMessages, mLogger) - - logger().Infow("observational memory initialized", - "provider", provider, - "model", omModel, - "messageTokenThreshold", msgThreshold, - "observationTokenThreshold", obsThreshold, - ) - - return &memoryComponents{ - store: mStore, - observer: observer, - reflector: reflector, - buffer: buffer, - } -} - -// initConversationAnalysis creates the conversation analysis pipeline if both -// knowledge and observational memory are enabled. -func initConversationAnalysis(cfg *config.Config, sv *supervisor.Supervisor, store session.Store, kc *knowledgeComponents, gc *graphComponents) *learning.AnalysisBuffer { - if kc == nil { - return nil - } - if !cfg.ObservationalMemory.Enabled { - return nil - } - - // Create LLM proxy reusing the observational memory provider/model. - omProvider := cfg.ObservationalMemory.Provider - if omProvider == "" { - omProvider = cfg.Agent.Provider - } - omModel := cfg.ObservationalMemory.Model - if omModel == "" { - omModel = cfg.Agent.Model - } - - proxy := supervisor.NewProviderProxy(sv, omProvider, omModel) - generator := &providerTextGenerator{proxy: proxy} - aLogger := logger() - - analyzer := learning.NewConversationAnalyzer(generator, kc.store, aLogger) - learner := learning.NewSessionLearner(generator, kc.store, aLogger) - - // Wire graph callbacks if graph store is available. - if gc != nil && gc.buffer != nil { - graphCB := func(triples []graph.Triple) { - gc.buffer.Enqueue(graph.GraphRequest{Triples: triples}) + if boot == nil || boot.DBClient == nil { + return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("KMS security provider requires bootstrap") } - analyzer.SetGraphCallback(graphCB) - learner.SetGraphCallback(graphCB) - } - // Message provider. - getMessages := func(sessionKey string) ([]session.Message, error) { - sess, err := store.Get(sessionKey) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - if sess == nil { - return nil, nil + keys := security.NewKeyRegistry(boot.DBClient) + ctx := context.Background() + if _, err := keys.RegisterKey(ctx, "kms-default", cfg.Security.KMS.KeyID, security.KeyTypeEncryption); err != nil { + return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("register KMS key: %w", err) } - return sess.History, nil - } - - turnThreshold := cfg.Knowledge.AnalysisTurnThreshold - tokenThreshold := cfg.Knowledge.AnalysisTokenThreshold - - buf := learning.NewAnalysisBuffer(analyzer, learner, getMessages, turnThreshold, tokenThreshold, aLogger) - logger().Infow("conversation analysis initialized", - "turnThreshold", turnThreshold, - "tokenThreshold", tokenThreshold, - ) + var finalProvider = kmsProvider - return buf -} - -// graphComponents holds optional graph store components. -type graphComponents struct { - store graph.Store - buffer *graph.GraphBuffer - ragService *graph.GraphRAGService -} - -// initGraphStore creates the graph store if enabled. -func initGraphStore(cfg *config.Config) *graphComponents { - if !cfg.Graph.Enabled { - logger().Info("graph store disabled") - return nil - } - - dbPath := cfg.Graph.DatabasePath - if dbPath == "" { - // Default: graph.db next to session database. - if cfg.Session.DatabasePath != "" { - dbPath = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(cfg.Session.DatabasePath), "graph.db") + // Wrap with CompositeCryptoProvider for fallback when configured. + if cfg.Security.KMS.FallbackToLocal && boot.Crypto != nil { + checker := security.NewKMSHealthChecker(kmsProvider, cfg.Security.KMS.KeyID, 0) + finalProvider = security.NewCompositeCryptoProvider(kmsProvider, boot.Crypto, checker) + logger().Infow("security initialized (KMS provider with local fallback)", + "provider", cfg.Security.Signer.Provider, + "keyID", cfg.Security.KMS.KeyID) } else { - dbPath = "graph.db" + logger().Infow("security initialized (KMS provider)", + "provider", cfg.Security.Signer.Provider, + "keyID", cfg.Security.KMS.KeyID) } - } - - store, err := graph.NewBoltStore(dbPath) - if err != nil { - logger().Warnw("graph store init error, skipping", "error", err) - return nil - } - - buffer := graph.NewGraphBuffer(store, logger()) - - logger().Infow("graph store initialized", "backend", "bolt", "path", dbPath) - return &graphComponents{ - store: store, - buffer: buffer, - } -} - -// embeddingComponents holds optional embedding/RAG components. -type embeddingComponents struct { - buffer *embedding.EmbeddingBuffer - ragService *embedding.RAGService -} - -// initEmbedding creates the embedding pipeline and RAG service if configured. -func initEmbedding(cfg *config.Config, rawDB *sql.DB, kc *knowledgeComponents, mc *memoryComponents) *embeddingComponents { - emb := cfg.Embedding - if emb.Provider == "" && emb.ProviderID == "" { - logger().Info("embedding system disabled (no provider configured)") - return nil - } - - backendType, apiKey := cfg.ResolveEmbeddingProvider() - if backendType == "" { - logger().Warnw("embedding provider type could not be resolved", - "providerID", emb.ProviderID, "provider", emb.Provider) - return nil - } - - providerCfg := embedding.ProviderConfig{ - Provider: backendType, - Model: emb.Model, - Dimensions: emb.Dimensions, - APIKey: apiKey, - BaseURL: emb.Local.BaseURL, - } - if backendType == "local" && emb.Local.Model != "" { - providerCfg.Model = emb.Local.Model - } - - registry, err := embedding.NewRegistry(providerCfg, nil, logger()) - if err != nil { - logger().Warnw("embedding provider init failed, skipping", "error", err) - return nil - } - provider := registry.Provider() - dimensions := provider.Dimensions() + secrets := security.NewSecretsStore(boot.DBClient, keys, finalProvider) + return finalProvider, keys, secrets, nil - // Create vector store using the shared database. - if rawDB == nil { - logger().Warn("embedding requires raw DB handle, skipping") - return nil - } - vecStore, err := embedding.NewSQLiteVecStore(rawDB, dimensions) - if err != nil { - logger().Warnw("sqlite-vec store init failed, skipping", "error", err) - return nil - } - - embLogger := logger() - - // Create buffer. - buffer := embedding.NewEmbeddingBuffer(provider, vecStore, embLogger) - - // Create resolver and RAG service. - var ks *knowledge.Store - var ms *memory.Store - if kc != nil { - ks = kc.store - } - if mc != nil { - ms = mc.store - } - resolver := embedding.NewStoreResolver(ks, ms) - ragService := embedding.NewRAGService(provider, vecStore, resolver, embLogger) - - // Wire embed callbacks into stores so saves trigger async embedding. - embedCB := func(id, collection, content string, metadata map[string]string) { - buffer.Enqueue(embedding.EmbedRequest{ - ID: id, - Collection: collection, - Content: content, - Metadata: metadata, - }) - } - if kc != nil { - kc.store.SetEmbedCallback(embedCB) - } - if mc != nil { - mc.store.SetEmbedCallback(embedCB) - } - - logger().Infow("embedding system initialized", - "provider", backendType, - "providerID", emb.ProviderID, - "dimensions", dimensions, - "ragEnabled", emb.RAG.Enabled, - ) - - return &embeddingComponents{ - buffer: buffer, - ragService: ragService, + default: + return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown security provider: %s", cfg.Security.Signer.Provider) } } @@ -680,6 +298,9 @@ func initAgent(ctx context.Context, sv *supervisor.Supervisor, cfg *config.Confi maxObs = 20 } ctxAdapter.WithMemoryLimits(maxRef, maxObs) + if cfg.ObservationalMemory.MemoryTokenBudget > 0 { + ctxAdapter.WithMemoryTokenBudget(cfg.ObservationalMemory.MemoryTokenBudget) + } } // Wire in RAG if available and enabled @@ -716,6 +337,9 @@ func initAgent(ctx context.Context, sv *supervisor.Supervisor, cfg *config.Confi maxObs = 20 } ctxAdapter.WithMemoryLimits(maxRef, maxObs) + if cfg.ObservationalMemory.MemoryTokenBudget > 0 { + ctxAdapter.WithMemoryTokenBudget(cfg.ObservationalMemory.MemoryTokenBudget) + } // Wire in RAG if available and enabled if ec != nil && cfg.Embedding.RAG.Enabled { @@ -776,7 +400,7 @@ func initAgent(ctx context.Context, sv *supervisor.Supervisor, cfg *config.Confi Model: llm, SystemPrompt: orchestratorPrompt, AdaptTool: adk.AdaptTool, - MaxDelegationRounds: 5, + MaxDelegationRounds: cfg.Agent.MaxDelegationRounds, SubAgentPrompt: buildSubAgentPromptFunc(&cfg.Agent), } @@ -796,7 +420,9 @@ func initAgent(ctx context.Context, sv *supervisor.Supervisor, cfg *config.Confi return nil, fmt.Errorf("build agent tree: %w", err) } - adkAgent, err := adk.NewAgentFromADK(agentTree, store) + // Build agent options for multi-agent mode. + agentOpts := buildAgentOptions(cfg, kc) + adkAgent, err := adk.NewAgentFromADK(agentTree, store, agentOpts...) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("adk multi-agent: %w", err) } @@ -805,13 +431,38 @@ func initAgent(ctx context.Context, sv *supervisor.Supervisor, cfg *config.Confi // Single-agent mode (default). logger().Info("initializing agent runtime (ADK)...") - adkAgent, err := adk.NewAgent(ctx, adkTools, llm, systemPrompt, store) + agentOpts := buildAgentOptions(cfg, kc) + adkAgent, err := adk.NewAgent(ctx, adkTools, llm, systemPrompt, store, agentOpts...) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("adk agent: %w", err) } return adkAgent, nil } +// buildAgentOptions constructs AgentOption slice from config and knowledge components. +func buildAgentOptions(cfg *config.Config, kc *knowledgeComponents) []adk.AgentOption { + var opts []adk.AgentOption + + // Token budget derived from the configured model. + opts = append(opts, adk.WithAgentTokenBudget(adk.ModelTokenBudget(cfg.Agent.Model))) + + // Max turns (0 = use agent default). + if cfg.Agent.MaxTurns > 0 { + opts = append(opts, adk.WithAgentMaxTurns(cfg.Agent.MaxTurns)) + } + + // Error correction: enabled by default when knowledge system is available. + errorCorrectionEnabled := true + if cfg.Agent.ErrorCorrectionEnabled != nil { + errorCorrectionEnabled = *cfg.Agent.ErrorCorrectionEnabled + } + if errorCorrectionEnabled && kc != nil && kc.engine != nil { + opts = append(opts, adk.WithAgentErrorFixProvider(kc.engine)) + } + + return opts +} + // initGateway creates the gateway server. func initGateway(cfg *config.Config, adkAgent *adk.Agent, store session.Store, auth *gateway.AuthManager) *gateway.Server { return gateway.New(gateway.Config{ @@ -824,523 +475,6 @@ func initGateway(cfg *config.Config, adkAgent *adk.Agent, store session.Store, a }, adkAgent, nil, store, auth) } -// wireGraphCallbacks connects graph store callbacks to knowledge and memory stores. -// It also creates the Entity Extractor pipeline and Memory GraphHooks. -func wireGraphCallbacks(gc *graphComponents, kc *knowledgeComponents, mc *memoryComponents, sv *supervisor.Supervisor, cfg *config.Config) { - if gc == nil || gc.buffer == nil { - return - } - - // Create Entity Extractor for async triple extraction from content. - var extractor *graph.Extractor - if sv != nil { - provider := cfg.Agent.Provider - mdl := cfg.Agent.Model - proxy := supervisor.NewProviderProxy(sv, provider, mdl) - generator := &providerTextGenerator{proxy: proxy} - extractor = graph.NewExtractor(generator, logger()) - logger().Info("graph entity extractor initialized") - } - - graphCB := func(id, collection, content string, metadata map[string]string) { - // Basic containment triple. - gc.buffer.Enqueue(graph.GraphRequest{ - Triples: []graph.Triple{ - { - Subject: collection + ":" + id, - Predicate: graph.Contains, - Object: "collection:" + collection, - Metadata: metadata, - }, - }, - }) - - // Async entity extraction via LLM. - if extractor != nil && content != "" { - go func() { - ctx := context.Background() - triples, err := extractor.Extract(ctx, content, id) - if err != nil { - logger().Debugw("entity extraction error", "id", id, "error", err) - return - } - if len(triples) > 0 { - gc.buffer.Enqueue(graph.GraphRequest{Triples: triples}) - } - }() - } - } - - if kc != nil { - kc.store.SetGraphCallback(graphCB) - } - if mc != nil { - mc.store.SetGraphCallback(graphCB) - - // Wire Memory GraphHooks for temporal/session triples. - tripleCallback := func(triples []graph.Triple) { - gc.buffer.Enqueue(graph.GraphRequest{Triples: triples}) - } - hooks := memory.NewGraphHooks(tripleCallback, logger()) - mc.store.SetGraphHooks(hooks) - logger().Info("memory graph hooks wired") - } -} - -// initGraphRAG creates the Graph RAG service if both graph store and vector RAG are available. -func initGraphRAG(cfg *config.Config, gc *graphComponents, ec *embeddingComponents) { - if gc == nil || ec == nil || ec.ragService == nil { - return - } - - maxDepth := cfg.Graph.MaxTraversalDepth - if maxDepth <= 0 { - maxDepth = 2 - } - maxExpand := cfg.Graph.MaxExpansionResults - if maxExpand <= 0 { - maxExpand = 10 - } - - // Create a VectorRetriever adapter from embedding.RAGService. - adapter := &ragServiceAdapter{inner: ec.ragService} - - gc.ragService = graph.NewGraphRAGService(adapter, gc.store, maxDepth, maxExpand, logger()) - logger().Info("graph RAG hybrid retrieval initialized") -} - -// ragServiceAdapter adapts embedding.RAGService to graph.VectorRetriever interface. -type ragServiceAdapter struct { - inner *embedding.RAGService -} - -func (a *ragServiceAdapter) Retrieve(ctx context.Context, query string, opts graph.VectorRetrieveOptions) ([]graph.VectorResult, error) { - embOpts := embedding.RetrieveOptions{ - Collections: opts.Collections, - Limit: opts.Limit, - SessionKey: opts.SessionKey, - MaxDistance: opts.MaxDistance, - } - - results, err := a.inner.Retrieve(ctx, query, embOpts) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - graphResults := make([]graph.VectorResult, len(results)) - for i, r := range results { - graphResults[i] = graph.VectorResult{ - Collection: r.Collection, - SourceID: r.SourceID, - Content: r.Content, - Distance: r.Distance, - } - } - return graphResults, nil -} - -// paymentComponents holds optional blockchain payment components. -type paymentComponents struct { - wallet wallet.WalletProvider - service *payment.Service - limiter wallet.SpendingLimiter - secrets *security.SecretsStore - chainID int64 -} - -// initPayment creates the payment components if enabled. -// Follows the same graceful degradation pattern as initGraphStore. -func initPayment(cfg *config.Config, store session.Store, secrets *security.SecretsStore) *paymentComponents { - if !cfg.Payment.Enabled { - logger().Info("payment system disabled") - return nil - } - - if secrets == nil { - logger().Warn("payment system requires security.signer, skipping") - return nil - } - - entStore, ok := store.(*session.EntStore) - if !ok { - logger().Warn("payment system requires EntStore, skipping") - return nil - } - - client := entStore.Client() - - // Create RPC client for blockchain interaction - rpcClient, err := ethclient.Dial(cfg.Payment.Network.RPCURL) - if err != nil { - logger().Warnw("payment RPC connection failed, skipping", "error", err, "rpcUrl", cfg.Payment.Network.RPCURL) - return nil - } - - // Create wallet provider based on configuration - var wp wallet.WalletProvider - switch cfg.Payment.WalletProvider { - case "local": - wp = wallet.NewLocalWallet(secrets, cfg.Payment.Network.RPCURL, cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID) - case "rpc": - wp = wallet.NewRPCWallet() - case "composite": - local := wallet.NewLocalWallet(secrets, cfg.Payment.Network.RPCURL, cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID) - rpc := wallet.NewRPCWallet() - wp = wallet.NewCompositeWallet(rpc, local, nil) - default: - logger().Warnw("unknown wallet provider, using local", "provider", cfg.Payment.WalletProvider) - wp = wallet.NewLocalWallet(secrets, cfg.Payment.Network.RPCURL, cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID) - } - - // Create spending limiter - limiter, err := wallet.NewEntSpendingLimiter(client, - cfg.Payment.Limits.MaxPerTx, - cfg.Payment.Limits.MaxDaily, - ) - if err != nil { - logger().Warnw("spending limiter init failed, skipping", "error", err) - return nil - } - - // Create transaction builder - builder := payment.NewTxBuilder(rpcClient, - cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID, - cfg.Payment.Network.USDCContract, - ) - - // Create payment service - svc := payment.NewService(wp, limiter, builder, client, rpcClient, cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID) - - logger().Infow("payment system initialized", - "walletProvider", cfg.Payment.WalletProvider, - "chainId", cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID, - "network", wallet.NetworkName(cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID), - "maxPerTx", cfg.Payment.Limits.MaxPerTx, - "maxDaily", cfg.Payment.Limits.MaxDaily, - ) - - return &paymentComponents{ - wallet: wp, - service: svc, - limiter: limiter, - secrets: secrets, - chainID: cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID, - } -} - -// x402Components holds optional X402 interceptor components. -type x402Components struct { - interceptor *x402pkg.Interceptor -} - -// initX402 creates the X402 interceptor if payment is enabled. -func initX402(cfg *config.Config, secrets *security.SecretsStore, limiter wallet.SpendingLimiter) *x402Components { - if !cfg.Payment.Enabled { - return nil - } - if secrets == nil { - return nil - } - - signerProvider := x402pkg.NewLocalSignerProvider(secrets) - - maxAutoPayAmt := cfg.Payment.Limits.MaxPerTx - if maxAutoPayAmt == "" { - maxAutoPayAmt = "1.00" - } - - x402Cfg := x402pkg.Config{ - Enabled: true, - ChainID: cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID, - MaxAutoPayAmount: maxAutoPayAmt, - } - - interceptor := x402pkg.NewInterceptor(signerProvider, limiter, x402Cfg, logger()) - - logger().Infow("X402 interceptor configured", - "chainId", x402Cfg.ChainID, - "maxAutoPayAmount", maxAutoPayAmt, - ) - - return &x402Components{ - interceptor: interceptor, - } -} - -// agentRunnerAdapter adapts app.runAgent to cron.AgentRunner / background.AgentRunner / workflow.AgentRunner. -type agentRunnerAdapter struct { - app *App -} - -func (r *agentRunnerAdapter) Run(ctx context.Context, sessionKey, promptText string) (string, error) { - return r.app.runAgent(ctx, sessionKey, promptText) -} - -// initCron creates the cron scheduling system if enabled. -func initCron(cfg *config.Config, store session.Store, app *App) *cronpkg.Scheduler { - if !cfg.Cron.Enabled { - logger().Info("cron scheduling disabled") - return nil - } - - entStore, ok := store.(*session.EntStore) - if !ok { - logger().Warn("cron scheduling requires EntStore, skipping") - return nil - } - - client := entStore.Client() - cronStore := cronpkg.NewEntStore(client) - sender := newChannelSender(app) - delivery := cronpkg.NewDelivery(sender, sender, logger()) - runner := &agentRunnerAdapter{app: app} - executor := cronpkg.NewExecutor(runner, delivery, cronStore, logger()) - - maxJobs := cfg.Cron.MaxConcurrentJobs - if maxJobs <= 0 { - maxJobs = 5 - } - - tz := cfg.Cron.Timezone - if tz == "" { - tz = "UTC" - } - - scheduler := cronpkg.New(cronStore, executor, tz, maxJobs, logger()) - - logger().Infow("cron scheduling initialized", - "timezone", tz, - "maxConcurrentJobs", maxJobs, - ) - - return scheduler -} - -// initBackground creates the background task manager if enabled. -func initBackground(cfg *config.Config, app *App) *background.Manager { - if !cfg.Background.Enabled { - logger().Info("background tasks disabled") - return nil - } - - runner := &agentRunnerAdapter{app: app} - sender := newChannelSender(app) - notify := background.NewNotification(sender, sender, logger()) - - maxTasks := cfg.Background.MaxConcurrentTasks - if maxTasks <= 0 { - maxTasks = 3 - } - - taskTimeout := cfg.Background.TaskTimeout - if taskTimeout <= 0 { - taskTimeout = 30 * time.Minute - } - - mgr := background.NewManager(runner, notify, maxTasks, taskTimeout, logger()) - - logger().Infow("background task manager initialized", - "maxConcurrentTasks", maxTasks, - "yieldMs", cfg.Background.YieldMs, - ) - - return mgr -} - -// initWorkflow creates the workflow engine if enabled. -func initWorkflow(cfg *config.Config, store session.Store, app *App) *workflow.Engine { - if !cfg.Workflow.Enabled { - logger().Info("workflow engine disabled") - return nil - } - - entStore, ok := store.(*session.EntStore) - if !ok { - logger().Warn("workflow engine requires EntStore, skipping") - return nil - } - - client := entStore.Client() - state := workflow.NewStateStore(client, logger()) - runner := &agentRunnerAdapter{app: app} - sender := newChannelSender(app) - - maxConcurrent := cfg.Workflow.MaxConcurrentSteps - if maxConcurrent <= 0 { - maxConcurrent = 4 - } - - defaultTimeout := cfg.Workflow.DefaultTimeout - if defaultTimeout <= 0 { - defaultTimeout = 10 * time.Minute - } - - engine := workflow.NewEngine(runner, state, sender, maxConcurrent, defaultTimeout, logger()) - - logger().Infow("workflow engine initialized", - "maxConcurrentSteps", maxConcurrent, - "defaultTimeout", defaultTimeout, - ) - - return engine -} - -// librarianComponents holds optional proactive librarian components. -type librarianComponents struct { - inquiryStore *librarian.InquiryStore - proactiveBuffer *librarian.ProactiveBuffer -} - -// initLibrarian creates the proactive librarian components if enabled. -// Requires: librarian.enabled && knowledge.enabled && observationalMemory.enabled. -func initLibrarian( - cfg *config.Config, - sv *supervisor.Supervisor, - store session.Store, - kc *knowledgeComponents, - mc *memoryComponents, - gc *graphComponents, -) *librarianComponents { - if !cfg.Librarian.Enabled { - logger().Info("proactive librarian disabled") - return nil - } - if kc == nil { - logger().Warn("proactive librarian requires knowledge system, skipping") - return nil - } - if mc == nil { - logger().Warn("proactive librarian requires observational memory, skipping") - return nil - } - - entStore, ok := store.(*session.EntStore) - if !ok { - logger().Warn("proactive librarian requires EntStore, skipping") - return nil - } - - client := entStore.Client() - lLogger := logger() - - inquiryStore := librarian.NewInquiryStore(client, lLogger) - - // Create LLM proxy. - provider := cfg.Librarian.Provider - if provider == "" { - provider = cfg.Agent.Provider - } - lModel := cfg.Librarian.Model - if lModel == "" { - lModel = cfg.Agent.Model - } - - proxy := supervisor.NewProviderProxy(sv, provider, lModel) - generator := &providerTextGenerator{proxy: proxy} - - analyzer := librarian.NewObservationAnalyzer(generator, lLogger) - processor := librarian.NewInquiryProcessor(generator, inquiryStore, kc.store, lLogger) - - // Message provider. - getMessages := func(sessionKey string) ([]session.Message, error) { - sess, err := store.Get(sessionKey) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - if sess == nil { - return nil, nil - } - return sess.History, nil - } - - // Observation provider. - getObservations := librarian.ObservationProvider(mc.store.ListObservations) - - bufCfg := librarian.ProactiveBufferConfig{ - ObservationThreshold: cfg.Librarian.ObservationThreshold, - CooldownTurns: cfg.Librarian.InquiryCooldownTurns, - MaxPending: cfg.Librarian.MaxPendingInquiries, - AutoSaveConfidence: cfg.Librarian.AutoSaveConfidence, - } - buffer := librarian.NewProactiveBuffer( - analyzer, processor, inquiryStore, kc.store, - getMessages, getObservations, bufCfg, lLogger, - ) - - // Wire graph callback if available. - if gc != nil && gc.buffer != nil { - buffer.SetGraphCallback(func(triples []librarian.Triple) { - graphTriples := make([]graph.Triple, len(triples)) - for i, t := range triples { - graphTriples[i] = graph.Triple{ - Subject: t.Subject, - Predicate: t.Predicate, - Object: t.Object, - Metadata: t.Metadata, - } - } - gc.buffer.Enqueue(graph.GraphRequest{Triples: graphTriples}) - }) - } - - logger().Infow("proactive librarian initialized", - "provider", provider, - "model", lModel, - "observationThreshold", bufCfg.ObservationThreshold, - "cooldownTurns", bufCfg.CooldownTurns, - "maxPending", bufCfg.MaxPending, - ) - - return &librarianComponents{ - inquiryStore: inquiryStore, - proactiveBuffer: buffer, - } -} - -// inquiryProviderAdapter bridges librarian.InquiryStore → knowledge.InquiryProvider. -type inquiryProviderAdapter struct { - store *librarian.InquiryStore -} - -func (a *inquiryProviderAdapter) PendingInquiryItems(ctx context.Context, sessionKey string, limit int) ([]knowledge.ContextItem, error) { - inquiries, err := a.store.ListPendingInquiries(ctx, sessionKey, limit) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - items := make([]knowledge.ContextItem, 0, len(inquiries)) - for _, inq := range inquiries { - items = append(items, knowledge.ContextItem{ - Layer: knowledge.LayerPendingInquiries, - Key: inq.Topic, - Content: inq.Question, - Source: inq.Context, - }) - } - return items, nil -} - -// skillProviderAdapter adapts *skill.Registry to knowledge.SkillProvider. -type skillProviderAdapter struct { - registry *skill.Registry -} - -func (a *skillProviderAdapter) ListActiveSkillInfos(ctx context.Context) ([]knowledge.SkillInfo, error) { - entries, err := a.registry.ListActiveSkills(ctx) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - infos := make([]knowledge.SkillInfo, len(entries)) - for i, e := range entries { - infos[i] = knowledge.SkillInfo{ - Name: e.Name, - Description: e.Description, - Type: string(e.Type), - } - } - return infos, nil -} - // buildAutomationPromptSection creates a dynamic prompt section describing // available automation capabilities (cron, background, workflow). func buildAutomationPromptSection(cfg *config.Config) *prompt.StaticSection { @@ -1379,7 +513,8 @@ func buildAutomationPromptSection(cfg *config.Config) *prompt.StaticSection { } parts = append(parts, `### Important -- ALWAYS use the built-in automation tools above. NEVER use exec to run "lango cron", "lango bg", or "lango workflow" commands — this will fail because spawning a new lango process requires passphrase authentication. +- ALWAYS use the built-in tools. NEVER use exec to run ANY "lango" CLI command — this includes "lango cron", "lango bg", "lango workflow", "lango graph", "lango memory", "lango p2p", "lango security", "lango payment", "lango config", "lango doctor", or any other subcommand. Every lango CLI invocation requires passphrase authentication during bootstrap and will fail when spawned as a non-interactive subprocess. +- If you need functionality without a built-in tool equivalent (e.g., config management, diagnostics), ask the user to run the command in their terminal. `) content := strings.Join(parts, "\n") diff --git a/internal/app/wiring_automation.go b/internal/app/wiring_automation.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..78ed2b52 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/app/wiring_automation.go @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +package app + +import ( + "context" + "time" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/background" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + cronpkg "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cron" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/workflow" +) + +// agentRunnerAdapter adapts app.runAgent to cron.AgentRunner / background.AgentRunner / workflow.AgentRunner. +type agentRunnerAdapter struct { + app *App +} + +func (r *agentRunnerAdapter) Run(ctx context.Context, sessionKey, promptText string) (string, error) { + return r.app.runAgent(ctx, sessionKey, promptText) +} + +// initCron creates the cron scheduling system if enabled. +func initCron(cfg *config.Config, store session.Store, app *App) *cronpkg.Scheduler { + if !cfg.Cron.Enabled { + logger().Info("cron scheduling disabled") + return nil + } + + entStore, ok := store.(*session.EntStore) + if !ok { + logger().Warn("cron scheduling requires EntStore, skipping") + return nil + } + + client := entStore.Client() + cronStore := cronpkg.NewEntStore(client) + sender := newChannelSender(app) + delivery := cronpkg.NewDelivery(sender, sender, logger()) + runner := &agentRunnerAdapter{app: app} + executor := cronpkg.NewExecutor(runner, delivery, cronStore, logger()) + + maxJobs := cfg.Cron.MaxConcurrentJobs + if maxJobs <= 0 { + maxJobs = 5 + } + + tz := cfg.Cron.Timezone + if tz == "" { + tz = "UTC" + } + + scheduler := cronpkg.New(cronStore, executor, tz, maxJobs, logger()) + + logger().Infow("cron scheduling initialized", + "timezone", tz, + "maxConcurrentJobs", maxJobs, + ) + + return scheduler +} + +// initBackground creates the background task manager if enabled. +func initBackground(cfg *config.Config, app *App) *background.Manager { + if !cfg.Background.Enabled { + logger().Info("background tasks disabled") + return nil + } + + runner := &agentRunnerAdapter{app: app} + sender := newChannelSender(app) + notify := background.NewNotification(sender, sender, logger()) + + maxTasks := cfg.Background.MaxConcurrentTasks + if maxTasks <= 0 { + maxTasks = 3 + } + + taskTimeout := cfg.Background.TaskTimeout + if taskTimeout <= 0 { + taskTimeout = 30 * time.Minute + } + + mgr := background.NewManager(runner, notify, maxTasks, taskTimeout, logger()) + + logger().Infow("background task manager initialized", + "maxConcurrentTasks", maxTasks, + "yieldMs", cfg.Background.YieldMs, + ) + + return mgr +} + +// initWorkflow creates the workflow engine if enabled. +func initWorkflow(cfg *config.Config, store session.Store, app *App) *workflow.Engine { + if !cfg.Workflow.Enabled { + logger().Info("workflow engine disabled") + return nil + } + + entStore, ok := store.(*session.EntStore) + if !ok { + logger().Warn("workflow engine requires EntStore, skipping") + return nil + } + + client := entStore.Client() + state := workflow.NewStateStore(client, logger()) + runner := &agentRunnerAdapter{app: app} + sender := newChannelSender(app) + + maxConcurrent := cfg.Workflow.MaxConcurrentSteps + if maxConcurrent <= 0 { + maxConcurrent = 4 + } + + defaultTimeout := cfg.Workflow.DefaultTimeout + if defaultTimeout <= 0 { + defaultTimeout = 10 * time.Minute + } + + engine := workflow.NewEngine(runner, state, sender, maxConcurrent, defaultTimeout, logger()) + + logger().Infow("workflow engine initialized", + "maxConcurrentSteps", maxConcurrent, + "defaultTimeout", defaultTimeout, + ) + + return engine +} diff --git a/internal/app/wiring_embedding.go b/internal/app/wiring_embedding.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ba80e0ee --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/app/wiring_embedding.go @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +package app + +import ( + "database/sql" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/embedding" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/knowledge" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/memory" +) + +// embeddingComponents holds optional embedding/RAG components. +type embeddingComponents struct { + buffer *embedding.EmbeddingBuffer + ragService *embedding.RAGService +} + +// initEmbedding creates the embedding pipeline and RAG service if configured. +func initEmbedding(cfg *config.Config, rawDB *sql.DB, kc *knowledgeComponents, mc *memoryComponents) *embeddingComponents { + emb := cfg.Embedding + if emb.Provider == "" { + logger().Info("embedding system disabled (no provider configured)") + return nil + } + + backendType, apiKey := cfg.ResolveEmbeddingProvider() + if backendType == "" { + logger().Warnw("embedding provider type could not be resolved", + "provider", emb.Provider) + return nil + } + + providerCfg := embedding.ProviderConfig{ + Provider: backendType, + Model: emb.Model, + Dimensions: emb.Dimensions, + APIKey: apiKey, + BaseURL: emb.Local.BaseURL, + } + + registry, err := embedding.NewRegistry(providerCfg, nil, logger()) + if err != nil { + logger().Warnw("embedding provider init failed, skipping", "error", err) + return nil + } + + provider := registry.Provider() + dimensions := provider.Dimensions() + + // Create vector store using the shared database. + if rawDB == nil { + logger().Warn("embedding requires raw DB handle, skipping") + return nil + } + vecStore, err := embedding.NewSQLiteVecStore(rawDB, dimensions) + if err != nil { + logger().Warnw("sqlite-vec store init failed, skipping", "error", err) + return nil + } + + embLogger := logger() + + // Create buffer. + buffer := embedding.NewEmbeddingBuffer(provider, vecStore, embLogger) + + // Create resolver and RAG service. + var ks *knowledge.Store + var ms *memory.Store + if kc != nil { + ks = kc.store + } + if mc != nil { + ms = mc.store + } + resolver := embedding.NewStoreResolver(ks, ms) + ragService := embedding.NewRAGService(provider, vecStore, resolver, embLogger) + + // Wire embed callbacks into stores so saves trigger async embedding. + embedCB := func(id, collection, content string, metadata map[string]string) { + buffer.Enqueue(embedding.EmbedRequest{ + ID: id, + Collection: collection, + Content: content, + Metadata: metadata, + }) + } + if kc != nil { + kc.store.SetEmbedCallback(embedCB) + } + if mc != nil { + mc.store.SetEmbedCallback(embedCB) + } + + logger().Infow("embedding system initialized", + "provider", emb.Provider, + "backendType", backendType, + "dimensions", dimensions, + "ragEnabled", emb.RAG.Enabled, + ) + + return &embeddingComponents{ + buffer: buffer, + ragService: ragService, + } +} diff --git a/internal/app/wiring_graph.go b/internal/app/wiring_graph.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6067ed18 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/app/wiring_graph.go @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +package app + +import ( + "context" + "path/filepath" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/embedding" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/graph" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/memory" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/supervisor" +) + +// graphComponents holds optional graph store components. +type graphComponents struct { + store graph.Store + buffer *graph.GraphBuffer + ragService *graph.GraphRAGService +} + +// initGraphStore creates the graph store if enabled. +func initGraphStore(cfg *config.Config) *graphComponents { + if !cfg.Graph.Enabled { + logger().Info("graph store disabled") + return nil + } + + dbPath := cfg.Graph.DatabasePath + if dbPath == "" { + // Default: graph.db next to session database. + if cfg.Session.DatabasePath != "" { + dbPath = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(cfg.Session.DatabasePath), "graph.db") + } else { + dbPath = "graph.db" + } + } + + store, err := graph.NewBoltStore(dbPath) + if err != nil { + logger().Warnw("graph store init error, skipping", "error", err) + return nil + } + + buffer := graph.NewGraphBuffer(store, logger()) + + logger().Infow("graph store initialized", "backend", "bolt", "path", dbPath) + return &graphComponents{ + store: store, + buffer: buffer, + } +} + +// wireGraphCallbacks connects graph store callbacks to knowledge and memory stores. +// It also creates the Entity Extractor pipeline and Memory GraphHooks. +func wireGraphCallbacks(gc *graphComponents, kc *knowledgeComponents, mc *memoryComponents, sv *supervisor.Supervisor, cfg *config.Config) { + if gc == nil || gc.buffer == nil { + return + } + + // Create Entity Extractor for async triple extraction from content. + var extractor *graph.Extractor + if sv != nil { + provider := cfg.Agent.Provider + mdl := cfg.Agent.Model + proxy := supervisor.NewProviderProxy(sv, provider, mdl) + generator := &providerTextGenerator{proxy: proxy} + extractor = graph.NewExtractor(generator, logger()) + logger().Info("graph entity extractor initialized") + } + + graphCB := func(id, collection, content string, metadata map[string]string) { + // Basic containment triple. + gc.buffer.Enqueue(graph.GraphRequest{ + Triples: []graph.Triple{ + { + Subject: collection + ":" + id, + Predicate: graph.Contains, + Object: "collection:" + collection, + Metadata: metadata, + }, + }, + }) + + // Async entity extraction via LLM. + if extractor != nil && content != "" { + go func() { + ctx := context.Background() + triples, err := extractor.Extract(ctx, content, id) + if err != nil { + logger().Debugw("entity extraction error", "id", id, "error", err) + return + } + if len(triples) > 0 { + gc.buffer.Enqueue(graph.GraphRequest{Triples: triples}) + } + }() + } + } + + if kc != nil { + kc.store.SetGraphCallback(graphCB) + } + if mc != nil { + mc.store.SetGraphCallback(graphCB) + + // Wire Memory GraphHooks for temporal/session triples. + tripleCallback := func(triples []graph.Triple) { + gc.buffer.Enqueue(graph.GraphRequest{Triples: triples}) + } + hooks := memory.NewGraphHooks(tripleCallback, logger()) + mc.store.SetGraphHooks(hooks) + logger().Info("memory graph hooks wired") + } +} + +// initGraphRAG creates the Graph RAG service if both graph store and vector RAG are available. +func initGraphRAG(cfg *config.Config, gc *graphComponents, ec *embeddingComponents) { + if gc == nil || ec == nil || ec.ragService == nil { + return + } + + maxDepth := cfg.Graph.MaxTraversalDepth + if maxDepth <= 0 { + maxDepth = 2 + } + maxExpand := cfg.Graph.MaxExpansionResults + if maxExpand <= 0 { + maxExpand = 10 + } + + // Create a VectorRetriever adapter from embedding.RAGService. + adapter := &ragServiceAdapter{inner: ec.ragService} + + gc.ragService = graph.NewGraphRAGService(adapter, gc.store, maxDepth, maxExpand, logger()) + logger().Info("graph RAG hybrid retrieval initialized") +} + +// ragServiceAdapter adapts embedding.RAGService to graph.VectorRetriever interface. +type ragServiceAdapter struct { + inner *embedding.RAGService +} + +func (a *ragServiceAdapter) Retrieve(ctx context.Context, query string, opts graph.VectorRetrieveOptions) ([]graph.VectorResult, error) { + embOpts := embedding.RetrieveOptions{ + Collections: opts.Collections, + Limit: opts.Limit, + SessionKey: opts.SessionKey, + MaxDistance: opts.MaxDistance, + } + + results, err := a.inner.Retrieve(ctx, query, embOpts) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + graphResults := make([]graph.VectorResult, len(results)) + for i, r := range results { + graphResults[i] = graph.VectorResult{ + Collection: r.Collection, + SourceID: r.SourceID, + Content: r.Content, + Distance: r.Distance, + } + } + return graphResults, nil +} diff --git a/internal/app/wiring_knowledge.go b/internal/app/wiring_knowledge.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8dc51b83 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/app/wiring_knowledge.go @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +package app + +import ( + "context" + "os" + "path/filepath" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/graph" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/knowledge" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/learning" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/librarian" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/skill" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/supervisor" + "github.com/langoai/lango/skills" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/agent" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/provider" + "fmt" + "strings" +) + +// knowledgeComponents holds optional self-learning components. +type knowledgeComponents struct { + store *knowledge.Store + engine *learning.Engine + observer learning.ToolResultObserver +} + +// initKnowledge creates the self-learning components if enabled. +// When gc is provided, a GraphEngine is used as the observer instead of the base Engine. +func initKnowledge(cfg *config.Config, store session.Store, gc *graphComponents) *knowledgeComponents { + if !cfg.Knowledge.Enabled { + logger().Info("knowledge system disabled") + return nil + } + + entStore, ok := store.(*session.EntStore) + if !ok { + logger().Warn("knowledge system requires EntStore, skipping") + return nil + } + + client := entStore.Client() + kLogger := logger() + + kStore := knowledge.NewStore(client, kLogger) + + engine := learning.NewEngine(kStore, kLogger) + + // Select observer: GraphEngine when graph store is available, otherwise base Engine. + var observer learning.ToolResultObserver = engine + if gc != nil { + graphEngine := learning.NewGraphEngine(kStore, gc.store, kLogger) + graphEngine.SetGraphCallback(func(triples []graph.Triple) { + gc.buffer.Enqueue(graph.GraphRequest{Triples: triples}) + }) + observer = graphEngine + logger().Info("graph-enhanced learning engine initialized") + } + + logger().Info("knowledge system initialized") + return &knowledgeComponents{ + store: kStore, + engine: engine, + observer: observer, + } +} + +// initSkills creates the file-based skill registry. +func initSkills(cfg *config.Config, baseTools []*agent.Tool) *skill.Registry { + if !cfg.Skill.Enabled { + logger().Info("skill system disabled") + return nil + } + + dir := cfg.Skill.SkillsDir + if dir == "" { + dir = "~/.lango/skills" + } + // Expand ~ to home directory. + if len(dir) > 1 && dir[:2] == "~/" { + if home, err := os.UserHomeDir(); err == nil { + dir = filepath.Join(home, dir[2:]) + } + } + + sLogger := logger() + store := skill.NewFileSkillStore(dir, sLogger) + + // Deploy embedded default skills. + defaultFS, err := skills.DefaultFS() + if err == nil { + if err := store.EnsureDefaults(defaultFS); err != nil { + sLogger.Warnw("deploy default skills error", "error", err) + } + } + + registry := skill.NewRegistry(store, baseTools, sLogger) + ctx := context.Background() + if err := registry.LoadSkills(ctx); err != nil { + sLogger.Warnw("load skills error", "error", err) + } + + sLogger.Infow("skill system initialized", "dir", dir) + return registry +} + +// initConversationAnalysis creates the conversation analysis pipeline if both +// knowledge and observational memory are enabled. +func initConversationAnalysis(cfg *config.Config, sv *supervisor.Supervisor, store session.Store, kc *knowledgeComponents, gc *graphComponents) *learning.AnalysisBuffer { + if kc == nil { + return nil + } + if !cfg.ObservationalMemory.Enabled { + return nil + } + + // Create LLM proxy reusing the observational memory provider/model. + omProvider := cfg.ObservationalMemory.Provider + if omProvider == "" { + omProvider = cfg.Agent.Provider + } + omModel := cfg.ObservationalMemory.Model + if omModel == "" { + omModel = cfg.Agent.Model + } + + proxy := supervisor.NewProviderProxy(sv, omProvider, omModel) + generator := &providerTextGenerator{proxy: proxy} + + aLogger := logger() + + analyzer := learning.NewConversationAnalyzer(generator, kc.store, aLogger) + learner := learning.NewSessionLearner(generator, kc.store, aLogger) + + // Wire graph callbacks if graph store is available. + if gc != nil && gc.buffer != nil { + graphCB := func(triples []graph.Triple) { + gc.buffer.Enqueue(graph.GraphRequest{Triples: triples}) + } + analyzer.SetGraphCallback(graphCB) + learner.SetGraphCallback(graphCB) + } + + // Message provider. + getMessages := func(sessionKey string) ([]session.Message, error) { + sess, err := store.Get(sessionKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if sess == nil { + return nil, nil + } + return sess.History, nil + } + + turnThreshold := cfg.Knowledge.AnalysisTurnThreshold + tokenThreshold := cfg.Knowledge.AnalysisTokenThreshold + + buf := learning.NewAnalysisBuffer(analyzer, learner, getMessages, turnThreshold, tokenThreshold, aLogger) + + logger().Infow("conversation analysis initialized", + "turnThreshold", turnThreshold, + "tokenThreshold", tokenThreshold, + ) + + return buf +} + +// providerTextGenerator adapts a supervisor.ProviderProxy to the memory.TextGenerator interface. +type providerTextGenerator struct { + proxy *supervisor.ProviderProxy +} + +func (g *providerTextGenerator) GenerateText(ctx context.Context, systemPrompt, userPrompt string) (string, error) { + params := provider.GenerateParams{ + Messages: []provider.Message{ + {Role: "system", Content: systemPrompt}, + {Role: "user", Content: userPrompt}, + }, + } + + stream, err := g.proxy.Generate(ctx, params) + if err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("generate text: %w", err) + } + + var result strings.Builder + for evt, err := range stream { + if err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("stream text: %w", err) + } + if evt.Type == provider.StreamEventPlainText { + result.WriteString(evt.Text) + } + if evt.Type == provider.StreamEventError && evt.Error != nil { + return "", evt.Error + } + } + return result.String(), nil +} + +// inquiryProviderAdapter bridges librarian.InquiryStore → knowledge.InquiryProvider. +type inquiryProviderAdapter struct { + store *librarian.InquiryStore +} + +func (a *inquiryProviderAdapter) PendingInquiryItems(ctx context.Context, sessionKey string, limit int) ([]knowledge.ContextItem, error) { + inquiries, err := a.store.ListPendingInquiries(ctx, sessionKey, limit) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + items := make([]knowledge.ContextItem, 0, len(inquiries)) + for _, inq := range inquiries { + items = append(items, knowledge.ContextItem{ + Layer: knowledge.LayerPendingInquiries, + Key: inq.Topic, + Content: inq.Question, + Source: inq.Context, + }) + } + return items, nil +} + +// skillProviderAdapter adapts *skill.Registry to knowledge.SkillProvider. +type skillProviderAdapter struct { + registry *skill.Registry +} + +func (a *skillProviderAdapter) ListActiveSkillInfos(ctx context.Context) ([]knowledge.SkillInfo, error) { + entries, err := a.registry.ListActiveSkills(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + infos := make([]knowledge.SkillInfo, len(entries)) + for i, e := range entries { + infos[i] = knowledge.SkillInfo{ + Name: e.Name, + Description: e.Description, + Type: string(e.Type), + } + } + return infos, nil +} diff --git a/internal/app/wiring_librarian.go b/internal/app/wiring_librarian.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..df27ac9e --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/app/wiring_librarian.go @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +package app + +import ( + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/graph" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/librarian" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/supervisor" +) + +// librarianComponents holds optional proactive librarian components. +type librarianComponents struct { + inquiryStore *librarian.InquiryStore + proactiveBuffer *librarian.ProactiveBuffer +} + +// initLibrarian creates the proactive librarian components if enabled. +// Requires: librarian.enabled && knowledge.enabled && observationalMemory.enabled. +func initLibrarian( + cfg *config.Config, + sv *supervisor.Supervisor, + store session.Store, + kc *knowledgeComponents, + mc *memoryComponents, + gc *graphComponents, +) *librarianComponents { + if !cfg.Librarian.Enabled { + logger().Info("proactive librarian disabled") + return nil + } + if kc == nil { + logger().Warn("proactive librarian requires knowledge system, skipping") + return nil + } + if mc == nil { + logger().Warn("proactive librarian requires observational memory, skipping") + return nil + } + + entStore, ok := store.(*session.EntStore) + if !ok { + logger().Warn("proactive librarian requires EntStore, skipping") + return nil + } + + client := entStore.Client() + lLogger := logger() + + inquiryStore := librarian.NewInquiryStore(client, lLogger) + + // Create LLM proxy. + provider := cfg.Librarian.Provider + if provider == "" { + provider = cfg.Agent.Provider + } + lModel := cfg.Librarian.Model + if lModel == "" { + lModel = cfg.Agent.Model + } + + proxy := supervisor.NewProviderProxy(sv, provider, lModel) + generator := &providerTextGenerator{proxy: proxy} + + analyzer := librarian.NewObservationAnalyzer(generator, lLogger) + processor := librarian.NewInquiryProcessor(generator, inquiryStore, kc.store, lLogger) + + // Message provider. + getMessages := func(sessionKey string) ([]session.Message, error) { + sess, err := store.Get(sessionKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if sess == nil { + return nil, nil + } + return sess.History, nil + } + + // Observation provider. + getObservations := librarian.ObservationProvider(mc.store.ListObservations) + + bufCfg := librarian.ProactiveBufferConfig{ + ObservationThreshold: cfg.Librarian.ObservationThreshold, + CooldownTurns: cfg.Librarian.InquiryCooldownTurns, + MaxPending: cfg.Librarian.MaxPendingInquiries, + AutoSaveConfidence: cfg.Librarian.AutoSaveConfidence, + } + buffer := librarian.NewProactiveBuffer( + analyzer, processor, inquiryStore, kc.store, + getMessages, getObservations, bufCfg, lLogger, + ) + + // Wire graph callback if available. + if gc != nil && gc.buffer != nil { + buffer.SetGraphCallback(func(triples []librarian.Triple) { + graphTriples := make([]graph.Triple, len(triples)) + for i, t := range triples { + graphTriples[i] = graph.Triple{ + Subject: t.Subject, + Predicate: t.Predicate, + Object: t.Object, + Metadata: t.Metadata, + } + } + gc.buffer.Enqueue(graph.GraphRequest{Triples: graphTriples}) + }) + } + + logger().Infow("proactive librarian initialized", + "provider", provider, + "model", lModel, + "observationThreshold", bufCfg.ObservationThreshold, + "cooldownTurns", bufCfg.CooldownTurns, + "maxPending", bufCfg.MaxPending, + ) + + return &librarianComponents{ + inquiryStore: inquiryStore, + proactiveBuffer: buffer, + } +} diff --git a/internal/app/wiring_memory.go b/internal/app/wiring_memory.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..21b2e857 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/app/wiring_memory.go @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +package app + +import ( + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/memory" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/supervisor" +) + +// memoryComponents holds optional observational memory components. +type memoryComponents struct { + store *memory.Store + observer *memory.Observer + reflector *memory.Reflector + buffer *memory.Buffer +} + +// initMemory creates the observational memory components if enabled. +func initMemory(cfg *config.Config, store session.Store, sv *supervisor.Supervisor) *memoryComponents { + if !cfg.ObservationalMemory.Enabled { + logger().Info("observational memory disabled") + return nil + } + + entStore, ok := store.(*session.EntStore) + if !ok { + logger().Warn("observational memory requires EntStore, skipping") + return nil + } + + client := entStore.Client() + mLogger := logger() + mStore := memory.NewStore(client, mLogger) + + // Create provider proxy for observer/reflector LLM calls + provider := cfg.ObservationalMemory.Provider + if provider == "" { + provider = cfg.Agent.Provider + } + omModel := cfg.ObservationalMemory.Model + if omModel == "" { + omModel = cfg.Agent.Model + } + + proxy := supervisor.NewProviderProxy(sv, provider, omModel) + generator := &providerTextGenerator{proxy: proxy} + + observer := memory.NewObserver(generator, mStore, mLogger) + reflector := memory.NewReflector(generator, mStore, mLogger) + + // Apply defaults for thresholds + msgThreshold := cfg.ObservationalMemory.MessageTokenThreshold + if msgThreshold <= 0 { + msgThreshold = 1000 + } + obsThreshold := cfg.ObservationalMemory.ObservationTokenThreshold + if obsThreshold <= 0 { + obsThreshold = 2000 + } + + // Message provider retrieves messages for a session key + getMessages := func(sessionKey string) ([]session.Message, error) { + sess, err := store.Get(sessionKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if sess == nil { + return nil, nil + } + return sess.History, nil + } + + buffer := memory.NewBuffer(observer, reflector, mStore, msgThreshold, obsThreshold, getMessages, mLogger) + + if cfg.ObservationalMemory.ReflectionConsolidationThreshold > 0 { + buffer.SetReflectionConsolidationThreshold(cfg.ObservationalMemory.ReflectionConsolidationThreshold) + } + + logger().Infow("observational memory initialized", + "provider", provider, + "model", omModel, + "messageTokenThreshold", msgThreshold, + "observationTokenThreshold", obsThreshold, + ) + + return &memoryComponents{ + store: mStore, + observer: observer, + reflector: reflector, + buffer: buffer, + } +} diff --git a/internal/app/wiring_p2p.go b/internal/app/wiring_p2p.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1a1b0a80 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/app/wiring_p2p.go @@ -0,0 +1,425 @@ +package app + +import ( + "context" + "time" + + "github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend" + "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/discovery" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/firewall" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/handshake" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/identity" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/paygate" + p2pproto "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/protocol" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/reputation" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/zkp" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/zkp/circuits" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/payment/contracts" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/security" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/wallet" + libp2pproto "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/protocol" +) + +// p2pComponents holds optional P2P networking components. +type p2pComponents struct { + node *p2p.Node + sessions *handshake.SessionStore + handshaker *handshake.Handshaker + fw *firewall.Firewall + gossip *discovery.GossipService + identity *identity.WalletDIDProvider + handler *p2pproto.Handler + payGate *paygate.Gate + reputation *reputation.Store + pricingCfg config.P2PPricingConfig + pricingFn func(toolName string) (string, bool) +} + +// initP2P creates the P2P networking components if enabled. +func initP2P(cfg *config.Config, wp wallet.WalletProvider, pc *paymentComponents, dbClient *ent.Client, secrets *security.SecretsStore) *p2pComponents { + if !cfg.P2P.Enabled { + logger().Info("P2P networking disabled") + return nil + } + + if wp == nil { + logger().Warn("P2P networking requires wallet provider, skipping") + return nil + } + + pLogger := logger() + + // Create P2P node with SecretsStore for encrypted key storage. + node, err := p2p.NewNode(cfg.P2P, pLogger, secrets) + if err != nil { + pLogger.Warnw("P2P node creation failed, skipping", "error", err) + return nil + } + + // Create identity provider from wallet. + idProvider := identity.NewProvider(wp, pLogger) + + // Create session store. + sessionTTL := cfg.P2P.SessionTokenTTL + if sessionTTL <= 0 { + sessionTTL = 24 * time.Hour + } + sessions, err := handshake.NewSessionStore(sessionTTL) + if err != nil { + pLogger.Warnw("P2P session store creation failed, skipping", "error", err) + return nil + } + + // Initialize ZKP prover (optional). + zkProver := initZKP(cfg) + + // Create nonce cache for replay protection (TTL = 2 * handshake timeout). + nonceTTL := 2 * cfg.P2P.HandshakeTimeout + if nonceTTL <= 0 { + nonceTTL = 60 * time.Second + } + nonceCache := handshake.NewNonceCache(nonceTTL) + nonceCache.Start() + + // Create handshaker. + hsTimeout := cfg.P2P.HandshakeTimeout + if hsTimeout <= 0 { + hsTimeout = 30 * time.Second + } + hsCfg := handshake.Config{ + Wallet: wp, + Sessions: sessions, + ZKEnabled: cfg.P2P.ZKHandshake, + Timeout: hsTimeout, + AutoApproveKnown: cfg.P2P.AutoApproveKnownPeers, + NonceCache: nonceCache, + RequireSignedChallenge: cfg.P2P.RequireSignedChallenge, + Logger: pLogger, + } + + // Wire ZK prover/verifier into handshake if available. + if zkProver != nil && cfg.P2P.ZKHandshake { + hsCfg.ZKProver = func(ctx context.Context, challenge []byte) ([]byte, error) { + assignment := &circuits.WalletOwnershipCircuit{ + Challenge: challenge, + Response: challenge, // simplified: use challenge as witness in MVP + } + proof, err := zkProver.Prove(ctx, "wallet_ownership", assignment) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return proof.Data, nil + } + hsCfg.ZKVerifier = func(ctx context.Context, proof, challenge, publicKey []byte) (bool, error) { + p := &zkp.Proof{ + CircuitID: "wallet_ownership", + Data: proof, + Scheme: zkProver.Scheme(), + } + return zkProver.Verify(ctx, p, &circuits.WalletOwnershipCircuit{}) + } + pLogger.Info("ZK handshake prover/verifier wired") + } + + handshaker := handshake.NewHandshaker(hsCfg) + + // Create firewall. + var aclRules []firewall.ACLRule + for _, r := range cfg.P2P.FirewallRules { + aclRules = append(aclRules, firewall.ACLRule{ + PeerDID: r.PeerDID, + Action: firewall.ACLAction(r.Action), + Tools: r.Tools, + RateLimit: r.RateLimit, + }) + } + fw := firewall.New(aclRules, pLogger) + + // Wire Owner Shield if configured. + ownerCfg := cfg.P2P.OwnerProtection + if ownerCfg.OwnerName != "" || ownerCfg.OwnerEmail != "" || ownerCfg.OwnerPhone != "" { + blockConv := true + if ownerCfg.BlockConversations != nil { + blockConv = *ownerCfg.BlockConversations + } + shield := firewall.NewOwnerShield(firewall.OwnerProtectionConfig{ + OwnerName: ownerCfg.OwnerName, + OwnerEmail: ownerCfg.OwnerEmail, + OwnerPhone: ownerCfg.OwnerPhone, + ExtraTerms: ownerCfg.ExtraTerms, + BlockConversations: blockConv, + }, pLogger) + fw.SetOwnerShield(shield) + pLogger.Info("P2P owner data shield enabled") + } + + // Wire ZK attestation into firewall if available. + if zkProver != nil && cfg.P2P.ZKAttestation { + fw.SetZKAttestFunc(func(responseHash, agentDIDHash []byte) (*firewall.AttestationResult, error) { + now := time.Now().Unix() + assignment := &circuits.ResponseAttestationCircuit{ + ResponseHash: responseHash, + AgentDIDHash: agentDIDHash, + Timestamp: now, + MinTimestamp: now - 300, // 5-minute window + MaxTimestamp: now + 30, // 30-second future grace + } + proof, err := zkProver.Prove(context.Background(), "response_attestation", assignment) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &firewall.AttestationResult{ + Proof: proof.Data, + PublicInputs: proof.PublicInputs, + CircuitID: proof.CircuitID, + Scheme: string(proof.Scheme), + }, nil + }) + pLogger.Info("ZK response attestation wired to firewall") + } + + // Wire reputation system if DB client is available. + var repStore *reputation.Store + if dbClient != nil { + repStore = reputation.NewStore(dbClient, pLogger) + minScore := cfg.P2P.MinTrustScore + if minScore <= 0 { + minScore = 0.3 + } + fw.SetReputationChecker(func(ctx context.Context, peerDID string) (float64, error) { + return repStore.GetScore(ctx, peerDID) + }, minScore) + pLogger.Infow("P2P reputation system enabled", "minTrustScore", minScore) + } + + // Register handshake protocol handlers (v1.0 legacy + v1.1 signed challenge). + node.Host().SetStreamHandler(libp2pproto.ID(handshake.ProtocolID), handshaker.StreamHandler()) + node.Host().SetStreamHandler(libp2pproto.ID(handshake.ProtocolIDv11), handshaker.StreamHandlerV11()) + + // Get local DID for protocol handler. + var localDID string + ctx := context.Background() + d, err := idProvider.DID(ctx) + if err == nil && d != nil { + localDID = d.ID + } + + // Create A2A-over-P2P protocol handler. + handler := p2pproto.NewHandler(p2pproto.HandlerConfig{ + Sessions: sessions, + Firewall: fw, + LocalDID: localDID, + Logger: pLogger, + }) + node.Host().SetStreamHandler(libp2pproto.ID(p2pproto.ProtocolID), handler.StreamHandler()) + + // Wire security event handler for auto-invalidation on repeated failures + // or reputation drops. + minTrust := cfg.P2P.MinTrustScore + if minTrust <= 0 { + minTrust = 0.3 + } + secEvents := handshake.NewSecurityEventHandler(sessions, 5, minTrust, pLogger) + handler.SetSecurityEvents(secEvents) + if repStore != nil { + repStore.SetOnChangeCallback(secEvents.OnReputationChange) + } + pLogger.Info("P2P security event handler wired") + + // Create gossip discovery service. + var gossip *discovery.GossipService + gossipInterval := cfg.P2P.GossipInterval + if gossipInterval <= 0 { + gossipInterval = 30 * time.Second + } + + agentName := cfg.A2A.AgentName + if agentName == "" { + agentName = "lango" + } + // Wire payment gate if pricing is enabled. + var pg *paygate.Gate + if cfg.P2P.Pricing.Enabled && pc != nil { + walletAddr := "" + ctx2 := context.Background() + if a, err := wp.Address(ctx2); err == nil { + walletAddr = a + } + usdcAddr, _ := contracts.LookupUSDC(pc.chainID) + + pricingFn := func(toolName string) (string, bool) { + if price, ok := cfg.P2P.Pricing.ToolPrices[toolName]; ok { + return price, false + } + if cfg.P2P.Pricing.PerQuery != "" { + return cfg.P2P.Pricing.PerQuery, false + } + return "", true // free by default + } + + pg = paygate.New(paygate.Config{ + PricingFn: pricingFn, + LocalAddr: walletAddr, + ChainID: pc.chainID, + USDCAddr: usdcAddr, + Logger: pLogger, + }) + + // Wire PayGate to handler via adapter. + handler.SetPayGate(&payGateAdapter{gate: pg, chainID: pc.chainID, usdcAddr: usdcAddr}) + pLogger.Infow("P2P payment gate enabled", + "perQuery", cfg.P2P.Pricing.PerQuery, + "toolPrices", len(cfg.P2P.Pricing.ToolPrices), + ) + } + + localCard := &discovery.GossipCard{ + Name: agentName, + DID: localDID, + PeerID: node.PeerID().String(), + } + for _, a := range node.Multiaddrs() { + localCard.Multiaddrs = append(localCard.Multiaddrs, a.String()) + } + + // Set pricing info on gossip card if pricing is enabled. + if cfg.P2P.Pricing.Enabled { + localCard.Pricing = &discovery.PricingInfo{ + Currency: wallet.CurrencyUSDC, + PerQuery: cfg.P2P.Pricing.PerQuery, + ToolPrices: cfg.P2P.Pricing.ToolPrices, + } + } + + gossip, err = discovery.NewGossipService(discovery.GossipConfig{ + Host: node.Host(), + LocalCard: localCard, + Interval: gossipInterval, + Logger: pLogger, + }) + if err != nil { + pLogger.Warnw("gossip service creation failed", "error", err) + } + + // Set credential max age from config. + if gossip != nil && cfg.P2P.ZKP.MaxCredentialAge != "" { + if maxAge, err := time.ParseDuration(cfg.P2P.ZKP.MaxCredentialAge); err == nil { + gossip.SetMaxCredentialAge(maxAge) + } + } + + pLogger.Infow("P2P networking initialized", + "peerID", node.PeerID(), + "did", localDID, + "listenAddrs", cfg.P2P.ListenAddrs, + "zkHandshake", cfg.P2P.ZKHandshake, + "firewallRules", len(aclRules), + ) + + // Build a pricing function for external use (e.g., approval wiring). + var extPricingFn func(string) (string, bool) + if cfg.P2P.Pricing.Enabled { + extPricingFn = func(toolName string) (string, bool) { + if price, ok := cfg.P2P.Pricing.ToolPrices[toolName]; ok { + return price, false + } + if cfg.P2P.Pricing.PerQuery != "" { + return cfg.P2P.Pricing.PerQuery, false + } + return "", true + } + } + + return &p2pComponents{ + node: node, + sessions: sessions, + handshaker: handshaker, + fw: fw, + gossip: gossip, + identity: idProvider, + handler: handler, + payGate: pg, + reputation: repStore, + pricingCfg: cfg.P2P.Pricing, + pricingFn: extPricingFn, + } +} + +// payGateAdapter adapts paygate.Gate to protocol.PayGateChecker. +type payGateAdapter struct { + gate *paygate.Gate + chainID int64 + usdcAddr common.Address +} + +func (a *payGateAdapter) Check(peerDID, toolName string, payload map[string]interface{}) (p2pproto.PayGateResult, error) { + result, err := a.gate.Check(peerDID, toolName, payload) + if err != nil { + return p2pproto.PayGateResult{}, err + } + pgr := p2pproto.PayGateResult{ + Status: string(result.Status), + } + if result.Auth != nil { + pgr.Auth = result.Auth + } + if result.PriceQuote != nil { + pgr.PriceQuote = map[string]interface{}{ + "toolName": result.PriceQuote.ToolName, + "price": result.PriceQuote.Price, + "currency": result.PriceQuote.Currency, + "usdcContract": result.PriceQuote.USDCContract, + "chainId": result.PriceQuote.ChainID, + "sellerAddr": result.PriceQuote.SellerAddr, + "quoteExpiry": result.PriceQuote.QuoteExpiry, + "isFree": false, + } + } + return pgr, nil +} + +// initZKP creates ZKP components if enabled. +func initZKP(cfg *config.Config) *zkp.ProverService { + if !cfg.P2P.ZKHandshake && !cfg.P2P.ZKAttestation { + return nil + } + + prover, err := zkp.NewProverService(zkp.Config{ + CacheDir: cfg.P2P.ZKP.ProofCacheDir, + Scheme: zkp.ProofScheme(cfg.P2P.ZKP.ProvingScheme), + SRSMode: zkp.SRSMode(cfg.P2P.ZKP.SRSMode), + SRSPath: cfg.P2P.ZKP.SRSPath, + Logger: logger(), + }) + if err != nil { + logger().Warnw("ZKP prover init error, skipping", "error", err) + return nil + } + + // Compile all 4 circuits. + circuitDefs := map[string]interface { + Define(frontend.API) error + }{ + "wallet_ownership": &circuits.WalletOwnershipCircuit{}, + "response_attestation": &circuits.ResponseAttestationCircuit{}, + "balance_range": &circuits.BalanceRangeCircuit{}, + "agent_capability": &circuits.AgentCapabilityCircuit{}, + } + + for id, circuit := range circuitDefs { + if err := prover.Compile(id, circuit); err != nil { + logger().Warnw("ZKP circuit compile error", "circuitID", id, "error", err) + } + } + + logger().Infow("ZKP prover initialized", + "scheme", prover.Scheme(), + "circuits", len(circuitDefs), + ) + return prover +} diff --git a/internal/app/wiring_payment.go b/internal/app/wiring_payment.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6690be8e --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/app/wiring_payment.go @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +package app + +import ( + "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethclient" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/payment" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/security" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/wallet" + x402pkg "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/x402" +) + +// paymentComponents holds optional blockchain payment components. +type paymentComponents struct { + wallet wallet.WalletProvider + service *payment.Service + limiter wallet.SpendingLimiter + secrets *security.SecretsStore + chainID int64 +} + +// initPayment creates the payment components if enabled. +// Follows the same graceful degradation pattern as initGraphStore. +func initPayment(cfg *config.Config, store session.Store, secrets *security.SecretsStore) *paymentComponents { + if !cfg.Payment.Enabled { + logger().Info("payment system disabled") + return nil + } + + if secrets == nil { + logger().Warn("payment system requires security.signer, skipping") + return nil + } + + entStore, ok := store.(*session.EntStore) + if !ok { + logger().Warn("payment system requires EntStore, skipping") + return nil + } + + client := entStore.Client() + + // Create RPC client for blockchain interaction + rpcClient, err := ethclient.Dial(cfg.Payment.Network.RPCURL) + if err != nil { + logger().Warnw("payment RPC connection failed, skipping", "error", err, "rpcUrl", cfg.Payment.Network.RPCURL) + return nil + } + + // Create wallet provider based on configuration + var wp wallet.WalletProvider + switch cfg.Payment.WalletProvider { + case "local": + wp = wallet.NewLocalWallet(secrets, cfg.Payment.Network.RPCURL, cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID) + case "rpc": + wp = wallet.NewRPCWallet() + case "composite": + local := wallet.NewLocalWallet(secrets, cfg.Payment.Network.RPCURL, cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID) + rpc := wallet.NewRPCWallet() + wp = wallet.NewCompositeWallet(rpc, local, nil) + default: + logger().Warnw("unknown wallet provider, using local", "provider", cfg.Payment.WalletProvider) + wp = wallet.NewLocalWallet(secrets, cfg.Payment.Network.RPCURL, cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID) + } + + // Create spending limiter + limiter, err := wallet.NewEntSpendingLimiter(client, + cfg.Payment.Limits.MaxPerTx, + cfg.Payment.Limits.MaxDaily, + cfg.Payment.Limits.AutoApproveBelow, + ) + if err != nil { + logger().Warnw("spending limiter init failed, skipping", "error", err) + return nil + } + + // Create transaction builder + builder := payment.NewTxBuilder(rpcClient, + cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID, + cfg.Payment.Network.USDCContract, + ) + + // Create payment service + svc := payment.NewService(wp, limiter, builder, client, rpcClient, cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID) + + logger().Infow("payment system initialized", + "walletProvider", cfg.Payment.WalletProvider, + "chainId", cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID, + "network", wallet.NetworkName(cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID), + "maxPerTx", cfg.Payment.Limits.MaxPerTx, + "maxDaily", cfg.Payment.Limits.MaxDaily, + ) + + return &paymentComponents{ + wallet: wp, + service: svc, + limiter: limiter, + secrets: secrets, + chainID: cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID, + } +} + +// x402Components holds optional X402 interceptor components. +type x402Components struct { + interceptor *x402pkg.Interceptor +} + +// initX402 creates the X402 interceptor if payment is enabled. +func initX402(cfg *config.Config, secrets *security.SecretsStore, limiter wallet.SpendingLimiter) *x402Components { + if !cfg.Payment.Enabled { + return nil + } + if secrets == nil { + return nil + } + + signerProvider := x402pkg.NewLocalSignerProvider(secrets) + + maxAutoPayAmt := cfg.Payment.Limits.MaxPerTx + if maxAutoPayAmt == "" { + maxAutoPayAmt = "1.00" + } + + x402Cfg := x402pkg.Config{ + Enabled: true, + ChainID: cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID, + MaxAutoPayAmount: maxAutoPayAmt, + } + + interceptor := x402pkg.NewInterceptor(signerProvider, limiter, x402Cfg, logger()) + + logger().Infow("X402 interceptor configured", + "chainId", x402Cfg.ChainID, + "maxAutoPayAmount", maxAutoPayAmt, + ) + + return &x402Components{ + interceptor: interceptor, + } +} diff --git a/internal/appinit/builder.go b/internal/appinit/builder.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..da0d4489 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/appinit/builder.go @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +package appinit + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/agent" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/lifecycle" +) + +// Builder collects modules and orchestrates their initialization. +type Builder struct { + modules []Module +} + +// NewBuilder creates an empty Builder. +func NewBuilder() *Builder { + return &Builder{} +} + +// AddModule appends a module and returns the builder for chaining. +func (b *Builder) AddModule(m Module) *Builder { + b.modules = append(b.modules, m) + return b +} + +// BuildResult holds the aggregated output from all initialized modules. +type BuildResult struct { + Tools []*agent.Tool + Components []lifecycle.ComponentEntry + Resolver Resolver +} + +// Build sorts modules by dependency order, initializes each in sequence, +// and returns the aggregated tools, components, and resolver. +func (b *Builder) Build(ctx context.Context) (*BuildResult, error) { + sorted, err := TopoSort(b.modules) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("appinit build: %w", err) + } + + resolver := newMapResolver() + var tools []*agent.Tool + var components []lifecycle.ComponentEntry + + for _, m := range sorted { + result, err := m.Init(ctx, resolver) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("init module %q: %w", m.Name(), err) + } + if result == nil { + continue + } + + tools = append(tools, result.Tools...) + components = append(components, result.Components...) + + for key, val := range result.Values { + resolver.set(key, val) + } + } + + return &BuildResult{ + Tools: tools, + Components: components, + Resolver: resolver, + }, nil +} diff --git a/internal/appinit/builder_test.go b/internal/appinit/builder_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..98d27664 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/appinit/builder_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ +package appinit + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "sync" + "testing" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/agent" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/lifecycle" +) + +func TestBuilder_Empty(t *testing.T) { + result, err := NewBuilder().Build(context.Background()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err) + } + if len(result.Tools) != 0 { + t.Errorf("want 0 tools, got %d", len(result.Tools)) + } + if len(result.Components) != 0 { + t.Errorf("want 0 components, got %d", len(result.Components)) + } +} + +func TestBuilder_MultipleModules(t *testing.T) { + toolA := &agent.Tool{Name: "tool_a", Description: "Tool A"} + toolB := &agent.Tool{Name: "tool_b", Description: "Tool B"} + + modA := &stubModule{ + name: "a", + provides: []Provides{"key_a"}, + enabled: true, + initFn: func(_ context.Context, _ Resolver) (*ModuleResult, error) { + return &ModuleResult{ + Tools: []*agent.Tool{toolA}, + Values: map[Provides]interface{}{"key_a": "value_a"}, + }, nil + }, + } + + modB := &stubModule{ + name: "b", + provides: []Provides{"key_b"}, + dependsOn: []Provides{"key_a"}, + enabled: true, + initFn: func(_ context.Context, r Resolver) (*ModuleResult, error) { + // Verify we can resolve the dependency from module A. + val := r.Resolve("key_a") + if val == nil { + return nil, errors.New("expected key_a to be resolved") + } + return &ModuleResult{ + Tools: []*agent.Tool{toolB}, + Values: map[Provides]interface{}{"key_b": val.(string) + "_extended"}, + }, nil + }, + } + + result, err := NewBuilder(). + AddModule(modB). // added out of order intentionally + AddModule(modA). + Build(context.Background()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err) + } + + if len(result.Tools) != 2 { + t.Fatalf("want 2 tools, got %d", len(result.Tools)) + } + // A should init first, so tool_a first. + if result.Tools[0].Name != "tool_a" { + t.Errorf("want first tool %q, got %q", "tool_a", result.Tools[0].Name) + } + if result.Tools[1].Name != "tool_b" { + t.Errorf("want second tool %q, got %q", "tool_b", result.Tools[1].Name) + } + + // Verify resolver contains values from both modules. + val := result.Resolver.Resolve("key_b") + if val != "value_a_extended" { + t.Errorf("want resolver key_b = %q, got %v", "value_a_extended", val) + } +} + +func TestBuilder_ResolverPassesValues(t *testing.T) { + var receivedVal interface{} + + modA := &stubModule{ + name: "provider", + provides: []Provides{ProvidesMemory}, + enabled: true, + initFn: func(_ context.Context, _ Resolver) (*ModuleResult, error) { + return &ModuleResult{ + Values: map[Provides]interface{}{ProvidesMemory: 42}, + }, nil + }, + } + + modB := &stubModule{ + name: "consumer", + dependsOn: []Provides{ProvidesMemory}, + enabled: true, + initFn: func(_ context.Context, r Resolver) (*ModuleResult, error) { + receivedVal = r.Resolve(ProvidesMemory) + return &ModuleResult{}, nil + }, + } + + _, err := NewBuilder(). + AddModule(modB). + AddModule(modA). + Build(context.Background()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err) + } + + if receivedVal != 42 { + t.Errorf("want resolved value 42, got %v", receivedVal) + } +} + +func TestBuilder_Components(t *testing.T) { + comp := &dummyComponent{name: "test_comp"} + mod := &stubModule{ + name: "comp_module", + enabled: true, + initFn: func(_ context.Context, _ Resolver) (*ModuleResult, error) { + return &ModuleResult{ + Components: []lifecycle.ComponentEntry{ + {Component: comp, Priority: lifecycle.PriorityCore}, + }, + }, nil + }, + } + + result, err := NewBuilder().AddModule(mod).Build(context.Background()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err) + } + if len(result.Components) != 1 { + t.Fatalf("want 1 component, got %d", len(result.Components)) + } + if result.Components[0].Component.Name() != "test_comp" { + t.Errorf("want component name %q, got %q", "test_comp", result.Components[0].Component.Name()) + } +} + +func TestBuilder_InitError(t *testing.T) { + mod := &stubModule{ + name: "failing", + enabled: true, + initFn: func(_ context.Context, _ Resolver) (*ModuleResult, error) { + return nil, errors.New("init failed") + }, + } + + _, err := NewBuilder().AddModule(mod).Build(context.Background()) + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error, got nil") + } + if !errors.Is(err, errors.Unwrap(err)) { + // Just check that the error message contains useful info. + wantMsg := `init module "failing"` + if got := err.Error(); len(got) == 0 { + t.Errorf("expected non-empty error message") + } + _ = wantMsg + } +} + +func TestBuilder_NilResult(t *testing.T) { + mod := &stubModule{ + name: "nil_result", + enabled: true, + initFn: func(_ context.Context, _ Resolver) (*ModuleResult, error) { + return nil, nil + }, + } + + result, err := NewBuilder().AddModule(mod).Build(context.Background()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err) + } + if len(result.Tools) != 0 { + t.Errorf("want 0 tools, got %d", len(result.Tools)) + } +} + +func TestBuilder_CycleError(t *testing.T) { + modA := &stubModule{ + name: "a", + provides: []Provides{"key_a"}, + dependsOn: []Provides{"key_b"}, + enabled: true, + } + modB := &stubModule{ + name: "b", + provides: []Provides{"key_b"}, + dependsOn: []Provides{"key_a"}, + enabled: true, + } + + _, err := NewBuilder().AddModule(modA).AddModule(modB).Build(context.Background()) + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected cycle error, got nil") + } +} + +// dummyComponent implements lifecycle.Component for testing. +type dummyComponent struct { + name string +} + +func (d *dummyComponent) Name() string { return d.name } +func (d *dummyComponent) Start(_ context.Context, _ *sync.WaitGroup) error { return nil } +func (d *dummyComponent) Stop(_ context.Context) error { return nil } diff --git a/internal/appinit/module.go b/internal/appinit/module.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..481182d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/appinit/module.go @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +package appinit + +import ( + "context" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/agent" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/lifecycle" +) + +// Provides identifies what a module provides to other modules. +type Provides string + +// Well-known module provides keys. +const ( + ProvidesSessionStore Provides = "session_store" + ProvidesSecurity Provides = "security" + ProvidesKnowledge Provides = "knowledge" + ProvidesMemory Provides = "memory" + ProvidesEmbedding Provides = "embedding" + ProvidesGraph Provides = "graph" + ProvidesPayment Provides = "payment" + ProvidesP2P Provides = "p2p" + ProvidesLibrarian Provides = "librarian" + ProvidesAutomation Provides = "automation" + ProvidesGateway Provides = "gateway" + ProvidesAgent Provides = "agent" +) + +// Resolver provides access to initialized module results. +type Resolver interface { + // Resolve returns the value registered by a module for the given key. + // Returns nil if the key hasn't been provided yet. + Resolve(key Provides) interface{} +} + +// mapResolver is the default Resolver backed by a map. +type mapResolver struct { + values map[Provides]interface{} +} + +func newMapResolver() *mapResolver { + return &mapResolver{values: make(map[Provides]interface{})} +} + +func (r *mapResolver) Resolve(key Provides) interface{} { + return r.values[key] +} + +func (r *mapResolver) set(key Provides, val interface{}) { + r.values[key] = val +} + +// ModuleResult is what Init returns. +type ModuleResult struct { + // Tools are agent tools contributed by this module. + Tools []*agent.Tool + // Components are lifecycle components that need Start/Stop management. + Components []lifecycle.ComponentEntry + // Values are named values this module provides to other modules via Resolver. + Values map[Provides]interface{} +} + +// Module represents an initialization unit. +type Module interface { + Name() string + Provides() []Provides + DependsOn() []Provides + Enabled() bool + Init(ctx context.Context, resolver Resolver) (*ModuleResult, error) +} diff --git a/internal/appinit/topo_sort.go b/internal/appinit/topo_sort.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e2cfe0bb --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/appinit/topo_sort.go @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +package appinit + +import ( + "fmt" + "strings" +) + +// TopoSort returns modules in dependency order. Disabled modules are excluded. +// If module A depends on key K and module B provides K, B appears before A. +// Dependencies on keys not provided by any enabled module are silently ignored. +// Returns an error if a dependency cycle is detected. +func TopoSort(modules []Module) ([]Module, error) { + // Filter to enabled modules only. + enabled := make([]Module, 0, len(modules)) + for _, m := range modules { + if m.Enabled() { + enabled = append(enabled, m) + } + } + + if len(enabled) == 0 { + return nil, nil + } + + // Build a map from provides-key to the module that provides it. + provider := make(map[Provides]Module, len(enabled)) + for _, m := range enabled { + for _, p := range m.Provides() { + provider[p] = m + } + } + + // Build adjacency list: module name -> set of module names it depends on. + // An edge from A to B means "A depends on B" (B must come first). + type nameSet = map[string]struct{} + deps := make(map[string]nameSet, len(enabled)) + byName := make(map[string]Module, len(enabled)) + + for _, m := range enabled { + byName[m.Name()] = m + deps[m.Name()] = make(nameSet) + } + + for _, m := range enabled { + for _, key := range m.DependsOn() { + prov, ok := provider[key] + if !ok { + // No enabled module provides this key; skip. + continue + } + if prov.Name() == m.Name() { + // Self-dependency; skip. + continue + } + deps[m.Name()][prov.Name()] = struct{}{} + } + } + + // Kahn's algorithm for topological sort. + inDegree := make(map[string]int, len(enabled)) + for _, m := range enabled { + inDegree[m.Name()] = len(deps[m.Name()]) + } + + queue := make([]string, 0, len(enabled)) + for _, m := range enabled { + if inDegree[m.Name()] == 0 { + queue = append(queue, m.Name()) + } + } + + sorted := make([]Module, 0, len(enabled)) + for len(queue) > 0 { + name := queue[0] + queue = queue[1:] + sorted = append(sorted, byName[name]) + + // For each module that depends on the current one, decrement in-degree. + for _, m := range enabled { + if _, ok := deps[m.Name()][name]; ok { + inDegree[m.Name()]-- + if inDegree[m.Name()] == 0 { + queue = append(queue, m.Name()) + } + } + } + } + + if len(sorted) != len(enabled) { + // Cycle detected — report the modules involved. + cycleMembers := make([]string, 0) + for _, m := range enabled { + if inDegree[m.Name()] > 0 { + cycleMembers = append(cycleMembers, m.Name()) + } + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("dependency cycle detected among modules: [%s]", + strings.Join(cycleMembers, ", ")) + } + + return sorted, nil +} diff --git a/internal/appinit/topo_sort_test.go b/internal/appinit/topo_sort_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a849ed88 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/appinit/topo_sort_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +package appinit + +import ( + "context" + "testing" +) + +// stubModule is a minimal Module implementation for testing. +type stubModule struct { + name string + provides []Provides + dependsOn []Provides + enabled bool + initFn func(ctx context.Context, r Resolver) (*ModuleResult, error) +} + +func (s *stubModule) Name() string { return s.name } +func (s *stubModule) Provides() []Provides { return s.provides } +func (s *stubModule) DependsOn() []Provides { return s.dependsOn } +func (s *stubModule) Enabled() bool { return s.enabled } +func (s *stubModule) Init(ctx context.Context, r Resolver) (*ModuleResult, error) { + if s.initFn != nil { + return s.initFn(ctx, r) + } + return &ModuleResult{}, nil +} + +func TestTopoSort(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give string + modules []Module + wantOrder []string + wantErr bool + }{ + { + give: "empty input", + modules: nil, + wantOrder: nil, + }, + { + give: "single module no deps", + modules: []Module{ + &stubModule{name: "a", provides: []Provides{"key_a"}, enabled: true}, + }, + wantOrder: []string{"a"}, + }, + { + give: "two modules with dependency", + modules: []Module{ + &stubModule{name: "b", provides: []Provides{"key_b"}, dependsOn: []Provides{"key_a"}, enabled: true}, + &stubModule{name: "a", provides: []Provides{"key_a"}, enabled: true}, + }, + wantOrder: []string{"a", "b"}, + }, + { + give: "chain A -> B -> C", + modules: []Module{ + &stubModule{name: "c", provides: []Provides{"key_c"}, dependsOn: []Provides{"key_b"}, enabled: true}, + &stubModule{name: "a", provides: []Provides{"key_a"}, enabled: true}, + &stubModule{name: "b", provides: []Provides{"key_b"}, dependsOn: []Provides{"key_a"}, enabled: true}, + }, + wantOrder: []string{"a", "b", "c"}, + }, + { + give: "diamond dependency", + modules: []Module{ + &stubModule{name: "d", provides: []Provides{"key_d"}, dependsOn: []Provides{"key_b", "key_c"}, enabled: true}, + &stubModule{name: "b", provides: []Provides{"key_b"}, dependsOn: []Provides{"key_a"}, enabled: true}, + &stubModule{name: "c", provides: []Provides{"key_c"}, dependsOn: []Provides{"key_a"}, enabled: true}, + &stubModule{name: "a", provides: []Provides{"key_a"}, enabled: true}, + }, + wantOrder: []string{"a", "b", "c", "d"}, + }, + { + give: "disabled module skipped", + modules: []Module{ + &stubModule{name: "a", provides: []Provides{"key_a"}, enabled: true}, + &stubModule{name: "b", provides: []Provides{"key_b"}, dependsOn: []Provides{"key_a"}, enabled: false}, + &stubModule{name: "c", provides: []Provides{"key_c"}, dependsOn: []Provides{"key_b"}, enabled: true}, + }, + // c depends on key_b but b is disabled, so the dep is ignored; a and c both have no real deps. + wantOrder: []string{"a", "c"}, + }, + { + give: "dependency on missing key ignored", + modules: []Module{ + &stubModule{name: "a", provides: []Provides{"key_a"}, dependsOn: []Provides{"nonexistent"}, enabled: true}, + }, + wantOrder: []string{"a"}, + }, + { + give: "cycle detection", + modules: []Module{ + &stubModule{name: "a", provides: []Provides{"key_a"}, dependsOn: []Provides{"key_b"}, enabled: true}, + &stubModule{name: "b", provides: []Provides{"key_b"}, dependsOn: []Provides{"key_a"}, enabled: true}, + }, + wantErr: true, + }, + { + give: "three-way cycle detection", + modules: []Module{ + &stubModule{name: "a", provides: []Provides{"key_a"}, dependsOn: []Provides{"key_c"}, enabled: true}, + &stubModule{name: "b", provides: []Provides{"key_b"}, dependsOn: []Provides{"key_a"}, enabled: true}, + &stubModule{name: "c", provides: []Provides{"key_c"}, dependsOn: []Provides{"key_b"}, enabled: true}, + }, + wantErr: true, + }, + { + give: "self-dependency ignored", + modules: []Module{ + &stubModule{name: "a", provides: []Provides{"key_a"}, dependsOn: []Provides{"key_a"}, enabled: true}, + }, + wantOrder: []string{"a"}, + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + got, err := TopoSort(tt.modules) + if tt.wantErr { + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error, got nil") + } + return + } + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err) + } + + if len(got) != len(tt.wantOrder) { + names := moduleNames(got) + t.Fatalf("want %d modules %v, got %d modules %v", + len(tt.wantOrder), tt.wantOrder, len(got), names) + } + + for i, m := range got { + if m.Name() != tt.wantOrder[i] { + t.Errorf("position %d: want %q, got %q", i, tt.wantOrder[i], m.Name()) + } + } + }) + } +} + +func moduleNames(modules []Module) []string { + names := make([]string, len(modules)) + for i, m := range modules { + names[i] = m.Name() + } + return names +} diff --git a/internal/approval/approval_test.go b/internal/approval/approval_test.go index dd66778c..b52dbc0f 100644 --- a/internal/approval/approval_test.go +++ b/internal/approval/approval_test.go @@ -234,6 +234,85 @@ func TestCompositeProvider_FirstMatchWins(t *testing.T) { } } +func TestCompositeProvider_P2PSessionBlocksHeadless(t *testing.T) { + // HeadlessProvider as TTY fallback must NOT be used for P2P sessions. + headless := &mockProvider{result: true} + + comp := NewCompositeProvider() + comp.SetTTYFallback(headless) // simulates HeadlessProvider as TTY fallback + + req := ApprovalRequest{ + ID: "test-p2p-headless", + ToolName: "exec", + SessionKey: "p2p:did:key:attacker", + CreatedAt: time.Now(), + } + + _, err := comp.RequestApproval(context.Background(), req) + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error: P2P session should not fall through to TTY/HeadlessProvider") + } + if headless.wasCalled() { + t.Error("HeadlessProvider (TTY fallback) should NOT be called for P2P sessions") + } +} + +func TestCompositeProvider_P2PFallbackRouting(t *testing.T) { + p2pFb := &mockProvider{result: true} + + comp := NewCompositeProvider() + comp.SetP2PFallback(p2pFb) + comp.SetTTYFallback(&mockProvider{result: true}) // should NOT be used + + req := ApprovalRequest{ + ID: "test-p2p-fb", + ToolName: "echo", + SessionKey: "p2p:did:key:friend", + CreatedAt: time.Now(), + } + + resp, err := comp.RequestApproval(context.Background(), req) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err) + } + if !resp.Approved { + t.Error("expected P2P fallback to approve") + } + if !p2pFb.wasCalled() { + t.Error("expected P2P fallback provider to be called") + } +} + +func TestCompositeProvider_NonP2PStillUsesTTY(t *testing.T) { + tty := &mockProvider{result: true} + p2pFb := &mockProvider{result: false} + + comp := NewCompositeProvider() + comp.SetTTYFallback(tty) + comp.SetP2PFallback(p2pFb) + + req := ApprovalRequest{ + ID: "test-non-p2p", + ToolName: "exec", + SessionKey: "local:session:123", + CreatedAt: time.Now(), + } + + resp, err := comp.RequestApproval(context.Background(), req) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err) + } + if !resp.Approved { + t.Error("expected TTY fallback to approve for non-P2P session") + } + if !tty.wasCalled() { + t.Error("expected TTY fallback to be called for non-P2P session") + } + if p2pFb.wasCalled() { + t.Error("P2P fallback should NOT be called for non-P2P session") + } +} + func TestGatewayProvider(t *testing.T) { tests := []struct { give string diff --git a/internal/approval/composite.go b/internal/approval/composite.go index fe6f7e2c..22544ce9 100644 --- a/internal/approval/composite.go +++ b/internal/approval/composite.go @@ -3,15 +3,19 @@ package approval import ( "context" "fmt" + "strings" "sync" ) // CompositeProvider routes approval requests to the appropriate provider // based on session key prefix. Falls back to TTY, then denies (fail-closed). +// P2P sessions ("p2p:..." keys) use a dedicated fallback and are never +// routed to HeadlessProvider to prevent remote peers from auto-approving. type CompositeProvider struct { mu sync.RWMutex providers []Provider ttyFallback Provider + p2pFallback Provider } // NewCompositeProvider creates a new CompositeProvider. @@ -33,13 +37,25 @@ func (c *CompositeProvider) SetTTYFallback(p Provider) { c.ttyFallback = p } +// SetP2PFallback sets a dedicated approval provider for P2P sessions. +// P2P sessions are never routed to the TTY fallback when it is a +// HeadlessProvider, preventing remote peers from auto-approving. +func (c *CompositeProvider) SetP2PFallback(p Provider) { + c.mu.Lock() + defer c.mu.Unlock() + c.p2pFallback = p +} + // RequestApproval routes the request to the first provider whose CanHandle -// returns true. If none match, falls back to TTY. If TTY is unavailable, denies. +// returns true. P2P sessions ("p2p:..." keys) use a dedicated fallback +// instead of the TTY fallback to ensure HeadlessProvider never auto-approves +// remote peer requests. If no provider matches, denies (fail-closed). func (c *CompositeProvider) RequestApproval(ctx context.Context, req ApprovalRequest) (ApprovalResponse, error) { c.mu.RLock() providers := make([]Provider, len(c.providers)) copy(providers, c.providers) tty := c.ttyFallback + p2p := c.p2pFallback c.mu.RUnlock() for _, p := range providers { @@ -48,12 +64,23 @@ func (c *CompositeProvider) RequestApproval(ctx context.Context, req ApprovalReq } } - // TTY fallback + // P2P sessions: use dedicated fallback, NEVER HeadlessProvider. + if strings.HasPrefix(req.SessionKey, "p2p:") { + if p2p != nil { + return p2p.RequestApproval(ctx, req) + } + return ApprovalResponse{}, fmt.Errorf( + "no approval provider for P2P session %q (headless auto-approve is not allowed for remote peers)", + req.SessionKey, + ) + } + + // TTY fallback (non-P2P only). if tty != nil { return tty.RequestApproval(ctx, req) } - // Fail-closed: no provider available + // Fail-closed: no provider available. return ApprovalResponse{}, fmt.Errorf("no approval provider for session %q", req.SessionKey) } diff --git a/internal/approval/grant.go b/internal/approval/grant.go index 26629725..c9b43a9f 100644 --- a/internal/approval/grant.go +++ b/internal/approval/grant.go @@ -3,39 +3,62 @@ package approval import ( "strings" "sync" + "time" ) +// grantEntry tracks when a grant was created for TTL expiration. +type grantEntry struct { + grantedAt time.Time +} + // GrantStore tracks per-session, per-tool "always allow" grants in memory. // Grants are cleared on application restart (no persistence). +// An optional TTL causes grants to expire automatically. type GrantStore struct { mu sync.RWMutex - grants map[string]struct{} // key = "sessionKey:toolName" + grants map[string]grantEntry // key = "sessionKey\x00toolName" + ttl time.Duration // 0 = no expiry (backward compatible default) + nowFn func() time.Time // for testing; defaults to time.Now } -// NewGrantStore creates an empty GrantStore. +// NewGrantStore creates an empty GrantStore with no TTL. func NewGrantStore() *GrantStore { return &GrantStore{ - grants: make(map[string]struct{}), + grants: make(map[string]grantEntry), + nowFn: time.Now, } } +// SetTTL sets the time-to-live for grants. Zero disables expiry. +func (s *GrantStore) SetTTL(ttl time.Duration) { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + s.ttl = ttl +} + func grantKey(sessionKey, toolName string) string { return sessionKey + "\x00" + toolName } -// Grant records a persistent approval for the given session and tool. +// Grant records an approval for the given session and tool. func (s *GrantStore) Grant(sessionKey, toolName string) { s.mu.Lock() defer s.mu.Unlock() - s.grants[grantKey(sessionKey, toolName)] = struct{}{} + s.grants[grantKey(sessionKey, toolName)] = grantEntry{grantedAt: s.nowFn()} } -// IsGranted reports whether the tool has been permanently approved for this session. +// IsGranted reports whether the tool has a valid (non-expired) grant. func (s *GrantStore) IsGranted(sessionKey, toolName string) bool { s.mu.RLock() defer s.mu.RUnlock() - _, ok := s.grants[grantKey(sessionKey, toolName)] - return ok + entry, ok := s.grants[grantKey(sessionKey, toolName)] + if !ok { + return false + } + if s.ttl > 0 && s.nowFn().Sub(entry.grantedAt) > s.ttl { + return false + } + return true } // Revoke removes a single tool grant for the given session. @@ -56,3 +79,24 @@ func (s *GrantStore) RevokeSession(sessionKey string) { } } } + +// CleanExpired removes all grants that have exceeded the TTL. +// Returns the number of entries removed. No-op when TTL is zero. +func (s *GrantStore) CleanExpired() int { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + + if s.ttl == 0 { + return 0 + } + + now := s.nowFn() + removed := 0 + for k, entry := range s.grants { + if now.Sub(entry.grantedAt) > s.ttl { + delete(s.grants, k) + removed++ + } + } + return removed +} diff --git a/internal/approval/grant_test.go b/internal/approval/grant_test.go index 7d6e54b0..82deb443 100644 --- a/internal/approval/grant_test.go +++ b/internal/approval/grant_test.go @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package approval import ( "sync" "testing" + "time" ) func TestGrantStore_GrantAndIsGranted(t *testing.T) { @@ -105,3 +106,83 @@ func TestGrantStore_RevokeNonExistent(t *testing.T) { gs.Revoke("nonexistent", "tool") gs.RevokeSession("nonexistent") } + +func TestGrantStore_TTLExpired(t *testing.T) { + now := time.Now() + gs := NewGrantStore() + gs.nowFn = func() time.Time { return now } + gs.SetTTL(10 * time.Minute) + + gs.Grant("session-1", "echo") + + // Still valid within TTL. + gs.nowFn = func() time.Time { return now.Add(9 * time.Minute) } + if !gs.IsGranted("session-1", "echo") { + t.Error("expected grant to be valid within TTL") + } + + // Expired after TTL. + gs.nowFn = func() time.Time { return now.Add(11 * time.Minute) } + if gs.IsGranted("session-1", "echo") { + t.Error("expected grant to be expired after TTL") + } +} + +func TestGrantStore_TTLZeroMeansNoExpiry(t *testing.T) { + now := time.Now() + gs := NewGrantStore() + gs.nowFn = func() time.Time { return now } + // TTL = 0 (default). + + gs.Grant("session-1", "echo") + + // 100 hours later, still valid. + gs.nowFn = func() time.Time { return now.Add(100 * time.Hour) } + if !gs.IsGranted("session-1", "echo") { + t.Error("expected grant to be valid indefinitely when TTL = 0") + } +} + +func TestGrantStore_CleanExpired(t *testing.T) { + now := time.Now() + gs := NewGrantStore() + gs.nowFn = func() time.Time { return now } + gs.SetTTL(5 * time.Minute) + + gs.Grant("session-1", "echo") + gs.Grant("session-1", "exec") + gs.Grant("session-2", "echo") + + // Advance time past TTL for the first two, but grant session-2:echo later. + gs.nowFn = func() time.Time { return now.Add(3 * time.Minute) } + gs.Grant("session-2", "echo") // refresh + + gs.nowFn = func() time.Time { return now.Add(6 * time.Minute) } + removed := gs.CleanExpired() + if removed != 2 { + t.Errorf("expected 2 expired grants removed, got %d", removed) + } + + if gs.IsGranted("session-1", "echo") { + t.Error("session-1:echo should be cleaned") + } + if gs.IsGranted("session-1", "exec") { + t.Error("session-1:exec should be cleaned") + } + if !gs.IsGranted("session-2", "echo") { + t.Error("session-2:echo should still be valid (refreshed)") + } +} + +func TestGrantStore_CleanExpiredNoOpWhenTTLZero(t *testing.T) { + gs := NewGrantStore() + gs.Grant("session-1", "echo") + + removed := gs.CleanExpired() + if removed != 0 { + t.Errorf("expected 0 removed with TTL=0, got %d", removed) + } + if !gs.IsGranted("session-1", "echo") { + t.Error("grant should remain when TTL=0") + } +} diff --git a/internal/asyncbuf/batch.go b/internal/asyncbuf/batch.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..03813026 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/asyncbuf/batch.go @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +package asyncbuf + +import ( + "sync" + "sync/atomic" + "time" + + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +// ProcessBatchFunc is called with a batch of items to process. +type ProcessBatchFunc[T any] func(batch []T) + +// BatchConfig holds configuration for a BatchBuffer. +type BatchConfig struct { + QueueSize int + BatchSize int + BatchTimeout time.Duration +} + +// BatchBuffer collects items and processes them in batches on a background +// goroutine. It follows the Start -> Enqueue -> Stop lifecycle. +type BatchBuffer[T any] struct { + processBatch ProcessBatchFunc[T] + queue chan T + stopCh chan struct{} + done chan struct{} + batchSize int + batchTimeout time.Duration + dropCount atomic.Int64 + logger *zap.SugaredLogger +} + +// NewBatchBuffer creates a new batch-oriented async buffer. +func NewBatchBuffer[T any](cfg BatchConfig, fn ProcessBatchFunc[T], logger *zap.SugaredLogger) *BatchBuffer[T] { + if cfg.QueueSize <= 0 { + cfg.QueueSize = 256 + } + if cfg.BatchSize <= 0 { + cfg.BatchSize = 32 + } + if cfg.BatchTimeout <= 0 { + cfg.BatchTimeout = 2 * time.Second + } + + return &BatchBuffer[T]{ + processBatch: fn, + queue: make(chan T, cfg.QueueSize), + stopCh: make(chan struct{}), + done: make(chan struct{}), + batchSize: cfg.BatchSize, + batchTimeout: cfg.BatchTimeout, + logger: logger, + } +} + +// Start launches the background goroutine. The WaitGroup is incremented +// so callers can wait for graceful shutdown. +func (b *BatchBuffer[T]) Start(wg *sync.WaitGroup) { + wg.Add(1) + go func() { + defer wg.Done() + defer close(b.done) + b.run() + }() +} + +// Enqueue submits an item. Non-blocking; drops if the queue is full. +func (b *BatchBuffer[T]) Enqueue(item T) { + select { + case b.queue <- item: + default: + b.dropCount.Add(1) + b.logger.Warnw("batch buffer queue full, dropping item", + "totalDropped", b.dropCount.Load()) + } +} + +// DroppedCount returns the total number of dropped items. +func (b *BatchBuffer[T]) DroppedCount() int64 { + return b.dropCount.Load() +} + +// Stop signals the background goroutine to drain and exit. +func (b *BatchBuffer[T]) Stop() { + close(b.stopCh) + <-b.done +} + +func (b *BatchBuffer[T]) run() { + timer := time.NewTimer(b.batchTimeout) + defer timer.Stop() + + var batch []T + + flush := func() { + if len(batch) == 0 { + return + } + b.processBatch(batch) + batch = batch[:0] + } + + for { + select { + case item := <-b.queue: + batch = append(batch, item) + if len(batch) >= b.batchSize { + flush() + timer.Reset(b.batchTimeout) + } + + case <-timer.C: + flush() + timer.Reset(b.batchTimeout) + + case <-b.stopCh: + // Drain remaining items. + for { + select { + case item := <-b.queue: + batch = append(batch, item) + default: + flush() + return + } + } + } + } +} diff --git a/internal/asyncbuf/batch_test.go b/internal/asyncbuf/batch_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5a960488 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/asyncbuf/batch_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +package asyncbuf + +import ( + "sync" + "sync/atomic" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +func TestBatchBuffer_StartStop(t *testing.T) { + logger := zap.NewNop().Sugar() + buf := NewBatchBuffer[int](BatchConfig{}, func(_ []int) {}, logger) + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + buf.Start(&wg) + + buf.Stop() + wg.Wait() +} + +func TestBatchBuffer_BatchFlush(t *testing.T) { + logger := zap.NewNop().Sugar() + + var mu sync.Mutex + var batches [][]int + + buf := NewBatchBuffer[int](BatchConfig{ + QueueSize: 64, + BatchSize: 5, + BatchTimeout: 10 * time.Second, // large timeout so flush is triggered by batch size + }, func(batch []int) { + cp := make([]int, len(batch)) + copy(cp, batch) + mu.Lock() + batches = append(batches, cp) + mu.Unlock() + }, logger) + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + buf.Start(&wg) + + for i := 0; i < 10; i++ { + buf.Enqueue(i) + } + + // Wait for batch-size flushes. + time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond) + buf.Stop() + wg.Wait() + + mu.Lock() + defer mu.Unlock() + + // Should have gotten at least 2 batches of 5. + total := 0 + for _, b := range batches { + total += len(b) + } + assert.Equal(t, 10, total) +} + +func TestBatchBuffer_TimeoutFlush(t *testing.T) { + logger := zap.NewNop().Sugar() + + var mu sync.Mutex + var received []int + + buf := NewBatchBuffer[int](BatchConfig{ + QueueSize: 64, + BatchSize: 100, // large batch size so flush is triggered by timeout + BatchTimeout: 50 * time.Millisecond, + }, func(batch []int) { + mu.Lock() + received = append(received, batch...) + mu.Unlock() + }, logger) + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + buf.Start(&wg) + + buf.Enqueue(1) + buf.Enqueue(2) + buf.Enqueue(3) + + // Wait for timeout flush. + time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond) + buf.Stop() + wg.Wait() + + mu.Lock() + defer mu.Unlock() + require.Len(t, received, 3) + assert.Equal(t, []int{1, 2, 3}, received) +} + +func TestBatchBuffer_DrainOnStop(t *testing.T) { + logger := zap.NewNop().Sugar() + + var mu sync.Mutex + var received []int + + buf := NewBatchBuffer[int](BatchConfig{ + QueueSize: 256, + BatchSize: 1000, // large so nothing flushes before stop + BatchTimeout: 10 * time.Second, + }, func(batch []int) { + mu.Lock() + received = append(received, batch...) + mu.Unlock() + }, logger) + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + buf.Start(&wg) + + for i := 0; i < 20; i++ { + buf.Enqueue(i) + } + + // Stop immediately — should drain. + buf.Stop() + wg.Wait() + + mu.Lock() + defer mu.Unlock() + assert.Len(t, received, 20) +} + +func TestBatchBuffer_DropCounting(t *testing.T) { + logger := zap.NewNop().Sugar() + + // Tiny queue + slow processor to force drops. + var processCalls atomic.Int64 + buf := NewBatchBuffer[int](BatchConfig{ + QueueSize: 2, + BatchSize: 1000, + BatchTimeout: 10 * time.Second, + }, func(_ []int) { + processCalls.Add(1) + }, logger) + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + buf.Start(&wg) + + // Enqueue more than queue capacity. + for i := 0; i < 10; i++ { + buf.Enqueue(i) + } + + buf.Stop() + wg.Wait() + + assert.Greater(t, buf.DroppedCount(), int64(0)) +} + +func TestBatchBuffer_DefaultConfig(t *testing.T) { + logger := zap.NewNop().Sugar() + buf := NewBatchBuffer[string](BatchConfig{}, func(_ []string) {}, logger) + + assert.Equal(t, 256, cap(buf.queue)) + assert.Equal(t, 32, buf.batchSize) + assert.Equal(t, 2*time.Second, buf.batchTimeout) +} diff --git a/internal/asyncbuf/trigger.go b/internal/asyncbuf/trigger.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c4070a01 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/asyncbuf/trigger.go @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +package asyncbuf + +import ( + "sync" + + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +// ProcessFunc is called for each individual item. +type ProcessFunc[T any] func(item T) + +// TriggerConfig holds configuration for a TriggerBuffer. +type TriggerConfig struct { + QueueSize int +} + +// TriggerBuffer processes items one at a time on a background goroutine. +// It follows the Start -> Enqueue -> Stop lifecycle. +type TriggerBuffer[T any] struct { + process ProcessFunc[T] + queue chan T + stopCh chan struct{} + done chan struct{} + logger *zap.SugaredLogger +} + +// NewTriggerBuffer creates a new per-item async buffer. +func NewTriggerBuffer[T any](cfg TriggerConfig, fn ProcessFunc[T], logger *zap.SugaredLogger) *TriggerBuffer[T] { + if cfg.QueueSize <= 0 { + cfg.QueueSize = 16 + } + + return &TriggerBuffer[T]{ + process: fn, + queue: make(chan T, cfg.QueueSize), + stopCh: make(chan struct{}), + done: make(chan struct{}), + logger: logger, + } +} + +// Start launches the background goroutine. The WaitGroup is incremented +// so callers can wait for graceful shutdown. +func (b *TriggerBuffer[T]) Start(wg *sync.WaitGroup) { + wg.Add(1) + go func() { + defer wg.Done() + defer close(b.done) + b.run() + }() +} + +// Enqueue submits an item. Non-blocking; drops if the queue is full. +func (b *TriggerBuffer[T]) Enqueue(item T) { + select { + case b.queue <- item: + default: + b.logger.Debugw("trigger buffer queue full, dropping item") + } +} + +// Stop signals the background goroutine to drain and exit. +func (b *TriggerBuffer[T]) Stop() { + close(b.stopCh) + <-b.done +} + +func (b *TriggerBuffer[T]) run() { + for { + select { + case item := <-b.queue: + b.process(item) + case <-b.stopCh: + // Drain remaining items. + for { + select { + case item := <-b.queue: + b.process(item) + default: + return + } + } + } + } +} diff --git a/internal/asyncbuf/trigger_test.go b/internal/asyncbuf/trigger_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9712398a --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/asyncbuf/trigger_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +package asyncbuf + +import ( + "sync" + "sync/atomic" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +func TestTriggerBuffer_StartStop(t *testing.T) { + logger := zap.NewNop().Sugar() + buf := NewTriggerBuffer[int](TriggerConfig{}, func(_ int) {}, logger) + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + buf.Start(&wg) + + buf.Stop() + wg.Wait() +} + +func TestTriggerBuffer_ProcessesItems(t *testing.T) { + logger := zap.NewNop().Sugar() + + var mu sync.Mutex + var received []string + + buf := NewTriggerBuffer[string](TriggerConfig{QueueSize: 32}, func(item string) { + mu.Lock() + received = append(received, item) + mu.Unlock() + }, logger) + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + buf.Start(&wg) + + buf.Enqueue("alpha") + buf.Enqueue("beta") + buf.Enqueue("gamma") + + // Wait for processing. + time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond) + buf.Stop() + wg.Wait() + + mu.Lock() + defer mu.Unlock() + assert.Equal(t, []string{"alpha", "beta", "gamma"}, received) +} + +func TestTriggerBuffer_DrainOnStop(t *testing.T) { + logger := zap.NewNop().Sugar() + + var count atomic.Int64 + + // Block processing until stop to ensure items are in the queue. + gate := make(chan struct{}) + buf := NewTriggerBuffer[int](TriggerConfig{QueueSize: 64}, func(_ int) { + <-gate + count.Add(1) + }, logger) + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + buf.Start(&wg) + + // Enqueue items while processor is blocked. + for i := 0; i < 5; i++ { + buf.Enqueue(i) + } + + // Unblock and stop — should drain all. + close(gate) + buf.Stop() + wg.Wait() + + assert.Equal(t, int64(5), count.Load()) +} + +func TestTriggerBuffer_DefaultConfig(t *testing.T) { + logger := zap.NewNop().Sugar() + buf := NewTriggerBuffer[int](TriggerConfig{}, func(_ int) {}, logger) + + assert.Equal(t, 16, cap(buf.queue)) +} + +func TestTriggerBuffer_ConcurrentEnqueue(t *testing.T) { + logger := zap.NewNop().Sugar() + + var count atomic.Int64 + + buf := NewTriggerBuffer[int](TriggerConfig{QueueSize: 256}, func(_ int) { + count.Add(1) + }, logger) + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + buf.Start(&wg) + + var enqueueWg sync.WaitGroup + for i := 0; i < 50; i++ { + enqueueWg.Add(1) + go func(v int) { + defer enqueueWg.Done() + buf.Enqueue(v) + }(i) + } + enqueueWg.Wait() + + time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond) + buf.Stop() + wg.Wait() + + assert.Equal(t, int64(50), count.Load()) +} diff --git a/internal/background/manager.go b/internal/background/manager.go index 9b96b9cd..74050aa7 100644 --- a/internal/background/manager.go +++ b/internal/background/manager.go @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import ( "github.com/google/uuid" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/approval" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ctxutil" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/types" "go.uber.org/zap" ) @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ func (m *Manager) Submit(ctx context.Context, prompt string, origin Origin) (str return "", fmt.Errorf("submit task: max concurrent tasks reached (%d)", m.maxTasks) } - detached := ctxutil.Detach(ctx) + detached := types.DetachContext(ctx) taskCtx, cancelFn := context.WithTimeout(detached, m.taskTimeout) id := uuid.New().String() diff --git a/internal/background/manager_test.go b/internal/background/manager_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c06c589b --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/background/manager_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +package background + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +type mockRunner struct { + result string + err error + delay time.Duration +} + +func (m *mockRunner) Run(_ context.Context, _ string, _ string) (string, error) { + if m.delay > 0 { + time.Sleep(m.delay) + } + return m.result, m.err +} + +func testLogger() *zap.SugaredLogger { + return zap.NewNop().Sugar() +} + +func TestNewManager_Defaults(t *testing.T) { + mgr := NewManager(&mockRunner{}, nil, 0, 0, testLogger()) + require.NotNil(t, mgr) + assert.Equal(t, 10, mgr.maxTasks, "default maxTasks should be 10") + assert.Equal(t, 30*time.Minute, mgr.taskTimeout, "default timeout should be 30m") +} + +func TestNewManager_CustomValues(t *testing.T) { + mgr := NewManager(&mockRunner{}, nil, 5, 10*time.Minute, testLogger()) + assert.Equal(t, 5, mgr.maxTasks) + assert.Equal(t, 10*time.Minute, mgr.taskTimeout) +} + +func TestManager_Submit_And_List(t *testing.T) { + runner := &mockRunner{result: "done", delay: 50 * time.Millisecond} + mgr := NewManager(runner, nil, 5, time.Minute, testLogger()) + + id, err := mgr.Submit(context.Background(), "test prompt", Origin{Channel: "test"}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.NotEmpty(t, id) + + // Give time for task to start. + time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond) + + tasks := mgr.List() + assert.Len(t, tasks, 1) +} + +func TestManager_Submit_MaxTasksReached(t *testing.T) { + runner := &mockRunner{delay: time.Second} + mgr := NewManager(runner, nil, 1, time.Minute, testLogger()) + + id1, err := mgr.Submit(context.Background(), "task1", Origin{}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.NotEmpty(t, id1) + + // Wait for the first task to become active. + time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond) + + _, err = mgr.Submit(context.Background(), "task2", Origin{}) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "max concurrent tasks") +} + +func TestManager_Cancel_NotFound(t *testing.T) { + mgr := NewManager(&mockRunner{}, nil, 5, time.Minute, testLogger()) + err := mgr.Cancel("nonexistent") + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "not found") +} + +func TestManager_Status_NotFound(t *testing.T) { + mgr := NewManager(&mockRunner{}, nil, 5, time.Minute, testLogger()) + snap, err := mgr.Status("nonexistent") + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Nil(t, snap) +} + +func TestManager_Result_NotFound(t *testing.T) { + mgr := NewManager(&mockRunner{}, nil, 5, time.Minute, testLogger()) + result, err := mgr.Result("nonexistent") + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, result) +} + +func TestManager_Submit_And_Result(t *testing.T) { + runner := &mockRunner{result: "hello world"} + mgr := NewManager(runner, nil, 5, time.Minute, testLogger()) + + id, err := mgr.Submit(context.Background(), "test", Origin{}) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // Wait for completion. + time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond) + + result, err := mgr.Result(id) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "hello world", result) +} + +func TestManager_Submit_RunnerError(t *testing.T) { + runner := &mockRunner{err: fmt.Errorf("runner failed")} + mgr := NewManager(runner, nil, 5, time.Minute, testLogger()) + + id, err := mgr.Submit(context.Background(), "test", Origin{}) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // Wait for completion. + time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond) + + snap, err := mgr.Status(id) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, Failed, snap.Status) +} + +// Test Status enum. +func TestStatus_Valid(t *testing.T) { + assert.True(t, Pending.Valid()) + assert.True(t, Running.Valid()) + assert.True(t, Done.Valid()) + assert.True(t, Failed.Valid()) + assert.True(t, Cancelled.Valid()) + assert.False(t, Status(0).Valid()) + assert.False(t, Status(99).Valid()) +} + +func TestStatus_String(t *testing.T) { + assert.Equal(t, "pending", Pending.String()) + assert.Equal(t, "running", Running.String()) + assert.Equal(t, "done", Done.String()) + assert.Equal(t, "failed", Failed.String()) + assert.Equal(t, "cancelled", Cancelled.String()) + assert.Equal(t, "unknown", Status(0).String()) +} diff --git a/internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go b/internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go index 67ef05fc..47f233f9 100644 --- a/internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go +++ b/internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go @@ -2,9 +2,7 @@ package bootstrap import ( "context" - "crypto/hmac" "database/sql" - "errors" "fmt" "os" "path/filepath" @@ -18,7 +16,6 @@ import ( "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/configstore" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/passphrase" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/security" ) @@ -49,134 +46,31 @@ type Options struct { // KeepKeyfile prevents the keyfile from being shredded after crypto initialization. // Default (false) shreds the keyfile for security. KeepKeyfile bool + // DBEncryption configures SQLCipher transparent database encryption. + DBEncryption config.DBEncryptionConfig + // SkipSecureDetection disables secure hardware provider detection (biometric/TPM). + // When true, the bootstrap falls back to keyfile or interactive prompt only. + // Useful for testing and headless environments. + SkipSecureDetection bool } -// Run executes the full bootstrap sequence: +// Run executes the full bootstrap sequence using the phase pipeline: // 1. Ensure ~/.lango/ directory -// 2. Open SQLite DB + ent schema migration +// 2. Detect DB encryption status // 3. Acquire passphrase -// 4. Initialize crypto provider (salt/checksum) -// 5. Load or create configuration profile +// 4. Open SQLite/SQLCipher DB + ent schema migration +// 5. Load security state (salt/checksum) +// 6. Initialize crypto provider +// 7. Load or create configuration profile func Run(opts Options) (*Result, error) { - home, err := os.UserHomeDir() - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolve home directory: %w", err) - } - - langoDir := filepath.Join(home, ".lango") - if opts.DBPath == "" { - opts.DBPath = filepath.Join(langoDir, "lango.db") - } - if opts.KeyfilePath == "" { - opts.KeyfilePath = filepath.Join(langoDir, "keyfile") - } - - // 1. Ensure data directory exists. - if err := os.MkdirAll(langoDir, 0700); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("create data directory: %w", err) - } - - // 2. Open database and run schema migration. - client, rawDB, err := openDatabase(opts.DBPath) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("open database: %w", err) - } - - // 3. Check existing salt to determine first-run vs returning user. - salt, checksum, firstRun, err := loadSecurityState(rawDB) - if err != nil { - client.Close() - return nil, fmt.Errorf("load security state: %w", err) - } - - // 4. Acquire passphrase. - pass, source, err := passphrase.Acquire(passphrase.Options{ - KeyfilePath: opts.KeyfilePath, - AllowCreation: firstRun, - }) - if err != nil { - client.Close() - return nil, fmt.Errorf("acquire passphrase: %w", err) - } - - // 5. Initialize crypto provider. - provider := security.NewLocalCryptoProvider() - if firstRun { - if err := provider.Initialize(pass); err != nil { - client.Close() - return nil, fmt.Errorf("initialize crypto: %w", err) - } - if err := storeSalt(rawDB, provider.Salt()); err != nil { - client.Close() - return nil, fmt.Errorf("store salt: %w", err) - } - cs := provider.CalculateChecksum(pass, provider.Salt()) - if err := storeChecksum(rawDB, cs); err != nil { - client.Close() - return nil, fmt.Errorf("store checksum: %w", err) - } - } else { - if err := provider.InitializeWithSalt(pass, salt); err != nil { - client.Close() - return nil, fmt.Errorf("initialize crypto with salt: %w", err) - } - if checksum != nil { - computed := provider.CalculateChecksum(pass, salt) - if !hmac.Equal(checksum, computed) { - client.Close() - return nil, fmt.Errorf("passphrase checksum mismatch: incorrect passphrase") - } - } - } - - // 5b. Shred keyfile after successful crypto initialization. - if source == passphrase.SourceKeyfile && !opts.KeepKeyfile { - if err := passphrase.ShredKeyfile(opts.KeyfilePath); err != nil { - fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: shred keyfile: %v\n", err) - } - } - - // 6. Load or create configuration profile. - store := configstore.NewStore(client, provider) - ctx := context.Background() - - profileName := opts.ForceProfile - var cfg *config.Config - - if profileName != "" { - cfg, err = store.Load(ctx, profileName) - if err != nil { - client.Close() - return nil, fmt.Errorf("load profile %q: %w", profileName, err) - } - } else { - profileName, cfg, err = store.LoadActive(ctx) - if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, configstore.ErrNoActiveProfile) { - client.Close() - return nil, fmt.Errorf("load active profile: %w", err) - } - - if errors.Is(err, configstore.ErrNoActiveProfile) { - cfg, profileName, err = handleNoProfile(ctx, store) - if err != nil { - client.Close() - return nil, err - } - } - } - - return &Result{ - Config: cfg, - DBClient: client, - RawDB: rawDB, - Crypto: provider, - ConfigStore: store, - ProfileName: profileName, - }, nil + pipeline := NewPipeline(DefaultPhases()...) + return pipeline.Execute(context.Background(), opts) } -// openDatabase opens the SQLite database and runs ent schema migration. -func openDatabase(dbPath string) (*ent.Client, *sql.DB, error) { +// openDatabase opens the SQLite/SQLCipher database and runs ent schema migration. +// When encryptionKey is non-empty, PRAGMA key is executed after opening the connection +// to enable SQLCipher transparent encryption. +func openDatabase(dbPath, encryptionKey string, cipherPageSize int) (*ent.Client, *sql.DB, error) { // Expand tilde. if strings.HasPrefix(dbPath, "~/") { home, err := os.UserHomeDir() @@ -199,6 +93,22 @@ func openDatabase(dbPath string) (*ent.Client, *sql.DB, error) { db.SetMaxOpenConns(4) db.SetMaxIdleConns(4) + // When encryption key is provided, set SQLCipher PRAGMAs. + // This requires the binary to be built with SQLCipher support. + if encryptionKey != "" { + if cipherPageSize <= 0 { + cipherPageSize = 4096 + } + if _, err := db.Exec(fmt.Sprintf("PRAGMA key = '%s'", encryptionKey)); err != nil { + db.Close() + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("set PRAGMA key: %w", err) + } + if _, err := db.Exec(fmt.Sprintf("PRAGMA cipher_page_size = %d", cipherPageSize)); err != nil { + db.Close() + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("set cipher_page_size: %w", err) + } + } + if _, err := db.Exec("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON"); err != nil { db.Close() return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("enable foreign keys: %w", err) @@ -218,6 +128,25 @@ func openDatabase(dbPath string) (*ent.Client, *sql.DB, error) { return client, db, nil } +// IsDBEncrypted checks whether a SQLite database file is encrypted. +// An encrypted DB will not have the standard "SQLite format 3" magic header. +func IsDBEncrypted(dbPath string) bool { + if _, err := os.Stat(dbPath); os.IsNotExist(err) { + return false + } + f, err := os.Open(dbPath) + if err != nil { + return false + } + defer f.Close() + header := make([]byte, 16) + n, err := f.Read(header) + if err != nil || n < 16 { + return false + } + return string(header[:15]) != "SQLite format 3" +} + // ensureSecurityTable creates the security_config table if it does not exist. func ensureSecurityTable(db *sql.DB) error { _, err := db.Exec(` diff --git a/internal/bootstrap/bootstrap_encryption_test.go b/internal/bootstrap/bootstrap_encryption_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e77af5de --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/bootstrap/bootstrap_encryption_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +package bootstrap + +import ( + "database/sql" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "testing" + + _ "github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func TestIsDBEncrypted_PlaintextDB(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + dbPath := filepath.Join(dir, "plain.db") + + db, err := sql.Open("sqlite3", "file:"+dbPath) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = db.Exec("CREATE TABLE test (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY)") + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, db.Close()) + + assert.False(t, IsDBEncrypted(dbPath)) +} + +func TestIsDBEncrypted_NonexistentFile(t *testing.T) { + assert.False(t, IsDBEncrypted("/tmp/nonexistent_db_test_bootstrap.db")) +} + +func TestIsDBEncrypted_EmptyFile(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "empty.db") + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte{}, 0600)) + assert.False(t, IsDBEncrypted(path)) +} + +func TestIsDBEncrypted_RandomBytes(t *testing.T) { + // A file with random bytes (simulating encrypted) should return true + // since it won't have the SQLite magic header. + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "random.db") + data := make([]byte, 4096) + for i := range data { + data[i] = byte(i % 256) + } + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, data, 0600)) + assert.True(t, IsDBEncrypted(path)) +} + +func TestOpenDatabase_Plaintext(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + dbPath := filepath.Join(dir, "test.db") + + client, rawDB, err := openDatabase(dbPath, "", 0) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NotNil(t, client) + require.NotNil(t, rawDB) + + // Verify DB is usable. + require.NoError(t, rawDB.Ping()) + + client.Close() +} + +func TestOpenDatabase_WithEncryptionKey_NoSQLCipher(t *testing.T) { + // When SQLCipher is not available, PRAGMA key is accepted silently + // by standard SQLite (it's a no-op). The DB opens but is NOT encrypted. + // This is expected behavior -- actual encryption requires SQLCipher support. + dir := t.TempDir() + dbPath := filepath.Join(dir, "test.db") + + client, rawDB, err := openDatabase(dbPath, "test-key", 4096) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NotNil(t, client) + require.NotNil(t, rawDB) + + // Verify DB is usable (PRAGMA key is silently ignored without SQLCipher). + require.NoError(t, rawDB.Ping()) + + client.Close() + + // Without SQLCipher, the file should still be plaintext. + assert.False(t, IsDBEncrypted(dbPath)) +} diff --git a/internal/bootstrap/bootstrap_test.go b/internal/bootstrap/bootstrap_test.go index 9593fc07..a0acc8ab 100644 --- a/internal/bootstrap/bootstrap_test.go +++ b/internal/bootstrap/bootstrap_test.go @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import ( "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/passphrase" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/security/passphrase" ) func TestRun_ShredsKeyfileAfterCryptoInit(t *testing.T) { @@ -20,8 +20,9 @@ func TestRun_ShredsKeyfileAfterCryptoInit(t *testing.T) { require.NoError(t, passphrase.WriteKeyfile(keyfilePath, pass)) result, err := Run(Options{ - DBPath: dbPath, - KeyfilePath: keyfilePath, + DBPath: dbPath, + KeyfilePath: keyfilePath, + SkipSecureDetection: true, }) require.NoError(t, err) t.Cleanup(func() { @@ -41,9 +42,10 @@ func TestRun_KeepsKeyfileWhenOptedOut(t *testing.T) { require.NoError(t, passphrase.WriteKeyfile(keyfilePath, pass)) result, err := Run(Options{ - DBPath: dbPath, - KeyfilePath: keyfilePath, - KeepKeyfile: true, + DBPath: dbPath, + KeyfilePath: keyfilePath, + KeepKeyfile: true, + SkipSecureDetection: true, }) require.NoError(t, err) t.Cleanup(func() { diff --git a/internal/bootstrap/phases.go b/internal/bootstrap/phases.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ada5c442 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/bootstrap/phases.go @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +package bootstrap + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/hmac" + "errors" + "fmt" + "os" + "path/filepath" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/prompt" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/configstore" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/keyring" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/security" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/security/passphrase" +) + +// DefaultPhases returns the standard bootstrap phase sequence. +func DefaultPhases() []Phase { + return []Phase{ + phaseEnsureDataDir(), + phaseDetectEncryption(), + phaseAcquirePassphrase(), + phaseOpenDatabase(), + phaseLoadSecurityState(), + phaseInitCrypto(), + phaseLoadProfile(), + } +} + +// phaseEnsureDataDir creates ~/.lango/ directory and resolves default paths. +func phaseEnsureDataDir() Phase { + return Phase{ + Name: "ensure data directory", + Run: func(_ context.Context, s *State) error { + home, err := os.UserHomeDir() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("resolve home directory: %w", err) + } + s.Home = home + s.LangoDir = filepath.Join(home, ".lango") + + if s.Options.DBPath == "" { + s.Options.DBPath = filepath.Join(s.LangoDir, "lango.db") + } + if s.Options.KeyfilePath == "" { + s.Options.KeyfilePath = filepath.Join(s.LangoDir, "keyfile") + } + + if err := os.MkdirAll(s.LangoDir, 0700); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("create data directory: %w", err) + } + return nil + }, + } +} + +// phaseDetectEncryption checks if DB is encrypted or encryption is configured. +func phaseDetectEncryption() Phase { + return Phase{ + Name: "detect encryption", + Run: func(_ context.Context, s *State) error { + s.DBEncrypted = IsDBEncrypted(s.Options.DBPath) + s.NeedsDBKey = s.DBEncrypted || s.Options.DBEncryption.Enabled + return nil + }, + } +} + +// phaseAcquirePassphrase acquires the passphrase from keyring, keyfile, or interactive prompt. +// Also offers to store the passphrase when secure hardware is available. +func phaseAcquirePassphrase() Phase { + return Phase{ + Name: "acquire passphrase", + Run: func(_ context.Context, s *State) error { + // Detect secure provider (biometric/TPM). + if !s.Options.SkipSecureDetection { + s.SecureProvider, s.SecurityTier = keyring.DetectSecureProvider() + } + + // Determine if this is a first-run scenario: no DB file. + _, statErr := os.Stat(s.Options.DBPath) + s.FirstRunGuess = statErr != nil + + pass, source, err := passphrase.Acquire(passphrase.Options{ + KeyfilePath: s.Options.KeyfilePath, + AllowCreation: s.FirstRunGuess, + KeyringProvider: s.SecureProvider, + }) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("acquire passphrase: %w", err) + } + s.Passphrase = pass + s.PassSource = source + + // Offer to store passphrase when secure hardware is available. + if source == passphrase.SourceInteractive && s.SecureProvider != nil { + tierLabel := s.SecurityTier.String() + msg := fmt.Sprintf("Secure storage available (%s). Store passphrase?", tierLabel) + if ok, promptErr := prompt.Confirm(msg); promptErr == nil && ok { + if storeErr := s.SecureProvider.Set(keyring.Service, keyring.KeyMasterPassphrase, pass); storeErr != nil { + if errors.Is(storeErr, keyring.ErrEntitlement) { + fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: biometric storage unavailable (binary not codesigned)\n") + fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, " Tip: codesign the binary for Touch ID support: make codesign\n") + fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, " Note: also ensure device passcode is set (required for biometric Keychain)\n") + } else { + fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: store passphrase failed: %v\n", storeErr) + } + } else { + fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Passphrase saved. Next launch will load it automatically.\n") + } + } + } + + return nil + }, + } +} + +// phaseOpenDatabase opens SQLite/SQLCipher DB and runs ent schema migration. +func phaseOpenDatabase() Phase { + return Phase{ + Name: "open database", + Run: func(_ context.Context, s *State) error { + if s.NeedsDBKey { + s.DBKey = s.Passphrase + } + client, rawDB, err := openDatabase(s.Options.DBPath, s.DBKey, s.Options.DBEncryption.CipherPageSize) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("open database: %w", err) + } + s.Client = client + s.RawDB = rawDB + // Populate Result early so later phases can build on it. + s.Result.DBClient = client + s.Result.RawDB = rawDB + return nil + }, + Cleanup: func(s *State) { + if s.Client != nil { + s.Client.Close() + } + }, + } +} + +// phaseLoadSecurityState reads salt and checksum from the database. +func phaseLoadSecurityState() Phase { + return Phase{ + Name: "load security state", + Run: func(_ context.Context, s *State) error { + salt, checksum, firstRun, err := loadSecurityState(s.RawDB) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load security state: %w", err) + } + s.Salt = salt + s.Checksum = checksum + s.FirstRun = firstRun + return nil + }, + } +} + +// phaseInitCrypto initializes the crypto provider and shreds keyfile if needed. +func phaseInitCrypto() Phase { + return Phase{ + Name: "initialize crypto", + Run: func(_ context.Context, s *State) error { + provider := security.NewLocalCryptoProvider() + + if s.FirstRun { + if err := provider.Initialize(s.Passphrase); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("initialize crypto: %w", err) + } + if err := storeSalt(s.RawDB, provider.Salt()); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("store salt: %w", err) + } + cs := provider.CalculateChecksum(s.Passphrase, provider.Salt()) + if err := storeChecksum(s.RawDB, cs); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("store checksum: %w", err) + } + } else { + if err := provider.InitializeWithSalt(s.Passphrase, s.Salt); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("initialize crypto with salt: %w", err) + } + if s.Checksum != nil { + computed := provider.CalculateChecksum(s.Passphrase, s.Salt) + if !hmac.Equal(s.Checksum, computed) { + return fmt.Errorf("passphrase checksum mismatch: incorrect passphrase") + } + } + } + + // Shred keyfile after successful crypto initialization. + if s.PassSource == passphrase.SourceKeyfile && !s.Options.KeepKeyfile { + if err := passphrase.ShredKeyfile(s.Options.KeyfilePath); err != nil { + fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: shred keyfile: %v\n", err) + } + } + + s.Crypto = provider + s.Result.Crypto = provider + return nil + }, + } +} + +// phaseLoadProfile loads or creates the configuration profile. +func phaseLoadProfile() Phase { + return Phase{ + Name: "load profile", + Run: func(ctx context.Context, s *State) error { + store := configstore.NewStore(s.Client, s.Crypto) + s.Result.ConfigStore = store + + profileName := s.Options.ForceProfile + + if profileName != "" { + cfg, err := store.Load(ctx, profileName) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load profile %q: %w", profileName, err) + } + s.Result.Config = cfg + s.Result.ProfileName = profileName + return nil + } + + name, cfg, err := store.LoadActive(ctx) + if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, configstore.ErrNoActiveProfile) { + return fmt.Errorf("load active profile: %w", err) + } + + if errors.Is(err, configstore.ErrNoActiveProfile) { + resultCfg, resultName, handleErr := handleNoProfile(ctx, store) + if handleErr != nil { + return handleErr + } + s.Result.Config = resultCfg + s.Result.ProfileName = resultName + return nil + } + + s.Result.Config = cfg + s.Result.ProfileName = name + return nil + }, + } +} diff --git a/internal/bootstrap/pipeline.go b/internal/bootstrap/pipeline.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5dbf8ed2 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/bootstrap/pipeline.go @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +package bootstrap + +import ( + "context" + "database/sql" + "fmt" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/keyring" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/security" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/security/passphrase" +) + +// State carries data between pipeline phases. +// Each phase can read from and write to State. +type State struct { + Options Options + Result Result + + // Internal state passed between phases. + Home string + LangoDir string + + // Encryption detection. + DBEncrypted bool + NeedsDBKey bool + + // Passphrase acquisition. + Passphrase string + PassSource passphrase.Source + SecureProvider keyring.Provider + SecurityTier keyring.SecurityTier + FirstRunGuess bool + + // Database handles (set by phaseOpenDatabase). + Client *ent.Client + RawDB *sql.DB + + // Security state from DB. + Salt []byte + Checksum []byte + FirstRun bool + + // Crypto. + DBKey string + Crypto security.CryptoProvider +} + +// Phase represents a single step in the bootstrap pipeline. +type Phase struct { + Name string + Run func(ctx context.Context, state *State) error + Cleanup func(state *State) // called in reverse order if a later phase fails +} + +// Pipeline executes phases sequentially. If a phase fails, +// cleanup functions of all previously completed phases are called in reverse order. +type Pipeline struct { + phases []Phase +} + +// NewPipeline creates a pipeline from the given phases. +func NewPipeline(phases ...Phase) *Pipeline { + return &Pipeline{phases: phases} +} + +// Execute runs all phases. On failure, cleans up in reverse order. +func (p *Pipeline) Execute(ctx context.Context, opts Options) (*Result, error) { + state := &State{Options: opts} + + var completed []int // indices of completed phases + + for i, phase := range p.phases { + if err := phase.Run(ctx, state); err != nil { + // Cleanup in reverse order. + for j := len(completed) - 1; j >= 0; j-- { + idx := completed[j] + if p.phases[idx].Cleanup != nil { + p.phases[idx].Cleanup(state) + } + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", phase.Name, err) + } + completed = append(completed, i) + } + + return &state.Result, nil +} diff --git a/internal/bootstrap/pipeline_test.go b/internal/bootstrap/pipeline_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..12e10c03 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/bootstrap/pipeline_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@ +package bootstrap + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func TestPipeline_ExecutesInOrder(t *testing.T) { + var order []string + + phases := []Phase{ + { + Name: "phase-a", + Run: func(_ context.Context, _ *State) error { + order = append(order, "a") + return nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "phase-b", + Run: func(_ context.Context, _ *State) error { + order = append(order, "b") + return nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "phase-c", + Run: func(_ context.Context, _ *State) error { + order = append(order, "c") + return nil + }, + }, + } + + p := NewPipeline(phases...) + result, err := p.Execute(context.Background(), Options{}) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NotNil(t, result) + assert.Equal(t, []string{"a", "b", "c"}, order) +} + +func TestPipeline_CleanupRunsInReverseOnFailure(t *testing.T) { + var cleanupOrder []string + + phases := []Phase{ + { + Name: "phase-a", + Run: func(_ context.Context, _ *State) error { + return nil + }, + Cleanup: func(_ *State) { + cleanupOrder = append(cleanupOrder, "a") + }, + }, + { + Name: "phase-b", + Run: func(_ context.Context, _ *State) error { + return nil + }, + Cleanup: func(_ *State) { + cleanupOrder = append(cleanupOrder, "b") + }, + }, + { + Name: "phase-c", + Run: func(_ context.Context, _ *State) error { + return errors.New("phase-c failed") + }, + Cleanup: func(_ *State) { + cleanupOrder = append(cleanupOrder, "c") + }, + }, + } + + p := NewPipeline(phases...) + _, err := p.Execute(context.Background(), Options{}) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "phase-c") + + // Cleanup should run for a and b (completed) in reverse, NOT for c (failed). + assert.Equal(t, []string{"b", "a"}, cleanupOrder) +} + +func TestPipeline_CleanupNotCalledForFailedPhase(t *testing.T) { + var cleaned []string + + phases := []Phase{ + { + Name: "phase-a", + Run: func(_ context.Context, _ *State) error { + return nil + }, + Cleanup: func(_ *State) { + cleaned = append(cleaned, "a") + }, + }, + { + Name: "phase-b", + Run: func(_ context.Context, _ *State) error { + return errors.New("boom") + }, + Cleanup: func(_ *State) { + cleaned = append(cleaned, "b") + }, + }, + } + + p := NewPipeline(phases...) + _, err := p.Execute(context.Background(), Options{}) + require.Error(t, err) + + // Only phase-a cleanup should run, not phase-b. + assert.Equal(t, []string{"a"}, cleaned) +} + +func TestPipeline_StatePassedBetweenPhases(t *testing.T) { + phases := []Phase{ + { + Name: "set-home", + Run: func(_ context.Context, s *State) error { + s.Home = "/test/home" + return nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "read-home", + Run: func(_ context.Context, s *State) error { + if s.Home != "/test/home" { + return errors.New("expected Home to be /test/home") + } + s.LangoDir = s.Home + "/.lango" + return nil + }, + }, + { + Name: "verify", + Run: func(_ context.Context, s *State) error { + if s.LangoDir != "/test/home/.lango" { + return errors.New("expected LangoDir to be /test/home/.lango") + } + return nil + }, + }, + } + + p := NewPipeline(phases...) + _, err := p.Execute(context.Background(), Options{}) + require.NoError(t, err) +} + +func TestPipeline_NilCleanupSkipped(t *testing.T) { + phases := []Phase{ + { + Name: "no-cleanup", + Run: func(_ context.Context, _ *State) error { + return nil + }, + // Cleanup is nil — should not panic. + }, + { + Name: "fail", + Run: func(_ context.Context, _ *State) error { + return errors.New("fail") + }, + }, + } + + p := NewPipeline(phases...) + _, err := p.Execute(context.Background(), Options{}) + require.Error(t, err) + // No panic means nil cleanup was properly skipped. +} + +func TestPipeline_ErrorWrapsPhaseNameAndCause(t *testing.T) { + sentinel := errors.New("root cause") + phases := []Phase{ + { + Name: "important-phase", + Run: func(_ context.Context, _ *State) error { + return sentinel + }, + }, + } + + p := NewPipeline(phases...) + _, err := p.Execute(context.Background(), Options{}) + require.Error(t, err) + + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "important-phase") + assert.True(t, errors.Is(err, sentinel)) +} + +func TestDefaultPhases_Returns7Phases(t *testing.T) { + phases := DefaultPhases() + require.Len(t, phases, 7) + + wantNames := []string{ + "ensure data directory", + "detect encryption", + "acquire passphrase", + "open database", + "load security state", + "initialize crypto", + "load profile", + } + + for i, want := range wantNames { + assert.Equal(t, want, phases[i].Name, "phase %d name", i) + } +} + +func TestDefaultPhases_OpenDatabaseHasCleanup(t *testing.T) { + phases := DefaultPhases() + // Only "open database" (index 3) should have a Cleanup function. + for i, p := range phases { + if p.Name == "open database" { + assert.NotNil(t, p.Cleanup, "phase %d (%s) should have Cleanup", i, p.Name) + } + } +} + +func TestPipeline_NoCleanupOnSuccess(t *testing.T) { + var cleaned bool + + phases := []Phase{ + { + Name: "only-phase", + Run: func(_ context.Context, _ *State) error { + return nil + }, + Cleanup: func(_ *State) { + cleaned = true + }, + }, + } + + p := NewPipeline(phases...) + _, err := p.Execute(context.Background(), Options{}) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // Cleanup should NOT run on success. + assert.False(t, cleaned) +} diff --git a/internal/channels/discord/discord.go b/internal/channels/discord/discord.go index 3ac98abe..af1a8d53 100644 --- a/internal/channels/discord/discord.go +++ b/internal/channels/discord/discord.go @@ -69,7 +69,6 @@ type Channel struct { ctx context.Context botID string stopChan chan struct{} - wg sync.WaitGroup } // New creates a new Discord channel @@ -366,7 +365,7 @@ func (c *Channel) isGuildAllowed(guildID string) bool { // sendError sends an error message func (c *Channel) sendError(channelID string, err error) { - c.session.ChannelMessageSend(channelID, fmt.Sprintf("❌ Error: %s", err.Error())) + _, _ = c.session.ChannelMessageSend(channelID, fmt.Sprintf("❌ Error: %s", err.Error())) } // splitMessage splits a message into chunks diff --git a/internal/channels/slack/slack.go b/internal/channels/slack/slack.go index 95a8d8e3..0d1bf33e 100644 --- a/internal/channels/slack/slack.go +++ b/internal/channels/slack/slack.go @@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ func (c *Channel) handleMessage(ctx context.Context, eventType, channelID, userI c.sendError(channelID, threadTS, err) // Clean up placeholder on error if placeholderErr == nil { - c.updateThinking(channelID, placeholderTS, fmt.Sprintf("Error: %s", err.Error())) + _ = c.updateThinking(channelID, placeholderTS, fmt.Sprintf("Error: %s", err.Error())) } return } @@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ func (c *Channel) cleanText(text string) string { // sendError sends an error message func (c *Channel) sendError(channelID, threadTS string, err error) { - c.Send(channelID, &OutgoingMessage{ + _ = c.Send(channelID, &OutgoingMessage{ Text: fmt.Sprintf("❌ Error: %s", err.Error()), ThreadTS: threadTS, }) diff --git a/internal/channels/slack/slack_test.go b/internal/channels/slack/slack_test.go index a98f2011..e7171667 100644 --- a/internal/channels/slack/slack_test.go +++ b/internal/channels/slack/slack_test.go @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package slack import ( "context" + "sync" "testing" "time" @@ -12,6 +13,7 @@ import ( // MockClient implements Client interface type MockClient struct { + mu sync.Mutex AuthTestFunc func() (*slack.AuthTestResponse, error) PostMessageFunc func(channelID string, options ...slack.MsgOption) (string, string, error) UpdateMessageFunc func(channelID, timestamp string, options ...slack.MsgOption) (string, string, string, error) @@ -38,11 +40,13 @@ func (m *MockClient) AuthTest() (*slack.AuthTestResponse, error) { } func (m *MockClient) UpdateMessage(channelID, timestamp string, options ...slack.MsgOption) (string, string, string, error) { + m.mu.Lock() m.UpdateMessages = append(m.UpdateMessages, struct { ChannelID string Timestamp string Options []slack.MsgOption }{ChannelID: channelID, Timestamp: timestamp, Options: options}) + m.mu.Unlock() if m.UpdateMessageFunc != nil { return m.UpdateMessageFunc(channelID, timestamp, options...) } @@ -50,16 +54,48 @@ func (m *MockClient) UpdateMessage(channelID, timestamp string, options ...slack } func (m *MockClient) PostMessage(channelID string, options ...slack.MsgOption) (string, string, error) { + m.mu.Lock() m.PostMessages = append(m.PostMessages, struct { ChannelID string Options []slack.MsgOption }{ChannelID: channelID, Options: options}) + m.mu.Unlock() if m.PostMessageFunc != nil { return m.PostMessageFunc(channelID, options...) } return "ts-123", "chan-123", nil } +func (m *MockClient) getPostMessages() []struct { + ChannelID string + Options []slack.MsgOption +} { + m.mu.Lock() + defer m.mu.Unlock() + result := make([]struct { + ChannelID string + Options []slack.MsgOption + }, len(m.PostMessages)) + copy(result, m.PostMessages) + return result +} + +func (m *MockClient) getUpdateMessages() []struct { + ChannelID string + Timestamp string + Options []slack.MsgOption +} { + m.mu.Lock() + defer m.mu.Unlock() + result := make([]struct { + ChannelID string + Timestamp string + Options []slack.MsgOption + }, len(m.UpdateMessages)) + copy(result, m.UpdateMessages) + return result +} + // MockSocket implements Socket interface type MockSocket struct { EventsCh chan socketmode.Event @@ -133,16 +169,14 @@ func TestSlackChannel(t *testing.T) { } // Wait for processing (async) - select { - case <-time.After(200 * time.Millisecond): - // With thinking indicator: expect 1 PostMessage (thinking placeholder) - // + 1 UpdateMessage (replace placeholder with response) - if len(mockClient.PostMessages) == 0 { - t.Error("expected PostMessage to be called (thinking placeholder)") - } - if len(mockClient.UpdateMessages) == 0 { - t.Error("expected UpdateMessage to be called (replace placeholder)") - } + <-time.After(200 * time.Millisecond) + // With thinking indicator: expect 1 PostMessage (thinking placeholder) + // + 1 UpdateMessage (replace placeholder with response) + if len(mockClient.getPostMessages()) == 0 { + t.Error("expected PostMessage to be called (thinking placeholder)") + } + if len(mockClient.getUpdateMessages()) == 0 { + t.Error("expected UpdateMessage to be called (replace placeholder)") } } @@ -207,16 +241,18 @@ func TestSlackThinkingPlaceholder(t *testing.T) { } // Verify: first PostMessage is the thinking placeholder, then UpdateMessage replaces it - if len(mockClient.PostMessages) < 1 { - t.Fatalf("expected at least 1 PostMessage call, got %d", len(mockClient.PostMessages)) + postMsgs := mockClient.getPostMessages() + if len(postMsgs) < 1 { + t.Fatalf("expected at least 1 PostMessage call, got %d", len(postMsgs)) } - if len(mockClient.UpdateMessages) < 1 { - t.Fatalf("expected at least 1 UpdateMessage call, got %d", len(mockClient.UpdateMessages)) + updateMsgs := mockClient.getUpdateMessages() + if len(updateMsgs) < 1 { + t.Fatalf("expected at least 1 UpdateMessage call, got %d", len(updateMsgs)) } // Verify UpdateMessage was called with the placeholder timestamp - if mockClient.UpdateMessages[0].Timestamp != "placeholder-ts" { - t.Errorf("expected update on 'placeholder-ts', got '%s'", mockClient.UpdateMessages[0].Timestamp) + if updateMsgs[0].Timestamp != "placeholder-ts" { + t.Errorf("expected update on 'placeholder-ts', got '%s'", updateMsgs[0].Timestamp) } } diff --git a/internal/channels/telegram/telegram.go b/internal/channels/telegram/telegram.go index 65a1511c..6126fa6a 100644 --- a/internal/channels/telegram/telegram.go +++ b/internal/channels/telegram/telegram.go @@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ func (c *Channel) splitMessage(text string, maxLen int) []string { // sendError sends an error message func (c *Channel) sendError(chatID int64, replyTo int, err error) { - c.Send(chatID, &OutgoingMessage{ + _ = c.Send(chatID, &OutgoingMessage{ Text: fmt.Sprintf("❌ Error: %s", err.Error()), ReplyToID: replyTo, }) diff --git a/internal/channels/telegram/telegram_test.go b/internal/channels/telegram/telegram_test.go index 348294de..d54841f2 100644 --- a/internal/channels/telegram/telegram_test.go +++ b/internal/channels/telegram/telegram_test.go @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package telegram import ( "context" + "sync" "testing" "time" @@ -10,6 +11,7 @@ import ( // MockBotAPI implements BotAPI interface type MockBotAPI struct { + mu sync.Mutex GetUpdatesChanFunc func(config tgbotapi.UpdateConfig) tgbotapi.UpdatesChannel SendFunc func(c tgbotapi.Chattable) (tgbotapi.Message, error) GetSelfFunc func() tgbotapi.User @@ -26,7 +28,9 @@ func (m *MockBotAPI) GetUpdatesChan(config tgbotapi.UpdateConfig) tgbotapi.Updat } func (m *MockBotAPI) Send(c tgbotapi.Chattable) (tgbotapi.Message, error) { + m.mu.Lock() m.SentMessages = append(m.SentMessages, c) + m.mu.Unlock() if m.SendFunc != nil { return m.SendFunc(c) } @@ -38,10 +42,28 @@ func (m *MockBotAPI) GetFile(config tgbotapi.FileConfig) (tgbotapi.File, error) } func (m *MockBotAPI) Request(c tgbotapi.Chattable) (*tgbotapi.APIResponse, error) { + m.mu.Lock() m.RequestCalls = append(m.RequestCalls, c) + m.mu.Unlock() return &tgbotapi.APIResponse{Ok: true}, nil } +func (m *MockBotAPI) getSentMessages() []tgbotapi.Chattable { + m.mu.Lock() + defer m.mu.Unlock() + result := make([]tgbotapi.Chattable, len(m.SentMessages)) + copy(result, m.SentMessages) + return result +} + +func (m *MockBotAPI) getRequestCalls() []tgbotapi.Chattable { + m.mu.Lock() + defer m.mu.Unlock() + result := make([]tgbotapi.Chattable, len(m.RequestCalls)) + copy(result, m.RequestCalls) + return result +} + func (m *MockBotAPI) StopReceivingUpdates() { } @@ -111,23 +133,28 @@ func TestTelegramChannel(t *testing.T) { select { case <-msgProcessed: + // Allow goroutine to finish posting + time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond) + // Check typing indicator was sent via Request - if len(mockBot.RequestCalls) == 0 { + reqCalls := mockBot.getRequestCalls() + if len(reqCalls) == 0 { t.Error("expected typing indicator via Request") } else { - action, ok := mockBot.RequestCalls[0].(tgbotapi.ChatActionConfig) + action, ok := reqCalls[0].(tgbotapi.ChatActionConfig) if !ok { - t.Errorf("expected ChatActionConfig, got %T", mockBot.RequestCalls[0]) + t.Errorf("expected ChatActionConfig, got %T", reqCalls[0]) } else if action.Action != tgbotapi.ChatTyping { t.Errorf("expected action 'typing', got '%s'", action.Action) } } // Check response - if len(mockBot.SentMessages) == 0 { + sentMsgs := mockBot.getSentMessages() + if len(sentMsgs) == 0 { t.Error("expected Send to be called") } else { - sent := mockBot.SentMessages[0].(tgbotapi.MessageConfig) + sent := sentMsgs[0].(tgbotapi.MessageConfig) if sent.Text != "Reply" { t.Errorf("expected 'Reply', got '%s'", sent.Text) } @@ -178,9 +205,12 @@ func TestTelegramTypingIndicator(t *testing.T) { select { case <-done: + // Allow goroutine to finish posting + time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond) + // Verify at least one Request call with ChatTyping action found := false - for _, call := range mockBot.RequestCalls { + for _, call := range mockBot.getRequestCalls() { if action, ok := call.(tgbotapi.ChatActionConfig); ok && action.Action == tgbotapi.ChatTyping { found = true break diff --git a/internal/cli/agent/status.go b/internal/cli/agent/status.go index 6a39a34c..bdfc47f1 100644 --- a/internal/cli/agent/status.go +++ b/internal/cli/agent/status.go @@ -27,21 +27,41 @@ func newStatusCmd(cfgLoader func() (*config.Config, error)) *cobra.Command { } type statusOutput struct { - Mode string `json:"mode"` - Provider string `json:"provider"` - Model string `json:"model"` - MultiAgent bool `json:"multi_agent"` - A2AEnabled bool `json:"a2a_enabled"` - A2ABaseURL string `json:"a2a_base_url,omitempty"` - A2AAgent string `json:"a2a_agent_name,omitempty"` + Mode string `json:"mode"` + Provider string `json:"provider"` + Model string `json:"model"` + MultiAgent bool `json:"multi_agent"` + A2AEnabled bool `json:"a2a_enabled"` + A2ABaseURL string `json:"a2a_base_url,omitempty"` + A2AAgent string `json:"a2a_agent_name,omitempty"` + MaxTurns int `json:"max_turns"` + ErrorCorrectionEnabled bool `json:"error_correction_enabled"` + MaxDelegationRounds int `json:"max_delegation_rounds,omitempty"` + } + + // Compute effective defaults. + maxTurns := cfg.Agent.MaxTurns + if maxTurns <= 0 { + maxTurns = 25 + } + errorCorrection := true + if cfg.Agent.ErrorCorrectionEnabled != nil { + errorCorrection = *cfg.Agent.ErrorCorrectionEnabled + } + maxDelegation := cfg.Agent.MaxDelegationRounds + if maxDelegation <= 0 { + maxDelegation = 10 } s := statusOutput{ - Mode: mode, - Provider: cfg.Agent.Provider, - Model: cfg.Agent.Model, - MultiAgent: cfg.Agent.MultiAgent, - A2AEnabled: cfg.A2A.Enabled, + Mode: mode, + Provider: cfg.Agent.Provider, + Model: cfg.Agent.Model, + MultiAgent: cfg.Agent.MultiAgent, + A2AEnabled: cfg.A2A.Enabled, + MaxTurns: maxTurns, + ErrorCorrectionEnabled: errorCorrection, + MaxDelegationRounds: maxDelegation, } if cfg.A2A.Enabled { s.A2ABaseURL = cfg.A2A.BaseURL @@ -55,14 +75,19 @@ func newStatusCmd(cfgLoader func() (*config.Config, error)) *cobra.Command { } fmt.Printf("Agent Status\n") - fmt.Printf(" Mode: %s\n", s.Mode) - fmt.Printf(" Provider: %s\n", s.Provider) - fmt.Printf(" Model: %s\n", s.Model) - fmt.Printf(" Multi-Agent: %v\n", s.MultiAgent) - fmt.Printf(" A2A Enabled: %v\n", s.A2AEnabled) + fmt.Printf(" Mode: %s\n", s.Mode) + fmt.Printf(" Provider: %s\n", s.Provider) + fmt.Printf(" Model: %s\n", s.Model) + fmt.Printf(" Multi-Agent: %v\n", s.MultiAgent) + fmt.Printf(" Max Turns: %d\n", s.MaxTurns) + fmt.Printf(" Error Correction: %v\n", s.ErrorCorrectionEnabled) + if s.MultiAgent { + fmt.Printf(" Delegation Rounds: %d\n", s.MaxDelegationRounds) + } + fmt.Printf(" A2A Enabled: %v\n", s.A2AEnabled) if cfg.A2A.Enabled { - fmt.Printf(" A2A Base URL: %s\n", s.A2ABaseURL) - fmt.Printf(" A2A Agent: %s\n", s.A2AAgent) + fmt.Printf(" A2A Base URL: %s\n", s.A2ABaseURL) + fmt.Printf(" A2A Agent: %s\n", s.A2AAgent) } return nil diff --git a/internal/cli/doctor/checks/checks_test.go b/internal/cli/doctor/checks/checks_test.go index 8835fbbf..4c243135 100644 --- a/internal/cli/doctor/checks/checks_test.go +++ b/internal/cli/doctor/checks/checks_test.go @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ func TestNetworkCheck_Run_PortAvailable(t *testing.T) { func TestDatabaseCheck_Run_DirectoryNotExist(t *testing.T) { cfg := &config.Config{ Session: config.SessionConfig{ - DatabasePath: "/nonexistent/path/sessions.db", + DatabasePath: "/nonexistent/path/lango.db", }, } diff --git a/internal/cli/doctor/checks/database.go b/internal/cli/doctor/checks/database.go index 3943c766..b3a0ca65 100644 --- a/internal/cli/doctor/checks/database.go +++ b/internal/cli/doctor/checks/database.go @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ func (c *DatabaseCheck) resolveDatabasePath(cfg *config.Config) string { // Default path home, err := os.UserHomeDir() if err != nil { - return "sessions.db" + return "lango.db" } - return filepath.Join(home, ".lango", "sessions.db") + return filepath.Join(home, ".lango", "lango.db") } diff --git a/internal/cli/doctor/checks/embedding.go b/internal/cli/doctor/checks/embedding.go index 1103ec1d..b4066b91 100644 --- a/internal/cli/doctor/checks/embedding.go +++ b/internal/cli/doctor/checks/embedding.go @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ func (c *EmbeddingCheck) Run(_ context.Context, cfg *config.Config) Result { } emb := cfg.Embedding - if emb.Provider == "" && emb.ProviderID == "" { + if emb.Provider == "" { return Result{ Name: c.Name(), Status: StatusSkip, @@ -37,14 +37,10 @@ func (c *EmbeddingCheck) Run(_ context.Context, cfg *config.Config) Result { backendType, apiKey := cfg.ResolveEmbeddingProvider() if backendType == "" { - if emb.ProviderID != "" { - issues = append(issues, fmt.Sprintf("provider ID %q not found in providers map or has unsupported type", emb.ProviderID)) - } else { - issues = append(issues, "embedding provider not properly configured (set providerID or provider=local)") - } + issues = append(issues, fmt.Sprintf("provider %q not found in providers map or has unsupported type", emb.Provider)) status = StatusFail } else if backendType != "local" && apiKey == "" { - issues = append(issues, fmt.Sprintf("provider %q has no API key configured", emb.ProviderID)) + issues = append(issues, fmt.Sprintf("provider %q has no API key configured", emb.Provider)) status = StatusFail } @@ -65,9 +61,9 @@ func (c *EmbeddingCheck) Run(_ context.Context, cfg *config.Config) Result { } if len(issues) == 0 { - providerLabel := backendType - if emb.ProviderID != "" { - providerLabel = fmt.Sprintf("%s (id=%s)", backendType, emb.ProviderID) + providerLabel := emb.Provider + if backendType != emb.Provider { + providerLabel = fmt.Sprintf("%s (%s)", emb.Provider, backendType) } msg := fmt.Sprintf("Embedding configured (provider=%s, dimensions=%d, rag=%v)", providerLabel, emb.Dimensions, emb.RAG.Enabled) diff --git a/internal/cli/doctor/checks/embedding_test.go b/internal/cli/doctor/checks/embedding_test.go index 98268e30..9e7a0501 100644 --- a/internal/cli/doctor/checks/embedding_test.go +++ b/internal/cli/doctor/checks/embedding_test.go @@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ import ( "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" ) -func TestEmbeddingCheck_Run_ProviderIDResolvesCorrectly(t *testing.T) { +func TestEmbeddingCheck_Run_ProviderResolvesCorrectly(t *testing.T) { cfg := &config.Config{ Embedding: config.EmbeddingConfig{ - ProviderID: "gemini-1", + Provider: "gemini-1", Dimensions: 768, }, Providers: map[string]config.ProviderConfig{ @@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ func TestEmbeddingCheck_Run_ProviderIDResolvesCorrectly(t *testing.T) { } } -func TestEmbeddingCheck_Run_ProviderIDNotFound(t *testing.T) { +func TestEmbeddingCheck_Run_ProviderNotFound(t *testing.T) { cfg := &config.Config{ Embedding: config.EmbeddingConfig{ - ProviderID: "nonexistent", + Provider: "nonexistent", Dimensions: 768, }, Providers: map[string]config.ProviderConfig{ @@ -45,10 +45,10 @@ func TestEmbeddingCheck_Run_ProviderIDNotFound(t *testing.T) { } } -func TestEmbeddingCheck_Run_ProviderIDNoAPIKey(t *testing.T) { +func TestEmbeddingCheck_Run_ProviderNoAPIKey(t *testing.T) { cfg := &config.Config{ Embedding: config.EmbeddingConfig{ - ProviderID: "my-openai", + Provider: "my-openai", Dimensions: 1536, }, Providers: map[string]config.ProviderConfig{ diff --git a/internal/cli/doctor/checks/graph_store.go b/internal/cli/doctor/checks/graph_store.go index 1f7c9e1c..073d2fcb 100644 --- a/internal/cli/doctor/checks/graph_store.go +++ b/internal/cli/doctor/checks/graph_store.go @@ -38,8 +38,10 @@ func (c *GraphStoreCheck) Run(_ context.Context, cfg *config.Config) Result { } if cfg.Graph.DatabasePath == "" { - issues = append(issues, "graph.databasePath is not set") - status = StatusFail + issues = append(issues, "graph.databasePath is not set (will default to graph.db next to session database)") + if status < StatusWarn { + status = StatusWarn + } } if cfg.Graph.MaxTraversalDepth <= 0 { diff --git a/internal/cli/doctor/checks/security.go b/internal/cli/doctor/checks/security.go index b846b747..07e39a15 100644 --- a/internal/cli/doctor/checks/security.go +++ b/internal/cli/doctor/checks/security.go @@ -5,9 +5,12 @@ import ( "encoding/json" "fmt" "net/http" + "os" + "path/filepath" "strings" "time" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" ) @@ -88,11 +91,24 @@ func (c *SecurityCheck) Run(ctx context.Context, cfg *config.Config) Result { } } + // 3. Check DB encryption status. + if cfg.Security.DBEncryption.Enabled { + dbPath := cfg.Session.DatabasePath + if strings.HasPrefix(dbPath, "~/") { + if h, err := os.UserHomeDir(); err == nil { + dbPath = filepath.Join(h, dbPath[2:]) + } + } + if !bootstrap.IsDBEncrypted(dbPath) { + issues = append(issues, "DB encryption enabled in config but database is plaintext (run 'lango security db-migrate')") + if status < StatusWarn { + status = StatusWarn + } + } + } + message := "Security configuration verified" if len(issues) > 0 { - message = fmt.Sprintf("Security issues found: %v", issues) - // Format nicer if multiple? - // "Security issues found:\n- Issue 1\n- Issue 2" message = "Security checks returned warnings:\n" for _, issue := range issues { message += fmt.Sprintf("- %s\n", issue) diff --git a/internal/cli/doctor/doctor.go b/internal/cli/doctor/doctor.go index 8c727922..ad0e18c7 100644 --- a/internal/cli/doctor/doctor.go +++ b/internal/cli/doctor/doctor.go @@ -29,14 +29,29 @@ func NewCommand() *cobra.Command { Long: `The doctor command checks your Lango configuration and environment for common issues and can automatically fix some problems. -Checks performed: - - Encrypted configuration profile validity - - API key and provider configuration - - Channel token validation +Checks performed (14 total): + - Configuration profile validity + - AI provider configuration and API keys + - API key security (env-var best practices) + - Channel token validation (Telegram, Discord, Slack) - Session database accessibility - Server port availability - - Security configuration (signer, interceptor, passphrase) - - Companion connectivity (WebSocket gateway status)`, + - Security configuration (signer, interceptor, encryption) + - Companion connectivity (WebSocket gateway status) + - Observational memory configuration + - Output scanning and interceptor settings + - Embedding / RAG provider and model setup + - Graph store configuration + - Multi-agent orchestration settings + - A2A protocol connectivity + +Use --fix to attempt automatic repair of fixable issues. +Use --json for machine-readable output. + +See Also: + lango settings - Interactive settings editor (TUI) + lango config - View/manage configuration profiles + lango onboard - Guided setup wizard`, RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { return run(cmd.Context(), opts) }, diff --git a/internal/cli/onboard/onboard.go b/internal/cli/onboard/onboard.go index a3a152a0..32fcae69 100644 --- a/internal/cli/onboard/onboard.go +++ b/internal/cli/onboard/onboard.go @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import ( "github.com/spf13/cobra" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/tui" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/configstore" ) @@ -23,15 +24,20 @@ func NewCommand() *cobra.Command { Short: "Guided 5-step setup wizard for Lango", Long: `The onboard command walks you through configuring Lango in five guided steps: - 1. Provider Setup — Choose an AI provider and enter API credentials - 2. Agent Config — Select model, max tokens, and temperature + 1. Provider Setup — Choose a provider (Anthropic, OpenAI, Gemini, Ollama, GitHub) + 2. Agent Config — Select model (auto-fetched from provider), tokens, temperature 3. Channel Setup — Configure Telegram, Discord, or Slack - 4. Security & Auth — Enable privacy interceptor and PII protection + 4. Security & Auth — Privacy interceptor, PII redaction, approval policy 5. Test Config — Validate your configuration For the full configuration editor with all options, use "lango settings". -All settings including API keys are saved in an encrypted profile (~/.lango/lango.db).`, +All settings including API keys are saved in an encrypted profile (~/.lango/lango.db). + +See Also: + lango settings - Interactive settings editor (TUI) + lango config - View/manage configuration profiles + lango doctor - Diagnose configuration issues`, RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { return runOnboard(profileName) }, @@ -56,6 +62,8 @@ func runOnboard(profileName string) error { return fmt.Errorf("load profile %q: %w", profileName, err) } + tui.SetProfile(profileName) + p := tea.NewProgram(NewWizard(initialCfg)) model, err := p.Run() if err != nil { diff --git a/internal/cli/onboard/steps.go b/internal/cli/onboard/steps.go index 33cbf4a9..f0c5ea26 100644 --- a/internal/cli/onboard/steps.go +++ b/internal/cli/onboard/steps.go @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import ( "sort" "strconv" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/settings" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/tuicore" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/types" @@ -16,26 +17,30 @@ func NewProviderStepForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "type", Label: "Provider Type", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, - Value: providerTypeFromConfig(cfg), - Options: []string{"anthropic", "openai", "gemini", "ollama"}, + Value: providerTypeFromConfig(cfg), + Options: []string{"anthropic", "openai", "gemini", "ollama", "github"}, + Description: "LLM provider type; determines API format and authentication method", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "id", Label: "Provider Name", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: providerIDFromConfig(cfg), Placeholder: "e.g. anthropic, my-openai", + Description: "Unique identifier to reference this provider in other settings", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "apikey", Label: "API Key", Type: tuicore.InputPassword, Value: providerAPIKeyFromConfig(cfg), Placeholder: "sk-... or ${ENV_VAR}", + Description: "API key or environment variable reference for authentication", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "baseurl", Label: "Base URL (optional)", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: providerBaseURLFromConfig(cfg), Placeholder: "https://api.example.com/v1", + Description: "Custom API endpoint; leave empty for provider default", }) return &form @@ -48,30 +53,57 @@ func NewAgentStepForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { providerOpts := buildProviderOptions(cfg) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "provider", Label: "Provider", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, - Value: cfg.Agent.Provider, - Options: providerOpts, + Value: cfg.Agent.Provider, + Options: providerOpts, + Description: "LLM provider to use for agent inference", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "model", Label: "Model ID", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: cfg.Agent.Model, Placeholder: suggestModel(cfg.Agent.Provider), + Description: "Model identifier from the selected provider", }) + // Try to fetch models dynamically from the selected provider + if modelOpts := settings.FetchModelOptions(cfg.Agent.Provider, cfg, cfg.Agent.Model); len(modelOpts) > 0 { + f := form.Fields[len(form.Fields)-1] + f.Type = tuicore.InputSelect + f.Options = modelOpts + f.Placeholder = "" + f.Description = fmt.Sprintf("Fetched %d models from provider; use ←→ to browse", len(modelOpts)) + } + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "maxtokens", Label: "Max Tokens", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Agent.MaxTokens), + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Agent.MaxTokens), + Description: "Maximum number of tokens the model can generate per response", Validate: func(s string) error { - if _, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil { + v, err := strconv.Atoi(s) + if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("must be integer") } + if v <= 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be positive") + } return nil }, }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "temp", Label: "Temperature", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: fmt.Sprintf("%.1f", cfg.Agent.Temperature), + Value: fmt.Sprintf("%.1f", cfg.Agent.Temperature), + Description: "Sampling temperature (0.0 = deterministic, 2.0 = max randomness)", + Validate: func(s string) error { + v, err := strconv.ParseFloat(s, 64) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a number") + } + if v < 0.0 || v > 2.0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be between 0.0 and 2.0") + } + return nil + }, }) return &form @@ -97,6 +129,7 @@ func newTelegramForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { Key: "telegram_token", Label: "Bot Token", Type: tuicore.InputPassword, Value: cfg.Channels.Telegram.BotToken, Placeholder: "123456:ABC-DEF1234ghIkl-zyx57W2v1u123ew11", + Description: "Telegram bot token from @BotFather", }) return &form } @@ -107,6 +140,7 @@ func newDiscordForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { Key: "discord_token", Label: "Bot Token", Type: tuicore.InputPassword, Value: cfg.Channels.Discord.BotToken, Placeholder: "Bot token from Developer Portal", + Description: "Discord bot token from the Developer Portal", }) return &form } @@ -117,11 +151,13 @@ func newSlackForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { Key: "slack_token", Label: "Bot Token", Type: tuicore.InputPassword, Value: cfg.Channels.Slack.BotToken, Placeholder: "xoxb-...", + Description: "Slack bot token (xoxb-...) from your Slack app", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "slack_app_token", Label: "App Token", Type: tuicore.InputPassword, Value: cfg.Channels.Slack.AppToken, Placeholder: "xapp-...", + Description: "Slack app-level token (xapp-...) for Socket Mode", }) return &form } @@ -130,14 +166,18 @@ func newSlackForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { func NewSecurityStepForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Security & Auth") - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + interceptorEnabled := &tuicore.Field{ Key: "interceptor_enabled", Label: "Privacy Interceptor", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Security.Interceptor.Enabled, - }) + Checked: cfg.Security.Interceptor.Enabled, + Description: "Enable privacy interceptor to filter sensitive content", + } + form.AddField(interceptorEnabled) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "interceptor_pii", Label: "Redact PII", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Security.Interceptor.RedactPII, + Key: "interceptor_pii", Label: " Redact PII", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.Security.Interceptor.RedactPII, + Description: "Automatically redact personally identifiable information", + VisibleWhen: func() bool { return interceptorEnabled.Checked }, }) policyVal := string(cfg.Security.Interceptor.ApprovalPolicy) @@ -145,9 +185,11 @@ func NewSecurityStepForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { policyVal = "dangerous" } form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "interceptor_policy", Label: "Approval Policy", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, - Value: policyVal, - Options: []string{"dangerous", "all", "configured", "none"}, + Key: "interceptor_policy", Label: " Approval Policy", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, + Value: policyVal, + Options: []string{"dangerous", "all", "configured", "none"}, + Description: "Which tool calls require explicit user approval before execution", + VisibleWhen: func() bool { return interceptorEnabled.Checked }, }) return &form @@ -161,7 +203,7 @@ func buildProviderOptions(cfg *config.Config) []string { } sort.Strings(opts) if len(opts) == 0 { - opts = []string{"anthropic", "openai", "gemini", "ollama"} + opts = []string{"anthropic", "openai", "gemini", "ollama", "github"} } return opts } @@ -177,6 +219,8 @@ func suggestModel(provider string) string { return "gemini-2.0-flash" case "ollama": return "llama3.1" + case "github": + return "gpt-4o" default: return "claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929" } diff --git a/internal/cli/onboard/steps_test.go b/internal/cli/onboard/steps_test.go index 982638ac..64c2229e 100644 --- a/internal/cli/onboard/steps_test.go +++ b/internal/cli/onboard/steps_test.go @@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ func TestSuggestModel(t *testing.T) { {give: "openai", want: "gpt-4o"}, {give: "gemini", want: "gemini-2.0-flash"}, {give: "ollama", want: "llama3.1"}, + {give: "github", want: "gpt-4o"}, {give: "unknown", want: "claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929"}, } @@ -152,3 +153,180 @@ func TestSuggestModel(t *testing.T) { }) } } + +// TestAllFormsHaveDescriptions verifies every field across all forms has a non-empty Description. +func TestAllFormsHaveDescriptions(t *testing.T) { + cfg := config.DefaultConfig() + + forms := map[string]*tuicore.FormModel{ + "provider": NewProviderStepForm(cfg), + "agent": NewAgentStepForm(cfg), + "telegram": NewChannelStepForm("telegram", cfg), + "discord": NewChannelStepForm("discord", cfg), + "slack": NewChannelStepForm("slack", cfg), + "security": NewSecurityStepForm(cfg), + } + + for name, form := range forms { + for _, f := range form.Fields { + if f.Description == "" { + t.Errorf("form %q field %q has empty Description", name, f.Key) + } + } + } +} + +// TestProviderOptionsIncludeGitHub verifies "github" is in provider options. +func TestProviderOptionsIncludeGitHub(t *testing.T) { + cfg := config.DefaultConfig() + + // Check Provider Step form + form := NewProviderStepForm(cfg) + typeField := fieldByKey(form, "type") + if typeField == nil { + t.Fatal("missing type field") + } + found := false + for _, opt := range typeField.Options { + if opt == "github" { + found = true + break + } + } + if !found { + t.Errorf("provider type options missing 'github': %v", typeField.Options) + } + + // Check fallback provider options list + opts := buildProviderOptions(cfg) + found = false + for _, opt := range opts { + if opt == "github" { + found = true + break + } + } + if !found { + t.Errorf("buildProviderOptions fallback missing 'github': %v", opts) + } +} + +// TestTemperatureValidator verifies temperature range validation. +func TestTemperatureValidator(t *testing.T) { + cfg := config.DefaultConfig() + form := NewAgentStepForm(cfg) + tempField := fieldByKey(form, "temp") + if tempField == nil { + t.Fatal("missing temp field") + } + if tempField.Validate == nil { + t.Fatal("temp field has no Validate function") + } + + tests := []struct { + give string + wantErr bool + }{ + {give: "0.0", wantErr: false}, + {give: "1.5", wantErr: false}, + {give: "2.0", wantErr: false}, + {give: "2.1", wantErr: true}, + {give: "-0.1", wantErr: true}, + {give: "abc", wantErr: true}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + err := tempField.Validate(tt.give) + if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr { + t.Errorf("Validate(%q): wantErr=%v, got %v", tt.give, tt.wantErr, err) + } + }) + } +} + +// TestMaxTokensValidator verifies max tokens positive integer validation. +func TestMaxTokensValidator(t *testing.T) { + cfg := config.DefaultConfig() + form := NewAgentStepForm(cfg) + mtField := fieldByKey(form, "maxtokens") + if mtField == nil { + t.Fatal("missing maxtokens field") + } + if mtField.Validate == nil { + t.Fatal("maxtokens field has no Validate function") + } + + tests := []struct { + give string + wantErr bool + }{ + {give: "4096", wantErr: false}, + {give: "1", wantErr: false}, + {give: "0", wantErr: true}, + {give: "-1", wantErr: true}, + {give: "abc", wantErr: true}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + err := mtField.Validate(tt.give) + if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr { + t.Errorf("Validate(%q): wantErr=%v, got %v", tt.give, tt.wantErr, err) + } + }) + } +} + +// TestSecurityConditionalVisibility verifies interceptor sub-fields are conditionally visible. +func TestSecurityConditionalVisibility(t *testing.T) { + cfg := config.DefaultConfig() + form := NewSecurityStepForm(cfg) + + enabledField := fieldByKey(form, "interceptor_enabled") + piiField := fieldByKey(form, "interceptor_pii") + policyField := fieldByKey(form, "interceptor_policy") + + if enabledField == nil || piiField == nil || policyField == nil { + t.Fatal("missing security fields") + } + + // When interceptor is disabled, sub-fields should be hidden + enabledField.Checked = false + if piiField.IsVisible() { + t.Error("interceptor_pii should be hidden when interceptor is disabled") + } + if policyField.IsVisible() { + t.Error("interceptor_policy should be hidden when interceptor is disabled") + } + + // Count visible fields when disabled + visibleCount := 0 + for _, f := range form.Fields { + if f.IsVisible() { + visibleCount++ + } + } + if visibleCount != 1 { + t.Errorf("expected 1 visible field when interceptor disabled, got %d", visibleCount) + } + + // When interceptor is enabled, all fields should be visible + enabledField.Checked = true + if !piiField.IsVisible() { + t.Error("interceptor_pii should be visible when interceptor is enabled") + } + if !policyField.IsVisible() { + t.Error("interceptor_policy should be visible when interceptor is enabled") + } + + visibleCount = 0 + for _, f := range form.Fields { + if f.IsVisible() { + visibleCount++ + } + } + if visibleCount != 3 { + t.Errorf("expected 3 visible fields when interceptor enabled, got %d", visibleCount) + } +} diff --git a/internal/cli/onboard/wizard.go b/internal/cli/onboard/wizard.go index ea513325..0bd901aa 100644 --- a/internal/cli/onboard/wizard.go +++ b/internal/cli/onboard/wizard.go @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ func NewWizard(cfg *config.Config) *Wizard { // Init implements tea.Model. func (w *Wizard) Init() tea.Cmd { - return nil + return tea.ClearScreen } // Update implements tea.Model. @@ -279,8 +279,10 @@ func (w *Wizard) enableChannel(ch string) { func (w *Wizard) View() string { var b strings.Builder - // Title - b.WriteString(tui.TitleStyle.Render("Lango Setup Wizard")) + // Banner + subtitle + b.WriteString(tui.Banner()) + b.WriteString("\n") + b.WriteString(tui.SubtitleStyle.Render("Setup Wizard")) b.WriteString("\n\n") if w.step <= StepTest { diff --git a/internal/cli/p2p/connect.go b/internal/cli/p2p/connect.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..03763474 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/p2p/connect.go @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +package p2p + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" + ma "github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr" + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" +) + +func newConnectCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "connect ", + Short: "Connect to a peer by multiaddr", + Args: cobra.ExactArgs(1), + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err) + } + defer boot.DBClient.Close() + + deps, err := initP2PDeps(boot) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer deps.cleanup() + + maddr, err := ma.NewMultiaddr(args[0]) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("parse multiaddr: %w", err) + } + + pi, err := peer.AddrInfoFromP2pAddr(maddr) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("parse peer info: %w", err) + } + + if err := deps.node.Host().Connect(context.Background(), *pi); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("connect to %s: %w", pi.ID, err) + } + + fmt.Printf("Connected to peer %s\n", pi.ID) + return nil + }, + } + + return cmd +} diff --git a/internal/cli/p2p/disconnect.go b/internal/cli/p2p/disconnect.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..439ef442 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/p2p/disconnect.go @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +package p2p + +import ( + "fmt" + + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" +) + +func newDisconnectCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "disconnect ", + Short: "Disconnect from a peer", + Args: cobra.ExactArgs(1), + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err) + } + defer boot.DBClient.Close() + + deps, err := initP2PDeps(boot) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer deps.cleanup() + + peerID, err := peer.Decode(args[0]) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("parse peer ID: %w", err) + } + + if err := deps.node.Host().Network().ClosePeer(peerID); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("disconnect from %s: %w", peerID, err) + } + + fmt.Printf("Disconnected from peer %s\n", peerID) + return nil + }, + } + + return cmd +} diff --git a/internal/cli/p2p/discover.go b/internal/cli/p2p/discover.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e01efdc6 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/p2p/discover.go @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +package p2p + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "os" + "strings" + "text/tabwriter" + + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/discovery" +) + +func newDiscoverCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + var ( + tag string + jsonOutput bool + ) + + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "discover", + Short: "Discover agents by capability", + Long: "Search for agents on the P2P network that advertise specific capabilities via GossipSub.", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err) + } + defer boot.DBClient.Close() + + deps, err := initP2PDeps(boot) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer deps.cleanup() + + gossip, err := discovery.NewGossipService(discovery.GossipConfig{ + Host: deps.node.Host(), + Interval: deps.config.GossipInterval, + }) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("init gossip service: %w", err) + } + defer gossip.Stop() + + var cards []*discovery.GossipCard + if tag != "" { + cards = gossip.FindByCapability(tag) + } else { + cards = gossip.KnownPeers() + } + + if jsonOutput { + enc := json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout) + enc.SetIndent("", " ") + return enc.Encode(cards) + } + + if len(cards) == 0 { + fmt.Println("No agents discovered. Try connecting to bootstrap peers first.") + return nil + } + + w := tabwriter.NewWriter(os.Stdout, 0, 4, 2, ' ', 0) + fmt.Fprintln(w, "NAME\tDID\tCAPABILITIES\tPEER ID") + for _, c := range cards { + caps := strings.Join(c.Capabilities, ", ") + fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n", c.Name, c.DID, caps, c.PeerID) + } + return w.Flush() + }, + } + + cmd.Flags().StringVar(&tag, "tag", "", "Filter agents by capability tag") + cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&jsonOutput, "json", false, "Output as JSON") + return cmd +} diff --git a/internal/cli/p2p/firewall.go b/internal/cli/p2p/firewall.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8189272a --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/p2p/firewall.go @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +package p2p + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "os" + "strings" + "text/tabwriter" + + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/firewall" +) + +func newFirewallCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "firewall", + Short: "Manage firewall ACL rules", + Long: "List, add, or remove knowledge firewall rules that control which peers can access which tools.", + } + + cmd.AddCommand(newFirewallListCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newFirewallAddCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newFirewallRemoveCmd(bootLoader)) + + return cmd +} + +func newFirewallListCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + var jsonOutput bool + + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "list", + Short: "List firewall ACL rules", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err) + } + defer boot.DBClient.Close() + + cfg := boot.Config + if !cfg.P2P.Enabled { + return fmt.Errorf("P2P networking is not enabled (set p2p.enabled = true)") + } + + // Build rules from config. + rules := make([]firewall.ACLRule, len(cfg.P2P.FirewallRules)) + for i, r := range cfg.P2P.FirewallRules { + rules[i] = firewall.ACLRule{ + PeerDID: r.PeerDID, + Action: firewall.ACLAction(r.Action), + Tools: r.Tools, + RateLimit: r.RateLimit, + } + } + + if jsonOutput { + enc := json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout) + enc.SetIndent("", " ") + return enc.Encode(rules) + } + + if len(rules) == 0 { + fmt.Println("No firewall rules configured. Default policy: deny-all.") + return nil + } + + w := tabwriter.NewWriter(os.Stdout, 0, 4, 2, ' ', 0) + fmt.Fprintln(w, "PEER DID\tACTION\tTOOLS\tRATE LIMIT") + for _, r := range rules { + tools := "*" + if len(r.Tools) > 0 { + tools = strings.Join(r.Tools, ", ") + } + rateLimit := "unlimited" + if r.RateLimit > 0 { + rateLimit = fmt.Sprintf("%d/min", r.RateLimit) + } + fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n", r.PeerDID, r.Action, tools, rateLimit) + } + return w.Flush() + }, + } + + cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&jsonOutput, "json", false, "Output as JSON") + return cmd +} + +func newFirewallAddCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + var ( + peerDID string + action string + tools []string + rateLimit int + ) + + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "add", + Short: "Add a firewall ACL rule", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + if peerDID == "" { + return fmt.Errorf("--peer-did is required") + } + if action != "allow" && action != "deny" { + return fmt.Errorf("--action must be 'allow' or 'deny'") + } + + rule := firewall.ACLRule{ + PeerDID: peerDID, + Action: firewall.ACLAction(action), + Tools: tools, + RateLimit: rateLimit, + } + + toolsStr := "*" + if len(tools) > 0 { + toolsStr = strings.Join(tools, ", ") + } + + fmt.Println("Firewall rule added (runtime only):") + fmt.Printf(" Peer DID: %s\n", rule.PeerDID) + fmt.Printf(" Action: %s\n", rule.Action) + fmt.Printf(" Tools: %s\n", toolsStr) + if rateLimit > 0 { + fmt.Printf(" Rate Limit: %d/min\n", rateLimit) + } + fmt.Println("\nTo persist this rule, add it to p2p.firewallRules in your configuration.") + return nil + }, + } + + cmd.Flags().StringVar(&peerDID, "peer-did", "", "Peer DID to apply the rule to ('*' for all)") + cmd.Flags().StringVar(&action, "action", "allow", "Action: 'allow' or 'deny'") + cmd.Flags().StringSliceVar(&tools, "tools", nil, "Tool name patterns (empty = all)") + cmd.Flags().IntVar(&rateLimit, "rate-limit", 0, "Max requests per minute (0 = unlimited)") + + return cmd +} + +func newFirewallRemoveCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "remove ", + Short: "Remove firewall rules for a peer DID", + Args: cobra.ExactArgs(1), + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + peerDID := args[0] + fmt.Printf("To remove rules for peer %s, edit p2p.firewallRules in your configuration.\n", peerDID) + fmt.Println("Runtime rule removal requires the P2P node to be running via 'lango serve'.") + return nil + }, + } + + return cmd +} diff --git a/internal/cli/p2p/identity.go b/internal/cli/p2p/identity.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5ee1435c --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/p2p/identity.go @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +package p2p + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "os" + + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" +) + +func newIdentityCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + var jsonOutput bool + + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "identity", + Short: "Show local DID and peer identity", + Long: "Show local DID and peer identity (creates an ephemeral node). For the running server's identity, use GET /api/p2p/identity.", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err) + } + defer boot.DBClient.Close() + + deps, err := initP2PDeps(boot) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer deps.cleanup() + + peerID := deps.node.PeerID().String() + addrs := deps.node.Multiaddrs() + + listenAddrs := make([]string, len(addrs)) + for i, a := range addrs { + listenAddrs[i] = a.String() + } + + if jsonOutput { + enc := json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout) + enc.SetIndent("", " ") + return enc.Encode(map[string]interface{}{ + "peerId": peerID, + "listenAddrs": listenAddrs, + "keyStorage": deps.keyStorage, + }) + } + + fmt.Println("P2P Identity") + fmt.Printf(" Peer ID: %s\n", peerID) + fmt.Printf(" Key Storage: %s\n", deps.keyStorage) + fmt.Printf(" Listen Addrs:\n") + for _, a := range listenAddrs { + fmt.Printf(" %s\n", a) + } + + return nil + }, + } + + cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&jsonOutput, "json", false, "Output as JSON") + return cmd +} diff --git a/internal/cli/p2p/p2p.go b/internal/cli/p2p/p2p.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2e70c3c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/p2p/p2p.go @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +// Package p2p provides CLI commands for P2P network management. +package p2p + +import ( + "fmt" + "sync" + "time" + + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + "go.uber.org/zap" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/logging" + p2pnet "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/handshake" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/security" +) + +// p2pDeps holds lazily-initialized P2P dependencies. +type p2pDeps struct { + config *config.P2PConfig + node *p2pnet.Node + sessions *handshake.SessionStore + keyStorage string // "secrets-store" or "file" + cleanup func() +} + +// NewP2PCmd creates the p2p command with lazy bootstrap loading. +func NewP2PCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "p2p", + Short: "Manage P2P network", + Long: "Connect to peers, manage firewall rules, discover agents, and inspect P2P node identity on the Sovereign Agent Network.", + } + + cmd.AddCommand(newStatusCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newPeersCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newConnectCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newDisconnectCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newFirewallCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newDiscoverCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newIdentityCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newReputationCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newPricingCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newSessionCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newSandboxCmd(bootLoader)) + + return cmd +} + +// initP2PDeps creates P2P components from a bootstrap result. +func initP2PDeps(boot *bootstrap.Result) (*p2pDeps, error) { + cfg := boot.Config + if !cfg.P2P.Enabled { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("P2P networking is not enabled (set p2p.enabled = true)") + } + + logger := logging.Sugar() + if logger == nil { + l, _ := zap.NewProduction() + logger = l.Sugar() + } + + // Build SecretsStore from bootstrap result if crypto is available. + var secrets *security.SecretsStore + keyStorage := "file" + if boot.Crypto != nil && boot.DBClient != nil { + keys := security.NewKeyRegistry(boot.DBClient) + secrets = security.NewSecretsStore(boot.DBClient, keys, boot.Crypto) + keyStorage = "secrets-store" + } + + node, err := p2pnet.NewNode(cfg.P2P, logger, secrets) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("create P2P node: %w", err) + } + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + if err := node.Start(&wg); err != nil { + _ = node.Stop() + return nil, fmt.Errorf("start P2P node: %w", err) + } + + sessionTTL := cfg.P2P.SessionTokenTTL + if sessionTTL <= 0 { + sessionTTL = 24 * time.Hour + } + sessions, err := handshake.NewSessionStore(sessionTTL) + if err != nil { + _ = node.Stop() + return nil, fmt.Errorf("create session store: %w", err) + } + + return &p2pDeps{ + config: &cfg.P2P, + node: node, + sessions: sessions, + keyStorage: keyStorage, + cleanup: func() { + _ = node.Stop() + }, + }, nil +} diff --git a/internal/cli/p2p/p2p_test.go b/internal/cli/p2p/p2p_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a300ec83 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/p2p/p2p_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +package p2p + +import ( + "strings" + "testing" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +// dummyBootLoader returns a boot loader that always errors. +// Used for testing command structure without actually bootstrapping. +func dummyBootLoader() func() (*bootstrap.Result, error) { + return func() (*bootstrap.Result, error) { + return nil, assert.AnError + } +} + +func TestNewP2PCmd_Structure(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewP2PCmd(dummyBootLoader()) + require.NotNil(t, cmd) + + assert.Equal(t, "p2p", cmd.Use) + assert.NotEmpty(t, cmd.Short) + + // Verify all expected subcommands exist. + expected := []string{ + "status", "peers", "connect", "disconnect", + "firewall", "discover", "identity", "reputation", + "pricing", "session", "sandbox", + } + + subCmds := make(map[string]bool) + for _, sub := range cmd.Commands() { + subCmds[strings.Fields(sub.Use)[0]] = true + } + + for _, name := range expected { + assert.True(t, subCmds[name], "missing subcommand: %s", name) + } +} + +func TestNewP2PCmd_SubcommandCount(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewP2PCmd(dummyBootLoader()) + assert.Equal(t, 11, len(cmd.Commands()), "expected 11 P2P subcommands") +} + +func TestStatusCmd_HasFlags(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewP2PCmd(dummyBootLoader()) + for _, sub := range cmd.Commands() { + if sub.Use == "status" { + jsonFlag := sub.Flags().Lookup("json") + assert.NotNil(t, jsonFlag, "status command should have --json flag") + return + } + } + t.Fatal("status subcommand not found") +} + +func TestFirewallCmd_HasSubcommands(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewP2PCmd(dummyBootLoader()) + for _, sub := range cmd.Commands() { + if sub.Use == "firewall" { + firewallSubs := make(map[string]bool) + for _, fsub := range sub.Commands() { + firewallSubs[fsub.Use] = true + } + assert.True(t, firewallSubs["list"], "firewall should have list subcommand") + assert.True(t, firewallSubs["add"], "firewall should have add subcommand") + assert.True(t, firewallSubs["remove "], "firewall should have remove subcommand") + return + } + } + t.Fatal("firewall subcommand not found") +} + +func TestSessionCmd_HasSubcommands(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewP2PCmd(dummyBootLoader()) + for _, sub := range cmd.Commands() { + if sub.Use == "session" { + sessionSubs := make(map[string]bool) + for _, ssub := range sub.Commands() { + sessionSubs[ssub.Use] = true + } + assert.True(t, sessionSubs["list"], "session should have list subcommand") + assert.True(t, sessionSubs["revoke"], "session should have revoke subcommand") + assert.True(t, sessionSubs["revoke-all"], "session should have revoke-all subcommand") + return + } + } + t.Fatal("session subcommand not found") +} + +func TestSandboxCmd_HasSubcommands(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewP2PCmd(dummyBootLoader()) + for _, sub := range cmd.Commands() { + if sub.Use == "sandbox" { + sandboxSubs := make(map[string]bool) + for _, ssub := range sub.Commands() { + sandboxSubs[ssub.Use] = true + } + assert.True(t, sandboxSubs["status"], "sandbox should have status subcommand") + assert.True(t, sandboxSubs["test"], "sandbox should have test subcommand") + assert.True(t, sandboxSubs["cleanup"], "sandbox should have cleanup subcommand") + return + } + } + t.Fatal("sandbox subcommand not found") +} diff --git a/internal/cli/p2p/peers.go b/internal/cli/p2p/peers.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..23f4c128 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/p2p/peers.go @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +package p2p + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "os" + "text/tabwriter" + + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" +) + +func newPeersCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + var jsonOutput bool + + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "peers", + Short: "List connected peers", + Long: "List connected peers (creates an ephemeral node). For the running server's peers, use GET /api/p2p/peers.", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err) + } + defer boot.DBClient.Close() + + deps, err := initP2PDeps(boot) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer deps.cleanup() + + peers := deps.node.ConnectedPeers() + host := deps.node.Host() + + type peerInfo struct { + PeerID string `json:"peerId"` + Addrs []string `json:"addrs"` + } + + infos := make([]peerInfo, 0, len(peers)) + for _, pid := range peers { + conns := host.Network().ConnsToPeer(pid) + addrs := make([]string, 0) + for _, c := range conns { + addrs = append(addrs, c.RemoteMultiaddr().String()) + } + infos = append(infos, peerInfo{ + PeerID: pid.String(), + Addrs: addrs, + }) + } + + if jsonOutput { + enc := json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout) + enc.SetIndent("", " ") + return enc.Encode(infos) + } + + if len(infos) == 0 { + fmt.Println("No connected peers.") + return nil + } + + w := tabwriter.NewWriter(os.Stdout, 0, 4, 2, ' ', 0) + fmt.Fprintln(w, "PEER ID\tADDRESS") + for _, p := range infos { + addr := "" + if len(p.Addrs) > 0 { + addr = p.Addrs[0] + } + fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s\t%s\n", p.PeerID, addr) + } + return w.Flush() + }, + } + + cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&jsonOutput, "json", false, "Output as JSON") + return cmd +} diff --git a/internal/cli/p2p/pricing.go b/internal/cli/p2p/pricing.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..365c4528 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/p2p/pricing.go @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +package p2p + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "os" + + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/wallet" +) + +func newPricingCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + var ( + toolName string + jsonOutput bool + ) + + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "pricing", + Short: "Show P2P tool pricing configuration", + Long: "Display the current P2P pricing configuration including default per-query price and tool-specific price overrides.", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err) + } + defer boot.DBClient.Close() + + pricing := boot.Config.P2P.Pricing + + if toolName != "" { + price, ok := pricing.ToolPrices[toolName] + if !ok { + price = pricing.PerQuery + } + if jsonOutput { + enc := json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout) + enc.SetIndent("", " ") + return enc.Encode(map[string]interface{}{ + "tool": toolName, + "price": price, + "currency": wallet.CurrencyUSDC, + }) + } + fmt.Printf("Tool: %s\n", toolName) + fmt.Printf("Price: %s %s\n", price, wallet.CurrencyUSDC) + return nil + } + + if jsonOutput { + enc := json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout) + enc.SetIndent("", " ") + return enc.Encode(map[string]interface{}{ + "enabled": pricing.Enabled, + "perQuery": pricing.PerQuery, + "toolPrices": pricing.ToolPrices, + "currency": wallet.CurrencyUSDC, + }) + } + + fmt.Println("P2P Pricing Configuration") + fmt.Printf(" Enabled: %v\n", pricing.Enabled) + fmt.Printf(" Per Query: %s %s\n", pricing.PerQuery, wallet.CurrencyUSDC) + if len(pricing.ToolPrices) > 0 { + fmt.Println(" Tool Prices:") + for tool, price := range pricing.ToolPrices { + fmt.Printf(" %-30s %s %s\n", tool, price, wallet.CurrencyUSDC) + } + } else { + fmt.Println(" Tool Prices: (none)") + } + + return nil + }, + } + + cmd.Flags().StringVar(&toolName, "tool", "", "Filter pricing for a specific tool") + cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&jsonOutput, "json", false, "Output as JSON") + return cmd +} diff --git a/internal/cli/p2p/reputation.go b/internal/cli/p2p/reputation.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2c47398a --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/p2p/reputation.go @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +package p2p + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "os" + + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + "go.uber.org/zap" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/logging" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/reputation" +) + +func newReputationCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + var ( + peerDID string + jsonOutput bool + ) + + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "reputation", + Short: "Show peer reputation and trust score", + Long: "Query the reputation system for a peer's trust score, exchange history, and interaction timeline.", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + if peerDID == "" { + return fmt.Errorf("--peer-did is required") + } + + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err) + } + defer boot.DBClient.Close() + + logger := logging.Sugar() + if logger == nil { + l, _ := zap.NewProduction() + logger = l.Sugar() + } + + store := reputation.NewStore(boot.DBClient, logger) + details, err := store.GetDetails(cmd.Context(), peerDID) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("get reputation: %w", err) + } + + if details == nil { + if jsonOutput { + enc := json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout) + enc.SetIndent("", " ") + return enc.Encode(map[string]interface{}{ + "peerDid": peerDID, + "trustScore": 0.0, + "message": "no reputation record found", + }) + } + fmt.Printf("No reputation record found for %s\n", peerDID) + return nil + } + + if jsonOutput { + enc := json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout) + enc.SetIndent("", " ") + return enc.Encode(details) + } + + fmt.Println("Peer Reputation") + fmt.Printf(" Peer DID: %s\n", details.PeerDID) + fmt.Printf(" Trust Score: %.4f\n", details.TrustScore) + fmt.Printf(" Successes: %d\n", details.SuccessfulExchanges) + fmt.Printf(" Failures: %d\n", details.FailedExchanges) + fmt.Printf(" Timeouts: %d\n", details.TimeoutCount) + fmt.Printf(" First Seen: %s\n", details.FirstSeen.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05")) + fmt.Printf(" Last Interaction: %s\n", details.LastInteraction.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05")) + + return nil + }, + } + + cmd.Flags().StringVar(&peerDID, "peer-did", "", "The DID of the peer to query") + cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&jsonOutput, "json", false, "Output as JSON") + return cmd +} diff --git a/internal/cli/p2p/sandbox.go b/internal/cli/p2p/sandbox.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7ce1929e --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/p2p/sandbox.go @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +package p2p + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + "time" + + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/sandbox" +) + +func newSandboxCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "sandbox", + Short: "Manage P2P tool execution sandbox", + Long: "Inspect sandbox status, run smoke tests, and clean up orphaned containers.", + } + + cmd.AddCommand(newSandboxStatusCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newSandboxTestCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newSandboxCleanupCmd(bootLoader)) + + return cmd +} + +func newSandboxStatusCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + return &cobra.Command{ + Use: "status", + Short: "Show sandbox runtime status", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + cfg := boot.Config + if !cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Enabled { + fmt.Println("Tool isolation: disabled") + return nil + } + + fmt.Println("Tool isolation: enabled") + fmt.Printf(" Timeout per tool: %v\n", cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.TimeoutPerTool) + fmt.Printf(" Max memory (MB): %d\n", cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.MaxMemoryMB) + + if !cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.Enabled { + fmt.Println(" Container mode: disabled (subprocess fallback)") + return nil + } + + fmt.Println(" Container mode: enabled") + fmt.Printf(" Runtime config: %s\n", cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.Runtime) + fmt.Printf(" Image: %s\n", cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.Image) + fmt.Printf(" Network mode: %s\n", cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.NetworkMode) + + // Probe actual runtime availability. + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second) + defer cancel() + + sbxCfg := sandbox.Config{ + Enabled: true, + TimeoutPerTool: cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.TimeoutPerTool, + MaxMemoryMB: cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.MaxMemoryMB, + } + exec, err := sandbox.NewContainerExecutor(sbxCfg, cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container) + if err != nil { + fmt.Printf(" Active runtime: unavailable (%v)\n", err) + return nil + } + _ = ctx + fmt.Printf(" Active runtime: %s\n", exec.RuntimeName()) + fmt.Printf(" Pool size: %d\n", cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.PoolSize) + + return nil + }, + } +} + +func newSandboxTestCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + return &cobra.Command{ + Use: "test", + Short: "Run a sandbox smoke test", + Long: "Execute a simple echo tool through the sandbox to verify it works.", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + cfg := boot.Config + if !cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Enabled { + return fmt.Errorf("tool isolation is not enabled (set p2p.toolIsolation.enabled = true)") + } + + sbxCfg := sandbox.Config{ + Enabled: true, + TimeoutPerTool: cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.TimeoutPerTool, + MaxMemoryMB: cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.MaxMemoryMB, + } + + var exec sandbox.Executor + if cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.Enabled { + containerExec, cErr := sandbox.NewContainerExecutor(sbxCfg, cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container) + if cErr != nil { + fmt.Printf("Container sandbox unavailable, using subprocess: %v\n", cErr) + exec = sandbox.NewSubprocessExecutor(sbxCfg) + } else { + fmt.Printf("Using container runtime: %s\n", containerExec.RuntimeName()) + exec = containerExec + } + } else { + fmt.Println("Using subprocess sandbox") + exec = sandbox.NewSubprocessExecutor(sbxCfg) + } + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second) + defer cancel() + + params := map[string]interface{}{"msg": "sandbox-smoke-test"} + result, err := exec.Execute(ctx, "echo", params) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("smoke test: %w", err) + } + + fmt.Printf("Smoke test passed: %v\n", result) + return nil + }, + } +} + +func newSandboxCleanupCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + return &cobra.Command{ + Use: "cleanup", + Short: "Remove orphaned sandbox containers", + Long: "Find and remove Docker containers with label lango.sandbox=true.", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + dr, err := sandbox.NewDockerRuntime() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("docker unavailable: %w", err) + } + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second) + defer cancel() + + if !dr.IsAvailable(ctx) { + return fmt.Errorf("docker daemon is not reachable") + } + + if err := dr.Cleanup(ctx, ""); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("cleanup: %w", err) + } + + fmt.Println("Orphaned sandbox containers cleaned up.") + return nil + }, + } +} diff --git a/internal/cli/p2p/session.go b/internal/cli/p2p/session.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b46d782b --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/p2p/session.go @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +package p2p + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "os" + "text/tabwriter" + "time" + + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/handshake" +) + +func newSessionCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "session", + Short: "Manage P2P sessions", + Long: "List, revoke, or revoke-all authenticated peer sessions.", + } + + cmd.AddCommand(newSessionListCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newSessionRevokeCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newSessionRevokeAllCmd(bootLoader)) + + return cmd +} + +func newSessionListCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + var jsonOutput bool + + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "list", + Short: "List active P2P sessions", + Long: "List all active (non-expired, non-invalidated) peer sessions.", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err) + } + defer boot.DBClient.Close() + + deps, err := initP2PDeps(boot) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer deps.cleanup() + + sessions := deps.sessions.ActiveSessions() + + if jsonOutput { + enc := json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout) + enc.SetIndent("", " ") + return enc.Encode(sessions) + } + + if len(sessions) == 0 { + fmt.Println("No active sessions.") + return nil + } + + w := tabwriter.NewWriter(os.Stdout, 0, 4, 2, ' ', 0) + fmt.Fprintln(w, "PEER DID\tCREATED\tEXPIRES\tZK VERIFIED") + for _, s := range sessions { + fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s\t%s\t%s\t%v\n", + s.PeerDID, + s.CreatedAt.Format(time.RFC3339), + s.ExpiresAt.Format(time.RFC3339), + s.ZKVerified, + ) + } + return w.Flush() + }, + } + + cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&jsonOutput, "json", false, "Output as JSON") + return cmd +} + +func newSessionRevokeCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + var peerDID string + + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "revoke", + Short: "Revoke a peer's session", + Long: "Explicitly invalidate and revoke the session for a specific peer DID.", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + if peerDID == "" { + return fmt.Errorf("--peer-did is required") + } + + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err) + } + defer boot.DBClient.Close() + + deps, err := initP2PDeps(boot) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer deps.cleanup() + + deps.sessions.Invalidate(peerDID, handshake.ReasonManualRevoke) + fmt.Printf("Session for %s revoked.\n", peerDID) + return nil + }, + } + + cmd.Flags().StringVar(&peerDID, "peer-did", "", "The DID of the peer to revoke") + return cmd +} + +func newSessionRevokeAllCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "revoke-all", + Short: "Revoke all active sessions", + Long: "Invalidate and revoke all active peer sessions.", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err) + } + defer boot.DBClient.Close() + + deps, err := initP2PDeps(boot) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer deps.cleanup() + + deps.sessions.InvalidateAll(handshake.ReasonManualRevoke) + fmt.Println("All sessions revoked.") + return nil + }, + } + + return cmd +} diff --git a/internal/cli/p2p/status.go b/internal/cli/p2p/status.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0769ba99 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/p2p/status.go @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +package p2p + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "os" + + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" +) + +func newStatusCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + var jsonOutput bool + + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "status", + Short: "Show P2P node status", + Long: "Show P2P node status (creates an ephemeral node). For the running server's node, use GET /api/p2p/status.", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err) + } + defer boot.DBClient.Close() + + deps, err := initP2PDeps(boot) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer deps.cleanup() + + peerID := deps.node.PeerID().String() + addrs := deps.node.Multiaddrs() + connectedPeers := deps.node.ConnectedPeers() + + listenAddrs := make([]string, len(addrs)) + for i, a := range addrs { + listenAddrs[i] = a.String() + } + + if jsonOutput { + enc := json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout) + enc.SetIndent("", " ") + return enc.Encode(map[string]interface{}{ + "peerId": peerID, + "listenAddrs": listenAddrs, + "connectedPeers": len(connectedPeers), + "maxPeers": deps.config.MaxPeers, + "mdns": deps.config.EnableMDNS, + "relay": deps.config.EnableRelay, + "zkHandshake": deps.config.ZKHandshake, + }) + } + + fmt.Println("P2P Node Status") + fmt.Printf(" Peer ID: %s\n", peerID) + fmt.Printf(" Listen Addrs: %v\n", listenAddrs) + fmt.Printf(" Connected Peers: %d / %d\n", len(connectedPeers), deps.config.MaxPeers) + fmt.Printf(" mDNS: %v\n", deps.config.EnableMDNS) + fmt.Printf(" Relay: %v\n", deps.config.EnableRelay) + fmt.Printf(" ZK Handshake: %v\n", deps.config.ZKHandshake) + + return nil + }, + } + + cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&jsonOutput, "json", false, "Output as JSON") + return cmd +} diff --git a/internal/cli/payment/balance.go b/internal/cli/payment/balance.go index a0c0af3e..582c0d35 100644 --- a/internal/cli/payment/balance.go +++ b/internal/cli/payment/balance.go @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func newBalanceCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command enc.SetIndent("", " ") return enc.Encode(map[string]interface{}{ "balance": balance, - "currency": "USDC", + "currency": wallet.CurrencyUSDC, "address": addr, "chainId": chainID, "network": network, @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ func newBalanceCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command } fmt.Println("Wallet Balance") - fmt.Printf(" Balance: %s USDC\n", balance) + fmt.Printf(" Balance: %s %s\n", balance, wallet.CurrencyUSDC) fmt.Printf(" Address: %s\n", addr) fmt.Printf(" Network: %s (chain %d)\n", network, chainID) diff --git a/internal/cli/payment/history.go b/internal/cli/payment/history.go index 990d3a09..63eef1ae 100644 --- a/internal/cli/payment/history.go +++ b/internal/cli/payment/history.go @@ -10,6 +10,15 @@ import ( "github.com/spf13/cobra" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/wallet" +) + +// Display truncation constants for history table formatting. +const ( + maxHashDisplay = 14 + truncatedHashLen = 10 + maxPurposeDisplay = 24 + truncatedPurpLen = 21 ) func newHistoryCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { @@ -59,24 +68,25 @@ func newHistoryCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command fmt.Fprintln(w, "STATUS\tAMOUNT\tTO\tMETHOD\tPURPOSE\tTX HASH\tCREATED") for _, tx := range txs { hash := tx.TxHash - if len(hash) > 14 { - hash = hash[:10] + "..." + if len(hash) > maxHashDisplay { + hash = hash[:truncatedHashLen] + "..." } to := tx.To - if len(to) > 14 { - to = to[:10] + "..." + if len(to) > maxHashDisplay { + to = to[:truncatedHashLen] + "..." } purpose := tx.Purpose - if len(purpose) > 24 { - purpose = purpose[:21] + "..." + if len(purpose) > maxPurposeDisplay { + purpose = purpose[:truncatedPurpLen] + "..." } method := tx.PaymentMethod if method == "" { method = "direct" } - fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s\t%s USDC\t%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n", + fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s\t%s %s\t%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n", tx.Status, tx.Amount, + wallet.CurrencyUSDC, to, method, purpose, diff --git a/internal/cli/payment/limits.go b/internal/cli/payment/limits.go index f7e48545..8d6c23d5 100644 --- a/internal/cli/payment/limits.go +++ b/internal/cli/payment/limits.go @@ -54,15 +54,15 @@ func newLimitsCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { "maxDaily": wallet.FormatUSDC(maxDaily), "dailySpent": wallet.FormatUSDC(spent), "dailyRemaining": wallet.FormatUSDC(remaining), - "currency": "USDC", + "currency": wallet.CurrencyUSDC, }) } fmt.Println("Spending Limits") - fmt.Printf(" Max Per Transaction: %s USDC\n", wallet.FormatUSDC(maxPerTx)) - fmt.Printf(" Max Daily: %s USDC\n", wallet.FormatUSDC(maxDaily)) - fmt.Printf(" Spent Today: %s USDC\n", wallet.FormatUSDC(spent)) - fmt.Printf(" Remaining Today: %s USDC\n", wallet.FormatUSDC(remaining)) + fmt.Printf(" Max Per Transaction: %s %s\n", wallet.FormatUSDC(maxPerTx), wallet.CurrencyUSDC) + fmt.Printf(" Max Daily: %s %s\n", wallet.FormatUSDC(maxDaily), wallet.CurrencyUSDC) + fmt.Printf(" Spent Today: %s %s\n", wallet.FormatUSDC(spent), wallet.CurrencyUSDC) + fmt.Printf(" Remaining Today: %s %s\n", wallet.FormatUSDC(remaining), wallet.CurrencyUSDC) return nil }, diff --git a/internal/cli/payment/payment.go b/internal/cli/payment/payment.go index 9a54e023..b3c0bc23 100644 --- a/internal/cli/payment/payment.go +++ b/internal/cli/payment/payment.go @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ func initPaymentDeps(boot *bootstrap.Result) (*paymentDeps, error) { limiter, err := wallet.NewEntSpendingLimiter(client, cfg.Payment.Limits.MaxPerTx, cfg.Payment.Limits.MaxDaily, + cfg.Payment.Limits.AutoApproveBelow, ) if err != nil { rpcClient.Close() diff --git a/internal/cli/payment/payment_test.go b/internal/cli/payment/payment_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a2c69ace --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/payment/payment_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +package payment + +import ( + "testing" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +// dummyBootLoader returns a boot loader that always errors. +func dummyBootLoader() func() (*bootstrap.Result, error) { + return func() (*bootstrap.Result, error) { + return nil, assert.AnError + } +} + +func TestNewPaymentCmd_Structure(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewPaymentCmd(dummyBootLoader()) + require.NotNil(t, cmd) + + assert.Equal(t, "payment", cmd.Use) + assert.NotEmpty(t, cmd.Short) + assert.NotEmpty(t, cmd.Long) +} + +func TestNewPaymentCmd_Subcommands(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewPaymentCmd(dummyBootLoader()) + + expected := []string{"balance", "history", "limits", "info", "send"} + + subCmds := make(map[string]bool) + for _, sub := range cmd.Commands() { + subCmds[sub.Use] = true + } + + for _, name := range expected { + assert.True(t, subCmds[name], "missing subcommand: %s", name) + } +} + +func TestNewPaymentCmd_SubcommandCount(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewPaymentCmd(dummyBootLoader()) + assert.Equal(t, 5, len(cmd.Commands()), "expected 5 payment subcommands") +} + +func TestBalanceCmd_HasJSONFlag(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewPaymentCmd(dummyBootLoader()) + for _, sub := range cmd.Commands() { + if sub.Use == "balance" { + jsonFlag := sub.Flags().Lookup("json") + assert.NotNil(t, jsonFlag, "balance command should have --json flag") + return + } + } + t.Fatal("balance subcommand not found") +} + +func TestSendCmd_HasRequiredFlags(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewPaymentCmd(dummyBootLoader()) + for _, sub := range cmd.Commands() { + if sub.Use == "send" { + assert.NotNil(t, sub.Flags().Lookup("to"), "send should have --to flag") + assert.NotNil(t, sub.Flags().Lookup("amount"), "send should have --amount flag") + assert.NotNil(t, sub.Flags().Lookup("purpose"), "send should have --purpose flag") + assert.NotNil(t, sub.Flags().Lookup("force"), "send should have --force flag") + return + } + } + t.Fatal("send subcommand not found") +} + +func TestHistoryCmd_HasLimitFlag(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewPaymentCmd(dummyBootLoader()) + for _, sub := range cmd.Commands() { + if sub.Use == "history" { + limitFlag := sub.Flags().Lookup("limit") + assert.NotNil(t, limitFlag, "history command should have --limit flag") + return + } + } + t.Fatal("history subcommand not found") +} + +func TestSubcommands_HaveShortDescription(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewPaymentCmd(dummyBootLoader()) + for _, sub := range cmd.Commands() { + assert.NotEmpty(t, sub.Short, "subcommand %q should have a Short description", sub.Use) + } +} diff --git a/internal/cli/payment/send.go b/internal/cli/payment/send.go index 9ec64214..33ac7abc 100644 --- a/internal/cli/payment/send.go +++ b/internal/cli/payment/send.go @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ func newSendCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { fmt.Printf("Purpose: %s\n", purpose) fmt.Print("Confirm [y/N]: ") var answer string - fmt.Scanln(&answer) + _, _ = fmt.Scanln(&answer) if answer != "y" && answer != "Y" && answer != "yes" { fmt.Println("Aborted.") return nil diff --git a/internal/cli/prompt/prompt.go b/internal/cli/prompt/prompt.go index fd428e78..16bce4c4 100644 --- a/internal/cli/prompt/prompt.go +++ b/internal/cli/prompt/prompt.go @@ -1,7 +1,10 @@ package prompt import ( + "bufio" "fmt" + "os" + "strings" "syscall" "golang.org/x/term" @@ -23,6 +26,18 @@ func Passphrase(prompt string) (string, error) { return string(bytePassword), nil } +// Confirm prompts the user for a yes/no confirmation and returns true for yes. +func Confirm(msg string) (bool, error) { + fmt.Printf("%s [y/N]: ", msg) + reader := bufio.NewReader(os.Stdin) + line, err := reader.ReadString('\n') + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + answer := strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(line)) + return answer == "y" || answer == "yes", nil +} + // PassphraseConfirm prompts for a passphrase and its confirmation func PassphraseConfirm(prompt, confirmPrompt string) (string, error) { pass1, err := Passphrase(prompt) diff --git a/internal/cli/security/db_migrate.go b/internal/cli/security/db_migrate.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a2b8c73a --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/security/db_migrate.go @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +package security + +import ( + "fmt" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "strings" + + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/prompt" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/dbmigrate" +) + +func newDBMigrateCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + var force bool + + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "db-migrate", + Short: "Encrypt the application database with SQLCipher", + Long: "Converts the plaintext SQLite database to SQLCipher-encrypted format using the current passphrase.", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err) + } + defer boot.DBClient.Close() + + dbPath := resolveDBPath(boot.Config.Session.DatabasePath) + if bootstrap.IsDBEncrypted(dbPath) { + return fmt.Errorf("database is already encrypted") + } + + if !force && !prompt.IsInteractive() { + return fmt.Errorf("this command requires an interactive terminal (use --force for non-interactive)") + } + + if !force { + ok, err := prompt.Confirm("This will encrypt your database. A backup will be created. Continue?") + if err != nil { + return err + } + if !ok { + fmt.Println("Aborted.") + return nil + } + } + + pageSize := boot.Config.Security.DBEncryption.CipherPageSize + if pageSize <= 0 { + pageSize = 4096 + } + + pass, err := prompt.Passphrase("Enter passphrase for DB encryption: ") + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read passphrase: %w", err) + } + + fmt.Println("Encrypting database...") + if err := dbmigrate.MigrateToEncrypted(dbPath, pass, pageSize); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("db encryption: %w", err) + } + + fmt.Println("Database encrypted successfully.") + fmt.Println("Set security.dbEncryption.enabled=true in your config to use the encrypted DB.") + return nil + }, + } + + cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&force, "force", false, "Skip confirmation prompt") + return cmd +} + +func newDBDecryptCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + var force bool + + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "db-decrypt", + Short: "Decrypt the application database back to plaintext", + Long: "Converts a SQLCipher-encrypted database back to a plaintext SQLite database.", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err) + } + defer boot.DBClient.Close() + + dbPath := resolveDBPath(boot.Config.Session.DatabasePath) + if !bootstrap.IsDBEncrypted(dbPath) { + return fmt.Errorf("database is not encrypted") + } + + if !force && !prompt.IsInteractive() { + return fmt.Errorf("this command requires an interactive terminal (use --force for non-interactive)") + } + + if !force { + ok, err := prompt.Confirm("This will decrypt your database to plaintext. Continue?") + if err != nil { + return err + } + if !ok { + fmt.Println("Aborted.") + return nil + } + } + + pageSize := boot.Config.Security.DBEncryption.CipherPageSize + if pageSize <= 0 { + pageSize = 4096 + } + + pass, err := prompt.Passphrase("Enter passphrase for DB decryption: ") + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read passphrase: %w", err) + } + + fmt.Println("Decrypting database...") + if err := dbmigrate.DecryptToPlaintext(dbPath, pass, pageSize); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("db decryption: %w", err) + } + + fmt.Println("Database decrypted successfully.") + fmt.Println("Set security.dbEncryption.enabled=false in your config if you no longer want encryption.") + return nil + }, + } + + cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&force, "force", false, "Skip confirmation prompt") + return cmd +} + +// resolveDBPath expands tilde in a database path. +func resolveDBPath(dbPath string) string { + if strings.HasPrefix(dbPath, "~/") { + home, err := os.UserHomeDir() + if err != nil { + return dbPath + } + return filepath.Join(home, dbPath[2:]) + } + return dbPath +} diff --git a/internal/cli/security/keyring.go b/internal/cli/security/keyring.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..311c9f10 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/security/keyring.go @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ +package security + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "fmt" + "os" + "path/filepath" + + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/prompt" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/keyring" +) + +func newKeyringCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "keyring", + Short: "Manage hardware keyring passphrase storage (Touch ID / TPM)", + } + + cmd.AddCommand(newKeyringStoreCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newKeyringClearCmd()) + cmd.AddCommand(newKeyringStatusCmd()) + + return cmd +} + +func newKeyringStoreCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + return &cobra.Command{ + Use: "store", + Short: "Store the master passphrase in a secure hardware backend", + Long: `Store the master passphrase using the best available secure hardware backend: + + - macOS with Touch ID: Keychain with biometric access control + - Linux with TPM 2.0: TPM-sealed blob (~/.lango/tpm/) + +If no secure hardware backend is available, this command will refuse to store +the passphrase to avoid exposing it to same-UID attacks via plain OS keyring.`, + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + secureProvider, tier := keyring.DetectSecureProvider() + if secureProvider == nil { + return fmt.Errorf( + "no secure hardware backend available (security tier: %s)\n"+ + "Use a keyfile (LANGO_PASSPHRASE_FILE) or interactive prompt instead", + tier.String(), + ) + } + + // Bootstrap to verify the passphrase is correct. + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err) + } + defer boot.DBClient.Close() + + // Check if passphrase is already stored in the secure provider. + if checker, ok := secureProvider.(keyring.KeyChecker); ok { + if checker.HasKey(keyring.Service, keyring.KeyMasterPassphrase) { + fmt.Println("Passphrase is already stored in the secure keyring.") + fmt.Println(" Next launch will load it automatically.") + return nil + } + } + + if !prompt.IsInteractive() { + return fmt.Errorf("this command requires an interactive terminal") + } + + pass, err := prompt.Passphrase("Enter passphrase to store: ") + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read passphrase: %w", err) + } + + if err := secureProvider.Set(keyring.Service, keyring.KeyMasterPassphrase, pass); err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, keyring.ErrEntitlement) { + return fmt.Errorf("biometric storage unavailable (binary not codesigned)\n"+ + " Tip: codesign the binary: make codesign\n"+ + " Note: also ensure device passcode is set (required for biometric Keychain)") + } + return fmt.Errorf("store passphrase: %w", err) + } + + fmt.Printf("Passphrase stored with %s protection.\n", tier.String()) + fmt.Println(" Next launch will load it automatically.") + return nil + }, + } +} + +func newKeyringClearCmd() *cobra.Command { + var force bool + + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "clear", + Short: "Remove the master passphrase from all storage backends", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + if !force { + if !prompt.IsInteractive() { + return fmt.Errorf("use --force for non-interactive deletion") + } + ok, err := prompt.Confirm("Remove passphrase from all keyring backends?") + if err != nil { + return err + } + if !ok { + fmt.Println("Aborted.") + return nil + } + } + + var cleared int + + // 1. Try secure hardware provider (biometric / TPM). + if secureProvider, _ := keyring.DetectSecureProvider(); secureProvider != nil { + if err := secureProvider.Delete(keyring.Service, keyring.KeyMasterPassphrase); err == nil { + fmt.Println("Removed passphrase from secure provider.") + cleared++ + } else if !errors.Is(err, keyring.ErrNotFound) { + fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: secure provider delete: %v\n", err) + } + } + + // 2. Remove TPM sealed blob files if they exist (belt-and-suspenders). + home, err := os.UserHomeDir() + if err == nil { + tpmDir := filepath.Join(home, ".lango", "tpm") + blobPath := filepath.Join(tpmDir, keyring.Service+"_"+keyring.KeyMasterPassphrase+".sealed") + if err := os.Remove(blobPath); err == nil { + fmt.Println("Removed TPM sealed blob file.") + cleared++ + } + } + + if cleared == 0 { + fmt.Println("No stored passphrase found in any backend.") + } + + return nil + }, + } + + cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&force, "force", false, "Skip confirmation prompt") + return cmd +} + +func newKeyringStatusCmd() *cobra.Command { + var jsonOutput bool + + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "status", + Short: "Show keyring availability, security tier, and stored passphrase status", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + // Detect hardware-backed secure provider (biometric / TPM). + secureProvider, tier := keyring.DetectSecureProvider() + available := secureProvider != nil + + // Check for stored passphrase using HasKey (avoids triggering Touch ID). + hasPassphrase := false + if secureProvider != nil { + if checker, ok := secureProvider.(keyring.KeyChecker); ok { + hasPassphrase = checker.HasKey(keyring.Service, keyring.KeyMasterPassphrase) + } + } + + type statusOutput struct { + Available bool `json:"available"` + SecurityTier string `json:"security_tier"` + HasPassphrase bool `json:"has_passphrase"` + } + + out := statusOutput{ + Available: available, + SecurityTier: tier.String(), + HasPassphrase: hasPassphrase, + } + + if jsonOutput { + enc := json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout) + enc.SetIndent("", " ") + return enc.Encode(out) + } + + fmt.Println("Hardware Keyring Status") + fmt.Printf(" Available: %v\n", out.Available) + fmt.Printf(" Security Tier: %s\n", out.SecurityTier) + fmt.Printf(" Has Passphrase: %v\n", out.HasPassphrase) + + return nil + }, + } + + cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&jsonOutput, "json", false, "Output as JSON") + return cmd +} diff --git a/internal/cli/security/kms.go b/internal/cli/security/kms.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f81d1798 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/security/kms.go @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +package security + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/rand" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "os" + + "github.com/spf13/cobra" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" + sec "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/security" +) + +func newKMSCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "kms", + Short: "Manage Cloud KMS / HSM integration", + } + + cmd.AddCommand(newKMSStatusCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newKMSTestCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newKMSKeysCmd(bootLoader)) + + return cmd +} + +func newKMSStatusCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + var jsonOutput bool + + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "status", + Short: "Show KMS provider status", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err) + } + defer boot.DBClient.Close() + + cfg := boot.Config + + type kmsStatus struct { + Provider string `json:"provider"` + KeyID string `json:"key_id"` + Region string `json:"region,omitempty"` + Fallback string `json:"fallback"` + Status string `json:"status"` + } + + provider := cfg.Security.Signer.Provider + isKMS := isKMSProvider(provider) + + s := kmsStatus{ + Provider: provider, + KeyID: cfg.Security.KMS.KeyID, + Region: cfg.Security.KMS.Region, + Fallback: boolToStatus(cfg.Security.KMS.FallbackToLocal), + Status: "not configured", + } + + if isKMS { + // Try to create the provider to check connectivity. + kmsProvider, provErr := sec.NewKMSProvider(sec.KMSProviderName(provider), cfg.Security.KMS) + if provErr != nil { + s.Status = fmt.Sprintf("error: %v", provErr) + } else { + checker := sec.NewKMSHealthChecker(kmsProvider, cfg.Security.KMS.KeyID, 0) + if checker.IsConnected() { + s.Status = "connected" + } else { + s.Status = "unreachable" + } + } + } + + if jsonOutput { + enc := json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout) + enc.SetIndent("", " ") + return enc.Encode(s) + } + + fmt.Println("KMS Status") + fmt.Printf(" Provider: %s\n", s.Provider) + fmt.Printf(" Key ID: %s\n", s.KeyID) + if s.Region != "" { + fmt.Printf(" Region: %s\n", s.Region) + } + fmt.Printf(" Fallback: %s\n", s.Fallback) + fmt.Printf(" Status: %s\n", s.Status) + + return nil + }, + } + + cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&jsonOutput, "json", false, "Output as JSON") + return cmd +} + +func newKMSTestCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + return &cobra.Command{ + Use: "test", + Short: "Test KMS encrypt/decrypt roundtrip", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err) + } + defer boot.DBClient.Close() + + cfg := boot.Config + provider := cfg.Security.Signer.Provider + if !isKMSProvider(provider) { + return fmt.Errorf("current provider %q is not a KMS provider", provider) + } + + kmsProvider, err := sec.NewKMSProvider(sec.KMSProviderName(provider), cfg.Security.KMS) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("create KMS provider: %w", err) + } + + ctx := context.Background() + keyID := cfg.Security.KMS.KeyID + + // Generate random test data. + testData := make([]byte, 32) + if _, err := rand.Read(testData); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("generate test data: %w", err) + } + + fmt.Printf("Testing KMS roundtrip with key %q...\n", keyID) + + // Encrypt. + ciphertext, err := kmsProvider.Encrypt(ctx, keyID, testData) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("encrypt: %w", err) + } + fmt.Printf(" Encrypt: OK (%d bytes → %d bytes)\n", len(testData), len(ciphertext)) + + // Decrypt. + plaintext, err := kmsProvider.Decrypt(ctx, keyID, ciphertext) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("decrypt: %w", err) + } + fmt.Printf(" Decrypt: OK (%d bytes)\n", len(plaintext)) + + // Verify roundtrip. + if len(plaintext) != len(testData) { + return fmt.Errorf("roundtrip mismatch: got %d bytes, want %d", len(plaintext), len(testData)) + } + for i := range testData { + if plaintext[i] != testData[i] { + return fmt.Errorf("roundtrip mismatch at byte %d", i) + } + } + + fmt.Println(" Roundtrip: PASS") + return nil + }, + } +} + +func newKMSKeysCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { + var jsonOutput bool + + cmd := &cobra.Command{ + Use: "keys", + Short: "List KMS keys registered in KeyRegistry", + RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { + boot, err := bootLoader() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err) + } + defer boot.DBClient.Close() + + ctx := context.Background() + registry := sec.NewKeyRegistry(boot.DBClient) + keys, err := registry.ListKeys(ctx) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("list keys: %w", err) + } + + if jsonOutput { + enc := json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout) + enc.SetIndent("", " ") + return enc.Encode(keys) + } + + if len(keys) == 0 { + fmt.Println("No keys registered.") + return nil + } + + fmt.Printf("%-36s %-20s %-12s %-40s\n", "ID", "NAME", "TYPE", "REMOTE KEY ID") + for _, k := range keys { + fmt.Printf("%-36s %-20s %-12s %-40s\n", + k.ID.String(), k.Name, k.Type, k.RemoteKeyID) + } + + return nil + }, + } + + cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&jsonOutput, "json", false, "Output as JSON") + return cmd +} + +func isKMSProvider(provider string) bool { + return sec.KMSProviderName(provider).Valid() +} diff --git a/internal/cli/security/migrate.go b/internal/cli/security/migrate.go index a7f8bd9f..ea921e52 100644 --- a/internal/cli/security/migrate.go +++ b/internal/cli/security/migrate.go @@ -10,13 +10,10 @@ import ( "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/prompt" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/logging" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/security" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" ) -var logger = logging.SubsystemSugar("cli-security") - // NewSecurityCmd creates the security command with lazy bootstrap loading. func NewSecurityCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { cmd := &cobra.Command{ @@ -27,6 +24,10 @@ func NewSecurityCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command cmd.AddCommand(newMigratePassphraseCmd(bootLoader)) cmd.AddCommand(newSecretsCmd(bootLoader)) cmd.AddCommand(newStatusCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newKeyringCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newDBMigrateCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newDBDecryptCmd(bootLoader)) + cmd.AddCommand(newKMSCmd(bootLoader)) return cmd } diff --git a/internal/cli/security/secrets.go b/internal/cli/security/secrets.go index cff79bdd..c097d0fc 100644 --- a/internal/cli/security/secrets.go +++ b/internal/cli/security/secrets.go @@ -2,9 +2,11 @@ package security import ( "context" + "encoding/hex" "encoding/json" "fmt" "os" + "strings" "text/tabwriter" "github.com/spf13/cobra" @@ -81,17 +83,15 @@ func newSecretsListCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Comm } func newSecretsSetCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { - return &cobra.Command{ + var valueHex string + + cmd := &cobra.Command{ Use: "set ", Short: "Store an encrypted secret", Args: cobra.ExactArgs(1), RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { name := args[0] - if !prompt.IsInteractive() { - return fmt.Errorf("this command requires an interactive terminal") - } - boot, err := bootLoader() if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err) @@ -103,13 +103,27 @@ func newSecretsSetCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Comma return err } - value, err := prompt.Passphrase("Enter secret value: ") - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("read secret value: %w", err) + var raw []byte + if valueHex != "" { + // Non-interactive: decode hex value (with optional 0x prefix). + decoded, err := hex.DecodeString(strings.TrimPrefix(valueHex, "0x")) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("decode hex value: %w", err) + } + raw = decoded + } else { + if !prompt.IsInteractive() { + return fmt.Errorf("this command requires an interactive terminal (use --value-hex for non-interactive)") + } + value, err := prompt.Passphrase("Enter secret value: ") + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("read secret value: %w", err) + } + raw = []byte(value) } ctx := context.Background() - if err := secretsStore.Store(ctx, name, []byte(value)); err != nil { + if err := secretsStore.Store(ctx, name, raw); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("store secret: %w", err) } @@ -117,6 +131,9 @@ func newSecretsSetCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Comma return nil }, } + + cmd.Flags().StringVar(&valueHex, "value-hex", "", "Hex-encoded value to store (non-interactive, optional 0x prefix)") + return cmd } func newSecretsDeleteCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { @@ -146,7 +163,7 @@ func newSecretsDeleteCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Co } fmt.Printf("Delete secret '%s'? [y/N] ", name) var answer string - fmt.Scanln(&answer) + _, _ = fmt.Scanln(&answer) if answer != "y" && answer != "Y" && answer != "yes" { fmt.Println("Aborted.") return nil diff --git a/internal/cli/security/security_test.go b/internal/cli/security/security_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1b3fe9ce --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/security/security_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +package security + +import ( + "testing" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func dummyBootLoader() func() (*bootstrap.Result, error) { + return func() (*bootstrap.Result, error) { + return nil, assert.AnError + } +} + +func TestNewSecurityCmd_Structure(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewSecurityCmd(dummyBootLoader()) + require.NotNil(t, cmd) + + assert.Equal(t, "security", cmd.Use) + assert.NotEmpty(t, cmd.Short) + + expected := []string{ + "migrate-passphrase", "secrets", "status", + "keyring", "db-migrate", "db-decrypt", "kms", + } + + subCmds := make(map[string]bool) + for _, sub := range cmd.Commands() { + subCmds[sub.Use] = true + } + + for _, name := range expected { + assert.True(t, subCmds[name], "missing subcommand: %s", name) + } +} + +func TestNewSecurityCmd_SubcommandCount(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewSecurityCmd(dummyBootLoader()) + assert.Equal(t, 7, len(cmd.Commands()), "expected 7 security subcommands") +} + +func TestSecretsCmd_HasSubcommands(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewSecurityCmd(dummyBootLoader()) + for _, sub := range cmd.Commands() { + if sub.Use == "secrets" { + secretsSubs := make(map[string]bool) + for _, ssub := range sub.Commands() { + secretsSubs[ssub.Use] = true + } + assert.True(t, secretsSubs["list"], "secrets should have list subcommand") + assert.True(t, secretsSubs["set "], "secrets should have set subcommand") + assert.True(t, secretsSubs["delete "], "secrets should have delete subcommand") + return + } + } + t.Fatal("secrets subcommand not found") +} + +func TestKeyringCmd_HasSubcommands(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewSecurityCmd(dummyBootLoader()) + for _, sub := range cmd.Commands() { + if sub.Use == "keyring" { + keyringCmds := make(map[string]bool) + for _, ksub := range sub.Commands() { + keyringCmds[ksub.Use] = true + } + assert.True(t, keyringCmds["store"], "keyring should have store subcommand") + assert.True(t, keyringCmds["clear"], "keyring should have clear subcommand") + assert.True(t, keyringCmds["status"], "keyring should have status subcommand") + return + } + } + t.Fatal("keyring subcommand not found") +} + +func TestKMSCmd_HasSubcommands(t *testing.T) { + cmd := NewSecurityCmd(dummyBootLoader()) + for _, sub := range cmd.Commands() { + if sub.Use == "kms" { + kmsCmds := make(map[string]bool) + for _, ksub := range sub.Commands() { + kmsCmds[ksub.Use] = true + } + assert.True(t, kmsCmds["status"], "kms should have status subcommand") + assert.True(t, kmsCmds["test"], "kms should have test subcommand") + assert.True(t, kmsCmds["keys"], "kms should have keys subcommand") + return + } + } + t.Fatal("kms subcommand not found") +} + +func TestBoolToStatus(t *testing.T) { + assert.Equal(t, "enabled", boolToStatus(true)) + assert.Equal(t, "disabled", boolToStatus(false)) +} + +func TestIsKMSProvider(t *testing.T) { + assert.True(t, isKMSProvider("aws-kms")) + assert.True(t, isKMSProvider("gcp-kms")) + assert.True(t, isKMSProvider("azure-kv")) + assert.True(t, isKMSProvider("pkcs11")) + assert.False(t, isKMSProvider("local")) + assert.False(t, isKMSProvider("rpc")) + assert.False(t, isKMSProvider("")) +} diff --git a/internal/cli/security/status.go b/internal/cli/security/status.go index b4a0c8ec..e29ce1ac 100644 --- a/internal/cli/security/status.go +++ b/internal/cli/security/status.go @@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ import ( "encoding/json" "fmt" "os" + "path/filepath" + "strings" "github.com/spf13/cobra" @@ -34,6 +36,10 @@ func newStatusCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { Interceptor string `json:"interceptor"` PIIRedaction string `json:"pii_redaction"` ApprovalPolicy string `json:"approval_policy"` + DBEncryption string `json:"db_encryption"` + KMSProvider string `json:"kms_provider,omitempty"` + KMSKeyID string `json:"kms_key_id,omitempty"` + KMSFallback string `json:"kms_fallback,omitempty"` } policy := string(cfg.Security.Interceptor.ApprovalPolicy) @@ -41,11 +47,33 @@ func newStatusCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { policy = "dangerous" } + // Determine DB encryption status. + dbEncStatus := "disabled (plaintext)" + dbPath := cfg.Session.DatabasePath + if strings.HasPrefix(dbPath, "~/") { + if h, err := os.UserHomeDir(); err == nil { + dbPath = filepath.Join(h, dbPath[2:]) + } + } + if bootstrap.IsDBEncrypted(dbPath) { + dbEncStatus = "encrypted (active)" + } else if cfg.Security.DBEncryption.Enabled { + dbEncStatus = "enabled (pending migration)" + } + s := statusOutput{ SignerProvider: cfg.Security.Signer.Provider, Interceptor: boolToStatus(cfg.Security.Interceptor.Enabled), PIIRedaction: boolToStatus(cfg.Security.Interceptor.RedactPII), ApprovalPolicy: policy, + DBEncryption: dbEncStatus, + } + + // Populate KMS fields when a KMS provider is configured. + if isKMSProvider(cfg.Security.Signer.Provider) { + s.KMSProvider = cfg.Security.Signer.Provider + s.KMSKeyID = cfg.Security.KMS.KeyID + s.KMSFallback = boolToStatus(cfg.Security.KMS.FallbackToLocal) } ctx := context.Background() @@ -73,6 +101,12 @@ func newStatusCmd(bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)) *cobra.Command { fmt.Printf(" Interceptor: %s\n", s.Interceptor) fmt.Printf(" PII Redaction: %s\n", s.PIIRedaction) fmt.Printf(" Approval Policy: %s\n", s.ApprovalPolicy) + fmt.Printf(" DB Encryption: %s\n", s.DBEncryption) + if s.KMSProvider != "" { + fmt.Printf(" KMS Provider: %s\n", s.KMSProvider) + fmt.Printf(" KMS Key ID: %s\n", s.KMSKeyID) + fmt.Printf(" KMS Fallback: %s\n", s.KMSFallback) + } return nil }, diff --git a/internal/cli/settings/auth_providers_list.go b/internal/cli/settings/auth_providers_list.go index 6fbc52ac..6edb7da0 100644 --- a/internal/cli/settings/auth_providers_list.go +++ b/internal/cli/settings/auth_providers_list.go @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ import ( tea "github.com/charmbracelet/bubbletea" "github.com/charmbracelet/lipgloss" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/tui" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" ) @@ -85,40 +87,50 @@ func (m AuthProvidersListModel) Update(msg tea.Msg) (AuthProvidersListModel, tea func (m AuthProvidersListModel) View() string { var b strings.Builder - titleStyle := lipgloss.NewStyle(). - Bold(true). - Foreground(lipgloss.Color("#7D56F4")). - MarginBottom(1) - - b.WriteString(titleStyle.Render("Manage OIDC Providers")) - b.WriteString("\n\n") - + // Items inside a container + var body strings.Builder for i, p := range m.Providers { cursor := " " itemStyle := lipgloss.NewStyle() if m.Cursor == i { - cursor = "\u25b8 " - itemStyle = itemStyle.Foreground(lipgloss.Color("#04B575")).Bold(true) + cursor = tui.CursorStyle.Render("▸ ") + itemStyle = tui.ActiveItemStyle } - b.WriteString(cursor) + body.WriteString(cursor) label := fmt.Sprintf("%s (%s)", p.ID, p.IssuerURL) - b.WriteString(itemStyle.Render(label)) - b.WriteString("\n") + body.WriteString(itemStyle.Render(label)) + body.WriteString("\n") } + // "Add New" item cursor := " " - itemStyle := lipgloss.NewStyle() + var itemStyle lipgloss.Style if m.Cursor == len(m.Providers) { - cursor = "\u25b8 " - itemStyle = itemStyle.Foreground(lipgloss.Color("#04B575")).Bold(true) + cursor = tui.CursorStyle.Render("▸ ") + itemStyle = tui.ActiveItemStyle + } else { + itemStyle = lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(tui.Muted) } - b.WriteString(cursor) - b.WriteString(itemStyle.Render("+ Add New OIDC Provider")) - b.WriteString("\n\n") - - b.WriteString(lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(lipgloss.Color("#626262")).Render("\u2191/\u2193: navigate \u2022 enter: select \u2022 d: delete \u2022 esc: back")) + body.WriteString(cursor) + body.WriteString(itemStyle.Render("+ Add New OIDC Provider")) + + // Wrap in container + container := lipgloss.NewStyle(). + Border(lipgloss.RoundedBorder()). + BorderForeground(tui.Muted). + Padding(1, 2) + b.WriteString(container.Render(body.String())) + + // Help footer + b.WriteString("\n") + b.WriteString(tui.HelpBar( + tui.HelpEntry("↑↓", "Navigate"), + tui.HelpEntry("Enter", "Select"), + tui.HelpEntry("d", "Delete"), + tui.HelpEntry("Esc", "Back"), + )) return b.String() } diff --git a/internal/cli/settings/editor.go b/internal/cli/settings/editor.go index 732d6122..02f56325 100644 --- a/internal/cli/settings/editor.go +++ b/internal/cli/settings/editor.go @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ func NewEditorWithConfig(cfg *config.Config) *Editor { // Init implements tea.Model. func (e *Editor) Init() tea.Cmd { - return nil + return tea.ClearScreen } // Update implements tea.Model. @@ -82,8 +82,15 @@ func (e *Editor) Update(msg tea.Msg) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) { if msg.String() == "esc" { switch e.step { - case StepWelcome, StepMenu: + case StepWelcome: return e, tea.Quit + case StepMenu: + if e.menu.IsSearching() { + // Let the menu handle esc to cancel search + break + } + e.step = StepWelcome + return e, nil case StepProvidersList: e.step = StepMenu return e, nil @@ -91,6 +98,11 @@ func (e *Editor) Update(msg tea.Msg) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) { e.step = StepMenu return e, nil case StepForm: + // If a search-select dropdown is open, let the form handle Esc + // (closes dropdown only, does not exit the form). + if e.activeForm != nil && e.activeForm.HasOpenDropdown() { + break + } if e.activeForm != nil { if e.activeAuthProviderID != "" || e.isAuthProviderForm() { e.state.UpdateAuthProviderFromForm(e.activeAuthProviderID, e.activeForm) @@ -280,6 +292,34 @@ func (e *Editor) handleMenuSelection(id string) tea.Cmd { e.activeForm = NewLibrarianForm(e.state.Current) e.activeForm.Focus = true e.step = StepForm + case "p2p": + e.activeForm = NewP2PForm(e.state.Current) + e.activeForm.Focus = true + e.step = StepForm + case "p2p_zkp": + e.activeForm = NewP2PZKPForm(e.state.Current) + e.activeForm.Focus = true + e.step = StepForm + case "p2p_pricing": + e.activeForm = NewP2PPricingForm(e.state.Current) + e.activeForm.Focus = true + e.step = StepForm + case "p2p_owner": + e.activeForm = NewP2POwnerProtectionForm(e.state.Current) + e.activeForm.Focus = true + e.step = StepForm + case "p2p_sandbox": + e.activeForm = NewP2PSandboxForm(e.state.Current) + e.activeForm.Focus = true + e.step = StepForm + case "security_db": + e.activeForm = NewDBEncryptionForm(e.state.Current) + e.activeForm.Focus = true + e.step = StepForm + case "security_kms": + e.activeForm = NewKMSForm(e.state.Current) + e.activeForm.Focus = true + e.step = StepForm case "auth": e.authProvidersList = NewAuthProvidersListModel(e.state.Current) e.step = StepAuthProvidersList @@ -301,15 +341,29 @@ func (e *Editor) handleMenuSelection(id string) tea.Cmd { func (e *Editor) View() string { var b strings.Builder - b.WriteString(tui.TitleStyle.Render("Lango Configuration Editor")) + // Dynamic breadcrumb header + switch e.step { + case StepWelcome, StepMenu: + b.WriteString(tui.Breadcrumb("Settings")) + case StepForm: + formTitle := "" + if e.activeForm != nil { + formTitle = e.activeForm.Title + } + b.WriteString(tui.Breadcrumb("Settings", formTitle)) + case StepProvidersList: + b.WriteString(tui.Breadcrumb("Settings", "Providers")) + case StepAuthProvidersList: + b.WriteString(tui.Breadcrumb("Settings", "Auth Providers")) + default: + b.WriteString(tui.Breadcrumb("Settings")) + } b.WriteString("\n\n") + // Content switch e.step { case StepWelcome: - b.WriteString(tui.SubtitleStyle.Render("Welcome!")) - b.WriteString("\n\n") - b.WriteString("Press [Enter] to start configuring Lango.\n") - b.WriteString(tui.MutedStyle.Render("This editor allows you to configure Agent, Server, Tools, and more.")) + b.WriteString(e.viewWelcome()) case StepMenu: b.WriteString(e.menu.View()) @@ -329,6 +383,23 @@ func (e *Editor) View() string { return b.String() } +func (e *Editor) viewWelcome() string { + var b strings.Builder + + b.WriteString(tui.BannerBox()) + b.WriteString("\n\n") + b.WriteString(tui.MutedStyle.Render("Configure your agent, providers, channels, and more.")) + b.WriteString("\n") + b.WriteString(tui.MutedStyle.Render("All settings are saved to an encrypted local profile.")) + b.WriteString("\n\n") + b.WriteString(tui.HelpBar( + tui.HelpEntry("Enter", "Start"), + tui.HelpEntry("Esc", "Quit"), + )) + + return b.String() +} + // Config returns the current configuration from the editor state. func (e *Editor) Config() *config.Config { return e.state.Current diff --git a/internal/cli/settings/editor_test.go b/internal/cli/settings/editor_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..72ab00b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/settings/editor_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +package settings + +import ( + "testing" + + tea "github.com/charmbracelet/bubbletea" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func TestEditor_EscAtWelcome_Quits(t *testing.T) { + e := NewEditor() + require.Equal(t, StepWelcome, e.step) + + model, cmd := e.Update(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyEsc}) + ed := model.(*Editor) + + assert.Equal(t, StepWelcome, ed.step) + assert.NotNil(t, cmd, "esc at welcome should return quit cmd") +} + +func TestEditor_EscAtMenu_NavigatesToWelcome(t *testing.T) { + e := NewEditor() + e.step = StepMenu + + model, cmd := e.Update(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyEsc}) + ed := model.(*Editor) + + assert.Equal(t, StepWelcome, ed.step) + assert.Nil(t, cmd, "esc at menu should not quit, just navigate back") +} + +func TestEditor_EscAtMenuWhileSearching_StaysAtMenu(t *testing.T) { + e := NewEditor() + e.step = StepMenu + + // Enter search mode by pressing / + model, _ := e.Update(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyRunes, Runes: []rune{'/'}}) + ed := model.(*Editor) + require.True(t, ed.menu.IsSearching(), "should be in search mode") + + // Press esc — should cancel search, not navigate back + model, cmd := ed.Update(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyEsc}) + ed = model.(*Editor) + + assert.Equal(t, StepMenu, ed.step, "should stay at menu") + assert.False(t, ed.menu.IsSearching(), "search should be cancelled") + assert.Nil(t, cmd) +} + +func TestEditor_CtrlC_AlwaysQuits(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give string + step EditorStep + }{ + {give: "welcome", step: StepWelcome}, + {give: "menu", step: StepMenu}, + {give: "form", step: StepForm}, + {give: "providers_list", step: StepProvidersList}, + {give: "auth_providers_list", step: StepAuthProvidersList}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + e := NewEditor() + e.step = tt.step + + model, cmd := e.Update(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyCtrlC}) + ed := model.(*Editor) + + assert.True(t, ed.Cancelled, "ctrl+c should set Cancelled") + assert.NotNil(t, cmd, "ctrl+c should return quit cmd") + }) + } +} diff --git a/internal/cli/settings/forms_agent.go b/internal/cli/settings/forms_agent.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e547721b --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/settings/forms_agent.go @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +package settings + +import ( + "fmt" + "strconv" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/tuicore" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" +) + +// NewMultiAgentForm creates the Multi-Agent configuration form. +func NewMultiAgentForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Multi-Agent Configuration") + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "multi_agent", Label: "Enable Multi-Agent Orchestration", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.Agent.MultiAgent, + Description: "Allow the agent to spawn and coordinate sub-agents for complex tasks", + }) + + return &form +} + +// NewA2AForm creates the A2A Protocol configuration form. +func NewA2AForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("A2A Protocol Configuration") + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "a2a_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.A2A.Enabled, + Description: "Enable Google A2A (Agent-to-Agent) protocol for inter-agent communication", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "a2a_base_url", Label: "Base URL", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.A2A.BaseURL, + Placeholder: "https://your-agent.example.com", + Description: "Public URL where this agent's A2A endpoint is accessible", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "a2a_agent_name", Label: "Agent Name", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.A2A.AgentName, + Placeholder: "my-lango-agent", + Description: "Human-readable name advertised in the A2A agent card", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "a2a_agent_desc", Label: "Agent Description", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.A2A.AgentDescription, + Placeholder: "A helpful AI assistant", + Description: "Description of this agent's capabilities for A2A discovery", + }) + + return &form +} + +// NewPaymentForm creates the Payment configuration form. +func NewPaymentForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Payment Configuration") + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "payment_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.Payment.Enabled, + Description: "Enable blockchain-based USDC payment capabilities", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "payment_wallet_provider", Label: "Wallet Provider", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, + Value: cfg.Payment.WalletProvider, + Options: []string{"local", "rpc", "composite"}, + Description: "Wallet backend: local=embedded key, rpc=remote signer, composite=multi-wallet", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "payment_chain_id", Label: "Chain ID", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.FormatInt(cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID, 10), + Description: "EVM chain ID (e.g. 84532 for Base Sepolia, 8453 for Base Mainnet)", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if _, err := strconv.ParseInt(s, 10, 64); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("must be an integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "payment_rpc_url", Label: "RPC URL", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Payment.Network.RPCURL, + Placeholder: "https://sepolia.base.org", + Description: "Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoint URL for blockchain interactions", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "payment_usdc_contract", Label: "USDC Contract", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Payment.Network.USDCContract, + Placeholder: "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e", + Description: "USDC token contract address on the selected chain", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "payment_max_per_tx", Label: "Max Per Transaction (USDC)", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Payment.Limits.MaxPerTx, + Placeholder: "1.00", + Description: "Maximum USDC amount allowed per single transaction", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "payment_max_daily", Label: "Max Daily (USDC)", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Payment.Limits.MaxDaily, + Placeholder: "10.00", + Description: "Maximum total USDC spending allowed per 24-hour period", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "payment_auto_approve", Label: "Auto-Approve Below (USDC)", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Payment.Limits.AutoApproveBelow, + Placeholder: "0.10", + Description: "Transactions below this amount are auto-approved without user confirmation", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "payment_x402_auto", Label: "X402 Auto-Intercept", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.Payment.X402.AutoIntercept, + Description: "Automatically handle HTTP 402 Payment Required responses with USDC", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "payment_x402_max", Label: "X402 Max Auto-Pay (USDC)", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Payment.X402.MaxAutoPayAmount, + Placeholder: "0.50", + Description: "Maximum USDC to auto-pay for a single X402 response", + }) + + return &form +} diff --git a/internal/cli/settings/forms_automation.go b/internal/cli/settings/forms_automation.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..80288421 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/settings/forms_automation.go @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +package settings + +import ( + "fmt" + "strconv" + "strings" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/tuicore" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" +) + +// NewCronForm creates the Cron Scheduler configuration form. +func NewCronForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Cron Scheduler Configuration") + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "cron_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.Cron.Enabled, + Description: "Enable the cron scheduler for recurring automated tasks", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "cron_timezone", Label: "Timezone", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Cron.Timezone, + Placeholder: "UTC or Asia/Seoul", + Description: "IANA timezone for cron schedule evaluation (e.g. America/New_York)", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "cron_max_jobs", Label: "Max Concurrent Jobs", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Cron.MaxConcurrentJobs), + Description: "Maximum number of cron jobs that can run simultaneously", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + sessionMode := cfg.Cron.DefaultSessionMode + if sessionMode == "" { + sessionMode = "isolated" + } + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "cron_session_mode", Label: "Session Mode", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, + Value: sessionMode, + Options: []string{"isolated", "main"}, + Description: "isolated=separate session per job, main=shared with main conversation", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "cron_history_retention", Label: "History Retention", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Cron.HistoryRetention, + Placeholder: "30d or 720h", + Description: "How long to keep cron job execution history", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "cron_default_deliver", Label: "Default Deliver To", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: strings.Join(cfg.Cron.DefaultDeliverTo, ","), + Placeholder: "telegram,discord,slack (comma-separated)", + Description: "Default channels to deliver cron job results to", + }) + + return &form +} + +// NewBackgroundForm creates the Background Tasks configuration form. +func NewBackgroundForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Background Tasks Configuration") + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "bg_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.Background.Enabled, + Description: "Enable asynchronous background task execution", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "bg_yield_ms", Label: "Yield Time (ms)", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Background.YieldMs), + Description: "Milliseconds to yield between task steps to avoid CPU monopolization", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i < 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a non-negative integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "bg_max_tasks", Label: "Max Concurrent Tasks", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Background.MaxConcurrentTasks), + Description: "Maximum number of background tasks running at the same time", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "bg_default_deliver", Label: "Default Deliver To", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: strings.Join(cfg.Background.DefaultDeliverTo, ","), + Placeholder: "telegram,discord,slack (comma-separated)", + Description: "Default channels to deliver background task results to", + }) + + return &form +} + +// NewWorkflowForm creates the Workflow Engine configuration form. +func NewWorkflowForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Workflow Engine Configuration") + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "wf_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.Workflow.Enabled, + Description: "Enable the DAG-based workflow engine for multi-step pipelines", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "wf_max_steps", Label: "Max Concurrent Steps", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Workflow.MaxConcurrentSteps), + Description: "Maximum workflow steps executed in parallel", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "wf_timeout", Label: "Default Timeout", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Workflow.DefaultTimeout.String(), + Placeholder: "10m", + Description: "Default timeout for an entire workflow execution", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "wf_state_dir", Label: "State Directory", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Workflow.StateDir, + Placeholder: "~/.lango/workflows", + Description: "Directory to persist workflow state and checkpoints", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "wf_default_deliver", Label: "Default Deliver To", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: strings.Join(cfg.Workflow.DefaultDeliverTo, ","), + Placeholder: "telegram,discord,slack (comma-separated)", + Description: "Default channels to deliver workflow completion results to", + }) + + return &form +} diff --git a/internal/cli/settings/forms_impl.go b/internal/cli/settings/forms_impl.go index 4f7b2337..8433b105 100644 --- a/internal/cli/settings/forms_impl.go +++ b/internal/cli/settings/forms_impl.go @@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import ( "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/tuicore" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/types" ) // buildProviderOptions builds provider options from registered providers. @@ -31,19 +30,33 @@ func NewAgentForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { providerOpts := buildProviderOptions(cfg) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "provider", Label: "Provider", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, - Value: cfg.Agent.Provider, - Options: providerOpts, + Value: cfg.Agent.Provider, + Options: providerOpts, + Description: "LLM provider to use for agent inference", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "model", Label: "Model ID", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: cfg.Agent.Model, Placeholder: "e.g. claude-3-5-sonnet-20240620", - }) + Description: "Model identifier from the selected provider", + }) + + // Try to fetch models dynamically from the selected provider + if modelOpts, fetchErr := FetchModelOptionsWithError(cfg.Agent.Provider, cfg, cfg.Agent.Model); len(modelOpts) > 0 { + f := form.Fields[len(form.Fields)-1] + f.Type = tuicore.InputSearchSelect + f.Options = modelOpts + f.Placeholder = "" + f.Description = fmt.Sprintf("Fetched %d models from provider; press Enter to search", len(modelOpts)) + } else if fetchErr != nil { + form.Fields[len(form.Fields)-1].Description = fmt.Sprintf("Could not fetch models (%v); enter model ID manually", fetchErr) + } form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "maxtokens", Label: "Max Tokens", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Agent.MaxTokens), + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Agent.MaxTokens), + Description: "Maximum number of tokens the model can generate per response", Validate: func(s string) error { if _, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("must be integer") @@ -54,38 +67,66 @@ func NewAgentForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "temp", Label: "Temperature", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: fmt.Sprintf("%.1f", cfg.Agent.Temperature), + Value: fmt.Sprintf("%.1f", cfg.Agent.Temperature), + Placeholder: "0.0 to 2.0", + Description: "Controls randomness: 0.0 = deterministic, 2.0 = maximum creativity", + Validate: func(s string) error { + f, err := strconv.ParseFloat(s, 64) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a number") + } + if f < 0 || f > 2.0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be between 0.0 and 2.0") + } + return nil + }, }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "prompts_dir", Label: "Prompts Directory", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: cfg.Agent.PromptsDir, Placeholder: "~/.lango/prompts (supports agents// for per-agent overrides)", + Description: "Directory containing system prompt templates; supports per-agent overrides", }) fallbackOpts := append([]string{""}, providerOpts...) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "fallback_provider", Label: "Fallback Provider", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, - Value: cfg.Agent.FallbackProvider, - Options: fallbackOpts, + Value: cfg.Agent.FallbackProvider, + Options: fallbackOpts, + Description: "Alternative provider used when primary provider fails or is unavailable", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "fallback_model", Label: "Fallback Model", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: cfg.Agent.FallbackModel, Placeholder: "e.g. gpt-4o", + Description: "Model to use with the fallback provider", }) + if cfg.Agent.FallbackProvider != "" { + if fbModelOpts, fbErr := FetchModelOptionsWithError(cfg.Agent.FallbackProvider, cfg, cfg.Agent.FallbackModel); len(fbModelOpts) > 0 { + fbModelOpts = append([]string{""}, fbModelOpts...) + form.Fields[len(form.Fields)-1].Type = tuicore.InputSearchSelect + form.Fields[len(form.Fields)-1].Options = fbModelOpts + form.Fields[len(form.Fields)-1].Placeholder = "" + } else if fbErr != nil { + form.Fields[len(form.Fields)-1].Description = fmt.Sprintf("Could not fetch models (%v); enter model ID manually", fbErr) + } + } + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "request_timeout", Label: "Request Timeout", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: cfg.Agent.RequestTimeout.String(), Placeholder: "5m (e.g. 30s, 2m, 5m)", + Description: "Maximum time to wait for a single LLM API request", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "tool_timeout", Label: "Tool Timeout", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: cfg.Agent.ToolTimeout.String(), Placeholder: "2m (e.g. 30s, 1m, 2m)", + Description: "Maximum execution time allowed for a single tool invocation", }) return &form @@ -97,23 +138,27 @@ func NewServerForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "host", Label: "Host", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Server.Host, + Value: cfg.Server.Host, + Description: "Network interface to bind to; use 0.0.0.0 to listen on all interfaces", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "port", Label: "Port", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Server.Port), - Validate: validatePort, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Server.Port), + Validate: validatePort, + Description: "TCP port for the HTTP/WebSocket server (1-65535)", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "http", Label: "Generic HTTP", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Server.HTTPEnabled, + Checked: cfg.Server.HTTPEnabled, + Description: "Enable REST API endpoint for HTTP-based integrations", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "ws", Label: "WebSockets", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Server.WebSocketEnabled, + Checked: cfg.Server.WebSocketEnabled, + Description: "Enable WebSocket endpoint for real-time bidirectional communication", }) return &form @@ -123,38 +168,52 @@ func NewServerForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { func NewChannelsForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Channels Configuration") - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + telegramEnabled := &tuicore.Field{ Key: "telegram_enabled", Label: "Telegram", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Channels.Telegram.Enabled, - }) + Checked: cfg.Channels.Telegram.Enabled, + Description: "Enable Telegram bot channel for receiving and sending messages", + } + form.AddField(telegramEnabled) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "telegram_token", Label: " Bot Token", Type: tuicore.InputPassword, Value: cfg.Channels.Telegram.BotToken, Placeholder: "123456:ABC-DEF1234ghIkl-zyx57W2v1u123ew11", + Description: "Bot token from @BotFather; use ${ENV_VAR} to reference environment variables", + VisibleWhen: func() bool { return telegramEnabled.Checked }, }) - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + discordEnabled := &tuicore.Field{ Key: "discord_enabled", Label: "Discord", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Channels.Discord.Enabled, - }) + Checked: cfg.Channels.Discord.Enabled, + Description: "Enable Discord bot channel for receiving and sending messages", + } + form.AddField(discordEnabled) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "discord_token", Label: " Bot Token", Type: tuicore.InputPassword, - Value: cfg.Channels.Discord.BotToken, + Value: cfg.Channels.Discord.BotToken, + Description: "Bot token from Discord Developer Portal; use ${ENV_VAR} for security", + VisibleWhen: func() bool { return discordEnabled.Checked }, }) - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + slackEnabled := &tuicore.Field{ Key: "slack_enabled", Label: "Slack", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Channels.Slack.Enabled, - }) + Checked: cfg.Channels.Slack.Enabled, + Description: "Enable Slack bot channel using Socket Mode", + } + form.AddField(slackEnabled) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "slack_token", Label: " Bot Token", Type: tuicore.InputPassword, Value: cfg.Channels.Slack.BotToken, Placeholder: "xoxb-...", + Description: "Slack Bot User OAuth Token (starts with xoxb-)", + VisibleWhen: func() bool { return slackEnabled.Checked }, }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "slack_app_token", Label: " App Token", Type: tuicore.InputPassword, Value: cfg.Channels.Slack.AppToken, Placeholder: "xapp-...", + Description: "Slack App-Level Token for Socket Mode (starts with xapp-)", + VisibleWhen: func() bool { return slackEnabled.Checked }, }) return &form @@ -168,29 +227,41 @@ func NewToolsForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { Key: "exec_timeout", Label: "Exec Timeout", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: cfg.Tools.Exec.DefaultTimeout.String(), Placeholder: "30s", + Description: "Default timeout for shell command execution", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "exec_bg", Label: "Allow Background", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Tools.Exec.AllowBackground, + Checked: cfg.Tools.Exec.AllowBackground, + Description: "Allow the agent to run shell commands in the background", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "browser_enabled", Label: "Browser Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Tools.Browser.Enabled, + Checked: cfg.Tools.Browser.Enabled, + Description: "Enable headless browser tool for web scraping and interaction", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "browser_headless", Label: "Browser Headless", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Tools.Browser.Headless, + Checked: cfg.Tools.Browser.Headless, + Description: "Run browser without visible UI window; disable for debugging", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "browser_session_timeout", Label: "Browser Session Timeout", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: cfg.Tools.Browser.SessionTimeout.String(), Placeholder: "5m", + Description: "Maximum duration for a single browser session before auto-close", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "fs_max_read", Label: "Max Read Size", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.FormatInt(cfg.Tools.Filesystem.MaxReadSize, 10), + Value: strconv.FormatInt(cfg.Tools.Filesystem.MaxReadSize, 10), + Description: "Maximum file size in bytes that the filesystem tool can read", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.ParseInt(s, 10, 64); err != nil || i <= 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") + } + return nil + }, }) return &form @@ -202,112 +273,22 @@ func NewSessionForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "ttl", Label: "Session TTL", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Session.TTL.String(), + Value: cfg.Session.TTL.String(), + Description: "Time-to-live before an idle session expires (e.g. 24h, 7d)", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "max_history_turns", Label: "Max History Turns", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Session.MaxHistoryTurns), - }) - - return &form -} - -// NewSecurityForm creates the Security configuration form. -func NewSecurityForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { - form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Security Configuration") - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "interceptor_enabled", Label: "Privacy Interceptor", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Security.Interceptor.Enabled, - }) - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "interceptor_pii", Label: " Redact PII", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Security.Interceptor.RedactPII, - }) - policyVal := string(cfg.Security.Interceptor.ApprovalPolicy) - if policyVal == "" { - policyVal = "dangerous" - } - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "interceptor_policy", Label: " Approval Policy", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, - Value: policyVal, - Options: []string{"dangerous", "all", "configured", "none"}, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "signer_provider", Label: "Signer Provider", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, - Value: cfg.Security.Signer.Provider, - Options: []string{"local", "rpc", "enclave"}, - }) - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "signer_rpc", Label: " RPC URL", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Security.Signer.RPCUrl, - Placeholder: "http://localhost:8080", - }) - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "signer_keyid", Label: " Key ID", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Security.Signer.KeyID, - Placeholder: "key-123", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "interceptor_timeout", Label: " Approval Timeout (s)", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Security.Interceptor.ApprovalTimeoutSec), + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Session.MaxHistoryTurns), + Description: "Maximum number of conversation turns kept in session history", Validate: func(s string) error { - if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i < 0 { - return fmt.Errorf("must be a non-negative integer") + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") } return nil }, }) - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "interceptor_notify", Label: " Notify Channel", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, - Value: cfg.Security.Interceptor.NotifyChannel, - Options: []string{"", string(types.ChannelTelegram), string(types.ChannelDiscord), string(types.ChannelSlack)}, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "interceptor_sensitive_tools", Label: " Sensitive Tools", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: strings.Join(cfg.Security.Interceptor.SensitiveTools, ","), - Placeholder: "exec,browser (comma-separated)", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "interceptor_exempt_tools", Label: " Exempt Tools", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: strings.Join(cfg.Security.Interceptor.ExemptTools, ","), - Placeholder: "filesystem (comma-separated)", - }) - - // PII Pattern Management - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "interceptor_pii_disabled", Label: " Disabled PII Patterns", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: strings.Join(cfg.Security.Interceptor.PIIDisabledPatterns, ","), - Placeholder: "kr_bank_account,passport,ipv4 (comma-separated)", - }) - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "interceptor_pii_custom", Label: " Custom PII Patterns", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: formatCustomPatterns(cfg.Security.Interceptor.PIICustomPatterns), - Placeholder: `my_id:\bID-\d{6}\b (name:regex, comma-sep)`, - }) - - // Presidio Integration - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "presidio_enabled", Label: " Presidio (Docker)", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Security.Interceptor.Presidio.Enabled, - }) - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "presidio_url", Label: " Presidio URL", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Security.Interceptor.Presidio.URL, - Placeholder: "http://localhost:5002", - }) - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "presidio_language", Label: " Presidio Language", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Security.Interceptor.Presidio.Language, - Placeholder: "en", - }) - return &form } @@ -364,218 +345,6 @@ func validatePort(s string) error { return nil } -// NewKnowledgeForm creates the Knowledge configuration form. -func NewKnowledgeForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { - form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Knowledge Configuration") - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "knowledge_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Knowledge.Enabled, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "knowledge_max_context", Label: "Max Context/Layer", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Knowledge.MaxContextPerLayer), - }) - - return &form -} - -// NewSkillForm creates the Skill configuration form. -func NewSkillForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { - form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Skill Configuration") - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "skill_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Skill.Enabled, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "skill_dir", Label: "Skills Directory", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Skill.SkillsDir, - Placeholder: "~/.lango/skills", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "skill_allow_import", Label: "Allow Import", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Skill.AllowImport, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "skill_max_bulk", Label: "Max Bulk Import", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Skill.MaxBulkImport), - Placeholder: "50", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "skill_import_concurrency", Label: "Import Concurrency", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Skill.ImportConcurrency), - Placeholder: "5", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "skill_import_timeout", Label: "Import Timeout", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Skill.ImportTimeout.String(), - Placeholder: "2m (e.g. 30s, 1m, 5m)", - }) - - return &form -} - -// NewObservationalMemoryForm creates the Observational Memory configuration form. -func NewObservationalMemoryForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { - form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Observational Memory") - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "om_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.ObservationalMemory.Enabled, - }) - - omProviderOpts := append([]string{""}, buildProviderOptions(cfg)...) - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "om_provider", Label: "Provider", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, - Value: cfg.ObservationalMemory.Provider, - Options: omProviderOpts, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "om_model", Label: "Model", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.ObservationalMemory.Model, - Placeholder: "leave empty for agent default", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "om_msg_threshold", Label: "Message Token Threshold", - Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.ObservationalMemory.MessageTokenThreshold), - Validate: func(s string) error { - if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { - return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") - } - return nil - }, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "om_obs_threshold", Label: "Observation Token Threshold", - Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.ObservationalMemory.ObservationTokenThreshold), - Validate: func(s string) error { - if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { - return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") - } - return nil - }, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "om_max_budget", Label: "Max Message Token Budget", - Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.ObservationalMemory.MaxMessageTokenBudget), - Validate: func(s string) error { - if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { - return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") - } - return nil - }, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "om_max_reflections", Label: "Max Reflections in Context", - Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.ObservationalMemory.MaxReflectionsInContext), - Validate: func(s string) error { - if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i < 0 { - return fmt.Errorf("must be a non-negative integer (0 = unlimited)") - } - return nil - }, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "om_max_observations", Label: "Max Observations in Context", - Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.ObservationalMemory.MaxObservationsInContext), - Validate: func(s string) error { - if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i < 0 { - return fmt.Errorf("must be a non-negative integer (0 = unlimited)") - } - return nil - }, - }) - - return &form -} - -// NewEmbeddingForm creates the Embedding & RAG configuration form. -func NewEmbeddingForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { - form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Embedding & RAG Configuration") - - providerOpts := []string{"local"} - for id := range cfg.Providers { - providerOpts = append(providerOpts, id) - } - sort.Strings(providerOpts) - - currentVal := cfg.Embedding.ProviderID - if currentVal == "" && cfg.Embedding.Provider == "local" { - currentVal = "local" - } - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "emb_provider_id", Label: "Provider", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, - Value: currentVal, - Options: providerOpts, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "emb_model", Label: "Model", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Embedding.Model, - Placeholder: "e.g. text-embedding-3-small", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "emb_dimensions", Label: "Dimensions", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Embedding.Dimensions), - Validate: func(s string) error { - if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i < 0 { - return fmt.Errorf("must be a non-negative integer") - } - return nil - }, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "emb_local_baseurl", Label: "Local Base URL", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Embedding.Local.BaseURL, - Placeholder: "http://localhost:11434/v1", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "emb_rag_enabled", Label: "RAG Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Embedding.RAG.Enabled, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "emb_rag_max_results", Label: "RAG Max Results", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Embedding.RAG.MaxResults), - Validate: func(s string) error { - if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i < 0 { - return fmt.Errorf("must be a non-negative integer") - } - return nil - }, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "emb_rag_collections", Label: "RAG Collections", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: strings.Join(cfg.Embedding.RAG.Collections, ","), - Placeholder: "collection1,collection2 (comma-separated)", - }) - - return &form -} - // NewOIDCProviderForm creates the OIDC Provider configuration form. func NewOIDCProviderForm(id string, cfg config.OIDCProviderConfig) *tuicore.FormModel { title := "Edit OIDC Provider: " + id @@ -588,6 +357,7 @@ func NewOIDCProviderForm(id string, cfg config.OIDCProviderConfig) *tuicore.Form form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "oidc_id", Label: "Provider Name", Type: tuicore.InputText, Placeholder: "e.g. google, github", + Description: "Unique identifier for this OIDC provider configuration", }) } @@ -595,363 +365,51 @@ func NewOIDCProviderForm(id string, cfg config.OIDCProviderConfig) *tuicore.Form Key: "oidc_issuer", Label: "Issuer URL", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: cfg.IssuerURL, Placeholder: "https://accounts.google.com", + Description: "OIDC issuer URL used for auto-discovery of endpoints", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "oidc_client_id", Label: "Client ID", Type: tuicore.InputPassword, Value: cfg.ClientID, Placeholder: "${ENV_VAR} or value", + Description: "OAuth2 Client ID from the identity provider; supports ${ENV_VAR} syntax", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "oidc_client_secret", Label: "Client Secret", Type: tuicore.InputPassword, Value: cfg.ClientSecret, Placeholder: "${ENV_VAR} or value", + Description: "OAuth2 Client Secret; strongly recommend using ${ENV_VAR} for security", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "oidc_redirect", Label: "Redirect URL", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: cfg.RedirectURL, Placeholder: "http://localhost:18789/auth/callback/", + Description: "Callback URL registered with the identity provider", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "oidc_scopes", Label: "Scopes", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: strings.Join(cfg.Scopes, ","), Placeholder: "openid,email,profile", + Description: "OAuth2 scopes to request; openid is required for OIDC", }) return &form } -// NewGraphForm creates the Graph Store configuration form. -func NewGraphForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { - form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Graph Store Configuration") - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "graph_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Graph.Enabled, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "graph_backend", Label: "Backend", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, - Value: cfg.Graph.Backend, - Options: []string{"bolt"}, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "graph_db_path", Label: "Database Path", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Graph.DatabasePath, - Placeholder: "~/.lango/graph.db", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "graph_max_depth", Label: "Max Traversal Depth", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Graph.MaxTraversalDepth), - Validate: func(s string) error { - if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { - return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") - } - return nil - }, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "graph_max_expand", Label: "Max Expansion Results", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Graph.MaxExpansionResults), - Validate: func(s string) error { - if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { - return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") - } - return nil - }, - }) - - return &form -} - -// NewMultiAgentForm creates the Multi-Agent configuration form. -func NewMultiAgentForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { - form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Multi-Agent Configuration") - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "multi_agent", Label: "Enable Multi-Agent Orchestration", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Agent.MultiAgent, - }) - - return &form -} - -// NewA2AForm creates the A2A Protocol configuration form. -func NewA2AForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { - form := tuicore.NewFormModel("A2A Protocol Configuration") - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "a2a_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.A2A.Enabled, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "a2a_base_url", Label: "Base URL", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.A2A.BaseURL, - Placeholder: "https://your-agent.example.com", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "a2a_agent_name", Label: "Agent Name", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.A2A.AgentName, - Placeholder: "my-lango-agent", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "a2a_agent_desc", Label: "Agent Description", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.A2A.AgentDescription, - Placeholder: "A helpful AI assistant", - }) - - return &form -} - -// NewPaymentForm creates the Payment configuration form. -func NewPaymentForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { - form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Payment Configuration") - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "payment_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Payment.Enabled, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "payment_wallet_provider", Label: "Wallet Provider", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, - Value: cfg.Payment.WalletProvider, - Options: []string{"local", "rpc", "composite"}, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "payment_chain_id", Label: "Chain ID", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.FormatInt(cfg.Payment.Network.ChainID, 10), - Validate: func(s string) error { - if _, err := strconv.ParseInt(s, 10, 64); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("must be an integer") - } - return nil - }, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "payment_rpc_url", Label: "RPC URL", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Payment.Network.RPCURL, - Placeholder: "https://sepolia.base.org", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "payment_usdc_contract", Label: "USDC Contract", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Payment.Network.USDCContract, - Placeholder: "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "payment_max_per_tx", Label: "Max Per Transaction (USDC)", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Payment.Limits.MaxPerTx, - Placeholder: "1.00", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "payment_max_daily", Label: "Max Daily (USDC)", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Payment.Limits.MaxDaily, - Placeholder: "10.00", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "payment_auto_approve", Label: "Auto-Approve Below (USDC)", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Payment.Limits.AutoApproveBelow, - Placeholder: "0.10", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "payment_x402_auto", Label: "X402 Auto-Intercept", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Payment.X402.AutoIntercept, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "payment_x402_max", Label: "X402 Max Auto-Pay (USDC)", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Payment.X402.MaxAutoPayAmount, - Placeholder: "0.50", - }) - - return &form -} - -// NewCronForm creates the Cron Scheduler configuration form. -func NewCronForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { - form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Cron Scheduler Configuration") - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "cron_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Cron.Enabled, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "cron_timezone", Label: "Timezone", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Cron.Timezone, - Placeholder: "UTC or Asia/Seoul", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "cron_max_jobs", Label: "Max Concurrent Jobs", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Cron.MaxConcurrentJobs), - }) - - sessionMode := cfg.Cron.DefaultSessionMode - if sessionMode == "" { - sessionMode = "isolated" +// derefBool safely dereferences a *bool with a default value. +func derefBool(p *bool, def bool) bool { + if p == nil { + return def } - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "cron_session_mode", Label: "Session Mode", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, - Value: sessionMode, - Options: []string{"isolated", "main"}, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "cron_history_retention", Label: "History Retention", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Cron.HistoryRetention, - Placeholder: "30d or 720h", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "cron_default_deliver", Label: "Default Deliver To", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: strings.Join(cfg.Cron.DefaultDeliverTo, ","), - Placeholder: "telegram,discord,slack (comma-separated)", - }) - - return &form -} - -// NewBackgroundForm creates the Background Tasks configuration form. -func NewBackgroundForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { - form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Background Tasks Configuration") - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "bg_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Background.Enabled, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "bg_yield_ms", Label: "Yield Time (ms)", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Background.YieldMs), - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "bg_max_tasks", Label: "Max Concurrent Tasks", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Background.MaxConcurrentTasks), - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "bg_default_deliver", Label: "Default Deliver To", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: strings.Join(cfg.Background.DefaultDeliverTo, ","), - Placeholder: "telegram,discord,slack (comma-separated)", - }) - - return &form -} - -// NewWorkflowForm creates the Workflow Engine configuration form. -func NewWorkflowForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { - form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Workflow Engine Configuration") - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "wf_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Workflow.Enabled, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "wf_max_steps", Label: "Max Concurrent Steps", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Workflow.MaxConcurrentSteps), - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "wf_timeout", Label: "Default Timeout", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Workflow.DefaultTimeout.String(), - Placeholder: "10m", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "wf_state_dir", Label: "State Directory", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Workflow.StateDir, - Placeholder: "~/.lango/workflows", - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "wf_default_deliver", Label: "Default Deliver To", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: strings.Join(cfg.Workflow.DefaultDeliverTo, ","), - Placeholder: "telegram,discord,slack (comma-separated)", - }) - - return &form + return *p } -// NewLibrarianForm creates the Librarian configuration form. -func NewLibrarianForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { - form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Librarian Configuration") - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "lib_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, - Checked: cfg.Librarian.Enabled, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "lib_obs_threshold", Label: "Observation Threshold", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Librarian.ObservationThreshold), - Validate: func(s string) error { - if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { - return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") - } - return nil - }, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "lib_cooldown", Label: "Inquiry Cooldown Turns", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Librarian.InquiryCooldownTurns), - Validate: func(s string) error { - if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i < 0 { - return fmt.Errorf("must be a non-negative integer") - } - return nil - }, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "lib_max_inquiries", Label: "Max Pending Inquiries", Type: tuicore.InputInt, - Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Librarian.MaxPendingInquiries), - Validate: func(s string) error { - if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i < 0 { - return fmt.Errorf("must be a non-negative integer") - } - return nil - }, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "lib_auto_save", Label: "Auto-Save Confidence", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, - Value: string(cfg.Librarian.AutoSaveConfidence), - Options: []string{"high", "medium", "low"}, - }) - - libProviderOpts := append([]string{""}, buildProviderOptions(cfg)...) - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "lib_provider", Label: "Provider", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, - Value: cfg.Librarian.Provider, - Options: libProviderOpts, - }) - - form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ - Key: "lib_model", Label: "Model", Type: tuicore.InputText, - Value: cfg.Librarian.Model, - Placeholder: "leave empty for agent default", - }) - - return &form +// formatKeyValueMap formats a map[string]string as "key:value" comma-separated. +func formatKeyValueMap(m map[string]string) string { + return formatCustomPatterns(m) } // NewProviderForm creates a Provider configuration form. @@ -964,14 +422,16 @@ func NewProviderForm(id string, cfg config.ProviderConfig) *tuicore.FormModel { form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "type", Label: "Type", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, - Value: string(cfg.Type), - Options: []string{"openai", "anthropic", "gemini", "ollama"}, + Value: string(cfg.Type), + Options: []string{"openai", "anthropic", "gemini", "ollama", "github"}, + Description: "LLM provider type; determines API format and authentication method", }) if id == "" { form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "id", Label: "Provider Name", Type: tuicore.InputText, Placeholder: "e.g. my-openai, production-claude", + Description: "Unique identifier to reference this provider in other settings", }) } @@ -979,12 +439,14 @@ func NewProviderForm(id string, cfg config.ProviderConfig) *tuicore.FormModel { Key: "apikey", Label: "API Key", Type: tuicore.InputPassword, Value: cfg.APIKey, Placeholder: "${ENV_VAR} or key", + Description: "API key for authentication; use ${ENV_VAR} to reference environment variables", }) form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ Key: "baseurl", Label: "Base URL", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: cfg.BaseURL, Placeholder: "https://api.example.com/v1", + Description: "Custom API base URL; leave empty for provider's default endpoint", }) return &form diff --git a/internal/cli/settings/forms_impl_test.go b/internal/cli/settings/forms_impl_test.go index 5179c81d..b2749a72 100644 --- a/internal/cli/settings/forms_impl_test.go +++ b/internal/cli/settings/forms_impl_test.go @@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ func TestNewEmbeddingForm_ProviderOptionsFromProviders(t *testing.T) { "gemini-1": {Type: "gemini", APIKey: "test-key"}, "my-openai": {Type: "openai", APIKey: "sk-test"}, } - cfg.Embedding.ProviderID = "gemini-1" + cfg.Embedding.Provider = "gemini-1" form := NewEmbeddingForm(cfg) f := fieldByKey(form, "emb_provider_id") @@ -369,11 +369,11 @@ func TestUpdateConfigFromForm_EmbeddingFields(t *testing.T) { state.UpdateConfigFromForm(&form) e := state.Current.Embedding - if e.ProviderID != "my-openai" { - t.Errorf("ProviderID: want %q, got %q", "my-openai", e.ProviderID) + if e.Provider != "my-openai" { + t.Errorf("Provider: want %q, got %q", "my-openai", e.Provider) } - if e.Provider != "" { - t.Errorf("Provider: want empty (non-local), got %q", e.Provider) + if e.ProviderID != "" { //nolint:staticcheck // intentional: verify deprecated field is cleared + t.Errorf("ProviderID: want empty (deprecated), got %q", e.ProviderID) //nolint:staticcheck // intentional } if e.Model != "text-embedding-3-small" { t.Errorf("Model: want %q, got %q", "text-embedding-3-small", e.Model) @@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ func TestUpdateConfigFromForm_EmbeddingFields(t *testing.T) { } } -func TestUpdateConfigFromForm_EmbeddingProviderIDLocal(t *testing.T) { +func TestUpdateConfigFromForm_EmbeddingProviderLocal(t *testing.T) { state := tuicore.NewConfigState() form := tuicore.NewFormModel("test") form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{Key: "emb_provider_id", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, Value: "local"}) @@ -403,12 +403,12 @@ func TestUpdateConfigFromForm_EmbeddingProviderIDLocal(t *testing.T) { state.UpdateConfigFromForm(&form) e := state.Current.Embedding - if e.ProviderID != "" { - t.Errorf("ProviderID: want empty, got %q", e.ProviderID) - } if e.Provider != "local" { t.Errorf("Provider: want %q, got %q", "local", e.Provider) } + if e.ProviderID != "" { //nolint:staticcheck // intentional: verify deprecated field is cleared + t.Errorf("ProviderID: want empty (deprecated), got %q", e.ProviderID) //nolint:staticcheck // intentional + } } func TestUpdateConfigFromForm_SecurityInterceptorFields(t *testing.T) { @@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ func TestNewMenuModel_HasEmbeddingCategory(t *testing.T) { menu := NewMenuModel() found := false - for _, cat := range menu.Categories { + for _, cat := range menu.AllCategories() { if cat.ID == "embedding" { found = true break @@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ func TestNewMenuModel_HasKnowledgeCategory(t *testing.T) { menu := NewMenuModel() found := false - for _, cat := range menu.Categories { + for _, cat := range menu.AllCategories() { if cat.ID == "knowledge" { found = true break @@ -493,6 +493,316 @@ func TestNewSkillForm_AllFields(t *testing.T) { } } +func TestNewP2PForm_AllFields(t *testing.T) { + cfg := defaultTestConfig() + form := NewP2PForm(cfg) + + wantKeys := []string{ + "p2p_enabled", "p2p_listen_addrs", "p2p_bootstrap_peers", + "p2p_enable_relay", "p2p_enable_mdns", "p2p_max_peers", + "p2p_handshake_timeout", "p2p_session_token_ttl", + "p2p_auto_approve", "p2p_gossip_interval", + "p2p_zk_handshake", "p2p_zk_attestation", + "p2p_require_signed_challenge", "p2p_min_trust_score", + } + + if len(form.Fields) != len(wantKeys) { + t.Fatalf("expected %d fields, got %d", len(wantKeys), len(form.Fields)) + } + + for _, key := range wantKeys { + if f := fieldByKey(form, key); f == nil { + t.Errorf("missing field %q", key) + } + } +} + +func TestNewP2PZKPForm_AllFields(t *testing.T) { + cfg := defaultTestConfig() + form := NewP2PZKPForm(cfg) + + wantKeys := []string{ + "zkp_proof_cache_dir", "zkp_proving_scheme", + "zkp_srs_mode", "zkp_srs_path", "zkp_max_credential_age", + } + + if len(form.Fields) != len(wantKeys) { + t.Fatalf("expected %d fields, got %d", len(wantKeys), len(form.Fields)) + } + + for _, key := range wantKeys { + if f := fieldByKey(form, key); f == nil { + t.Errorf("missing field %q", key) + } + } + + if f := fieldByKey(form, "zkp_proving_scheme"); f.Type != tuicore.InputSelect { + t.Errorf("zkp_proving_scheme: want InputSelect, got %d", f.Type) + } +} + +func TestNewP2PPricingForm_AllFields(t *testing.T) { + cfg := defaultTestConfig() + form := NewP2PPricingForm(cfg) + + wantKeys := []string{ + "pricing_enabled", "pricing_per_query", "pricing_tool_prices", + } + + if len(form.Fields) != len(wantKeys) { + t.Fatalf("expected %d fields, got %d", len(wantKeys), len(form.Fields)) + } + + for _, key := range wantKeys { + if f := fieldByKey(form, key); f == nil { + t.Errorf("missing field %q", key) + } + } +} + +func TestNewP2POwnerProtectionForm_AllFields(t *testing.T) { + cfg := defaultTestConfig() + form := NewP2POwnerProtectionForm(cfg) + + wantKeys := []string{ + "owner_name", "owner_email", "owner_phone", + "owner_extra_terms", "owner_block_conversations", + } + + if len(form.Fields) != len(wantKeys) { + t.Fatalf("expected %d fields, got %d", len(wantKeys), len(form.Fields)) + } + + for _, key := range wantKeys { + if f := fieldByKey(form, key); f == nil { + t.Errorf("missing field %q", key) + } + } + + if f := fieldByKey(form, "owner_block_conversations"); !f.Checked { + t.Error("owner_block_conversations: want true by default (nil *bool)") + } +} + +func TestNewP2PSandboxForm_AllFields(t *testing.T) { + cfg := defaultTestConfig() + form := NewP2PSandboxForm(cfg) + + wantKeys := []string{ + "sandbox_enabled", "sandbox_timeout", "sandbox_max_memory_mb", + "container_enabled", "container_runtime", "container_image", + "container_network_mode", "container_readonly_rootfs", + "container_cpu_quota", "container_pool_size", "container_pool_idle_timeout", + } + + if len(form.Fields) != len(wantKeys) { + t.Fatalf("expected %d fields, got %d", len(wantKeys), len(form.Fields)) + } + + for _, key := range wantKeys { + if f := fieldByKey(form, key); f == nil { + t.Errorf("missing field %q", key) + } + } + + if f := fieldByKey(form, "container_runtime"); f.Type != tuicore.InputSelect { + t.Errorf("container_runtime: want InputSelect, got %d", f.Type) + } +} + +func TestNewDBEncryptionForm_AllFields(t *testing.T) { + cfg := defaultTestConfig() + form := NewDBEncryptionForm(cfg) + + wantKeys := []string{ + "db_encryption_enabled", "db_cipher_page_size", + } + + if len(form.Fields) != len(wantKeys) { + t.Fatalf("expected %d fields, got %d", len(wantKeys), len(form.Fields)) + } + + for _, key := range wantKeys { + if f := fieldByKey(form, key); f == nil { + t.Errorf("missing field %q", key) + } + } +} + +func TestNewKMSForm_AllFields(t *testing.T) { + cfg := defaultTestConfig() + form := NewKMSForm(cfg) + + wantKeys := []string{ + "kms_backend", + "kms_region", "kms_key_id", "kms_endpoint", + "kms_fallback_to_local", "kms_timeout", "kms_max_retries", + "kms_azure_vault_url", "kms_azure_key_version", + "kms_pkcs11_module", "kms_pkcs11_slot_id", + "kms_pkcs11_pin", "kms_pkcs11_key_label", + } + + if len(form.Fields) != len(wantKeys) { + t.Fatalf("expected %d fields, got %d", len(wantKeys), len(form.Fields)) + } + + for _, key := range wantKeys { + if f := fieldByKey(form, key); f == nil { + t.Errorf("missing field %q", key) + } + } + + if f := fieldByKey(form, "kms_pkcs11_pin"); f.Type != tuicore.InputPassword { + t.Errorf("kms_pkcs11_pin: want InputPassword, got %d", f.Type) + } +} + +func TestNewMenuModel_HasP2PCategories(t *testing.T) { + menu := NewMenuModel() + + wantIDs := []string{ + "p2p", "p2p_zkp", "p2p_pricing", "p2p_owner", "p2p_sandbox", + "security_db", "security_kms", + } + + for _, id := range wantIDs { + found := false + for _, cat := range menu.AllCategories() { + if cat.ID == id { + found = true + break + } + } + if !found { + t.Errorf("menu missing %q category", id) + } + } +} + +func TestUpdateConfigFromForm_P2PFields(t *testing.T) { + state := tuicore.NewConfigState() + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("test") + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{Key: "p2p_enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, Checked: true}) + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{Key: "p2p_listen_addrs", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: "/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/9000,/ip4/0.0.0.0/udp/9000"}) + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{Key: "p2p_max_peers", Type: tuicore.InputInt, Value: "50"}) + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{Key: "p2p_handshake_timeout", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: "45s"}) + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{Key: "p2p_min_trust_score", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: "0.5"}) + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{Key: "p2p_zk_handshake", Type: tuicore.InputBool, Checked: true}) + + state.UpdateConfigFromForm(&form) + + p := state.Current.P2P + if !p.Enabled { + t.Error("P2P.Enabled: want true") + } + if len(p.ListenAddrs) != 2 { + t.Errorf("ListenAddrs: want 2, got %d", len(p.ListenAddrs)) + } + if p.MaxPeers != 50 { + t.Errorf("MaxPeers: want 50, got %d", p.MaxPeers) + } + if p.HandshakeTimeout != 45*time.Second { + t.Errorf("HandshakeTimeout: want 45s, got %v", p.HandshakeTimeout) + } + if p.MinTrustScore != 0.5 { + t.Errorf("MinTrustScore: want 0.5, got %f", p.MinTrustScore) + } + if !p.ZKHandshake { + t.Error("ZKHandshake: want true") + } +} + +func TestUpdateConfigFromForm_P2PSandboxBoolPtr(t *testing.T) { + state := tuicore.NewConfigState() + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("test") + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{Key: "sandbox_enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, Checked: true}) + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{Key: "container_readonly_rootfs", Type: tuicore.InputBool, Checked: false}) + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{Key: "owner_block_conversations", Type: tuicore.InputBool, Checked: false}) + + state.UpdateConfigFromForm(&form) + + if !state.Current.P2P.ToolIsolation.Enabled { + t.Error("ToolIsolation.Enabled: want true") + } + ro := state.Current.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.ReadOnlyRootfs + if ro == nil { + t.Fatal("ReadOnlyRootfs: want non-nil") + } + if *ro { + t.Error("ReadOnlyRootfs: want false") + } + bc := state.Current.P2P.OwnerProtection.BlockConversations + if bc == nil { + t.Fatal("BlockConversations: want non-nil") + } + if *bc { + t.Error("BlockConversations: want false") + } +} + +func TestUpdateConfigFromForm_KMSFields(t *testing.T) { + state := tuicore.NewConfigState() + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("test") + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{Key: "kms_region", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: "us-east-1"}) + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{Key: "kms_key_id", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123:key/abc"}) + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{Key: "kms_fallback_to_local", Type: tuicore.InputBool, Checked: true}) + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{Key: "kms_timeout", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: "10s"}) + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{Key: "kms_max_retries", Type: tuicore.InputInt, Value: "5"}) + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{Key: "kms_azure_vault_url", Type: tuicore.InputText, Value: "https://myvault.vault.azure.net"}) + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{Key: "kms_pkcs11_slot_id", Type: tuicore.InputInt, Value: "2"}) + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{Key: "kms_pkcs11_pin", Type: tuicore.InputPassword, Value: "1234"}) + + state.UpdateConfigFromForm(&form) + + k := state.Current.Security.KMS + if k.Region != "us-east-1" { + t.Errorf("Region: want %q, got %q", "us-east-1", k.Region) + } + if k.KeyID != "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123:key/abc" { + t.Errorf("KeyID: want arn..., got %q", k.KeyID) + } + if !k.FallbackToLocal { + t.Error("FallbackToLocal: want true") + } + if k.TimeoutPerOperation != 10*time.Second { + t.Errorf("TimeoutPerOperation: want 10s, got %v", k.TimeoutPerOperation) + } + if k.MaxRetries != 5 { + t.Errorf("MaxRetries: want 5, got %d", k.MaxRetries) + } + if k.Azure.VaultURL != "https://myvault.vault.azure.net" { + t.Errorf("Azure.VaultURL: want vault url, got %q", k.Azure.VaultURL) + } + if k.PKCS11.SlotID != 2 { + t.Errorf("PKCS11.SlotID: want 2, got %d", k.PKCS11.SlotID) + } + if k.PKCS11.Pin != "1234" { + t.Errorf("PKCS11.Pin: want 1234, got %q", k.PKCS11.Pin) + } +} + +func TestDerefBool(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give *bool + def bool + want bool + }{ + {give: nil, def: true, want: true}, + {give: nil, def: false, want: false}, + {give: boolP(true), def: false, want: true}, + {give: boolP(false), def: true, want: false}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + got := derefBool(tt.give, tt.def) + if got != tt.want { + t.Errorf("derefBool(%v, %v): want %v, got %v", tt.give, tt.def, tt.want, got) + } + } +} + +func boolP(b bool) *bool { return &b } + func TestValidatePort(t *testing.T) { tests := []struct { give string diff --git a/internal/cli/settings/forms_knowledge.go b/internal/cli/settings/forms_knowledge.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..95752aab --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/settings/forms_knowledge.go @@ -0,0 +1,423 @@ +package settings + +import ( + "fmt" + "sort" + "strconv" + "strings" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/tuicore" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" +) + +// NewKnowledgeForm creates the Knowledge configuration form. +func NewKnowledgeForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Knowledge Configuration") + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "knowledge_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.Knowledge.Enabled, + Description: "Enable the knowledge layer for persistent learning across sessions", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "knowledge_max_context", Label: "Max Context/Layer", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Knowledge.MaxContextPerLayer), + Description: "Maximum tokens of context injected per knowledge layer per turn", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + return &form +} + +// NewSkillForm creates the Skill configuration form. +func NewSkillForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Skill Configuration") + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "skill_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.Skill.Enabled, + Description: "Enable file-based skill system for reusable agent capabilities", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "skill_dir", Label: "Skills Directory", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Skill.SkillsDir, + Placeholder: "~/.lango/skills", + Description: "Directory where skill YAML files are stored and loaded from", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "skill_allow_import", Label: "Allow Import", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.Skill.AllowImport, + Description: "Allow importing skills from external sources (URLs, P2P peers)", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "skill_max_bulk", Label: "Max Bulk Import", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Skill.MaxBulkImport), + Placeholder: "50", + Description: "Maximum number of skills to import in a single bulk operation", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "skill_import_concurrency", Label: "Import Concurrency", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Skill.ImportConcurrency), + Placeholder: "5", + Description: "Number of skills to import in parallel during bulk operations", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "skill_import_timeout", Label: "Import Timeout", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Skill.ImportTimeout.String(), + Placeholder: "2m (e.g. 30s, 1m, 5m)", + Description: "Maximum time allowed for a single skill import operation", + }) + + return &form +} + +// NewObservationalMemoryForm creates the Observational Memory configuration form. +func NewObservationalMemoryForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Observational Memory") + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "om_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.ObservationalMemory.Enabled, + Description: "Enable observational memory for automatic user behavior learning", + }) + + omProviderOpts := append([]string{""}, buildProviderOptions(cfg)...) + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "om_provider", Label: "Provider", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, + Value: cfg.ObservationalMemory.Provider, + Options: omProviderOpts, + Placeholder: "(inherits from Agent)", + Description: fmt.Sprintf("LLM provider for memory processing; empty = inherit from Agent (%s)", cfg.Agent.Provider), + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "om_model", Label: "Model", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.ObservationalMemory.Model, + Placeholder: "(inherits from Agent)", + Description: fmt.Sprintf("Model for observation/reflection generation; empty = inherit from Agent (%s)", cfg.Agent.Model), + }) + + omFetchProvider := cfg.ObservationalMemory.Provider + if omFetchProvider == "" { + omFetchProvider = cfg.Agent.Provider + } + if omModelOpts, omErr := FetchModelOptionsWithError(omFetchProvider, cfg, cfg.ObservationalMemory.Model); len(omModelOpts) > 0 { + omModelOpts = append([]string{""}, omModelOpts...) + form.Fields[len(form.Fields)-1].Type = tuicore.InputSearchSelect + form.Fields[len(form.Fields)-1].Options = omModelOpts + form.Fields[len(form.Fields)-1].Placeholder = "" + } else if omErr != nil { + form.Fields[len(form.Fields)-1].Description = fmt.Sprintf("Could not fetch models (%v); enter model ID manually", omErr) + } + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "om_msg_threshold", Label: "Message Token Threshold", + Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.ObservationalMemory.MessageTokenThreshold), + Description: "Minimum tokens in a message before it triggers observation", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "om_obs_threshold", Label: "Observation Token Threshold", + Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.ObservationalMemory.ObservationTokenThreshold), + Description: "Token threshold to trigger consolidation into reflections", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "om_max_budget", Label: "Max Message Token Budget", + Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.ObservationalMemory.MaxMessageTokenBudget), + Description: "Maximum tokens allocated for memory context in each turn", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "om_max_reflections", Label: "Max Reflections in Context", + Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.ObservationalMemory.MaxReflectionsInContext), + Description: "Max reflections injected per turn; 0 = unlimited", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i < 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a non-negative integer (0 = unlimited)") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "om_max_observations", Label: "Max Observations in Context", + Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.ObservationalMemory.MaxObservationsInContext), + Description: "Max raw observations injected per turn; 0 = unlimited", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i < 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a non-negative integer (0 = unlimited)") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + return &form +} + +// NewEmbeddingForm creates the Embedding & RAG configuration form. +func NewEmbeddingForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Embedding & RAG Configuration") + + providerOpts := []string{"local"} + for id := range cfg.Providers { + providerOpts = append(providerOpts, id) + } + sort.Strings(providerOpts) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "emb_provider_id", Label: "Provider", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, + Value: cfg.Embedding.Provider, + Options: providerOpts, + Description: "Embedding provider; 'local' uses a local model via Ollama/compatible API", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "emb_model", Label: "Model", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Embedding.Model, + Placeholder: "e.g. text-embedding-3-small", + Description: "Embedding model name; must be supported by the selected provider", + }) + + if cfg.Embedding.Provider != "" { + if embModelOpts := FetchEmbeddingModelOptions(cfg.Embedding.Provider, cfg, cfg.Embedding.Model); len(embModelOpts) > 0 { + embModelOpts = append([]string{""}, embModelOpts...) + form.Fields[len(form.Fields)-1].Type = tuicore.InputSearchSelect + form.Fields[len(form.Fields)-1].Options = embModelOpts + form.Fields[len(form.Fields)-1].Placeholder = "" + } else { + // FetchEmbeddingModelOptions returns nil only if FetchModelOptions fails + if _, embErr := FetchModelOptionsWithError(cfg.Embedding.Provider, cfg, cfg.Embedding.Model); embErr != nil { + form.Fields[len(form.Fields)-1].Description = fmt.Sprintf("Could not fetch models (%v); enter model ID manually", embErr) + } + } + } + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "emb_dimensions", Label: "Dimensions", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Embedding.Dimensions), + Description: "Vector dimensions for embeddings; 0 = use model default", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i < 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a non-negative integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "emb_local_baseurl", Label: "Local Base URL", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Embedding.Local.BaseURL, + Placeholder: "http://localhost:11434/v1", + Description: "API base URL for the local embedding server (Ollama, vLLM, etc.)", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "emb_rag_enabled", Label: "RAG Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.Embedding.RAG.Enabled, + Description: "Enable Retrieval-Augmented Generation for knowledge-enhanced responses", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "emb_rag_max_results", Label: "RAG Max Results", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Embedding.RAG.MaxResults), + Description: "Maximum number of retrieved chunks injected into context per query", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i < 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a non-negative integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "emb_rag_collections", Label: "RAG Collections", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: strings.Join(cfg.Embedding.RAG.Collections, ","), + Placeholder: "collection1,collection2 (comma-separated)", + Description: "Vector store collections to search during RAG retrieval", + }) + + return &form +} + +// NewGraphForm creates the Graph Store configuration form. +func NewGraphForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Graph Store Configuration") + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "graph_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.Graph.Enabled, + Description: "Enable knowledge graph for structured entity and relationship storage", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "graph_backend", Label: "Backend", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, + Value: cfg.Graph.Backend, + Options: []string{"bolt"}, + Description: "Graph database backend; 'bolt' uses embedded BoltDB", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "graph_db_path", Label: "Database Path", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Graph.DatabasePath, + Placeholder: "~/.lango/graph.db", + Description: "File path for the graph database storage", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "graph_max_depth", Label: "Max Traversal Depth", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Graph.MaxTraversalDepth), + Description: "Maximum depth for graph traversal queries (hop count)", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "graph_max_expand", Label: "Max Expansion Results", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Graph.MaxExpansionResults), + Description: "Maximum nodes returned per expansion query", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + return &form +} + +// NewLibrarianForm creates the Librarian configuration form. +func NewLibrarianForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Librarian Configuration") + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "lib_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.Librarian.Enabled, + Description: "Enable proactive knowledge extraction from conversations", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "lib_obs_threshold", Label: "Observation Threshold", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Librarian.ObservationThreshold), + Description: "Minimum observations before the librarian triggers knowledge extraction", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "lib_cooldown", Label: "Inquiry Cooldown Turns", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Librarian.InquiryCooldownTurns), + Description: "Minimum turns between librarian inquiries to avoid being intrusive", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i < 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a non-negative integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "lib_max_inquiries", Label: "Max Pending Inquiries", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Librarian.MaxPendingInquiries), + Description: "Maximum unanswered inquiries before pausing new ones", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i < 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a non-negative integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "lib_auto_save", Label: "Auto-Save Confidence", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, + Value: string(cfg.Librarian.AutoSaveConfidence), + Options: []string{"high", "medium", "low"}, + Description: "Confidence threshold for auto-saving extracted knowledge without confirmation", + }) + + libProviderOpts := append([]string{""}, buildProviderOptions(cfg)...) + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "lib_provider", Label: "Provider", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, + Value: cfg.Librarian.Provider, + Options: libProviderOpts, + Placeholder: "(inherits from Agent)", + Description: fmt.Sprintf("LLM provider for librarian processing; empty = inherit from Agent (%s)", cfg.Agent.Provider), + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "lib_model", Label: "Model", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Librarian.Model, + Placeholder: "(inherits from Agent)", + Description: fmt.Sprintf("Model for knowledge extraction; empty = inherit from Agent (%s)", cfg.Agent.Model), + }) + + libFetchProvider := cfg.Librarian.Provider + if libFetchProvider == "" { + libFetchProvider = cfg.Agent.Provider + } + if libModelOpts, libErr := FetchModelOptionsWithError(libFetchProvider, cfg, cfg.Librarian.Model); len(libModelOpts) > 0 { + libModelOpts = append([]string{""}, libModelOpts...) + form.Fields[len(form.Fields)-1].Type = tuicore.InputSearchSelect + form.Fields[len(form.Fields)-1].Options = libModelOpts + form.Fields[len(form.Fields)-1].Placeholder = "" + } else if libErr != nil { + form.Fields[len(form.Fields)-1].Description = fmt.Sprintf("Could not fetch models (%v); enter model ID manually", libErr) + } + + return &form +} diff --git a/internal/cli/settings/forms_p2p.go b/internal/cli/settings/forms_p2p.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5674a873 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/settings/forms_p2p.go @@ -0,0 +1,357 @@ +package settings + +import ( + "fmt" + "strconv" + "strings" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/tuicore" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" +) + +// NewP2PForm creates the P2P Network configuration form. +func NewP2PForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("P2P Network Configuration") + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "p2p_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.P2P.Enabled, + Description: "Enable libp2p-based peer-to-peer networking for agent discovery", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "p2p_listen_addrs", Label: "Listen Addresses", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: strings.Join(cfg.P2P.ListenAddrs, ","), + Placeholder: "/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/9000 (comma-separated)", + Description: "Multiaddr listen addresses for incoming P2P connections", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "p2p_bootstrap_peers", Label: "Bootstrap Peers", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: strings.Join(cfg.P2P.BootstrapPeers, ","), + Placeholder: "/ip4/host/tcp/port/p2p/peerID (comma-separated)", + Description: "Initial peers to connect to for network discovery", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "p2p_enable_relay", Label: "Enable Relay", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.P2P.EnableRelay, + Description: "Allow relaying connections for peers behind NAT", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "p2p_enable_mdns", Label: "Enable mDNS", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.P2P.EnableMDNS, + Description: "Use multicast DNS for local network peer discovery", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "p2p_max_peers", Label: "Max Peers", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.P2P.MaxPeers), + Description: "Maximum number of simultaneous peer connections", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "p2p_handshake_timeout", Label: "Handshake Timeout", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.P2P.HandshakeTimeout.String(), + Placeholder: "30s", + Description: "Maximum time to wait for peer handshake completion", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "p2p_session_token_ttl", Label: "Session Token TTL", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.P2P.SessionTokenTTL.String(), + Placeholder: "24h", + Description: "Lifetime of P2P session tokens before re-authentication is required", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "p2p_auto_approve", Label: "Auto-Approve Known Peers", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.P2P.AutoApproveKnownPeers, + Description: "Skip approval for previously authenticated and trusted peers", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "p2p_gossip_interval", Label: "Gossip Interval", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.P2P.GossipInterval.String(), + Placeholder: "30s", + Description: "Interval between gossip protocol broadcasts for peer discovery", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "p2p_zk_handshake", Label: "ZK Handshake", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.P2P.ZKHandshake, + Description: "Use zero-knowledge proofs during peer handshake for privacy", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "p2p_zk_attestation", Label: "ZK Attestation", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.P2P.ZKAttestation, + Description: "Require ZK attestation proofs for tool execution results", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "p2p_require_signed_challenge", Label: "Require Signed Challenge", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.P2P.RequireSignedChallenge, + Description: "Require cryptographic challenge-response during peer authentication", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "p2p_min_trust_score", Label: "Min Trust Score", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: fmt.Sprintf("%.1f", cfg.P2P.MinTrustScore), + Placeholder: "0.3 (0.0 to 1.0)", + Description: "Minimum trust score (0.0-1.0) required to interact with a peer", + Validate: func(s string) error { + f, err := strconv.ParseFloat(s, 64) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a number") + } + if f < 0 || f > 1.0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be between 0.0 and 1.0") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + return &form +} + +// NewP2PZKPForm creates the P2P ZKP configuration form. +func NewP2PZKPForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("P2P ZKP Configuration") + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "zkp_proof_cache_dir", Label: "Proof Cache Directory", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.P2P.ZKP.ProofCacheDir, + Placeholder: "~/.lango/p2p/zkp-cache", + Description: "Directory to cache generated zero-knowledge proofs", + }) + + provingScheme := cfg.P2P.ZKP.ProvingScheme + if provingScheme == "" { + provingScheme = "plonk" + } + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "zkp_proving_scheme", Label: "Proving Scheme", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, + Value: provingScheme, + Options: []string{"plonk", "groth16"}, + Description: "ZKP proving system: plonk=universal setup, groth16=faster but circuit-specific", + }) + + srsMode := cfg.P2P.ZKP.SRSMode + if srsMode == "" { + srsMode = "unsafe" + } + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "zkp_srs_mode", Label: "SRS Mode", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, + Value: srsMode, + Options: []string{"unsafe", "file"}, + Description: "Structured Reference String mode: unsafe=dev-only random, file=from trusted setup", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "zkp_srs_path", Label: "SRS File Path", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.P2P.ZKP.SRSPath, + Placeholder: "/path/to/srs.bin (when SRS mode = file)", + Description: "Path to the SRS file from a trusted ceremony (required when mode=file)", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "zkp_max_credential_age", Label: "Max Credential Age", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.P2P.ZKP.MaxCredentialAge, + Placeholder: "24h", + Description: "Maximum age of a ZKP credential before it must be refreshed", + }) + + return &form +} + +// NewP2PPricingForm creates the P2P Pricing configuration form. +func NewP2PPricingForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("P2P Pricing Configuration") + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "pricing_enabled", Label: "Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.P2P.Pricing.Enabled, + Description: "Enable paid tool invocations from P2P peers", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "pricing_per_query", Label: "Price Per Query (USDC)", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.P2P.Pricing.PerQuery, + Placeholder: "0.50", + Description: "USDC price charged per incoming P2P query", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "pricing_tool_prices", Label: "Tool Prices", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: formatKeyValueMap(cfg.P2P.Pricing.ToolPrices), + Placeholder: "exec:0.10,browser:0.50 (name:price, comma-sep)", + Description: "Per-tool USDC pricing overrides in tool_name:price format", + }) + + return &form +} + +// NewP2POwnerProtectionForm creates the P2P Owner Protection configuration form. +func NewP2POwnerProtectionForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("P2P Owner Protection") + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "owner_name", Label: "Owner Name", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.P2P.OwnerProtection.OwnerName, + Placeholder: "Your name to block from P2P responses", + Description: "Owner's real name to prevent leaking via P2P responses", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "owner_email", Label: "Owner Email", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.P2P.OwnerProtection.OwnerEmail, + Placeholder: "your@email.com", + Description: "Owner's email address to redact from P2P responses", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "owner_phone", Label: "Owner Phone", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.P2P.OwnerProtection.OwnerPhone, + Placeholder: "+82-10-1234-5678", + Description: "Owner's phone number to redact from P2P responses", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "owner_extra_terms", Label: "Extra Terms", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: strings.Join(cfg.P2P.OwnerProtection.ExtraTerms, ","), + Placeholder: "company-name,project-name (comma-sep)", + Description: "Additional terms to block from P2P responses (company names, etc.)", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "owner_block_conversations", Label: "Block Conversations", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: derefBool(cfg.P2P.OwnerProtection.BlockConversations, true), + Description: "Block P2P peers from accessing owner's conversation history", + }) + + return &form +} + +// NewP2PSandboxForm creates the P2P Sandbox configuration form. +func NewP2PSandboxForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("P2P Sandbox Configuration") + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "sandbox_enabled", Label: "Tool Isolation Enabled", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Enabled, + Description: "Isolate P2P tool executions in sandboxed environments", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "sandbox_timeout", Label: "Timeout Per Tool", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.TimeoutPerTool.String(), + Placeholder: "30s", + Description: "Maximum execution time for a single sandboxed tool invocation", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "sandbox_max_memory_mb", Label: "Max Memory (MB)", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.MaxMemoryMB), + Placeholder: "256", + Description: "Memory limit in MB for each sandboxed tool execution", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + containerEnabled := &tuicore.Field{ + Key: "container_enabled", Label: "Container Sandbox", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.Enabled, + Description: "Use container-based isolation (Docker/gVisor) for stronger security", + } + form.AddField(containerEnabled) + isContainerOn := func() bool { return containerEnabled.Checked } + + runtime := cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.Runtime + if runtime == "" { + runtime = "auto" + } + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "container_runtime", Label: " Runtime", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, + Value: runtime, + Options: []string{"auto", "docker", "gvisor", "native"}, + Description: "Container runtime: auto=detect best, gvisor=strongest isolation", + VisibleWhen: isContainerOn, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "container_image", Label: " Image", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.Image, + Placeholder: "lango-sandbox:latest", + Description: "Docker image to use for sandboxed tool execution", + VisibleWhen: isContainerOn, + }) + + networkMode := cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.NetworkMode + if networkMode == "" { + networkMode = "none" + } + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "container_network_mode", Label: " Network Mode", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, + Value: networkMode, + Options: []string{"none", "host", "bridge"}, + Description: "Container network: none=no network, host=full access, bridge=isolated", + VisibleWhen: isContainerOn, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "container_readonly_rootfs", Label: " Read-Only Rootfs", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: derefBool(cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.ReadOnlyRootfs, true), + Description: "Mount container root filesystem as read-only for security", + VisibleWhen: isContainerOn, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "container_cpu_quota", Label: " CPU Quota (us)", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.FormatInt(cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.CPUQuotaUS, 10), + Placeholder: "0 (0 = unlimited)", + Description: "CPU quota in microseconds per 100ms period; 0 = unlimited", + VisibleWhen: isContainerOn, + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.ParseInt(s, 10, 64); err != nil || i < 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a non-negative integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "container_pool_size", Label: " Pool Size", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.PoolSize), + Placeholder: "0 (0 = disabled)", + Description: "Number of pre-warmed containers in the pool; 0 = create on demand", + VisibleWhen: isContainerOn, + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i < 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a non-negative integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "container_pool_idle_timeout", Label: " Pool Idle Timeout", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.PoolIdleTimeout.String(), + Placeholder: "5m", + Description: "Time before idle pooled containers are destroyed", + VisibleWhen: isContainerOn, + }) + + return &form +} diff --git a/internal/cli/settings/forms_security.go b/internal/cli/settings/forms_security.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3ada9851 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/settings/forms_security.go @@ -0,0 +1,314 @@ +package settings + +import ( + "fmt" + "strconv" + "strings" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/tuicore" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/types" +) + +// NewSecurityForm creates the Security configuration form. +func NewSecurityForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Security Configuration") + + interceptorEnabled := &tuicore.Field{ + Key: "interceptor_enabled", Label: "Privacy Interceptor", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.Security.Interceptor.Enabled, + Description: "Enable the privacy interceptor to filter outgoing data", + } + form.AddField(interceptorEnabled) + isInterceptorOn := func() bool { return interceptorEnabled.Checked } + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "interceptor_pii", Label: " Redact PII", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.Security.Interceptor.RedactPII, + Description: "Automatically redact personally identifiable information from messages", + VisibleWhen: isInterceptorOn, + }) + policyVal := string(cfg.Security.Interceptor.ApprovalPolicy) + if policyVal == "" { + policyVal = "dangerous" + } + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "interceptor_policy", Label: " Approval Policy", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, + Value: policyVal, + Options: []string{"dangerous", "all", "configured", "none"}, + Description: "When to require user approval: dangerous=risky tools, all=every tool, none=skip", + VisibleWhen: isInterceptorOn, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "interceptor_timeout", Label: " Approval Timeout (s)", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Security.Interceptor.ApprovalTimeoutSec), + Description: "Seconds to wait for user approval before auto-denying; 0 = wait forever", + VisibleWhen: isInterceptorOn, + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i < 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a non-negative integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "interceptor_notify", Label: " Notify Channel", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, + Value: cfg.Security.Interceptor.NotifyChannel, + Options: []string{"", string(types.ChannelTelegram), string(types.ChannelDiscord), string(types.ChannelSlack)}, + Description: "Channel to send approval notifications to; empty = no notification", + VisibleWhen: isInterceptorOn, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "interceptor_sensitive_tools", Label: " Sensitive Tools", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: strings.Join(cfg.Security.Interceptor.SensitiveTools, ","), + Placeholder: "exec,browser (comma-separated)", + Description: "Tools that always require approval regardless of approval policy", + VisibleWhen: isInterceptorOn, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "interceptor_exempt_tools", Label: " Exempt Tools", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: strings.Join(cfg.Security.Interceptor.ExemptTools, ","), + Placeholder: "filesystem (comma-separated)", + Description: "Tools that never require approval, even with 'all' policy", + VisibleWhen: isInterceptorOn, + }) + + // PII Pattern Management + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "interceptor_pii_disabled", Label: " Disabled PII Patterns", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: strings.Join(cfg.Security.Interceptor.PIIDisabledPatterns, ","), + Placeholder: "kr_bank_account,passport,ipv4 (comma-separated)", + Description: "Built-in PII pattern names to disable (e.g. ipv4, passport)", + VisibleWhen: isInterceptorOn, + }) + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "interceptor_pii_custom", Label: " Custom PII Patterns", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: formatCustomPatterns(cfg.Security.Interceptor.PIICustomPatterns), + Placeholder: `my_id:\bID-\d{6}\b (name:regex, comma-sep)`, + Description: "Custom regex patterns for PII detection in name:regex format", + VisibleWhen: isInterceptorOn, + }) + + // Presidio Integration + presidioEnabled := &tuicore.Field{ + Key: "presidio_enabled", Label: " Presidio (Docker)", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.Security.Interceptor.Presidio.Enabled, + Description: "Use Microsoft Presidio (Docker) for advanced NLP-based PII detection", + VisibleWhen: isInterceptorOn, + } + form.AddField(presidioEnabled) + isPresidioOn := func() bool { return isInterceptorOn() && presidioEnabled.Checked } + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "presidio_url", Label: " Presidio URL", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Security.Interceptor.Presidio.URL, + Placeholder: "http://localhost:5002", + Description: "URL of the Presidio analyzer service endpoint", + VisibleWhen: isPresidioOn, + }) + presidioLang := cfg.Security.Interceptor.Presidio.Language + if presidioLang == "" { + presidioLang = "en" + } + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "presidio_language", Label: " Presidio Language", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, + Value: presidioLang, + Options: []string{"en", "ko", "ja", "zh", "de", "fr", "es", "it", "pt", "nl", "ru"}, + Description: "Primary language for Presidio NLP analysis", + VisibleWhen: isPresidioOn, + }) + + // Signer Configuration + signerField := &tuicore.Field{ + Key: "signer_provider", Label: "Signer Provider", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, + Value: cfg.Security.Signer.Provider, + Options: []string{"local", "rpc", "enclave", "aws-kms", "gcp-kms", "azure-kv", "pkcs11"}, + Description: "Cryptographic signer backend for message signing and verification", + } + form.AddField(signerField) + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "signer_rpc", Label: " RPC URL", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Security.Signer.RPCUrl, + Placeholder: "http://localhost:8080", + Description: "URL of the remote signing service", + VisibleWhen: func() bool { return signerField.Value == "rpc" }, + }) + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "signer_keyid", Label: " Key ID", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Security.Signer.KeyID, + Placeholder: "key-123", + Description: "Key identifier for the signer (ARN for AWS, key name for GCP/Azure)", + VisibleWhen: func() bool { + v := signerField.Value + return v == "rpc" || v == "aws-kms" || v == "gcp-kms" || v == "azure-kv" || v == "pkcs11" + }, + }) + + return &form +} + +// NewDBEncryptionForm creates the Security DB Encryption configuration form. +func NewDBEncryptionForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Security DB Encryption Configuration") + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "db_encryption_enabled", Label: "SQLCipher Encryption", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.Security.DBEncryption.Enabled, + Description: "Encrypt the SQLite database at rest using SQLCipher", + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "db_cipher_page_size", Label: "Cipher Page Size", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Security.DBEncryption.CipherPageSize), + Placeholder: "4096", + Description: "SQLCipher page size; must match database creation settings (default: 4096)", + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i <= 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a positive integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + return &form +} + +// NewKMSForm creates the Security KMS configuration form. +func NewKMSForm(cfg *config.Config) *tuicore.FormModel { + form := tuicore.NewFormModel("Security KMS Configuration") + + // Backend selector mirrors signer provider to drive field visibility. + signerProv := cfg.Security.Signer.Provider + if signerProv == "" { + signerProv = "local" + } + backendField := &tuicore.Field{ + Key: "kms_backend", Label: "KMS Backend", Type: tuicore.InputSelect, + Value: signerProv, + Options: []string{"local", "aws-kms", "gcp-kms", "azure-kv", "pkcs11"}, + Description: "Cloud KMS or HSM backend; must match Signer Provider in Security settings", + } + form.AddField(backendField) + + isCloudKMS := func() bool { + v := backendField.Value + return v == "aws-kms" || v == "gcp-kms" || v == "azure-kv" + } + isAnyKMS := func() bool { + return backendField.Value != "local" + } + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "kms_region", Label: "Region", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Security.KMS.Region, + Placeholder: "us-east-1 or us-central1", + Description: "Cloud region for KMS API calls (AWS region or GCP location)", + VisibleWhen: isCloudKMS, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "kms_key_id", Label: "Key ID", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Security.KMS.KeyID, + Placeholder: "arn:aws:kms:... or alias/my-key", + Description: "KMS key identifier (AWS ARN, GCP resource name, or Azure key name)", + VisibleWhen: isAnyKMS, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "kms_endpoint", Label: "Endpoint", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Security.KMS.Endpoint, + Placeholder: "http://localhost:8080 (optional)", + Description: "Custom KMS API endpoint; leave empty for default cloud endpoints", + VisibleWhen: isCloudKMS, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "kms_fallback_to_local", Label: "Fallback to Local", Type: tuicore.InputBool, + Checked: cfg.Security.KMS.FallbackToLocal, + Description: "Fall back to local key signing if cloud KMS is unavailable", + VisibleWhen: isAnyKMS, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "kms_timeout", Label: "Timeout Per Operation", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Security.KMS.TimeoutPerOperation.String(), + Placeholder: "5s", + Description: "Timeout for each individual KMS API call", + VisibleWhen: isAnyKMS, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "kms_max_retries", Label: "Max Retries", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Security.KMS.MaxRetries), + Placeholder: "3", + Description: "Number of retry attempts for failed KMS operations", + VisibleWhen: isAnyKMS, + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i < 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a non-negative integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + isAzure := func() bool { return backendField.Value == "azure-kv" } + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "kms_azure_vault_url", Label: "Azure Vault URL", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Security.KMS.Azure.VaultURL, + Placeholder: "https://myvault.vault.azure.net", + Description: "Azure Key Vault URL (required for Azure backend)", + VisibleWhen: isAzure, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "kms_azure_key_version", Label: "Azure Key Version", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Security.KMS.Azure.KeyVersion, + Placeholder: "empty = latest", + Description: "Specific key version to use; empty = always use latest version", + VisibleWhen: isAzure, + }) + + isPKCS11 := func() bool { return backendField.Value == "pkcs11" } + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "kms_pkcs11_module", Label: "PKCS#11 Module Path", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Security.KMS.PKCS11.ModulePath, + Placeholder: "/usr/lib/pkcs11/opensc-pkcs11.so", + Description: "Path to the PKCS#11 shared library for HSM access", + VisibleWhen: isPKCS11, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "kms_pkcs11_slot_id", Label: "PKCS#11 Slot ID", Type: tuicore.InputInt, + Value: strconv.Itoa(cfg.Security.KMS.PKCS11.SlotID), + Placeholder: "0", + Description: "HSM slot index to use for key operations", + VisibleWhen: isPKCS11, + Validate: func(s string) error { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(s); err != nil || i < 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("must be a non-negative integer") + } + return nil + }, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "kms_pkcs11_pin", Label: "PKCS#11 PIN", Type: tuicore.InputPassword, + Value: cfg.Security.KMS.PKCS11.Pin, + Placeholder: "prefer LANGO_PKCS11_PIN env var", + Description: "HSM PIN/password; strongly prefer LANGO_PKCS11_PIN env var for security", + VisibleWhen: isPKCS11, + }) + + form.AddField(&tuicore.Field{ + Key: "kms_pkcs11_key_label", Label: "PKCS#11 Key Label", Type: tuicore.InputText, + Value: cfg.Security.KMS.PKCS11.KeyLabel, + Placeholder: "my-signing-key", + Description: "Label of the signing key stored in the HSM", + VisibleWhen: isPKCS11, + }) + + return &form +} diff --git a/internal/cli/settings/menu.go b/internal/cli/settings/menu.go index af4e8795..2f77b3da 100644 --- a/internal/cli/settings/menu.go +++ b/internal/cli/settings/menu.go @@ -3,8 +3,11 @@ package settings import ( "strings" + "github.com/charmbracelet/bubbles/textinput" tea "github.com/charmbracelet/bubbletea" "github.com/charmbracelet/lipgloss" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/tui" ) // Category represents a configuration category in the menu. @@ -14,43 +17,132 @@ type Category struct { Desc string } +// Section groups related categories under a heading. +type Section struct { + Title string + Categories []Category +} + // MenuModel manages the configuration menu. type MenuModel struct { - Categories []Category - Cursor int - Selected string - Width int - Height int + Sections []Section + Cursor int + Selected string + Width int + Height int + + // Search + searching bool + searchInput textinput.Model + filtered []Category // filtered results (nil when not searching) +} + +// allCategories returns a flat list of all selectable categories across sections. +func (m *MenuModel) allCategories() []Category { + var all []Category + for _, s := range m.Sections { + all = append(all, s.Categories...) + } + return all } -// NewMenuModel creates a new menu model with all configuration categories. +// AllCategories returns a flat list of all categories (public, for tests). +func (m MenuModel) AllCategories() []Category { + return m.allCategories() +} + +// IsSearching returns true when the menu is in search mode. +func (m MenuModel) IsSearching() bool { + return m.searching +} + +// selectableItems returns the list the cursor currently navigates. +func (m *MenuModel) selectableItems() []Category { + if m.searching && m.filtered != nil { + return m.filtered + } + return m.allCategories() +} + +// NewMenuModel creates a new menu model with grouped configuration categories. func NewMenuModel() MenuModel { + si := textinput.New() + si.Placeholder = "Type to search..." + si.CharLimit = 40 + si.Width = 30 + si.Prompt = "/ " + si.PromptStyle = lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(tui.Primary).Bold(true) + si.TextStyle = lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(tui.Foreground) + return MenuModel{ - Categories: []Category{ - {"providers", "Providers", "Manage multi-provider configurations"}, - {"agent", "Agent", "Provider, Model, Key"}, - {"server", "Server", "Host, Port, Networking"}, - {"channels", "Channels", "Telegram, Discord, Slack"}, - {"tools", "Tools", "Exec, Browser, Filesystem"}, - {"session", "Session", "Database, TTL, History"}, - {"security", "Security", "PII, Approval, Encryption"}, - {"auth", "Auth", "OIDC provider configuration"}, - {"knowledge", "Knowledge", "Learning, Context limits"}, - {"skill", "Skill", "File-based skill system"}, - {"observational_memory", "Observational Memory", "Observer, Reflector, Thresholds"}, - {"embedding", "Embedding & RAG", "Provider, Model, RAG settings"}, - {"graph", "Graph Store", "Knowledge graph, GraphRAG settings"}, - {"multi_agent", "Multi-Agent", "Orchestration mode"}, - {"a2a", "A2A Protocol", "Agent-to-Agent, remote agents"}, - {"payment", "Payment", "Blockchain wallet, spending limits, X402"}, - {"cron", "Cron Scheduler", "Scheduled jobs, timezone, history"}, - {"background", "Background Tasks", "Async tasks, concurrency limits"}, - {"workflow", "Workflow Engine", "DAG workflows, timeouts, state"}, - {"librarian", "Librarian", "Proactive knowledge extraction, inquiries"}, - {"save", "Save & Exit", "Save encrypted profile"}, - {"cancel", "Cancel", "Exit without saving"}, + Sections: []Section{ + { + Title: "Core", + Categories: []Category{ + {"providers", "Providers", "Multi-provider configurations"}, + {"agent", "Agent", "Provider, Model, Key"}, + {"server", "Server", "Host, Port, Networking"}, + {"session", "Session", "Database, TTL, History"}, + }, + }, + { + Title: "Communication", + Categories: []Category{ + {"channels", "Channels", "Telegram, Discord, Slack"}, + {"tools", "Tools", "Exec, Browser, Filesystem"}, + {"multi_agent", "Multi-Agent", "Orchestration mode"}, + {"a2a", "A2A Protocol", "Agent-to-Agent, remote agents"}, + }, + }, + { + Title: "AI & Knowledge", + Categories: []Category{ + {"knowledge", "Knowledge", "Learning, Context limits"}, + {"skill", "Skill", "File-based skill system"}, + {"observational_memory", "Observational Memory", "Observer, Reflector, Thresholds"}, + {"embedding", "Embedding & RAG", "Provider, Model, RAG settings"}, + {"graph", "Graph Store", "Knowledge graph, GraphRAG settings"}, + {"librarian", "Librarian", "Proactive knowledge extraction"}, + }, + }, + { + Title: "Infrastructure", + Categories: []Category{ + {"payment", "Payment", "Blockchain wallet, spending limits"}, + {"cron", "Cron Scheduler", "Scheduled jobs, timezone, history"}, + {"background", "Background Tasks", "Async tasks, concurrency limits"}, + {"workflow", "Workflow Engine", "DAG workflows, timeouts, state"}, + }, + }, + { + Title: "P2P Network", + Categories: []Category{ + {"p2p", "P2P Network", "Peer-to-peer networking, discovery"}, + {"p2p_zkp", "P2P ZKP", "Zero-knowledge proof settings"}, + {"p2p_pricing", "P2P Pricing", "Paid tool invocations"}, + {"p2p_owner", "P2P Owner Protection", "Owner PII leak prevention"}, + {"p2p_sandbox", "P2P Sandbox", "Tool isolation, container sandbox"}, + }, + }, + { + Title: "Security", + Categories: []Category{ + {"security", "Security", "PII, Approval, Encryption"}, + {"auth", "Auth", "OIDC provider configuration"}, + {"security_db", "Security DB Encryption", "SQLCipher database encryption"}, + {"security_kms", "Security KMS", "Cloud KMS / HSM backends"}, + }, + }, + { + Title: "", + Categories: []Category{ + {"save", "Save & Exit", "Save encrypted profile"}, + {"cancel", "Cancel", "Exit without saving"}, + }, + }, }, - Cursor: 0, + Cursor: 0, + searchInput: si, } } @@ -63,51 +155,254 @@ func (m MenuModel) Init() tea.Cmd { func (m MenuModel) Update(msg tea.Msg) (MenuModel, tea.Cmd) { switch msg := msg.(type) { case tea.KeyMsg: - switch msg.String() { + key := msg.String() + + // --- Search mode handling --- + if m.searching { + switch key { + case "esc": + m.searching = false + m.filtered = nil + m.searchInput.SetValue("") + m.searchInput.Blur() + m.Cursor = 0 + return m, nil + case "enter": + items := m.selectableItems() + if len(items) > 0 && m.Cursor < len(items) { + m.Selected = items[m.Cursor].ID + m.searching = false + m.filtered = nil + m.searchInput.SetValue("") + m.searchInput.Blur() + } + return m, nil + case "up", "shift+tab": + if m.Cursor > 0 { + m.Cursor-- + } + return m, nil + case "down", "tab": + items := m.selectableItems() + if m.Cursor < len(items)-1 { + m.Cursor++ + } + return m, nil + default: + // Forward to text input + var cmd tea.Cmd + m.searchInput, cmd = m.searchInput.Update(msg) + m.applyFilter() + return m, cmd + } + } + + // --- Normal mode handling --- + switch key { + case "/": + m.searching = true + m.searchInput.Focus() + m.searchInput.SetValue("") + m.Cursor = 0 + return m, textinput.Blink case "up", "k": if m.Cursor > 0 { m.Cursor-- } case "down", "j": - if m.Cursor < len(m.Categories)-1 { + items := m.selectableItems() + if m.Cursor < len(items)-1 { m.Cursor++ } case "enter": - m.Selected = m.Categories[m.Cursor].ID + items := m.selectableItems() + if len(items) > 0 && m.Cursor < len(items) { + m.Selected = items[m.Cursor].ID + } return m, nil } } return m, nil } +// applyFilter updates the filtered list based on the current search query. +func (m *MenuModel) applyFilter() { + query := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(m.searchInput.Value())) + if query == "" { + m.filtered = nil + m.Cursor = 0 + return + } + + var results []Category + all := m.allCategories() + for _, cat := range all { + title := strings.ToLower(cat.Title) + desc := strings.ToLower(cat.Desc) + id := strings.ToLower(cat.ID) + if strings.Contains(title, query) || strings.Contains(desc, query) || strings.Contains(id, query) { + results = append(results, cat) + } + } + m.filtered = results + m.Cursor = 0 +} + // View renders the configuration menu. func (m MenuModel) View() string { var b strings.Builder - titleStyle := lipgloss.NewStyle(). - Bold(true). - Foreground(lipgloss.Color("#7D56F4")). - MarginBottom(1) - - b.WriteString(titleStyle.Render("Configuration Menu")) + // Search bar — always visible + if m.searching { + b.WriteString(tui.SearchBarStyle.Render(m.searchInput.View())) + } else { + hint := lipgloss.NewStyle(). + Foreground(tui.Dim). + Italic(true). + PaddingLeft(1) + b.WriteString(hint.Render("/ Search...")) + } b.WriteString("\n\n") - for i, cat := range m.Categories { - cursor := " " - itemStyle := lipgloss.NewStyle() + // Menu body + var body strings.Builder + if m.searching && m.filtered != nil { + m.renderFilteredView(&body) + } else { + m.renderGroupedView(&body) + } + + // Wrap in container + container := lipgloss.NewStyle(). + Border(lipgloss.RoundedBorder()). + BorderForeground(tui.Muted). + Padding(0, 1) + b.WriteString(container.Render(body.String())) + + // Help footer with key badges + b.WriteString("\n") + if m.searching { + b.WriteString(tui.HelpBar( + tui.HelpEntry("↑↓", "Navigate"), + tui.HelpEntry("Enter", "Select"), + tui.HelpEntry("Esc", "Cancel"), + )) + } else { + b.WriteString(tui.HelpBar( + tui.HelpEntry("↑↓", "Navigate"), + tui.HelpEntry("Enter", "Select"), + tui.HelpEntry("/", "Search"), + tui.HelpEntry("Esc", "Back"), + )) + } + + return b.String() +} - if m.Cursor == i { - cursor = "\u25b8 " - itemStyle = itemStyle.Foreground(lipgloss.Color("#04B575")).Bold(true) +func (m MenuModel) renderGroupedView(b *strings.Builder) { + globalIdx := 0 + for si, section := range m.Sections { + // Section header + if section.Title != "" { + if si > 0 { + b.WriteString(tui.SeparatorLineStyle.Render(" " + strings.Repeat("─", 38))) + b.WriteString("\n") + } + b.WriteString(tui.SectionHeaderStyle.Render(section.Title)) + b.WriteString("\n") + } else if si > 0 { + b.WriteString(tui.SeparatorLineStyle.Render(" " + strings.Repeat("─", 38))) + b.WriteString("\n") } - b.WriteString(cursor) - b.WriteString(itemStyle.Render(cat.Title)) - if cat.Desc != "" { - b.WriteString(" " + lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(lipgloss.Color("#626262")).Render(cat.Desc)) + for _, cat := range section.Categories { + m.renderItem(b, cat, globalIdx) + globalIdx++ } + } +} + +func (m MenuModel) renderFilteredView(b *strings.Builder) { + if len(m.filtered) == 0 { + noResult := lipgloss.NewStyle(). + Foreground(tui.Muted). + Italic(true) + b.WriteString(noResult.Render(" No matching items")) b.WriteString("\n") + return } - return b.String() + for i, cat := range m.filtered { + m.renderItem(b, cat, i) + } +} + +func (m MenuModel) renderItem(b *strings.Builder, cat Category, idx int) { + const titleWidth = 22 + isSelected := m.Cursor == idx + + cursor := " " + titleStyle := lipgloss.NewStyle().Width(titleWidth) + descStyle := lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(tui.Dim) + + if isSelected { + cursor = tui.CursorStyle.Render("▸ ") + titleStyle = titleStyle.Foreground(tui.Accent).Bold(true) + descStyle = descStyle.Foreground(tui.Accent) + } + + // Handle search highlighting + title := cat.Title + desc := cat.Desc + + if m.searching && m.searchInput.Value() != "" { + query := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(m.searchInput.Value())) + highlightedTitle := m.highlightMatch(title, query, isSelected) + highlightedDesc := m.highlightMatch(desc, query, isSelected) + + b.WriteString(cursor) + b.WriteString(lipgloss.NewStyle().Width(titleWidth).Render(highlightedTitle)) + if desc != "" { + b.WriteString(" ") + b.WriteString(highlightedDesc) + } + } else { + b.WriteString(cursor) + b.WriteString(titleStyle.Render(title)) + if desc != "" { + b.WriteString(descStyle.Render(desc)) + } + } + b.WriteString("\n") +} + +// highlightMatch highlights matching substrings with amber color. +func (m MenuModel) highlightMatch(text, query string, selected bool) string { + if query == "" { + return text + } + lower := strings.ToLower(text) + idx := strings.Index(lower, query) + if idx < 0 { + if selected { + return lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(tui.Accent).Bold(true).Render(text) + } + return lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(tui.Dim).Render(text) + } + + matchStyle := lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(tui.Warning).Bold(true) + if selected { + matchStyle = matchStyle.Underline(true) + } + + before := text[:idx] + match := text[idx : idx+len(query)] + after := text[idx+len(query):] + + normalStyle := lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(tui.Dim) + if selected { + normalStyle = lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(tui.Accent).Bold(true) + } + + return normalStyle.Render(before) + matchStyle.Render(match) + normalStyle.Render(after) } diff --git a/internal/cli/settings/model_fetcher.go b/internal/cli/settings/model_fetcher.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..85d54f61 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/settings/model_fetcher.go @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +package settings + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + "sort" + "strings" + "time" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/provider" + provanthropic "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/provider/anthropic" + provgemini "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/provider/gemini" + provopenai "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/provider/openai" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/types" +) + +const modelFetchTimeout = 15 * time.Second + +// NewProviderFromConfig creates a lightweight provider instance from config. +// Returns nil if the provider cannot be created (missing API key, unknown type, etc.). +func NewProviderFromConfig(id string, pCfg config.ProviderConfig) provider.Provider { + apiKey := pCfg.APIKey + if apiKey == "" && pCfg.Type != types.ProviderOllama { + return nil + } + + switch pCfg.Type { + case types.ProviderOpenAI: + return provopenai.NewProvider(id, apiKey, pCfg.BaseURL) + case types.ProviderAnthropic: + return provanthropic.NewProvider(id, apiKey) + case types.ProviderGemini, types.ProviderGoogle: + p, err := provgemini.NewProvider(context.Background(), id, apiKey, "") + if err != nil { + return nil + } + return p + case types.ProviderOllama: + baseURL := pCfg.BaseURL + if baseURL == "" { + baseURL = "http://localhost:11434/v1" + } + return provopenai.NewProvider(id, apiKey, baseURL) + case types.ProviderGitHub: + baseURL := pCfg.BaseURL + if baseURL == "" { + baseURL = "https://models.inference.ai.azure.com" + } + return provopenai.NewProvider(id, apiKey, baseURL) + default: + return nil + } +} + +// FetchModelOptions fetches available models from a provider. +// Returns a sorted list of model IDs, or nil if fetching fails. +// The currentModel (if non-empty) is always included in the result. +func FetchModelOptions(providerID string, cfg *config.Config, currentModel string) []string { + opts, _ := FetchModelOptionsWithError(providerID, cfg, currentModel) + return opts +} + +// FetchModelOptionsWithError is like FetchModelOptions but also returns +// the error when model fetching fails, for diagnostic feedback. +func FetchModelOptionsWithError(providerID string, cfg *config.Config, currentModel string) ([]string, error) { + pCfg, ok := cfg.Providers[providerID] + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("provider %q not found in config", providerID) + } + + p := NewProviderFromConfig(providerID, pCfg) + if p == nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("provider %q: missing API key or unsupported type", providerID) + } + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), modelFetchTimeout) + defer cancel() + + models, err := p.ListModels(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("provider %q: %w", providerID, err) + } + if len(models) == 0 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("provider %q returned no models", providerID) + } + + seen := make(map[string]bool, len(models)) + opts := make([]string, 0, len(models)) + for _, m := range models { + if !seen[m.ID] { + seen[m.ID] = true + opts = append(opts, m.ID) + } + } + sort.Strings(opts) + + // Ensure current model is included + if currentModel != "" && !seen[currentModel] { + opts = append([]string{currentModel}, opts...) + } + + return opts, nil +} + +// embeddingPatterns contains substrings that indicate embedding models. +var embeddingPatterns = []string{"embed", "embedding"} + +// FetchEmbeddingModelOptions fetches models and filters for embedding-capable ones. +// Falls back to the full model list if no embedding models are found. +func FetchEmbeddingModelOptions(providerID string, cfg *config.Config, currentModel string) []string { + all := FetchModelOptions(providerID, cfg, currentModel) + if len(all) == 0 { + return nil + } + + var filtered []string + for _, m := range all { + lower := strings.ToLower(m) + for _, pat := range embeddingPatterns { + if strings.Contains(lower, pat) { + filtered = append(filtered, m) + break + } + } + } + + // Ensure current model is included in filtered results + if currentModel != "" && len(filtered) > 0 { + found := false + for _, m := range filtered { + if m == currentModel { + found = true + break + } + } + if !found { + filtered = append([]string{currentModel}, filtered...) + } + } + + // Fallback to full list if no embedding models detected + if len(filtered) == 0 { + return all + } + return filtered +} diff --git a/internal/cli/settings/model_fetcher_test.go b/internal/cli/settings/model_fetcher_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..24f8699d --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/settings/model_fetcher_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +package settings + +import ( + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" +) + +func TestFetchEmbeddingModelOptions_FiltersByPattern(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give []string + wantLen int + wantHas string + wantMiss string + }{ + { + give: []string{"text-embedding-3-small", "text-embedding-3-large", "gpt-4o", "gpt-3.5-turbo"}, + wantLen: 2, + wantHas: "text-embedding-3-small", + wantMiss: "gpt-4o", + }, + { + give: []string{"embed-english-v3.0", "command-r", "command-r-plus"}, + wantLen: 1, + wantHas: "embed-english-v3.0", + wantMiss: "command-r", + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.wantHas, func(t *testing.T) { + // Filter using embeddingPatterns directly + var filtered []string + for _, m := range tt.give { + for _, pat := range embeddingPatterns { + if contains(m, pat) { + filtered = append(filtered, m) + break + } + } + } + + assert.Equal(t, tt.wantLen, len(filtered)) + assert.Contains(t, filtered, tt.wantHas) + assert.NotContains(t, filtered, tt.wantMiss) + }) + } +} + +func TestFetchEmbeddingModelOptions_FallbackWhenNoEmbedModels(t *testing.T) { + all := []string{"gpt-4o", "gpt-3.5-turbo", "claude-3-opus"} + + var filtered []string + for _, m := range all { + for _, pat := range embeddingPatterns { + if contains(m, pat) { + filtered = append(filtered, m) + break + } + } + } + + // No embedding models found, should fallback + if len(filtered) == 0 { + filtered = all + } + + assert.Equal(t, len(all), len(filtered)) + assert.Equal(t, all, filtered) +} + +func TestFetchEmbeddingModelOptions_IncludesCurrentModel(t *testing.T) { + all := []string{"text-embedding-3-small", "text-embedding-3-large", "gpt-4o"} + currentModel := "custom-embed-model" + + var filtered []string + for _, m := range all { + for _, pat := range embeddingPatterns { + if contains(m, pat) { + filtered = append(filtered, m) + break + } + } + } + + // Include current model if not already present + if currentModel != "" && len(filtered) > 0 { + found := false + for _, m := range filtered { + if m == currentModel { + found = true + break + } + } + if !found { + filtered = append([]string{currentModel}, filtered...) + } + } + + assert.Equal(t, 3, len(filtered)) + assert.Equal(t, currentModel, filtered[0]) +} + +func contains(s, substr string) bool { + return len(s) >= len(substr) && (s == substr || len(substr) == 0 || + func() bool { + for i := 0; i <= len(s)-len(substr); i++ { + if lower(s[i:i+len(substr)]) == lower(substr) { + return true + } + } + return false + }()) +} + +func lower(s string) string { + b := make([]byte, len(s)) + for i := range s { + c := s[i] + if c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z' { + c += 'a' - 'A' + } + b[i] = c + } + return string(b) +} diff --git a/internal/cli/settings/providers_list.go b/internal/cli/settings/providers_list.go index d4b541f1..98e0e058 100644 --- a/internal/cli/settings/providers_list.go +++ b/internal/cli/settings/providers_list.go @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ import ( tea "github.com/charmbracelet/bubbletea" "github.com/charmbracelet/lipgloss" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/tui" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" ) @@ -85,40 +87,50 @@ func (m ProvidersListModel) Update(msg tea.Msg) (ProvidersListModel, tea.Cmd) { func (m ProvidersListModel) View() string { var b strings.Builder - titleStyle := lipgloss.NewStyle(). - Bold(true). - Foreground(lipgloss.Color("#7D56F4")). - MarginBottom(1) - - b.WriteString(titleStyle.Render("Manage Providers")) - b.WriteString("\n\n") - + // Items inside a container + var body strings.Builder for i, p := range m.Providers { cursor := " " itemStyle := lipgloss.NewStyle() if m.Cursor == i { - cursor = "\u25b8 " - itemStyle = itemStyle.Foreground(lipgloss.Color("#04B575")).Bold(true) + cursor = tui.CursorStyle.Render("▸ ") + itemStyle = tui.ActiveItemStyle } - b.WriteString(cursor) + body.WriteString(cursor) label := fmt.Sprintf("%s (%s)", p.ID, p.Type) - b.WriteString(itemStyle.Render(label)) - b.WriteString("\n") + body.WriteString(itemStyle.Render(label)) + body.WriteString("\n") } + // "Add New" item cursor := " " - itemStyle := lipgloss.NewStyle() + var itemStyle lipgloss.Style if m.Cursor == len(m.Providers) { - cursor = "\u25b8 " - itemStyle = itemStyle.Foreground(lipgloss.Color("#04B575")).Bold(true) + cursor = tui.CursorStyle.Render("▸ ") + itemStyle = tui.ActiveItemStyle + } else { + itemStyle = lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(tui.Muted) } - b.WriteString(cursor) - b.WriteString(itemStyle.Render("+ Add New Provider")) - b.WriteString("\n\n") - - b.WriteString(lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(lipgloss.Color("#626262")).Render("\u2191/\u2193: navigate \u2022 enter: select \u2022 d: delete \u2022 esc: back")) + body.WriteString(cursor) + body.WriteString(itemStyle.Render("+ Add New Provider")) + + // Wrap in container + container := lipgloss.NewStyle(). + Border(lipgloss.RoundedBorder()). + BorderForeground(tui.Muted). + Padding(1, 2) + b.WriteString(container.Render(body.String())) + + // Help footer + b.WriteString("\n") + b.WriteString(tui.HelpBar( + tui.HelpEntry("↑↓", "Navigate"), + tui.HelpEntry("Enter", "Select"), + tui.HelpEntry("d", "Delete"), + tui.HelpEntry("Esc", "Back"), + )) return b.String() } diff --git a/internal/cli/settings/settings.go b/internal/cli/settings/settings.go index 4e4c7087..b361a732 100644 --- a/internal/cli/settings/settings.go +++ b/internal/cli/settings/settings.go @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import ( "github.com/spf13/cobra" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/bootstrap" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/tui" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/configstore" ) @@ -24,22 +25,27 @@ func NewCommand() *cobra.Command { Long: `The settings command opens an interactive menu-based editor for all Lango configuration. Unlike "lango onboard" (which is a guided wizard for first-time setup), this editor -gives you free navigation across every configuration section: - - Providers: Manage multiple provider configurations - - Agent: Provider, Model, Tokens, Fallback settings - - Server: Host, Port, HTTP/WebSocket toggles - - Channels: Telegram, Discord, Slack tokens - - Tools: Exec timeouts, Browser, Filesystem limits - - Auth: OIDC providers, JWT settings - - Security: PII interceptor, Signer - - Session: Session DB, TTL - - Knowledge: Learning limits, Context per layer - - Skill: File-based skill system, Skills directory - - Embedding: Provider, Model, RAG settings - - Graph: Knowledge graph and GraphRAG - - Payment: Blockchain wallet, spending limits, X402 - -All settings including API keys are saved in an encrypted profile (~/.lango/lango.db).`, +gives you free navigation across every configuration section. Categories are organized +into groups: + + Core: Providers, Agent, Server, Session + Communication: Channels, Tools, Multi-Agent, A2A Protocol + AI & Knowledge: Knowledge, Skill, Observational Memory, Embedding & RAG, + Graph Store, Librarian + Infrastructure: Payment, Cron Scheduler, Background Tasks, Workflow Engine + P2P Network: P2P Network, P2P ZKP, P2P Pricing, P2P Owner Protection, + P2P Sandbox + Security: Security, Auth, Security DB Encryption, + Security KMS + +Press "/" to search across all categories by keyword. + +All settings including API keys are saved in an encrypted profile (~/.lango/lango.db). + +See Also: + lango config - View/manage configuration profiles + lango onboard - Guided setup wizard + lango doctor - Diagnose configuration issues`, RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { return runSettings(profileName) }, @@ -64,6 +70,8 @@ func runSettings(profileName string) error { return fmt.Errorf("load profile %q: %w", profileName, err) } + tui.SetProfile(profileName) + p := tea.NewProgram(NewEditorWithConfig(initialCfg)) model, err := p.Run() if err != nil { diff --git a/internal/cli/tui/banner.go b/internal/cli/tui/banner.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8995fc42 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/tui/banner.go @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +package tui + +import ( + "fmt" + "strings" + + "github.com/charmbracelet/lipgloss" +) + +// Package-level version info, set by main.go via SetVersionInfo. +var ( + _version = "dev" + _buildTime = "unknown" + _profile = "default" +) + +// SetVersionInfo injects version and build time from main.go. +func SetVersionInfo(version, buildTime string) { + _version = version + _buildTime = buildTime +} + +// SetProfile injects the active profile name. +func SetProfile(name string) { + _profile = name +} + +// squirrelFace returns the squirrel mascot ASCII art lines. +func squirrelFace() string { + return " ▄▀▄▄▄▀▄\n ▜ ●.● ▛\n ▜▄▄▄▛" +} + +// Banner returns the squirrel mascot with brand info side-by-side. +func Banner() string { + artStyle := lipgloss.NewStyle(). + Foreground(Primary). + Bold(true) + + infoLines := []string{ + lipgloss.NewStyle().Bold(true).Foreground(Foreground).Render(fmt.Sprintf("Lango v%s", _version)), + MutedStyle.Render("Fast AI Agent in Go"), + MutedStyle.Render(fmt.Sprintf("profile: %s", _profile)), + } + + art := artStyle.Render(squirrelFace()) + info := strings.Join(infoLines, "\n") + + // Add padding between art and info + infoBlock := lipgloss.NewStyle().PaddingLeft(4).Render(info) + + return lipgloss.JoinHorizontal(lipgloss.Top, art, infoBlock) +} + +// BannerBox wraps the Banner in a rounded border box (for settings welcome). +func BannerBox() string { + box := lipgloss.NewStyle(). + Border(lipgloss.RoundedBorder()). + BorderForeground(Primary). + Padding(1, 3) + + return box.Render(Banner()) +} + +// ServeBanner returns a banner for the serve command with a separator line. +func ServeBanner() string { + var b strings.Builder + + b.WriteString("\n") + b.WriteString(Banner()) + b.WriteString("\n") + + sep := lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(Separator).Render(strings.Repeat("─", 48)) + b.WriteString(sep) + b.WriteString("\n\n") + + return b.String() +} diff --git a/internal/cli/tui/banner_test.go b/internal/cli/tui/banner_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..611cea9c --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/tui/banner_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +package tui + +import ( + "strings" + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" +) + +func TestSetVersionInfo(t *testing.T) { + SetVersionInfo("1.2.3", "2026-01-01") + assert.Equal(t, "1.2.3", _version) + assert.Equal(t, "2026-01-01", _buildTime) +} + +func TestSetProfile(t *testing.T) { + SetProfile("production") + assert.Equal(t, "production", _profile) +} + +func TestBanner_ContainsLango(t *testing.T) { + SetVersionInfo("0.4.0", "2026-01-01") + SetProfile("default") + + banner := Banner() + assert.True(t, strings.Contains(banner, "Lango")) + assert.True(t, strings.Contains(banner, "0.4.0")) +} + +func TestServeBanner_ContainsVersion(t *testing.T) { + SetVersionInfo("0.5.0", "2026-02-01") + + serve := ServeBanner() + assert.True(t, strings.Contains(serve, "0.5.0")) + assert.True(t, strings.Contains(serve, "─")) +} + +func TestBannerBox_HasBorder(t *testing.T) { + SetVersionInfo("1.0.0", "2026-01-01") + + box := BannerBox() + // Rounded border uses characters like ╭ ╮ ╰ ╯ + assert.True(t, strings.Contains(box, "╭") || strings.Contains(box, "│")) +} + +func TestSquirrelFace(t *testing.T) { + face := squirrelFace() + assert.True(t, strings.Contains(face, "●.●")) +} diff --git a/internal/cli/tui/styles.go b/internal/cli/tui/styles.go index 9ae53f0d..4bce968f 100644 --- a/internal/cli/tui/styles.go +++ b/internal/cli/tui/styles.go @@ -1,7 +1,11 @@ // Package tui provides shared TUI components for Lango CLI commands. package tui -import "github.com/charmbracelet/lipgloss" +import ( + "strings" + + "github.com/charmbracelet/lipgloss" +) // Color palette for consistent theming var ( @@ -13,6 +17,9 @@ var ( Foreground = lipgloss.Color("#F9FAFB") // White Background = lipgloss.Color("#1F2937") // Dark gray Highlight = lipgloss.Color("#3B82F6") // Blue + Accent = lipgloss.Color("#04B575") // Green (selection/focus) + Dim = lipgloss.Color("#626262") // Dim gray (descriptions) + Separator = lipgloss.Color("#374151") // Dark gray (dividers) ) // Base styles for TUI components @@ -64,6 +71,45 @@ var ( PaddingLeft(2). Foreground(Primary). Bold(true) + + // SectionHeaderStyle for menu section titles + SectionHeaderStyle = lipgloss.NewStyle(). + Foreground(Highlight). + Bold(true). + PaddingLeft(2) + + // SeparatorLineStyle for section dividers + SeparatorLineStyle = lipgloss.NewStyle(). + Foreground(Separator) + + // CursorStyle for the selection arrow + CursorStyle = lipgloss.NewStyle(). + Foreground(Accent) + + // ActiveItemStyle for highlighted/selected items + ActiveItemStyle = lipgloss.NewStyle(). + Foreground(Accent). + Bold(true) + + // SearchBarStyle for the search input container + SearchBarStyle = lipgloss.NewStyle(). + Border(lipgloss.RoundedBorder()). + BorderForeground(Primary). + Padding(0, 1) + + // FormTitleBarStyle for form titles + FormTitleBarStyle = lipgloss.NewStyle(). + Bold(true). + Foreground(Primary). + Border(lipgloss.NormalBorder(), false, false, true, false). + BorderForeground(Primary). + MarginBottom(1) + + // FieldDescStyle for field description/help text + FieldDescStyle = lipgloss.NewStyle(). + Foreground(Dim). + Italic(true). + PaddingLeft(2) ) // Check result indicators @@ -93,3 +139,40 @@ func FormatFail(msg string) string { func FormatMuted(msg string) string { return MutedStyle.Render(msg) } + +// KeyBadge renders a keyboard shortcut as a styled badge. +func KeyBadge(key string) string { + badge := lipgloss.NewStyle(). + Foreground(Foreground). + Background(Separator). + Bold(true). + Padding(0, 1) + return badge.Render(key) +} + +// HelpEntry renders a single help entry: key badge + label. +func HelpEntry(key, label string) string { + return KeyBadge(key) + " " + lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(Dim).Render(label) +} + +// HelpBar renders a full help footer from HelpEntry results. +func HelpBar(entries ...string) string { + return lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(Dim).Render(strings.Join(entries, " ")) +} + +// Breadcrumb renders a navigation path like "Settings > Agent Configuration". +func Breadcrumb(segments ...string) string { + if len(segments) == 0 { + return "" + } + sep := lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(Dim).Render(" > ") + var parts []string + for i, s := range segments { + if i == len(segments)-1 { + parts = append(parts, lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(Primary).Bold(true).Render(s)) + } else { + parts = append(parts, lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(Muted).Render(s)) + } + } + return strings.Join(parts, sep) +} diff --git a/internal/cli/tuicore/field.go b/internal/cli/tuicore/field.go index f56b80ba..2b52fadd 100644 --- a/internal/cli/tuicore/field.go +++ b/internal/cli/tuicore/field.go @@ -1,7 +1,11 @@ // Package tuicore provides shared TUI form components for CLI commands. package tuicore -import "github.com/charmbracelet/bubbles/textinput" +import ( + "strings" + + "github.com/charmbracelet/bubbles/textinput" +) // InputType defines the type of input field. type InputType int @@ -12,21 +16,59 @@ const ( InputBool // Toggled via space InputSelect InputPassword + InputSearchSelect // Searchable dropdown select ) // Field represents a single configuration field in a form. type Field struct { Key string Label string + Description string // Help text shown below the focused field Type InputType Value string Placeholder string - Options []string // For InputSelect + Options []string // For InputSelect and InputSearchSelect Checked bool // For InputBool Width int Validate func(string) error + // VisibleWhen controls conditional visibility. When non-nil, the field is + // shown only when this function returns true. When nil the field is always visible. + VisibleWhen func() bool + // TextInput holds the bubbletea text input model (exported for cross-package use). TextInput textinput.Model Err error + + // InputSearchSelect state + FilteredOptions []string // Filtered subset of Options + SelectCursor int // Cursor position in filtered list + SelectOpen bool // Whether dropdown is open +} + +// applySearchFilter filters Options by case-insensitive substring match. +func (f *Field) applySearchFilter(query string) { + if query == "" { + f.FilteredOptions = make([]string, len(f.Options)) + copy(f.FilteredOptions, f.Options) + } else { + q := strings.ToLower(query) + f.FilteredOptions = f.FilteredOptions[:0] + for _, opt := range f.Options { + if strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(opt), q) { + f.FilteredOptions = append(f.FilteredOptions, opt) + } + } + } + if f.SelectCursor >= len(f.FilteredOptions) { + f.SelectCursor = max(0, len(f.FilteredOptions)-1) + } +} + +// IsVisible reports whether this field should be rendered and navigable. +func (f *Field) IsVisible() bool { + if f.VisibleWhen == nil { + return true + } + return f.VisibleWhen() } diff --git a/internal/cli/tuicore/form.go b/internal/cli/tuicore/form.go index 93ec324a..c611aabb 100644 --- a/internal/cli/tuicore/form.go +++ b/internal/cli/tuicore/form.go @@ -7,13 +7,15 @@ import ( "github.com/charmbracelet/bubbles/textinput" tea "github.com/charmbracelet/bubbletea" "github.com/charmbracelet/lipgloss" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/tui" ) // FormModel manages a list of fields. type FormModel struct { Title string Fields []*Field - Cursor int + Cursor int // index into VisibleFields() Focus bool OnSave func(map[string]interface{}) OnCancel func() @@ -45,9 +47,43 @@ func (m *FormModel) AddField(f *Field) { } f.TextInput = ti } + if f.Type == InputSearchSelect { + ti := textinput.New() + ti.Placeholder = "Type to search..." + ti.SetValue(f.Value) + ti.CharLimit = 200 + ti.Width = 40 + if f.Width > 0 { + ti.Width = f.Width + } + f.TextInput = ti + f.FilteredOptions = make([]string, len(f.Options)) + copy(f.FilteredOptions, f.Options) + } m.Fields = append(m.Fields, f) } +// HasOpenDropdown reports whether any field has an open search-select dropdown. +func (m FormModel) HasOpenDropdown() bool { + for _, f := range m.Fields { + if f.Type == InputSearchSelect && f.SelectOpen { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// VisibleFields returns only the fields that pass their visibility check. +func (m FormModel) VisibleFields() []*Field { + var out []*Field + for _, f := range m.Fields { + if f.IsVisible() { + out = append(out, f) + } + } + return out +} + // Init implements tea.Model. func (m FormModel) Init() tea.Cmd { return textinput.Blink @@ -59,8 +95,73 @@ func (m FormModel) Update(msg tea.Msg) (FormModel, tea.Cmd) { return m, nil } + visible := m.VisibleFields() + if len(visible) == 0 { + return m, nil + } + + // Clamp cursor in case visibility changed. + if m.Cursor >= len(visible) { + m.Cursor = len(visible) - 1 + } + var cmd tea.Cmd + field := visible[m.Cursor] + + // InputSearchSelect with open dropdown: intercept keys before form navigation. + if field.Type == InputSearchSelect && field.SelectOpen { + if msg, ok := msg.(tea.KeyMsg); ok { + switch msg.String() { + case "up": + if field.SelectCursor > 0 { + field.SelectCursor-- + } + return m, nil + case "down": + if field.SelectCursor < len(field.FilteredOptions)-1 { + field.SelectCursor++ + } + return m, nil + case "enter": + if len(field.FilteredOptions) > 0 && field.SelectCursor < len(field.FilteredOptions) { + field.Value = field.FilteredOptions[field.SelectCursor] + field.TextInput.SetValue(field.Value) + } + field.SelectOpen = false + return m, nil + case "esc": + field.SelectOpen = false + field.TextInput.SetValue(field.Value) + field.applySearchFilter("") + return m, nil + case "tab": + field.SelectOpen = false + field.TextInput.SetValue(field.Value) + field.applySearchFilter("") + if m.Cursor < len(visible)-1 { + m.Cursor++ + } + return m, nil + case "shift+tab": + field.SelectOpen = false + field.TextInput.SetValue(field.Value) + field.applySearchFilter("") + if m.Cursor > 0 { + m.Cursor-- + } + return m, nil + default: + // Pass character input to text field for filtering + var inputCmd tea.Cmd + field.TextInput, inputCmd = field.TextInput.Update(msg) + field.applySearchFilter(field.TextInput.Value()) + cmd = inputCmd + return m, cmd + } + } + } + switch msg := msg.(type) { case tea.KeyMsg: switch msg.String() { @@ -69,14 +170,29 @@ func (m FormModel) Update(msg tea.Msg) (FormModel, tea.Cmd) { m.Cursor-- } case "down", "tab": - if m.Cursor < len(m.Fields)-1 { + if m.Cursor < len(visible)-1 { m.Cursor++ } case " ": - field := m.Fields[m.Cursor] if field.Type == InputBool { field.Checked = !field.Checked } + case "enter": + if field.Type == InputSearchSelect { + field.SelectOpen = true + field.SelectCursor = 0 + field.TextInput.SetValue("") + field.applySearchFilter("") + field.TextInput.Focus() + // Pre-select current value in list + for i, opt := range field.FilteredOptions { + if opt == field.Value { + field.SelectCursor = i + break + } + } + return m, nil + } case "esc": if m.OnCancel != nil { m.OnCancel() @@ -84,8 +200,17 @@ func (m FormModel) Update(msg tea.Msg) (FormModel, tea.Cmd) { } } - // Update specific field logic - field := m.Fields[m.Cursor] + // Re-evaluate visible after potential toggle change. + visible = m.VisibleFields() + if len(visible) == 0 { + return m, nil + } + if m.Cursor >= len(visible) { + m.Cursor = len(visible) - 1 + } + + // Update specific field logic. + field = visible[m.Cursor] if field.Type == InputText || field.Type == InputInt || field.Type == InputPassword { var inputCmd tea.Cmd field.TextInput, inputCmd = field.TextInput.Update(msg) @@ -93,7 +218,7 @@ func (m FormModel) Update(msg tea.Msg) (FormModel, tea.Cmd) { cmd = inputCmd } - // Handle Select Logic (Left/Right to cycle options) + // Handle Select Logic (Left/Right to cycle options). if field.Type == InputSelect { if msg, ok := msg.(tea.KeyMsg); ok { switch msg.String() { @@ -134,23 +259,25 @@ func (m FormModel) Update(msg tea.Msg) (FormModel, tea.Cmd) { func (m FormModel) View() string { var b strings.Builder - titleStyle := lipgloss.NewStyle().Bold(true).Border(lipgloss.NormalBorder(), false, false, true, false).BorderForeground(lipgloss.Color("#7D56F4")).MarginBottom(1) - b.WriteString(titleStyle.Render(m.Title)) + b.WriteString(tui.FormTitleBarStyle.Render(m.Title)) b.WriteString("\n") - for i, f := range m.Fields { + visible := m.VisibleFields() + for vi, f := range visible { + isFocused := vi == m.Cursor + labelStyle := lipgloss.NewStyle().Width(20) - if i == m.Cursor { - labelStyle = labelStyle.Foreground(lipgloss.Color("#04B575")).Bold(true) + if isFocused { + labelStyle = labelStyle.Foreground(tui.Accent).Bold(true) } b.WriteString(labelStyle.Render(f.Label)) switch f.Type { case InputText, InputInt, InputPassword: - if i == m.Cursor { + if isFocused { f.TextInput.Focus() - f.TextInput.TextStyle = lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(lipgloss.Color("#04B575")) + f.TextInput.TextStyle = lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(tui.Accent) } else { f.TextInput.Blur() f.TextInput.TextStyle = lipgloss.NewStyle() @@ -162,8 +289,8 @@ func (m FormModel) View() string { if f.Checked { check = "[x]" } - if i == m.Cursor { - check = lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(lipgloss.Color("#04B575")).Render(check) + if isFocused { + check = lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(tui.Accent).Render(check) } b.WriteString(check) @@ -172,18 +299,98 @@ func (m FormModel) View() string { if val == "" && len(f.Options) > 0 { val = f.Options[0] } - if i == m.Cursor { + if isFocused { val = fmt.Sprintf("< %s >", val) - val = lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(lipgloss.Color("#04B575")).Render(val) + val = lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(tui.Accent).Render(val) } b.WriteString(val) + + case InputSearchSelect: + if isFocused && f.SelectOpen { + // Show search input + f.TextInput.Focus() + f.TextInput.TextStyle = lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(tui.Accent) + b.WriteString(f.TextInput.View()) + b.WriteString("\n") + + // Show match count + matchInfo := fmt.Sprintf(" %d/%d matches", len(f.FilteredOptions), len(f.Options)) + b.WriteString(lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(tui.Dim).Render(matchInfo)) + b.WriteString("\n") + + // Render dropdown (max 8 visible) + maxVisible := 8 + start := 0 + if f.SelectCursor >= maxVisible { + start = f.SelectCursor - maxVisible + 1 + } + end := start + maxVisible + if end > len(f.FilteredOptions) { + end = len(f.FilteredOptions) + } + + for i := start; i < end; i++ { + opt := f.FilteredOptions[i] + if i == f.SelectCursor { + b.WriteString(lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(tui.Accent).Bold(true).Render(" > " + opt)) + } else { + b.WriteString(lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(tui.Muted).Render(" " + opt)) + } + b.WriteString("\n") + } + + if end < len(f.FilteredOptions) { + more := fmt.Sprintf(" ... %d more", len(f.FilteredOptions)-end) + b.WriteString(lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(tui.Dim).Render(more)) + b.WriteString("\n") + } + } else { + // Closed state: show current value + val := f.Value + if val == "" { + val = "(none)" + } + if isFocused { + val = lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(tui.Accent).Render(val + " [Enter: search]") + } + b.WriteString(val) + } } b.WriteString("\n") + + // Show description for the focused field. + if isFocused && f.Description != "" { + b.WriteString(tui.FieldDescStyle.Render("ℹ " + f.Description)) + b.WriteString("\n") + } } - // Help Footer + // Help Footer - context-dependent b.WriteString("\n") - b.WriteString(lipgloss.NewStyle().Foreground(lipgloss.Color("#626262")).Render("tab/shift+tab: nav \u2022 space: toggle \u2022 \u2190/\u2192: select options \u2022 esc: back")) + hasOpenDropdown := false + for _, f := range visible { + if f.Type == InputSearchSelect && f.SelectOpen { + hasOpenDropdown = true + break + } + } + if hasOpenDropdown { + b.WriteString(tui.HelpBar( + tui.HelpEntry("↑↓", "Navigate"), + tui.HelpEntry("Enter", "Select"), + tui.HelpEntry("Esc", "Close"), + tui.HelpEntry("Type", "Filter"), + )) + } else { + b.WriteString(tui.HelpBar( + tui.HelpEntry("Tab", "Next"), + tui.HelpEntry("Shift+Tab", "Prev"), + tui.HelpEntry("Space", "Toggle"), + tui.HelpEntry("←→", "Options"), + tui.HelpEntry("Enter", "Search"), + tui.HelpEntry("Esc", "Back"), + )) + } return b.String() } diff --git a/internal/cli/tuicore/form_test.go b/internal/cli/tuicore/form_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..632f65df --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/cli/tuicore/form_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +package tuicore + +import ( + "testing" + + tea "github.com/charmbracelet/bubbletea" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func newTestSearchSelectForm(options []string, value string) FormModel { + form := NewFormModel("Test Form") + form.Focus = true + form.AddField(&Field{ + Key: "model", + Label: "Model", + Type: InputSearchSelect, + Value: value, + Options: options, + }) + return form +} + +func TestInputSearchSelect_FilterBySubstring(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give string + wantCount int + wantFirst string + }{ + {give: "", wantCount: 4, wantFirst: "claude-3-opus"}, + {give: "claude", wantCount: 2, wantFirst: "claude-3-opus"}, + {give: "gpt", wantCount: 1, wantFirst: "gpt-4o"}, + {give: "xyz", wantCount: 0}, + {give: "CLAUDE", wantCount: 2, wantFirst: "claude-3-opus"}, // case insensitive + } + + options := []string{"claude-3-opus", "claude-3-sonnet", "gpt-4o", "gemini-pro"} + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + form := newTestSearchSelectForm(options, "") + field := form.Fields[0] + + field.applySearchFilter(tt.give) + + assert.Equal(t, tt.wantCount, len(field.FilteredOptions)) + if tt.wantCount > 0 { + assert.Equal(t, tt.wantFirst, field.FilteredOptions[0]) + } + }) + } +} + +func TestInputSearchSelect_OpenCloseWithEnterEsc(t *testing.T) { + form := newTestSearchSelectForm([]string{"model-a", "model-b", "model-c"}, "model-b") + field := form.Fields[0] + + // Initially closed + assert.False(t, field.SelectOpen) + + // Press Enter to open dropdown + form, _ = form.Update(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyEnter}) + assert.True(t, field.SelectOpen) + + // Cursor should be at current value + assert.Equal(t, 1, field.SelectCursor) // model-b is index 1 + + // Press Esc to close dropdown + form, _ = form.Update(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyEscape}) + assert.False(t, field.SelectOpen) + + // Value should remain unchanged + assert.Equal(t, "model-b", field.Value) +} + +func TestInputSearchSelect_NavigateAndSelect(t *testing.T) { + form := newTestSearchSelectForm([]string{"alpha", "beta", "gamma"}, "alpha") + field := form.Fields[0] + + // Open dropdown + form, _ = form.Update(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyEnter}) + require.True(t, field.SelectOpen) + assert.Equal(t, 0, field.SelectCursor) // alpha at index 0 + + // Navigate down + form, _ = form.Update(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyDown}) + assert.Equal(t, 1, field.SelectCursor) + + form, _ = form.Update(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyDown}) + assert.Equal(t, 2, field.SelectCursor) + + // Don't go past the end + form, _ = form.Update(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyDown}) + assert.Equal(t, 2, field.SelectCursor) + + // Navigate up + form, _ = form.Update(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyUp}) + assert.Equal(t, 1, field.SelectCursor) + + // Select with Enter + form, _ = form.Update(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyEnter}) + assert.False(t, field.SelectOpen) + assert.Equal(t, "beta", field.Value) +} + +func TestInputSearchSelect_TabClosesDropdown(t *testing.T) { + form := NewFormModel("Test") + form.Focus = true + form.AddField(&Field{ + Key: "model", Label: "Model", Type: InputSearchSelect, + Value: "a", + Options: []string{"a", "b", "c"}, + }) + form.AddField(&Field{ + Key: "name", Label: "Name", Type: InputText, + Value: "test", + }) + + field := form.Fields[0] + + // Open dropdown + form, _ = form.Update(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyEnter}) + require.True(t, field.SelectOpen) + + // Tab should close dropdown and move to next field + form, _ = form.Update(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyTab}) + assert.False(t, field.SelectOpen) + assert.Equal(t, 1, form.Cursor) +} + +func TestInputSearchSelect_EscDoesNotCancelForm(t *testing.T) { + cancelled := false + form := newTestSearchSelectForm([]string{"a", "b"}, "a") + form.OnCancel = func() { cancelled = true } + field := form.Fields[0] + + // Open dropdown + form, _ = form.Update(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyEnter}) + require.True(t, field.SelectOpen) + + // Esc should close dropdown, NOT cancel form + form, _ = form.Update(tea.KeyMsg{Type: tea.KeyEscape}) + assert.False(t, field.SelectOpen) + assert.False(t, cancelled) +} + +func TestInputSearchSelect_CursorClamping(t *testing.T) { + form := newTestSearchSelectForm([]string{"embed-a", "embed-b", "gpt-4o"}, "") + field := form.Fields[0] + + field.SelectCursor = 2 + field.applySearchFilter("embed") + + // Cursor should be clamped to new filtered length + assert.Equal(t, 1, field.SelectCursor) // max index is 1 (2 items) +} + +func TestFormModel_HasOpenDropdown(t *testing.T) { + form := NewFormModel("Test") + form.Focus = true + form.AddField(&Field{ + Key: "model", Label: "Model", Type: InputSearchSelect, + Options: []string{"a", "b"}, + }) + form.AddField(&Field{ + Key: "name", Label: "Name", Type: InputText, + }) + + assert.False(t, form.HasOpenDropdown()) + + form.Fields[0].SelectOpen = true + assert.True(t, form.HasOpenDropdown()) +} diff --git a/internal/cli/tuicore/state_update.go b/internal/cli/tuicore/state_update.go index 7a262f22..3cc363b5 100644 --- a/internal/cli/tuicore/state_update.go +++ b/internal/cli/tuicore/state_update.go @@ -206,13 +206,8 @@ func (s *ConfigState) UpdateConfigFromForm(form *FormModel) { // Embedding & RAG case "emb_provider_id": - if val == "local" { - s.Current.Embedding.ProviderID = "" - s.Current.Embedding.Provider = "local" - } else { - s.Current.Embedding.ProviderID = val - s.Current.Embedding.Provider = "" - } + s.Current.Embedding.Provider = val + s.Current.Embedding.ProviderID = "" //nolint:staticcheck // intentional: clear deprecated field case "emb_model": s.Current.Embedding.Model = val case "emb_dimensions": @@ -330,6 +325,155 @@ func (s *ConfigState) UpdateConfigFromForm(form *FormModel) { case "payment_x402_max": s.Current.Payment.X402.MaxAutoPayAmount = val + // P2P Network + case "p2p_enabled": + s.Current.P2P.Enabled = f.Checked + case "p2p_listen_addrs": + s.Current.P2P.ListenAddrs = splitCSV(val) + case "p2p_bootstrap_peers": + s.Current.P2P.BootstrapPeers = splitCSV(val) + case "p2p_enable_relay": + s.Current.P2P.EnableRelay = f.Checked + case "p2p_enable_mdns": + s.Current.P2P.EnableMDNS = f.Checked + case "p2p_max_peers": + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(val); err == nil { + s.Current.P2P.MaxPeers = i + } + case "p2p_handshake_timeout": + if d, err := time.ParseDuration(val); err == nil { + s.Current.P2P.HandshakeTimeout = d + } + case "p2p_session_token_ttl": + if d, err := time.ParseDuration(val); err == nil { + s.Current.P2P.SessionTokenTTL = d + } + case "p2p_auto_approve": + s.Current.P2P.AutoApproveKnownPeers = f.Checked + case "p2p_gossip_interval": + if d, err := time.ParseDuration(val); err == nil { + s.Current.P2P.GossipInterval = d + } + case "p2p_zk_handshake": + s.Current.P2P.ZKHandshake = f.Checked + case "p2p_zk_attestation": + s.Current.P2P.ZKAttestation = f.Checked + case "p2p_require_signed_challenge": + s.Current.P2P.RequireSignedChallenge = f.Checked + case "p2p_min_trust_score": + if fv, err := strconv.ParseFloat(val, 64); err == nil { + s.Current.P2P.MinTrustScore = fv + } + + // P2P ZKP + case "zkp_proof_cache_dir": + s.Current.P2P.ZKP.ProofCacheDir = val + case "zkp_proving_scheme": + s.Current.P2P.ZKP.ProvingScheme = val + case "zkp_srs_mode": + s.Current.P2P.ZKP.SRSMode = val + case "zkp_srs_path": + s.Current.P2P.ZKP.SRSPath = val + case "zkp_max_credential_age": + s.Current.P2P.ZKP.MaxCredentialAge = val + + // P2P Pricing + case "pricing_enabled": + s.Current.P2P.Pricing.Enabled = f.Checked + case "pricing_per_query": + s.Current.P2P.Pricing.PerQuery = val + case "pricing_tool_prices": + s.Current.P2P.Pricing.ToolPrices = parseCustomPatterns(val) + + // P2P Owner Protection + case "owner_name": + s.Current.P2P.OwnerProtection.OwnerName = val + case "owner_email": + s.Current.P2P.OwnerProtection.OwnerEmail = val + case "owner_phone": + s.Current.P2P.OwnerProtection.OwnerPhone = val + case "owner_extra_terms": + s.Current.P2P.OwnerProtection.ExtraTerms = splitCSV(val) + case "owner_block_conversations": + s.Current.P2P.OwnerProtection.BlockConversations = boolPtr(f.Checked) + + // P2P Sandbox + case "sandbox_enabled": + s.Current.P2P.ToolIsolation.Enabled = f.Checked + case "sandbox_timeout": + if d, err := time.ParseDuration(val); err == nil { + s.Current.P2P.ToolIsolation.TimeoutPerTool = d + } + case "sandbox_max_memory_mb": + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(val); err == nil { + s.Current.P2P.ToolIsolation.MaxMemoryMB = i + } + case "container_enabled": + s.Current.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.Enabled = f.Checked + case "container_runtime": + s.Current.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.Runtime = val + case "container_image": + s.Current.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.Image = val + case "container_network_mode": + s.Current.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.NetworkMode = val + case "container_readonly_rootfs": + s.Current.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.ReadOnlyRootfs = boolPtr(f.Checked) + case "container_cpu_quota": + if i, err := strconv.ParseInt(val, 10, 64); err == nil { + s.Current.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.CPUQuotaUS = i + } + case "container_pool_size": + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(val); err == nil { + s.Current.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.PoolSize = i + } + case "container_pool_idle_timeout": + if d, err := time.ParseDuration(val); err == nil { + s.Current.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.PoolIdleTimeout = d + } + + // Security DB Encryption + case "db_encryption_enabled": + s.Current.Security.DBEncryption.Enabled = f.Checked + case "db_cipher_page_size": + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(val); err == nil { + s.Current.Security.DBEncryption.CipherPageSize = i + } + + // Security KMS + case "kms_backend": + // Syncs the KMS backend selector with signer provider. + s.Current.Security.Signer.Provider = val + case "kms_region": + s.Current.Security.KMS.Region = val + case "kms_key_id": + s.Current.Security.KMS.KeyID = val + case "kms_endpoint": + s.Current.Security.KMS.Endpoint = val + case "kms_fallback_to_local": + s.Current.Security.KMS.FallbackToLocal = f.Checked + case "kms_timeout": + if d, err := time.ParseDuration(val); err == nil { + s.Current.Security.KMS.TimeoutPerOperation = d + } + case "kms_max_retries": + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(val); err == nil { + s.Current.Security.KMS.MaxRetries = i + } + case "kms_azure_vault_url": + s.Current.Security.KMS.Azure.VaultURL = val + case "kms_azure_key_version": + s.Current.Security.KMS.Azure.KeyVersion = val + case "kms_pkcs11_module": + s.Current.Security.KMS.PKCS11.ModulePath = val + case "kms_pkcs11_slot_id": + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(val); err == nil { + s.Current.Security.KMS.PKCS11.SlotID = i + } + case "kms_pkcs11_pin": + s.Current.Security.KMS.PKCS11.Pin = val + case "kms_pkcs11_key_label": + s.Current.Security.KMS.PKCS11.KeyLabel = val + // Librarian case "lib_enabled": s.Current.Librarian.Enabled = f.Checked @@ -447,6 +591,9 @@ func (s *ConfigState) UpdateProviderFromForm(id string, form *FormModel) { s.MarkDirty("providers") } +// boolPtr returns a pointer to the given bool value. +func boolPtr(b bool) *bool { return &b } + // parseCustomPatterns parses a comma-separated "name:regex" string into a map. func parseCustomPatterns(val string) map[string]string { if val == "" { diff --git a/internal/config/loader.go b/internal/config/loader.go index bf242961..e3d08341 100644 --- a/internal/config/loader.go +++ b/internal/config/loader.go @@ -58,6 +58,15 @@ func DefaultConfig() *Config { Enabled: true, ApprovalPolicy: ApprovalPolicyDangerous, }, + DBEncryption: DBEncryptionConfig{ + Enabled: false, + CipherPageSize: 4096, + }, + KMS: KMSConfig{ + FallbackToLocal: true, + TimeoutPerOperation: 5 * time.Second, + MaxRetries: 3, + }, }, Knowledge: KnowledgeConfig{ Enabled: false, @@ -115,6 +124,16 @@ func DefaultConfig() *Config { DefaultTimeout: 10 * time.Minute, StateDir: "~/.lango/workflows/", }, + ObservationalMemory: ObservationalMemoryConfig{ + Enabled: false, + MessageTokenThreshold: 1000, + ObservationTokenThreshold: 2000, + MaxMessageTokenBudget: 8000, + MaxReflectionsInContext: 5, + MaxObservationsInContext: 20, + MemoryTokenBudget: 4000, + ReflectionConsolidationThreshold: 5, + }, Librarian: LibrarianConfig{ Enabled: false, ObservationThreshold: 2, @@ -122,9 +141,50 @@ func DefaultConfig() *Config { MaxPendingInquiries: 2, AutoSaveConfidence: types.ConfidenceHigh, }, + P2P: P2PConfig{ + Enabled: false, + ListenAddrs: []string{ + "/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/9000", + "/ip4/0.0.0.0/udp/9000/quic-v1", + }, + KeyDir: "~/.lango/p2p", + EnableRelay: true, + EnableMDNS: true, + MaxPeers: 50, + HandshakeTimeout: 30 * time.Second, + SessionTokenTTL: 24 * time.Hour, + GossipInterval: 30 * time.Second, + ZKHandshake: true, + ZKAttestation: true, + ZKP: ZKPConfig{ + ProofCacheDir: "~/.lango/p2p/zkp-cache", + ProvingScheme: "plonk", + SRSMode: "unsafe", + MaxCredentialAge: "24h", + }, + ToolIsolation: ToolIsolationConfig{ + Enabled: false, + TimeoutPerTool: 30 * time.Second, + MaxMemoryMB: 256, + Container: ContainerSandboxConfig{ + Enabled: false, + Runtime: "auto", + Image: "lango-sandbox:latest", + NetworkMode: "none", + ReadOnlyRootfs: boolPtr(true), + PoolSize: 0, + PoolIdleTimeout: 5 * time.Minute, + }, + }, + }, } } +// boolPtr returns a pointer to a bool value. +func boolPtr(b bool) *bool { + return &b +} + // Load reads configuration from file and environment func Load(configPath string) (*Config, error) { v := viper.New() @@ -154,6 +214,11 @@ func Load(configPath string) (*Config, error) { v.SetDefault("tools.browser.sessionTimeout", defaults.Tools.Browser.SessionTimeout) v.SetDefault("security.interceptor.enabled", defaults.Security.Interceptor.Enabled) v.SetDefault("security.interceptor.approvalPolicy", string(defaults.Security.Interceptor.ApprovalPolicy)) + v.SetDefault("security.dbEncryption.enabled", defaults.Security.DBEncryption.Enabled) + v.SetDefault("security.dbEncryption.cipherPageSize", defaults.Security.DBEncryption.CipherPageSize) + v.SetDefault("security.kms.fallbackToLocal", defaults.Security.KMS.FallbackToLocal) + v.SetDefault("security.kms.timeoutPerOperation", defaults.Security.KMS.TimeoutPerOperation) + v.SetDefault("security.kms.maxRetries", defaults.Security.KMS.MaxRetries) v.SetDefault("graph.enabled", defaults.Graph.Enabled) v.SetDefault("graph.backend", defaults.Graph.Backend) v.SetDefault("graph.maxTraversalDepth", defaults.Graph.MaxTraversalDepth) @@ -188,6 +253,14 @@ func Load(configPath string) (*Config, error) { v.SetDefault("librarian.inquiryCooldownTurns", defaults.Librarian.InquiryCooldownTurns) v.SetDefault("librarian.maxPendingInquiries", defaults.Librarian.MaxPendingInquiries) v.SetDefault("librarian.autoSaveConfidence", defaults.Librarian.AutoSaveConfidence) + v.SetDefault("observationalMemory.enabled", defaults.ObservationalMemory.Enabled) + v.SetDefault("observationalMemory.messageTokenThreshold", defaults.ObservationalMemory.MessageTokenThreshold) + v.SetDefault("observationalMemory.observationTokenThreshold", defaults.ObservationalMemory.ObservationTokenThreshold) + v.SetDefault("observationalMemory.maxMessageTokenBudget", defaults.ObservationalMemory.MaxMessageTokenBudget) + v.SetDefault("observationalMemory.maxReflectionsInContext", defaults.ObservationalMemory.MaxReflectionsInContext) + v.SetDefault("observationalMemory.maxObservationsInContext", defaults.ObservationalMemory.MaxObservationsInContext) + v.SetDefault("observationalMemory.memoryTokenBudget", defaults.ObservationalMemory.MemoryTokenBudget) + v.SetDefault("observationalMemory.reflectionConsolidationThreshold", defaults.ObservationalMemory.ReflectionConsolidationThreshold) v.SetDefault("security.interceptor.presidio.url", "http://localhost:5002") v.SetDefault("security.interceptor.presidio.scoreThreshold", 0.7) v.SetDefault("security.interceptor.presidio.language", "en") @@ -197,6 +270,26 @@ func Load(configPath string) (*Config, error) { v.SetDefault("skill.maxBulkImport", defaults.Skill.MaxBulkImport) v.SetDefault("skill.importConcurrency", defaults.Skill.ImportConcurrency) v.SetDefault("skill.importTimeout", defaults.Skill.ImportTimeout) + v.SetDefault("p2p.enabled", defaults.P2P.Enabled) + v.SetDefault("p2p.listenAddrs", defaults.P2P.ListenAddrs) + v.SetDefault("p2p.keyDir", defaults.P2P.KeyDir) + v.SetDefault("p2p.nodeKeyName", "p2p.node.privatekey") + v.SetDefault("p2p.enableRelay", defaults.P2P.EnableRelay) + v.SetDefault("p2p.enableMdns", defaults.P2P.EnableMDNS) + v.SetDefault("p2p.maxPeers", defaults.P2P.MaxPeers) + v.SetDefault("p2p.handshakeTimeout", defaults.P2P.HandshakeTimeout) + v.SetDefault("p2p.sessionTokenTtl", defaults.P2P.SessionTokenTTL) + v.SetDefault("p2p.gossipInterval", defaults.P2P.GossipInterval) + v.SetDefault("p2p.zkHandshake", defaults.P2P.ZKHandshake) + v.SetDefault("p2p.zkAttestation", defaults.P2P.ZKAttestation) + v.SetDefault("p2p.zkp.proofCacheDir", defaults.P2P.ZKP.ProofCacheDir) + v.SetDefault("p2p.zkp.provingScheme", defaults.P2P.ZKP.ProvingScheme) + v.SetDefault("p2p.toolIsolation.container.enabled", defaults.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.Enabled) + v.SetDefault("p2p.toolIsolation.container.runtime", defaults.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.Runtime) + v.SetDefault("p2p.toolIsolation.container.image", defaults.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.Image) + v.SetDefault("p2p.toolIsolation.container.networkMode", defaults.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.NetworkMode) + v.SetDefault("p2p.toolIsolation.container.poolSize", defaults.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.PoolSize) + v.SetDefault("p2p.toolIsolation.container.poolIdleTimeout", defaults.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.PoolIdleTimeout) // Configure viper v.SetConfigType("json") @@ -224,6 +317,9 @@ func Load(configPath string) (*Config, error) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal config: %w", err) } + // Migrate legacy fields. + cfg.MigrateEmbeddingProvider() + // Apply environment variable substitution substituteEnvVars(cfg) @@ -303,13 +399,34 @@ func Validate(cfg *Config) error { // Validate security config if cfg.Security.Signer.Provider != "" { - validProviders := map[string]bool{"local": true, "rpc": true, "enclave": true} + validProviders := map[string]bool{ + "local": true, "rpc": true, "enclave": true, + "aws-kms": true, "gcp-kms": true, "azure-kv": true, "pkcs11": true, + } if !validProviders[cfg.Security.Signer.Provider] { - errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("invalid security.signer.provider: %q (must be local, rpc, or enclave)", cfg.Security.Signer.Provider)) + errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("invalid security.signer.provider: %q (must be local, rpc, enclave, aws-kms, gcp-kms, azure-kv, or pkcs11)", cfg.Security.Signer.Provider)) } if cfg.Security.Signer.Provider == "rpc" && cfg.Security.Signer.RPCUrl == "" { errs = append(errs, "security.signer.rpcUrl is required when provider is 'rpc'") } + // Validate KMS-specific config. + switch cfg.Security.Signer.Provider { + case "aws-kms", "gcp-kms": + if cfg.Security.KMS.KeyID == "" { + errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("security.kms.keyId is required when provider is %q", cfg.Security.Signer.Provider)) + } + case "azure-kv": + if cfg.Security.KMS.Azure.VaultURL == "" { + errs = append(errs, "security.kms.azure.vaultUrl is required when provider is 'azure-kv'") + } + if cfg.Security.KMS.KeyID == "" { + errs = append(errs, "security.kms.keyId is required when provider is 'azure-kv'") + } + case "pkcs11": + if cfg.Security.KMS.PKCS11.ModulePath == "" { + errs = append(errs, "security.kms.pkcs11.modulePath is required when provider is 'pkcs11'") + } + } } // Validate graph config @@ -338,6 +455,25 @@ func Validate(cfg *Config) error { } } + // Validate P2P config + if cfg.P2P.Enabled { + if !cfg.Payment.Enabled { + errs = append(errs, "p2p requires payment.enabled (wallet needed for identity)") + } + validSchemes := map[string]bool{"plonk": true, "groth16": true} + if cfg.P2P.ZKP.ProvingScheme != "" && !validSchemes[cfg.P2P.ZKP.ProvingScheme] { + errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("invalid p2p.zkp.provingScheme: %q (must be plonk or groth16)", cfg.P2P.ZKP.ProvingScheme)) + } + } + + // Validate container sandbox config + if cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.Enabled { + validRuntimes := map[string]bool{"auto": true, "docker": true, "gvisor": true, "native": true} + if !validRuntimes[cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.Runtime] { + errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("invalid p2p.toolIsolation.container.runtime: %q (must be auto, docker, gvisor, or native)", cfg.P2P.ToolIsolation.Container.Runtime)) + } + } + if len(errs) > 0 { return fmt.Errorf("configuration validation failed:\n - %s", strings.Join(errs, "\n - ")) } diff --git a/internal/config/types.go b/internal/config/types.go index d6c07fad..3bc48763 100644 --- a/internal/config/types.go +++ b/internal/config/types.go @@ -65,280 +65,13 @@ type Config struct { // Librarian configuration (proactive knowledge agent) Librarian LibrarianConfig `mapstructure:"librarian" json:"librarian"` + // P2P network configuration + P2P P2PConfig `mapstructure:"p2p" json:"p2p"` + // Providers configuration Providers map[string]ProviderConfig `mapstructure:"providers" json:"providers"` } -// CronConfig defines cron scheduling settings. -type CronConfig struct { - // Enable the cron scheduling system. - Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` - - // Default timezone for cron schedules (e.g. "Asia/Seoul"). - Timezone string `mapstructure:"timezone" json:"timezone"` - - // Maximum number of concurrently executing jobs. - MaxConcurrentJobs int `mapstructure:"maxConcurrentJobs" json:"maxConcurrentJobs"` - - // Default session mode for jobs: "isolated" or "main". - DefaultSessionMode string `mapstructure:"defaultSessionMode" json:"defaultSessionMode"` - - // How long to retain job execution history (e.g. "30d", "720h"). - HistoryRetention string `mapstructure:"historyRetention" json:"historyRetention"` - - // Default delivery channels when deliver_to is not specified (e.g. ["telegram"]). - DefaultDeliverTo []string `mapstructure:"defaultDeliverTo" json:"defaultDeliverTo"` -} - -// BackgroundConfig defines background task execution settings. -type BackgroundConfig struct { - // Enable the background task system. - Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` - - // Time in milliseconds before an agent turn is auto-yielded to background. - YieldMs int `mapstructure:"yieldMs" json:"yieldMs"` - - // Maximum number of concurrently running background tasks. - MaxConcurrentTasks int `mapstructure:"maxConcurrentTasks" json:"maxConcurrentTasks"` - - // TaskTimeout is the maximum duration for a single background task (default: 30m). - TaskTimeout time.Duration `mapstructure:"taskTimeout" json:"taskTimeout"` - - // Default delivery channels when channel is not specified (e.g. ["telegram"]). - DefaultDeliverTo []string `mapstructure:"defaultDeliverTo" json:"defaultDeliverTo"` -} - -// WorkflowConfig defines workflow engine settings. -type WorkflowConfig struct { - // Enable the workflow engine. - Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` - - // Maximum number of concurrently executing workflow steps. - MaxConcurrentSteps int `mapstructure:"maxConcurrentSteps" json:"maxConcurrentSteps"` - - // Default timeout for a single workflow step (e.g. "10m"). - DefaultTimeout time.Duration `mapstructure:"defaultTimeout" json:"defaultTimeout"` - - // Directory to store workflow state for resume capability. - StateDir string `mapstructure:"stateDir" json:"stateDir"` - - // Default delivery channels when deliver_to is not specified (e.g. ["telegram"]). - DefaultDeliverTo []string `mapstructure:"defaultDeliverTo" json:"defaultDeliverTo"` -} - -// LibrarianConfig defines proactive knowledge librarian settings. -type LibrarianConfig struct { - // Enable the proactive librarian system. - Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` - - // Minimum observation count to trigger analysis (default: 2). - ObservationThreshold int `mapstructure:"observationThreshold" json:"observationThreshold"` - - // Turns between inquiries per session (default: 3). - InquiryCooldownTurns int `mapstructure:"inquiryCooldownTurns" json:"inquiryCooldownTurns"` - - // Maximum pending inquiries per session (default: 2). - MaxPendingInquiries int `mapstructure:"maxPendingInquiries" json:"maxPendingInquiries"` - - // Minimum confidence level for auto-save: "high", "medium", "low" (default: "high"). - AutoSaveConfidence types.Confidence `mapstructure:"autoSaveConfidence" json:"autoSaveConfidence"` - - // LLM provider for analysis (empty = use agent default). - Provider string `mapstructure:"provider" json:"provider"` - - // Model ID for analysis (empty = use agent default). - Model string `mapstructure:"model" json:"model"` -} - -// SkillConfig defines file-based skill settings. -type SkillConfig struct { - // Enable the skill system. - Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` - - // SkillsDir is the directory containing skill files (default: ~/.lango/skills). - SkillsDir string `mapstructure:"skillsDir" json:"skillsDir"` - - // AllowImport enables importing skills from external URLs and GitHub repositories. - AllowImport bool `mapstructure:"allowImport" json:"allowImport"` - - // MaxBulkImport limits the number of skills in a single bulk import operation (default: 50). - MaxBulkImport int `mapstructure:"maxBulkImport" json:"maxBulkImport"` - - // ImportConcurrency sets the number of concurrent HTTP requests during bulk import (default: 5). - ImportConcurrency int `mapstructure:"importConcurrency" json:"importConcurrency"` - - // ImportTimeout is the overall timeout for skill import operations (default: 2m). - ImportTimeout time.Duration `mapstructure:"importTimeout" json:"importTimeout"` -} - -// KnowledgeConfig defines self-learning knowledge system settings -type KnowledgeConfig struct { - // Enable the knowledge/learning system - Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` - - // Maximum context items per layer in retrieval - MaxContextPerLayer int `mapstructure:"maxContextPerLayer" json:"maxContextPerLayer"` - - // AnalysisTurnThreshold is the number of new turns before triggering conversation analysis (default: 10). - AnalysisTurnThreshold int `mapstructure:"analysisTurnThreshold" json:"analysisTurnThreshold"` - - // AnalysisTokenThreshold is the token count before triggering conversation analysis (default: 2000). - AnalysisTokenThreshold int `mapstructure:"analysisTokenThreshold" json:"analysisTokenThreshold"` -} - -// ObservationalMemoryConfig defines Observational Memory settings -type ObservationalMemoryConfig struct { - // Enable the observational memory system - Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` - - // LLM provider for observer/reflector (empty = use agent default) - Provider string `mapstructure:"provider" json:"provider"` - - // Model ID for observer/reflector (empty = use agent default) - Model string `mapstructure:"model" json:"model"` - - // Token threshold to trigger observation (default: 1000) - MessageTokenThreshold int `mapstructure:"messageTokenThreshold" json:"messageTokenThreshold"` - - // Token threshold to trigger reflection (default: 2000) - ObservationTokenThreshold int `mapstructure:"observationTokenThreshold" json:"observationTokenThreshold"` - - // Max token budget for recent messages in context (default: 8000) - MaxMessageTokenBudget int `mapstructure:"maxMessageTokenBudget" json:"maxMessageTokenBudget"` - - // MaxReflectionsInContext limits reflections injected into LLM context (default: 5, 0 = unlimited). - MaxReflectionsInContext int `mapstructure:"maxReflectionsInContext" json:"maxReflectionsInContext"` - - // MaxObservationsInContext limits observations injected into LLM context (default: 20, 0 = unlimited). - MaxObservationsInContext int `mapstructure:"maxObservationsInContext" json:"maxObservationsInContext"` -} - -// EmbeddingConfig defines embedding and RAG settings. -type EmbeddingConfig struct { - // ProviderID references a key in the providers map (e.g., "gemini-1", "my-openai"). - // The embedding backend type and API key are resolved from this provider. - // For local (Ollama) embeddings, leave ProviderID empty and set Provider to "local". - ProviderID string `mapstructure:"providerID" json:"providerID"` - - // Provider is used only for local (Ollama) embeddings where no entry in the - // providers map is needed. Set to "local" to enable local embeddings. - Provider string `mapstructure:"provider" json:"provider"` - - // Model is the embedding model identifier. - Model string `mapstructure:"model" json:"model"` - - // Dimensions is the embedding vector dimensionality. - Dimensions int `mapstructure:"dimensions" json:"dimensions"` - - // Local holds settings for the local (Ollama) provider. - Local LocalEmbeddingConfig `mapstructure:"local" json:"local"` - - // RAG holds retrieval-augmented generation settings. - RAG RAGConfig `mapstructure:"rag" json:"rag"` -} - -// LocalEmbeddingConfig defines settings for a local embedding provider. -type LocalEmbeddingConfig struct { - // BaseURL is the Ollama endpoint (default: http://localhost:11434/v1). - BaseURL string `mapstructure:"baseUrl" json:"baseUrl"` - // Model overrides the embedding model for local provider. - Model string `mapstructure:"model" json:"model"` -} - -// RAGConfig defines retrieval-augmented generation settings. -type RAGConfig struct { - // Enabled activates RAG context injection. - Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` - // MaxResults is the maximum number of results to inject. - MaxResults int `mapstructure:"maxResults" json:"maxResults"` - // Collections to search (empty means all). - Collections []string `mapstructure:"collections" json:"collections"` - // MaxDistance is the maximum cosine distance for RAG results (0.0 = disabled). - MaxDistance float32 `mapstructure:"maxDistance" json:"maxDistance"` -} - -// AuthConfig defines authentication settings -type AuthConfig struct { - // OIDC Providers - Providers map[string]OIDCProviderConfig `mapstructure:"providers" json:"providers"` -} - -// OIDCProviderConfig defines a single OIDC provider -type OIDCProviderConfig struct { - IssuerURL string `mapstructure:"issuerUrl" json:"issuerUrl"` - ClientID string `mapstructure:"clientId" json:"clientId"` - ClientSecret string `mapstructure:"clientSecret" json:"clientSecret"` - RedirectURL string `mapstructure:"redirectUrl" json:"redirectUrl"` - Scopes []string `mapstructure:"scopes" json:"scopes"` -} - -// SecurityConfig defines security settings -type SecurityConfig struct { - // Interceptor configuration - Interceptor InterceptorConfig `mapstructure:"interceptor" json:"interceptor"` - // Signer configuration - Signer SignerConfig `mapstructure:"signer" json:"signer"` -} - -// ApprovalPolicy determines which tools require approval before execution. -type ApprovalPolicy string - -const ( - // ApprovalPolicyDangerous requires approval for Dangerous-level tools (default). - ApprovalPolicyDangerous ApprovalPolicy = "dangerous" - // ApprovalPolicyAll requires approval for all tools. - ApprovalPolicyAll ApprovalPolicy = "all" - // ApprovalPolicyConfigured requires approval only for explicitly listed SensitiveTools. - ApprovalPolicyConfigured ApprovalPolicy = "configured" - // ApprovalPolicyNone disables approval entirely. - ApprovalPolicyNone ApprovalPolicy = "none" -) - -// Valid reports whether p is a known approval policy. -func (p ApprovalPolicy) Valid() bool { - switch p { - case ApprovalPolicyDangerous, ApprovalPolicyAll, ApprovalPolicyConfigured, ApprovalPolicyNone: - return true - } - return false -} - -// Values returns all known approval policies. -func (p ApprovalPolicy) Values() []ApprovalPolicy { - return []ApprovalPolicy{ApprovalPolicyDangerous, ApprovalPolicyAll, ApprovalPolicyConfigured, ApprovalPolicyNone} -} - -// InterceptorConfig defines AI Privacy Interceptor settings -type InterceptorConfig struct { - Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` - RedactPII bool `mapstructure:"redactPii" json:"redactPii"` - ApprovalPolicy ApprovalPolicy `mapstructure:"approvalPolicy" json:"approvalPolicy"` // default: "dangerous" - HeadlessAutoApprove bool `mapstructure:"headlessAutoApprove" json:"headlessAutoApprove"` - NotifyChannel string `mapstructure:"notifyChannel" json:"notifyChannel"` // e.g. "discord", "telegram" - SensitiveTools []string `mapstructure:"sensitiveTools" json:"sensitiveTools"` - ExemptTools []string `mapstructure:"exemptTools" json:"exemptTools"` // Tools exempt from approval regardless of policy - PIIRegexPatterns []string `mapstructure:"piiRegexPatterns" json:"piiRegexPatterns"` - ApprovalTimeoutSec int `mapstructure:"approvalTimeoutSec" json:"approvalTimeoutSec"` // default 30 - PIIDisabledPatterns []string `mapstructure:"piiDisabledPatterns" json:"piiDisabledPatterns"` - PIICustomPatterns map[string]string `mapstructure:"piiCustomPatterns" json:"piiCustomPatterns"` - Presidio PresidioConfig `mapstructure:"presidio" json:"presidio"` -} - -// PresidioConfig defines Microsoft Presidio integration settings. -type PresidioConfig struct { - Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` - URL string `mapstructure:"url" json:"url"` // default: http://localhost:5002 - ScoreThreshold float64 `mapstructure:"scoreThreshold" json:"scoreThreshold"` // default: 0.7 - Language string `mapstructure:"language" json:"language"` // default: "en" -} - -// SignerConfig defines Secure Signer settings -type SignerConfig struct { - Provider string `mapstructure:"provider" json:"provider"` // "local", "rpc", "enclave" - RPCUrl string `mapstructure:"rpcUrl" json:"rpcUrl"` // for RPC provider - KeyID string `mapstructure:"keyId" json:"keyId"` // Key identifier -} - // ServerConfig defines gateway server settings type ServerConfig struct { // Host to bind to (default: "localhost") @@ -390,6 +123,18 @@ type AgentConfig struct { // ToolTimeout is the maximum duration for a single tool call execution (default: 2m). ToolTimeout time.Duration `mapstructure:"toolTimeout" json:"toolTimeout"` + + // MaxTurns limits the number of tool-calling iterations per agent run (default: 25). + // Zero means use the default. + MaxTurns int `mapstructure:"maxTurns" json:"maxTurns"` + + // ErrorCorrectionEnabled enables learning-based error correction (default: true). + // When nil, defaults to true if the knowledge system is enabled. + ErrorCorrectionEnabled *bool `mapstructure:"errorCorrectionEnabled" json:"errorCorrectionEnabled"` + + // MaxDelegationRounds limits orchestrator→sub-agent delegation rounds per turn (default: 10). + // Zero means use the default. + MaxDelegationRounds int `mapstructure:"maxDelegationRounds" json:"maxDelegationRounds"` } // ProviderConfig defines AI provider settings @@ -522,138 +267,3 @@ type BrowserToolConfig struct { // Session timeout SessionTimeout time.Duration `mapstructure:"sessionTimeout" json:"sessionTimeout"` } - -// ProviderTypeToEmbeddingType maps a provider config type to the corresponding -// embedding backend type. -var ProviderTypeToEmbeddingType = map[types.ProviderType]string{ - types.ProviderOpenAI: "openai", - types.ProviderGemini: "google", - types.ProviderGoogle: "google", - types.ProviderAnthropic: "", - types.ProviderOllama: "local", -} - -// GraphConfig defines graph store settings for relationship-aware retrieval. -type GraphConfig struct { - // Enable the graph store. - Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` - - // Backend type: "bolt" (default, embedded BoltDB) or "rocksdb". - Backend string `mapstructure:"backend" json:"backend"` - - // DatabasePath is the file path for the graph database. - // Defaults to a "graph.db" file next to the session database. - DatabasePath string `mapstructure:"databasePath" json:"databasePath"` - - // MaxTraversalDepth limits graph expansion depth (default: 2). - MaxTraversalDepth int `mapstructure:"maxTraversalDepth" json:"maxTraversalDepth"` - - // MaxExpansionResults limits how many graph-expanded results to return (default: 10). - MaxExpansionResults int `mapstructure:"maxExpansionResults" json:"maxExpansionResults"` -} - -// A2AConfig defines Agent-to-Agent protocol settings. -type A2AConfig struct { - // Enable A2A protocol support. - Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` - - // BaseURL is the external URL where this agent is reachable. - BaseURL string `mapstructure:"baseUrl" json:"baseUrl"` - - // AgentName is the name advertised in the Agent Card. - AgentName string `mapstructure:"agentName" json:"agentName"` - - // AgentDescription is the description in the Agent Card. - AgentDescription string `mapstructure:"agentDescription" json:"agentDescription"` - - // RemoteAgents is a list of external A2A agents to integrate as sub-agents. - RemoteAgents []RemoteAgentConfig `mapstructure:"remoteAgents" json:"remoteAgents"` -} - -// RemoteAgentConfig defines an external A2A agent to connect to. -type RemoteAgentConfig struct { - // Name is the local name for this remote agent. - Name string `mapstructure:"name" json:"name"` - - // AgentCardURL is the URL to fetch the agent card from. - // Typically: https://host/.well-known/agent.json - AgentCardURL string `mapstructure:"agentCardUrl" json:"agentCardUrl"` -} - -// PaymentConfig defines blockchain payment settings. -type PaymentConfig struct { - // Enable blockchain payment features. - Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` - - // WalletProvider selects the wallet backend: "local", "rpc", or "composite". - WalletProvider string `mapstructure:"walletProvider" json:"walletProvider"` - - // Network defines blockchain network parameters. - Network PaymentNetworkConfig `mapstructure:"network" json:"network"` - - // Limits defines spending restrictions. - Limits SpendingLimitsConfig `mapstructure:"limits" json:"limits"` - - // X402 defines X402 protocol interception settings. - X402 X402Config `mapstructure:"x402" json:"x402"` -} - -// PaymentNetworkConfig defines blockchain network parameters. -type PaymentNetworkConfig struct { - // ChainID is the EVM chain ID (default: 84532 = Base Sepolia). - ChainID int64 `mapstructure:"chainId" json:"chainId"` - - // RPCURL is the JSON-RPC endpoint for the blockchain network. - RPCURL string `mapstructure:"rpcUrl" json:"rpcUrl"` - - // USDCContract is the USDC token contract address on the target chain. - USDCContract string `mapstructure:"usdcContract" json:"usdcContract"` -} - -// SpendingLimitsConfig defines spending restrictions for payment transactions. -type SpendingLimitsConfig struct { - // MaxPerTx is the maximum amount per transaction in USDC (e.g. "1.00"). - MaxPerTx string `mapstructure:"maxPerTx" json:"maxPerTx"` - - // MaxDaily is the maximum daily spending in USDC (e.g. "10.00"). - MaxDaily string `mapstructure:"maxDaily" json:"maxDaily"` - - // AutoApproveBelow is the amount below which transactions are auto-approved. - AutoApproveBelow string `mapstructure:"autoApproveBelow" json:"autoApproveBelow"` -} - -// X402Config defines X402 protocol interception settings. -type X402Config struct { - // AutoIntercept enables automatic interception of HTTP 402 responses. - AutoIntercept bool `mapstructure:"autoIntercept" json:"autoIntercept"` - - // MaxAutoPayAmount is the maximum amount to auto-pay for X402 challenges. - MaxAutoPayAmount string `mapstructure:"maxAutoPayAmount" json:"maxAutoPayAmount"` -} - -// ResolveEmbeddingProvider returns the embedding backend type and API key -// for the configured embedding provider. -// Priority: ProviderID (from providers map) > Provider "local" (Ollama). -func (c *Config) ResolveEmbeddingProvider() (backendType, apiKey string) { - emb := c.Embedding - - // Explicit provider ID — resolve type and key from providers map. - if emb.ProviderID != "" { - p, ok := c.Providers[emb.ProviderID] - if !ok { - return "", "" - } - bt := ProviderTypeToEmbeddingType[p.Type] - if bt == "" { - return "", "" - } - return bt, p.APIKey - } - - // Local (Ollama) provider — no API key needed. - if emb.Provider == "local" { - return "local", "" - } - - return "", "" -} diff --git a/internal/config/types_automation.go b/internal/config/types_automation.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..72bf2ed0 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/config/types_automation.go @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +package config + +import "time" + +// CronConfig defines cron scheduling settings. +type CronConfig struct { + // Enable the cron scheduling system. + Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` + + // Default timezone for cron schedules (e.g. "Asia/Seoul"). + Timezone string `mapstructure:"timezone" json:"timezone"` + + // Maximum number of concurrently executing jobs. + MaxConcurrentJobs int `mapstructure:"maxConcurrentJobs" json:"maxConcurrentJobs"` + + // Default session mode for jobs: "isolated" or "main". + DefaultSessionMode string `mapstructure:"defaultSessionMode" json:"defaultSessionMode"` + + // How long to retain job execution history (e.g. "30d", "720h"). + HistoryRetention string `mapstructure:"historyRetention" json:"historyRetention"` + + // Default delivery channels when deliver_to is not specified (e.g. ["telegram"]). + DefaultDeliverTo []string `mapstructure:"defaultDeliverTo" json:"defaultDeliverTo"` +} + +// BackgroundConfig defines background task execution settings. +type BackgroundConfig struct { + // Enable the background task system. + Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` + + // Time in milliseconds before an agent turn is auto-yielded to background. + YieldMs int `mapstructure:"yieldMs" json:"yieldMs"` + + // Maximum number of concurrently running background tasks. + MaxConcurrentTasks int `mapstructure:"maxConcurrentTasks" json:"maxConcurrentTasks"` + + // TaskTimeout is the maximum duration for a single background task (default: 30m). + TaskTimeout time.Duration `mapstructure:"taskTimeout" json:"taskTimeout"` + + // Default delivery channels when channel is not specified (e.g. ["telegram"]). + DefaultDeliverTo []string `mapstructure:"defaultDeliverTo" json:"defaultDeliverTo"` +} + +// WorkflowConfig defines workflow engine settings. +type WorkflowConfig struct { + // Enable the workflow engine. + Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` + + // Maximum number of concurrently executing workflow steps. + MaxConcurrentSteps int `mapstructure:"maxConcurrentSteps" json:"maxConcurrentSteps"` + + // Default timeout for a single workflow step (e.g. "10m"). + DefaultTimeout time.Duration `mapstructure:"defaultTimeout" json:"defaultTimeout"` + + // Directory to store workflow state for resume capability. + StateDir string `mapstructure:"stateDir" json:"stateDir"` + + // Default delivery channels when deliver_to is not specified (e.g. ["telegram"]). + DefaultDeliverTo []string `mapstructure:"defaultDeliverTo" json:"defaultDeliverTo"` +} + +// PaymentConfig defines blockchain payment settings. +type PaymentConfig struct { + // Enable blockchain payment features. + Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` + + // WalletProvider selects the wallet backend: "local", "rpc", or "composite". + WalletProvider string `mapstructure:"walletProvider" json:"walletProvider"` + + // Network defines blockchain network parameters. + Network PaymentNetworkConfig `mapstructure:"network" json:"network"` + + // Limits defines spending restrictions. + Limits SpendingLimitsConfig `mapstructure:"limits" json:"limits"` + + // X402 defines X402 protocol interception settings. + X402 X402Config `mapstructure:"x402" json:"x402"` +} + +// PaymentNetworkConfig defines blockchain network parameters. +type PaymentNetworkConfig struct { + // ChainID is the EVM chain ID (default: 84532 = Base Sepolia). + ChainID int64 `mapstructure:"chainId" json:"chainId"` + + // RPCURL is the JSON-RPC endpoint for the blockchain network. + RPCURL string `mapstructure:"rpcUrl" json:"rpcUrl"` + + // USDCContract is the USDC token contract address on the target chain. + USDCContract string `mapstructure:"usdcContract" json:"usdcContract"` +} + +// SpendingLimitsConfig defines spending restrictions for payment transactions. +type SpendingLimitsConfig struct { + // MaxPerTx is the maximum amount per transaction in USDC (e.g. "1.00"). + MaxPerTx string `mapstructure:"maxPerTx" json:"maxPerTx"` + + // MaxDaily is the maximum daily spending in USDC (e.g. "10.00"). + MaxDaily string `mapstructure:"maxDaily" json:"maxDaily"` + + // AutoApproveBelow is the amount below which transactions are auto-approved. + AutoApproveBelow string `mapstructure:"autoApproveBelow" json:"autoApproveBelow"` +} + +// X402Config defines X402 protocol interception settings. +type X402Config struct { + // AutoIntercept enables automatic interception of HTTP 402 responses. + AutoIntercept bool `mapstructure:"autoIntercept" json:"autoIntercept"` + + // MaxAutoPayAmount is the maximum amount to auto-pay for X402 challenges. + MaxAutoPayAmount string `mapstructure:"maxAutoPayAmount" json:"maxAutoPayAmount"` +} + +// A2AConfig defines Agent-to-Agent protocol settings. +type A2AConfig struct { + // Enable A2A protocol support. + Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` + + // BaseURL is the external URL where this agent is reachable. + BaseURL string `mapstructure:"baseUrl" json:"baseUrl"` + + // AgentName is the name advertised in the Agent Card. + AgentName string `mapstructure:"agentName" json:"agentName"` + + // AgentDescription is the description in the Agent Card. + AgentDescription string `mapstructure:"agentDescription" json:"agentDescription"` + + // RemoteAgents is a list of external A2A agents to integrate as sub-agents. + RemoteAgents []RemoteAgentConfig `mapstructure:"remoteAgents" json:"remoteAgents"` +} + +// RemoteAgentConfig defines an external A2A agent to connect to. +type RemoteAgentConfig struct { + // Name is the local name for this remote agent. + Name string `mapstructure:"name" json:"name"` + + // AgentCardURL is the URL to fetch the agent card from. + // Typically: https://host/.well-known/agent.json + AgentCardURL string `mapstructure:"agentCardUrl" json:"agentCardUrl"` +} diff --git a/internal/config/types_knowledge.go b/internal/config/types_knowledge.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7351339d --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/config/types_knowledge.go @@ -0,0 +1,229 @@ +package config + +import ( + "time" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/types" +) + +// KnowledgeConfig defines self-learning knowledge system settings +type KnowledgeConfig struct { + // Enable the knowledge/learning system + Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` + + // Maximum context items per layer in retrieval + MaxContextPerLayer int `mapstructure:"maxContextPerLayer" json:"maxContextPerLayer"` + + // AnalysisTurnThreshold is the number of new turns before triggering conversation analysis (default: 10). + AnalysisTurnThreshold int `mapstructure:"analysisTurnThreshold" json:"analysisTurnThreshold"` + + // AnalysisTokenThreshold is the token count before triggering conversation analysis (default: 2000). + AnalysisTokenThreshold int `mapstructure:"analysisTokenThreshold" json:"analysisTokenThreshold"` +} + +// ObservationalMemoryConfig defines Observational Memory settings +type ObservationalMemoryConfig struct { + // Enable the observational memory system + Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` + + // LLM provider for observer/reflector (empty = use agent default) + Provider string `mapstructure:"provider" json:"provider"` + + // Model ID for observer/reflector (empty = use agent default) + Model string `mapstructure:"model" json:"model"` + + // Token threshold to trigger observation (default: 1000) + MessageTokenThreshold int `mapstructure:"messageTokenThreshold" json:"messageTokenThreshold"` + + // Token threshold to trigger reflection (default: 2000) + ObservationTokenThreshold int `mapstructure:"observationTokenThreshold" json:"observationTokenThreshold"` + + // Max token budget for recent messages in context (default: 8000) + MaxMessageTokenBudget int `mapstructure:"maxMessageTokenBudget" json:"maxMessageTokenBudget"` + + // MaxReflectionsInContext limits reflections injected into LLM context (default: 5, 0 = unlimited). + MaxReflectionsInContext int `mapstructure:"maxReflectionsInContext" json:"maxReflectionsInContext"` + + // MaxObservationsInContext limits observations injected into LLM context (default: 20, 0 = unlimited). + MaxObservationsInContext int `mapstructure:"maxObservationsInContext" json:"maxObservationsInContext"` + + // MemoryTokenBudget sets the max token budget for the memory section in system prompt (default: 4000). + // Zero means use the default. + MemoryTokenBudget int `mapstructure:"memoryTokenBudget" json:"memoryTokenBudget"` + + // ReflectionConsolidationThreshold is the min reflections before meta-reflection triggers (default: 5). + // Zero means use the default. + ReflectionConsolidationThreshold int `mapstructure:"reflectionConsolidationThreshold" json:"reflectionConsolidationThreshold"` +} + +// EmbeddingConfig defines embedding and RAG settings. +type EmbeddingConfig struct { + // Provider selects the embedding provider. Set to "local" for Ollama-based + // local embeddings, or use a key from the providers map (e.g., "my-openai", + // "gemini-1") to resolve the backend type and API key automatically. + Provider string `mapstructure:"provider" json:"provider"` + + // Deprecated: ProviderID is kept only for backwards-compatible config loading. + // New configs should use Provider for both local and remote providers. + ProviderID string `mapstructure:"providerID" json:"providerID,omitempty"` + + // Model is the embedding model identifier. + Model string `mapstructure:"model" json:"model"` + + // Dimensions is the embedding vector dimensionality. + Dimensions int `mapstructure:"dimensions" json:"dimensions"` + + // Local holds settings for the local (Ollama) provider. + Local LocalEmbeddingConfig `mapstructure:"local" json:"local"` + + // RAG holds retrieval-augmented generation settings. + RAG RAGConfig `mapstructure:"rag" json:"rag"` +} + +// LocalEmbeddingConfig defines settings for a local embedding provider. +type LocalEmbeddingConfig struct { + // BaseURL is the Ollama endpoint (default: http://localhost:11434/v1). + BaseURL string `mapstructure:"baseUrl" json:"baseUrl"` + // Deprecated: Model is now unified in EmbeddingConfig.Model for all providers. + // Retained only for backward-compatible config loading and migration. + Model string `mapstructure:"model" json:"model,omitempty"` +} + +// RAGConfig defines retrieval-augmented generation settings. +type RAGConfig struct { + // Enabled activates RAG context injection. + Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` + // MaxResults is the maximum number of results to inject. + MaxResults int `mapstructure:"maxResults" json:"maxResults"` + // Collections to search (empty means all). + Collections []string `mapstructure:"collections" json:"collections"` + // MaxDistance is the maximum cosine distance for RAG results (0.0 = disabled). + MaxDistance float32 `mapstructure:"maxDistance" json:"maxDistance"` +} + +// GraphConfig defines graph store settings for relationship-aware retrieval. +type GraphConfig struct { + // Enable the graph store. + Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` + + // Backend type: "bolt" (default, embedded BoltDB) or "rocksdb". + Backend string `mapstructure:"backend" json:"backend"` + + // DatabasePath is the file path for the graph database. + // Defaults to a "graph.db" file next to the session database. + DatabasePath string `mapstructure:"databasePath" json:"databasePath"` + + // MaxTraversalDepth limits graph expansion depth (default: 2). + MaxTraversalDepth int `mapstructure:"maxTraversalDepth" json:"maxTraversalDepth"` + + // MaxExpansionResults limits how many graph-expanded results to return (default: 10). + MaxExpansionResults int `mapstructure:"maxExpansionResults" json:"maxExpansionResults"` +} + +// LibrarianConfig defines proactive knowledge librarian settings. +type LibrarianConfig struct { + // Enable the proactive librarian system. + Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` + + // Minimum observation count to trigger analysis (default: 2). + ObservationThreshold int `mapstructure:"observationThreshold" json:"observationThreshold"` + + // Turns between inquiries per session (default: 3). + InquiryCooldownTurns int `mapstructure:"inquiryCooldownTurns" json:"inquiryCooldownTurns"` + + // Maximum pending inquiries per session (default: 2). + MaxPendingInquiries int `mapstructure:"maxPendingInquiries" json:"maxPendingInquiries"` + + // Minimum confidence level for auto-save: "high", "medium", "low" (default: "high"). + AutoSaveConfidence types.Confidence `mapstructure:"autoSaveConfidence" json:"autoSaveConfidence"` + + // LLM provider for analysis (empty = use agent default). + Provider string `mapstructure:"provider" json:"provider"` + + // Model ID for analysis (empty = use agent default). + Model string `mapstructure:"model" json:"model"` +} + +// SkillConfig defines file-based skill settings. +type SkillConfig struct { + // Enable the skill system. + Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` + + // SkillsDir is the directory containing skill files (default: ~/.lango/skills). + SkillsDir string `mapstructure:"skillsDir" json:"skillsDir"` + + // AllowImport enables importing skills from external URLs and GitHub repositories. + AllowImport bool `mapstructure:"allowImport" json:"allowImport"` + + // MaxBulkImport limits the number of skills in a single bulk import operation (default: 50). + MaxBulkImport int `mapstructure:"maxBulkImport" json:"maxBulkImport"` + + // ImportConcurrency sets the number of concurrent HTTP requests during bulk import (default: 5). + ImportConcurrency int `mapstructure:"importConcurrency" json:"importConcurrency"` + + // ImportTimeout is the overall timeout for skill import operations (default: 2m). + ImportTimeout time.Duration `mapstructure:"importTimeout" json:"importTimeout"` +} + +// ProviderTypeToEmbeddingType maps a provider config type to the corresponding +// embedding backend type. +var ProviderTypeToEmbeddingType = map[types.ProviderType]string{ + types.ProviderOpenAI: "openai", + types.ProviderGemini: "google", + types.ProviderGoogle: "google", + types.ProviderAnthropic: "", + types.ProviderOllama: "local", +} + +// ResolveEmbeddingProvider returns the embedding backend type and API key +// for the configured embedding provider. +// The Provider field can be "local" (Ollama) or a key in the providers map. +// Legacy configs with ProviderID are handled via MigrateEmbeddingProvider. +func (c *Config) ResolveEmbeddingProvider() (backendType, apiKey string) { + emb := c.Embedding + + provider := emb.Provider + // Backwards compatibility: fall back to deprecated ProviderID. + if provider == "" && emb.ProviderID != "" { + provider = emb.ProviderID + } + + if provider == "" { + return "", "" + } + + // Local (Ollama) provider — no API key needed. + if provider == "local" { + return "local", "" + } + + // Look up in providers map. + p, ok := c.Providers[provider] + if !ok { + return "", "" + } + bt := ProviderTypeToEmbeddingType[p.Type] + if bt == "" { + return "", "" + } + return bt, p.APIKey +} + +// MigrateEmbeddingProvider migrates legacy configs that use separate ProviderID +// and Provider fields into the unified Provider field, and consolidates +// the deprecated Local.Model into the canonical Model field. +func (c *Config) MigrateEmbeddingProvider() { + if c.Embedding.ProviderID != "" && c.Embedding.Provider == "" { + c.Embedding.Provider = c.Embedding.ProviderID + c.Embedding.ProviderID = "" + } + // If both are set, Provider takes precedence; clear deprecated ProviderID. + if c.Embedding.ProviderID != "" && c.Embedding.Provider != "" { + c.Embedding.ProviderID = "" + } + // Migrate deprecated Local.Model into unified Model field. + if c.Embedding.Local.Model != "" && c.Embedding.Model == "" { + c.Embedding.Model = c.Embedding.Local.Model + } + c.Embedding.Local.Model = "" +} diff --git a/internal/config/types_p2p.go b/internal/config/types_p2p.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..74241522 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/config/types_p2p.go @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +package config + +import "time" + +// P2PConfig defines peer-to-peer network settings for the Sovereign Agent Network. +type P2PConfig struct { + // Enable P2P networking. + Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` + + // ListenAddrs are the multiaddrs to listen on (e.g. /ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/9000). + ListenAddrs []string `mapstructure:"listenAddrs" json:"listenAddrs"` + + // BootstrapPeers are initial peers to connect to for DHT bootstrapping. + BootstrapPeers []string `mapstructure:"bootstrapPeers" json:"bootstrapPeers"` + + // Deprecated: KeyDir is the legacy directory for persisting node keys. + // Node keys are now stored in SecretsStore (encrypted) when available. + // This field is retained for backward compatibility and migration. + KeyDir string `mapstructure:"keyDir" json:"keyDir,omitempty"` + + // EnableRelay allows this node to act as a relay for NAT traversal. + EnableRelay bool `mapstructure:"enableRelay" json:"enableRelay"` + + // EnableMDNS enables multicast DNS for local peer discovery. + EnableMDNS bool `mapstructure:"enableMdns" json:"enableMdns"` + + // MaxPeers is the maximum number of connected peers. + MaxPeers int `mapstructure:"maxPeers" json:"maxPeers"` + + // HandshakeTimeout is the maximum duration for peer handshake. + HandshakeTimeout time.Duration `mapstructure:"handshakeTimeout" json:"handshakeTimeout"` + + // SessionTokenTTL is the lifetime of session tokens after handshake. + SessionTokenTTL time.Duration `mapstructure:"sessionTokenTtl" json:"sessionTokenTtl"` + + // AutoApproveKnownPeers skips HITL approval for previously authenticated peers. + AutoApproveKnownPeers bool `mapstructure:"autoApproveKnownPeers" json:"autoApproveKnownPeers"` + + // FirewallRules defines static ACL rules for the knowledge firewall. + FirewallRules []FirewallRule `mapstructure:"firewallRules" json:"firewallRules"` + + // GossipInterval is the interval for gossip-based agent card propagation. + GossipInterval time.Duration `mapstructure:"gossipInterval" json:"gossipInterval"` + + // ZKHandshake enables ZK-enhanced handshake instead of plain signature mode. + ZKHandshake bool `mapstructure:"zkHandshake" json:"zkHandshake"` + + // ZKAttestation enables ZK attestation proofs on responses to peers. + ZKAttestation bool `mapstructure:"zkAttestation" json:"zkAttestation"` + + // ZKP holds zero-knowledge proof settings. + ZKP ZKPConfig `mapstructure:"zkp" json:"zkp"` + + // Pricing for paid P2P tool invocations. + Pricing P2PPricingConfig `mapstructure:"pricing" json:"pricing"` + + // OwnerProtection prevents owner PII from leaking via P2P. + OwnerProtection OwnerProtectionConfig `mapstructure:"ownerProtection" json:"ownerProtection"` + + // MinTrustScore is the minimum reputation to accept requests (0.0 to 1.0, default 0.3). + MinTrustScore float64 `mapstructure:"minTrustScore" json:"minTrustScore"` + + // ToolIsolation configures process isolation for remote tool invocations. + ToolIsolation ToolIsolationConfig `mapstructure:"toolIsolation" json:"toolIsolation"` + + // RequireSignedChallenge rejects unsigned challenges from peers when true. + // When false (default), unsigned legacy challenges are accepted for backward compatibility. + RequireSignedChallenge bool `mapstructure:"requireSignedChallenge" json:"requireSignedChallenge"` +} + +// ToolIsolationConfig configures subprocess isolation for P2P tool execution. +type ToolIsolationConfig struct { + // Enabled turns on subprocess isolation for remote peer tool invocations. + Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` + + // TimeoutPerTool is the maximum duration for a single tool execution (default: 30s). + TimeoutPerTool time.Duration `mapstructure:"timeoutPerTool" json:"timeoutPerTool"` + + // MaxMemoryMB is a soft memory limit per subprocess in megabytes (Phase 2). + MaxMemoryMB int `mapstructure:"maxMemoryMB" json:"maxMemoryMB"` + + // Container configures container-based tool execution sandbox (Phase 2). + Container ContainerSandboxConfig `mapstructure:"container" json:"container"` +} + +// ContainerSandboxConfig configures container-based tool execution isolation. +type ContainerSandboxConfig struct { + // Enabled activates container-based sandbox instead of subprocess isolation. + Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` + + // Runtime selects the container runtime: "auto", "docker", "gvisor", or "native" (default: "auto"). + Runtime string `mapstructure:"runtime" json:"runtime"` + + // Image is the Docker image for the sandbox container (default: "lango-sandbox:latest"). + Image string `mapstructure:"image" json:"image"` + + // NetworkMode is the Docker network mode for sandbox containers (default: "none"). + NetworkMode string `mapstructure:"networkMode" json:"networkMode"` + + // ReadOnlyRootfs mounts the container root filesystem as read-only (default: true). + ReadOnlyRootfs *bool `mapstructure:"readOnlyRootfs" json:"readOnlyRootfs"` + + // CPUQuotaUS is the Docker CPU quota in microseconds (0 = unlimited). + CPUQuotaUS int64 `mapstructure:"cpuQuotaUs" json:"cpuQuotaUs"` + + // PoolSize is the number of pre-warmed containers in the pool (0 = disabled). + PoolSize int `mapstructure:"poolSize" json:"poolSize"` + + // PoolIdleTimeout is the idle timeout before pool containers are recycled (default: 5m). + PoolIdleTimeout time.Duration `mapstructure:"poolIdleTimeout" json:"poolIdleTimeout"` +} + +// P2PPricingConfig defines pricing for P2P tool invocations. +type P2PPricingConfig struct { + // Enable paid tool invocations. + Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` + + // PerQuery is the default price per query in USDC (e.g. "0.50"). + PerQuery string `mapstructure:"perQuery" json:"perQuery"` + + // ToolPrices maps tool names to their specific prices in USDC. + ToolPrices map[string]string `mapstructure:"toolPrices" json:"toolPrices,omitempty"` +} + +// OwnerProtectionConfig configures owner data protection for P2P responses. +type OwnerProtectionConfig struct { + // OwnerName is the owner's name to block from P2P responses. + OwnerName string `mapstructure:"ownerName" json:"ownerName"` + + // OwnerEmail is the owner's email to block from P2P responses. + OwnerEmail string `mapstructure:"ownerEmail" json:"ownerEmail"` + + // OwnerPhone is the owner's phone number to block from P2P responses. + OwnerPhone string `mapstructure:"ownerPhone" json:"ownerPhone"` + + // ExtraTerms are additional terms to block from P2P responses. + ExtraTerms []string `mapstructure:"extraTerms" json:"extraTerms,omitempty"` + + // BlockConversations blocks all conversation-related fields from P2P responses (default: true). + BlockConversations *bool `mapstructure:"blockConversations" json:"blockConversations"` +} + +// ZKPConfig defines zero-knowledge proof settings. +type ZKPConfig struct { + // ProofCacheDir is the directory for caching compiled circuits and proving keys. + ProofCacheDir string `mapstructure:"proofCacheDir" json:"proofCacheDir"` + + // ProvingScheme selects the ZKP proving scheme: "plonk" or "groth16". + ProvingScheme string `mapstructure:"provingScheme" json:"provingScheme"` + + // SRSMode selects the SRS generation mode: "unsafe" (default) or "file". + SRSMode string `mapstructure:"srsMode" json:"srsMode"` + + // SRSPath is the path to the SRS file (used when SRSMode == "file"). + SRSPath string `mapstructure:"srsPath" json:"srsPath"` + + // MaxCredentialAge is the maximum age for ZK credentials (e.g. "24h"). + MaxCredentialAge string `mapstructure:"maxCredentialAge" json:"maxCredentialAge"` +} + +// FirewallRule defines an ACL rule for the knowledge firewall. +type FirewallRule struct { + // PeerDID is the DID of the peer this rule applies to ("*" for all). + PeerDID string `mapstructure:"peerDid" json:"peerDid"` + + // Action is "allow" or "deny". + Action string `mapstructure:"action" json:"action"` + + // Tools lists tool name patterns this rule applies to. + Tools []string `mapstructure:"tools" json:"tools"` + + // RateLimit is the maximum requests per minute (0 = unlimited). + RateLimit int `mapstructure:"rateLimit" json:"rateLimit"` +} diff --git a/internal/config/types_security.go b/internal/config/types_security.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a93fee56 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/config/types_security.go @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +package config + +import "time" + +// SecurityConfig defines security settings +type SecurityConfig struct { + // Interceptor configuration + Interceptor InterceptorConfig `mapstructure:"interceptor" json:"interceptor"` + // Signer configuration + Signer SignerConfig `mapstructure:"signer" json:"signer"` + // DBEncryption configuration (SQLCipher transparent encryption) + DBEncryption DBEncryptionConfig `mapstructure:"dbEncryption" json:"dbEncryption"` + // KMS configuration (Cloud KMS / HSM backends) + KMS KMSConfig `mapstructure:"kms" json:"kms"` +} + +// KMSConfig defines Cloud KMS and HSM backend settings. +type KMSConfig struct { + // Region is the cloud region for KMS API calls (e.g. "us-east-1", "us-central1"). + Region string `mapstructure:"region" json:"region"` + + // KeyID is the KMS key identifier (ARN, resource name, or alias). + KeyID string `mapstructure:"keyId" json:"keyId"` + + // Endpoint is an optional custom endpoint for KMS API calls (useful for testing). + Endpoint string `mapstructure:"endpoint" json:"endpoint,omitempty"` + + // FallbackToLocal enables automatic fallback to the local CryptoProvider when KMS is unavailable. + FallbackToLocal bool `mapstructure:"fallbackToLocal" json:"fallbackToLocal"` + + // TimeoutPerOperation is the maximum duration for a single KMS API call (default: 5s). + TimeoutPerOperation time.Duration `mapstructure:"timeoutPerOperation" json:"timeoutPerOperation"` + + // MaxRetries is the number of retry attempts for transient KMS errors (default: 3). + MaxRetries int `mapstructure:"maxRetries" json:"maxRetries"` + + // Azure holds Azure Key Vault specific settings. + Azure AzureKVConfig `mapstructure:"azure" json:"azure"` + + // PKCS11 holds PKCS#11 HSM specific settings. + PKCS11 PKCS11Config `mapstructure:"pkcs11" json:"pkcs11"` +} + +// AzureKVConfig defines Azure Key Vault specific settings. +type AzureKVConfig struct { + // VaultURL is the Azure Key Vault URL (e.g. "https://myvault.vault.azure.net"). + VaultURL string `mapstructure:"vaultUrl" json:"vaultUrl"` + + // KeyVersion is the specific key version to use (empty = latest). + KeyVersion string `mapstructure:"keyVersion" json:"keyVersion,omitempty"` +} + +// PKCS11Config defines PKCS#11 HSM specific settings. +type PKCS11Config struct { + // ModulePath is the path to the PKCS#11 shared library (.so/.dylib/.dll). + ModulePath string `mapstructure:"modulePath" json:"modulePath"` + + // SlotID is the PKCS#11 slot number to use. + SlotID int `mapstructure:"slotId" json:"slotId"` + + // Pin is the PKCS#11 user PIN (prefer LANGO_PKCS11_PIN env var). + Pin string `mapstructure:"pin" json:"pin,omitempty"` + + // KeyLabel is the label of the key object in the HSM. + KeyLabel string `mapstructure:"keyLabel" json:"keyLabel"` +} + +// DBEncryptionConfig defines SQLCipher transparent database encryption settings. +type DBEncryptionConfig struct { + // Enabled activates SQLCipher encryption for the application database. + Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` + // CipherPageSize is the SQLCipher cipher_page_size PRAGMA (default: 4096). + CipherPageSize int `mapstructure:"cipherPageSize" json:"cipherPageSize"` +} + +// ApprovalPolicy determines which tools require approval before execution. +type ApprovalPolicy string + +const ( + // ApprovalPolicyDangerous requires approval for Dangerous-level tools (default). + ApprovalPolicyDangerous ApprovalPolicy = "dangerous" + // ApprovalPolicyAll requires approval for all tools. + ApprovalPolicyAll ApprovalPolicy = "all" + // ApprovalPolicyConfigured requires approval only for explicitly listed SensitiveTools. + ApprovalPolicyConfigured ApprovalPolicy = "configured" + // ApprovalPolicyNone disables approval entirely. + ApprovalPolicyNone ApprovalPolicy = "none" +) + +// Valid reports whether p is a known approval policy. +func (p ApprovalPolicy) Valid() bool { + switch p { + case ApprovalPolicyDangerous, ApprovalPolicyAll, ApprovalPolicyConfigured, ApprovalPolicyNone: + return true + } + return false +} + +// Values returns all known approval policies. +func (p ApprovalPolicy) Values() []ApprovalPolicy { + return []ApprovalPolicy{ApprovalPolicyDangerous, ApprovalPolicyAll, ApprovalPolicyConfigured, ApprovalPolicyNone} +} + +// InterceptorConfig defines AI Privacy Interceptor settings +type InterceptorConfig struct { + Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` + RedactPII bool `mapstructure:"redactPii" json:"redactPii"` + ApprovalPolicy ApprovalPolicy `mapstructure:"approvalPolicy" json:"approvalPolicy"` // default: "dangerous" + HeadlessAutoApprove bool `mapstructure:"headlessAutoApprove" json:"headlessAutoApprove"` + NotifyChannel string `mapstructure:"notifyChannel" json:"notifyChannel"` // e.g. "discord", "telegram" + SensitiveTools []string `mapstructure:"sensitiveTools" json:"sensitiveTools"` + ExemptTools []string `mapstructure:"exemptTools" json:"exemptTools"` // Tools exempt from approval regardless of policy + PIIRegexPatterns []string `mapstructure:"piiRegexPatterns" json:"piiRegexPatterns"` + ApprovalTimeoutSec int `mapstructure:"approvalTimeoutSec" json:"approvalTimeoutSec"` // default 30 + PIIDisabledPatterns []string `mapstructure:"piiDisabledPatterns" json:"piiDisabledPatterns"` + PIICustomPatterns map[string]string `mapstructure:"piiCustomPatterns" json:"piiCustomPatterns"` + Presidio PresidioConfig `mapstructure:"presidio" json:"presidio"` +} + +// PresidioConfig defines Microsoft Presidio integration settings. +type PresidioConfig struct { + Enabled bool `mapstructure:"enabled" json:"enabled"` + URL string `mapstructure:"url" json:"url"` // default: http://localhost:5002 + ScoreThreshold float64 `mapstructure:"scoreThreshold" json:"scoreThreshold"` // default: 0.7 + Language string `mapstructure:"language" json:"language"` // default: "en" +} + +// SignerConfig defines Secure Signer settings +type SignerConfig struct { + Provider string `mapstructure:"provider" json:"provider"` // "local", "rpc", "enclave" + RPCUrl string `mapstructure:"rpcUrl" json:"rpcUrl"` // for RPC provider + KeyID string `mapstructure:"keyId" json:"keyId"` // Key identifier +} + +// AuthConfig defines authentication settings +type AuthConfig struct { + // OIDC Providers + Providers map[string]OIDCProviderConfig `mapstructure:"providers" json:"providers"` +} + +// OIDCProviderConfig defines a single OIDC provider +type OIDCProviderConfig struct { + IssuerURL string `mapstructure:"issuerUrl" json:"issuerUrl"` + ClientID string `mapstructure:"clientId" json:"clientId"` + ClientSecret string `mapstructure:"clientSecret" json:"clientSecret"` + RedirectURL string `mapstructure:"redirectUrl" json:"redirectUrl"` + Scopes []string `mapstructure:"scopes" json:"scopes"` +} diff --git a/internal/config/types_test.go b/internal/config/types_test.go index 9d51406c..792018f0 100644 --- a/internal/config/types_test.go +++ b/internal/config/types_test.go @@ -2,17 +2,17 @@ package config import "testing" -func TestResolveEmbeddingProvider_ExplicitProviderID(t *testing.T) { +func TestResolveEmbeddingProvider_ByProviderMapKey(t *testing.T) { tests := []struct { - give string - providerID string - providers map[string]ProviderConfig - wantBackend string - wantHasAPIKey bool + give string + provider string + providers map[string]ProviderConfig + wantBackend string + wantHasAPIKey bool }{ { - give: "gemini provider by custom ID", - providerID: "gemini-1", + give: "gemini provider by custom ID", + provider: "gemini-1", providers: map[string]ProviderConfig{ "gemini-1": {Type: "gemini", APIKey: "test-key"}, }, @@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ func TestResolveEmbeddingProvider_ExplicitProviderID(t *testing.T) { wantHasAPIKey: true, }, { - give: "openai provider by custom ID", - providerID: "my-openai", + give: "openai provider by custom ID", + provider: "my-openai", providers: map[string]ProviderConfig{ "my-openai": {Type: "openai", APIKey: "sk-test"}, }, @@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ func TestResolveEmbeddingProvider_ExplicitProviderID(t *testing.T) { wantHasAPIKey: true, }, { - give: "ollama provider by custom ID", - providerID: "my-ollama", + give: "ollama provider by custom ID", + provider: "my-ollama", providers: map[string]ProviderConfig{ "my-ollama": {Type: "ollama"}, }, @@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ func TestResolveEmbeddingProvider_ExplicitProviderID(t *testing.T) { wantHasAPIKey: false, }, { - give: "anthropic provider has no embedding support", - providerID: "my-claude", + give: "anthropic provider has no embedding support", + provider: "my-claude", providers: map[string]ProviderConfig{ "my-claude": {Type: "anthropic", APIKey: "sk-ant-test"}, }, @@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ func TestResolveEmbeddingProvider_ExplicitProviderID(t *testing.T) { wantHasAPIKey: false, }, { - give: "provider ID not found", - providerID: "nonexistent", + give: "provider not found", + provider: "nonexistent", providers: map[string]ProviderConfig{ "openai": {Type: "openai", APIKey: "sk-test"}, }, @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ func TestResolveEmbeddingProvider_ExplicitProviderID(t *testing.T) { for _, tt := range tests { t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { cfg := &Config{ - Embedding: EmbeddingConfig{ProviderID: tt.providerID}, + Embedding: EmbeddingConfig{Provider: tt.provider}, Providers: tt.providers, } backend, apiKey := cfg.ResolveEmbeddingProvider() @@ -100,7 +100,9 @@ func TestResolveEmbeddingProvider_NeitherConfigured(t *testing.T) { } } -func TestResolveEmbeddingProvider_ProviderIDTakesPrecedence(t *testing.T) { +func TestResolveEmbeddingProvider_LegacyProviderIDFallback(t *testing.T) { + // Legacy configs may still have ProviderID set. The resolver should + // fall back to ProviderID when Provider is empty. cfg := &Config{ Embedding: EmbeddingConfig{ ProviderID: "gemini-1", @@ -118,3 +120,74 @@ func TestResolveEmbeddingProvider_ProviderIDTakesPrecedence(t *testing.T) { t.Errorf("apiKey: want %q, got %q", "gemini-key", apiKey) } } + +func TestMigrateEmbeddingProvider(t *testing.T) { + t.Run("migrates ProviderID to Provider", func(t *testing.T) { + cfg := &Config{ + Embedding: EmbeddingConfig{ProviderID: "my-openai"}, + } + cfg.MigrateEmbeddingProvider() + if cfg.Embedding.Provider != "my-openai" { + t.Errorf("Provider: want %q, got %q", "my-openai", cfg.Embedding.Provider) + } + if cfg.Embedding.ProviderID != "" { + t.Errorf("ProviderID should be empty after migration, got %q", cfg.Embedding.ProviderID) + } + }) + + t.Run("Provider takes precedence when both set", func(t *testing.T) { + cfg := &Config{ + Embedding: EmbeddingConfig{Provider: "local", ProviderID: "gemini-1"}, + } + cfg.MigrateEmbeddingProvider() + if cfg.Embedding.Provider != "local" { + t.Errorf("Provider: want %q, got %q", "local", cfg.Embedding.Provider) + } + if cfg.Embedding.ProviderID != "" { + t.Errorf("ProviderID should be empty after migration, got %q", cfg.Embedding.ProviderID) + } + }) + + t.Run("no-op when only Provider is set", func(t *testing.T) { + cfg := &Config{ + Embedding: EmbeddingConfig{Provider: "local"}, + } + cfg.MigrateEmbeddingProvider() + if cfg.Embedding.Provider != "local" { + t.Errorf("Provider: want %q, got %q", "local", cfg.Embedding.Provider) + } + }) + + t.Run("migrates Local.Model to Model", func(t *testing.T) { + cfg := &Config{ + Embedding: EmbeddingConfig{ + Provider: "local", + Local: LocalEmbeddingConfig{Model: "nomic-embed-text"}, + }, + } + cfg.MigrateEmbeddingProvider() + if cfg.Embedding.Model != "nomic-embed-text" { + t.Errorf("Model: want %q, got %q", "nomic-embed-text", cfg.Embedding.Model) + } + if cfg.Embedding.Local.Model != "" { + t.Errorf("Local.Model should be cleared, got %q", cfg.Embedding.Local.Model) + } + }) + + t.Run("Model takes precedence over Local.Model", func(t *testing.T) { + cfg := &Config{ + Embedding: EmbeddingConfig{ + Provider: "local", + Model: "text-embedding-3-small", + Local: LocalEmbeddingConfig{Model: "nomic-embed-text"}, + }, + } + cfg.MigrateEmbeddingProvider() + if cfg.Embedding.Model != "text-embedding-3-small" { + t.Errorf("Model: want %q, got %q", "text-embedding-3-small", cfg.Embedding.Model) + } + if cfg.Embedding.Local.Model != "" { + t.Errorf("Local.Model should be cleared, got %q", cfg.Embedding.Local.Model) + } + }) +} diff --git a/internal/cron/delivery.go b/internal/cron/delivery.go index cc8b9db7..0afce8da 100644 --- a/internal/cron/delivery.go +++ b/internal/cron/delivery.go @@ -121,10 +121,10 @@ func (d *Delivery) StartTyping(ctx context.Context, targets []string) func() { // formatDeliveryMessage formats a JobResult into a human-readable message. func formatDeliveryMessage(result *JobResult) string { var sb strings.Builder - sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("[Cron] %s\n", result.JobName)) + fmt.Fprintf(&sb, "[Cron] %s\n", result.JobName) if result.Error != nil { - sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("Error: %v", result.Error)) + fmt.Fprintf(&sb, "Error: %v", result.Error) } else { sb.WriteString(result.Response) } diff --git a/internal/dbmigrate/migrate.go b/internal/dbmigrate/migrate.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..03d86e1a --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/dbmigrate/migrate.go @@ -0,0 +1,275 @@ +// Package dbmigrate provides tools for converting between plaintext SQLite +// and SQLCipher-encrypted databases. +// +// SQLCipher support requires building with CGO and a SQLite library that includes +// SQLCipher (e.g., via system libsqlcipher). When built with the standard +// mattn/go-sqlite3 amalgamation, PRAGMA key is a no-op and encryption is unavailable. +package dbmigrate + +import ( + "database/sql" + "fmt" + "os" + + _ "github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3" // SQLite driver (SQLCipher when linked with libsqlcipher) +) + +// MigrateToEncrypted converts a plaintext SQLite DB to a SQLCipher-encrypted database. +// The original file is backed up and securely deleted after successful migration. +func MigrateToEncrypted(dbPath, passphrase string, cipherPageSize int) error { + if passphrase == "" { + return fmt.Errorf("passphrase must not be empty") + } + if cipherPageSize <= 0 { + cipherPageSize = 4096 + } + + // Validate that the source DB is NOT already encrypted. + if IsEncrypted(dbPath) { + return fmt.Errorf("database is already encrypted") + } + + tmpPath := dbPath + ".enc" + defer os.Remove(tmpPath) // clean up temp file on error + + // Open the plaintext source database. + srcDB, err := sql.Open("sqlite3", "file:"+dbPath+"?_journal_mode=WAL&_busy_timeout=5000") + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("open source db: %w", err) + } + defer srcDB.Close() + + // Verify SQLCipher is available by checking for the sqlcipher_export function. + if err := verifySQLCipherAvailable(srcDB); err != nil { + return err + } + + // Verify we can actually read the source. + if err := srcDB.Ping(); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("ping source db: %w", err) + } + + // Attach the encrypted target and export. + attachSQL := fmt.Sprintf("ATTACH DATABASE '%s' AS target KEY '%s'", tmpPath, passphrase) + if _, err := srcDB.Exec(attachSQL); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("attach encrypted target: %w", err) + } + + pragmaSQL := fmt.Sprintf("PRAGMA target.cipher_page_size = %d", cipherPageSize) + if _, err := srcDB.Exec(pragmaSQL); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("set cipher_page_size: %w", err) + } + + if _, err := srcDB.Exec("SELECT sqlcipher_export('target')"); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("sqlcipher_export: %w", err) + } + + if _, err := srcDB.Exec("DETACH DATABASE target"); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("detach target: %w", err) + } + + srcDB.Close() + + // Verify the new encrypted DB can be opened. + if err := verifyEncryptedDB(tmpPath, passphrase, cipherPageSize); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("verify encrypted db: %w", err) + } + + // Atomic swap: original -> .bak, encrypted -> original. + bakPath := dbPath + ".bak" + if err := os.Rename(dbPath, bakPath); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("rename original to backup: %w", err) + } + if err := os.Rename(tmpPath, dbPath); err != nil { + // Rollback: restore backup. + _ = os.Rename(bakPath, dbPath) + return fmt.Errorf("rename encrypted to original: %w", err) + } + + // Secure-delete the backup. + if err := secureDeleteFile(bakPath); err != nil { + // Non-fatal: warn only. + fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: secure delete of backup: %v\n", err) + } + + return nil +} + +// DecryptToPlaintext converts a SQLCipher-encrypted DB back to a plaintext SQLite database. +func DecryptToPlaintext(dbPath, passphrase string, cipherPageSize int) error { + if passphrase == "" { + return fmt.Errorf("passphrase must not be empty") + } + if cipherPageSize <= 0 { + cipherPageSize = 4096 + } + + // Validate that the source DB IS encrypted. + if !IsEncrypted(dbPath) { + return fmt.Errorf("database is not encrypted") + } + + tmpPath := dbPath + ".dec" + defer os.Remove(tmpPath) + + // Open the encrypted source database with the key. + srcDB, err := sql.Open("sqlite3", "file:"+dbPath+"?_busy_timeout=5000") + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("open encrypted source: %w", err) + } + defer srcDB.Close() + + // Set the key PRAGMA to decrypt. + if _, err := srcDB.Exec(fmt.Sprintf("PRAGMA key = '%s'", passphrase)); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("set pragma key: %w", err) + } + if _, err := srcDB.Exec(fmt.Sprintf("PRAGMA cipher_page_size = %d", cipherPageSize)); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("set cipher_page_size: %w", err) + } + + if err := srcDB.Ping(); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("open encrypted source (wrong passphrase?): %w", err) + } + + // Attach plaintext target (empty key = no encryption). + attachSQL := fmt.Sprintf("ATTACH DATABASE '%s' AS target KEY ''", tmpPath) + if _, err := srcDB.Exec(attachSQL); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("attach plaintext target: %w", err) + } + + if _, err := srcDB.Exec("SELECT sqlcipher_export('target')"); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("sqlcipher_export: %w", err) + } + + if _, err := srcDB.Exec("DETACH DATABASE target"); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("detach target: %w", err) + } + + srcDB.Close() + + // Verify the new plaintext DB can be opened. + if err := verifyPlaintextDB(tmpPath); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("verify plaintext db: %w", err) + } + + // Atomic swap. + bakPath := dbPath + ".bak" + if err := os.Rename(dbPath, bakPath); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("rename original to backup: %w", err) + } + if err := os.Rename(tmpPath, dbPath); err != nil { + _ = os.Rename(bakPath, dbPath) + return fmt.Errorf("rename plaintext to original: %w", err) + } + + if err := secureDeleteFile(bakPath); err != nil { + fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: secure delete of backup: %v\n", err) + } + + return nil +} + +// IsEncrypted checks whether a database file is encrypted by inspecting the magic header. +// A standard SQLite file starts with "SQLite format 3\000"; an encrypted file does not. +func IsEncrypted(dbPath string) bool { + f, err := os.Open(dbPath) + if err != nil { + return false + } + defer f.Close() + header := make([]byte, 16) + n, err := f.Read(header) + if err != nil || n < 16 { + return false + } + return string(header[:15]) != "SQLite format 3" +} + +// IsSQLCipherAvailable checks whether the SQLite driver supports SQLCipher operations. +func IsSQLCipherAvailable() bool { + db, err := sql.Open("sqlite3", ":memory:") + if err != nil { + return false + } + defer db.Close() + // sqlcipher_export is only available when SQLCipher is linked. + var version string + err = db.QueryRow("PRAGMA cipher_version").Scan(&version) + return err == nil && version != "" +} + +// verifySQLCipherAvailable returns an error if SQLCipher is not available. +func verifySQLCipherAvailable(db *sql.DB) error { + var version string + err := db.QueryRow("PRAGMA cipher_version").Scan(&version) + if err != nil || version == "" { + return fmt.Errorf("SQLCipher not available: binary must be built with SQLCipher support " + + "(install libsqlcipher-dev and rebuild with CGO_LDFLAGS=-lsqlcipher)") + } + return nil +} + +// verifyEncryptedDB opens the encrypted DB to verify it is readable. +func verifyEncryptedDB(path, passphrase string, cipherPageSize int) error { + db, err := sql.Open("sqlite3", "file:"+path) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer db.Close() + + if _, err := db.Exec(fmt.Sprintf("PRAGMA key = '%s'", passphrase)); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := db.Exec(fmt.Sprintf("PRAGMA cipher_page_size = %d", cipherPageSize)); err != nil { + return err + } + return db.Ping() +} + +// verifyPlaintextDB opens the plaintext DB to verify it is readable. +func verifyPlaintextDB(path string) error { + db, err := sql.Open("sqlite3", "file:"+path) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer db.Close() + return db.Ping() +} + +// secureDeleteFile overwrites a file with zeros before removing it. +func secureDeleteFile(path string) error { + info, err := os.Stat(path) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_WRONLY, 0) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + zeros := make([]byte, 4096) + remaining := info.Size() + for remaining > 0 { + n := int64(len(zeros)) + if n > remaining { + n = remaining + } + written, err := f.Write(zeros[:n]) + if err != nil { + f.Close() + os.Remove(path) + return err + } + remaining -= int64(written) + } + + if err := f.Sync(); err != nil { + f.Close() + os.Remove(path) + return err + } + f.Close() + + return os.Remove(path) +} diff --git a/internal/dbmigrate/migrate_test.go b/internal/dbmigrate/migrate_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..18c41f31 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/dbmigrate/migrate_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +package dbmigrate + +import ( + "database/sql" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "testing" + + _ "github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func createPlaintextDB(t *testing.T, dir string) string { + t.Helper() + dbPath := filepath.Join(dir, "test.db") + db, err := sql.Open("sqlite3", "file:"+dbPath+"?_journal_mode=WAL") + require.NoError(t, err) + + _, err = db.Exec("CREATE TABLE test (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, name TEXT)") + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = db.Exec("INSERT INTO test (name) VALUES ('hello'), ('world')") + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NoError(t, db.Close()) + return dbPath +} + +func TestIsEncrypted_PlaintextDB(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + dbPath := createPlaintextDB(t, dir) + assert.False(t, IsEncrypted(dbPath)) +} + +func TestIsEncrypted_NonexistentFile(t *testing.T) { + assert.False(t, IsEncrypted("/tmp/nonexistent_db_file_for_test.db")) +} + +func TestIsEncrypted_SmallFile(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "tiny.db") + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("short"), 0600)) + assert.False(t, IsEncrypted(path)) +} + +func TestMigrateToEncrypted_EmptyPassphrase(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + dbPath := createPlaintextDB(t, dir) + err := MigrateToEncrypted(dbPath, "", 4096) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "passphrase must not be empty") +} + +func TestDecryptToPlaintext_EmptyPassphrase(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + dbPath := createPlaintextDB(t, dir) + err := DecryptToPlaintext(dbPath, "", 4096) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "passphrase must not be empty") +} + +func TestDecryptToPlaintext_NotEncrypted(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + dbPath := createPlaintextDB(t, dir) + err := DecryptToPlaintext(dbPath, "test-pass", 4096) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "database is not encrypted") +} + +func TestIsSQLCipherAvailable(t *testing.T) { + // This test documents the runtime check; the result depends on the build. + available := IsSQLCipherAvailable() + t.Logf("SQLCipher available: %v", available) +} + +func TestMigrateToEncrypted_NoSQLCipher(t *testing.T) { + // When built without SQLCipher, migration should return a clear error. + if IsSQLCipherAvailable() { + t.Skip("SQLCipher is available; this test only runs without SQLCipher support") + } + + dir := t.TempDir() + dbPath := createPlaintextDB(t, dir) + err := MigrateToEncrypted(dbPath, "test-passphrase", 4096) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "SQLCipher not available") +} + +func TestSecureDeleteFile(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "secret.txt") + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("sensitive data here"), 0600)) + + require.NoError(t, secureDeleteFile(path)) + + _, err := os.Stat(path) + assert.True(t, os.IsNotExist(err)) +} + +func TestSecureDeleteFile_NonexistentFile(t *testing.T) { + err := secureDeleteFile("/tmp/nonexistent_file_for_test_12345.txt") + require.Error(t, err) +} diff --git a/internal/embedding/buffer.go b/internal/embedding/buffer.go index cd624174..54165aa1 100644 --- a/internal/embedding/buffer.go +++ b/internal/embedding/buffer.go @@ -3,10 +3,11 @@ package embedding import ( "context" "sync" - "sync/atomic" "time" "go.uber.org/zap" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/asyncbuf" ) // EmbedRequest represents a request to embed and store a text. @@ -19,19 +20,12 @@ type EmbedRequest struct { // EmbeddingBuffer collects embed requests and processes them in batches // on a background goroutine. It follows the same lifecycle pattern as -// memory.Buffer: Start → Enqueue → Stop. +// memory.Buffer: Start -> Enqueue -> Stop. type EmbeddingBuffer struct { provider EmbeddingProvider store VectorStore - - queue chan EmbedRequest - stopCh chan struct{} - done chan struct{} - - batchSize int - batchTimeout time.Duration - dropCount atomic.Int64 - logger *zap.SugaredLogger + inner *asyncbuf.BatchBuffer[EmbedRequest] + logger *zap.SugaredLogger } // NewEmbeddingBuffer creates a new asynchronous embedding buffer. @@ -40,91 +34,38 @@ func NewEmbeddingBuffer( store VectorStore, logger *zap.SugaredLogger, ) *EmbeddingBuffer { - return &EmbeddingBuffer{ - provider: provider, - store: store, - queue: make(chan EmbedRequest, 256), - stopCh: make(chan struct{}), - done: make(chan struct{}), - batchSize: 32, - batchTimeout: 2 * time.Second, - logger: logger, + b := &EmbeddingBuffer{ + provider: provider, + store: store, + logger: logger, } + b.inner = asyncbuf.NewBatchBuffer[EmbedRequest](asyncbuf.BatchConfig{ + QueueSize: 256, + BatchSize: 32, + BatchTimeout: 2 * time.Second, + }, b.processBatch, logger) + return b } // Start launches the background goroutine. The WaitGroup is incremented // so callers can wait for graceful shutdown. func (b *EmbeddingBuffer) Start(wg *sync.WaitGroup) { - wg.Add(1) - go func() { - defer wg.Done() - defer close(b.done) - b.run() - }() + b.inner.Start(wg) } // Enqueue submits an embed request. Non-blocking; drops if the queue is full. func (b *EmbeddingBuffer) Enqueue(req EmbedRequest) { - select { - case b.queue <- req: - default: - b.dropCount.Add(1) - b.logger.Warnw("embedding queue full, dropping request", - "id", req.ID, "collection", req.Collection, "totalDropped", b.dropCount.Load()) - } + b.inner.Enqueue(req) } // DroppedCount returns the total number of dropped embed requests. func (b *EmbeddingBuffer) DroppedCount() int64 { - return b.dropCount.Load() + return b.inner.DroppedCount() } // Stop signals the background goroutine to drain and exit. func (b *EmbeddingBuffer) Stop() { - close(b.stopCh) - <-b.done -} - -func (b *EmbeddingBuffer) run() { - timer := time.NewTimer(b.batchTimeout) - defer timer.Stop() - - var batch []EmbedRequest - - flush := func() { - if len(batch) == 0 { - return - } - b.processBatch(batch) - batch = batch[:0] - } - - for { - select { - case req := <-b.queue: - batch = append(batch, req) - if len(batch) >= b.batchSize { - flush() - timer.Reset(b.batchTimeout) - } - - case <-timer.C: - flush() - timer.Reset(b.batchTimeout) - - case <-b.stopCh: - // Drain remaining items. - for { - select { - case req := <-b.queue: - batch = append(batch, req) - default: - flush() - return - } - } - } - } + b.inner.Stop() } func (b *EmbeddingBuffer) processBatch(batch []EmbedRequest) { diff --git a/internal/embedding/sqlite_vec.go b/internal/embedding/sqlite_vec.go index 2c7cdb3e..2e97f958 100644 --- a/internal/embedding/sqlite_vec.go +++ b/internal/embedding/sqlite_vec.go @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ func (s *SQLiteVecStore) Upsert(ctx context.Context, records []VectorRecord) err if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("begin tx: %w", err) } - defer tx.Rollback() + defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }() // Delete existing records first for upsert semantics delStmt, err := tx.PrepareContext(ctx, diff --git a/internal/ent/client.go b/internal/ent/client.go index baa9a5b3..e2047ed8 100644 --- a/internal/ent/client.go +++ b/internal/ent/client.go @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ import ( "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/message" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/observation" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/paymenttx" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/peerreputation" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/reflection" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/secret" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/session" @@ -64,6 +65,8 @@ type Client struct { Observation *ObservationClient // PaymentTx is the client for interacting with the PaymentTx builders. PaymentTx *PaymentTxClient + // PeerReputation is the client for interacting with the PeerReputation builders. + PeerReputation *PeerReputationClient // Reflection is the client for interacting with the Reflection builders. Reflection *ReflectionClient // Secret is the client for interacting with the Secret builders. @@ -97,6 +100,7 @@ func (c *Client) init() { c.Message = NewMessageClient(c.config) c.Observation = NewObservationClient(c.config) c.PaymentTx = NewPaymentTxClient(c.config) + c.PeerReputation = NewPeerReputationClient(c.config) c.Reflection = NewReflectionClient(c.config) c.Secret = NewSecretClient(c.config) c.Session = NewSessionClient(c.config) @@ -206,6 +210,7 @@ func (c *Client) Tx(ctx context.Context) (*Tx, error) { Message: NewMessageClient(cfg), Observation: NewObservationClient(cfg), PaymentTx: NewPaymentTxClient(cfg), + PeerReputation: NewPeerReputationClient(cfg), Reflection: NewReflectionClient(cfg), Secret: NewSecretClient(cfg), Session: NewSessionClient(cfg), @@ -242,6 +247,7 @@ func (c *Client) BeginTx(ctx context.Context, opts *sql.TxOptions) (*Tx, error) Message: NewMessageClient(cfg), Observation: NewObservationClient(cfg), PaymentTx: NewPaymentTxClient(cfg), + PeerReputation: NewPeerReputationClient(cfg), Reflection: NewReflectionClient(cfg), Secret: NewSecretClient(cfg), Session: NewSessionClient(cfg), @@ -278,8 +284,8 @@ func (c *Client) Use(hooks ...Hook) { for _, n := range []interface{ Use(...Hook) }{ c.AuditLog, c.ConfigProfile, c.CronJob, c.CronJobHistory, c.ExternalRef, c.Inquiry, c.Key, c.Knowledge, c.Learning, c.Message, c.Observation, - c.PaymentTx, c.Reflection, c.Secret, c.Session, c.WorkflowRun, - c.WorkflowStepRun, + c.PaymentTx, c.PeerReputation, c.Reflection, c.Secret, c.Session, + c.WorkflowRun, c.WorkflowStepRun, } { n.Use(hooks...) } @@ -291,8 +297,8 @@ func (c *Client) Intercept(interceptors ...Interceptor) { for _, n := range []interface{ Intercept(...Interceptor) }{ c.AuditLog, c.ConfigProfile, c.CronJob, c.CronJobHistory, c.ExternalRef, c.Inquiry, c.Key, c.Knowledge, c.Learning, c.Message, c.Observation, - c.PaymentTx, c.Reflection, c.Secret, c.Session, c.WorkflowRun, - c.WorkflowStepRun, + c.PaymentTx, c.PeerReputation, c.Reflection, c.Secret, c.Session, + c.WorkflowRun, c.WorkflowStepRun, } { n.Intercept(interceptors...) } @@ -325,6 +331,8 @@ func (c *Client) Mutate(ctx context.Context, m Mutation) (Value, error) { return c.Observation.mutate(ctx, m) case *PaymentTxMutation: return c.PaymentTx.mutate(ctx, m) + case *PeerReputationMutation: + return c.PeerReputation.mutate(ctx, m) case *ReflectionMutation: return c.Reflection.mutate(ctx, m) case *SecretMutation: @@ -1968,6 +1976,139 @@ func (c *PaymentTxClient) mutate(ctx context.Context, m *PaymentTxMutation) (Val } } +// PeerReputationClient is a client for the PeerReputation schema. +type PeerReputationClient struct { + config +} + +// NewPeerReputationClient returns a client for the PeerReputation from the given config. +func NewPeerReputationClient(c config) *PeerReputationClient { + return &PeerReputationClient{config: c} +} + +// Use adds a list of mutation hooks to the hooks stack. +// A call to `Use(f, g, h)` equals to `peerreputation.Hooks(f(g(h())))`. +func (c *PeerReputationClient) Use(hooks ...Hook) { + c.hooks.PeerReputation = append(c.hooks.PeerReputation, hooks...) +} + +// Intercept adds a list of query interceptors to the interceptors stack. +// A call to `Intercept(f, g, h)` equals to `peerreputation.Intercept(f(g(h())))`. +func (c *PeerReputationClient) Intercept(interceptors ...Interceptor) { + c.inters.PeerReputation = append(c.inters.PeerReputation, interceptors...) +} + +// Create returns a builder for creating a PeerReputation entity. +func (c *PeerReputationClient) Create() *PeerReputationCreate { + mutation := newPeerReputationMutation(c.config, OpCreate) + return &PeerReputationCreate{config: c.config, hooks: c.Hooks(), mutation: mutation} +} + +// CreateBulk returns a builder for creating a bulk of PeerReputation entities. +func (c *PeerReputationClient) CreateBulk(builders ...*PeerReputationCreate) *PeerReputationCreateBulk { + return &PeerReputationCreateBulk{config: c.config, builders: builders} +} + +// MapCreateBulk creates a bulk creation builder from the given slice. For each item in the slice, the function creates +// a builder and applies setFunc on it. +func (c *PeerReputationClient) MapCreateBulk(slice any, setFunc func(*PeerReputationCreate, int)) *PeerReputationCreateBulk { + rv := reflect.ValueOf(slice) + if rv.Kind() != reflect.Slice { + return &PeerReputationCreateBulk{err: fmt.Errorf("calling to PeerReputationClient.MapCreateBulk with wrong type %T, need slice", slice)} + } + builders := make([]*PeerReputationCreate, rv.Len()) + for i := 0; i < rv.Len(); i++ { + builders[i] = c.Create() + setFunc(builders[i], i) + } + return &PeerReputationCreateBulk{config: c.config, builders: builders} +} + +// Update returns an update builder for PeerReputation. +func (c *PeerReputationClient) Update() *PeerReputationUpdate { + mutation := newPeerReputationMutation(c.config, OpUpdate) + return &PeerReputationUpdate{config: c.config, hooks: c.Hooks(), mutation: mutation} +} + +// UpdateOne returns an update builder for the given entity. +func (c *PeerReputationClient) UpdateOne(_m *PeerReputation) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + mutation := newPeerReputationMutation(c.config, OpUpdateOne, withPeerReputation(_m)) + return &PeerReputationUpdateOne{config: c.config, hooks: c.Hooks(), mutation: mutation} +} + +// UpdateOneID returns an update builder for the given id. +func (c *PeerReputationClient) UpdateOneID(id uuid.UUID) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + mutation := newPeerReputationMutation(c.config, OpUpdateOne, withPeerReputationID(id)) + return &PeerReputationUpdateOne{config: c.config, hooks: c.Hooks(), mutation: mutation} +} + +// Delete returns a delete builder for PeerReputation. +func (c *PeerReputationClient) Delete() *PeerReputationDelete { + mutation := newPeerReputationMutation(c.config, OpDelete) + return &PeerReputationDelete{config: c.config, hooks: c.Hooks(), mutation: mutation} +} + +// DeleteOne returns a builder for deleting the given entity. +func (c *PeerReputationClient) DeleteOne(_m *PeerReputation) *PeerReputationDeleteOne { + return c.DeleteOneID(_m.ID) +} + +// DeleteOneID returns a builder for deleting the given entity by its id. +func (c *PeerReputationClient) DeleteOneID(id uuid.UUID) *PeerReputationDeleteOne { + builder := c.Delete().Where(peerreputation.ID(id)) + builder.mutation.id = &id + builder.mutation.op = OpDeleteOne + return &PeerReputationDeleteOne{builder} +} + +// Query returns a query builder for PeerReputation. +func (c *PeerReputationClient) Query() *PeerReputationQuery { + return &PeerReputationQuery{ + config: c.config, + ctx: &QueryContext{Type: TypePeerReputation}, + inters: c.Interceptors(), + } +} + +// Get returns a PeerReputation entity by its id. +func (c *PeerReputationClient) Get(ctx context.Context, id uuid.UUID) (*PeerReputation, error) { + return c.Query().Where(peerreputation.ID(id)).Only(ctx) +} + +// GetX is like Get, but panics if an error occurs. +func (c *PeerReputationClient) GetX(ctx context.Context, id uuid.UUID) *PeerReputation { + obj, err := c.Get(ctx, id) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + return obj +} + +// Hooks returns the client hooks. +func (c *PeerReputationClient) Hooks() []Hook { + return c.hooks.PeerReputation +} + +// Interceptors returns the client interceptors. +func (c *PeerReputationClient) Interceptors() []Interceptor { + return c.inters.PeerReputation +} + +func (c *PeerReputationClient) mutate(ctx context.Context, m *PeerReputationMutation) (Value, error) { + switch m.Op() { + case OpCreate: + return (&PeerReputationCreate{config: c.config, hooks: c.Hooks(), mutation: m}).Save(ctx) + case OpUpdate: + return (&PeerReputationUpdate{config: c.config, hooks: c.Hooks(), mutation: m}).Save(ctx) + case OpUpdateOne: + return (&PeerReputationUpdateOne{config: c.config, hooks: c.Hooks(), mutation: m}).Save(ctx) + case OpDelete, OpDeleteOne: + return (&PeerReputationDelete{config: c.config, hooks: c.Hooks(), mutation: m}).Exec(ctx) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ent: unknown PeerReputation mutation op: %q", m.Op()) + } +} + // ReflectionClient is a client for the Reflection schema. type ReflectionClient struct { config @@ -2669,12 +2810,12 @@ func (c *WorkflowStepRunClient) mutate(ctx context.Context, m *WorkflowStepRunMu type ( hooks struct { AuditLog, ConfigProfile, CronJob, CronJobHistory, ExternalRef, Inquiry, Key, - Knowledge, Learning, Message, Observation, PaymentTx, Reflection, Secret, - Session, WorkflowRun, WorkflowStepRun []ent.Hook + Knowledge, Learning, Message, Observation, PaymentTx, PeerReputation, + Reflection, Secret, Session, WorkflowRun, WorkflowStepRun []ent.Hook } inters struct { AuditLog, ConfigProfile, CronJob, CronJobHistory, ExternalRef, Inquiry, Key, - Knowledge, Learning, Message, Observation, PaymentTx, Reflection, Secret, - Session, WorkflowRun, WorkflowStepRun []ent.Interceptor + Knowledge, Learning, Message, Observation, PaymentTx, PeerReputation, + Reflection, Secret, Session, WorkflowRun, WorkflowStepRun []ent.Interceptor } ) diff --git a/internal/ent/ent.go b/internal/ent/ent.go index 622320b7..be929b91 100644 --- a/internal/ent/ent.go +++ b/internal/ent/ent.go @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import ( "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/message" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/observation" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/paymenttx" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/peerreputation" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/reflection" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/secret" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/session" @@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ func checkColumn(t, c string) error { message.Table: message.ValidColumn, observation.Table: observation.ValidColumn, paymenttx.Table: paymenttx.ValidColumn, + peerreputation.Table: peerreputation.ValidColumn, reflection.Table: reflection.ValidColumn, secret.Table: secret.ValidColumn, session.Table: session.ValidColumn, diff --git a/internal/ent/hook/hook.go b/internal/ent/hook/hook.go index b8dab721..2c23d39d 100644 --- a/internal/ent/hook/hook.go +++ b/internal/ent/hook/hook.go @@ -153,6 +153,18 @@ func (f PaymentTxFunc) Mutate(ctx context.Context, m ent.Mutation) (ent.Value, e return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected mutation type %T. expect *ent.PaymentTxMutation", m) } +// The PeerReputationFunc type is an adapter to allow the use of ordinary +// function as PeerReputation mutator. +type PeerReputationFunc func(context.Context, *ent.PeerReputationMutation) (ent.Value, error) + +// Mutate calls f(ctx, m). +func (f PeerReputationFunc) Mutate(ctx context.Context, m ent.Mutation) (ent.Value, error) { + if mv, ok := m.(*ent.PeerReputationMutation); ok { + return f(ctx, mv) + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected mutation type %T. expect *ent.PeerReputationMutation", m) +} + // The ReflectionFunc type is an adapter to allow the use of ordinary // function as Reflection mutator. type ReflectionFunc func(context.Context, *ent.ReflectionMutation) (ent.Value, error) diff --git a/internal/ent/migrate/schema.go b/internal/ent/migrate/schema.go index 1430420a..f51e4894 100644 --- a/internal/ent/migrate/schema.go +++ b/internal/ent/migrate/schema.go @@ -384,6 +384,37 @@ var ( }, }, } + // PeerReputationsColumns holds the columns for the "peer_reputations" table. + PeerReputationsColumns = []*schema.Column{ + {Name: "id", Type: field.TypeUUID}, + {Name: "peer_did", Type: field.TypeString, Unique: true}, + {Name: "successful_exchanges", Type: field.TypeInt, Default: 0}, + {Name: "failed_exchanges", Type: field.TypeInt, Default: 0}, + {Name: "timeout_count", Type: field.TypeInt, Default: 0}, + {Name: "trust_score", Type: field.TypeFloat64, Default: 0}, + {Name: "first_seen", Type: field.TypeTime}, + {Name: "last_interaction", Type: field.TypeTime}, + {Name: "created_at", Type: field.TypeTime}, + {Name: "updated_at", Type: field.TypeTime}, + } + // PeerReputationsTable holds the schema information for the "peer_reputations" table. + PeerReputationsTable = &schema.Table{ + Name: "peer_reputations", + Columns: PeerReputationsColumns, + PrimaryKey: []*schema.Column{PeerReputationsColumns[0]}, + Indexes: []*schema.Index{ + { + Name: "peerreputation_trust_score", + Unique: false, + Columns: []*schema.Column{PeerReputationsColumns[5]}, + }, + { + Name: "peerreputation_last_interaction", + Unique: false, + Columns: []*schema.Column{PeerReputationsColumns[7]}, + }, + }, + } // ReflectionsColumns holds the columns for the "reflections" table. ReflectionsColumns = []*schema.Column{ {Name: "id", Type: field.TypeUUID}, @@ -557,6 +588,7 @@ var ( MessagesTable, ObservationsTable, PaymentTxesTable, + PeerReputationsTable, ReflectionsTable, SecretsTable, SessionsTable, diff --git a/internal/ent/mutation.go b/internal/ent/mutation.go index 5e1e5054..70257304 100644 --- a/internal/ent/mutation.go +++ b/internal/ent/mutation.go @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import ( "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/message" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/observation" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/paymenttx" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/peerreputation" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/predicate" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/reflection" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/schema" @@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ const ( TypeMessage = "Message" TypeObservation = "Observation" TypePaymentTx = "PaymentTx" + TypePeerReputation = "PeerReputation" TypeReflection = "Reflection" TypeSecret = "Secret" TypeSession = "Session" @@ -10000,6 +10002,905 @@ func (m *PaymentTxMutation) ResetEdge(name string) error { return fmt.Errorf("unknown PaymentTx edge %s", name) } +// PeerReputationMutation represents an operation that mutates the PeerReputation nodes in the graph. +type PeerReputationMutation struct { + config + op Op + typ string + id *uuid.UUID + peer_did *string + successful_exchanges *int + addsuccessful_exchanges *int + failed_exchanges *int + addfailed_exchanges *int + timeout_count *int + addtimeout_count *int + trust_score *float64 + addtrust_score *float64 + first_seen *time.Time + last_interaction *time.Time + created_at *time.Time + updated_at *time.Time + clearedFields map[string]struct{} + done bool + oldValue func(context.Context) (*PeerReputation, error) + predicates []predicate.PeerReputation +} + +var _ ent.Mutation = (*PeerReputationMutation)(nil) + +// peerreputationOption allows management of the mutation configuration using functional options. +type peerreputationOption func(*PeerReputationMutation) + +// newPeerReputationMutation creates new mutation for the PeerReputation entity. +func newPeerReputationMutation(c config, op Op, opts ...peerreputationOption) *PeerReputationMutation { + m := &PeerReputationMutation{ + config: c, + op: op, + typ: TypePeerReputation, + clearedFields: make(map[string]struct{}), + } + for _, opt := range opts { + opt(m) + } + return m +} + +// withPeerReputationID sets the ID field of the mutation. +func withPeerReputationID(id uuid.UUID) peerreputationOption { + return func(m *PeerReputationMutation) { + var ( + err error + once sync.Once + value *PeerReputation + ) + m.oldValue = func(ctx context.Context) (*PeerReputation, error) { + once.Do(func() { + if m.done { + err = errors.New("querying old values post mutation is not allowed") + } else { + value, err = m.Client().PeerReputation.Get(ctx, id) + } + }) + return value, err + } + m.id = &id + } +} + +// withPeerReputation sets the old PeerReputation of the mutation. +func withPeerReputation(node *PeerReputation) peerreputationOption { + return func(m *PeerReputationMutation) { + m.oldValue = func(context.Context) (*PeerReputation, error) { + return node, nil + } + m.id = &node.ID + } +} + +// Client returns a new `ent.Client` from the mutation. If the mutation was +// executed in a transaction (ent.Tx), a transactional client is returned. +func (m PeerReputationMutation) Client() *Client { + client := &Client{config: m.config} + client.init() + return client +} + +// Tx returns an `ent.Tx` for mutations that were executed in transactions; +// it returns an error otherwise. +func (m PeerReputationMutation) Tx() (*Tx, error) { + if _, ok := m.driver.(*txDriver); !ok { + return nil, errors.New("ent: mutation is not running in a transaction") + } + tx := &Tx{config: m.config} + tx.init() + return tx, nil +} + +// SetID sets the value of the id field. Note that this +// operation is only accepted on creation of PeerReputation entities. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) SetID(id uuid.UUID) { + m.id = &id +} + +// ID returns the ID value in the mutation. Note that the ID is only available +// if it was provided to the builder or after it was returned from the database. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) ID() (id uuid.UUID, exists bool) { + if m.id == nil { + return + } + return *m.id, true +} + +// IDs queries the database and returns the entity ids that match the mutation's predicate. +// That means, if the mutation is applied within a transaction with an isolation level such +// as sql.LevelSerializable, the returned ids match the ids of the rows that will be updated +// or updated by the mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) IDs(ctx context.Context) ([]uuid.UUID, error) { + switch { + case m.op.Is(OpUpdateOne | OpDeleteOne): + id, exists := m.ID() + if exists { + return []uuid.UUID{id}, nil + } + fallthrough + case m.op.Is(OpUpdate | OpDelete): + return m.Client().PeerReputation.Query().Where(m.predicates...).IDs(ctx) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("IDs is not allowed on %s operations", m.op) + } +} + +// SetPeerDid sets the "peer_did" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) SetPeerDid(s string) { + m.peer_did = &s +} + +// PeerDid returns the value of the "peer_did" field in the mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) PeerDid() (r string, exists bool) { + v := m.peer_did + if v == nil { + return + } + return *v, true +} + +// OldPeerDid returns the old "peer_did" field's value of the PeerReputation entity. +// If the PeerReputation object wasn't provided to the builder, the object is fetched from the database. +// An error is returned if the mutation operation is not UpdateOne, or the database query fails. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) OldPeerDid(ctx context.Context) (v string, err error) { + if !m.op.Is(OpUpdateOne) { + return v, errors.New("OldPeerDid is only allowed on UpdateOne operations") + } + if m.id == nil || m.oldValue == nil { + return v, errors.New("OldPeerDid requires an ID field in the mutation") + } + oldValue, err := m.oldValue(ctx) + if err != nil { + return v, fmt.Errorf("querying old value for OldPeerDid: %w", err) + } + return oldValue.PeerDid, nil +} + +// ResetPeerDid resets all changes to the "peer_did" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) ResetPeerDid() { + m.peer_did = nil +} + +// SetSuccessfulExchanges sets the "successful_exchanges" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) SetSuccessfulExchanges(i int) { + m.successful_exchanges = &i + m.addsuccessful_exchanges = nil +} + +// SuccessfulExchanges returns the value of the "successful_exchanges" field in the mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) SuccessfulExchanges() (r int, exists bool) { + v := m.successful_exchanges + if v == nil { + return + } + return *v, true +} + +// OldSuccessfulExchanges returns the old "successful_exchanges" field's value of the PeerReputation entity. +// If the PeerReputation object wasn't provided to the builder, the object is fetched from the database. +// An error is returned if the mutation operation is not UpdateOne, or the database query fails. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) OldSuccessfulExchanges(ctx context.Context) (v int, err error) { + if !m.op.Is(OpUpdateOne) { + return v, errors.New("OldSuccessfulExchanges is only allowed on UpdateOne operations") + } + if m.id == nil || m.oldValue == nil { + return v, errors.New("OldSuccessfulExchanges requires an ID field in the mutation") + } + oldValue, err := m.oldValue(ctx) + if err != nil { + return v, fmt.Errorf("querying old value for OldSuccessfulExchanges: %w", err) + } + return oldValue.SuccessfulExchanges, nil +} + +// AddSuccessfulExchanges adds i to the "successful_exchanges" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) AddSuccessfulExchanges(i int) { + if m.addsuccessful_exchanges != nil { + *m.addsuccessful_exchanges += i + } else { + m.addsuccessful_exchanges = &i + } +} + +// AddedSuccessfulExchanges returns the value that was added to the "successful_exchanges" field in this mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) AddedSuccessfulExchanges() (r int, exists bool) { + v := m.addsuccessful_exchanges + if v == nil { + return + } + return *v, true +} + +// ResetSuccessfulExchanges resets all changes to the "successful_exchanges" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) ResetSuccessfulExchanges() { + m.successful_exchanges = nil + m.addsuccessful_exchanges = nil +} + +// SetFailedExchanges sets the "failed_exchanges" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) SetFailedExchanges(i int) { + m.failed_exchanges = &i + m.addfailed_exchanges = nil +} + +// FailedExchanges returns the value of the "failed_exchanges" field in the mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) FailedExchanges() (r int, exists bool) { + v := m.failed_exchanges + if v == nil { + return + } + return *v, true +} + +// OldFailedExchanges returns the old "failed_exchanges" field's value of the PeerReputation entity. +// If the PeerReputation object wasn't provided to the builder, the object is fetched from the database. +// An error is returned if the mutation operation is not UpdateOne, or the database query fails. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) OldFailedExchanges(ctx context.Context) (v int, err error) { + if !m.op.Is(OpUpdateOne) { + return v, errors.New("OldFailedExchanges is only allowed on UpdateOne operations") + } + if m.id == nil || m.oldValue == nil { + return v, errors.New("OldFailedExchanges requires an ID field in the mutation") + } + oldValue, err := m.oldValue(ctx) + if err != nil { + return v, fmt.Errorf("querying old value for OldFailedExchanges: %w", err) + } + return oldValue.FailedExchanges, nil +} + +// AddFailedExchanges adds i to the "failed_exchanges" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) AddFailedExchanges(i int) { + if m.addfailed_exchanges != nil { + *m.addfailed_exchanges += i + } else { + m.addfailed_exchanges = &i + } +} + +// AddedFailedExchanges returns the value that was added to the "failed_exchanges" field in this mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) AddedFailedExchanges() (r int, exists bool) { + v := m.addfailed_exchanges + if v == nil { + return + } + return *v, true +} + +// ResetFailedExchanges resets all changes to the "failed_exchanges" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) ResetFailedExchanges() { + m.failed_exchanges = nil + m.addfailed_exchanges = nil +} + +// SetTimeoutCount sets the "timeout_count" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) SetTimeoutCount(i int) { + m.timeout_count = &i + m.addtimeout_count = nil +} + +// TimeoutCount returns the value of the "timeout_count" field in the mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) TimeoutCount() (r int, exists bool) { + v := m.timeout_count + if v == nil { + return + } + return *v, true +} + +// OldTimeoutCount returns the old "timeout_count" field's value of the PeerReputation entity. +// If the PeerReputation object wasn't provided to the builder, the object is fetched from the database. +// An error is returned if the mutation operation is not UpdateOne, or the database query fails. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) OldTimeoutCount(ctx context.Context) (v int, err error) { + if !m.op.Is(OpUpdateOne) { + return v, errors.New("OldTimeoutCount is only allowed on UpdateOne operations") + } + if m.id == nil || m.oldValue == nil { + return v, errors.New("OldTimeoutCount requires an ID field in the mutation") + } + oldValue, err := m.oldValue(ctx) + if err != nil { + return v, fmt.Errorf("querying old value for OldTimeoutCount: %w", err) + } + return oldValue.TimeoutCount, nil +} + +// AddTimeoutCount adds i to the "timeout_count" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) AddTimeoutCount(i int) { + if m.addtimeout_count != nil { + *m.addtimeout_count += i + } else { + m.addtimeout_count = &i + } +} + +// AddedTimeoutCount returns the value that was added to the "timeout_count" field in this mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) AddedTimeoutCount() (r int, exists bool) { + v := m.addtimeout_count + if v == nil { + return + } + return *v, true +} + +// ResetTimeoutCount resets all changes to the "timeout_count" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) ResetTimeoutCount() { + m.timeout_count = nil + m.addtimeout_count = nil +} + +// SetTrustScore sets the "trust_score" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) SetTrustScore(f float64) { + m.trust_score = &f + m.addtrust_score = nil +} + +// TrustScore returns the value of the "trust_score" field in the mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) TrustScore() (r float64, exists bool) { + v := m.trust_score + if v == nil { + return + } + return *v, true +} + +// OldTrustScore returns the old "trust_score" field's value of the PeerReputation entity. +// If the PeerReputation object wasn't provided to the builder, the object is fetched from the database. +// An error is returned if the mutation operation is not UpdateOne, or the database query fails. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) OldTrustScore(ctx context.Context) (v float64, err error) { + if !m.op.Is(OpUpdateOne) { + return v, errors.New("OldTrustScore is only allowed on UpdateOne operations") + } + if m.id == nil || m.oldValue == nil { + return v, errors.New("OldTrustScore requires an ID field in the mutation") + } + oldValue, err := m.oldValue(ctx) + if err != nil { + return v, fmt.Errorf("querying old value for OldTrustScore: %w", err) + } + return oldValue.TrustScore, nil +} + +// AddTrustScore adds f to the "trust_score" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) AddTrustScore(f float64) { + if m.addtrust_score != nil { + *m.addtrust_score += f + } else { + m.addtrust_score = &f + } +} + +// AddedTrustScore returns the value that was added to the "trust_score" field in this mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) AddedTrustScore() (r float64, exists bool) { + v := m.addtrust_score + if v == nil { + return + } + return *v, true +} + +// ResetTrustScore resets all changes to the "trust_score" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) ResetTrustScore() { + m.trust_score = nil + m.addtrust_score = nil +} + +// SetFirstSeen sets the "first_seen" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) SetFirstSeen(t time.Time) { + m.first_seen = &t +} + +// FirstSeen returns the value of the "first_seen" field in the mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) FirstSeen() (r time.Time, exists bool) { + v := m.first_seen + if v == nil { + return + } + return *v, true +} + +// OldFirstSeen returns the old "first_seen" field's value of the PeerReputation entity. +// If the PeerReputation object wasn't provided to the builder, the object is fetched from the database. +// An error is returned if the mutation operation is not UpdateOne, or the database query fails. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) OldFirstSeen(ctx context.Context) (v time.Time, err error) { + if !m.op.Is(OpUpdateOne) { + return v, errors.New("OldFirstSeen is only allowed on UpdateOne operations") + } + if m.id == nil || m.oldValue == nil { + return v, errors.New("OldFirstSeen requires an ID field in the mutation") + } + oldValue, err := m.oldValue(ctx) + if err != nil { + return v, fmt.Errorf("querying old value for OldFirstSeen: %w", err) + } + return oldValue.FirstSeen, nil +} + +// ResetFirstSeen resets all changes to the "first_seen" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) ResetFirstSeen() { + m.first_seen = nil +} + +// SetLastInteraction sets the "last_interaction" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) SetLastInteraction(t time.Time) { + m.last_interaction = &t +} + +// LastInteraction returns the value of the "last_interaction" field in the mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) LastInteraction() (r time.Time, exists bool) { + v := m.last_interaction + if v == nil { + return + } + return *v, true +} + +// OldLastInteraction returns the old "last_interaction" field's value of the PeerReputation entity. +// If the PeerReputation object wasn't provided to the builder, the object is fetched from the database. +// An error is returned if the mutation operation is not UpdateOne, or the database query fails. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) OldLastInteraction(ctx context.Context) (v time.Time, err error) { + if !m.op.Is(OpUpdateOne) { + return v, errors.New("OldLastInteraction is only allowed on UpdateOne operations") + } + if m.id == nil || m.oldValue == nil { + return v, errors.New("OldLastInteraction requires an ID field in the mutation") + } + oldValue, err := m.oldValue(ctx) + if err != nil { + return v, fmt.Errorf("querying old value for OldLastInteraction: %w", err) + } + return oldValue.LastInteraction, nil +} + +// ResetLastInteraction resets all changes to the "last_interaction" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) ResetLastInteraction() { + m.last_interaction = nil +} + +// SetCreatedAt sets the "created_at" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) SetCreatedAt(t time.Time) { + m.created_at = &t +} + +// CreatedAt returns the value of the "created_at" field in the mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) CreatedAt() (r time.Time, exists bool) { + v := m.created_at + if v == nil { + return + } + return *v, true +} + +// OldCreatedAt returns the old "created_at" field's value of the PeerReputation entity. +// If the PeerReputation object wasn't provided to the builder, the object is fetched from the database. +// An error is returned if the mutation operation is not UpdateOne, or the database query fails. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) OldCreatedAt(ctx context.Context) (v time.Time, err error) { + if !m.op.Is(OpUpdateOne) { + return v, errors.New("OldCreatedAt is only allowed on UpdateOne operations") + } + if m.id == nil || m.oldValue == nil { + return v, errors.New("OldCreatedAt requires an ID field in the mutation") + } + oldValue, err := m.oldValue(ctx) + if err != nil { + return v, fmt.Errorf("querying old value for OldCreatedAt: %w", err) + } + return oldValue.CreatedAt, nil +} + +// ResetCreatedAt resets all changes to the "created_at" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) ResetCreatedAt() { + m.created_at = nil +} + +// SetUpdatedAt sets the "updated_at" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) SetUpdatedAt(t time.Time) { + m.updated_at = &t +} + +// UpdatedAt returns the value of the "updated_at" field in the mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) UpdatedAt() (r time.Time, exists bool) { + v := m.updated_at + if v == nil { + return + } + return *v, true +} + +// OldUpdatedAt returns the old "updated_at" field's value of the PeerReputation entity. +// If the PeerReputation object wasn't provided to the builder, the object is fetched from the database. +// An error is returned if the mutation operation is not UpdateOne, or the database query fails. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) OldUpdatedAt(ctx context.Context) (v time.Time, err error) { + if !m.op.Is(OpUpdateOne) { + return v, errors.New("OldUpdatedAt is only allowed on UpdateOne operations") + } + if m.id == nil || m.oldValue == nil { + return v, errors.New("OldUpdatedAt requires an ID field in the mutation") + } + oldValue, err := m.oldValue(ctx) + if err != nil { + return v, fmt.Errorf("querying old value for OldUpdatedAt: %w", err) + } + return oldValue.UpdatedAt, nil +} + +// ResetUpdatedAt resets all changes to the "updated_at" field. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) ResetUpdatedAt() { + m.updated_at = nil +} + +// Where appends a list predicates to the PeerReputationMutation builder. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) Where(ps ...predicate.PeerReputation) { + m.predicates = append(m.predicates, ps...) +} + +// WhereP appends storage-level predicates to the PeerReputationMutation builder. Using this method, +// users can use type-assertion to append predicates that do not depend on any generated package. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) WhereP(ps ...func(*sql.Selector)) { + p := make([]predicate.PeerReputation, len(ps)) + for i := range ps { + p[i] = ps[i] + } + m.Where(p...) +} + +// Op returns the operation name. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) Op() Op { + return m.op +} + +// SetOp allows setting the mutation operation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) SetOp(op Op) { + m.op = op +} + +// Type returns the node type of this mutation (PeerReputation). +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) Type() string { + return m.typ +} + +// Fields returns all fields that were changed during this mutation. Note that in +// order to get all numeric fields that were incremented/decremented, call +// AddedFields(). +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) Fields() []string { + fields := make([]string, 0, 9) + if m.peer_did != nil { + fields = append(fields, peerreputation.FieldPeerDid) + } + if m.successful_exchanges != nil { + fields = append(fields, peerreputation.FieldSuccessfulExchanges) + } + if m.failed_exchanges != nil { + fields = append(fields, peerreputation.FieldFailedExchanges) + } + if m.timeout_count != nil { + fields = append(fields, peerreputation.FieldTimeoutCount) + } + if m.trust_score != nil { + fields = append(fields, peerreputation.FieldTrustScore) + } + if m.first_seen != nil { + fields = append(fields, peerreputation.FieldFirstSeen) + } + if m.last_interaction != nil { + fields = append(fields, peerreputation.FieldLastInteraction) + } + if m.created_at != nil { + fields = append(fields, peerreputation.FieldCreatedAt) + } + if m.updated_at != nil { + fields = append(fields, peerreputation.FieldUpdatedAt) + } + return fields +} + +// Field returns the value of a field with the given name. The second boolean +// return value indicates that this field was not set, or was not defined in the +// schema. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) Field(name string) (ent.Value, bool) { + switch name { + case peerreputation.FieldPeerDid: + return m.PeerDid() + case peerreputation.FieldSuccessfulExchanges: + return m.SuccessfulExchanges() + case peerreputation.FieldFailedExchanges: + return m.FailedExchanges() + case peerreputation.FieldTimeoutCount: + return m.TimeoutCount() + case peerreputation.FieldTrustScore: + return m.TrustScore() + case peerreputation.FieldFirstSeen: + return m.FirstSeen() + case peerreputation.FieldLastInteraction: + return m.LastInteraction() + case peerreputation.FieldCreatedAt: + return m.CreatedAt() + case peerreputation.FieldUpdatedAt: + return m.UpdatedAt() + } + return nil, false +} + +// OldField returns the old value of the field from the database. An error is +// returned if the mutation operation is not UpdateOne, or the query to the +// database failed. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) OldField(ctx context.Context, name string) (ent.Value, error) { + switch name { + case peerreputation.FieldPeerDid: + return m.OldPeerDid(ctx) + case peerreputation.FieldSuccessfulExchanges: + return m.OldSuccessfulExchanges(ctx) + case peerreputation.FieldFailedExchanges: + return m.OldFailedExchanges(ctx) + case peerreputation.FieldTimeoutCount: + return m.OldTimeoutCount(ctx) + case peerreputation.FieldTrustScore: + return m.OldTrustScore(ctx) + case peerreputation.FieldFirstSeen: + return m.OldFirstSeen(ctx) + case peerreputation.FieldLastInteraction: + return m.OldLastInteraction(ctx) + case peerreputation.FieldCreatedAt: + return m.OldCreatedAt(ctx) + case peerreputation.FieldUpdatedAt: + return m.OldUpdatedAt(ctx) + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown PeerReputation field %s", name) +} + +// SetField sets the value of a field with the given name. It returns an error if +// the field is not defined in the schema, or if the type mismatched the field +// type. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) SetField(name string, value ent.Value) error { + switch name { + case peerreputation.FieldPeerDid: + v, ok := value.(string) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field %s", value, name) + } + m.SetPeerDid(v) + return nil + case peerreputation.FieldSuccessfulExchanges: + v, ok := value.(int) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field %s", value, name) + } + m.SetSuccessfulExchanges(v) + return nil + case peerreputation.FieldFailedExchanges: + v, ok := value.(int) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field %s", value, name) + } + m.SetFailedExchanges(v) + return nil + case peerreputation.FieldTimeoutCount: + v, ok := value.(int) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field %s", value, name) + } + m.SetTimeoutCount(v) + return nil + case peerreputation.FieldTrustScore: + v, ok := value.(float64) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field %s", value, name) + } + m.SetTrustScore(v) + return nil + case peerreputation.FieldFirstSeen: + v, ok := value.(time.Time) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field %s", value, name) + } + m.SetFirstSeen(v) + return nil + case peerreputation.FieldLastInteraction: + v, ok := value.(time.Time) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field %s", value, name) + } + m.SetLastInteraction(v) + return nil + case peerreputation.FieldCreatedAt: + v, ok := value.(time.Time) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field %s", value, name) + } + m.SetCreatedAt(v) + return nil + case peerreputation.FieldUpdatedAt: + v, ok := value.(time.Time) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field %s", value, name) + } + m.SetUpdatedAt(v) + return nil + } + return fmt.Errorf("unknown PeerReputation field %s", name) +} + +// AddedFields returns all numeric fields that were incremented/decremented during +// this mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) AddedFields() []string { + var fields []string + if m.addsuccessful_exchanges != nil { + fields = append(fields, peerreputation.FieldSuccessfulExchanges) + } + if m.addfailed_exchanges != nil { + fields = append(fields, peerreputation.FieldFailedExchanges) + } + if m.addtimeout_count != nil { + fields = append(fields, peerreputation.FieldTimeoutCount) + } + if m.addtrust_score != nil { + fields = append(fields, peerreputation.FieldTrustScore) + } + return fields +} + +// AddedField returns the numeric value that was incremented/decremented on a field +// with the given name. The second boolean return value indicates that this field +// was not set, or was not defined in the schema. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) AddedField(name string) (ent.Value, bool) { + switch name { + case peerreputation.FieldSuccessfulExchanges: + return m.AddedSuccessfulExchanges() + case peerreputation.FieldFailedExchanges: + return m.AddedFailedExchanges() + case peerreputation.FieldTimeoutCount: + return m.AddedTimeoutCount() + case peerreputation.FieldTrustScore: + return m.AddedTrustScore() + } + return nil, false +} + +// AddField adds the value to the field with the given name. It returns an error if +// the field is not defined in the schema, or if the type mismatched the field +// type. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) AddField(name string, value ent.Value) error { + switch name { + case peerreputation.FieldSuccessfulExchanges: + v, ok := value.(int) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field %s", value, name) + } + m.AddSuccessfulExchanges(v) + return nil + case peerreputation.FieldFailedExchanges: + v, ok := value.(int) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field %s", value, name) + } + m.AddFailedExchanges(v) + return nil + case peerreputation.FieldTimeoutCount: + v, ok := value.(int) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field %s", value, name) + } + m.AddTimeoutCount(v) + return nil + case peerreputation.FieldTrustScore: + v, ok := value.(float64) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field %s", value, name) + } + m.AddTrustScore(v) + return nil + } + return fmt.Errorf("unknown PeerReputation numeric field %s", name) +} + +// ClearedFields returns all nullable fields that were cleared during this +// mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) ClearedFields() []string { + return nil +} + +// FieldCleared returns a boolean indicating if a field with the given name was +// cleared in this mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) FieldCleared(name string) bool { + _, ok := m.clearedFields[name] + return ok +} + +// ClearField clears the value of the field with the given name. It returns an +// error if the field is not defined in the schema. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) ClearField(name string) error { + return fmt.Errorf("unknown PeerReputation nullable field %s", name) +} + +// ResetField resets all changes in the mutation for the field with the given name. +// It returns an error if the field is not defined in the schema. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) ResetField(name string) error { + switch name { + case peerreputation.FieldPeerDid: + m.ResetPeerDid() + return nil + case peerreputation.FieldSuccessfulExchanges: + m.ResetSuccessfulExchanges() + return nil + case peerreputation.FieldFailedExchanges: + m.ResetFailedExchanges() + return nil + case peerreputation.FieldTimeoutCount: + m.ResetTimeoutCount() + return nil + case peerreputation.FieldTrustScore: + m.ResetTrustScore() + return nil + case peerreputation.FieldFirstSeen: + m.ResetFirstSeen() + return nil + case peerreputation.FieldLastInteraction: + m.ResetLastInteraction() + return nil + case peerreputation.FieldCreatedAt: + m.ResetCreatedAt() + return nil + case peerreputation.FieldUpdatedAt: + m.ResetUpdatedAt() + return nil + } + return fmt.Errorf("unknown PeerReputation field %s", name) +} + +// AddedEdges returns all edge names that were set/added in this mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) AddedEdges() []string { + edges := make([]string, 0, 0) + return edges +} + +// AddedIDs returns all IDs (to other nodes) that were added for the given edge +// name in this mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) AddedIDs(name string) []ent.Value { + return nil +} + +// RemovedEdges returns all edge names that were removed in this mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) RemovedEdges() []string { + edges := make([]string, 0, 0) + return edges +} + +// RemovedIDs returns all IDs (to other nodes) that were removed for the edge with +// the given name in this mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) RemovedIDs(name string) []ent.Value { + return nil +} + +// ClearedEdges returns all edge names that were cleared in this mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) ClearedEdges() []string { + edges := make([]string, 0, 0) + return edges +} + +// EdgeCleared returns a boolean which indicates if the edge with the given name +// was cleared in this mutation. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) EdgeCleared(name string) bool { + return false +} + +// ClearEdge clears the value of the edge with the given name. It returns an error +// if that edge is not defined in the schema. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) ClearEdge(name string) error { + return fmt.Errorf("unknown PeerReputation unique edge %s", name) +} + +// ResetEdge resets all changes to the edge with the given name in this mutation. +// It returns an error if the edge is not defined in the schema. +func (m *PeerReputationMutation) ResetEdge(name string) error { + return fmt.Errorf("unknown PeerReputation edge %s", name) +} + // ReflectionMutation represents an operation that mutates the Reflection nodes in the graph. type ReflectionMutation struct { config diff --git a/internal/ent/peerreputation.go b/internal/ent/peerreputation.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d5132adf --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/ent/peerreputation.go @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +// Code generated by ent, DO NOT EDIT. + +package ent + +import ( + "fmt" + "strings" + "time" + + "entgo.io/ent" + "entgo.io/ent/dialect/sql" + "github.com/google/uuid" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/peerreputation" +) + +// PeerReputation is the model entity for the PeerReputation schema. +type PeerReputation struct { + config `json:"-"` + // ID of the ent. + ID uuid.UUID `json:"id,omitempty"` + // DID of the peer + PeerDid string `json:"peer_did,omitempty"` + // Count of successful paid exchanges + SuccessfulExchanges int `json:"successful_exchanges,omitempty"` + // Count of failed exchanges + FailedExchanges int `json:"failed_exchanges,omitempty"` + // Count of timed-out exchanges + TimeoutCount int `json:"timeout_count,omitempty"` + // Computed trust score + TrustScore float64 `json:"trust_score,omitempty"` + // When this peer was first observed + FirstSeen time.Time `json:"first_seen,omitempty"` + // Most recent interaction timestamp + LastInteraction time.Time `json:"last_interaction,omitempty"` + // CreatedAt holds the value of the "created_at" field. + CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at,omitempty"` + // UpdatedAt holds the value of the "updated_at" field. + UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updated_at,omitempty"` + selectValues sql.SelectValues +} + +// scanValues returns the types for scanning values from sql.Rows. +func (*PeerReputation) scanValues(columns []string) ([]any, error) { + values := make([]any, len(columns)) + for i := range columns { + switch columns[i] { + case peerreputation.FieldTrustScore: + values[i] = new(sql.NullFloat64) + case peerreputation.FieldSuccessfulExchanges, peerreputation.FieldFailedExchanges, peerreputation.FieldTimeoutCount: + values[i] = new(sql.NullInt64) + case peerreputation.FieldPeerDid: + values[i] = new(sql.NullString) + case peerreputation.FieldFirstSeen, peerreputation.FieldLastInteraction, peerreputation.FieldCreatedAt, peerreputation.FieldUpdatedAt: + values[i] = new(sql.NullTime) + case peerreputation.FieldID: + values[i] = new(uuid.UUID) + default: + values[i] = new(sql.UnknownType) + } + } + return values, nil +} + +// assignValues assigns the values that were returned from sql.Rows (after scanning) +// to the PeerReputation fields. +func (_m *PeerReputation) assignValues(columns []string, values []any) error { + if m, n := len(values), len(columns); m < n { + return fmt.Errorf("mismatch number of scan values: %d != %d", m, n) + } + for i := range columns { + switch columns[i] { + case peerreputation.FieldID: + if value, ok := values[i].(*uuid.UUID); !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field id", values[i]) + } else if value != nil { + _m.ID = *value + } + case peerreputation.FieldPeerDid: + if value, ok := values[i].(*sql.NullString); !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field peer_did", values[i]) + } else if value.Valid { + _m.PeerDid = value.String + } + case peerreputation.FieldSuccessfulExchanges: + if value, ok := values[i].(*sql.NullInt64); !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field successful_exchanges", values[i]) + } else if value.Valid { + _m.SuccessfulExchanges = int(value.Int64) + } + case peerreputation.FieldFailedExchanges: + if value, ok := values[i].(*sql.NullInt64); !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field failed_exchanges", values[i]) + } else if value.Valid { + _m.FailedExchanges = int(value.Int64) + } + case peerreputation.FieldTimeoutCount: + if value, ok := values[i].(*sql.NullInt64); !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field timeout_count", values[i]) + } else if value.Valid { + _m.TimeoutCount = int(value.Int64) + } + case peerreputation.FieldTrustScore: + if value, ok := values[i].(*sql.NullFloat64); !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field trust_score", values[i]) + } else if value.Valid { + _m.TrustScore = value.Float64 + } + case peerreputation.FieldFirstSeen: + if value, ok := values[i].(*sql.NullTime); !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field first_seen", values[i]) + } else if value.Valid { + _m.FirstSeen = value.Time + } + case peerreputation.FieldLastInteraction: + if value, ok := values[i].(*sql.NullTime); !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field last_interaction", values[i]) + } else if value.Valid { + _m.LastInteraction = value.Time + } + case peerreputation.FieldCreatedAt: + if value, ok := values[i].(*sql.NullTime); !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field created_at", values[i]) + } else if value.Valid { + _m.CreatedAt = value.Time + } + case peerreputation.FieldUpdatedAt: + if value, ok := values[i].(*sql.NullTime); !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type %T for field updated_at", values[i]) + } else if value.Valid { + _m.UpdatedAt = value.Time + } + default: + _m.selectValues.Set(columns[i], values[i]) + } + } + return nil +} + +// Value returns the ent.Value that was dynamically selected and assigned to the PeerReputation. +// This includes values selected through modifiers, order, etc. +func (_m *PeerReputation) Value(name string) (ent.Value, error) { + return _m.selectValues.Get(name) +} + +// Update returns a builder for updating this PeerReputation. +// Note that you need to call PeerReputation.Unwrap() before calling this method if this PeerReputation +// was returned from a transaction, and the transaction was committed or rolled back. +func (_m *PeerReputation) Update() *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + return NewPeerReputationClient(_m.config).UpdateOne(_m) +} + +// Unwrap unwraps the PeerReputation entity that was returned from a transaction after it was closed, +// so that all future queries will be executed through the driver which created the transaction. +func (_m *PeerReputation) Unwrap() *PeerReputation { + _tx, ok := _m.config.driver.(*txDriver) + if !ok { + panic("ent: PeerReputation is not a transactional entity") + } + _m.config.driver = _tx.drv + return _m +} + +// String implements the fmt.Stringer. +func (_m *PeerReputation) String() string { + var builder strings.Builder + builder.WriteString("PeerReputation(") + builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("id=%v, ", _m.ID)) + builder.WriteString("peer_did=") + builder.WriteString(_m.PeerDid) + builder.WriteString(", ") + builder.WriteString("successful_exchanges=") + builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("%v", _m.SuccessfulExchanges)) + builder.WriteString(", ") + builder.WriteString("failed_exchanges=") + builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("%v", _m.FailedExchanges)) + builder.WriteString(", ") + builder.WriteString("timeout_count=") + builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("%v", _m.TimeoutCount)) + builder.WriteString(", ") + builder.WriteString("trust_score=") + builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("%v", _m.TrustScore)) + builder.WriteString(", ") + builder.WriteString("first_seen=") + builder.WriteString(_m.FirstSeen.Format(time.ANSIC)) + builder.WriteString(", ") + builder.WriteString("last_interaction=") + builder.WriteString(_m.LastInteraction.Format(time.ANSIC)) + builder.WriteString(", ") + builder.WriteString("created_at=") + builder.WriteString(_m.CreatedAt.Format(time.ANSIC)) + builder.WriteString(", ") + builder.WriteString("updated_at=") + builder.WriteString(_m.UpdatedAt.Format(time.ANSIC)) + builder.WriteByte(')') + return builder.String() +} + +// PeerReputations is a parsable slice of PeerReputation. +type PeerReputations []*PeerReputation diff --git a/internal/ent/peerreputation/peerreputation.go b/internal/ent/peerreputation/peerreputation.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bb8998f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/ent/peerreputation/peerreputation.go @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +// Code generated by ent, DO NOT EDIT. + +package peerreputation + +import ( + "time" + + "entgo.io/ent/dialect/sql" + "github.com/google/uuid" +) + +const ( + // Label holds the string label denoting the peerreputation type in the database. + Label = "peer_reputation" + // FieldID holds the string denoting the id field in the database. + FieldID = "id" + // FieldPeerDid holds the string denoting the peer_did field in the database. + FieldPeerDid = "peer_did" + // FieldSuccessfulExchanges holds the string denoting the successful_exchanges field in the database. + FieldSuccessfulExchanges = "successful_exchanges" + // FieldFailedExchanges holds the string denoting the failed_exchanges field in the database. + FieldFailedExchanges = "failed_exchanges" + // FieldTimeoutCount holds the string denoting the timeout_count field in the database. + FieldTimeoutCount = "timeout_count" + // FieldTrustScore holds the string denoting the trust_score field in the database. + FieldTrustScore = "trust_score" + // FieldFirstSeen holds the string denoting the first_seen field in the database. + FieldFirstSeen = "first_seen" + // FieldLastInteraction holds the string denoting the last_interaction field in the database. + FieldLastInteraction = "last_interaction" + // FieldCreatedAt holds the string denoting the created_at field in the database. + FieldCreatedAt = "created_at" + // FieldUpdatedAt holds the string denoting the updated_at field in the database. + FieldUpdatedAt = "updated_at" + // Table holds the table name of the peerreputation in the database. + Table = "peer_reputations" +) + +// Columns holds all SQL columns for peerreputation fields. +var Columns = []string{ + FieldID, + FieldPeerDid, + FieldSuccessfulExchanges, + FieldFailedExchanges, + FieldTimeoutCount, + FieldTrustScore, + FieldFirstSeen, + FieldLastInteraction, + FieldCreatedAt, + FieldUpdatedAt, +} + +// ValidColumn reports if the column name is valid (part of the table columns). +func ValidColumn(column string) bool { + for i := range Columns { + if column == Columns[i] { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +var ( + // PeerDidValidator is a validator for the "peer_did" field. It is called by the builders before save. + PeerDidValidator func(string) error + // DefaultSuccessfulExchanges holds the default value on creation for the "successful_exchanges" field. + DefaultSuccessfulExchanges int + // DefaultFailedExchanges holds the default value on creation for the "failed_exchanges" field. + DefaultFailedExchanges int + // DefaultTimeoutCount holds the default value on creation for the "timeout_count" field. + DefaultTimeoutCount int + // DefaultTrustScore holds the default value on creation for the "trust_score" field. + DefaultTrustScore float64 + // DefaultFirstSeen holds the default value on creation for the "first_seen" field. + DefaultFirstSeen func() time.Time + // DefaultLastInteraction holds the default value on creation for the "last_interaction" field. + DefaultLastInteraction func() time.Time + // UpdateDefaultLastInteraction holds the default value on update for the "last_interaction" field. + UpdateDefaultLastInteraction func() time.Time + // DefaultCreatedAt holds the default value on creation for the "created_at" field. + DefaultCreatedAt func() time.Time + // DefaultUpdatedAt holds the default value on creation for the "updated_at" field. + DefaultUpdatedAt func() time.Time + // UpdateDefaultUpdatedAt holds the default value on update for the "updated_at" field. + UpdateDefaultUpdatedAt func() time.Time + // DefaultID holds the default value on creation for the "id" field. + DefaultID func() uuid.UUID +) + +// OrderOption defines the ordering options for the PeerReputation queries. +type OrderOption func(*sql.Selector) + +// ByID orders the results by the id field. +func ByID(opts ...sql.OrderTermOption) OrderOption { + return sql.OrderByField(FieldID, opts...).ToFunc() +} + +// ByPeerDid orders the results by the peer_did field. +func ByPeerDid(opts ...sql.OrderTermOption) OrderOption { + return sql.OrderByField(FieldPeerDid, opts...).ToFunc() +} + +// BySuccessfulExchanges orders the results by the successful_exchanges field. +func BySuccessfulExchanges(opts ...sql.OrderTermOption) OrderOption { + return sql.OrderByField(FieldSuccessfulExchanges, opts...).ToFunc() +} + +// ByFailedExchanges orders the results by the failed_exchanges field. +func ByFailedExchanges(opts ...sql.OrderTermOption) OrderOption { + return sql.OrderByField(FieldFailedExchanges, opts...).ToFunc() +} + +// ByTimeoutCount orders the results by the timeout_count field. +func ByTimeoutCount(opts ...sql.OrderTermOption) OrderOption { + return sql.OrderByField(FieldTimeoutCount, opts...).ToFunc() +} + +// ByTrustScore orders the results by the trust_score field. +func ByTrustScore(opts ...sql.OrderTermOption) OrderOption { + return sql.OrderByField(FieldTrustScore, opts...).ToFunc() +} + +// ByFirstSeen orders the results by the first_seen field. +func ByFirstSeen(opts ...sql.OrderTermOption) OrderOption { + return sql.OrderByField(FieldFirstSeen, opts...).ToFunc() +} + +// ByLastInteraction orders the results by the last_interaction field. +func ByLastInteraction(opts ...sql.OrderTermOption) OrderOption { + return sql.OrderByField(FieldLastInteraction, opts...).ToFunc() +} + +// ByCreatedAt orders the results by the created_at field. +func ByCreatedAt(opts ...sql.OrderTermOption) OrderOption { + return sql.OrderByField(FieldCreatedAt, opts...).ToFunc() +} + +// ByUpdatedAt orders the results by the updated_at field. +func ByUpdatedAt(opts ...sql.OrderTermOption) OrderOption { + return sql.OrderByField(FieldUpdatedAt, opts...).ToFunc() +} diff --git a/internal/ent/peerreputation/where.go b/internal/ent/peerreputation/where.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..423bc866 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/ent/peerreputation/where.go @@ -0,0 +1,501 @@ +// Code generated by ent, DO NOT EDIT. + +package peerreputation + +import ( + "time" + + "entgo.io/ent/dialect/sql" + "github.com/google/uuid" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/predicate" +) + +// ID filters vertices based on their ID field. +func ID(id uuid.UUID) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldID, id)) +} + +// IDEQ applies the EQ predicate on the ID field. +func IDEQ(id uuid.UUID) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldID, id)) +} + +// IDNEQ applies the NEQ predicate on the ID field. +func IDNEQ(id uuid.UUID) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNEQ(FieldID, id)) +} + +// IDIn applies the In predicate on the ID field. +func IDIn(ids ...uuid.UUID) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldIn(FieldID, ids...)) +} + +// IDNotIn applies the NotIn predicate on the ID field. +func IDNotIn(ids ...uuid.UUID) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNotIn(FieldID, ids...)) +} + +// IDGT applies the GT predicate on the ID field. +func IDGT(id uuid.UUID) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGT(FieldID, id)) +} + +// IDGTE applies the GTE predicate on the ID field. +func IDGTE(id uuid.UUID) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGTE(FieldID, id)) +} + +// IDLT applies the LT predicate on the ID field. +func IDLT(id uuid.UUID) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLT(FieldID, id)) +} + +// IDLTE applies the LTE predicate on the ID field. +func IDLTE(id uuid.UUID) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLTE(FieldID, id)) +} + +// PeerDid applies equality check predicate on the "peer_did" field. It's identical to PeerDidEQ. +func PeerDid(v string) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldPeerDid, v)) +} + +// SuccessfulExchanges applies equality check predicate on the "successful_exchanges" field. It's identical to SuccessfulExchangesEQ. +func SuccessfulExchanges(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldSuccessfulExchanges, v)) +} + +// FailedExchanges applies equality check predicate on the "failed_exchanges" field. It's identical to FailedExchangesEQ. +func FailedExchanges(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldFailedExchanges, v)) +} + +// TimeoutCount applies equality check predicate on the "timeout_count" field. It's identical to TimeoutCountEQ. +func TimeoutCount(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldTimeoutCount, v)) +} + +// TrustScore applies equality check predicate on the "trust_score" field. It's identical to TrustScoreEQ. +func TrustScore(v float64) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldTrustScore, v)) +} + +// FirstSeen applies equality check predicate on the "first_seen" field. It's identical to FirstSeenEQ. +func FirstSeen(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldFirstSeen, v)) +} + +// LastInteraction applies equality check predicate on the "last_interaction" field. It's identical to LastInteractionEQ. +func LastInteraction(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldLastInteraction, v)) +} + +// CreatedAt applies equality check predicate on the "created_at" field. It's identical to CreatedAtEQ. +func CreatedAt(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldCreatedAt, v)) +} + +// UpdatedAt applies equality check predicate on the "updated_at" field. It's identical to UpdatedAtEQ. +func UpdatedAt(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldUpdatedAt, v)) +} + +// PeerDidEQ applies the EQ predicate on the "peer_did" field. +func PeerDidEQ(v string) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldPeerDid, v)) +} + +// PeerDidNEQ applies the NEQ predicate on the "peer_did" field. +func PeerDidNEQ(v string) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNEQ(FieldPeerDid, v)) +} + +// PeerDidIn applies the In predicate on the "peer_did" field. +func PeerDidIn(vs ...string) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldIn(FieldPeerDid, vs...)) +} + +// PeerDidNotIn applies the NotIn predicate on the "peer_did" field. +func PeerDidNotIn(vs ...string) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNotIn(FieldPeerDid, vs...)) +} + +// PeerDidGT applies the GT predicate on the "peer_did" field. +func PeerDidGT(v string) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGT(FieldPeerDid, v)) +} + +// PeerDidGTE applies the GTE predicate on the "peer_did" field. +func PeerDidGTE(v string) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGTE(FieldPeerDid, v)) +} + +// PeerDidLT applies the LT predicate on the "peer_did" field. +func PeerDidLT(v string) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLT(FieldPeerDid, v)) +} + +// PeerDidLTE applies the LTE predicate on the "peer_did" field. +func PeerDidLTE(v string) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLTE(FieldPeerDid, v)) +} + +// PeerDidContains applies the Contains predicate on the "peer_did" field. +func PeerDidContains(v string) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldContains(FieldPeerDid, v)) +} + +// PeerDidHasPrefix applies the HasPrefix predicate on the "peer_did" field. +func PeerDidHasPrefix(v string) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldHasPrefix(FieldPeerDid, v)) +} + +// PeerDidHasSuffix applies the HasSuffix predicate on the "peer_did" field. +func PeerDidHasSuffix(v string) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldHasSuffix(FieldPeerDid, v)) +} + +// PeerDidEqualFold applies the EqualFold predicate on the "peer_did" field. +func PeerDidEqualFold(v string) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEqualFold(FieldPeerDid, v)) +} + +// PeerDidContainsFold applies the ContainsFold predicate on the "peer_did" field. +func PeerDidContainsFold(v string) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldContainsFold(FieldPeerDid, v)) +} + +// SuccessfulExchangesEQ applies the EQ predicate on the "successful_exchanges" field. +func SuccessfulExchangesEQ(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldSuccessfulExchanges, v)) +} + +// SuccessfulExchangesNEQ applies the NEQ predicate on the "successful_exchanges" field. +func SuccessfulExchangesNEQ(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNEQ(FieldSuccessfulExchanges, v)) +} + +// SuccessfulExchangesIn applies the In predicate on the "successful_exchanges" field. +func SuccessfulExchangesIn(vs ...int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldIn(FieldSuccessfulExchanges, vs...)) +} + +// SuccessfulExchangesNotIn applies the NotIn predicate on the "successful_exchanges" field. +func SuccessfulExchangesNotIn(vs ...int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNotIn(FieldSuccessfulExchanges, vs...)) +} + +// SuccessfulExchangesGT applies the GT predicate on the "successful_exchanges" field. +func SuccessfulExchangesGT(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGT(FieldSuccessfulExchanges, v)) +} + +// SuccessfulExchangesGTE applies the GTE predicate on the "successful_exchanges" field. +func SuccessfulExchangesGTE(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGTE(FieldSuccessfulExchanges, v)) +} + +// SuccessfulExchangesLT applies the LT predicate on the "successful_exchanges" field. +func SuccessfulExchangesLT(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLT(FieldSuccessfulExchanges, v)) +} + +// SuccessfulExchangesLTE applies the LTE predicate on the "successful_exchanges" field. +func SuccessfulExchangesLTE(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLTE(FieldSuccessfulExchanges, v)) +} + +// FailedExchangesEQ applies the EQ predicate on the "failed_exchanges" field. +func FailedExchangesEQ(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldFailedExchanges, v)) +} + +// FailedExchangesNEQ applies the NEQ predicate on the "failed_exchanges" field. +func FailedExchangesNEQ(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNEQ(FieldFailedExchanges, v)) +} + +// FailedExchangesIn applies the In predicate on the "failed_exchanges" field. +func FailedExchangesIn(vs ...int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldIn(FieldFailedExchanges, vs...)) +} + +// FailedExchangesNotIn applies the NotIn predicate on the "failed_exchanges" field. +func FailedExchangesNotIn(vs ...int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNotIn(FieldFailedExchanges, vs...)) +} + +// FailedExchangesGT applies the GT predicate on the "failed_exchanges" field. +func FailedExchangesGT(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGT(FieldFailedExchanges, v)) +} + +// FailedExchangesGTE applies the GTE predicate on the "failed_exchanges" field. +func FailedExchangesGTE(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGTE(FieldFailedExchanges, v)) +} + +// FailedExchangesLT applies the LT predicate on the "failed_exchanges" field. +func FailedExchangesLT(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLT(FieldFailedExchanges, v)) +} + +// FailedExchangesLTE applies the LTE predicate on the "failed_exchanges" field. +func FailedExchangesLTE(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLTE(FieldFailedExchanges, v)) +} + +// TimeoutCountEQ applies the EQ predicate on the "timeout_count" field. +func TimeoutCountEQ(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldTimeoutCount, v)) +} + +// TimeoutCountNEQ applies the NEQ predicate on the "timeout_count" field. +func TimeoutCountNEQ(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNEQ(FieldTimeoutCount, v)) +} + +// TimeoutCountIn applies the In predicate on the "timeout_count" field. +func TimeoutCountIn(vs ...int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldIn(FieldTimeoutCount, vs...)) +} + +// TimeoutCountNotIn applies the NotIn predicate on the "timeout_count" field. +func TimeoutCountNotIn(vs ...int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNotIn(FieldTimeoutCount, vs...)) +} + +// TimeoutCountGT applies the GT predicate on the "timeout_count" field. +func TimeoutCountGT(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGT(FieldTimeoutCount, v)) +} + +// TimeoutCountGTE applies the GTE predicate on the "timeout_count" field. +func TimeoutCountGTE(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGTE(FieldTimeoutCount, v)) +} + +// TimeoutCountLT applies the LT predicate on the "timeout_count" field. +func TimeoutCountLT(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLT(FieldTimeoutCount, v)) +} + +// TimeoutCountLTE applies the LTE predicate on the "timeout_count" field. +func TimeoutCountLTE(v int) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLTE(FieldTimeoutCount, v)) +} + +// TrustScoreEQ applies the EQ predicate on the "trust_score" field. +func TrustScoreEQ(v float64) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldTrustScore, v)) +} + +// TrustScoreNEQ applies the NEQ predicate on the "trust_score" field. +func TrustScoreNEQ(v float64) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNEQ(FieldTrustScore, v)) +} + +// TrustScoreIn applies the In predicate on the "trust_score" field. +func TrustScoreIn(vs ...float64) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldIn(FieldTrustScore, vs...)) +} + +// TrustScoreNotIn applies the NotIn predicate on the "trust_score" field. +func TrustScoreNotIn(vs ...float64) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNotIn(FieldTrustScore, vs...)) +} + +// TrustScoreGT applies the GT predicate on the "trust_score" field. +func TrustScoreGT(v float64) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGT(FieldTrustScore, v)) +} + +// TrustScoreGTE applies the GTE predicate on the "trust_score" field. +func TrustScoreGTE(v float64) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGTE(FieldTrustScore, v)) +} + +// TrustScoreLT applies the LT predicate on the "trust_score" field. +func TrustScoreLT(v float64) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLT(FieldTrustScore, v)) +} + +// TrustScoreLTE applies the LTE predicate on the "trust_score" field. +func TrustScoreLTE(v float64) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLTE(FieldTrustScore, v)) +} + +// FirstSeenEQ applies the EQ predicate on the "first_seen" field. +func FirstSeenEQ(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldFirstSeen, v)) +} + +// FirstSeenNEQ applies the NEQ predicate on the "first_seen" field. +func FirstSeenNEQ(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNEQ(FieldFirstSeen, v)) +} + +// FirstSeenIn applies the In predicate on the "first_seen" field. +func FirstSeenIn(vs ...time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldIn(FieldFirstSeen, vs...)) +} + +// FirstSeenNotIn applies the NotIn predicate on the "first_seen" field. +func FirstSeenNotIn(vs ...time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNotIn(FieldFirstSeen, vs...)) +} + +// FirstSeenGT applies the GT predicate on the "first_seen" field. +func FirstSeenGT(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGT(FieldFirstSeen, v)) +} + +// FirstSeenGTE applies the GTE predicate on the "first_seen" field. +func FirstSeenGTE(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGTE(FieldFirstSeen, v)) +} + +// FirstSeenLT applies the LT predicate on the "first_seen" field. +func FirstSeenLT(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLT(FieldFirstSeen, v)) +} + +// FirstSeenLTE applies the LTE predicate on the "first_seen" field. +func FirstSeenLTE(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLTE(FieldFirstSeen, v)) +} + +// LastInteractionEQ applies the EQ predicate on the "last_interaction" field. +func LastInteractionEQ(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldLastInteraction, v)) +} + +// LastInteractionNEQ applies the NEQ predicate on the "last_interaction" field. +func LastInteractionNEQ(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNEQ(FieldLastInteraction, v)) +} + +// LastInteractionIn applies the In predicate on the "last_interaction" field. +func LastInteractionIn(vs ...time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldIn(FieldLastInteraction, vs...)) +} + +// LastInteractionNotIn applies the NotIn predicate on the "last_interaction" field. +func LastInteractionNotIn(vs ...time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNotIn(FieldLastInteraction, vs...)) +} + +// LastInteractionGT applies the GT predicate on the "last_interaction" field. +func LastInteractionGT(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGT(FieldLastInteraction, v)) +} + +// LastInteractionGTE applies the GTE predicate on the "last_interaction" field. +func LastInteractionGTE(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGTE(FieldLastInteraction, v)) +} + +// LastInteractionLT applies the LT predicate on the "last_interaction" field. +func LastInteractionLT(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLT(FieldLastInteraction, v)) +} + +// LastInteractionLTE applies the LTE predicate on the "last_interaction" field. +func LastInteractionLTE(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLTE(FieldLastInteraction, v)) +} + +// CreatedAtEQ applies the EQ predicate on the "created_at" field. +func CreatedAtEQ(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldCreatedAt, v)) +} + +// CreatedAtNEQ applies the NEQ predicate on the "created_at" field. +func CreatedAtNEQ(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNEQ(FieldCreatedAt, v)) +} + +// CreatedAtIn applies the In predicate on the "created_at" field. +func CreatedAtIn(vs ...time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldIn(FieldCreatedAt, vs...)) +} + +// CreatedAtNotIn applies the NotIn predicate on the "created_at" field. +func CreatedAtNotIn(vs ...time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNotIn(FieldCreatedAt, vs...)) +} + +// CreatedAtGT applies the GT predicate on the "created_at" field. +func CreatedAtGT(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGT(FieldCreatedAt, v)) +} + +// CreatedAtGTE applies the GTE predicate on the "created_at" field. +func CreatedAtGTE(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGTE(FieldCreatedAt, v)) +} + +// CreatedAtLT applies the LT predicate on the "created_at" field. +func CreatedAtLT(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLT(FieldCreatedAt, v)) +} + +// CreatedAtLTE applies the LTE predicate on the "created_at" field. +func CreatedAtLTE(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLTE(FieldCreatedAt, v)) +} + +// UpdatedAtEQ applies the EQ predicate on the "updated_at" field. +func UpdatedAtEQ(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldEQ(FieldUpdatedAt, v)) +} + +// UpdatedAtNEQ applies the NEQ predicate on the "updated_at" field. +func UpdatedAtNEQ(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNEQ(FieldUpdatedAt, v)) +} + +// UpdatedAtIn applies the In predicate on the "updated_at" field. +func UpdatedAtIn(vs ...time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldIn(FieldUpdatedAt, vs...)) +} + +// UpdatedAtNotIn applies the NotIn predicate on the "updated_at" field. +func UpdatedAtNotIn(vs ...time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldNotIn(FieldUpdatedAt, vs...)) +} + +// UpdatedAtGT applies the GT predicate on the "updated_at" field. +func UpdatedAtGT(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGT(FieldUpdatedAt, v)) +} + +// UpdatedAtGTE applies the GTE predicate on the "updated_at" field. +func UpdatedAtGTE(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldGTE(FieldUpdatedAt, v)) +} + +// UpdatedAtLT applies the LT predicate on the "updated_at" field. +func UpdatedAtLT(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLT(FieldUpdatedAt, v)) +} + +// UpdatedAtLTE applies the LTE predicate on the "updated_at" field. +func UpdatedAtLTE(v time.Time) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.FieldLTE(FieldUpdatedAt, v)) +} + +// And groups predicates with the AND operator between them. +func And(predicates ...predicate.PeerReputation) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.AndPredicates(predicates...)) +} + +// Or groups predicates with the OR operator between them. +func Or(predicates ...predicate.PeerReputation) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.OrPredicates(predicates...)) +} + +// Not applies the not operator on the given predicate. +func Not(p predicate.PeerReputation) predicate.PeerReputation { + return predicate.PeerReputation(sql.NotPredicates(p)) +} diff --git a/internal/ent/peerreputation_create.go b/internal/ent/peerreputation_create.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9a0486a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/ent/peerreputation_create.go @@ -0,0 +1,419 @@ +// Code generated by ent, DO NOT EDIT. + +package ent + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "time" + + "entgo.io/ent/dialect/sql/sqlgraph" + "entgo.io/ent/schema/field" + "github.com/google/uuid" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/peerreputation" +) + +// PeerReputationCreate is the builder for creating a PeerReputation entity. +type PeerReputationCreate struct { + config + mutation *PeerReputationMutation + hooks []Hook +} + +// SetPeerDid sets the "peer_did" field. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SetPeerDid(v string) *PeerReputationCreate { + _c.mutation.SetPeerDid(v) + return _c +} + +// SetSuccessfulExchanges sets the "successful_exchanges" field. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SetSuccessfulExchanges(v int) *PeerReputationCreate { + _c.mutation.SetSuccessfulExchanges(v) + return _c +} + +// SetNillableSuccessfulExchanges sets the "successful_exchanges" field if the given value is not nil. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SetNillableSuccessfulExchanges(v *int) *PeerReputationCreate { + if v != nil { + _c.SetSuccessfulExchanges(*v) + } + return _c +} + +// SetFailedExchanges sets the "failed_exchanges" field. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SetFailedExchanges(v int) *PeerReputationCreate { + _c.mutation.SetFailedExchanges(v) + return _c +} + +// SetNillableFailedExchanges sets the "failed_exchanges" field if the given value is not nil. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SetNillableFailedExchanges(v *int) *PeerReputationCreate { + if v != nil { + _c.SetFailedExchanges(*v) + } + return _c +} + +// SetTimeoutCount sets the "timeout_count" field. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SetTimeoutCount(v int) *PeerReputationCreate { + _c.mutation.SetTimeoutCount(v) + return _c +} + +// SetNillableTimeoutCount sets the "timeout_count" field if the given value is not nil. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SetNillableTimeoutCount(v *int) *PeerReputationCreate { + if v != nil { + _c.SetTimeoutCount(*v) + } + return _c +} + +// SetTrustScore sets the "trust_score" field. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SetTrustScore(v float64) *PeerReputationCreate { + _c.mutation.SetTrustScore(v) + return _c +} + +// SetNillableTrustScore sets the "trust_score" field if the given value is not nil. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SetNillableTrustScore(v *float64) *PeerReputationCreate { + if v != nil { + _c.SetTrustScore(*v) + } + return _c +} + +// SetFirstSeen sets the "first_seen" field. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SetFirstSeen(v time.Time) *PeerReputationCreate { + _c.mutation.SetFirstSeen(v) + return _c +} + +// SetNillableFirstSeen sets the "first_seen" field if the given value is not nil. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SetNillableFirstSeen(v *time.Time) *PeerReputationCreate { + if v != nil { + _c.SetFirstSeen(*v) + } + return _c +} + +// SetLastInteraction sets the "last_interaction" field. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SetLastInteraction(v time.Time) *PeerReputationCreate { + _c.mutation.SetLastInteraction(v) + return _c +} + +// SetNillableLastInteraction sets the "last_interaction" field if the given value is not nil. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SetNillableLastInteraction(v *time.Time) *PeerReputationCreate { + if v != nil { + _c.SetLastInteraction(*v) + } + return _c +} + +// SetCreatedAt sets the "created_at" field. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SetCreatedAt(v time.Time) *PeerReputationCreate { + _c.mutation.SetCreatedAt(v) + return _c +} + +// SetNillableCreatedAt sets the "created_at" field if the given value is not nil. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SetNillableCreatedAt(v *time.Time) *PeerReputationCreate { + if v != nil { + _c.SetCreatedAt(*v) + } + return _c +} + +// SetUpdatedAt sets the "updated_at" field. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SetUpdatedAt(v time.Time) *PeerReputationCreate { + _c.mutation.SetUpdatedAt(v) + return _c +} + +// SetNillableUpdatedAt sets the "updated_at" field if the given value is not nil. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SetNillableUpdatedAt(v *time.Time) *PeerReputationCreate { + if v != nil { + _c.SetUpdatedAt(*v) + } + return _c +} + +// SetID sets the "id" field. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SetID(v uuid.UUID) *PeerReputationCreate { + _c.mutation.SetID(v) + return _c +} + +// SetNillableID sets the "id" field if the given value is not nil. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SetNillableID(v *uuid.UUID) *PeerReputationCreate { + if v != nil { + _c.SetID(*v) + } + return _c +} + +// Mutation returns the PeerReputationMutation object of the builder. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) Mutation() *PeerReputationMutation { + return _c.mutation +} + +// Save creates the PeerReputation in the database. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) Save(ctx context.Context) (*PeerReputation, error) { + _c.defaults() + return withHooks(ctx, _c.sqlSave, _c.mutation, _c.hooks) +} + +// SaveX calls Save and panics if Save returns an error. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) SaveX(ctx context.Context) *PeerReputation { + v, err := _c.Save(ctx) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + return v +} + +// Exec executes the query. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) Exec(ctx context.Context) error { + _, err := _c.Save(ctx) + return err +} + +// ExecX is like Exec, but panics if an error occurs. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) ExecX(ctx context.Context) { + if err := _c.Exec(ctx); err != nil { + panic(err) + } +} + +// defaults sets the default values of the builder before save. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) defaults() { + if _, ok := _c.mutation.SuccessfulExchanges(); !ok { + v := peerreputation.DefaultSuccessfulExchanges + _c.mutation.SetSuccessfulExchanges(v) + } + if _, ok := _c.mutation.FailedExchanges(); !ok { + v := peerreputation.DefaultFailedExchanges + _c.mutation.SetFailedExchanges(v) + } + if _, ok := _c.mutation.TimeoutCount(); !ok { + v := peerreputation.DefaultTimeoutCount + _c.mutation.SetTimeoutCount(v) + } + if _, ok := _c.mutation.TrustScore(); !ok { + v := peerreputation.DefaultTrustScore + _c.mutation.SetTrustScore(v) + } + if _, ok := _c.mutation.FirstSeen(); !ok { + v := peerreputation.DefaultFirstSeen() + _c.mutation.SetFirstSeen(v) + } + if _, ok := _c.mutation.LastInteraction(); !ok { + v := peerreputation.DefaultLastInteraction() + _c.mutation.SetLastInteraction(v) + } + if _, ok := _c.mutation.CreatedAt(); !ok { + v := peerreputation.DefaultCreatedAt() + _c.mutation.SetCreatedAt(v) + } + if _, ok := _c.mutation.UpdatedAt(); !ok { + v := peerreputation.DefaultUpdatedAt() + _c.mutation.SetUpdatedAt(v) + } + if _, ok := _c.mutation.ID(); !ok { + v := peerreputation.DefaultID() + _c.mutation.SetID(v) + } +} + +// check runs all checks and user-defined validators on the builder. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) check() error { + if _, ok := _c.mutation.PeerDid(); !ok { + return &ValidationError{Name: "peer_did", err: errors.New(`ent: missing required field "PeerReputation.peer_did"`)} + } + if v, ok := _c.mutation.PeerDid(); ok { + if err := peerreputation.PeerDidValidator(v); err != nil { + return &ValidationError{Name: "peer_did", err: fmt.Errorf(`ent: validator failed for field "PeerReputation.peer_did": %w`, err)} + } + } + if _, ok := _c.mutation.SuccessfulExchanges(); !ok { + return &ValidationError{Name: "successful_exchanges", err: errors.New(`ent: missing required field "PeerReputation.successful_exchanges"`)} + } + if _, ok := _c.mutation.FailedExchanges(); !ok { + return &ValidationError{Name: "failed_exchanges", err: errors.New(`ent: missing required field "PeerReputation.failed_exchanges"`)} + } + if _, ok := _c.mutation.TimeoutCount(); !ok { + return &ValidationError{Name: "timeout_count", err: errors.New(`ent: missing required field "PeerReputation.timeout_count"`)} + } + if _, ok := _c.mutation.TrustScore(); !ok { + return &ValidationError{Name: "trust_score", err: errors.New(`ent: missing required field "PeerReputation.trust_score"`)} + } + if _, ok := _c.mutation.FirstSeen(); !ok { + return &ValidationError{Name: "first_seen", err: errors.New(`ent: missing required field "PeerReputation.first_seen"`)} + } + if _, ok := _c.mutation.LastInteraction(); !ok { + return &ValidationError{Name: "last_interaction", err: errors.New(`ent: missing required field "PeerReputation.last_interaction"`)} + } + if _, ok := _c.mutation.CreatedAt(); !ok { + return &ValidationError{Name: "created_at", err: errors.New(`ent: missing required field "PeerReputation.created_at"`)} + } + if _, ok := _c.mutation.UpdatedAt(); !ok { + return &ValidationError{Name: "updated_at", err: errors.New(`ent: missing required field "PeerReputation.updated_at"`)} + } + return nil +} + +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) sqlSave(ctx context.Context) (*PeerReputation, error) { + if err := _c.check(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + _node, _spec := _c.createSpec() + if err := sqlgraph.CreateNode(ctx, _c.driver, _spec); err != nil { + if sqlgraph.IsConstraintError(err) { + err = &ConstraintError{msg: err.Error(), wrap: err} + } + return nil, err + } + if _spec.ID.Value != nil { + if id, ok := _spec.ID.Value.(*uuid.UUID); ok { + _node.ID = *id + } else if err := _node.ID.Scan(_spec.ID.Value); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + _c.mutation.id = &_node.ID + _c.mutation.done = true + return _node, nil +} + +func (_c *PeerReputationCreate) createSpec() (*PeerReputation, *sqlgraph.CreateSpec) { + var ( + _node = &PeerReputation{config: _c.config} + _spec = sqlgraph.NewCreateSpec(peerreputation.Table, sqlgraph.NewFieldSpec(peerreputation.FieldID, field.TypeUUID)) + ) + if id, ok := _c.mutation.ID(); ok { + _node.ID = id + _spec.ID.Value = &id + } + if value, ok := _c.mutation.PeerDid(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldPeerDid, field.TypeString, value) + _node.PeerDid = value + } + if value, ok := _c.mutation.SuccessfulExchanges(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldSuccessfulExchanges, field.TypeInt, value) + _node.SuccessfulExchanges = value + } + if value, ok := _c.mutation.FailedExchanges(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldFailedExchanges, field.TypeInt, value) + _node.FailedExchanges = value + } + if value, ok := _c.mutation.TimeoutCount(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldTimeoutCount, field.TypeInt, value) + _node.TimeoutCount = value + } + if value, ok := _c.mutation.TrustScore(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldTrustScore, field.TypeFloat64, value) + _node.TrustScore = value + } + if value, ok := _c.mutation.FirstSeen(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldFirstSeen, field.TypeTime, value) + _node.FirstSeen = value + } + if value, ok := _c.mutation.LastInteraction(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldLastInteraction, field.TypeTime, value) + _node.LastInteraction = value + } + if value, ok := _c.mutation.CreatedAt(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldCreatedAt, field.TypeTime, value) + _node.CreatedAt = value + } + if value, ok := _c.mutation.UpdatedAt(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldUpdatedAt, field.TypeTime, value) + _node.UpdatedAt = value + } + return _node, _spec +} + +// PeerReputationCreateBulk is the builder for creating many PeerReputation entities in bulk. +type PeerReputationCreateBulk struct { + config + err error + builders []*PeerReputationCreate +} + +// Save creates the PeerReputation entities in the database. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreateBulk) Save(ctx context.Context) ([]*PeerReputation, error) { + if _c.err != nil { + return nil, _c.err + } + specs := make([]*sqlgraph.CreateSpec, len(_c.builders)) + nodes := make([]*PeerReputation, len(_c.builders)) + mutators := make([]Mutator, len(_c.builders)) + for i := range _c.builders { + func(i int, root context.Context) { + builder := _c.builders[i] + builder.defaults() + var mut Mutator = MutateFunc(func(ctx context.Context, m Mutation) (Value, error) { + mutation, ok := m.(*PeerReputationMutation) + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected mutation type %T", m) + } + if err := builder.check(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + builder.mutation = mutation + var err error + nodes[i], specs[i] = builder.createSpec() + if i < len(mutators)-1 { + _, err = mutators[i+1].Mutate(root, _c.builders[i+1].mutation) + } else { + spec := &sqlgraph.BatchCreateSpec{Nodes: specs} + // Invoke the actual operation on the latest mutation in the chain. + if err = sqlgraph.BatchCreate(ctx, _c.driver, spec); err != nil { + if sqlgraph.IsConstraintError(err) { + err = &ConstraintError{msg: err.Error(), wrap: err} + } + } + } + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + mutation.id = &nodes[i].ID + mutation.done = true + return nodes[i], nil + }) + for i := len(builder.hooks) - 1; i >= 0; i-- { + mut = builder.hooks[i](mut) + } + mutators[i] = mut + }(i, ctx) + } + if len(mutators) > 0 { + if _, err := mutators[0].Mutate(ctx, _c.builders[0].mutation); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + return nodes, nil +} + +// SaveX is like Save, but panics if an error occurs. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreateBulk) SaveX(ctx context.Context) []*PeerReputation { + v, err := _c.Save(ctx) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + return v +} + +// Exec executes the query. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreateBulk) Exec(ctx context.Context) error { + _, err := _c.Save(ctx) + return err +} + +// ExecX is like Exec, but panics if an error occurs. +func (_c *PeerReputationCreateBulk) ExecX(ctx context.Context) { + if err := _c.Exec(ctx); err != nil { + panic(err) + } +} diff --git a/internal/ent/peerreputation_delete.go b/internal/ent/peerreputation_delete.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0794e424 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/ent/peerreputation_delete.go @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +// Code generated by ent, DO NOT EDIT. + +package ent + +import ( + "context" + + "entgo.io/ent/dialect/sql" + "entgo.io/ent/dialect/sql/sqlgraph" + "entgo.io/ent/schema/field" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/peerreputation" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/predicate" +) + +// PeerReputationDelete is the builder for deleting a PeerReputation entity. +type PeerReputationDelete struct { + config + hooks []Hook + mutation *PeerReputationMutation +} + +// Where appends a list predicates to the PeerReputationDelete builder. +func (_d *PeerReputationDelete) Where(ps ...predicate.PeerReputation) *PeerReputationDelete { + _d.mutation.Where(ps...) + return _d +} + +// Exec executes the deletion query and returns how many vertices were deleted. +func (_d *PeerReputationDelete) Exec(ctx context.Context) (int, error) { + return withHooks(ctx, _d.sqlExec, _d.mutation, _d.hooks) +} + +// ExecX is like Exec, but panics if an error occurs. +func (_d *PeerReputationDelete) ExecX(ctx context.Context) int { + n, err := _d.Exec(ctx) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + return n +} + +func (_d *PeerReputationDelete) sqlExec(ctx context.Context) (int, error) { + _spec := sqlgraph.NewDeleteSpec(peerreputation.Table, sqlgraph.NewFieldSpec(peerreputation.FieldID, field.TypeUUID)) + if ps := _d.mutation.predicates; len(ps) > 0 { + _spec.Predicate = func(selector *sql.Selector) { + for i := range ps { + ps[i](selector) + } + } + } + affected, err := sqlgraph.DeleteNodes(ctx, _d.driver, _spec) + if err != nil && sqlgraph.IsConstraintError(err) { + err = &ConstraintError{msg: err.Error(), wrap: err} + } + _d.mutation.done = true + return affected, err +} + +// PeerReputationDeleteOne is the builder for deleting a single PeerReputation entity. +type PeerReputationDeleteOne struct { + _d *PeerReputationDelete +} + +// Where appends a list predicates to the PeerReputationDelete builder. +func (_d *PeerReputationDeleteOne) Where(ps ...predicate.PeerReputation) *PeerReputationDeleteOne { + _d._d.mutation.Where(ps...) + return _d +} + +// Exec executes the deletion query. +func (_d *PeerReputationDeleteOne) Exec(ctx context.Context) error { + n, err := _d._d.Exec(ctx) + switch { + case err != nil: + return err + case n == 0: + return &NotFoundError{peerreputation.Label} + default: + return nil + } +} + +// ExecX is like Exec, but panics if an error occurs. +func (_d *PeerReputationDeleteOne) ExecX(ctx context.Context) { + if err := _d.Exec(ctx); err != nil { + panic(err) + } +} diff --git a/internal/ent/peerreputation_query.go b/internal/ent/peerreputation_query.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..decaf810 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/ent/peerreputation_query.go @@ -0,0 +1,528 @@ +// Code generated by ent, DO NOT EDIT. + +package ent + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + "math" + + "entgo.io/ent" + "entgo.io/ent/dialect/sql" + "entgo.io/ent/dialect/sql/sqlgraph" + "entgo.io/ent/schema/field" + "github.com/google/uuid" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/peerreputation" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/predicate" +) + +// PeerReputationQuery is the builder for querying PeerReputation entities. +type PeerReputationQuery struct { + config + ctx *QueryContext + order []peerreputation.OrderOption + inters []Interceptor + predicates []predicate.PeerReputation + // intermediate query (i.e. traversal path). + sql *sql.Selector + path func(context.Context) (*sql.Selector, error) +} + +// Where adds a new predicate for the PeerReputationQuery builder. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) Where(ps ...predicate.PeerReputation) *PeerReputationQuery { + _q.predicates = append(_q.predicates, ps...) + return _q +} + +// Limit the number of records to be returned by this query. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) Limit(limit int) *PeerReputationQuery { + _q.ctx.Limit = &limit + return _q +} + +// Offset to start from. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) Offset(offset int) *PeerReputationQuery { + _q.ctx.Offset = &offset + return _q +} + +// Unique configures the query builder to filter duplicate records on query. +// By default, unique is set to true, and can be disabled using this method. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) Unique(unique bool) *PeerReputationQuery { + _q.ctx.Unique = &unique + return _q +} + +// Order specifies how the records should be ordered. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) Order(o ...peerreputation.OrderOption) *PeerReputationQuery { + _q.order = append(_q.order, o...) + return _q +} + +// First returns the first PeerReputation entity from the query. +// Returns a *NotFoundError when no PeerReputation was found. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) First(ctx context.Context) (*PeerReputation, error) { + nodes, err := _q.Limit(1).All(setContextOp(ctx, _q.ctx, ent.OpQueryFirst)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if len(nodes) == 0 { + return nil, &NotFoundError{peerreputation.Label} + } + return nodes[0], nil +} + +// FirstX is like First, but panics if an error occurs. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) FirstX(ctx context.Context) *PeerReputation { + node, err := _q.First(ctx) + if err != nil && !IsNotFound(err) { + panic(err) + } + return node +} + +// FirstID returns the first PeerReputation ID from the query. +// Returns a *NotFoundError when no PeerReputation ID was found. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) FirstID(ctx context.Context) (id uuid.UUID, err error) { + var ids []uuid.UUID + if ids, err = _q.Limit(1).IDs(setContextOp(ctx, _q.ctx, ent.OpQueryFirstID)); err != nil { + return + } + if len(ids) == 0 { + err = &NotFoundError{peerreputation.Label} + return + } + return ids[0], nil +} + +// FirstIDX is like FirstID, but panics if an error occurs. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) FirstIDX(ctx context.Context) uuid.UUID { + id, err := _q.FirstID(ctx) + if err != nil && !IsNotFound(err) { + panic(err) + } + return id +} + +// Only returns a single PeerReputation entity found by the query, ensuring it only returns one. +// Returns a *NotSingularError when more than one PeerReputation entity is found. +// Returns a *NotFoundError when no PeerReputation entities are found. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) Only(ctx context.Context) (*PeerReputation, error) { + nodes, err := _q.Limit(2).All(setContextOp(ctx, _q.ctx, ent.OpQueryOnly)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + switch len(nodes) { + case 1: + return nodes[0], nil + case 0: + return nil, &NotFoundError{peerreputation.Label} + default: + return nil, &NotSingularError{peerreputation.Label} + } +} + +// OnlyX is like Only, but panics if an error occurs. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) OnlyX(ctx context.Context) *PeerReputation { + node, err := _q.Only(ctx) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + return node +} + +// OnlyID is like Only, but returns the only PeerReputation ID in the query. +// Returns a *NotSingularError when more than one PeerReputation ID is found. +// Returns a *NotFoundError when no entities are found. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) OnlyID(ctx context.Context) (id uuid.UUID, err error) { + var ids []uuid.UUID + if ids, err = _q.Limit(2).IDs(setContextOp(ctx, _q.ctx, ent.OpQueryOnlyID)); err != nil { + return + } + switch len(ids) { + case 1: + id = ids[0] + case 0: + err = &NotFoundError{peerreputation.Label} + default: + err = &NotSingularError{peerreputation.Label} + } + return +} + +// OnlyIDX is like OnlyID, but panics if an error occurs. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) OnlyIDX(ctx context.Context) uuid.UUID { + id, err := _q.OnlyID(ctx) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + return id +} + +// All executes the query and returns a list of PeerReputations. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) All(ctx context.Context) ([]*PeerReputation, error) { + ctx = setContextOp(ctx, _q.ctx, ent.OpQueryAll) + if err := _q.prepareQuery(ctx); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + qr := querierAll[[]*PeerReputation, *PeerReputationQuery]() + return withInterceptors[[]*PeerReputation](ctx, _q, qr, _q.inters) +} + +// AllX is like All, but panics if an error occurs. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) AllX(ctx context.Context) []*PeerReputation { + nodes, err := _q.All(ctx) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + return nodes +} + +// IDs executes the query and returns a list of PeerReputation IDs. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) IDs(ctx context.Context) (ids []uuid.UUID, err error) { + if _q.ctx.Unique == nil && _q.path != nil { + _q.Unique(true) + } + ctx = setContextOp(ctx, _q.ctx, ent.OpQueryIDs) + if err = _q.Select(peerreputation.FieldID).Scan(ctx, &ids); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return ids, nil +} + +// IDsX is like IDs, but panics if an error occurs. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) IDsX(ctx context.Context) []uuid.UUID { + ids, err := _q.IDs(ctx) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + return ids +} + +// Count returns the count of the given query. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) Count(ctx context.Context) (int, error) { + ctx = setContextOp(ctx, _q.ctx, ent.OpQueryCount) + if err := _q.prepareQuery(ctx); err != nil { + return 0, err + } + return withInterceptors[int](ctx, _q, querierCount[*PeerReputationQuery](), _q.inters) +} + +// CountX is like Count, but panics if an error occurs. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) CountX(ctx context.Context) int { + count, err := _q.Count(ctx) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + return count +} + +// Exist returns true if the query has elements in the graph. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) Exist(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) { + ctx = setContextOp(ctx, _q.ctx, ent.OpQueryExist) + switch _, err := _q.FirstID(ctx); { + case IsNotFound(err): + return false, nil + case err != nil: + return false, fmt.Errorf("ent: check existence: %w", err) + default: + return true, nil + } +} + +// ExistX is like Exist, but panics if an error occurs. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) ExistX(ctx context.Context) bool { + exist, err := _q.Exist(ctx) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + return exist +} + +// Clone returns a duplicate of the PeerReputationQuery builder, including all associated steps. It can be +// used to prepare common query builders and use them differently after the clone is made. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) Clone() *PeerReputationQuery { + if _q == nil { + return nil + } + return &PeerReputationQuery{ + config: _q.config, + ctx: _q.ctx.Clone(), + order: append([]peerreputation.OrderOption{}, _q.order...), + inters: append([]Interceptor{}, _q.inters...), + predicates: append([]predicate.PeerReputation{}, _q.predicates...), + // clone intermediate query. + sql: _q.sql.Clone(), + path: _q.path, + } +} + +// GroupBy is used to group vertices by one or more fields/columns. +// It is often used with aggregate functions, like: count, max, mean, min, sum. +// +// Example: +// +// var v []struct { +// PeerDid string `json:"peer_did,omitempty"` +// Count int `json:"count,omitempty"` +// } +// +// client.PeerReputation.Query(). +// GroupBy(peerreputation.FieldPeerDid). +// Aggregate(ent.Count()). +// Scan(ctx, &v) +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) GroupBy(field string, fields ...string) *PeerReputationGroupBy { + _q.ctx.Fields = append([]string{field}, fields...) + grbuild := &PeerReputationGroupBy{build: _q} + grbuild.flds = &_q.ctx.Fields + grbuild.label = peerreputation.Label + grbuild.scan = grbuild.Scan + return grbuild +} + +// Select allows the selection one or more fields/columns for the given query, +// instead of selecting all fields in the entity. +// +// Example: +// +// var v []struct { +// PeerDid string `json:"peer_did,omitempty"` +// } +// +// client.PeerReputation.Query(). +// Select(peerreputation.FieldPeerDid). +// Scan(ctx, &v) +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) Select(fields ...string) *PeerReputationSelect { + _q.ctx.Fields = append(_q.ctx.Fields, fields...) + sbuild := &PeerReputationSelect{PeerReputationQuery: _q} + sbuild.label = peerreputation.Label + sbuild.flds, sbuild.scan = &_q.ctx.Fields, sbuild.Scan + return sbuild +} + +// Aggregate returns a PeerReputationSelect configured with the given aggregations. +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) Aggregate(fns ...AggregateFunc) *PeerReputationSelect { + return _q.Select().Aggregate(fns...) +} + +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) prepareQuery(ctx context.Context) error { + for _, inter := range _q.inters { + if inter == nil { + return fmt.Errorf("ent: uninitialized interceptor (forgotten import ent/runtime?)") + } + if trv, ok := inter.(Traverser); ok { + if err := trv.Traverse(ctx, _q); err != nil { + return err + } + } + } + for _, f := range _q.ctx.Fields { + if !peerreputation.ValidColumn(f) { + return &ValidationError{Name: f, err: fmt.Errorf("ent: invalid field %q for query", f)} + } + } + if _q.path != nil { + prev, err := _q.path(ctx) + if err != nil { + return err + } + _q.sql = prev + } + return nil +} + +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) sqlAll(ctx context.Context, hooks ...queryHook) ([]*PeerReputation, error) { + var ( + nodes = []*PeerReputation{} + _spec = _q.querySpec() + ) + _spec.ScanValues = func(columns []string) ([]any, error) { + return (*PeerReputation).scanValues(nil, columns) + } + _spec.Assign = func(columns []string, values []any) error { + node := &PeerReputation{config: _q.config} + nodes = append(nodes, node) + return node.assignValues(columns, values) + } + for i := range hooks { + hooks[i](ctx, _spec) + } + if err := sqlgraph.QueryNodes(ctx, _q.driver, _spec); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if len(nodes) == 0 { + return nodes, nil + } + return nodes, nil +} + +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) sqlCount(ctx context.Context) (int, error) { + _spec := _q.querySpec() + _spec.Node.Columns = _q.ctx.Fields + if len(_q.ctx.Fields) > 0 { + _spec.Unique = _q.ctx.Unique != nil && *_q.ctx.Unique + } + return sqlgraph.CountNodes(ctx, _q.driver, _spec) +} + +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) querySpec() *sqlgraph.QuerySpec { + _spec := sqlgraph.NewQuerySpec(peerreputation.Table, peerreputation.Columns, sqlgraph.NewFieldSpec(peerreputation.FieldID, field.TypeUUID)) + _spec.From = _q.sql + if unique := _q.ctx.Unique; unique != nil { + _spec.Unique = *unique + } else if _q.path != nil { + _spec.Unique = true + } + if fields := _q.ctx.Fields; len(fields) > 0 { + _spec.Node.Columns = make([]string, 0, len(fields)) + _spec.Node.Columns = append(_spec.Node.Columns, peerreputation.FieldID) + for i := range fields { + if fields[i] != peerreputation.FieldID { + _spec.Node.Columns = append(_spec.Node.Columns, fields[i]) + } + } + } + if ps := _q.predicates; len(ps) > 0 { + _spec.Predicate = func(selector *sql.Selector) { + for i := range ps { + ps[i](selector) + } + } + } + if limit := _q.ctx.Limit; limit != nil { + _spec.Limit = *limit + } + if offset := _q.ctx.Offset; offset != nil { + _spec.Offset = *offset + } + if ps := _q.order; len(ps) > 0 { + _spec.Order = func(selector *sql.Selector) { + for i := range ps { + ps[i](selector) + } + } + } + return _spec +} + +func (_q *PeerReputationQuery) sqlQuery(ctx context.Context) *sql.Selector { + builder := sql.Dialect(_q.driver.Dialect()) + t1 := builder.Table(peerreputation.Table) + columns := _q.ctx.Fields + if len(columns) == 0 { + columns = peerreputation.Columns + } + selector := builder.Select(t1.Columns(columns...)...).From(t1) + if _q.sql != nil { + selector = _q.sql + selector.Select(selector.Columns(columns...)...) + } + if _q.ctx.Unique != nil && *_q.ctx.Unique { + selector.Distinct() + } + for _, p := range _q.predicates { + p(selector) + } + for _, p := range _q.order { + p(selector) + } + if offset := _q.ctx.Offset; offset != nil { + // limit is mandatory for offset clause. We start + // with default value, and override it below if needed. + selector.Offset(*offset).Limit(math.MaxInt32) + } + if limit := _q.ctx.Limit; limit != nil { + selector.Limit(*limit) + } + return selector +} + +// PeerReputationGroupBy is the group-by builder for PeerReputation entities. +type PeerReputationGroupBy struct { + selector + build *PeerReputationQuery +} + +// Aggregate adds the given aggregation functions to the group-by query. +func (_g *PeerReputationGroupBy) Aggregate(fns ...AggregateFunc) *PeerReputationGroupBy { + _g.fns = append(_g.fns, fns...) + return _g +} + +// Scan applies the selector query and scans the result into the given value. +func (_g *PeerReputationGroupBy) Scan(ctx context.Context, v any) error { + ctx = setContextOp(ctx, _g.build.ctx, ent.OpQueryGroupBy) + if err := _g.build.prepareQuery(ctx); err != nil { + return err + } + return scanWithInterceptors[*PeerReputationQuery, *PeerReputationGroupBy](ctx, _g.build, _g, _g.build.inters, v) +} + +func (_g *PeerReputationGroupBy) sqlScan(ctx context.Context, root *PeerReputationQuery, v any) error { + selector := root.sqlQuery(ctx).Select() + aggregation := make([]string, 0, len(_g.fns)) + for _, fn := range _g.fns { + aggregation = append(aggregation, fn(selector)) + } + if len(selector.SelectedColumns()) == 0 { + columns := make([]string, 0, len(*_g.flds)+len(_g.fns)) + for _, f := range *_g.flds { + columns = append(columns, selector.C(f)) + } + columns = append(columns, aggregation...) + selector.Select(columns...) + } + selector.GroupBy(selector.Columns(*_g.flds...)...) + if err := selector.Err(); err != nil { + return err + } + rows := &sql.Rows{} + query, args := selector.Query() + if err := _g.build.driver.Query(ctx, query, args, rows); err != nil { + return err + } + defer rows.Close() + return sql.ScanSlice(rows, v) +} + +// PeerReputationSelect is the builder for selecting fields of PeerReputation entities. +type PeerReputationSelect struct { + *PeerReputationQuery + selector +} + +// Aggregate adds the given aggregation functions to the selector query. +func (_s *PeerReputationSelect) Aggregate(fns ...AggregateFunc) *PeerReputationSelect { + _s.fns = append(_s.fns, fns...) + return _s +} + +// Scan applies the selector query and scans the result into the given value. +func (_s *PeerReputationSelect) Scan(ctx context.Context, v any) error { + ctx = setContextOp(ctx, _s.ctx, ent.OpQuerySelect) + if err := _s.prepareQuery(ctx); err != nil { + return err + } + return scanWithInterceptors[*PeerReputationQuery, *PeerReputationSelect](ctx, _s.PeerReputationQuery, _s, _s.inters, v) +} + +func (_s *PeerReputationSelect) sqlScan(ctx context.Context, root *PeerReputationQuery, v any) error { + selector := root.sqlQuery(ctx) + aggregation := make([]string, 0, len(_s.fns)) + for _, fn := range _s.fns { + aggregation = append(aggregation, fn(selector)) + } + switch n := len(*_s.selector.flds); { + case n == 0 && len(aggregation) > 0: + selector.Select(aggregation...) + case n != 0 && len(aggregation) > 0: + selector.AppendSelect(aggregation...) + } + rows := &sql.Rows{} + query, args := selector.Query() + if err := _s.driver.Query(ctx, query, args, rows); err != nil { + return err + } + defer rows.Close() + return sql.ScanSlice(rows, v) +} diff --git a/internal/ent/peerreputation_update.go b/internal/ent/peerreputation_update.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..096c0569 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/ent/peerreputation_update.go @@ -0,0 +1,514 @@ +// Code generated by ent, DO NOT EDIT. + +package ent + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "time" + + "entgo.io/ent/dialect/sql" + "entgo.io/ent/dialect/sql/sqlgraph" + "entgo.io/ent/schema/field" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/peerreputation" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/predicate" +) + +// PeerReputationUpdate is the builder for updating PeerReputation entities. +type PeerReputationUpdate struct { + config + hooks []Hook + mutation *PeerReputationMutation +} + +// Where appends a list predicates to the PeerReputationUpdate builder. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) Where(ps ...predicate.PeerReputation) *PeerReputationUpdate { + _u.mutation.Where(ps...) + return _u +} + +// SetPeerDid sets the "peer_did" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) SetPeerDid(v string) *PeerReputationUpdate { + _u.mutation.SetPeerDid(v) + return _u +} + +// SetNillablePeerDid sets the "peer_did" field if the given value is not nil. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) SetNillablePeerDid(v *string) *PeerReputationUpdate { + if v != nil { + _u.SetPeerDid(*v) + } + return _u +} + +// SetSuccessfulExchanges sets the "successful_exchanges" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) SetSuccessfulExchanges(v int) *PeerReputationUpdate { + _u.mutation.ResetSuccessfulExchanges() + _u.mutation.SetSuccessfulExchanges(v) + return _u +} + +// SetNillableSuccessfulExchanges sets the "successful_exchanges" field if the given value is not nil. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) SetNillableSuccessfulExchanges(v *int) *PeerReputationUpdate { + if v != nil { + _u.SetSuccessfulExchanges(*v) + } + return _u +} + +// AddSuccessfulExchanges adds value to the "successful_exchanges" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) AddSuccessfulExchanges(v int) *PeerReputationUpdate { + _u.mutation.AddSuccessfulExchanges(v) + return _u +} + +// SetFailedExchanges sets the "failed_exchanges" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) SetFailedExchanges(v int) *PeerReputationUpdate { + _u.mutation.ResetFailedExchanges() + _u.mutation.SetFailedExchanges(v) + return _u +} + +// SetNillableFailedExchanges sets the "failed_exchanges" field if the given value is not nil. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) SetNillableFailedExchanges(v *int) *PeerReputationUpdate { + if v != nil { + _u.SetFailedExchanges(*v) + } + return _u +} + +// AddFailedExchanges adds value to the "failed_exchanges" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) AddFailedExchanges(v int) *PeerReputationUpdate { + _u.mutation.AddFailedExchanges(v) + return _u +} + +// SetTimeoutCount sets the "timeout_count" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) SetTimeoutCount(v int) *PeerReputationUpdate { + _u.mutation.ResetTimeoutCount() + _u.mutation.SetTimeoutCount(v) + return _u +} + +// SetNillableTimeoutCount sets the "timeout_count" field if the given value is not nil. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) SetNillableTimeoutCount(v *int) *PeerReputationUpdate { + if v != nil { + _u.SetTimeoutCount(*v) + } + return _u +} + +// AddTimeoutCount adds value to the "timeout_count" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) AddTimeoutCount(v int) *PeerReputationUpdate { + _u.mutation.AddTimeoutCount(v) + return _u +} + +// SetTrustScore sets the "trust_score" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) SetTrustScore(v float64) *PeerReputationUpdate { + _u.mutation.ResetTrustScore() + _u.mutation.SetTrustScore(v) + return _u +} + +// SetNillableTrustScore sets the "trust_score" field if the given value is not nil. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) SetNillableTrustScore(v *float64) *PeerReputationUpdate { + if v != nil { + _u.SetTrustScore(*v) + } + return _u +} + +// AddTrustScore adds value to the "trust_score" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) AddTrustScore(v float64) *PeerReputationUpdate { + _u.mutation.AddTrustScore(v) + return _u +} + +// SetLastInteraction sets the "last_interaction" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) SetLastInteraction(v time.Time) *PeerReputationUpdate { + _u.mutation.SetLastInteraction(v) + return _u +} + +// SetUpdatedAt sets the "updated_at" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) SetUpdatedAt(v time.Time) *PeerReputationUpdate { + _u.mutation.SetUpdatedAt(v) + return _u +} + +// Mutation returns the PeerReputationMutation object of the builder. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) Mutation() *PeerReputationMutation { + return _u.mutation +} + +// Save executes the query and returns the number of nodes affected by the update operation. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) Save(ctx context.Context) (int, error) { + _u.defaults() + return withHooks(ctx, _u.sqlSave, _u.mutation, _u.hooks) +} + +// SaveX is like Save, but panics if an error occurs. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) SaveX(ctx context.Context) int { + affected, err := _u.Save(ctx) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + return affected +} + +// Exec executes the query. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) Exec(ctx context.Context) error { + _, err := _u.Save(ctx) + return err +} + +// ExecX is like Exec, but panics if an error occurs. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) ExecX(ctx context.Context) { + if err := _u.Exec(ctx); err != nil { + panic(err) + } +} + +// defaults sets the default values of the builder before save. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) defaults() { + if _, ok := _u.mutation.LastInteraction(); !ok { + v := peerreputation.UpdateDefaultLastInteraction() + _u.mutation.SetLastInteraction(v) + } + if _, ok := _u.mutation.UpdatedAt(); !ok { + v := peerreputation.UpdateDefaultUpdatedAt() + _u.mutation.SetUpdatedAt(v) + } +} + +// check runs all checks and user-defined validators on the builder. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) check() error { + if v, ok := _u.mutation.PeerDid(); ok { + if err := peerreputation.PeerDidValidator(v); err != nil { + return &ValidationError{Name: "peer_did", err: fmt.Errorf(`ent: validator failed for field "PeerReputation.peer_did": %w`, err)} + } + } + return nil +} + +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdate) sqlSave(ctx context.Context) (_node int, err error) { + if err := _u.check(); err != nil { + return _node, err + } + _spec := sqlgraph.NewUpdateSpec(peerreputation.Table, peerreputation.Columns, sqlgraph.NewFieldSpec(peerreputation.FieldID, field.TypeUUID)) + if ps := _u.mutation.predicates; len(ps) > 0 { + _spec.Predicate = func(selector *sql.Selector) { + for i := range ps { + ps[i](selector) + } + } + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.PeerDid(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldPeerDid, field.TypeString, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.SuccessfulExchanges(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldSuccessfulExchanges, field.TypeInt, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.AddedSuccessfulExchanges(); ok { + _spec.AddField(peerreputation.FieldSuccessfulExchanges, field.TypeInt, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.FailedExchanges(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldFailedExchanges, field.TypeInt, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.AddedFailedExchanges(); ok { + _spec.AddField(peerreputation.FieldFailedExchanges, field.TypeInt, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.TimeoutCount(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldTimeoutCount, field.TypeInt, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.AddedTimeoutCount(); ok { + _spec.AddField(peerreputation.FieldTimeoutCount, field.TypeInt, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.TrustScore(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldTrustScore, field.TypeFloat64, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.AddedTrustScore(); ok { + _spec.AddField(peerreputation.FieldTrustScore, field.TypeFloat64, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.LastInteraction(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldLastInteraction, field.TypeTime, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.UpdatedAt(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldUpdatedAt, field.TypeTime, value) + } + if _node, err = sqlgraph.UpdateNodes(ctx, _u.driver, _spec); err != nil { + if _, ok := err.(*sqlgraph.NotFoundError); ok { + err = &NotFoundError{peerreputation.Label} + } else if sqlgraph.IsConstraintError(err) { + err = &ConstraintError{msg: err.Error(), wrap: err} + } + return 0, err + } + _u.mutation.done = true + return _node, nil +} + +// PeerReputationUpdateOne is the builder for updating a single PeerReputation entity. +type PeerReputationUpdateOne struct { + config + fields []string + hooks []Hook + mutation *PeerReputationMutation +} + +// SetPeerDid sets the "peer_did" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) SetPeerDid(v string) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + _u.mutation.SetPeerDid(v) + return _u +} + +// SetNillablePeerDid sets the "peer_did" field if the given value is not nil. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) SetNillablePeerDid(v *string) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + if v != nil { + _u.SetPeerDid(*v) + } + return _u +} + +// SetSuccessfulExchanges sets the "successful_exchanges" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) SetSuccessfulExchanges(v int) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + _u.mutation.ResetSuccessfulExchanges() + _u.mutation.SetSuccessfulExchanges(v) + return _u +} + +// SetNillableSuccessfulExchanges sets the "successful_exchanges" field if the given value is not nil. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) SetNillableSuccessfulExchanges(v *int) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + if v != nil { + _u.SetSuccessfulExchanges(*v) + } + return _u +} + +// AddSuccessfulExchanges adds value to the "successful_exchanges" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) AddSuccessfulExchanges(v int) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + _u.mutation.AddSuccessfulExchanges(v) + return _u +} + +// SetFailedExchanges sets the "failed_exchanges" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) SetFailedExchanges(v int) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + _u.mutation.ResetFailedExchanges() + _u.mutation.SetFailedExchanges(v) + return _u +} + +// SetNillableFailedExchanges sets the "failed_exchanges" field if the given value is not nil. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) SetNillableFailedExchanges(v *int) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + if v != nil { + _u.SetFailedExchanges(*v) + } + return _u +} + +// AddFailedExchanges adds value to the "failed_exchanges" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) AddFailedExchanges(v int) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + _u.mutation.AddFailedExchanges(v) + return _u +} + +// SetTimeoutCount sets the "timeout_count" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) SetTimeoutCount(v int) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + _u.mutation.ResetTimeoutCount() + _u.mutation.SetTimeoutCount(v) + return _u +} + +// SetNillableTimeoutCount sets the "timeout_count" field if the given value is not nil. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) SetNillableTimeoutCount(v *int) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + if v != nil { + _u.SetTimeoutCount(*v) + } + return _u +} + +// AddTimeoutCount adds value to the "timeout_count" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) AddTimeoutCount(v int) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + _u.mutation.AddTimeoutCount(v) + return _u +} + +// SetTrustScore sets the "trust_score" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) SetTrustScore(v float64) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + _u.mutation.ResetTrustScore() + _u.mutation.SetTrustScore(v) + return _u +} + +// SetNillableTrustScore sets the "trust_score" field if the given value is not nil. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) SetNillableTrustScore(v *float64) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + if v != nil { + _u.SetTrustScore(*v) + } + return _u +} + +// AddTrustScore adds value to the "trust_score" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) AddTrustScore(v float64) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + _u.mutation.AddTrustScore(v) + return _u +} + +// SetLastInteraction sets the "last_interaction" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) SetLastInteraction(v time.Time) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + _u.mutation.SetLastInteraction(v) + return _u +} + +// SetUpdatedAt sets the "updated_at" field. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) SetUpdatedAt(v time.Time) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + _u.mutation.SetUpdatedAt(v) + return _u +} + +// Mutation returns the PeerReputationMutation object of the builder. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) Mutation() *PeerReputationMutation { + return _u.mutation +} + +// Where appends a list predicates to the PeerReputationUpdate builder. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) Where(ps ...predicate.PeerReputation) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + _u.mutation.Where(ps...) + return _u +} + +// Select allows selecting one or more fields (columns) of the returned entity. +// The default is selecting all fields defined in the entity schema. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) Select(field string, fields ...string) *PeerReputationUpdateOne { + _u.fields = append([]string{field}, fields...) + return _u +} + +// Save executes the query and returns the updated PeerReputation entity. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) Save(ctx context.Context) (*PeerReputation, error) { + _u.defaults() + return withHooks(ctx, _u.sqlSave, _u.mutation, _u.hooks) +} + +// SaveX is like Save, but panics if an error occurs. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) SaveX(ctx context.Context) *PeerReputation { + node, err := _u.Save(ctx) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + return node +} + +// Exec executes the query on the entity. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) Exec(ctx context.Context) error { + _, err := _u.Save(ctx) + return err +} + +// ExecX is like Exec, but panics if an error occurs. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) ExecX(ctx context.Context) { + if err := _u.Exec(ctx); err != nil { + panic(err) + } +} + +// defaults sets the default values of the builder before save. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) defaults() { + if _, ok := _u.mutation.LastInteraction(); !ok { + v := peerreputation.UpdateDefaultLastInteraction() + _u.mutation.SetLastInteraction(v) + } + if _, ok := _u.mutation.UpdatedAt(); !ok { + v := peerreputation.UpdateDefaultUpdatedAt() + _u.mutation.SetUpdatedAt(v) + } +} + +// check runs all checks and user-defined validators on the builder. +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) check() error { + if v, ok := _u.mutation.PeerDid(); ok { + if err := peerreputation.PeerDidValidator(v); err != nil { + return &ValidationError{Name: "peer_did", err: fmt.Errorf(`ent: validator failed for field "PeerReputation.peer_did": %w`, err)} + } + } + return nil +} + +func (_u *PeerReputationUpdateOne) sqlSave(ctx context.Context) (_node *PeerReputation, err error) { + if err := _u.check(); err != nil { + return _node, err + } + _spec := sqlgraph.NewUpdateSpec(peerreputation.Table, peerreputation.Columns, sqlgraph.NewFieldSpec(peerreputation.FieldID, field.TypeUUID)) + id, ok := _u.mutation.ID() + if !ok { + return nil, &ValidationError{Name: "id", err: errors.New(`ent: missing "PeerReputation.id" for update`)} + } + _spec.Node.ID.Value = id + if fields := _u.fields; len(fields) > 0 { + _spec.Node.Columns = make([]string, 0, len(fields)) + _spec.Node.Columns = append(_spec.Node.Columns, peerreputation.FieldID) + for _, f := range fields { + if !peerreputation.ValidColumn(f) { + return nil, &ValidationError{Name: f, err: fmt.Errorf("ent: invalid field %q for query", f)} + } + if f != peerreputation.FieldID { + _spec.Node.Columns = append(_spec.Node.Columns, f) + } + } + } + if ps := _u.mutation.predicates; len(ps) > 0 { + _spec.Predicate = func(selector *sql.Selector) { + for i := range ps { + ps[i](selector) + } + } + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.PeerDid(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldPeerDid, field.TypeString, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.SuccessfulExchanges(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldSuccessfulExchanges, field.TypeInt, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.AddedSuccessfulExchanges(); ok { + _spec.AddField(peerreputation.FieldSuccessfulExchanges, field.TypeInt, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.FailedExchanges(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldFailedExchanges, field.TypeInt, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.AddedFailedExchanges(); ok { + _spec.AddField(peerreputation.FieldFailedExchanges, field.TypeInt, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.TimeoutCount(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldTimeoutCount, field.TypeInt, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.AddedTimeoutCount(); ok { + _spec.AddField(peerreputation.FieldTimeoutCount, field.TypeInt, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.TrustScore(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldTrustScore, field.TypeFloat64, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.AddedTrustScore(); ok { + _spec.AddField(peerreputation.FieldTrustScore, field.TypeFloat64, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.LastInteraction(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldLastInteraction, field.TypeTime, value) + } + if value, ok := _u.mutation.UpdatedAt(); ok { + _spec.SetField(peerreputation.FieldUpdatedAt, field.TypeTime, value) + } + _node = &PeerReputation{config: _u.config} + _spec.Assign = _node.assignValues + _spec.ScanValues = _node.scanValues + if err = sqlgraph.UpdateNode(ctx, _u.driver, _spec); err != nil { + if _, ok := err.(*sqlgraph.NotFoundError); ok { + err = &NotFoundError{peerreputation.Label} + } else if sqlgraph.IsConstraintError(err) { + err = &ConstraintError{msg: err.Error(), wrap: err} + } + return nil, err + } + _u.mutation.done = true + return _node, nil +} diff --git a/internal/ent/predicate/predicate.go b/internal/ent/predicate/predicate.go index 6c565adc..acb4c307 100644 --- a/internal/ent/predicate/predicate.go +++ b/internal/ent/predicate/predicate.go @@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ type Observation func(*sql.Selector) // PaymentTx is the predicate function for paymenttx builders. type PaymentTx func(*sql.Selector) +// PeerReputation is the predicate function for peerreputation builders. +type PeerReputation func(*sql.Selector) + // Reflection is the predicate function for reflection builders. type Reflection func(*sql.Selector) diff --git a/internal/ent/runtime.go b/internal/ent/runtime.go index e32d49ab..9a41517a 100644 --- a/internal/ent/runtime.go +++ b/internal/ent/runtime.go @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import ( "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/message" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/observation" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/paymenttx" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/peerreputation" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/reflection" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/schema" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/secret" @@ -330,6 +331,52 @@ func init() { paymenttxDescID := paymenttxFields[0].Descriptor() // paymenttx.DefaultID holds the default value on creation for the id field. paymenttx.DefaultID = paymenttxDescID.Default.(func() uuid.UUID) + peerreputationFields := schema.PeerReputation{}.Fields() + _ = peerreputationFields + // peerreputationDescPeerDid is the schema descriptor for peer_did field. + peerreputationDescPeerDid := peerreputationFields[1].Descriptor() + // peerreputation.PeerDidValidator is a validator for the "peer_did" field. It is called by the builders before save. + peerreputation.PeerDidValidator = peerreputationDescPeerDid.Validators[0].(func(string) error) + // peerreputationDescSuccessfulExchanges is the schema descriptor for successful_exchanges field. + peerreputationDescSuccessfulExchanges := peerreputationFields[2].Descriptor() + // peerreputation.DefaultSuccessfulExchanges holds the default value on creation for the successful_exchanges field. + peerreputation.DefaultSuccessfulExchanges = peerreputationDescSuccessfulExchanges.Default.(int) + // peerreputationDescFailedExchanges is the schema descriptor for failed_exchanges field. + peerreputationDescFailedExchanges := peerreputationFields[3].Descriptor() + // peerreputation.DefaultFailedExchanges holds the default value on creation for the failed_exchanges field. + peerreputation.DefaultFailedExchanges = peerreputationDescFailedExchanges.Default.(int) + // peerreputationDescTimeoutCount is the schema descriptor for timeout_count field. + peerreputationDescTimeoutCount := peerreputationFields[4].Descriptor() + // peerreputation.DefaultTimeoutCount holds the default value on creation for the timeout_count field. + peerreputation.DefaultTimeoutCount = peerreputationDescTimeoutCount.Default.(int) + // peerreputationDescTrustScore is the schema descriptor for trust_score field. + peerreputationDescTrustScore := peerreputationFields[5].Descriptor() + // peerreputation.DefaultTrustScore holds the default value on creation for the trust_score field. + peerreputation.DefaultTrustScore = peerreputationDescTrustScore.Default.(float64) + // peerreputationDescFirstSeen is the schema descriptor for first_seen field. + peerreputationDescFirstSeen := peerreputationFields[6].Descriptor() + // peerreputation.DefaultFirstSeen holds the default value on creation for the first_seen field. + peerreputation.DefaultFirstSeen = peerreputationDescFirstSeen.Default.(func() time.Time) + // peerreputationDescLastInteraction is the schema descriptor for last_interaction field. + peerreputationDescLastInteraction := peerreputationFields[7].Descriptor() + // peerreputation.DefaultLastInteraction holds the default value on creation for the last_interaction field. + peerreputation.DefaultLastInteraction = peerreputationDescLastInteraction.Default.(func() time.Time) + // peerreputation.UpdateDefaultLastInteraction holds the default value on update for the last_interaction field. + peerreputation.UpdateDefaultLastInteraction = peerreputationDescLastInteraction.UpdateDefault.(func() time.Time) + // peerreputationDescCreatedAt is the schema descriptor for created_at field. + peerreputationDescCreatedAt := peerreputationFields[8].Descriptor() + // peerreputation.DefaultCreatedAt holds the default value on creation for the created_at field. + peerreputation.DefaultCreatedAt = peerreputationDescCreatedAt.Default.(func() time.Time) + // peerreputationDescUpdatedAt is the schema descriptor for updated_at field. + peerreputationDescUpdatedAt := peerreputationFields[9].Descriptor() + // peerreputation.DefaultUpdatedAt holds the default value on creation for the updated_at field. + peerreputation.DefaultUpdatedAt = peerreputationDescUpdatedAt.Default.(func() time.Time) + // peerreputation.UpdateDefaultUpdatedAt holds the default value on update for the updated_at field. + peerreputation.UpdateDefaultUpdatedAt = peerreputationDescUpdatedAt.UpdateDefault.(func() time.Time) + // peerreputationDescID is the schema descriptor for id field. + peerreputationDescID := peerreputationFields[0].Descriptor() + // peerreputation.DefaultID holds the default value on creation for the id field. + peerreputation.DefaultID = peerreputationDescID.Default.(func() uuid.UUID) reflectionFields := schema.Reflection{}.Fields() _ = reflectionFields // reflectionDescSessionKey is the schema descriptor for session_key field. diff --git a/internal/ent/schema/peer_reputation.go b/internal/ent/schema/peer_reputation.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8da30921 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/ent/schema/peer_reputation.go @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +package schema + +import ( + "time" + + "entgo.io/ent" + "entgo.io/ent/schema/field" + "entgo.io/ent/schema/index" + "github.com/google/uuid" +) + +// PeerReputation holds the schema definition for tracking peer trust scores. +type PeerReputation struct { + ent.Schema +} + +// Fields of the PeerReputation. +func (PeerReputation) Fields() []ent.Field { + return []ent.Field{ + field.UUID("id", uuid.UUID{}). + Default(uuid.New). + Immutable(), + field.String("peer_did"). + Unique(). + NotEmpty(). + Comment("DID of the peer"), + field.Int("successful_exchanges"). + Default(0). + Comment("Count of successful paid exchanges"), + field.Int("failed_exchanges"). + Default(0). + Comment("Count of failed exchanges"), + field.Int("timeout_count"). + Default(0). + Comment("Count of timed-out exchanges"), + field.Float("trust_score"). + Default(0.0). + Comment("Computed trust score"), + field.Time("first_seen"). + Default(time.Now). + Immutable(). + Comment("When this peer was first observed"), + field.Time("last_interaction"). + Default(time.Now). + UpdateDefault(time.Now). + Comment("Most recent interaction timestamp"), + field.Time("created_at"). + Default(time.Now). + Immutable(), + field.Time("updated_at"). + Default(time.Now). + UpdateDefault(time.Now), + } +} + +// Edges of the PeerReputation. +func (PeerReputation) Edges() []ent.Edge { + return nil +} + +// Indexes of the PeerReputation. +func (PeerReputation) Indexes() []ent.Index { + return []ent.Index{ + index.Fields("trust_score"), + index.Fields("last_interaction"), + } +} diff --git a/internal/ent/tx.go b/internal/ent/tx.go index 93d7f7fc..1e72a00a 100644 --- a/internal/ent/tx.go +++ b/internal/ent/tx.go @@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ type Tx struct { Observation *ObservationClient // PaymentTx is the client for interacting with the PaymentTx builders. PaymentTx *PaymentTxClient + // PeerReputation is the client for interacting with the PeerReputation builders. + PeerReputation *PeerReputationClient // Reflection is the client for interacting with the Reflection builders. Reflection *ReflectionClient // Secret is the client for interacting with the Secret builders. @@ -189,6 +191,7 @@ func (tx *Tx) init() { tx.Message = NewMessageClient(tx.config) tx.Observation = NewObservationClient(tx.config) tx.PaymentTx = NewPaymentTxClient(tx.config) + tx.PeerReputation = NewPeerReputationClient(tx.config) tx.Reflection = NewReflectionClient(tx.config) tx.Secret = NewSecretClient(tx.config) tx.Session = NewSessionClient(tx.config) diff --git a/internal/eventbus/bus.go b/internal/eventbus/bus.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1bc34f6a --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/eventbus/bus.go @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +// Package eventbus provides a synchronous, typed event bus for decoupling +// components that currently rely on scattered SetXxxCallback() wiring. +// +// Events are dispatched synchronously in registration order. The bus is +// safe for concurrent use; Subscribe takes a write lock, Publish takes a +// read lock. +package eventbus + +import "sync" + +// Event is implemented by all event types. +type Event interface { + EventName() string +} + +// HandlerFunc processes an event. +type HandlerFunc func(event Event) + +// Bus is a synchronous typed event bus. +type Bus struct { + mu sync.RWMutex + handlers map[string][]HandlerFunc +} + +// New creates a new event bus. +func New() *Bus { + return &Bus{ + handlers: make(map[string][]HandlerFunc), + } +} + +// Subscribe registers a handler for a specific event name. +func (b *Bus) Subscribe(eventName string, handler HandlerFunc) { + b.mu.Lock() + defer b.mu.Unlock() + + b.handlers[eventName] = append(b.handlers[eventName], handler) +} + +// Publish sends an event to all registered handlers synchronously. +// If no handlers are registered for the event, it is silently ignored. +func (b *Bus) Publish(event Event) { + b.mu.RLock() + // Copy the handler slice under the read lock so that a handler calling + // Subscribe does not deadlock or observe a partially-mutated slice. + hs := make([]HandlerFunc, len(b.handlers[event.EventName()])) + copy(hs, b.handlers[event.EventName()]) + b.mu.RUnlock() + + for _, h := range hs { + h(event) + } +} + +// SubscribeTyped is a generic helper that provides type-safe subscription. +// It registers a handler that automatically type-asserts the event before +// calling the typed handler function. +func SubscribeTyped[T Event](bus *Bus, handler func(T)) { + var zero T + bus.Subscribe(zero.EventName(), func(event Event) { + if typed, ok := event.(T); ok { + handler(typed) + } + }) +} diff --git a/internal/eventbus/bus_test.go b/internal/eventbus/bus_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4b8b239f --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/eventbus/bus_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,270 @@ +package eventbus + +import ( + "sync" + "sync/atomic" + "testing" +) + +// testEvent is a minimal event used across tests. +type testEvent struct { + Value string +} + +func (e testEvent) EventName() string { return "test.event" } + +// otherEvent is used to verify event routing isolation. +type otherEvent struct { + Code int +} + +func (e otherEvent) EventName() string { return "other.event" } + +func TestSingleHandlerReceivesEvent(t *testing.T) { + bus := New() + + var received string + bus.Subscribe("test.event", func(event Event) { + received = event.(testEvent).Value + }) + + bus.Publish(testEvent{Value: "hello"}) + + if received != "hello" { + t.Errorf("want %q, got %q", "hello", received) + } +} + +func TestMultipleHandlersReceiveInOrder(t *testing.T) { + bus := New() + + var order []int + bus.Subscribe("test.event", func(_ Event) { order = append(order, 1) }) + bus.Subscribe("test.event", func(_ Event) { order = append(order, 2) }) + bus.Subscribe("test.event", func(_ Event) { order = append(order, 3) }) + + bus.Publish(testEvent{Value: "x"}) + + if len(order) != 3 { + t.Fatalf("want 3 handler calls, got %d", len(order)) + } + for i, want := range []int{1, 2, 3} { + if order[i] != want { + t.Errorf("order[%d] = %d, want %d", i, order[i], want) + } + } +} + +func TestPublishWithNoHandlersDoesNotPanic(t *testing.T) { + bus := New() + + // Should not panic. + bus.Publish(testEvent{Value: "nobody listening"}) +} + +func TestSubscribeTypedProvidesSafeHandling(t *testing.T) { + bus := New() + + var received ContentSavedEvent + SubscribeTyped(bus, func(e ContentSavedEvent) { + received = e + }) + + bus.Publish(ContentSavedEvent{ + ID: "doc-1", + Collection: "notes", + Content: "hello world", + Source: "knowledge", + }) + + if received.ID != "doc-1" { + t.Errorf("want ID %q, got %q", "doc-1", received.ID) + } + if received.Source != "knowledge" { + t.Errorf("want Source %q, got %q", "knowledge", received.Source) + } +} + +func TestDifferentEventTypesRouteToSeparateHandlers(t *testing.T) { + bus := New() + + var testCalled, otherCalled bool + bus.Subscribe("test.event", func(_ Event) { testCalled = true }) + bus.Subscribe("other.event", func(_ Event) { otherCalled = true }) + + bus.Publish(testEvent{Value: "a"}) + + if !testCalled { + t.Error("test.event handler was not called") + } + if otherCalled { + t.Error("other.event handler was called unexpectedly") + } + + // Reset and publish the other event. + testCalled = false + otherCalled = false + + bus.Publish(otherEvent{Code: 42}) + + if testCalled { + t.Error("test.event handler was called unexpectedly") + } + if !otherCalled { + t.Error("other.event handler was not called") + } +} + +func TestConcurrentPublishAndSubscribe(t *testing.T) { + bus := New() + + var count atomic.Int64 + const goroutines = 50 + const eventsPerGoroutine = 100 + + // Pre-register one handler so there is something to call. + bus.Subscribe("test.event", func(_ Event) { + count.Add(1) + }) + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + + // Concurrent publishers. + for i := range goroutines { + wg.Add(1) + go func(id int) { + defer wg.Done() + for j := range eventsPerGoroutine { + bus.Publish(testEvent{Value: "msg"}) + // Interleave a subscribe on every 10th iteration to + // exercise concurrent subscribe + publish. + if j%10 == 0 { + bus.Subscribe("test.event", func(_ Event) { + count.Add(1) + }) + } + } + _ = id + }(i) + } + + wg.Wait() + + // We only assert that no data race occurred. The exact count is + // non-deterministic because new handlers are added while publishing. + if count.Load() == 0 { + t.Error("expected at least one handler invocation") + } +} + +func TestSubscribeTypedIgnoresMismatchedType(t *testing.T) { + bus := New() + + var called bool + SubscribeTyped(bus, func(_ TurnCompletedEvent) { + called = true + }) + + // Publish a different event with the same event name — this should not + // happen in production but verifies the type assertion guard. + bus.Subscribe("turn.completed", func(_ Event) {}) + bus.Publish(TurnCompletedEvent{SessionKey: "sess-1"}) + + if !called { + t.Error("typed handler was not called for matching type") + } +} + +func TestAllEventTypesHaveDistinctNames(t *testing.T) { + events := []Event{ + ContentSavedEvent{}, + TriplesExtractedEvent{}, + TurnCompletedEvent{}, + ReputationChangedEvent{}, + MemoryGraphEvent{}, + } + + seen := make(map[string]bool, len(events)) + for _, e := range events { + name := e.EventName() + if seen[name] { + t.Errorf("duplicate event name: %s", name) + } + seen[name] = true + } +} + +func TestReputationChangedEventRoundTrip(t *testing.T) { + bus := New() + + var got ReputationChangedEvent + SubscribeTyped(bus, func(e ReputationChangedEvent) { + got = e + }) + + bus.Publish(ReputationChangedEvent{PeerDID: "did:example:123", NewScore: 0.85}) + + if got.PeerDID != "did:example:123" { + t.Errorf("PeerDID = %q, want %q", got.PeerDID, "did:example:123") + } + if got.NewScore != 0.85 { + t.Errorf("NewScore = %f, want %f", got.NewScore, 0.85) + } +} + +func TestTriplesExtractedEventRoundTrip(t *testing.T) { + bus := New() + + var got TriplesExtractedEvent + SubscribeTyped(bus, func(e TriplesExtractedEvent) { + got = e + }) + + bus.Publish(TriplesExtractedEvent{ + Triples: []Triple{ + {Subject: "Go", Predicate: "is", Object: "fast"}, + {Subject: "Rust", Predicate: "is", Object: "safe"}, + }, + Source: "learning", + }) + + if len(got.Triples) != 2 { + t.Fatalf("want 2 triples, got %d", len(got.Triples)) + } + if got.Triples[0].Subject != "Go" { + t.Errorf("Subject = %q, want %q", got.Triples[0].Subject, "Go") + } + if got.Source != "learning" { + t.Errorf("Source = %q, want %q", got.Source, "learning") + } +} + +func TestMemoryGraphEventRoundTrip(t *testing.T) { + bus := New() + + var got MemoryGraphEvent + SubscribeTyped(bus, func(e MemoryGraphEvent) { + got = e + }) + + bus.Publish(MemoryGraphEvent{ + Triples: []Triple{ + {Subject: "Alice", Predicate: "knows", Object: "Bob"}, + }, + SessionKey: "sess-42", + Type: "observation", + }) + + if len(got.Triples) != 1 { + t.Fatalf("want 1 triple, got %d", len(got.Triples)) + } + if got.Triples[0].Subject != "Alice" { + t.Errorf("Subject = %q, want %q", got.Triples[0].Subject, "Alice") + } + if got.SessionKey != "sess-42" { + t.Errorf("SessionKey = %q, want %q", got.SessionKey, "sess-42") + } + if got.Type != "observation" { + t.Errorf("Type = %q, want %q", got.Type, "observation") + } +} diff --git a/internal/eventbus/events.go b/internal/eventbus/events.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dec4fab5 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/eventbus/events.go @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +package eventbus + +// ContentSavedEvent is published when knowledge or memory content is saved. +// Replaces: SetEmbedCallback, SetGraphCallback on knowledge and memory stores. +type ContentSavedEvent struct { + ID string + Collection string + Content string + Metadata map[string]string + Source string // "knowledge" or "memory" +} + +// EventName implements Event. +func (e ContentSavedEvent) EventName() string { return "content.saved" } + +// TriplesExtractedEvent is published when graph triples are extracted. +// Replaces: SetGraphCallback on learning engines and analyzers. +type TriplesExtractedEvent struct { + Triples []Triple + Source string // e.g. "learning", "analysis", "librarian" +} + +// EventName implements Event. +func (e TriplesExtractedEvent) EventName() string { return "triples.extracted" } + +// Triple mirrors graph.Triple to avoid an import dependency on the graph +// package, keeping the eventbus package dependency-free. +type Triple struct { + Subject string + Predicate string + Object string + Metadata map[string]string +} + +// TurnCompletedEvent is published when a gateway turn completes. +// Replaces: Gateway.OnTurnComplete callbacks. +type TurnCompletedEvent struct { + SessionKey string +} + +// EventName implements Event. +func (e TurnCompletedEvent) EventName() string { return "turn.completed" } + +// ReputationChangedEvent is published when a peer's reputation changes. +// Replaces: reputation.Store.SetOnChangeCallback. +type ReputationChangedEvent struct { + PeerDID string + NewScore float64 +} + +// EventName implements Event. +func (e ReputationChangedEvent) EventName() string { return "reputation.changed" } + +// MemoryGraphEvent is published when memory graph hooks fire. +// Replaces: memory.Store.SetGraphHooks. +type MemoryGraphEvent struct { + Triples []Triple + SessionKey string + Type string // "observation" or "reflection" +} + +// EventName implements Event. +func (e MemoryGraphEvent) EventName() string { return "memory.graph" } diff --git a/internal/gateway/auth.go b/internal/gateway/auth.go index a21a342b..e60a2117 100644 --- a/internal/gateway/auth.go +++ b/internal/gateway/auth.go @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ func (am *AuthManager) handleCallback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // Return structured JSON response (no PII exposure) w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") - json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{ + _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{ "status": "authenticated", "sessionKey": sessionKey, }) @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ func (am *AuthManager) handleLogout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { }) w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") - json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{ + _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{ "status": "logged_out", }) } diff --git a/internal/gateway/middleware_test.go b/internal/gateway/middleware_test.go index 80e78259..8f5c8b73 100644 --- a/internal/gateway/middleware_test.go +++ b/internal/gateway/middleware_test.go @@ -217,9 +217,8 @@ func TestMakeOriginChecker_TrailingSlashNormalized(t *testing.T) { func TestIsSecure_DirectTLS(t *testing.T) { req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://localhost/test", nil) // httptest doesn't set TLS, manually test the header path - if isSecure(req) { - // TLS is nil in httptest, that's expected - } + // isSecure returns false here: httptest doesn't set TLS, that's expected. + _ = isSecure(req) // Test X-Forwarded-Proto header req = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://localhost/test", nil) @@ -320,10 +319,9 @@ func TestStateCookie_PerProviderName(t *testing.T) { // This should return "state cookie missing" because it looks for "oauth_state_google" auth.handleCallback(rec, req) - if rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound { - // Provider "google" is not registered, so we get 404 first - // But the important thing is it doesn't use the old cookie name - } + // Provider "google" is not registered, so we get 404 first. + // The important thing is it doesn't use the old cookie name. + _ = rec.Code // Now test with correct per-provider cookie but non-existent provider req2 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/auth/callback/google?state=abc&code=xyz", nil) diff --git a/internal/gateway/server.go b/internal/gateway/server.go index eb4ca9e9..7caf0640 100644 --- a/internal/gateway/server.go +++ b/internal/gateway/server.go @@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ func (s *Server) Shutdown(ctx context.Context) error { // handleHealth returns health status func (s *Server) handleHealth(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) { w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") - json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{ + _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{ "status": "ok", "time": time.Now().Format(time.RFC3339), }) @@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ func (s *Server) handleStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) { s.clientsMu.RUnlock() w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") - json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{ + _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{ "status": "running", "clients": clientCount, "wsEnabled": s.config.WebSocketEnabled, @@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ func (c *Client) writePump() { select { case message, ok := <-c.Send: if !ok { - c.Conn.WriteMessage(websocket.CloseMessage, []byte{}) + _ = c.Conn.WriteMessage(websocket.CloseMessage, []byte{}) return } if err := c.Conn.WriteMessage(websocket.TextMessage, message); err != nil { diff --git a/internal/graph/buffer.go b/internal/graph/buffer.go index e2f483bf..0f29d842 100644 --- a/internal/graph/buffer.go +++ b/internal/graph/buffer.go @@ -3,10 +3,11 @@ package graph import ( "context" "sync" - "sync/atomic" "time" "go.uber.org/zap" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/asyncbuf" ) // GraphRequest represents a request to add triples to the graph. @@ -16,106 +17,61 @@ type GraphRequest struct { // GraphBuffer collects graph update requests and processes them in batches // on a background goroutine. It follows the same lifecycle pattern as -// embedding.EmbeddingBuffer: Start → Enqueue → Stop. +// embedding.EmbeddingBuffer: Start -> Enqueue -> Stop. +// +// Note: GraphRequest items are expanded into individual Triples for batch +// processing, so the BatchBuffer operates on Triple slices internally. type GraphBuffer struct { - store Store - - queue chan GraphRequest - stopCh chan struct{} - done chan struct{} - - batchSize int - batchTimeout time.Duration - dropCount atomic.Int64 - logger *zap.SugaredLogger + store Store + inner *asyncbuf.BatchBuffer[GraphRequest] + logger *zap.SugaredLogger } // NewGraphBuffer creates a new asynchronous graph update buffer. func NewGraphBuffer(store Store, logger *zap.SugaredLogger) *GraphBuffer { - return &GraphBuffer{ - store: store, - queue: make(chan GraphRequest, 256), - stopCh: make(chan struct{}), - done: make(chan struct{}), - batchSize: 64, - batchTimeout: 2 * time.Second, - logger: logger, + b := &GraphBuffer{ + store: store, + logger: logger, } + b.inner = asyncbuf.NewBatchBuffer[GraphRequest](asyncbuf.BatchConfig{ + QueueSize: 256, + BatchSize: 64, + BatchTimeout: 2 * time.Second, + }, b.processBatchRequests, logger) + return b } // Start launches the background goroutine. The WaitGroup is incremented // so callers can wait for graceful shutdown. func (b *GraphBuffer) Start(wg *sync.WaitGroup) { - wg.Add(1) - go func() { - defer wg.Done() - defer close(b.done) - b.run() - }() + b.inner.Start(wg) } // Enqueue submits a graph update request. Non-blocking; drops if the queue is full. func (b *GraphBuffer) Enqueue(req GraphRequest) { - select { - case b.queue <- req: - default: - b.dropCount.Add(1) - b.logger.Warnw("graph queue full, dropping request", - "triples", len(req.Triples), "totalDropped", b.dropCount.Load()) - } + b.inner.Enqueue(req) } // DroppedCount returns the total number of dropped graph requests. func (b *GraphBuffer) DroppedCount() int64 { - return b.dropCount.Load() + return b.inner.DroppedCount() } // Stop signals the background goroutine to drain and exit. func (b *GraphBuffer) Stop() { - close(b.stopCh) - <-b.done + b.inner.Stop() } -func (b *GraphBuffer) run() { - timer := time.NewTimer(b.batchTimeout) - defer timer.Stop() - - var batch []Triple - - flush := func() { - if len(batch) == 0 { - return - } - b.processBatch(batch) - batch = batch[:0] +// processBatchRequests expands GraphRequests into triples and stores them. +func (b *GraphBuffer) processBatchRequests(batch []GraphRequest) { + var triples []Triple + for _, req := range batch { + triples = append(triples, req.Triples...) } - - for { - select { - case req := <-b.queue: - batch = append(batch, req.Triples...) - if len(batch) >= b.batchSize { - flush() - timer.Reset(b.batchTimeout) - } - - case <-timer.C: - flush() - timer.Reset(b.batchTimeout) - - case <-b.stopCh: - // Drain remaining items. - for { - select { - case req := <-b.queue: - batch = append(batch, req.Triples...) - default: - flush() - return - } - } - } + if len(triples) == 0 { + return } + b.processBatch(triples) } func (b *GraphBuffer) processBatch(batch []Triple) { diff --git a/internal/graph/rag.go b/internal/graph/rag.go index 0c75c1df..b84a27e9 100644 --- a/internal/graph/rag.go +++ b/internal/graph/rag.go @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ func (s *GraphRAGService) AssembleSection(result *GraphRAGResult) string { if r.Content == "" { continue } - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("\n### [%s] %s\n", r.Collection, r.SourceID)) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "\n### [%s] %s\n", r.Collection, r.SourceID) b.WriteString(r.Content) b.WriteString("\n") } @@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ func (s *GraphRAGService) AssembleSection(result *GraphRAGResult) string { b.WriteString("\n## Graph-Expanded Context\n") b.WriteString("The following related items were discovered through knowledge graph traversal:\n") for _, g := range result.GraphResults { - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- **%s** (via %s from %s)\n", g.ID, g.Predicate, g.FromNode)) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- **%s** (via %s from %s)\n", g.ID, g.Predicate, g.FromNode) } } diff --git a/internal/keyring/biometric_darwin.go b/internal/keyring/biometric_darwin.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..329037d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/keyring/biometric_darwin.go @@ -0,0 +1,395 @@ +//go:build darwin && cgo + +package keyring + +/* +#cgo LDFLAGS: -framework CoreFoundation -framework Security + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +// secure_free zeroes out memory before freeing to prevent plaintext lingering +// in freed heap pages (memory dumps, core dumps). Uses volatile pointer to +// prevent compiler from optimizing away the zeroing. +static void secure_free(char *ptr, int len) { + if (ptr) { + volatile char *vp = (volatile char *)ptr; + for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) vp[i] = 0; + free(ptr); + } +} + +// KeychainResult is returned by C helper functions. +typedef struct { + int status; // 0 = success, -1 = not found, >0 = OSStatus error + char *data; // returned data (caller must free) + int data_len; +} KeychainResult; + +static CFStringRef _toCFString(const char *s) { + return CFStringCreateWithCString(kCFAllocatorDefault, s, kCFStringEncodingUTF8); +} + +// keychain_biometric_available checks if biometric access control can be created +// and verifies that the login Keychain actually accepts biometric-protected items. +// This probe does NOT trigger a Touch ID prompt (writes bypass ACL evaluation). +static int keychain_biometric_available(void) { + // 1. Check if biometric access control flags are supported. + CFErrorRef error = NULL; + SecAccessControlRef access = SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags( + kCFAllocatorDefault, + kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly, + kSecAccessControlBiometryCurrentSet, + &error + ); + if (error != NULL) { + CFRelease(error); + return 0; + } + + // 2. Probe the login Keychain with a real SecItemAdd to verify entitlements. + CFStringRef svc = CFSTR("lango-probe"); + CFStringRef acct = CFSTR("biometric-check"); + CFDataRef val = CFDataCreate(kCFAllocatorDefault, (const UInt8 *)"p", 1); + + // Clean up any leftover probe item. + CFMutableDictionaryRef del = CFDictionaryCreateMutable( + kCFAllocatorDefault, 0, + &kCFTypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks, + &kCFTypeDictionaryValueCallBacks); + CFDictionarySetValue(del, kSecClass, kSecClassGenericPassword); + CFDictionarySetValue(del, kSecAttrService, svc); + CFDictionarySetValue(del, kSecAttrAccount, acct); + CFDictionarySetValue(del, kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain, kCFBooleanFalse); + SecItemDelete(del); + CFRelease(del); + + // Attempt to add a probe item with biometric ACL. + CFMutableDictionaryRef add = CFDictionaryCreateMutable( + kCFAllocatorDefault, 0, + &kCFTypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks, + &kCFTypeDictionaryValueCallBacks); + CFDictionarySetValue(add, kSecClass, kSecClassGenericPassword); + CFDictionarySetValue(add, kSecAttrService, svc); + CFDictionarySetValue(add, kSecAttrAccount, acct); + CFDictionarySetValue(add, kSecValueData, val); + CFDictionarySetValue(add, kSecAttrAccessControl, access); + CFDictionarySetValue(add, kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain, kCFBooleanFalse); + + OSStatus status = SecItemAdd(add, NULL); + + // Clean up probe item on success. + if (status == errSecSuccess) { + CFMutableDictionaryRef cleanup = CFDictionaryCreateMutable( + kCFAllocatorDefault, 0, + &kCFTypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks, + &kCFTypeDictionaryValueCallBacks); + CFDictionarySetValue(cleanup, kSecClass, kSecClassGenericPassword); + CFDictionarySetValue(cleanup, kSecAttrService, svc); + CFDictionarySetValue(cleanup, kSecAttrAccount, acct); + CFDictionarySetValue(cleanup, kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain, kCFBooleanFalse); + SecItemDelete(cleanup); + CFRelease(cleanup); + } + + CFRelease(add); + CFRelease(access); + CFRelease(val); + + return (status == errSecSuccess) ? 1 : 0; +} + +// keychain_set_biometric stores a value with biometric (Touch ID) access control. +// Uses the login Keychain (kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = false) so that +// ad-hoc signed binaries work without keychain-access-groups entitlement. +static KeychainResult keychain_set_biometric(const char *service, const char *account, + const char *value, int value_len) { + KeychainResult result = {0, NULL, 0}; + + CFStringRef cfService = _toCFString(service); + CFStringRef cfAccount = _toCFString(account); + CFDataRef cfValue = CFDataCreate(kCFAllocatorDefault, (const UInt8 *)value, value_len); + + // Delete any existing item first (ignore errors). + CFMutableDictionaryRef delQuery = CFDictionaryCreateMutable( + kCFAllocatorDefault, 0, + &kCFTypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks, + &kCFTypeDictionaryValueCallBacks); + CFDictionarySetValue(delQuery, kSecClass, kSecClassGenericPassword); + CFDictionarySetValue(delQuery, kSecAttrService, cfService); + CFDictionarySetValue(delQuery, kSecAttrAccount, cfAccount); + CFDictionarySetValue(delQuery, kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain, kCFBooleanFalse); + SecItemDelete(delQuery); + CFRelease(delQuery); + + // Create biometric access control targeting login Keychain. + // BiometryCurrentSet: invalidates item when biometric enrollment changes. + CFErrorRef acError = NULL; + SecAccessControlRef access = SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags( + kCFAllocatorDefault, + kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly, + kSecAccessControlBiometryCurrentSet, + &acError); + if (acError != NULL) { + result.status = (int)CFErrorGetCode(acError); + CFRelease(acError); + CFRelease(cfService); + CFRelease(cfAccount); + CFRelease(cfValue); + return result; + } + + // Add item with biometric protection to login Keychain. + CFMutableDictionaryRef query = CFDictionaryCreateMutable( + kCFAllocatorDefault, 0, + &kCFTypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks, + &kCFTypeDictionaryValueCallBacks); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecClass, kSecClassGenericPassword); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecAttrService, cfService); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecAttrAccount, cfAccount); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecValueData, cfValue); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecAttrAccessControl, access); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain, kCFBooleanFalse); + + OSStatus status = SecItemAdd(query, NULL); + result.status = (int)status; + + CFRelease(query); + CFRelease(access); + CFRelease(cfService); + CFRelease(cfAccount); + CFRelease(cfValue); + return result; +} + +// keychain_get_biometric retrieves a value; triggers Touch ID prompt. +// Targets the login Keychain explicitly. +static KeychainResult keychain_get_biometric(const char *service, const char *account) { + KeychainResult result = {0, NULL, 0}; + + CFStringRef cfService = _toCFString(service); + CFStringRef cfAccount = _toCFString(account); + + CFMutableDictionaryRef query = CFDictionaryCreateMutable( + kCFAllocatorDefault, 0, + &kCFTypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks, + &kCFTypeDictionaryValueCallBacks); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecClass, kSecClassGenericPassword); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecAttrService, cfService); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecAttrAccount, cfAccount); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecMatchLimit, kSecMatchLimitOne); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecReturnData, kCFBooleanTrue); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain, kCFBooleanFalse); + + CFTypeRef item = NULL; + OSStatus status = SecItemCopyMatching(query, &item); + + if (status == errSecItemNotFound) { + result.status = -1; + } else if (status != errSecSuccess) { + result.status = (int)status; + } else { + CFDataRef data = (CFDataRef)item; + CFIndex len = CFDataGetLength(data); + result.data = (char *)malloc(len); + memcpy(result.data, CFDataGetBytePtr(data), len); + result.data_len = (int)len; + CFRelease(item); + } + + CFRelease(query); + CFRelease(cfService); + CFRelease(cfAccount); + return result; +} + +// keychain_has_biometric checks if an item exists WITHOUT triggering Touch ID. +// Queries for attributes only (not data), so biometric ACL is not enforced. +// Targets the login Keychain explicitly. +static int keychain_has_biometric(const char *service, const char *account) { + CFStringRef cfService = _toCFString(service); + CFStringRef cfAccount = _toCFString(account); + + CFMutableDictionaryRef query = CFDictionaryCreateMutable( + kCFAllocatorDefault, 0, + &kCFTypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks, + &kCFTypeDictionaryValueCallBacks); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecClass, kSecClassGenericPassword); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecAttrService, cfService); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecAttrAccount, cfAccount); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecMatchLimit, kSecMatchLimitOne); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecReturnAttributes, kCFBooleanTrue); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain, kCFBooleanFalse); + + CFTypeRef item = NULL; + OSStatus status = SecItemCopyMatching(query, &item); + + if (item != NULL) CFRelease(item); + CFRelease(query); + CFRelease(cfService); + CFRelease(cfAccount); + + return (status == errSecSuccess) ? 1 : 0; +} + +// keychain_delete_biometric deletes the item from the login Keychain. +static int keychain_delete_biometric(const char *service, const char *account) { + CFStringRef cfService = _toCFString(service); + CFStringRef cfAccount = _toCFString(account); + + CFMutableDictionaryRef query = CFDictionaryCreateMutable( + kCFAllocatorDefault, 0, + &kCFTypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks, + &kCFTypeDictionaryValueCallBacks); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecClass, kSecClassGenericPassword); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecAttrService, cfService); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecAttrAccount, cfAccount); + CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain, kCFBooleanFalse); + + OSStatus status = SecItemDelete(query); + + CFRelease(query); + CFRelease(cfService); + CFRelease(cfAccount); + + if (status == errSecItemNotFound) { + return -1; + } + return (int)status; +} +*/ +import "C" + +import ( + "fmt" + "unsafe" +) + +// BiometricProvider stores secrets in the macOS login Keychain with Touch ID +// (biometric) protection via kSecAccessControlBiometryCurrentSet. Items require +// biometric authentication for retrieval. Uses the login Keychain instead of +// the Data Protection Keychain so that ad-hoc signed binaries work without +// keychain-access-groups entitlement. Biometric enrollment changes invalidate +// stored items (BiometryCurrentSet), providing stronger security than BiometryAny. +type BiometricProvider struct{} + +var _ Provider = (*BiometricProvider)(nil) +var _ KeyChecker = (*BiometricProvider)(nil) + +// NewBiometricProvider creates a new BiometricProvider. +// Returns ErrBiometricNotAvailable if Touch ID hardware is not available. +func NewBiometricProvider() (*BiometricProvider, error) { + if C.keychain_biometric_available() == 0 { + return nil, ErrBiometricNotAvailable + } + return &BiometricProvider{}, nil +} + +// Get retrieves a secret from the biometric-protected Keychain. +// This triggers a Touch ID prompt on the user's device. +func (p *BiometricProvider) Get(service, key string) (string, error) { + cService := C.CString(service) + defer C.free(unsafe.Pointer(cService)) + cKey := C.CString(key) + defer C.free(unsafe.Pointer(cKey)) + + result := C.keychain_get_biometric(cService, cKey) + if result.status == -1 { + return "", ErrNotFound + } + if int(result.status) == -34018 { + return "", fmt.Errorf("keychain biometric get: %w", ErrEntitlement) + } + if result.status != 0 { + return "", fmt.Errorf("keychain biometric get: OSStatus %d (%s)", result.status, osStatusDescription(int(result.status))) + } + + // Copy into Go []byte first so we can zero it after extracting the string. + data := C.GoBytes(unsafe.Pointer(result.data), result.data_len) + C.secure_free(result.data, result.data_len) // zero C heap before freeing + pass := string(data) + for i := range data { + data[i] = 0 // zero the Go []byte copy + } + return pass, nil +} + +// Set stores a secret in the login Keychain with biometric (Touch ID) access control. +// The kSecAccessControlBiometryCurrentSet flag ensures that any read of this item +// requires biometric authentication, and the item is invalidated if biometric +// enrollment changes (fingerprints added/removed). +func (p *BiometricProvider) Set(service, key, value string) error { + cService := C.CString(service) + defer C.free(unsafe.Pointer(cService)) + cKey := C.CString(key) + defer C.free(unsafe.Pointer(cKey)) + cValue := C.CString(value) + defer func() { + C.memset(unsafe.Pointer(cValue), 0, C.size_t(len(value)+1)) // zero before free + C.free(unsafe.Pointer(cValue)) + }() + + result := C.keychain_set_biometric(cService, cKey, cValue, C.int(len(value))) + if int(result.status) == -34018 { + return fmt.Errorf("keychain biometric set: %w", ErrEntitlement) + } + if result.status != 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("keychain biometric set: OSStatus %d (%s)", result.status, osStatusDescription(int(result.status))) + } + return nil +} + +// HasKey checks if a key exists in the biometric-protected Keychain WITHOUT +// triggering a Touch ID prompt. Queries for item attributes only, not data. +func (p *BiometricProvider) HasKey(service, key string) bool { + cService := C.CString(service) + defer C.free(unsafe.Pointer(cService)) + cKey := C.CString(key) + defer C.free(unsafe.Pointer(cKey)) + + return C.keychain_has_biometric(cService, cKey) == 1 +} + +// Delete removes a secret from the biometric-protected Keychain. +func (p *BiometricProvider) Delete(service, key string) error { + cService := C.CString(service) + defer C.free(unsafe.Pointer(cService)) + cKey := C.CString(key) + defer C.free(unsafe.Pointer(cKey)) + + status := C.keychain_delete_biometric(cService, cKey) + if status == -1 { + return ErrNotFound + } + if int(status) == -34018 { + return fmt.Errorf("keychain biometric delete: %w", ErrEntitlement) + } + if status != 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("keychain biometric delete: OSStatus %d (%s)", status, osStatusDescription(int(status))) + } + return nil +} + +// osStatusDescription returns a human-readable description for common Security +// framework OSStatus error codes. This helps diagnose Keychain issues without +// requiring the developer to look up Apple documentation. +func osStatusDescription(code int) string { + switch code { + case -34018: + return "errSecMissingEntitlement: binary needs Apple Developer signing" + case -25308: + return "errSecInteractionNotAllowed: cannot present Touch ID UI" + case -128: + return "errSecUserCanceled: user cancelled biometric prompt" + case -25293: + return "errSecAuthFailed: authentication failed or biometric enrollment changed" + case -25300: + return "errSecItemNotFound: item not found" + case -25291: + return "errSecInvalidOwnerEdit: device passcode may not be set" + default: + return "unknown" + } +} diff --git a/internal/keyring/biometric_stub.go b/internal/keyring/biometric_stub.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7d4f972b --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/keyring/biometric_stub.go @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +//go:build !darwin || !cgo + +package keyring + +// BiometricProvider is a stub on platforms without macOS Touch ID support. +type BiometricProvider struct{} + +// NewBiometricProvider always returns ErrBiometricNotAvailable on non-Darwin +// or non-CGO platforms. +func NewBiometricProvider() (*BiometricProvider, error) { + return nil, ErrBiometricNotAvailable +} + +// Get is a no-op stub that always returns ErrBiometricNotAvailable. +func (*BiometricProvider) Get(string, string) (string, error) { + return "", ErrBiometricNotAvailable +} + +// Set is a no-op stub that always returns ErrBiometricNotAvailable. +func (*BiometricProvider) Set(string, string, string) error { + return ErrBiometricNotAvailable +} + +// Delete is a no-op stub that always returns ErrBiometricNotAvailable. +func (*BiometricProvider) Delete(string, string) error { + return ErrBiometricNotAvailable +} + +// HasKey is a no-op stub that always returns false. +func (*BiometricProvider) HasKey(string, string) bool { + return false +} diff --git a/internal/keyring/keyring.go b/internal/keyring/keyring.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b4338abe --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/keyring/keyring.go @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +package keyring + +import "errors" + +// Service is the service name used for all keyring operations. +const Service = "lango" + +// KeyMasterPassphrase is the keyring key for the master passphrase. +const KeyMasterPassphrase = "master-passphrase" + +// ErrNotFound is returned when the requested key does not exist in the keyring. +var ErrNotFound = errors.New("keyring: key not found") + +// ErrBiometricNotAvailable is returned when biometric authentication hardware +// (e.g., Touch ID on macOS) is not available on the current system. +var ErrBiometricNotAvailable = errors.New("keyring: biometric authentication not available") + +// ErrTPMNotAvailable is returned when no TPM 2.0 device is accessible on the current system. +var ErrTPMNotAvailable = errors.New("keyring: TPM device not available") + +// ErrEntitlement is returned when a keyring operation fails due to missing +// code signing entitlements (macOS errSecMissingEntitlement / -34018). +// With the login Keychain + BiometryCurrentSet approach, this error should +// no longer occur in normal usage. Retained as a safety net for edge cases +// (e.g., device passcode not set with kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly). +var ErrEntitlement = errors.New("keyring: missing code signing entitlement for biometric storage") + +// Provider abstracts OS keyring operations for testability. +type Provider interface { + // Get retrieves a secret for the given service and key. + // Returns ErrNotFound if the key does not exist. + Get(service, key string) (string, error) + + // Set stores a secret for the given service and key. + Set(service, key, value string) error + + // Delete removes a secret for the given service and key. + // Returns ErrNotFound if the key does not exist. + Delete(service, key string) error +} + +// KeyChecker is an optional interface that secure providers can implement +// to check key existence without triggering authentication (e.g., Touch ID). +// CLI status commands should prefer HasKey over Get to avoid unnecessary +// biometric prompts. +type KeyChecker interface { + HasKey(service, key string) bool +} + +// SecurityTier represents the level of hardware-backed security available +// for keyring storage. +type SecurityTier int + +const ( + // TierNone indicates no secure hardware backend; keyfile or interactive prompt only. + TierNone SecurityTier = iota + // TierTPM indicates TPM 2.0 sealed storage is available (Linux). + TierTPM + // TierBiometric indicates biometric-protected keyring is available (macOS Touch ID). + TierBiometric +) + +// String returns a human-readable label for the security tier. +func (t SecurityTier) String() string { + switch t { + case TierBiometric: + return "biometric" + case TierTPM: + return "tpm" + default: + return "none" + } +} + diff --git a/internal/keyring/keyring_test.go b/internal/keyring/keyring_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6e833b49 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/keyring/keyring_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +package keyring + +import ( + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +// mockProvider is an in-memory Provider for testing. +type mockProvider struct { + store map[string]string +} + +func newMockProvider() *mockProvider { + return &mockProvider{store: make(map[string]string)} +} + +func (m *mockProvider) Get(service, key string) (string, error) { + k := service + "/" + key + v, ok := m.store[k] + if !ok { + return "", ErrNotFound + } + return v, nil +} + +func (m *mockProvider) Set(service, key, value string) error { + k := service + "/" + key + m.store[k] = value + return nil +} + +func (m *mockProvider) Delete(service, key string) error { + k := service + "/" + key + if _, ok := m.store[k]; !ok { + return ErrNotFound + } + delete(m.store, k) + return nil +} + +func TestMockProvider_SetGetDelete(t *testing.T) { + p := newMockProvider() + + // Get non-existent key returns ErrNotFound. + _, err := p.Get(Service, KeyMasterPassphrase) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNotFound) + + // Set and Get. + require.NoError(t, p.Set(Service, KeyMasterPassphrase, "my-secret")) + got, err := p.Get(Service, KeyMasterPassphrase) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "my-secret", got) + + // Overwrite. + require.NoError(t, p.Set(Service, KeyMasterPassphrase, "updated")) + got, err = p.Get(Service, KeyMasterPassphrase) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "updated", got) + + // Delete. + require.NoError(t, p.Delete(Service, KeyMasterPassphrase)) + _, err = p.Get(Service, KeyMasterPassphrase) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNotFound) + + // Delete non-existent key returns ErrNotFound. + err = p.Delete(Service, KeyMasterPassphrase) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNotFound) +} + +func TestMockProvider_MultipleKeys(t *testing.T) { + p := newMockProvider() + + require.NoError(t, p.Set(Service, "key-a", "val-a")) + require.NoError(t, p.Set(Service, "key-b", "val-b")) + + a, err := p.Get(Service, "key-a") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "val-a", a) + + b, err := p.Get(Service, "key-b") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "val-b", b) + + // Delete one, other still exists. + require.NoError(t, p.Delete(Service, "key-a")) + _, err = p.Get(Service, "key-a") + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNotFound) + + b, err = p.Get(Service, "key-b") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "val-b", b) +} + +func TestProviderInterfaceCompliance(t *testing.T) { + // Compile-time check that mockProvider satisfies Provider. + var _ Provider = (*mockProvider)(nil) +} + +func TestConstants(t *testing.T) { + assert.Equal(t, "lango", Service) + assert.Equal(t, "master-passphrase", KeyMasterPassphrase) +} diff --git a/internal/keyring/tier.go b/internal/keyring/tier.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f3fde2ef --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/keyring/tier.go @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +package keyring + +// DetectSecureProvider probes available security backends and returns the +// highest-tier provider. Returns (nil, TierNone) if no secure hardware backend +// is available — callers should fall back to keyfile or interactive prompt. +func DetectSecureProvider() (Provider, SecurityTier) { + // 1. Try biometric (macOS Touch ID). + if p, err := NewBiometricProvider(); err == nil { + return p, TierBiometric + } + + // 2. Try TPM 2.0 (Linux). + if p, err := NewTPMProvider(); err == nil { + return p, TierTPM + } + + // 3. No secure provider available. + return nil, TierNone +} diff --git a/internal/keyring/tier_test.go b/internal/keyring/tier_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a4ccd61a --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/keyring/tier_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +package keyring + +import ( + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" +) + +func TestSecurityTier_String(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give SecurityTier + want string + }{ + {give: TierNone, want: "none"}, + {give: TierTPM, want: "tpm"}, + {give: TierBiometric, want: "biometric"}, + {give: SecurityTier(99), want: "none"}, // unknown defaults to "none" + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.want, func(t *testing.T) { + assert.Equal(t, tt.want, tt.give.String()) + }) + } +} + +func TestSecurityTier_Ordering(t *testing.T) { + // Verify tier ordering: None < TPM < Biometric. + assert.Less(t, TierNone, TierTPM) + assert.Less(t, TierTPM, TierBiometric) +} + +func TestDetectSecureProvider_ReturnsProvider(t *testing.T) { + // DetectSecureProvider should always return without panicking. + // On CI / machines without biometric or TPM, it returns (nil, TierNone). + provider, tier := DetectSecureProvider() + + switch tier { + case TierBiometric: + assert.NotNil(t, provider) + case TierTPM: + assert.NotNil(t, provider) + case TierNone: + assert.Nil(t, provider) + default: + t.Fatalf("unexpected security tier: %d", tier) + } +} + +func TestDetectSecureProvider_MockFallback(t *testing.T) { + // Verify that DetectSecureProvider gracefully degrades. + // This test always passes — it documents the fallback behavior. + _, tier := DetectSecureProvider() + assert.Contains(t, []SecurityTier{TierNone, TierTPM, TierBiometric}, tier) +} + +func TestErrSentinels(t *testing.T) { + assert.EqualError(t, ErrNotFound, "keyring: key not found") + assert.EqualError(t, ErrBiometricNotAvailable, "keyring: biometric authentication not available") + assert.EqualError(t, ErrTPMNotAvailable, "keyring: TPM device not available") +} diff --git a/internal/keyring/tpm_provider.go b/internal/keyring/tpm_provider.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..63fe5224 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/keyring/tpm_provider.go @@ -0,0 +1,307 @@ +//go:build linux + +package keyring + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "fmt" + "os" + "path/filepath" + + "github.com/google/go-tpm/tpm2" + "github.com/google/go-tpm/tpm2/transport" +) + +const ( + // tpmDevicePath is the TPM2 resource manager device on Linux. + tpmDevicePath = "/dev/tpmrm0" + // tpmSealedDir is the directory under ~/.lango/ for sealed blobs. + tpmSealedDir = "tpm" +) + +// TPMProvider stores secrets as TPM2-sealed blobs on disk. +// Only the same TPM chip can unseal the data, providing hardware-bound protection. +type TPMProvider struct { + sealedDir string +} + +var _ Provider = (*TPMProvider)(nil) +var _ KeyChecker = (*TPMProvider)(nil) + +// NewTPMProvider creates a new TPMProvider. +// Returns ErrTPMNotAvailable if the TPM2 device is not accessible. +func NewTPMProvider() (*TPMProvider, error) { + //nolint:staticcheck // deprecated but no alternative transport package available yet + t, err := transport.OpenTPM(tpmDevicePath) + if err != nil { + return nil, ErrTPMNotAvailable + } + t.Close() + + home, err := os.UserHomeDir() + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolve home directory: %w", err) + } + + dir := filepath.Join(home, ".lango", tpmSealedDir) + if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0700); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("create sealed directory: %w", err) + } + + return &TPMProvider{sealedDir: dir}, nil +} + +// Get retrieves and unseals a secret from the TPM-sealed blob. +func (p *TPMProvider) Get(service, key string) (string, error) { + blobPath := p.blobPath(service, key) + blob, err := os.ReadFile(blobPath) + if err != nil { + if os.IsNotExist(err) { + return "", ErrNotFound + } + return "", fmt.Errorf("read sealed blob: %w", err) + } + + data, err := p.unseal(blob) + if err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("tpm unseal: %w", err) + } + return string(data), nil +} + +// Set seals a secret with the TPM and writes the sealed blob to disk. +func (p *TPMProvider) Set(service, key, value string) error { + blob, err := p.seal([]byte(value)) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("tpm seal: %w", err) + } + + blobPath := p.blobPath(service, key) + if err := os.WriteFile(blobPath, blob, 0600); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("write sealed blob: %w", err) + } + return nil +} + +// HasKey checks if a sealed blob file exists for the given key without unsealing. +func (p *TPMProvider) HasKey(service, key string) bool { + _, err := os.Stat(p.blobPath(service, key)) + return err == nil +} + +// Delete removes the sealed blob file. +func (p *TPMProvider) Delete(service, key string) error { + blobPath := p.blobPath(service, key) + if err := os.Remove(blobPath); err != nil { + if os.IsNotExist(err) { + return ErrNotFound + } + return fmt.Errorf("remove sealed blob: %w", err) + } + return nil +} + +// blobPath returns the file path for a sealed blob. +func (p *TPMProvider) blobPath(service, key string) string { + return filepath.Join(p.sealedDir, service+"_"+key+".sealed") +} + +// srkTemplate returns the Storage Root Key template (ECC P256). +func srkTemplate() tpm2.TPMTPublic { + return tpm2.TPMTPublic{ + Type: tpm2.TPMAlgECC, + NameAlg: tpm2.TPMAlgSHA256, + ObjectAttributes: tpm2.TPMAObject{ + FixedTPM: true, + FixedParent: true, + SensitiveDataOrigin: true, + UserWithAuth: true, + NoDA: true, + Restricted: true, + Decrypt: true, + }, + Parameters: tpm2.NewTPMUPublicParms( + tpm2.TPMAlgECC, + &tpm2.TPMSECCParms{ + Symmetric: tpm2.TPMTSymDefObject{ + Algorithm: tpm2.TPMAlgAES, + KeyBits: tpm2.NewTPMUSymKeyBits(tpm2.TPMAlgAES, tpm2.TPMKeyBits(128)), + Mode: tpm2.NewTPMUSymMode(tpm2.TPMAlgAES, tpm2.TPMAlgCFB), + }, + CurveID: tpm2.TPMECCNistP256, + }, + ), + } +} + +// sealedObjectTemplate returns the template for a sealed data object. +func sealedObjectTemplate() tpm2.TPMTPublic { + return tpm2.TPMTPublic{ + Type: tpm2.TPMAlgKeyedHash, + NameAlg: tpm2.TPMAlgSHA256, + ObjectAttributes: tpm2.TPMAObject{ + FixedTPM: true, + FixedParent: true, + UserWithAuth: true, + NoDA: true, + }, + } +} + +// createPrimaryKey creates an SRK under the owner hierarchy. +func createPrimaryKey(t transport.TPM) (*tpm2.CreatePrimaryResponse, error) { + cmd := tpm2.CreatePrimary{ + PrimaryHandle: tpm2.TPMRHOwner, + InPublic: tpm2.New2B(srkTemplate()), + } + return cmd.Execute(t) +} + +// seal encrypts data under the TPM's SRK. +// Returns a blob containing the marshaled public and private parts. +func (p *TPMProvider) seal(data []byte) ([]byte, error) { + //nolint:staticcheck // deprecated but no alternative transport package available yet + t, err := transport.OpenTPM(tpmDevicePath) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("open tpm: %w", err) + } + defer t.Close() + + primary, err := createPrimaryKey(t) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("create primary key: %w", err) + } + defer func() { + flush := tpm2.FlushContext{FlushHandle: primary.ObjectHandle} + _, _ = flush.Execute(t) + }() + + createCmd := tpm2.Create{ + ParentHandle: tpm2.NamedHandle{ + Handle: primary.ObjectHandle, + Name: primary.Name, + }, + InSensitive: tpm2.TPM2BSensitiveCreate{ + Sensitive: &tpm2.TPMSSensitiveCreate{ + Data: tpm2.NewTPMUSensitiveCreate( + &tpm2.TPM2BSensitiveData{Buffer: data}, + ), + }, + }, + InPublic: tpm2.New2B(sealedObjectTemplate()), + } + + createRsp, err := createCmd.Execute(t) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("create sealed object: %w", err) + } + + return marshalSealedBlob(createRsp.OutPublic, createRsp.OutPrivate) +} + +// unseal decrypts a sealed blob using the TPM's SRK. +func (p *TPMProvider) unseal(blob []byte) ([]byte, error) { + pub, priv, err := unmarshalSealedBlob(blob) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal blob: %w", err) + } + + //nolint:staticcheck // deprecated but no alternative transport package available yet + t, err := transport.OpenTPM(tpmDevicePath) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("open tpm: %w", err) + } + defer t.Close() + + primary, err := createPrimaryKey(t) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("create primary key: %w", err) + } + defer func() { + flush := tpm2.FlushContext{FlushHandle: primary.ObjectHandle} + _, _ = flush.Execute(t) + }() + + loadCmd := tpm2.Load{ + ParentHandle: tpm2.NamedHandle{ + Handle: primary.ObjectHandle, + Name: primary.Name, + }, + InPublic: pub, + InPrivate: priv, + } + loadRsp, err := loadCmd.Execute(t) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("load sealed object: %w", err) + } + defer func() { + flush := tpm2.FlushContext{FlushHandle: loadRsp.ObjectHandle} + _, _ = flush.Execute(t) + }() + + unsealCmd := tpm2.Unseal{ + ItemHandle: tpm2.NamedHandle{ + Handle: loadRsp.ObjectHandle, + Name: loadRsp.Name, + }, + } + unsealRsp, err := unsealCmd.Execute(t) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unseal: %w", err) + } + + return unsealRsp.OutData.Buffer, nil +} + +// marshalSealedBlob encodes TPM public and private parts into a single byte slice. +// Format: [4-byte pubLen][pubBytes][4-byte privLen][privBytes] +func marshalSealedBlob(pub tpm2.TPM2BPublic, priv tpm2.TPM2BPrivate) ([]byte, error) { + pubBytes := tpm2.Marshal(pub) + privBytes := tpm2.Marshal(priv) + + buf := make([]byte, 4+len(pubBytes)+4+len(privBytes)) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(buf[0:4], uint32(len(pubBytes))) + copy(buf[4:], pubBytes) + offset := 4 + len(pubBytes) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(buf[offset:offset+4], uint32(len(privBytes))) + copy(buf[offset+4:], privBytes) + + return buf, nil +} + +// unmarshalSealedBlob decodes a sealed blob back into TPM public and private parts. +func unmarshalSealedBlob(blob []byte) (tpm2.TPM2BPublic, tpm2.TPM2BPrivate, error) { + var pub tpm2.TPM2BPublic + var priv tpm2.TPM2BPrivate + + if len(blob) < 8 { + return pub, priv, fmt.Errorf("sealed blob too short") + } + + pubLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(blob[0:4]) + if uint32(len(blob)) < 4+pubLen+4 { + return pub, priv, fmt.Errorf("sealed blob truncated at public") + } + + pubBytes := blob[4 : 4+pubLen] + pPub, err := tpm2.Unmarshal[tpm2.TPM2BPublic](pubBytes) + if err != nil { + return pub, priv, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal public: %w", err) + } + pub = *pPub + + offset := 4 + pubLen + privLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(blob[offset : offset+4]) + if uint32(len(blob)) < offset+4+privLen { + return pub, priv, fmt.Errorf("sealed blob truncated at private") + } + + privBytes := blob[offset+4 : offset+4+privLen] + pPriv, err := tpm2.Unmarshal[tpm2.TPM2BPrivate](privBytes) + if err != nil { + return pub, priv, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal private: %w", err) + } + priv = *pPriv + + return pub, priv, nil +} diff --git a/internal/keyring/tpm_stub.go b/internal/keyring/tpm_stub.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ca8b17f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/keyring/tpm_stub.go @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +//go:build !linux + +package keyring + +// TPMProvider is a stub on platforms without TPM 2.0 support. +type TPMProvider struct{} + +// NewTPMProvider always returns ErrTPMNotAvailable on non-Linux platforms. +func NewTPMProvider() (*TPMProvider, error) { + return nil, ErrTPMNotAvailable +} + +// Get is a no-op stub that always returns ErrTPMNotAvailable. +func (*TPMProvider) Get(string, string) (string, error) { + return "", ErrTPMNotAvailable +} + +// Set is a no-op stub that always returns ErrTPMNotAvailable. +func (*TPMProvider) Set(string, string, string) error { + return ErrTPMNotAvailable +} + +// Delete is a no-op stub that always returns ErrTPMNotAvailable. +func (*TPMProvider) Delete(string, string) error { + return ErrTPMNotAvailable +} + +// HasKey is a no-op stub that always returns false. +func (*TPMProvider) HasKey(string, string) bool { + return false +} diff --git a/internal/knowledge/retriever.go b/internal/knowledge/retriever.go index c777d542..9bd58e15 100644 --- a/internal/knowledge/retriever.go +++ b/internal/knowledge/retriever.go @@ -153,42 +153,43 @@ func (r *ContextRetriever) AssemblePrompt(basePrompt string, result *RetrievalRe if items, ok := result.Items[LayerRuntimeContext]; ok && len(items) > 0 { b.WriteString("\n\n## Runtime Context\n") for _, item := range items { - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- %s\n", item.Content)) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- %s\n", item.Content) } } if items, ok := result.Items[LayerToolRegistry]; ok && len(items) > 0 { b.WriteString("\n\n## Available Tools\n") for _, item := range items { - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- **%s**: %s\n", item.Key, item.Content)) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- **%s**: %s\n", item.Key, item.Content) } } if items, ok := result.Items[LayerUserKnowledge]; ok && len(items) > 0 { b.WriteString("\n\n## User Knowledge\n") for _, item := range items { - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- [%s] %s: %s\n", item.Category, item.Key, item.Content)) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- [%s] %s: %s\n", item.Category, item.Key, item.Content) } } if items, ok := result.Items[LayerAgentLearnings]; ok && len(items) > 0 { b.WriteString("\n\n## Known Solutions\n") for _, item := range items { - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- %s\n", item.Content)) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- %s\n", item.Content) } } if items, ok := result.Items[LayerSkillPatterns]; ok && len(items) > 0 { b.WriteString("\n\n## Available Skills\n") + b.WriteString("**Note:** Prefer built-in tools over skills. Use skills only when no built-in tool provides the needed functionality.\n") for _, item := range items { - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- %s: %s\n", item.Key, item.Content)) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- %s: %s\n", item.Key, item.Content) } } if items, ok := result.Items[LayerExternalKnowledge]; ok && len(items) > 0 { b.WriteString("\n\n## External References\n") for _, item := range items { - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- %s (%s): %s\n", item.Key, item.Source, item.Content)) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- %s (%s): %s\n", item.Key, item.Source, item.Content) } } @@ -197,9 +198,9 @@ func (r *ContextRetriever) AssemblePrompt(basePrompt string, result *RetrievalRe b.WriteString("Consider weaving ONE of these questions naturally into your response:\n") for _, item := range items { if item.Source != "" { - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- [%s] %s (context: %s)\n", item.Key, item.Content, item.Source)) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- [%s] %s (context: %s)\n", item.Key, item.Content, item.Source) } else { - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- [%s] %s\n", item.Key, item.Content)) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- [%s] %s\n", item.Key, item.Content) } } } diff --git a/internal/learning/analysis_buffer.go b/internal/learning/analysis_buffer.go index 9b2641a7..5082abc5 100644 --- a/internal/learning/analysis_buffer.go +++ b/internal/learning/analysis_buffer.go @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import ( "go.uber.org/zap" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/asyncbuf" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/types" ) @@ -31,11 +32,9 @@ type AnalysisBuffer struct { tokenThreshold int mu sync.Mutex - lastAnalyzed map[string]int // session_key → last analyzed message index + lastAnalyzed map[string]int // session_key -> last analyzed message index - queue chan AnalysisRequest - stopCh chan struct{} - done chan struct{} + inner *asyncbuf.TriggerBuffer[AnalysisRequest] logger *zap.SugaredLogger } @@ -53,71 +52,39 @@ func NewAnalysisBuffer( if tokenThreshold <= 0 { tokenThreshold = 2000 } - return &AnalysisBuffer{ + b := &AnalysisBuffer{ analyzer: analyzer, learner: learner, getMessages: getMessages, turnThreshold: turnThreshold, tokenThreshold: tokenThreshold, lastAnalyzed: make(map[string]int), - queue: make(chan AnalysisRequest, 32), - stopCh: make(chan struct{}), - done: make(chan struct{}), logger: logger, } + b.inner = asyncbuf.NewTriggerBuffer[AnalysisRequest](asyncbuf.TriggerConfig{ + QueueSize: 32, + }, b.process, logger) + return b } // Start launches the background analysis goroutine. func (b *AnalysisBuffer) Start(wg *sync.WaitGroup) { - wg.Add(1) - go func() { - defer wg.Done() - defer close(b.done) - b.run() - }() + b.inner.Start(wg) } // Trigger checks if analysis is needed for a session and enqueues if thresholds are met. func (b *AnalysisBuffer) Trigger(sessionKey string) { - select { - case b.queue <- AnalysisRequest{SessionKey: sessionKey}: - default: - b.logger.Warnw("analysis queue full, dropping trigger", "sessionKey", sessionKey) - } + b.inner.Enqueue(AnalysisRequest{SessionKey: sessionKey}) } // TriggerSessionEnd enqueues a session-end analysis request. func (b *AnalysisBuffer) TriggerSessionEnd(sessionKey string) { - select { - case b.queue <- AnalysisRequest{SessionKey: sessionKey, SessionEnd: true}: - default: - b.logger.Warnw("analysis queue full, dropping session-end trigger", "sessionKey", sessionKey) - } + b.inner.Enqueue(AnalysisRequest{SessionKey: sessionKey, SessionEnd: true}) } // Stop signals the background goroutine to drain and exit. func (b *AnalysisBuffer) Stop() { - close(b.stopCh) - <-b.done -} - -func (b *AnalysisBuffer) run() { - for { - select { - case req := <-b.queue: - b.process(req) - case <-b.stopCh: - // Drain remaining. - for { - select { - case req := <-b.queue: - b.process(req) - default: - return - } - } - } - } + b.inner.Stop() } func (b *AnalysisBuffer) process(req AnalysisRequest) { diff --git a/internal/learning/conversation_analyzer.go b/internal/learning/conversation_analyzer.go index a820f4cc..308e090c 100644 --- a/internal/learning/conversation_analyzer.go +++ b/internal/learning/conversation_analyzer.go @@ -95,10 +95,15 @@ func (a *ConversationAnalyzer) Analyze(ctx context.Context, sessionKey string, m func (a *ConversationAnalyzer) saveResult(ctx context.Context, sessionKey string, r analysisResult) { switch r.Type { case "fact", "preference": + cat, err := mapKnowledgeCategory(r.Type) + if err != nil { + a.logger.Debugw("skip knowledge: unknown type", "type", r.Type, "error", err) + break + } key := fmt.Sprintf("conv:%s:%s", sessionKey, sanitizeForNode(r.Content[:min(len(r.Content), 32)])) entry := knowledge.KnowledgeEntry{ Key: key, - Category: mapKnowledgeCategory(r.Type), + Category: cat, Content: r.Content, Source: "conversation_analysis", } diff --git a/internal/learning/engine.go b/internal/learning/engine.go index e4a97bf0..7c005f87 100644 --- a/internal/learning/engine.go +++ b/internal/learning/engine.go @@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ func (e *Engine) OnToolResult(ctx context.Context, sessionKey, toolName string, e.handleSuccess(ctx, toolName) } +// autoApplyConfidenceThreshold is the minimum confidence required to auto-apply a learned fix. +// Set higher than the previous 0.5 to reduce false positives from low-quality learnings. +const autoApplyConfidenceThreshold = 0.7 + // GetFixForError returns a known fix for a given tool error if one exists with sufficient confidence. func (e *Engine) GetFixForError(ctx context.Context, toolName string, err error) (string, bool) { pattern := extractErrorPattern(err) @@ -76,7 +80,7 @@ func (e *Engine) GetFixForError(ctx context.Context, toolName string, err error) } for _, entity := range entities { - if entity.Confidence > 0.5 && entity.Fix != "" { + if entity.Confidence > autoApplyConfidenceThreshold && entity.Fix != "" { return entity.Fix, true } } @@ -103,7 +107,7 @@ func (e *Engine) handleError(ctx context.Context, sessionKey, toolName string, e } for _, entity := range entities { - if entity.Confidence > 0.5 { + if entity.Confidence > autoApplyConfidenceThreshold { e.logger.Infow("known fix exists for error", "tool", toolName, "pattern", pattern, @@ -129,15 +133,20 @@ func (e *Engine) handleError(ctx context.Context, sessionKey, toolName string, e } func (e *Engine) handleSuccess(ctx context.Context, toolName string) { - entities, searchErr := e.store.SearchLearningEntities(ctx, toolName, 5) + // Search by the specific tool trigger to avoid boosting unrelated learnings. + trigger := fmt.Sprintf("tool:%s", toolName) + entities, searchErr := e.store.SearchLearningEntities(ctx, trigger, 5) if searchErr != nil { e.logger.Warnw("search learnings:", "error", searchErr) return } for _, entity := range entities { - if boostErr := e.store.BoostLearningConfidence(ctx, entity.ID, 1, 0.0); boostErr != nil { - e.logger.Warnw("boost learning confidence:", "error", boostErr) + // Only boost learnings whose trigger matches this tool. + if entity.Trigger == trigger { + if boostErr := e.store.BoostLearningConfidence(ctx, entity.ID, 1, 0.0); boostErr != nil { + e.logger.Warnw("boost learning confidence:", "error", boostErr) + } } } } diff --git a/internal/learning/parse.go b/internal/learning/parse.go index cbb18658..db1fb4be 100644 --- a/internal/learning/parse.go +++ b/internal/learning/parse.go @@ -43,18 +43,22 @@ func parseAnalysisResponse(raw string) ([]analysisResult, error) { } // mapKnowledgeCategory maps LLM analysis type to a valid knowledge category. -func mapKnowledgeCategory(analysisType string) entknowledge.Category { +func mapKnowledgeCategory(analysisType string) (entknowledge.Category, error) { switch analysisType { case "preference": - return entknowledge.CategoryPreference + return entknowledge.CategoryPreference, nil case "fact": - return entknowledge.CategoryFact + return entknowledge.CategoryFact, nil case "rule": - return entknowledge.CategoryRule + return entknowledge.CategoryRule, nil case "definition": - return entknowledge.CategoryDefinition + return entknowledge.CategoryDefinition, nil + case "pattern": + return entknowledge.CategoryPattern, nil + case "correction": + return entknowledge.CategoryCorrection, nil default: - return entknowledge.CategoryFact + return "", fmt.Errorf("unrecognized knowledge type: %q", analysisType) } } @@ -86,8 +90,6 @@ func stripCodeFence(s string) string { } else if strings.HasPrefix(s, "```") { s = strings.TrimPrefix(s, "```") } - if strings.HasSuffix(s, "```") { - s = strings.TrimSuffix(s, "```") - } + s = strings.TrimSuffix(s, "```") return strings.TrimSpace(s) } diff --git a/internal/learning/parse_test.go b/internal/learning/parse_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9b97b7b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/learning/parse_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +package learning + +import ( + "testing" + + entknowledge "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/knowledge" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func TestMapKnowledgeCategory(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give string + wantCat entknowledge.Category + wantErr bool + }{ + {give: "preference", wantCat: entknowledge.CategoryPreference}, + {give: "fact", wantCat: entknowledge.CategoryFact}, + {give: "rule", wantCat: entknowledge.CategoryRule}, + {give: "definition", wantCat: entknowledge.CategoryDefinition}, + {give: "pattern", wantCat: entknowledge.CategoryPattern}, + {give: "correction", wantCat: entknowledge.CategoryCorrection}, + {give: "unknown", wantErr: true}, + {give: "", wantErr: true}, + {give: "PREFERENCE", wantErr: true}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + got, err := mapKnowledgeCategory(tt.give) + if tt.wantErr { + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "unrecognized knowledge type") + } else { + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, tt.wantCat, got) + } + }) + } +} diff --git a/internal/learning/session_learner.go b/internal/learning/session_learner.go index 3156950c..8e3e27a8 100644 --- a/internal/learning/session_learner.go +++ b/internal/learning/session_learner.go @@ -99,10 +99,15 @@ func (l *SessionLearner) LearnFromSession(ctx context.Context, sessionKey string func (l *SessionLearner) saveSessionResult(ctx context.Context, sessionKey string, r analysisResult) { switch r.Type { case "fact", "preference": + cat, err := mapKnowledgeCategory(r.Type) + if err != nil { + l.logger.Debugw("skip session knowledge: unknown type", "type", r.Type, "error", err) + break + } key := fmt.Sprintf("session:%s:%s", sessionKey, sanitizeForNode(r.Content[:min(len(r.Content), 32)])) entry := knowledge.KnowledgeEntry{ Key: key, - Category: mapKnowledgeCategory(r.Type), + Category: cat, Content: r.Content, Source: "session_learning", } diff --git a/internal/librarian/inquiry_processor.go b/internal/librarian/inquiry_processor.go index 06062cce..ac7a89e4 100644 --- a/internal/librarian/inquiry_processor.go +++ b/internal/librarian/inquiry_processor.go @@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import ( "github.com/google/uuid" "go.uber.org/zap" - entknowledge "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/knowledge" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/knowledge" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/types" @@ -102,18 +101,24 @@ func (p *InquiryProcessor) ProcessAnswers(ctx context.Context, sessionKey string var knowledgeKey string if match.Knowledge != nil && match.Knowledge.Key != "" { - entry := knowledge.KnowledgeEntry{ - Key: match.Knowledge.Key, - Category: entknowledge.Category(match.Knowledge.Category), - Content: match.Knowledge.Content, - Source: "proactive_librarian", - } - if err := p.knowledgeStore.SaveKnowledge(ctx, sessionKey, entry); err != nil { - p.logger.Warnw("save matched knowledge", "key", entry.Key, "error", err) + cat, err := mapCategory(match.Knowledge.Category) + if err != nil { + p.logger.Warnw("skip knowledge: invalid category", + "key", match.Knowledge.Key, "category", match.Knowledge.Category, "error", err) } else { - knowledgeKey = entry.Key - p.logger.Infow("knowledge saved from inquiry answer", - "key", entry.Key, "inquiryID", match.InquiryID) + entry := knowledge.KnowledgeEntry{ + Key: match.Knowledge.Key, + Category: cat, + Content: match.Knowledge.Content, + Source: "proactive_librarian", + } + if err := p.knowledgeStore.SaveKnowledge(ctx, sessionKey, entry); err != nil { + p.logger.Warnw("save matched knowledge", "key", entry.Key, "error", err) + } else { + knowledgeKey = entry.Key + p.logger.Infow("knowledge saved from inquiry answer", + "key", entry.Key, "inquiryID", match.InquiryID) + } } } @@ -130,12 +135,12 @@ func (p *InquiryProcessor) buildMatchPrompt(pending []Inquiry, messages []sessio b.WriteString("## Pending Inquiries\n") for _, inq := range pending { - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- ID: %s | Topic: %s | Question: %s\n", inq.ID.String(), inq.Topic, inq.Question)) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- ID: %s | Topic: %s | Question: %s\n", inq.ID.String(), inq.Topic, inq.Question) } b.WriteString("\n## Recent Messages\n") for _, msg := range messages { - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("[%s]: %s\n", msg.Role, msg.Content)) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "[%s]: %s\n", msg.Role, msg.Content) } return b.String() diff --git a/internal/librarian/inquiry_processor_test.go b/internal/librarian/inquiry_processor_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7da48bf9 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/librarian/inquiry_processor_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,200 @@ +package librarian + +import ( + "testing" + + "github.com/google/uuid" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/types" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +// --- stripCodeFence --- + +func TestStripCodeFence_NoFence(t *testing.T) { + input := `[{"inquiry_id":"abc","answer":"yes"}]` + assert.Equal(t, input, stripCodeFence(input)) +} + +func TestStripCodeFence_JSONFence(t *testing.T) { + input := "```json\n[{\"inquiry_id\":\"abc\"}]\n```" + assert.Equal(t, `[{"inquiry_id":"abc"}]`, stripCodeFence(input)) +} + +func TestStripCodeFence_PlainFence(t *testing.T) { + input := "```\n{\"key\":\"val\"}\n```" + assert.Equal(t, `{"key":"val"}`, stripCodeFence(input)) +} + +func TestStripCodeFence_TrailingWhitespace(t *testing.T) { + input := " ```json\n content \n``` " + result := stripCodeFence(input) + assert.Equal(t, "content", result) +} + +// --- parseAnswerMatches --- + +func TestParseAnswerMatches_EmptyArray(t *testing.T) { + matches, err := parseAnswerMatches("[]") + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, matches) +} + +func TestParseAnswerMatches_SingleMatch(t *testing.T) { + raw := `[{"inquiry_id":"550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000","answer":"Go 1.21","confidence":"high"}]` + matches, err := parseAnswerMatches(raw) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, matches, 1) + assert.Equal(t, "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000", matches[0].InquiryID) + assert.Equal(t, "Go 1.21", matches[0].Answer) + assert.Equal(t, types.ConfidenceHigh, matches[0].Confidence) + assert.Nil(t, matches[0].Knowledge) +} + +func TestParseAnswerMatches_WithKnowledge(t *testing.T) { + raw := `[{ + "inquiry_id":"abc123", + "answer":"Python", + "confidence":"medium", + "knowledge":{ + "key":"preferred_language", + "category":"preference", + "content":"User prefers Python" + } + }]` + matches, err := parseAnswerMatches(raw) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, matches, 1) + require.NotNil(t, matches[0].Knowledge) + assert.Equal(t, "preferred_language", matches[0].Knowledge.Key) + assert.Equal(t, "preference", matches[0].Knowledge.Category) + assert.Equal(t, "User prefers Python", matches[0].Knowledge.Content) +} + +func TestParseAnswerMatches_WithCodeFence(t *testing.T) { + raw := "```json\n[{\"inquiry_id\":\"abc\",\"answer\":\"yes\",\"confidence\":\"high\"}]\n```" + matches, err := parseAnswerMatches(raw) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, matches, 1) + assert.Equal(t, "yes", matches[0].Answer) +} + +func TestParseAnswerMatches_InvalidJSON(t *testing.T) { + _, err := parseAnswerMatches("not json") + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "parse answer matches") +} + +// --- parseAnalysisOutput --- + +func TestParseAnalysisOutput_Valid(t *testing.T) { + raw := `{ + "extractions": [ + { + "type": "fact", + "category": "tech", + "content": "Uses Go", + "confidence": "high", + "key": "tech_go" + } + ], + "gaps": [ + { + "topic": "testing", + "question": "What test framework do you prefer?", + "priority": "medium" + } + ] + }` + out, err := parseAnalysisOutput(raw) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, out.Extractions, 1) + assert.Equal(t, "fact", out.Extractions[0].Type) + assert.Equal(t, "tech_go", out.Extractions[0].Key) + require.Len(t, out.Gaps, 1) + assert.Equal(t, "testing", out.Gaps[0].Topic) +} + +func TestParseAnalysisOutput_Empty(t *testing.T) { + raw := `{"extractions":[],"gaps":[]}` + out, err := parseAnalysisOutput(raw) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, out.Extractions) + assert.Empty(t, out.Gaps) +} + +func TestParseAnalysisOutput_InvalidJSON(t *testing.T) { + _, err := parseAnalysisOutput("{bad") + assert.Error(t, err) +} + +func TestParseAnalysisOutput_WithCodeFence(t *testing.T) { + raw := "```json\n{\"extractions\":[],\"gaps\":[]}\n```" + out, err := parseAnalysisOutput(raw) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, out.Extractions) +} + +// --- buildMatchPrompt --- + +func TestBuildMatchPrompt_EmptyInputs(t *testing.T) { + p := &InquiryProcessor{} + result := p.buildMatchPrompt(nil, nil) + assert.Contains(t, result, "## Pending Inquiries") + assert.Contains(t, result, "## Recent Messages") +} + +func TestBuildMatchPrompt_WithData(t *testing.T) { + p := &InquiryProcessor{} + + id1 := uuid.MustParse("550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000") + id2 := uuid.MustParse("660e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000") + + pending := []Inquiry{ + {ID: id1, Topic: "language", Question: "What language do you prefer?"}, + {ID: id2, Topic: "framework", Question: "Which framework?"}, + } + + messages := []session.Message{ + {Role: "user", Content: "I prefer Go"}, + {Role: "assistant", Content: "Got it!"}, + } + + result := p.buildMatchPrompt(pending, messages) + + assert.Contains(t, result, id1.String()) + assert.Contains(t, result, id2.String()) + assert.Contains(t, result, "language") + assert.Contains(t, result, "What language do you prefer?") + assert.Contains(t, result, "[user]: I prefer Go") + assert.Contains(t, result, "[assistant]: Got it!") +} + +// --- NewInquiryProcessor --- + +func TestNewInquiryProcessor(t *testing.T) { + p := NewInquiryProcessor(nil, nil, nil, nil) + require.NotNil(t, p) + assert.Nil(t, p.generator) + assert.Nil(t, p.inquiryStore) + assert.Nil(t, p.knowledgeStore) + assert.Nil(t, p.logger) +} + +// --- answerMatch type --- + +func TestAnswerMatch_Confidence(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + conf types.Confidence + low bool + }{ + {types.ConfidenceHigh, false}, + {types.ConfidenceMedium, false}, + {types.ConfidenceLow, true}, + } + for _, tt := range tests { + assert.Equal(t, tt.low, tt.conf == types.ConfidenceLow, + "confidence %q", tt.conf) + } +} diff --git a/internal/librarian/observation_analyzer.go b/internal/librarian/observation_analyzer.go index 14589248..b234ebd0 100644 --- a/internal/librarian/observation_analyzer.go +++ b/internal/librarian/observation_analyzer.go @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Output JSON: { "extractions": [ { - "type": "preference|fact|rule|definition", + "type": "preference|fact|rule|definition|pattern|correction", "category": "domain category", "content": "the knowledge content", "confidence": "high|medium|low", @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ func (a *ObservationAnalyzer) Analyze(ctx context.Context, observations []memory // Build observation content for LLM. var content strings.Builder for i, obs := range observations { - content.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("--- Observation %d ---\n%s\n\n", i+1, obs.Content)) + fmt.Fprintf(&content, "--- Observation %d ---\n%s\n\n", i+1, obs.Content) } raw, err := a.generator.GenerateText(ctx, observationAnalysisPrompt, content.String()) diff --git a/internal/librarian/parse.go b/internal/librarian/parse.go index a89a23a7..79040d8e 100644 --- a/internal/librarian/parse.go +++ b/internal/librarian/parse.go @@ -56,8 +56,6 @@ func stripCodeFence(s string) string { } else if strings.HasPrefix(s, "```") { s = strings.TrimPrefix(s, "```") } - if strings.HasSuffix(s, "```") { - s = strings.TrimSuffix(s, "```") - } + s = strings.TrimSuffix(s, "```") return strings.TrimSpace(s) } diff --git a/internal/librarian/proactive_buffer.go b/internal/librarian/proactive_buffer.go index f60eee4b..a8f158a1 100644 --- a/internal/librarian/proactive_buffer.go +++ b/internal/librarian/proactive_buffer.go @@ -2,12 +2,13 @@ package librarian import ( "context" + "fmt" "sync" "go.uber.org/zap" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/asyncbuf" entknowledge "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/knowledge" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/graph" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/knowledge" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/memory" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" @@ -35,11 +36,9 @@ type ProactiveBuffer struct { graphCallback GraphCallback mu sync.Mutex - turnCounter map[string]int // session_key → turns since last inquiry + turnCounter map[string]int // session_key -> turns since last inquiry - queue chan string - stopCh chan struct{} - done chan struct{} + inner *asyncbuf.TriggerBuffer[string] logger *zap.SugaredLogger } @@ -75,7 +74,7 @@ func NewProactiveBuffer( cfg.AutoSaveConfidence = types.ConfidenceHigh } - return &ProactiveBuffer{ + b := &ProactiveBuffer{ analyzer: analyzer, processor: processor, inquiryStore: inquiryStore, @@ -87,11 +86,12 @@ func NewProactiveBuffer( maxPending: cfg.MaxPending, autoSaveConfidence: cfg.AutoSaveConfidence, turnCounter: make(map[string]int), - queue: make(chan string, 32), - stopCh: make(chan struct{}), - done: make(chan struct{}), logger: logger, } + b.inner = asyncbuf.NewTriggerBuffer[string](asyncbuf.TriggerConfig{ + QueueSize: 32, + }, b.process, logger) + return b } // SetGraphCallback sets the optional graph triple callback. @@ -101,45 +101,17 @@ func (b *ProactiveBuffer) SetGraphCallback(cb GraphCallback) { // Start launches the background processing goroutine. func (b *ProactiveBuffer) Start(wg *sync.WaitGroup) { - wg.Add(1) - go func() { - defer wg.Done() - defer close(b.done) - b.run() - }() + b.inner.Start(wg) } // Trigger enqueues a session for proactive analysis. func (b *ProactiveBuffer) Trigger(sessionKey string) { - select { - case b.queue <- sessionKey: - default: - b.logger.Warnw("proactive buffer queue full, dropping trigger", "sessionKey", sessionKey) - } + b.inner.Enqueue(sessionKey) } // Stop signals the background goroutine to drain and exit. func (b *ProactiveBuffer) Stop() { - close(b.stopCh) - <-b.done -} - -func (b *ProactiveBuffer) run() { - for { - select { - case sessionKey := <-b.queue: - b.process(sessionKey) - case <-b.stopCh: - for { - select { - case sessionKey := <-b.queue: - b.process(sessionKey) - default: - return - } - } - } - } + b.inner.Stop() } func (b *ProactiveBuffer) process(sessionKey string) { @@ -178,9 +150,14 @@ func (b *ProactiveBuffer) process(sessionKey string) { // Process extractions: auto-save high confidence, create inquiries for medium. for _, ext := range output.Extractions { if b.shouldAutoSave(ext.Confidence) { + cat, err := mapCategory(ext.Type) + if err != nil { + b.logger.Warnw("skip extraction: unknown type", "key", ext.Key, "type", ext.Type, "error", err) + continue + } entry := knowledge.KnowledgeEntry{ Key: ext.Key, - Category: mapCategory(ext.Type), + Category: cat, Content: ext.Content, Source: "proactive_librarian", } @@ -260,31 +237,22 @@ func (b *ProactiveBuffer) shouldAutoSave(confidence types.Confidence) bool { } // mapCategory maps LLM analysis type to a valid knowledge category. -func mapCategory(analysisType string) entknowledge.Category { +func mapCategory(analysisType string) (entknowledge.Category, error) { switch analysisType { case "preference": - return entknowledge.CategoryPreference + return entknowledge.CategoryPreference, nil case "fact": - return entknowledge.CategoryFact + return entknowledge.CategoryFact, nil case "rule": - return entknowledge.CategoryRule + return entknowledge.CategoryRule, nil case "definition": - return entknowledge.CategoryDefinition + return entknowledge.CategoryDefinition, nil + case "pattern": + return entknowledge.CategoryPattern, nil + case "correction": + return entknowledge.CategoryCorrection, nil default: - return entknowledge.CategoryFact + return "", fmt.Errorf("unrecognized knowledge type: %q", analysisType) } } -// toGraphTriples converts librarian triples to graph.Triple for callback. -func toGraphTriples(triples []Triple) []graph.Triple { - result := make([]graph.Triple, len(triples)) - for i, t := range triples { - result[i] = graph.Triple{ - Subject: t.Subject, - Predicate: t.Predicate, - Object: t.Object, - Metadata: t.Metadata, - } - } - return result -} diff --git a/internal/librarian/proactive_buffer_test.go b/internal/librarian/proactive_buffer_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..249591a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/librarian/proactive_buffer_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +package librarian + +import ( + "testing" + + entknowledge "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/knowledge" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func TestMapCategory(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give string + wantCat entknowledge.Category + wantErr bool + }{ + {give: "preference", wantCat: entknowledge.CategoryPreference}, + {give: "fact", wantCat: entknowledge.CategoryFact}, + {give: "rule", wantCat: entknowledge.CategoryRule}, + {give: "definition", wantCat: entknowledge.CategoryDefinition}, + {give: "pattern", wantCat: entknowledge.CategoryPattern}, + {give: "correction", wantCat: entknowledge.CategoryCorrection}, + {give: "unknown", wantErr: true}, + {give: "", wantErr: true}, + {give: "FACT", wantErr: true}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + got, err := mapCategory(tt.give) + if tt.wantErr { + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "unrecognized knowledge type") + } else { + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, tt.wantCat, got) + } + }) + } +} diff --git a/internal/lifecycle/adapter.go b/internal/lifecycle/adapter.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..98a811c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/lifecycle/adapter.go @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +package lifecycle + +import ( + "context" + "sync" +) + +// Startable represents components with Start(*sync.WaitGroup) / Stop() signatures. +type Startable interface { + Start(wg *sync.WaitGroup) + Stop() +} + +// NewSimpleComponent creates a Component adapter from a Startable. +func NewSimpleComponent(name string, s Startable) Component { + return &SimpleComponent{ + ComponentName: name, + StartFunc: s.Start, + StopFunc: s.Stop, + } +} + +// SimpleComponent adapts components with Start(*sync.WaitGroup) / Stop() signatures. +type SimpleComponent struct { + ComponentName string + StartFunc func(wg *sync.WaitGroup) + StopFunc func() +} + +func (c *SimpleComponent) Name() string { return c.ComponentName } + +func (c *SimpleComponent) Start(_ context.Context, wg *sync.WaitGroup) error { + c.StartFunc(wg) + return nil +} + +func (c *SimpleComponent) Stop(_ context.Context) error { + c.StopFunc() + return nil +} + +// NewFuncComponent creates a Component from start/stop functions. +func NewFuncComponent( + name string, + startFn func(ctx context.Context, wg *sync.WaitGroup) error, + stopFn func(ctx context.Context) error, +) *FuncComponent { + return &FuncComponent{ComponentName: name, StartFunc: startFn, StopFunc: stopFn} +} + +// FuncComponent wraps arbitrary start/stop functions. +type FuncComponent struct { + ComponentName string + StartFunc func(ctx context.Context, wg *sync.WaitGroup) error + StopFunc func(ctx context.Context) error +} + +func (c *FuncComponent) Name() string { return c.ComponentName } + +func (c *FuncComponent) Start(ctx context.Context, wg *sync.WaitGroup) error { + return c.StartFunc(ctx, wg) +} + +func (c *FuncComponent) Stop(ctx context.Context) error { + if c.StopFunc != nil { + return c.StopFunc(ctx) + } + return nil +} + +// ErrorComponent adapts components with Start(context.Context) error / Stop() signatures. +type ErrorComponent struct { + ComponentName string + StartFunc func(ctx context.Context) error + StopFunc func() +} + +func (c *ErrorComponent) Name() string { return c.ComponentName } + +func (c *ErrorComponent) Start(ctx context.Context, _ *sync.WaitGroup) error { + return c.StartFunc(ctx) +} + +func (c *ErrorComponent) Stop(_ context.Context) error { + c.StopFunc() + return nil +} diff --git a/internal/lifecycle/adapter_test.go b/internal/lifecycle/adapter_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e3829d70 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/lifecycle/adapter_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +package lifecycle + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "sync" + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +type mockStartable struct { + started bool + stopped bool +} + +func (m *mockStartable) Start(_ *sync.WaitGroup) { m.started = true } +func (m *mockStartable) Stop() { m.stopped = true } + +func TestNewSimpleComponent(t *testing.T) { + m := &mockStartable{} + c := NewSimpleComponent("test-simple", m) + + assert.Equal(t, "test-simple", c.Name()) + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + err := c.Start(context.Background(), &wg) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, m.started) + + err = c.Stop(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, m.stopped) +} + +func TestSimpleComponent_Struct(t *testing.T) { + started := false + stopped := false + c := &SimpleComponent{ + ComponentName: "test-struct", + StartFunc: func(_ *sync.WaitGroup) { started = true }, + StopFunc: func() { stopped = true }, + } + + assert.Equal(t, "test-struct", c.Name()) + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + err := c.Start(context.Background(), &wg) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, started) + + err = c.Stop(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, stopped) +} + +func TestFuncComponent(t *testing.T) { + started := false + stopped := false + c := &FuncComponent{ + ComponentName: "test-func", + StartFunc: func(_ context.Context, _ *sync.WaitGroup) error { + started = true + return nil + }, + StopFunc: func(_ context.Context) error { + stopped = true + return nil + }, + } + + assert.Equal(t, "test-func", c.Name()) + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + err := c.Start(context.Background(), &wg) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, started) + + err = c.Stop(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, stopped) +} + +func TestFuncComponent_NilStop(t *testing.T) { + c := &FuncComponent{ + ComponentName: "test-nil-stop", + StartFunc: func(_ context.Context, _ *sync.WaitGroup) error { return nil }, + } + + err := c.Stop(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) +} + +func TestErrorComponent(t *testing.T) { + errBoom := errors.New("boom") + c := &ErrorComponent{ + ComponentName: "test-error", + StartFunc: func(_ context.Context) error { return errBoom }, + StopFunc: func() {}, + } + + assert.Equal(t, "test-error", c.Name()) + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + err := c.Start(context.Background(), &wg) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, errBoom) +} diff --git a/internal/lifecycle/component.go b/internal/lifecycle/component.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b5e6e77d --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/lifecycle/component.go @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +package lifecycle + +import ( + "context" + "sync" +) + +// Component represents a startable/stoppable application component. +type Component interface { + Name() string + Start(ctx context.Context, wg *sync.WaitGroup) error + Stop(ctx context.Context) error +} + +// Priority controls component startup order (lower = earlier). +type Priority int + +const ( + PriorityInfra Priority = 100 + PriorityCore Priority = 200 + PriorityBuffer Priority = 300 + PriorityNetwork Priority = 400 + PriorityAutomation Priority = 500 +) + +// ComponentEntry pairs a component with its startup priority. +type ComponentEntry struct { + Component Component + Priority Priority +} diff --git a/internal/lifecycle/registry.go b/internal/lifecycle/registry.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0aef2265 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/lifecycle/registry.go @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +package lifecycle + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + "sort" + "sync" +) + +// Registry manages component lifecycle with ordered startup and reverse shutdown. +type Registry struct { + mu sync.Mutex + entries []ComponentEntry + started []Component +} + +// NewRegistry creates an empty component registry. +func NewRegistry() *Registry { + return &Registry{} +} + +// Register adds a component at the given priority. +func (r *Registry) Register(c Component, p Priority) { + r.mu.Lock() + defer r.mu.Unlock() + r.entries = append(r.entries, ComponentEntry{Component: c, Priority: p}) +} + +// StartAll starts all registered components in priority order (ascending). +// If a component fails to start, already-started components are stopped in +// reverse order (rollback). +func (r *Registry) StartAll(ctx context.Context, wg *sync.WaitGroup) error { + r.mu.Lock() + defer r.mu.Unlock() + + sorted := make([]ComponentEntry, len(r.entries)) + copy(sorted, r.entries) + sort.SliceStable(sorted, func(i, j int) bool { + return sorted[i].Priority < sorted[j].Priority + }) + + r.started = r.started[:0] + + for _, entry := range sorted { + if err := entry.Component.Start(ctx, wg); err != nil { + for i := len(r.started) - 1; i >= 0; i-- { + _ = r.started[i].Stop(ctx) + } + r.started = nil + return fmt.Errorf("start %s: %w", entry.Component.Name(), err) + } + r.started = append(r.started, entry.Component) + } + + return nil +} + +// StopAll stops all started components in reverse startup order. +func (r *Registry) StopAll(ctx context.Context) error { + r.mu.Lock() + defer r.mu.Unlock() + + var firstErr error + for i := len(r.started) - 1; i >= 0; i-- { + if err := r.started[i].Stop(ctx); err != nil && firstErr == nil { + firstErr = fmt.Errorf("stop %s: %w", r.started[i].Name(), err) + } + } + r.started = nil + return firstErr +} + +// Len returns the number of registered components. +func (r *Registry) Len() int { + r.mu.Lock() + defer r.mu.Unlock() + return len(r.entries) +} diff --git a/internal/lifecycle/registry_test.go b/internal/lifecycle/registry_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..af8bb7e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/lifecycle/registry_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +package lifecycle + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "sync" + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +type orderTracker struct { + mu sync.Mutex + order []string +} + +func (o *orderTracker) record(action string) { + o.mu.Lock() + defer o.mu.Unlock() + o.order = append(o.order, action) +} + +type mockComponent struct { + name string + tracker *orderTracker + startErr error +} + +func (m *mockComponent) Name() string { return m.name } + +func (m *mockComponent) Start(_ context.Context, _ *sync.WaitGroup) error { + if m.startErr != nil { + return m.startErr + } + m.tracker.record("start:" + m.name) + return nil +} + +func (m *mockComponent) Stop(_ context.Context) error { + m.tracker.record("stop:" + m.name) + return nil +} + +func TestRegistry_StartOrder(t *testing.T) { + tracker := &orderTracker{} + r := NewRegistry() + + r.Register(&mockComponent{name: "network", tracker: tracker}, PriorityNetwork) + r.Register(&mockComponent{name: "buffer", tracker: tracker}, PriorityBuffer) + r.Register(&mockComponent{name: "infra", tracker: tracker}, PriorityInfra) + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + err := r.StartAll(context.Background(), &wg) + require.NoError(t, err) + + assert.Equal(t, []string{"start:infra", "start:buffer", "start:network"}, tracker.order) +} + +func TestRegistry_StopReverseOrder(t *testing.T) { + tracker := &orderTracker{} + r := NewRegistry() + + r.Register(&mockComponent{name: "infra", tracker: tracker}, PriorityInfra) + r.Register(&mockComponent{name: "buffer", tracker: tracker}, PriorityBuffer) + r.Register(&mockComponent{name: "network", tracker: tracker}, PriorityNetwork) + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + err := r.StartAll(context.Background(), &wg) + require.NoError(t, err) + + tracker.order = nil // reset + err = r.StopAll(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + + assert.Equal(t, []string{"stop:network", "stop:buffer", "stop:infra"}, tracker.order) +} + +func TestRegistry_RollbackOnFailure(t *testing.T) { + tracker := &orderTracker{} + errBoom := errors.New("boom") + r := NewRegistry() + + r.Register(&mockComponent{name: "a", tracker: tracker}, PriorityInfra) + r.Register(&mockComponent{name: "b", tracker: tracker}, PriorityBuffer) + r.Register(&mockComponent{name: "c", tracker: tracker, startErr: errBoom}, PriorityNetwork) + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + err := r.StartAll(context.Background(), &wg) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, errBoom) + + // a and b started, then c failed, so b and a should be stopped in reverse + assert.Equal(t, []string{"start:a", "start:b", "stop:b", "stop:a"}, tracker.order) +} + +func TestRegistry_EmptyRegistry(t *testing.T) { + r := NewRegistry() + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + err := r.StartAll(context.Background(), &wg) + require.NoError(t, err) + + err = r.StopAll(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) +} + +func TestRegistry_SamePriorityPreservesOrder(t *testing.T) { + tracker := &orderTracker{} + r := NewRegistry() + + r.Register(&mockComponent{name: "first", tracker: tracker}, PriorityBuffer) + r.Register(&mockComponent{name: "second", tracker: tracker}, PriorityBuffer) + r.Register(&mockComponent{name: "third", tracker: tracker}, PriorityBuffer) + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + err := r.StartAll(context.Background(), &wg) + require.NoError(t, err) + + assert.Equal(t, []string{"start:first", "start:second", "start:third"}, tracker.order) +} diff --git a/internal/memory/buffer.go b/internal/memory/buffer.go index 8a647e05..8415526b 100644 --- a/internal/memory/buffer.go +++ b/internal/memory/buffer.go @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import ( "go.uber.org/zap" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/asyncbuf" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" ) @@ -15,25 +16,28 @@ type MessageProvider func(sessionKey string) ([]session.Message, error) // MessageCompactor replaces observed messages with a summary to reduce session size. type MessageCompactor func(sessionKey string, upToIndex int, summary string) error +// defaultReflectionConsolidationThreshold is the minimum number of reflections +// that must accumulate before meta-reflection (consolidation) is triggered. +const defaultReflectionConsolidationThreshold = 5 + // Buffer manages background observation and reflection processing. type Buffer struct { observer *Observer reflector *Reflector store *Store - messageTokenThreshold int - observationTokenThreshold int - getMessages MessageProvider - compactor MessageCompactor // optional: compact observed messages + messageTokenThreshold int + observationTokenThreshold int + reflectionConsolidationThreshold int // min reflections before meta-reflection; 0 = default (5) + getMessages MessageProvider + compactor MessageCompactor // optional: compact observed messages // lastObserved tracks the last observed message index per session. mu sync.Mutex lastObserved map[string]int - triggerCh chan string - stopCh chan struct{} - done chan struct{} - logger *zap.SugaredLogger + inner *asyncbuf.TriggerBuffer[string] + logger *zap.SugaredLogger } // NewBuffer creates a new asynchronous observation buffer. @@ -45,7 +49,7 @@ func NewBuffer( getMessages MessageProvider, logger *zap.SugaredLogger, ) *Buffer { - return &Buffer{ + b := &Buffer{ observer: observer, reflector: reflector, store: store, @@ -53,31 +57,23 @@ func NewBuffer( observationTokenThreshold: obsThreshold, getMessages: getMessages, lastObserved: make(map[string]int), - triggerCh: make(chan string, 16), - stopCh: make(chan struct{}), - done: make(chan struct{}), logger: logger, } + b.inner = asyncbuf.NewTriggerBuffer[string](asyncbuf.TriggerConfig{ + QueueSize: 16, + }, b.process, logger) + return b } // Start launches the background goroutine. The WaitGroup is incremented so // callers can wait for graceful shutdown. func (b *Buffer) Start(wg *sync.WaitGroup) { - wg.Add(1) - go func() { - defer wg.Done() - defer close(b.done) - b.run() - }() + b.inner.Start(wg) } // Trigger sends a non-blocking signal to process the given session. func (b *Buffer) Trigger(sessionKey string) { - select { - case b.triggerCh <- sessionKey: - default: - b.logger.Debugw("buffer trigger dropped (channel full)", "sessionKey", sessionKey) - } + b.inner.Enqueue(sessionKey) } // SetCompactor enables message compaction after observation. When set, @@ -87,29 +83,15 @@ func (b *Buffer) SetCompactor(c MessageCompactor) { b.compactor = c } -// Stop signals the background goroutine to stop and waits for completion. -func (b *Buffer) Stop() { - close(b.stopCh) - <-b.done +// SetReflectionConsolidationThreshold overrides the default number of reflections +// that must accumulate before meta-reflection (consolidation) is triggered. +func (b *Buffer) SetReflectionConsolidationThreshold(n int) { + b.reflectionConsolidationThreshold = n } -func (b *Buffer) run() { - for { - select { - case sessionKey := <-b.triggerCh: - b.process(sessionKey) - case <-b.stopCh: - // Drain remaining triggers before exiting. - for { - select { - case sessionKey := <-b.triggerCh: - b.process(sessionKey) - default: - return - } - } - } - } +// Stop signals the background goroutine to stop and waits for completion. +func (b *Buffer) Stop() { + b.inner.Stop() } func (b *Buffer) process(sessionKey string) { @@ -171,6 +153,29 @@ func (b *Buffer) process(sessionKey string) { b.logger.Errorw("reflector failed", "sessionKey", sessionKey, "error", err) } } + + // Auto-trigger meta-reflection when reflections accumulate past the threshold. + // This prevents unbounded reflection growth in long-running sessions. + threshold := b.reflectionConsolidationThreshold + if threshold <= 0 { + threshold = defaultReflectionConsolidationThreshold + } + + reflections, err := b.store.ListReflections(ctx, sessionKey) + if err != nil { + b.logger.Errorw("list reflections for meta-reflection check", "sessionKey", sessionKey, "error", err) + return + } + if len(reflections) >= threshold { + _, err := b.reflector.ReflectOnReflections(ctx, sessionKey) + if err != nil { + b.logger.Errorw("meta-reflector failed", "sessionKey", sessionKey, "error", err) + } else { + b.logger.Debugw("meta-reflection triggered", + "sessionKey", sessionKey, + "condensedReflections", len(reflections)) + } + } } func (b *Buffer) getLastObserved(sessionKey string) int { diff --git a/internal/orchestration/orchestrator.go b/internal/orchestration/orchestrator.go index 4e41d684..2a38bca2 100644 --- a/internal/orchestration/orchestrator.go +++ b/internal/orchestration/orchestrator.go @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ type Config struct { // RemoteAgents are external A2A agents to include as sub-agents. RemoteAgents []adk_agent.Agent // MaxDelegationRounds limits the number of orchestrator→sub-agent - // delegation rounds per user turn. Zero means use default (5). + // delegation rounds per user turn. Zero means use default (10). MaxDelegationRounds int // SubAgentPrompt builds the final system prompt for each sub-agent. // When nil, the original spec.Instruction is used unchanged. @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ func BuildAgentTree(cfg Config) (adk_agent.Agent, error) { maxRounds := cfg.MaxDelegationRounds if maxRounds <= 0 { - maxRounds = 5 + maxRounds = 10 } orchestratorInstruction := buildOrchestratorInstruction( diff --git a/internal/orchestration/orchestrator_test.go b/internal/orchestration/orchestrator_test.go index feb9c8d1..f999153c 100644 --- a/internal/orchestration/orchestrator_test.go +++ b/internal/orchestration/orchestrator_test.go @@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ func TestBuildOrchestratorInstruction_ContainsRoutingTable(t *testing.T) { assert.Contains(t, got, "run, execute") assert.Contains(t, got, "web browsing") assert.Contains(t, got, "Decision Protocol") - assert.Contains(t, got, "Maximum 5 delegation rounds") + assert.Contains(t, got, "maximum of 5 delegation rounds") } func TestBuildOrchestratorInstruction_UnmatchedTools(t *testing.T) { diff --git a/internal/orchestration/tools.go b/internal/orchestration/tools.go index 8d949fbe..f0f572e7 100644 --- a/internal/orchestration/tools.go +++ b/internal/orchestration/tools.go @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ Return operation results: encrypted/decrypted data, confirmation of secret stora - Handle sensitive data carefully — never log secrets or private keys in plain text. - If a task does not match your capabilities, REJECT it by responding: "[REJECT] This task requires . I handle: encryption, secret management, blockchain payments."`, - Prefixes: []string{"crypto_", "secrets_", "payment_"}, - Keywords: []string{"encrypt", "decrypt", "sign", "hash", "secret", "password", "payment", "wallet", "USDC"}, + Prefixes: []string{"crypto_", "secrets_", "payment_", "p2p_"}, + Keywords: []string{"encrypt", "decrypt", "sign", "hash", "secret", "password", "payment", "wallet", "USDC", "peer", "p2p", "connect", "handshake", "firewall", "zkp"}, Accepts: "A security operation (crypto, secret, or payment) with parameters", Returns: "Encrypted/decrypted data, secret confirmation, or payment transaction status", CannotDo: []string{"shell commands", "file operations", "web browsing", "knowledge search", "memory management"}, @@ -394,13 +394,13 @@ You do NOT have tools. You MUST delegate all tool-requiring tasks to the appropr ## Routing Table (use EXACTLY these agent names) `) for _, e := range entries { - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("\n### %s\n", e.Name)) - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- **Role**: %s\n", e.Description)) - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- **Keywords**: [%s]\n", strings.Join(e.Keywords, ", "))) - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- **Accepts**: %s\n", e.Accepts)) - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- **Returns**: %s\n", e.Returns)) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "\n### %s\n", e.Name) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- **Role**: %s\n", e.Description) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- **Keywords**: [%s]\n", strings.Join(e.Keywords, ", ")) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- **Accepts**: %s\n", e.Accepts) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- **Returns**: %s\n", e.Returns) if len(e.CannotDo) > 0 { - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- **Cannot**: %s\n", strings.Join(e.CannotDo, "; "))) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- **Cannot**: %s\n", strings.Join(e.CannotDo, "; ")) } } @@ -410,10 +410,10 @@ You do NOT have tools. You MUST delegate all tool-requiring tasks to the appropr for i, t := range unmatched { names[i] = t.Name } - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("The following tools are available but not assigned to a specific agent: %s. Handle requests for these tools directly or choose the closest matching agent.\n", strings.Join(names, ", "))) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "The following tools are available but not assigned to a specific agent: %s. Handle requests for these tools directly or choose the closest matching agent.\n", strings.Join(names, ", ")) } - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(` + fmt.Fprintf(&b, ` ## Decision Protocol Before delegating, follow these steps: 1. CLASSIFY: Identify the domain of the request. @@ -425,15 +425,27 @@ Before delegating, follow these steps: ## Rejection Handling If a sub-agent rejects a task with [REJECT], try the next most relevant agent or handle the request directly. +## Round Budget Management +You have a maximum of %d delegation rounds per user turn. Use them efficiently: +- Simple tasks (greetings, lookups): 1-2 rounds +- Medium tasks (file operations, searches): 3-5 rounds +- Complex multi-step tasks: 6-10 rounds + +After each delegation, evaluate: +1. Did the sub-agent complete the assigned step? +2. Is the accumulated result sufficient to answer the user? +3. If yes, respond directly. If no, delegate the next step. + +If running low on rounds, consolidate partial results and provide the best possible answer. + ## Delegation Rules 1. For any action that requires tools: delegate to the sub-agent from the routing table whose keywords and role best match. 2. For simple conversational messages (greetings, opinions, general knowledge): respond directly without delegation. -3. Maximum %d delegation rounds per user turn. ## CRITICAL - You MUST use the EXACT agent name from the routing table (e.g. "operator", NOT "exec", "browser", or any abbreviation). - NEVER invent or abbreviate agent names. -`, maxRounds)) +`, maxRounds) return b.String() } diff --git a/internal/p2p/discovery/agentad.go b/internal/p2p/discovery/agentad.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..99333e12 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/discovery/agentad.go @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +package discovery + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "sync" + "time" + + dht "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-kad-dht" + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +// AgentAd is a structured service advertisement (Context Flyer). +type AgentAd struct { + DID string `json:"did"` + Name string `json:"name"` + Description string `json:"description"` + Tags []string `json:"tags"` + Capabilities []string `json:"capabilities,omitempty"` + Pricing *PricingInfo `json:"pricing,omitempty"` + ZKCredentials []ZKCredential `json:"zkCredentials,omitempty"` + Multiaddrs []string `json:"multiaddrs,omitempty"` + PeerID string `json:"peerId"` + Timestamp time.Time `json:"timestamp"` + Metadata map[string]string `json:"metadata,omitempty"` +} + +// AdService manages agent advertisement and discovery via DHT provider records. +type AdService struct { + dht *dht.IpfsDHT + localAd *AgentAd + verifier ZKCredentialVerifier + mu sync.RWMutex + ads map[string]*AgentAd // keyed by DID + logger *zap.SugaredLogger +} + +// AdServiceConfig configures the AdService. +type AdServiceConfig struct { + DHT *dht.IpfsDHT + LocalAd *AgentAd + Verifier ZKCredentialVerifier + Logger *zap.SugaredLogger +} + +// NewAdService creates a new agent advertisement service. +func NewAdService(cfg AdServiceConfig) *AdService { + return &AdService{ + dht: cfg.DHT, + localAd: cfg.LocalAd, + verifier: cfg.Verifier, + ads: make(map[string]*AgentAd), + logger: cfg.Logger, + } +} + +// Advertise publishes the local agent ad to the DHT. +func (s *AdService) Advertise(ctx context.Context) error { + if s.localAd == nil { + return nil + } + + s.localAd.Timestamp = time.Now() + + data, err := json.Marshal(s.localAd) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("marshal agent ad: %w", err) + } + + // Store as a DHT value keyed by the agent's DID. + key := "/lango/agentad/" + s.localAd.DID + if err := s.dht.PutValue(ctx, key, data); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("put agent ad to DHT: %w", err) + } + + s.logger.Debugw("agent ad advertised", "did", s.localAd.DID, "tags", s.localAd.Tags) + return nil +} + +// Discover searches for agent ads matching the given tags. +func (s *AdService) Discover(ctx context.Context, tags []string) ([]*AgentAd, error) { + s.mu.RLock() + defer s.mu.RUnlock() + + if len(tags) == 0 { + // Return all known ads. + ads := make([]*AgentAd, 0, len(s.ads)) + for _, ad := range s.ads { + ads = append(ads, ad) + } + return ads, nil + } + + // Filter by tags. + var matches []*AgentAd + for _, ad := range s.ads { + if matchesTags(ad.Tags, tags) { + matches = append(matches, ad) + } + } + return matches, nil +} + +// DiscoverByCapability returns ads matching a specific capability. +func (s *AdService) DiscoverByCapability(ctx context.Context, capability string) []*AgentAd { + s.mu.RLock() + defer s.mu.RUnlock() + + var matches []*AgentAd + for _, ad := range s.ads { + for _, cap := range ad.Capabilities { + if cap == capability { + matches = append(matches, ad) + break + } + } + } + return matches +} + +// StoreAd stores a discovered agent ad after ZK credential verification. +func (s *AdService) StoreAd(ad *AgentAd) error { + if ad.DID == "" { + return fmt.Errorf("agent ad missing DID") + } + + // Verify ZK credentials if verifier is available. + if s.verifier != nil { + for _, cred := range ad.ZKCredentials { + if cred.ExpiresAt.Before(time.Now()) { + s.logger.Debugw("expired ZK credential in ad", "did", ad.DID, "capability", cred.CapabilityID) + continue + } + valid, err := s.verifier(&cred) + if err != nil || !valid { + return fmt.Errorf("invalid ZK credential in ad for %s: capability %s", ad.DID, cred.CapabilityID) + } + } + } + + s.mu.Lock() + existing, ok := s.ads[ad.DID] + if !ok || ad.Timestamp.After(existing.Timestamp) { + s.ads[ad.DID] = ad + } + s.mu.Unlock() + + s.logger.Debugw("agent ad stored", "did", ad.DID, "name", ad.Name, "tags", ad.Tags) + return nil +} + +// matchesTags returns true if the ad tags contain any of the requested tags. +func matchesTags(adTags, requestedTags []string) bool { + tagSet := make(map[string]struct{}, len(adTags)) + for _, t := range adTags { + tagSet[t] = struct{}{} + } + for _, t := range requestedTags { + if _, ok := tagSet[t]; ok { + return true + } + } + return false +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/discovery/agentad_test.go b/internal/p2p/discovery/agentad_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..78ae400f --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/discovery/agentad_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,228 @@ +package discovery + +import ( + "context" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +func testLogger() *zap.SugaredLogger { + return zap.NewNop().Sugar() +} + +func TestNewAdService(t *testing.T) { + svc := NewAdService(AdServiceConfig{Logger: testLogger()}) + require.NotNil(t, svc) + assert.NotNil(t, svc.ads) +} + +func TestStoreAd_Valid(t *testing.T) { + svc := NewAdService(AdServiceConfig{Logger: testLogger()}) + + ad := &AgentAd{ + DID: "did:lango:abc123", + Name: "test-agent", + Tags: []string{"search", "code"}, + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + err := svc.StoreAd(ad) + require.NoError(t, err) + + results, err := svc.Discover(context.Background(), nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, "test-agent", results[0].Name) +} + +func TestStoreAd_MissingDID(t *testing.T) { + svc := NewAdService(AdServiceConfig{Logger: testLogger()}) + + ad := &AgentAd{Name: "no-did-agent"} + err := svc.StoreAd(ad) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "missing DID") +} + +func TestStoreAd_ZKVerification_Pass(t *testing.T) { + verifier := func(cred *ZKCredential) (bool, error) { return true, nil } + svc := NewAdService(AdServiceConfig{ + Logger: testLogger(), + Verifier: verifier, + }) + + ad := &AgentAd{ + DID: "did:lango:abc123", + Name: "verified-agent", + Timestamp: time.Now(), + ZKCredentials: []ZKCredential{ + { + CapabilityID: "search", + Proof: []byte("valid-proof"), + IssuedAt: time.Now(), + ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour), + }, + }, + } + err := svc.StoreAd(ad) + assert.NoError(t, err) +} + +func TestStoreAd_ZKVerification_Fail(t *testing.T) { + verifier := func(cred *ZKCredential) (bool, error) { return false, nil } + svc := NewAdService(AdServiceConfig{ + Logger: testLogger(), + Verifier: verifier, + }) + + ad := &AgentAd{ + DID: "did:lango:abc123", + Name: "unverified-agent", + Timestamp: time.Now(), + ZKCredentials: []ZKCredential{ + { + CapabilityID: "search", + Proof: []byte("invalid-proof"), + IssuedAt: time.Now(), + ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour), + }, + }, + } + err := svc.StoreAd(ad) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid ZK credential") +} + +func TestStoreAd_ExpiredCredential_Skipped(t *testing.T) { + called := false + verifier := func(cred *ZKCredential) (bool, error) { + called = true + return true, nil + } + svc := NewAdService(AdServiceConfig{ + Logger: testLogger(), + Verifier: verifier, + }) + + ad := &AgentAd{ + DID: "did:lango:abc123", + Name: "expired-cred-agent", + Timestamp: time.Now(), + ZKCredentials: []ZKCredential{ + { + CapabilityID: "search", + Proof: []byte("proof"), + IssuedAt: time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour), + ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour), // already expired + }, + }, + } + err := svc.StoreAd(ad) + assert.NoError(t, err) + assert.False(t, called, "verifier should not be called for expired credentials") +} + +func TestStoreAd_TimestampOrdering(t *testing.T) { + svc := NewAdService(AdServiceConfig{Logger: testLogger()}) + + older := &AgentAd{ + DID: "did:lango:abc123", + Name: "old-name", + Timestamp: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour), + } + newer := &AgentAd{ + DID: "did:lango:abc123", + Name: "new-name", + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + + require.NoError(t, svc.StoreAd(newer)) + require.NoError(t, svc.StoreAd(older)) // older should not overwrite + + results, _ := svc.Discover(context.Background(), nil) + require.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, "new-name", results[0].Name, "newer ad should be retained") +} + +func TestDiscover_EmptyTags_ReturnsAll(t *testing.T) { + svc := NewAdService(AdServiceConfig{Logger: testLogger()}) + + for _, did := range []string{"did:lango:a", "did:lango:b", "did:lango:c"} { + require.NoError(t, svc.StoreAd(&AgentAd{DID: did, Timestamp: time.Now()})) + } + + results, err := svc.Discover(context.Background(), nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Len(t, results, 3) +} + +func TestDiscover_WithTags_Filters(t *testing.T) { + svc := NewAdService(AdServiceConfig{Logger: testLogger()}) + + require.NoError(t, svc.StoreAd(&AgentAd{ + DID: "did:lango:a", Tags: []string{"search", "code"}, Timestamp: time.Now(), + })) + require.NoError(t, svc.StoreAd(&AgentAd{ + DID: "did:lango:b", Tags: []string{"translate"}, Timestamp: time.Now(), + })) + + results, err := svc.Discover(context.Background(), []string{"code"}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Len(t, results, 1) + assert.Equal(t, "did:lango:a", results[0].DID) +} + +func TestDiscover_NoMatches(t *testing.T) { + svc := NewAdService(AdServiceConfig{Logger: testLogger()}) + + require.NoError(t, svc.StoreAd(&AgentAd{ + DID: "did:lango:a", Tags: []string{"search"}, Timestamp: time.Now(), + })) + + results, err := svc.Discover(context.Background(), []string{"nonexistent"}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, results) +} + +func TestDiscoverByCapability(t *testing.T) { + svc := NewAdService(AdServiceConfig{Logger: testLogger()}) + + require.NoError(t, svc.StoreAd(&AgentAd{ + DID: "did:lango:a", Capabilities: []string{"search", "summarize"}, Timestamp: time.Now(), + })) + require.NoError(t, svc.StoreAd(&AgentAd{ + DID: "did:lango:b", Capabilities: []string{"translate"}, Timestamp: time.Now(), + })) + + matches := svc.DiscoverByCapability(context.Background(), "search") + assert.Len(t, matches, 1) + assert.Equal(t, "did:lango:a", matches[0].DID) + + noMatch := svc.DiscoverByCapability(context.Background(), "unknown") + assert.Empty(t, noMatch) +} + +func TestMatchesTags(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + name string + adTags []string + query []string + expected bool + }{ + {"overlap", []string{"a", "b"}, []string{"b", "c"}, true}, + {"no overlap", []string{"a", "b"}, []string{"c", "d"}, false}, + {"empty ad tags", nil, []string{"a"}, false}, + {"empty query", []string{"a"}, nil, false}, + {"both empty", nil, nil, false}, + {"exact match", []string{"search"}, []string{"search"}, true}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { + assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, matchesTags(tt.adTags, tt.query)) + }) + } +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/discovery/gossip.go b/internal/p2p/discovery/gossip.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a74276bc --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/discovery/gossip.go @@ -0,0 +1,336 @@ +// Package discovery implements gossip-based agent card propagation and peer discovery. +package discovery + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "sync" + "time" + + pubsub "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-pubsub" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/host" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +// TopicAgentCard is the GossipSub topic for agent card propagation. +const TopicAgentCard = "/lango/agentcard/1.0.0" + +// GossipCard is an agent card propagated via GossipSub. +type GossipCard struct { + Name string `json:"name"` + Description string `json:"description"` + DID string `json:"did,omitempty"` + Multiaddrs []string `json:"multiaddrs,omitempty"` + Capabilities []string `json:"capabilities,omitempty"` + Pricing *PricingInfo `json:"pricing,omitempty"` + ZKCredentials []ZKCredential `json:"zkCredentials,omitempty"` + PeerID string `json:"peerId"` + Timestamp time.Time `json:"timestamp"` +} + +// PricingInfo describes the pricing for an agent's services. +type PricingInfo struct { + Currency string `json:"currency"` // e.g. "USDC" + PerQuery string `json:"perQuery"` // per-query price + PerMinute string `json:"perMinute"` // per-minute price + ToolPrices map[string]string `json:"toolPrices"` // per-tool pricing +} + +// ZKCredential is a zero-knowledge proof of agent capability. +type ZKCredential struct { + CapabilityID string `json:"capabilityId"` + Proof []byte `json:"proof"` + IssuedAt time.Time `json:"issuedAt"` + ExpiresAt time.Time `json:"expiresAt"` +} + +// ZKCredentialVerifier verifies a ZK credential proof. +type ZKCredentialVerifier func(cred *ZKCredential) (bool, error) + +// defaultMaxCredentialAge is the default maximum age for ZK credentials. +const defaultMaxCredentialAge = 24 * time.Hour + +// GossipService manages agent card propagation via GossipSub. +type GossipService struct { + host host.Host + ps *pubsub.PubSub + topic *pubsub.Topic + sub *pubsub.Subscription + localCard *GossipCard + interval time.Duration + verifier ZKCredentialVerifier + + mu sync.RWMutex + peers map[string]*GossipCard // keyed by DID + cancel context.CancelFunc + logger *zap.SugaredLogger + + revokedMu sync.RWMutex + revokedDIDs map[string]time.Time // DID → revocation time + maxCredentialAge time.Duration +} + +// GossipConfig configures the gossip service. +type GossipConfig struct { + Host host.Host + LocalCard *GossipCard + Interval time.Duration + Verifier ZKCredentialVerifier + Logger *zap.SugaredLogger +} + +// NewGossipService creates a new gossip-based discovery service. +func NewGossipService(cfg GossipConfig) (*GossipService, error) { + ps, err := pubsub.NewGossipSub(context.Background(), cfg.Host) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("create gossipsub: %w", err) + } + + topic, err := ps.Join(TopicAgentCard) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("join topic %s: %w", TopicAgentCard, err) + } + + sub, err := topic.Subscribe() + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("subscribe to %s: %w", TopicAgentCard, err) + } + + return &GossipService{ + host: cfg.Host, + ps: ps, + topic: topic, + sub: sub, + localCard: cfg.LocalCard, + interval: cfg.Interval, + verifier: cfg.Verifier, + peers: make(map[string]*GossipCard), + logger: cfg.Logger, + revokedDIDs: make(map[string]time.Time), + maxCredentialAge: defaultMaxCredentialAge, + }, nil +} + +// Start begins periodic card publication and message processing. +func (g *GossipService) Start(wg *sync.WaitGroup) { + ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background()) + g.cancel = cancel + + // Publisher goroutine. + wg.Add(1) + go func() { + defer wg.Done() + g.publishLoop(ctx) + }() + + // Subscriber goroutine. + wg.Add(1) + go func() { + defer wg.Done() + g.subscribeLoop(ctx) + }() + + g.logger.Infow("gossip service started", "topic", TopicAgentCard, "interval", g.interval) +} + +// Stop halts the gossip service. +func (g *GossipService) Stop() { + if g.cancel != nil { + g.cancel() + } + g.sub.Cancel() + g.topic.Close() + g.logger.Info("gossip service stopped") +} + +// KnownPeers returns all known peer agent cards. +func (g *GossipService) KnownPeers() []*GossipCard { + g.mu.RLock() + defer g.mu.RUnlock() + + cards := make([]*GossipCard, 0, len(g.peers)) + for _, card := range g.peers { + cards = append(cards, card) + } + return cards +} + +// FindByCapability returns peers that advertise the given capability. +func (g *GossipService) FindByCapability(capability string) []*GossipCard { + g.mu.RLock() + defer g.mu.RUnlock() + + var matches []*GossipCard + for _, card := range g.peers { + for _, cap := range card.Capabilities { + if cap == capability { + matches = append(matches, card) + break + } + } + } + return matches +} + +// FindByDID returns a peer by DID. +func (g *GossipService) FindByDID(did string) *GossipCard { + g.mu.RLock() + defer g.mu.RUnlock() + return g.peers[did] +} + +// RevokeDID marks a DID as revoked, preventing its credentials from being accepted. +func (g *GossipService) RevokeDID(did string) { + g.revokedMu.Lock() + g.revokedDIDs[did] = time.Now() + g.revokedMu.Unlock() + g.logger.Infow("DID revoked", "did", did) +} + +// IsRevoked checks if a DID has been revoked. +func (g *GossipService) IsRevoked(did string) bool { + g.revokedMu.RLock() + _, revoked := g.revokedDIDs[did] + g.revokedMu.RUnlock() + return revoked +} + +// SetMaxCredentialAge sets the maximum allowed age for ZK credentials. +func (g *GossipService) SetMaxCredentialAge(d time.Duration) { + g.revokedMu.Lock() + g.maxCredentialAge = d + g.revokedMu.Unlock() +} + +// publishLoop periodically publishes the local agent card. +func (g *GossipService) publishLoop(ctx context.Context) { + ticker := time.NewTicker(g.interval) + defer ticker.Stop() + + // Publish immediately on start. + g.publishCard(ctx) + + for { + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + return + case <-ticker.C: + g.publishCard(ctx) + } + } +} + +// publishCard publishes the local agent card to the gossip topic. +func (g *GossipService) publishCard(ctx context.Context) { + if g.localCard == nil { + return + } + + g.localCard.Timestamp = time.Now() + + data, err := json.Marshal(g.localCard) + if err != nil { + g.logger.Warnw("marshal agent card", "error", err) + return + } + + if err := g.topic.Publish(ctx, data); err != nil { + g.logger.Debugw("publish agent card", "error", err) + } +} + +// subscribeLoop processes incoming agent card messages. +func (g *GossipService) subscribeLoop(ctx context.Context) { + for { + msg, err := g.sub.Next(ctx) + if err != nil { + if ctx.Err() != nil { + return + } + g.logger.Warnw("gossip subscription", "error", err) + continue + } + + // Skip own messages. + if msg.ReceivedFrom == g.host.ID() { + continue + } + + g.handleMessage(msg) + } +} + +// handleMessage processes a received gossip message. +func (g *GossipService) handleMessage(msg *pubsub.Message) { + var card GossipCard + if err := json.Unmarshal(msg.Data, &card); err != nil { + g.logger.Debugw("unmarshal gossip card", "error", err, "from", msg.ReceivedFrom) + return + } + + if card.DID == "" { + return + } + + // Reject cards from revoked DIDs. + if g.IsRevoked(card.DID) { + g.logger.Warnw("rejected card from revoked DID", "did", card.DID) + return + } + + // Verify ZK credentials if verifier is available. + now := time.Now() + if g.verifier != nil { + for _, cred := range card.ZKCredentials { + if cred.ExpiresAt.Before(now) { + g.logger.Debugw("expired ZK credential", + "did", card.DID, "capability", cred.CapabilityID) + continue + } + + // Check credential age against max allowed age. + g.revokedMu.RLock() + maxAge := g.maxCredentialAge + g.revokedMu.RUnlock() + if cred.IssuedAt.Add(maxAge).Before(now) { + g.logger.Warnw("stale ZK credential exceeds max age", + "did", card.DID, + "capability", cred.CapabilityID, + "issuedAt", cred.IssuedAt, + "maxAge", maxAge, + ) + continue + } + + valid, err := g.verifier(&cred) + if err != nil || !valid { + g.logger.Warnw("invalid ZK credential, discarding card", + "did", card.DID, + "capability", cred.CapabilityID, + "error", err, + ) + return // Discard the entire card if any credential is invalid. + } + } + } + + // Store/update peer card. + g.mu.Lock() + existing, ok := g.peers[card.DID] + if !ok || card.Timestamp.After(existing.Timestamp) { + g.peers[card.DID] = &card + g.logger.Debugw("peer card updated", + "did", card.DID, + "name", card.Name, + "capabilities", card.Capabilities, + ) + } + g.mu.Unlock() +} + +// PeerIDFromString parses a peer ID string. +func PeerIDFromString(s string) (peer.ID, error) { + return peer.Decode(s) +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/discovery/gossip_test.go b/internal/p2p/discovery/gossip_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..49bd0233 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/discovery/gossip_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +package discovery + +import ( + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +// newTestGossipServiceFields creates a GossipService with only the internal +// fields set, suitable for testing query/revocation methods that do not touch +// the libp2p host, PubSub, or topic. +func newTestGossipServiceFields() *GossipService { + return &GossipService{ + peers: make(map[string]*GossipCard), + revokedDIDs: make(map[string]time.Time), + maxCredentialAge: defaultMaxCredentialAge, + logger: testLogger(), + } +} + +func TestGossipService_KnownPeers_Empty(t *testing.T) { + gs := newTestGossipServiceFields() + assert.Empty(t, gs.KnownPeers()) +} + +func TestGossipService_KnownPeers_AfterAdding(t *testing.T) { + gs := newTestGossipServiceFields() + gs.peers["did:lango:a"] = &GossipCard{DID: "did:lango:a", Name: "alice"} + gs.peers["did:lango:b"] = &GossipCard{DID: "did:lango:b", Name: "bob"} + + peers := gs.KnownPeers() + assert.Len(t, peers, 2) +} + +func TestGossipService_FindByCapability_Match(t *testing.T) { + gs := newTestGossipServiceFields() + gs.peers["did:lango:a"] = &GossipCard{ + DID: "did:lango:a", + Capabilities: []string{"search", "translate"}, + } + gs.peers["did:lango:b"] = &GossipCard{ + DID: "did:lango:b", + Capabilities: []string{"code"}, + } + + matches := gs.FindByCapability("search") + require.Len(t, matches, 1) + assert.Equal(t, "did:lango:a", matches[0].DID) +} + +func TestGossipService_FindByCapability_NoMatch(t *testing.T) { + gs := newTestGossipServiceFields() + gs.peers["did:lango:a"] = &GossipCard{ + DID: "did:lango:a", + Capabilities: []string{"search"}, + } + + matches := gs.FindByCapability("unknown") + assert.Empty(t, matches) +} + +func TestGossipService_FindByDID(t *testing.T) { + gs := newTestGossipServiceFields() + card := &GossipCard{DID: "did:lango:alice", Name: "alice"} + gs.peers["did:lango:alice"] = card + + found := gs.FindByDID("did:lango:alice") + require.NotNil(t, found) + assert.Equal(t, "alice", found.Name) + + notFound := gs.FindByDID("did:lango:unknown") + assert.Nil(t, notFound) +} + +func TestGossipService_RevokeDID_And_IsRevoked(t *testing.T) { + gs := newTestGossipServiceFields() + + assert.False(t, gs.IsRevoked("did:lango:bad")) + + gs.RevokeDID("did:lango:bad") + assert.True(t, gs.IsRevoked("did:lango:bad")) + + assert.False(t, gs.IsRevoked("did:lango:good")) +} + +func TestGossipService_SetMaxCredentialAge(t *testing.T) { + gs := newTestGossipServiceFields() + assert.Equal(t, defaultMaxCredentialAge, gs.maxCredentialAge) + + gs.SetMaxCredentialAge(12 * time.Hour) + + gs.revokedMu.RLock() + assert.Equal(t, 12*time.Hour, gs.maxCredentialAge) + gs.revokedMu.RUnlock() +} + +func TestGossipService_DefaultMaxCredentialAge(t *testing.T) { + assert.Equal(t, 24*time.Hour, defaultMaxCredentialAge) +} + +func TestTopicAgentCard_Constant(t *testing.T) { + assert.Equal(t, "/lango/agentcard/1.0.0", TopicAgentCard) +} + +func TestPeerIDFromString_Valid(t *testing.T) { + // Use a well-known peer ID format (base58 encoded). + // This tests that the function wraps peer.Decode correctly. + _, err := PeerIDFromString("invalid-peer-id") + assert.Error(t, err, "invalid peer ID string should return error") +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/firewall/firewall.go b/internal/p2p/firewall/firewall.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b926fdbd --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/firewall/firewall.go @@ -0,0 +1,370 @@ +// Package firewall implements the Knowledge Firewall for P2P queries. +// Default policy is deny-all — explicit rules must be added to allow access. +package firewall + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "regexp" + "strings" + "sync" + "time" + + "go.uber.org/zap" + "golang.org/x/time/rate" +) + +// ACLAction identifies the action of an ACL rule. +type ACLAction string + +const ( + // ACLActionAllow permits matching queries. + ACLActionAllow ACLAction = "allow" + + // ACLActionDeny blocks matching queries. + ACLActionDeny ACLAction = "deny" +) + +// Valid reports whether a is a known ACL action. +func (a ACLAction) Valid() bool { + switch a { + case ACLActionAllow, ACLActionDeny: + return true + } + return false +} + +// WildcardAll matches all peers or all tools. +const WildcardAll = "*" + +// Sentinel errors for firewall decisions. +var ( + ErrRateLimitExceeded = errors.New("rate limit exceeded") + ErrGlobalRateLimitExceeded = errors.New("global rate limit exceeded") + ErrQueryDenied = errors.New("query denied by firewall rule") + ErrNoMatchingAllowRule = errors.New("query denied: no matching allow rule") +) + +// ACLRule defines an access control rule. +type ACLRule struct { + // PeerDID is the peer this rule applies to (WildcardAll for all peers). + PeerDID string `json:"peerDid"` + + // Action is ACLActionAllow or ACLActionDeny. + Action ACLAction `json:"action"` + + // Tools lists tool name patterns (supports * wildcard). + Tools []string `json:"tools"` + + // RateLimit is max requests per minute (0 = unlimited). + RateLimit int `json:"rateLimit"` +} + +// AttestationResult holds a structured ZK attestation proof from the prover. +type AttestationResult struct { + Proof []byte + PublicInputs []byte + CircuitID string + Scheme string +} + +// ZKAttestFunc generates a ZK attestation proof for a response. +type ZKAttestFunc func(responseHash, agentDIDHash []byte) (*AttestationResult, error) + +// ReputationChecker returns a trust score for a peer DID. +type ReputationChecker func(ctx context.Context, peerDID string) (float64, error) + +// Firewall enforces access control and response sanitization for P2P queries. +type Firewall struct { + rules []ACLRule + mu sync.RWMutex + limiters map[string]*rate.Limiter // per-peer rate limiters + attestFunc ZKAttestFunc + ownerShield *OwnerShield + reputationCheck ReputationChecker + minTrustScore float64 + logger *zap.SugaredLogger +} + +// New creates a new Firewall with deny-all default policy. +func New(rules []ACLRule, logger *zap.SugaredLogger) *Firewall { + f := &Firewall{ + rules: make([]ACLRule, 0, len(rules)), + limiters: make(map[string]*rate.Limiter), + logger: logger, + } + + // Initialize from provided rules; warn on overly permissive ones + // but still load them for backward compatibility. + for _, r := range rules { + if err := ValidateRule(r); err != nil { + logger.Warnw("loading overly permissive firewall rule (consider removing)", + "peerDID", r.PeerDID, + "action", r.Action, + "tools", r.Tools, + "warning", err.Error(), + ) + } + f.rules = append(f.rules, r) + if r.RateLimit > 0 && r.PeerDID != "" { + f.limiters[r.PeerDID] = rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(time.Minute/time.Duration(r.RateLimit)), r.RateLimit) + } + } + + return f +} + +// SetZKAttestFunc sets the ZK attestation function for response signing. +func (f *Firewall) SetZKAttestFunc(fn ZKAttestFunc) { + f.mu.Lock() + f.attestFunc = fn + f.mu.Unlock() +} + +// SetOwnerShield sets the owner data protection shield. +func (f *Firewall) SetOwnerShield(shield *OwnerShield) { + f.mu.Lock() + f.ownerShield = shield + f.mu.Unlock() +} + +// SetReputationChecker sets the reputation checker and minimum trust score. +func (f *Firewall) SetReputationChecker(fn ReputationChecker, minScore float64) { + f.mu.Lock() + f.reputationCheck = fn + f.minTrustScore = minScore + f.mu.Unlock() +} + +// FilterQuery checks if a query from the given peer is allowed. +func (f *Firewall) FilterQuery(ctx context.Context, peerDID, toolName string) error { + f.mu.RLock() + defer f.mu.RUnlock() + + // Check rate limit first. + if limiter, ok := f.limiters[peerDID]; ok { + if !limiter.Allow() { + return fmt.Errorf("%w for peer %s", ErrRateLimitExceeded, peerDID) + } + } + // Also check wildcard rate limiter. + if limiter, ok := f.limiters[WildcardAll]; ok { + if !limiter.Allow() { + return ErrGlobalRateLimitExceeded + } + } + + // Check reputation score. + if f.reputationCheck != nil { + score, err := f.reputationCheck(ctx, peerDID) + if err != nil { + f.logger.Warnw("reputation check error", "peerDID", peerDID, "error", err) + // Don't block on reputation errors, continue to ACL. + } else if score > 0 && score < f.minTrustScore { + // score == 0 means new peer, allow through (they start fresh). + return fmt.Errorf("peer %s reputation %.2f below minimum %.2f", peerDID, score, f.minTrustScore) + } + } + + // Check ACL rules. Default is deny-all. + allowed := false + for _, rule := range f.rules { + if !matchesPeer(rule.PeerDID, peerDID) { + continue + } + if !matchesTool(rule.Tools, toolName) { + continue + } + + switch rule.Action { + case ACLActionAllow: + allowed = true + case ACLActionDeny: + return fmt.Errorf("%w for peer %s, tool %s", ErrQueryDenied, peerDID, toolName) + } + } + + if !allowed { + return fmt.Errorf("%w for peer %s, tool %s", ErrNoMatchingAllowRule, peerDID, toolName) + } + + return nil +} + +// SanitizeResponse removes sensitive internal data from a response. +func (f *Firewall) SanitizeResponse(response map[string]interface{}) map[string]interface{} { + sanitized := make(map[string]interface{}, len(response)) + + for k, v := range response { + // Remove internal fields that should never be exposed. + if isSensitiveKey(k) { + continue + } + + switch val := v.(type) { + case string: + sanitized[k] = sanitizeString(val) + case map[string]interface{}: + sanitized[k] = f.SanitizeResponse(val) + default: + sanitized[k] = v + } + } + + // Apply owner shield if configured. + if f.ownerShield != nil { + var blocked []string + sanitized, blocked = f.ownerShield.ScanAndRedact(sanitized) + if len(blocked) > 0 { + f.logger.Infow("owner data redacted from P2P response", "fields", blocked) + } + } + + return sanitized +} + +// AttestResponse generates a ZK attestation proof for a response. +func (f *Firewall) AttestResponse(responseHash, agentDIDHash []byte) (*AttestationResult, error) { + f.mu.RLock() + fn := f.attestFunc + f.mu.RUnlock() + + if fn == nil { + return nil, nil // Attestation not configured. + } + + return fn(responseHash, agentDIDHash) +} + +// ValidateRule checks whether an ACL rule is safe to add. It rejects +// overly permissive allow rules (wildcard peer + wildcard tools). +func ValidateRule(rule ACLRule) error { + if rule.Action != ACLActionAllow { + return nil // deny rules are always safe + } + + isWildcardPeer := rule.PeerDID == WildcardAll + isWildcardTools := len(rule.Tools) == 0 + for _, t := range rule.Tools { + if t == WildcardAll { + isWildcardTools = true + break + } + } + + if isWildcardPeer && isWildcardTools { + return fmt.Errorf("overly permissive rule: allow all peers with all tools is prohibited") + } + + return nil +} + +// AddRule validates and adds a new ACL rule. Returns an error if the rule +// is overly permissive (e.g. allow * with all tools). +func (f *Firewall) AddRule(rule ACLRule) error { + if err := ValidateRule(rule); err != nil { + return err + } + + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + + f.rules = append(f.rules, rule) + + if rule.RateLimit > 0 && rule.PeerDID != "" { + f.limiters[rule.PeerDID] = rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(time.Minute/time.Duration(rule.RateLimit)), rule.RateLimit) + } + + f.logger.Infow("firewall rule added", + "peerDID", rule.PeerDID, + "action", rule.Action, + "tools", rule.Tools, + ) + return nil +} + +// RemoveRule removes ACL rules matching the peer DID. +func (f *Firewall) RemoveRule(peerDID string) int { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + + var kept []ACLRule + removed := 0 + for _, r := range f.rules { + if r.PeerDID == peerDID { + removed++ + continue + } + kept = append(kept, r) + } + f.rules = kept + delete(f.limiters, peerDID) + + f.logger.Infow("firewall rules removed", "peerDID", peerDID, "count", removed) + return removed +} + +// Rules returns a copy of current rules. +func (f *Firewall) Rules() []ACLRule { + f.mu.RLock() + defer f.mu.RUnlock() + + rules := make([]ACLRule, len(f.rules)) + copy(rules, f.rules) + return rules +} + +// matchesPeer checks if a rule peer pattern matches the given peer DID. +func matchesPeer(pattern, peerDID string) bool { + if pattern == WildcardAll { + return true + } + return pattern == peerDID +} + +// matchesTool checks if any tool pattern in the rule matches the tool name. +func matchesTool(patterns []string, toolName string) bool { + if len(patterns) == 0 { + return true // No tool filter means all tools. + } + for _, p := range patterns { + if p == WildcardAll { + return true + } + if strings.HasSuffix(p, WildcardAll) { + if strings.HasPrefix(toolName, strings.TrimSuffix(p, WildcardAll)) { + return true + } + } + if p == toolName { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// sensitiveKeyPatterns are field names that should be stripped from responses. +var sensitiveKeyPatterns = []*regexp.Regexp{ + regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)^(db_?path|file_?path|internal_?id|_internal)$`), + regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)password|secret|private_?key|token`), +} + +// isSensitiveKey checks if a response field name should be stripped. +func isSensitiveKey(key string) bool { + for _, re := range sensitiveKeyPatterns { + if re.MatchString(key) { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// sanitizeString removes file paths and internal references from string values. +func sanitizeString(s string) string { + // Remove absolute file paths. + pathPattern := regexp.MustCompile(`(?:/[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+){3,}`) + s = pathPattern.ReplaceAllString(s, "[path-redacted]") + + return s +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/firewall/firewall_test.go b/internal/p2p/firewall/firewall_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..96721f59 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/firewall/firewall_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +package firewall + +import ( + "testing" + + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +func TestValidateRule_AllowWildcardPeerAndTools(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give ACLRule + wantErr bool + }{ + { + give: ACLRule{PeerDID: WildcardAll, Action: ACLActionAllow}, + wantErr: true, // wildcard peer + empty tools (= all) + }, + { + give: ACLRule{PeerDID: WildcardAll, Action: ACLActionAllow, Tools: []string{WildcardAll}}, + wantErr: true, // wildcard peer + wildcard tool + }, + { + give: ACLRule{PeerDID: WildcardAll, Action: ACLActionAllow, Tools: []string{"echo", WildcardAll}}, + wantErr: true, // wildcard tool mixed in + }, + { + give: ACLRule{PeerDID: WildcardAll, Action: ACLActionDeny}, + wantErr: false, // deny rules always safe + }, + { + give: ACLRule{PeerDID: WildcardAll, Action: ACLActionDeny, Tools: []string{WildcardAll}}, + wantErr: false, // deny rules always safe + }, + { + give: ACLRule{PeerDID: "did:key:specific", Action: ACLActionAllow, Tools: []string{WildcardAll}}, + wantErr: false, // specific peer OK + }, + { + give: ACLRule{PeerDID: WildcardAll, Action: ACLActionAllow, Tools: []string{"echo"}}, + wantErr: false, // specific tool OK + }, + { + give: ACLRule{PeerDID: "did:key:abc", Action: ACLActionAllow}, + wantErr: false, // specific peer, all tools + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give.PeerDID+"/"+string(tt.give.Action), func(t *testing.T) { + err := ValidateRule(tt.give) + if tt.wantErr && err == nil { + t.Error("expected error for overly permissive rule") + } + if !tt.wantErr && err != nil { + t.Errorf("unexpected error: %v", err) + } + }) + } +} + +func TestAddRule_RejectsOverlyPermissive(t *testing.T) { + logger, _ := zap.NewDevelopment() + fw := New(nil, logger.Sugar()) + + err := fw.AddRule(ACLRule{PeerDID: WildcardAll, Action: ACLActionAllow, Tools: []string{WildcardAll}}) + if err == nil { + t.Error("expected AddRule to reject wildcard allow rule") + } + + // Verify the rule was NOT added. + rules := fw.Rules() + if len(rules) != 0 { + t.Errorf("expected no rules, got %d", len(rules)) + } +} + +func TestAddRule_AcceptsValidRule(t *testing.T) { + logger, _ := zap.NewDevelopment() + fw := New(nil, logger.Sugar()) + + err := fw.AddRule(ACLRule{PeerDID: "did:key:peer-1", Action: ACLActionAllow, Tools: []string{"echo"}}) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err) + } + + rules := fw.Rules() + if len(rules) != 1 { + t.Fatalf("expected 1 rule, got %d", len(rules)) + } + if rules[0].PeerDID != "did:key:peer-1" { + t.Errorf("unexpected peer DID: %s", rules[0].PeerDID) + } +} + +func TestAddRule_AcceptsDenyWildcard(t *testing.T) { + logger, _ := zap.NewDevelopment() + fw := New(nil, logger.Sugar()) + + err := fw.AddRule(ACLRule{PeerDID: WildcardAll, Action: ACLActionDeny, Tools: []string{WildcardAll}}) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err) + } + + rules := fw.Rules() + if len(rules) != 1 { + t.Fatalf("expected 1 rule, got %d", len(rules)) + } +} + +func TestNew_WarnsOnOverlyPermissiveInitialRules(t *testing.T) { + // Should not panic — just logs a warning for backward compatibility. + logger, _ := zap.NewDevelopment() + fw := New([]ACLRule{ + {PeerDID: WildcardAll, Action: ACLActionAllow}, + }, logger.Sugar()) + + // Rule is still loaded (backward compat). + rules := fw.Rules() + if len(rules) != 1 { + t.Fatalf("expected 1 rule (backward compat), got %d", len(rules)) + } +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/firewall/owner_shield.go b/internal/p2p/firewall/owner_shield.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..047b49d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/firewall/owner_shield.go @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +// Package firewall implements the Knowledge Firewall for P2P queries. +package firewall + +import ( + "fmt" + "regexp" + "strings" + + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +// OwnerProtectionConfig configures owner data protection. +type OwnerProtectionConfig struct { + OwnerName string `json:"ownerName"` + OwnerEmail string `json:"ownerEmail"` + OwnerPhone string `json:"ownerPhone"` + ExtraTerms []string `json:"extraTerms,omitempty"` + BlockConversations bool `json:"blockConversations"` +} + +// OwnerShield prevents owner personal data from leaking via P2P responses. +// No amount of USDC can bypass this layer. +type OwnerShield struct { + exactTerms []string + regexPatterns []*regexp.Regexp + blockConvKeys bool + logger *zap.SugaredLogger +} + +// conversationKeys are substrings that identify conversation-related fields. +var conversationKeys = []string{ + "conversation", + "message_history", + "chat_log", + "session_history", + "chat_history", +} + +const redactedPlaceholder = "[owner-data-redacted]" + +// NewOwnerShield creates a new OwnerShield from the given config. +func NewOwnerShield(cfg OwnerProtectionConfig, logger *zap.SugaredLogger) *OwnerShield { + var exactTerms []string + for _, term := range []string{cfg.OwnerName, cfg.OwnerEmail, cfg.OwnerPhone} { + if term != "" { + exactTerms = append(exactTerms, strings.ToLower(term)) + } + } + for _, term := range cfg.ExtraTerms { + if term != "" { + exactTerms = append(exactTerms, strings.ToLower(term)) + } + } + + regexPatterns := []*regexp.Regexp{ + regexp.MustCompile(`\b[\w.+-]+@[\w.-]+\.\w{2,}\b`), + regexp.MustCompile(`\b\d{2,4}[-.]?\d{3,4}[-.]?\d{4}\b`), + } + + return &OwnerShield{ + exactTerms: exactTerms, + regexPatterns: regexPatterns, + blockConvKeys: cfg.BlockConversations, + logger: logger, + } +} + +// ScanAndRedact recursively walks the response map and redacts owner data. +// It returns the redacted map and a list of redacted field paths. +func (s *OwnerShield) ScanAndRedact(response map[string]interface{}) (map[string]interface{}, []string) { + result := make(map[string]interface{}, len(response)) + var blocked []string + s.scanMap(response, result, "", &blocked) + return result, blocked +} + +// ContainsOwnerData checks if the text contains any owner data. +func (s *OwnerShield) ContainsOwnerData(text string) bool { + lower := strings.ToLower(text) + for _, term := range s.exactTerms { + if strings.Contains(lower, term) { + return true + } + } + for _, re := range s.regexPatterns { + if re.MatchString(text) { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +func (s *OwnerShield) scanMap(src, dst map[string]interface{}, prefix string, blocked *[]string) { + for k, v := range src { + path := joinPath(prefix, k) + + // Block conversation-related keys entirely. + if s.blockConvKeys && isConversationKey(k) { + dst[k] = redactedPlaceholder + *blocked = append(*blocked, path) + continue + } + + switch val := v.(type) { + case string: + if s.containsOwnerMatch(val) { + dst[k] = redactedPlaceholder + *blocked = append(*blocked, path) + } else { + dst[k] = val + } + case map[string]interface{}: + nested := make(map[string]interface{}, len(val)) + s.scanMap(val, nested, path, blocked) + dst[k] = nested + case []interface{}: + dst[k] = s.scanSlice(val, path, blocked) + default: + dst[k] = v + } + } +} + +func (s *OwnerShield) scanSlice(src []interface{}, prefix string, blocked *[]string) []interface{} { + result := make([]interface{}, len(src)) + for i, elem := range src { + path := fmt.Sprintf("%s[%d]", prefix, i) + switch val := elem.(type) { + case string: + if s.containsOwnerMatch(val) { + result[i] = redactedPlaceholder + *blocked = append(*blocked, path) + } else { + result[i] = val + } + case map[string]interface{}: + nested := make(map[string]interface{}, len(val)) + s.scanMap(val, nested, path, blocked) + result[i] = nested + case []interface{}: + result[i] = s.scanSlice(val, path, blocked) + default: + result[i] = elem + } + } + return result +} + +func (s *OwnerShield) containsOwnerMatch(text string) bool { + lower := strings.ToLower(text) + for _, term := range s.exactTerms { + if strings.Contains(lower, term) { + return true + } + } + for _, re := range s.regexPatterns { + if re.MatchString(text) { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +func isConversationKey(key string) bool { + lower := strings.ToLower(key) + for _, ck := range conversationKeys { + if strings.Contains(lower, ck) { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +func joinPath(prefix, key string) string { + if prefix == "" { + return key + } + return prefix + "." + key +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/firewall/owner_shield_test.go b/internal/p2p/firewall/owner_shield_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c78413d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/firewall/owner_shield_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,269 @@ +package firewall + +import ( + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +func testLogger() *zap.SugaredLogger { + logger, _ := zap.NewDevelopment() + return logger.Sugar() +} + +func TestScanAndRedact_ExactTerms(t *testing.T) { + shield := NewOwnerShield(OwnerProtectionConfig{ + OwnerName: "Alice Kim", + OwnerEmail: "alice@example.com", + OwnerPhone: "010-1234-5678", + }, testLogger()) + + tests := []struct { + give string + giveData map[string]interface{} + wantKeys []string + }{ + { + give: "name redacted", + giveData: map[string]interface{}{ + "result": "Contact Alice Kim for details", + }, + wantKeys: []string{"result"}, + }, + { + give: "email redacted", + giveData: map[string]interface{}{ + "contact": "Send mail to alice@example.com", + }, + wantKeys: []string{"contact"}, + }, + { + give: "phone redacted", + giveData: map[string]interface{}{ + "phone": "Call 010-1234-5678", + }, + wantKeys: []string{"phone"}, + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + result, blocked := shield.ScanAndRedact(tt.giveData) + require.Len(t, blocked, len(tt.wantKeys)) + for _, key := range tt.wantKeys { + assert.Equal(t, redactedPlaceholder, result[key]) + assert.Contains(t, blocked, key) + } + }) + } +} + +func TestScanAndRedact_RegexPatterns(t *testing.T) { + shield := NewOwnerShield(OwnerProtectionConfig{}, testLogger()) + + tests := []struct { + give string + giveData map[string]interface{} + wantBlock bool + }{ + { + give: "generic email caught", + giveData: map[string]interface{}{"info": "Email bob@corp.io for help"}, + wantBlock: true, + }, + { + give: "generic phone caught", + giveData: map[string]interface{}{"info": "Call 02-555-1234 now"}, + wantBlock: true, + }, + { + give: "phone with dots caught", + giveData: map[string]interface{}{"info": "Phone: 010.9876.5432"}, + wantBlock: true, + }, + { + give: "no match passes through", + giveData: map[string]interface{}{"info": "Nothing sensitive here"}, + wantBlock: false, + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + _, blocked := shield.ScanAndRedact(tt.giveData) + if tt.wantBlock { + assert.NotEmpty(t, blocked) + } else { + assert.Empty(t, blocked) + } + }) + } +} + +func TestScanAndRedact_ConversationBlocking(t *testing.T) { + shield := NewOwnerShield(OwnerProtectionConfig{ + BlockConversations: true, + }, testLogger()) + + tests := []struct { + give string + giveData map[string]interface{} + wantKey string + }{ + { + give: "conversation key blocked", + giveData: map[string]interface{}{"conversation": "secret chat content"}, + wantKey: "conversation", + }, + { + give: "message_history key blocked", + giveData: map[string]interface{}{"message_history": []interface{}{"msg1", "msg2"}}, + wantKey: "message_history", + }, + { + give: "chat_log key blocked", + giveData: map[string]interface{}{"chat_log": "some log data"}, + wantKey: "chat_log", + }, + { + give: "session_history key blocked", + giveData: map[string]interface{}{"session_history": "session data"}, + wantKey: "session_history", + }, + { + give: "chat_history key blocked", + giveData: map[string]interface{}{"chat_history": map[string]interface{}{"key": "val"}}, + wantKey: "chat_history", + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + result, blocked := shield.ScanAndRedact(tt.giveData) + require.Len(t, blocked, 1) + assert.Equal(t, tt.wantKey, blocked[0]) + assert.Equal(t, redactedPlaceholder, result[tt.wantKey]) + }) + } +} + +func TestScanAndRedact_ConversationBlocking_Disabled(t *testing.T) { + shield := NewOwnerShield(OwnerProtectionConfig{ + BlockConversations: false, + }, testLogger()) + + data := map[string]interface{}{ + "conversation": "safe content without PII", + } + + result, blocked := shield.ScanAndRedact(data) + assert.Empty(t, blocked) + assert.Equal(t, "safe content without PII", result["conversation"]) +} + +func TestScanAndRedact_NestedMaps(t *testing.T) { + shield := NewOwnerShield(OwnerProtectionConfig{ + OwnerName: "Alice Kim", + }, testLogger()) + + data := map[string]interface{}{ + "outer": map[string]interface{}{ + "inner": "Alice Kim is the owner", + "safe": "nothing here", + }, + "list": []interface{}{ + "Alice Kim was mentioned", + "clean item", + map[string]interface{}{ + "deep": "deep mention of Alice Kim", + }, + }, + } + + result, blocked := shield.ScanAndRedact(data) + require.Len(t, blocked, 3) + assert.Contains(t, blocked, "outer.inner") + assert.Contains(t, blocked, "list[0]") + assert.Contains(t, blocked, "list[2].deep") + + outer := result["outer"].(map[string]interface{}) + assert.Equal(t, redactedPlaceholder, outer["inner"]) + assert.Equal(t, "nothing here", outer["safe"]) + + list := result["list"].([]interface{}) + assert.Equal(t, redactedPlaceholder, list[0]) + assert.Equal(t, "clean item", list[1]) + deepMap := list[2].(map[string]interface{}) + assert.Equal(t, redactedPlaceholder, deepMap["deep"]) +} + +func TestScanAndRedact_NoMatch(t *testing.T) { + shield := NewOwnerShield(OwnerProtectionConfig{ + OwnerName: "Alice Kim", + OwnerEmail: "alice@example.com", + BlockConversations: true, + }, testLogger()) + + data := map[string]interface{}{ + "result": "The weather is sunny today", + "count": 42, + "details": map[string]interface{}{"note": "no PII here"}, + } + + result, blocked := shield.ScanAndRedact(data) + assert.Empty(t, blocked) + assert.Equal(t, "The weather is sunny today", result["result"]) + assert.Equal(t, 42, result["count"]) + details := result["details"].(map[string]interface{}) + assert.Equal(t, "no PII here", details["note"]) +} + +func TestContainsOwnerData(t *testing.T) { + shield := NewOwnerShield(OwnerProtectionConfig{ + OwnerName: "Alice Kim", + OwnerEmail: "alice@example.com", + OwnerPhone: "010-1234-5678", + ExtraTerms: []string{"Project Omega"}, + }, testLogger()) + + tests := []struct { + give string + want bool + }{ + {give: "Contact Alice Kim please", want: true}, + {give: "Send to alice@example.com", want: true}, + {give: "Call 010-1234-5678", want: true}, + {give: "Top secret Project Omega data", want: true}, + {give: "case insensitive ALICE KIM test", want: true}, + {give: "generic email test@domain.org", want: true}, + {give: "generic phone 02-555-1234", want: true}, + {give: "nothing sensitive at all", want: false}, + {give: "just a plain number 42", want: false}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + assert.Equal(t, tt.want, shield.ContainsOwnerData(tt.give)) + }) + } +} + +func TestNewOwnerShield_EmptyConfig(t *testing.T) { + shield := NewOwnerShield(OwnerProtectionConfig{}, testLogger()) + + assert.Empty(t, shield.exactTerms) + assert.Len(t, shield.regexPatterns, 2) + assert.False(t, shield.blockConvKeys) +} + +func TestNewOwnerShield_ExtraTerms(t *testing.T) { + shield := NewOwnerShield(OwnerProtectionConfig{ + ExtraTerms: []string{"secret-project", "", "codename-alpha"}, + }, testLogger()) + + assert.Len(t, shield.exactTerms, 2) + assert.Contains(t, shield.exactTerms, "secret-project") + assert.Contains(t, shield.exactTerms, "codename-alpha") +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/handshake/handshake.go b/internal/p2p/handshake/handshake.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b5b1aa96 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/handshake/handshake.go @@ -0,0 +1,458 @@ +package handshake + +import ( + "bytes" + "context" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/rand" + "encoding/binary" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "math" + "time" + + ethcrypto "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/network" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" + "go.uber.org/zap" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/wallet" +) + +// Protocol version constants for handshake negotiation. +const ( + // ProtocolID is the legacy protocol identifier (unsigned challenges). + ProtocolID = "/lango/handshake/1.0.0" + + // ProtocolIDv11 is the signed-challenge protocol (v1.1). + ProtocolIDv11 = "/lango/handshake/1.1.0" +) + +// challengeTimestampWindow is the maximum age of a challenge timestamp (5 min). +const challengeTimestampWindow = 5 * time.Minute + +// challengeFutureGrace is the maximum future drift allowed for challenge timestamps. +const challengeFutureGrace = 30 * time.Second + +// ApprovalFunc is called to request user approval for an incoming handshake. +// Uses the callback pattern to avoid import cycles with the approval package. +type ApprovalFunc func(ctx context.Context, pending *PendingHandshake) (bool, error) + +// ZKProverFunc generates a ZK ownership proof for the given challenge. +type ZKProverFunc func(ctx context.Context, challenge []byte) ([]byte, error) + +// ZKVerifierFunc verifies a ZK ownership proof. +type ZKVerifierFunc func(ctx context.Context, proof, challenge, publicKey []byte) (bool, error) + +// PendingHandshake describes a handshake awaiting user approval. +type PendingHandshake struct { + PeerID peer.ID `json:"peerId"` + PeerDID string `json:"peerDid"` + RemoteAddr string `json:"remoteAddr"` + Timestamp time.Time `json:"timestamp"` +} + +// Challenge is sent by the initiator to start the handshake. +type Challenge struct { + Nonce []byte `json:"nonce"` + Timestamp int64 `json:"timestamp"` + SenderDID string `json:"senderDid"` + PublicKey []byte `json:"publicKey,omitempty"` // v1.1: initiator's public key + Signature []byte `json:"signature,omitempty"` // v1.1: ECDSA signature over canonical payload +} + +// ChallengeResponse is the target's reply with proof of identity. +type ChallengeResponse struct { + Nonce []byte `json:"nonce"` + Signature []byte `json:"signature,omitempty"` + ZKProof []byte `json:"zkProof,omitempty"` + DID string `json:"did"` + PublicKey []byte `json:"publicKey"` +} + +// SessionAck is sent by the initiator after verifying the response. +type SessionAck struct { + Token string `json:"token"` + ExpiresAt int64 `json:"expiresAt"` +} + +// Handshaker manages peer authentication using wallet signatures or ZK proofs. +type Handshaker struct { + wallet wallet.WalletProvider + sessions *SessionStore + approvalFn ApprovalFunc + zkProver ZKProverFunc + zkVerifier ZKVerifierFunc + zkEnabled bool + timeout time.Duration + autoApproveKnown bool + nonceCache *NonceCache + requireSignedChallenge bool + logger *zap.SugaredLogger +} + +// Config configures the Handshaker. +type Config struct { + Wallet wallet.WalletProvider + Sessions *SessionStore + ApprovalFn ApprovalFunc + ZKProver ZKProverFunc + ZKVerifier ZKVerifierFunc + ZKEnabled bool + Timeout time.Duration + AutoApproveKnown bool + NonceCache *NonceCache + RequireSignedChallenge bool + Logger *zap.SugaredLogger +} + +// NewHandshaker creates a new peer authenticator. +func NewHandshaker(cfg Config) *Handshaker { + return &Handshaker{ + wallet: cfg.Wallet, + sessions: cfg.Sessions, + approvalFn: cfg.ApprovalFn, + zkProver: cfg.ZKProver, + zkVerifier: cfg.ZKVerifier, + zkEnabled: cfg.ZKEnabled, + timeout: cfg.Timeout, + autoApproveKnown: cfg.AutoApproveKnown, + nonceCache: cfg.NonceCache, + requireSignedChallenge: cfg.RequireSignedChallenge, + logger: cfg.Logger, + } +} + +// Initiate starts a handshake with a remote peer over the given stream. +func (h *Handshaker) Initiate(ctx context.Context, s network.Stream, localDID string) (*Session, error) { + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, h.timeout) + defer cancel() + + // Generate challenge nonce. + nonce := make([]byte, 32) + if _, err := rand.Read(nonce); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate nonce: %w", err) + } + + challenge := Challenge{ + Nonce: nonce, + Timestamp: time.Now().Unix(), + SenderDID: localDID, + } + + // Sign the challenge (v1.1 protocol). + pubkey, err := h.wallet.PublicKey(ctx) + if err != nil { + h.logger.Warnw("challenge signing skipped: get public key", "error", err) + } else { + challenge.PublicKey = pubkey + payload := challengeSignPayload(nonce, challenge.Timestamp, localDID) + sig, err := h.wallet.SignMessage(ctx, payload) + if err != nil { + h.logger.Warnw("challenge signing skipped: sign", "error", err) + } else { + challenge.Signature = sig + } + } + + // Send challenge. + enc := json.NewEncoder(s) + if err := enc.Encode(challenge); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("send challenge: %w", err) + } + + // Receive response. + var resp ChallengeResponse + dec := json.NewDecoder(s) + if err := dec.Decode(&resp); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("receive challenge response: %w", err) + } + + // Verify response. + if err := h.verifyResponse(ctx, &resp, nonce); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("verify response: %w", err) + } + + // Determine ZK verification status. + zkVerified := len(resp.ZKProof) > 0 + + // Create session. + sess, err := h.sessions.Create(resp.DID, zkVerified) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("create session: %w", err) + } + + // Send session acknowledgment. + ack := SessionAck{ + Token: sess.Token, + ExpiresAt: sess.ExpiresAt.Unix(), + } + if err := enc.Encode(ack); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("send session ack: %w", err) + } + + h.logger.Infow("handshake initiated", + "remoteDID", resp.DID, + "zkVerified", zkVerified, + ) + + return sess, nil +} + +// HandleIncoming processes an incoming handshake request. +func (h *Handshaker) HandleIncoming(ctx context.Context, s network.Stream) (*Session, error) { + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, h.timeout) + defer cancel() + + // Receive challenge. + var challenge Challenge + dec := json.NewDecoder(s) + if err := dec.Decode(&challenge); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("receive challenge: %w", err) + } + + // Validate challenge timestamp (reject stale or far-future challenges). + if err := validateChallengeTimestamp(challenge.Timestamp); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("challenge timestamp: %w", err) + } + + // Check nonce replay. + if h.nonceCache != nil { + if !h.nonceCache.CheckAndRecord(challenge.Nonce) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("nonce replay detected") + } + } + + // Verify challenge signature (v1.1 protocol). + if len(challenge.Signature) > 0 && len(challenge.PublicKey) > 0 { + if err := verifyChallengeSignature(&challenge); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("challenge signature: %w", err) + } + h.logger.Debugw("challenge signature verified", "senderDID", challenge.SenderDID) + } else if h.requireSignedChallenge { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsigned challenge rejected (requireSignedChallenge=true)") + } + + // Request user approval (HITL). + remotePeer := s.Conn().RemotePeer() + if h.approvalFn != nil { + // Check if auto-approve is enabled for known peers. + existing := h.sessions.Get(challenge.SenderDID) + needsApproval := existing == nil || !h.autoApproveKnown + + if needsApproval { + pending := &PendingHandshake{ + PeerID: remotePeer, + PeerDID: challenge.SenderDID, + RemoteAddr: s.Conn().RemoteMultiaddr().String(), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + approved, err := h.approvalFn(ctx, pending) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("approval request: %w", err) + } + if !approved { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("handshake denied by user") + } + } + } + + // Get local public key. + pubkey, err := h.wallet.PublicKey(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("get public key: %w", err) + } + + // Build response. + resp := ChallengeResponse{ + Nonce: challenge.Nonce, + PublicKey: pubkey, + } + + // Generate DID from pubkey. + resp.DID = "did:lango:" + fmt.Sprintf("%x", pubkey) + + // Sign or generate ZK proof. + if h.zkEnabled && h.zkProver != nil { + proof, err := h.zkProver(ctx, challenge.Nonce) + if err != nil { + h.logger.Warnw("ZK proof generation failed, falling back to signature", "error", err) + // Fall back to signature mode. + sig, err := h.wallet.SignMessage(ctx, challenge.Nonce) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("sign challenge: %w", err) + } + resp.Signature = sig + } else { + resp.ZKProof = proof + } + } else { + sig, err := h.wallet.SignMessage(ctx, challenge.Nonce) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("sign challenge: %w", err) + } + resp.Signature = sig + } + + // Send response. + enc := json.NewEncoder(s) + if err := enc.Encode(resp); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("send response: %w", err) + } + + // Receive session acknowledgment. + var ack SessionAck + if err := dec.Decode(&ack); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("receive session ack: %w", err) + } + + zkVerified := len(resp.ZKProof) > 0 + sess := &Session{ + PeerDID: challenge.SenderDID, + Token: ack.Token, + CreatedAt: time.Now(), + ExpiresAt: time.Unix(ack.ExpiresAt, 0), + ZKVerified: zkVerified, + } + + // Store the session locally as well. + h.sessions.mu.Lock() + h.sessions.sessions[challenge.SenderDID] = sess + h.sessions.mu.Unlock() + + h.logger.Infow("handshake accepted", + "remoteDID", challenge.SenderDID, + "zkVerified", zkVerified, + ) + + return sess, nil +} + +// verifyResponse checks the challenge response authenticity. +func (h *Handshaker) verifyResponse(ctx context.Context, resp *ChallengeResponse, nonce []byte) error { + // Verify nonce matches using constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks. + if !hmac.Equal(resp.Nonce, nonce) { + return fmt.Errorf("nonce mismatch") + } + + // Verify ZK proof if provided. + if len(resp.ZKProof) > 0 && h.zkVerifier != nil { + valid, err := h.zkVerifier(ctx, resp.ZKProof, nonce, resp.PublicKey) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("ZK proof verification: %w", err) + } + if !valid { + return fmt.Errorf("ZK proof invalid") + } + return nil + } + + // Verify ECDSA signature by recovering the public key and comparing with the + // claimed key (secp256k1 recovery, matching wallet.SignMessage pattern). + if len(resp.Signature) > 0 { + // Signature must be exactly 65 bytes: R(32) + S(32) + V(1). + if len(resp.Signature) != 65 { + return fmt.Errorf("invalid signature length: %d (expected 65)", len(resp.Signature)) + } + + // Hash the nonce using Keccak256 (consistent with wallet.SignMessage). + hash := ethcrypto.Keccak256(nonce) + + // Recover the public key from the signature. + recoveredPub, err := ethcrypto.SigToPub(hash, resp.Signature) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("recover public key from signature: %w", err) + } + + // Compare the recovered compressed public key with the claimed key. + recoveredCompressed := ethcrypto.CompressPubkey(recoveredPub) + if !bytes.Equal(recoveredCompressed, resp.PublicKey) { + return fmt.Errorf("signature public key mismatch") + } + + return nil + } + + return fmt.Errorf("no proof or signature in response") +} + +// StreamHandlerV11 returns a libp2p stream handler for v1.1 (signed challenge) handshakes. +// Uses the same HandleIncoming logic since it handles both signed and unsigned challenges. +func (h *Handshaker) StreamHandlerV11() network.StreamHandler { + return func(s network.Stream) { + defer s.Close() + + ctx := context.Background() + _, err := h.HandleIncoming(ctx, s) + if err != nil { + h.logger.Warnw("incoming v1.1 handshake failed", "peer", s.Conn().RemotePeer(), "error", err) + } + } +} + +// challengeSignPayload constructs the canonical bytes for challenge signing: +// nonce || bigEndian(timestamp, 8) || utf8(senderDID) +func challengeSignPayload(nonce []byte, timestamp int64, senderDID string) []byte { + buf := make([]byte, 0, len(nonce)+8+len(senderDID)) + buf = append(buf, nonce...) + ts := make([]byte, 8) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(ts, uint64(timestamp)) + buf = append(buf, ts...) + buf = append(buf, []byte(senderDID)...) + return ethcrypto.Keccak256(buf) +} + +// verifyChallengeSignature verifies the ECDSA signature on a v1.1 challenge. +func verifyChallengeSignature(c *Challenge) error { + if len(c.Signature) != 65 { + return fmt.Errorf("invalid signature length: %d (expected 65)", len(c.Signature)) + } + + payload := challengeSignPayload(c.Nonce, c.Timestamp, c.SenderDID) + recovered, err := ethcrypto.SigToPub(payload, c.Signature) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("recover public key: %w", err) + } + + recoveredCompressed := ethcrypto.CompressPubkey(recovered) + if !bytes.Equal(recoveredCompressed, c.PublicKey) { + return fmt.Errorf("public key mismatch") + } + + return nil +} + +// validateChallengeTimestamp ensures the challenge timestamp is within the +// acceptable window: not older than challengeTimestampWindow and not more +// than challengeFutureGrace in the future. +func validateChallengeTimestamp(ts int64) error { + if ts <= 0 || ts > math.MaxInt64/2 { + return fmt.Errorf("invalid timestamp value: %d", ts) + } + + now := time.Now() + challengeTime := time.Unix(ts, 0) + + if now.Sub(challengeTime) > challengeTimestampWindow { + return fmt.Errorf("timestamp too old: %v ago (max %v)", now.Sub(challengeTime), challengeTimestampWindow) + } + + if challengeTime.Sub(now) > challengeFutureGrace { + return fmt.Errorf("timestamp too far in future: %v ahead (max %v)", challengeTime.Sub(now), challengeFutureGrace) + } + + return nil +} + +// StreamHandler returns a libp2p stream handler for incoming handshakes. +func (h *Handshaker) StreamHandler() network.StreamHandler { + return func(s network.Stream) { + defer s.Close() + + ctx := context.Background() + _, err := h.HandleIncoming(ctx, s) + if err != nil { + h.logger.Warnw("incoming handshake failed", "peer", s.Conn().RemotePeer(), "error", err) + } + } +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/handshake/handshake_test.go b/internal/p2p/handshake/handshake_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..83187b61 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/handshake/handshake_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +package handshake + +import ( + "context" + "math/big" + "testing" + "time" + + ethcrypto "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +// mockWallet implements wallet.WalletProvider for testing. +type mockWallet struct { + privKeyBytes []byte +} + +func (m *mockWallet) SignMessage(_ context.Context, message []byte) ([]byte, error) { + key, err := ethcrypto.ToECDSA(m.privKeyBytes) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + hash := ethcrypto.Keccak256(message) + return ethcrypto.Sign(hash, key) +} + +func (m *mockWallet) PublicKey(_ context.Context) ([]byte, error) { + key, err := ethcrypto.ToECDSA(m.privKeyBytes) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return ethcrypto.CompressPubkey(&key.PublicKey), nil +} + +func (m *mockWallet) Address(_ context.Context) (string, error) { return "", nil } +func (m *mockWallet) Balance(_ context.Context) (*big.Int, error) { return nil, nil } +func (m *mockWallet) SignTransaction(_ context.Context, _ []byte) ([]byte, error) { return nil, nil } + +func newTestHandshaker(t *testing.T, w *mockWallet) *Handshaker { + t.Helper() + sessions, err := NewSessionStore(24 * time.Hour) + require.NoError(t, err) + + return NewHandshaker(Config{ + Wallet: w, + Sessions: sessions, + Timeout: 30 * time.Second, + Logger: zap.NewNop().Sugar(), + }) +} + +func TestVerifyResponse_ValidSignature(t *testing.T) { + privKey, err := ethcrypto.GenerateKey() + require.NoError(t, err) + privBytes := ethcrypto.FromECDSA(privKey) + + w := &mockWallet{privKeyBytes: privBytes} + h := newTestHandshaker(t, w) + + nonce := []byte("test-challenge-nonce-32bytes!!!!!") + sig, err := w.SignMessage(context.Background(), nonce) + require.NoError(t, err) + + pubkey, err := w.PublicKey(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + + resp := &ChallengeResponse{ + Nonce: nonce, + Signature: sig, + PublicKey: pubkey, + DID: "did:lango:test", + } + + err = h.verifyResponse(context.Background(), resp, nonce) + assert.NoError(t, err) +} + +func TestVerifyResponse_InvalidSignature(t *testing.T) { + privKey, err := ethcrypto.GenerateKey() + require.NoError(t, err) + privBytes := ethcrypto.FromECDSA(privKey) + + w := &mockWallet{privKeyBytes: privBytes} + h := newTestHandshaker(t, w) + + nonce := []byte("test-challenge-nonce-32bytes!!!!!") + + // Sign with one key but claim a different public key. + sig, err := w.SignMessage(context.Background(), nonce) + require.NoError(t, err) + + otherKey, err := ethcrypto.GenerateKey() + require.NoError(t, err) + otherPubkey := ethcrypto.CompressPubkey(&otherKey.PublicKey) + + resp := &ChallengeResponse{ + Nonce: nonce, + Signature: sig, + PublicKey: otherPubkey, + DID: "did:lango:test", + } + + err = h.verifyResponse(context.Background(), resp, nonce) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "public key mismatch") +} + +func TestVerifyResponse_WrongSignatureLength(t *testing.T) { + privKey, err := ethcrypto.GenerateKey() + require.NoError(t, err) + privBytes := ethcrypto.FromECDSA(privKey) + + w := &mockWallet{privKeyBytes: privBytes} + h := newTestHandshaker(t, w) + + nonce := []byte("test-challenge-nonce-32bytes!!!!!") + pubkey, err := w.PublicKey(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + + resp := &ChallengeResponse{ + Nonce: nonce, + Signature: []byte("too-short"), + PublicKey: pubkey, + DID: "did:lango:test", + } + + err = h.verifyResponse(context.Background(), resp, nonce) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid signature length") +} + +func TestVerifyResponse_NonceMismatch(t *testing.T) { + privKey, err := ethcrypto.GenerateKey() + require.NoError(t, err) + privBytes := ethcrypto.FromECDSA(privKey) + + w := &mockWallet{privKeyBytes: privBytes} + h := newTestHandshaker(t, w) + + nonce := []byte("test-challenge-nonce-32bytes!!!!!") + wrongNonce := []byte("wrong-nonce-does-not-match!!!!!!!") + + sig, err := w.SignMessage(context.Background(), nonce) + require.NoError(t, err) + pubkey, err := w.PublicKey(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + + resp := &ChallengeResponse{ + Nonce: wrongNonce, + Signature: sig, + PublicKey: pubkey, + DID: "did:lango:test", + } + + err = h.verifyResponse(context.Background(), resp, nonce) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "nonce mismatch") +} + +func TestVerifyResponse_NoProofOrSignature(t *testing.T) { + privKey, err := ethcrypto.GenerateKey() + require.NoError(t, err) + privBytes := ethcrypto.FromECDSA(privKey) + + w := &mockWallet{privKeyBytes: privBytes} + h := newTestHandshaker(t, w) + + nonce := []byte("test-challenge-nonce-32bytes!!!!!") + pubkey, err := w.PublicKey(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + + resp := &ChallengeResponse{ + Nonce: nonce, + PublicKey: pubkey, + DID: "did:lango:test", + } + + err = h.verifyResponse(context.Background(), resp, nonce) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "no proof or signature") +} + +func TestVerifyResponse_CorruptedSignature(t *testing.T) { + privKey, err := ethcrypto.GenerateKey() + require.NoError(t, err) + privBytes := ethcrypto.FromECDSA(privKey) + + w := &mockWallet{privKeyBytes: privBytes} + h := newTestHandshaker(t, w) + + nonce := []byte("test-challenge-nonce-32bytes!!!!!") + sig, err := w.SignMessage(context.Background(), nonce) + require.NoError(t, err) + pubkey, err := w.PublicKey(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // Corrupt the signature (flip a byte). + sig[10] ^= 0xFF + + resp := &ChallengeResponse{ + Nonce: nonce, + Signature: sig, + PublicKey: pubkey, + DID: "did:lango:test", + } + + err = h.verifyResponse(context.Background(), resp, nonce) + assert.Error(t, err) +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/handshake/nonce_cache.go b/internal/p2p/handshake/nonce_cache.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..af521389 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/handshake/nonce_cache.go @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +package handshake + +import ( + "sync" + "time" +) + +// NonceSize is the expected byte length of a nonce. +const NonceSize = 32 + +// NonceCache prevents nonce replay attacks by tracking recently seen nonces. +type NonceCache struct { + mu sync.Mutex + seen map[[NonceSize]byte]time.Time + ttl time.Duration + ticker *time.Ticker + stopCh chan struct{} +} + +// NewNonceCache creates a new NonceCache with the given TTL. +func NewNonceCache(ttl time.Duration) *NonceCache { + return &NonceCache{ + seen: make(map[[NonceSize]byte]time.Time), + ttl: ttl, + stopCh: make(chan struct{}), + } +} + +// CheckAndRecord returns true if the nonce has NOT been seen before (first occurrence). +// Returns false if the nonce was already recorded (replay detected). +// The nonce parameter must be exactly 32 bytes. +func (nc *NonceCache) CheckAndRecord(nonce []byte) bool { + if len(nonce) != NonceSize { + return false + } + + var key [NonceSize]byte + copy(key[:], nonce) + + nc.mu.Lock() + defer nc.mu.Unlock() + + if _, exists := nc.seen[key]; exists { + return false + } + + nc.seen[key] = time.Now() + return true +} + +// Cleanup removes expired entries older than TTL. +func (nc *NonceCache) Cleanup() { + nc.mu.Lock() + defer nc.mu.Unlock() + + for key, recorded := range nc.seen { + if time.Since(recorded) > nc.ttl { + delete(nc.seen, key) + } + } +} + +// Start begins periodic cleanup using a ticker goroutine. +func (nc *NonceCache) Start() { + nc.ticker = time.NewTicker(nc.ttl / 2) + + go func() { + for { + select { + case <-nc.ticker.C: + nc.Cleanup() + case <-nc.stopCh: + return + } + } + }() +} + +// Stop halts the periodic cleanup goroutine. +func (nc *NonceCache) Stop() { + close(nc.stopCh) + if nc.ticker != nil { + nc.ticker.Stop() + } +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/handshake/nonce_cache_test.go b/internal/p2p/handshake/nonce_cache_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1118c198 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/handshake/nonce_cache_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +package handshake + +import ( + "crypto/rand" + "sync" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func makeNonce(t *testing.T) []byte { + t.Helper() + nonce := make([]byte, NonceSize) + _, err := rand.Read(nonce) + require.NoError(t, err) + return nonce +} + +func TestNonceCache_FirstNonce(t *testing.T) { + nc := NewNonceCache(5 * time.Minute) + + nonce := makeNonce(t) + ok := nc.CheckAndRecord(nonce) + assert.True(t, ok, "first occurrence of a nonce should return true") +} + +func TestNonceCache_DuplicateNonce(t *testing.T) { + nc := NewNonceCache(5 * time.Minute) + + nonce := makeNonce(t) + ok := nc.CheckAndRecord(nonce) + require.True(t, ok) + + ok = nc.CheckAndRecord(nonce) + assert.False(t, ok, "duplicate nonce should return false") +} + +func TestNonceCache_DifferentNonces(t *testing.T) { + nc := NewNonceCache(5 * time.Minute) + + nonce1 := makeNonce(t) + nonce2 := makeNonce(t) + + ok1 := nc.CheckAndRecord(nonce1) + ok2 := nc.CheckAndRecord(nonce2) + + assert.True(t, ok1, "first nonce should return true") + assert.True(t, ok2, "second different nonce should return true") +} + +func TestNonceCache_InvalidLength(t *testing.T) { + nc := NewNonceCache(5 * time.Minute) + + tests := []struct { + give string + data []byte + }{ + {give: "nil", data: nil}, + {give: "empty", data: []byte{}}, + {give: "too_short", data: make([]byte, 16)}, + {give: "too_long", data: make([]byte, 64)}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + ok := nc.CheckAndRecord(tt.data) + assert.False(t, ok, "invalid nonce length should return false") + }) + } +} + +func TestNonceCache_Cleanup(t *testing.T) { + ttl := 50 * time.Millisecond + nc := NewNonceCache(ttl) + + nonce := makeNonce(t) + ok := nc.CheckAndRecord(nonce) + require.True(t, ok) + + // Wait for TTL to expire. + time.Sleep(ttl + 10*time.Millisecond) + nc.Cleanup() + + // After cleanup, the nonce should be accepted again. + ok = nc.CheckAndRecord(nonce) + assert.True(t, ok, "nonce should be accepted again after TTL expiry and cleanup") +} + +func TestNonceCache_StartStop(t *testing.T) { + ttl := 50 * time.Millisecond + nc := NewNonceCache(ttl) + + nc.Start() + + nonce := makeNonce(t) + ok := nc.CheckAndRecord(nonce) + require.True(t, ok) + + // Duplicate while running should be rejected. + ok = nc.CheckAndRecord(nonce) + assert.False(t, ok) + + // Wait for automatic cleanup via ticker. + time.Sleep(ttl + 30*time.Millisecond) + + // After automatic cleanup, the nonce should be accepted again. + ok = nc.CheckAndRecord(nonce) + assert.True(t, ok, "nonce should be accepted after automatic cleanup") + + nc.Stop() +} + +func TestNonceCache_Concurrent(t *testing.T) { + nc := NewNonceCache(5 * time.Minute) + nc.Start() + defer nc.Stop() + + const goroutines = 50 + nonces := make([][]byte, goroutines) + for i := range nonces { + nonces[i] = makeNonce(t) + } + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + results := make([]bool, goroutines) + + // Each goroutine records a unique nonce. + wg.Add(goroutines) + for i := 0; i < goroutines; i++ { + go func(idx int) { + defer wg.Done() + results[idx] = nc.CheckAndRecord(nonces[idx]) + }(i) + } + wg.Wait() + + for i, ok := range results { + assert.True(t, ok, "unique nonce %d should succeed", i) + } + + // Now try duplicates concurrently — exactly one should succeed per nonce. + shared := makeNonce(t) + ok := nc.CheckAndRecord(shared) + require.True(t, ok) + + dupResults := make([]bool, goroutines) + wg.Add(goroutines) + for i := 0; i < goroutines; i++ { + go func(idx int) { + defer wg.Done() + dupResults[idx] = nc.CheckAndRecord(shared) + }(i) + } + wg.Wait() + + // All duplicate attempts should return false since the nonce is already recorded. + for i, ok := range dupResults { + assert.False(t, ok, "duplicate nonce attempt %d should fail", i) + } +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/handshake/security_events.go b/internal/p2p/handshake/security_events.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..90add72d --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/handshake/security_events.go @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +package handshake + +import ( + "sync" + + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +// SecurityEventHandler tracks tool execution failures and reputation changes +// to auto-invalidate sessions when thresholds are exceeded. +type SecurityEventHandler struct { + sessions *SessionStore + mu sync.Mutex + failureCounts map[string]int + maxFailures int + minTrustScore float64 + logger *zap.SugaredLogger +} + +// NewSecurityEventHandler creates a handler that auto-invalidates sessions +// after consecutive tool failures or reputation drops below the threshold. +func NewSecurityEventHandler( + sessions *SessionStore, + maxFailures int, + minTrustScore float64, + logger *zap.SugaredLogger, +) *SecurityEventHandler { + if maxFailures <= 0 { + maxFailures = 5 + } + return &SecurityEventHandler{ + sessions: sessions, + failureCounts: make(map[string]int), + maxFailures: maxFailures, + minTrustScore: minTrustScore, + logger: logger, + } +} + +// RecordToolFailure increments the consecutive failure counter for the peer. +// When the counter reaches maxFailures, the session is auto-invalidated. +func (h *SecurityEventHandler) RecordToolFailure(peerDID string) { + h.mu.Lock() + h.failureCounts[peerDID]++ + count := h.failureCounts[peerDID] + h.mu.Unlock() + + if count >= h.maxFailures { + h.logger.Warnw("auto-invalidating session: repeated failures", + "peerDID", peerDID, "failures", count) + h.sessions.Invalidate(peerDID, ReasonRepeatedFailures) + + h.mu.Lock() + delete(h.failureCounts, peerDID) + h.mu.Unlock() + } +} + +// RecordToolSuccess resets the consecutive failure counter for the peer. +func (h *SecurityEventHandler) RecordToolSuccess(peerDID string) { + h.mu.Lock() + delete(h.failureCounts, peerDID) + h.mu.Unlock() +} + +// OnReputationChange invalidates the peer's session if the new score drops +// below the minimum trust threshold. +func (h *SecurityEventHandler) OnReputationChange(peerDID string, newScore float64) { + if newScore < h.minTrustScore { + h.logger.Warnw("auto-invalidating session: reputation drop", + "peerDID", peerDID, "score", newScore, "threshold", h.minTrustScore) + h.sessions.Invalidate(peerDID, ReasonReputationDrop) + } +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/handshake/security_events_test.go b/internal/p2p/handshake/security_events_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e7d7b5bb --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/handshake/security_events_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +package handshake + +import ( + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +func newTestSecurityHandler(t *testing.T, maxFailures int, minTrust float64) (*SecurityEventHandler, *SessionStore) { + t.Helper() + store, err := NewSessionStore(24 * time.Hour) + require.NoError(t, err) + + handler := NewSecurityEventHandler(store, maxFailures, minTrust, zap.NewNop().Sugar()) + return handler, store +} + +func TestConsecutiveFailures_TriggerAutoInvalidation(t *testing.T) { + handler, store := newTestSecurityHandler(t, 3, 0.3) + + sess, err := store.Create("did:lango:peer1", false) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // First two failures should not invalidate. + handler.RecordToolFailure("did:lango:peer1") + assert.True(t, store.Validate("did:lango:peer1", sess.Token)) + + handler.RecordToolFailure("did:lango:peer1") + assert.True(t, store.Validate("did:lango:peer1", sess.Token)) + + // Third failure should trigger auto-invalidation. + handler.RecordToolFailure("did:lango:peer1") + assert.False(t, store.Validate("did:lango:peer1", sess.Token)) + + // History should record the invalidation. + history := store.InvalidationHistory() + assert.Len(t, history, 1) + assert.Equal(t, ReasonRepeatedFailures, history[0].Reason) +} + +func TestSuccess_ResetsFailureCounter(t *testing.T) { + handler, store := newTestSecurityHandler(t, 3, 0.3) + + sess, err := store.Create("did:lango:peer1", false) + require.NoError(t, err) + + handler.RecordToolFailure("did:lango:peer1") + handler.RecordToolFailure("did:lango:peer1") + + // Success resets counter. + handler.RecordToolSuccess("did:lango:peer1") + + // Two more failures should not trigger invalidation (counter was reset). + handler.RecordToolFailure("did:lango:peer1") + handler.RecordToolFailure("did:lango:peer1") + assert.True(t, store.Validate("did:lango:peer1", sess.Token)) + + // Third failure after reset should trigger it. + handler.RecordToolFailure("did:lango:peer1") + assert.False(t, store.Validate("did:lango:peer1", sess.Token)) +} + +func TestReputationDrop_TriggersInvalidation(t *testing.T) { + handler, store := newTestSecurityHandler(t, 5, 0.3) + + sess, err := store.Create("did:lango:peer1", false) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // Score above threshold should not invalidate. + handler.OnReputationChange("did:lango:peer1", 0.5) + assert.True(t, store.Validate("did:lango:peer1", sess.Token)) + + // Score below threshold should invalidate. + handler.OnReputationChange("did:lango:peer1", 0.2) + assert.False(t, store.Validate("did:lango:peer1", sess.Token)) + + history := store.InvalidationHistory() + assert.Len(t, history, 1) + assert.Equal(t, ReasonReputationDrop, history[0].Reason) +} + +func TestReputationAtThreshold_NoInvalidation(t *testing.T) { + handler, store := newTestSecurityHandler(t, 5, 0.3) + + sess, err := store.Create("did:lango:peer1", false) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // Score exactly at threshold should not invalidate. + handler.OnReputationChange("did:lango:peer1", 0.3) + assert.True(t, store.Validate("did:lango:peer1", sess.Token)) +} + +func TestDefaultMaxFailures(t *testing.T) { + store, err := NewSessionStore(24 * time.Hour) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // Pass 0 for maxFailures; should default to 5. + handler := NewSecurityEventHandler(store, 0, 0.3, zap.NewNop().Sugar()) + + sess, err := store.Create("did:lango:peer1", false) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // 4 failures should not trigger invalidation. + for i := 0; i < 4; i++ { + handler.RecordToolFailure("did:lango:peer1") + } + assert.True(t, store.Validate("did:lango:peer1", sess.Token)) + + // 5th failure should trigger it. + handler.RecordToolFailure("did:lango:peer1") + assert.False(t, store.Validate("did:lango:peer1", sess.Token)) +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/handshake/session.go b/internal/p2p/handshake/session.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..597171db --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/handshake/session.go @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +// Package handshake implements ZK-enhanced peer authentication and session management. +package handshake + +import ( + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/sha256" + "encoding/hex" + "fmt" + "sync" + "time" +) + +// InvalidationReason describes why a session was invalidated. +type InvalidationReason string + +const ( + ReasonLogout InvalidationReason = "logout" + ReasonReputationDrop InvalidationReason = "reputation_drop" + ReasonRepeatedFailures InvalidationReason = "repeated_failures" + ReasonManualRevoke InvalidationReason = "manual_revoke" + ReasonSecurityEvent InvalidationReason = "security_event" +) + +// InvalidationRecord stores details about a session invalidation. +type InvalidationRecord struct { + PeerDID string `json:"peerDid"` + Reason InvalidationReason `json:"reason"` + InvalidatedAt time.Time `json:"invalidatedAt"` +} + +// Session represents an authenticated peer session. +type Session struct { + PeerDID string `json:"peerDid"` + Token string `json:"token"` + CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"` + ExpiresAt time.Time `json:"expiresAt"` + ZKVerified bool `json:"zkVerified"` + Invalidated bool `json:"invalidated"` + InvalidatedReason InvalidationReason `json:"invalidatedReason,omitempty"` +} + +// IsExpired reports whether the session has expired. +func (s *Session) IsExpired() bool { + return time.Now().After(s.ExpiresAt) +} + +// SessionStore manages authenticated peer sessions with TTL eviction. +type SessionStore struct { + mu sync.RWMutex + sessions map[string]*Session // keyed by peer DID + hmacKey []byte + ttl time.Duration + invalidationHistory []InvalidationRecord + onInvalidate func(peerDID string, reason InvalidationReason) +} + +// NewSessionStore creates a session store with the given TTL. +func NewSessionStore(ttl time.Duration) (*SessionStore, error) { + key := make([]byte, 32) + if _, err := rand.Read(key); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate HMAC key: %w", err) + } + + return &SessionStore{ + sessions: make(map[string]*Session), + hmacKey: key, + ttl: ttl, + }, nil +} + +// Create creates a new session for the given peer DID. +func (s *SessionStore) Create(peerDID string, zkVerified bool) (*Session, error) { + tokenBytes := make([]byte, 32) + if _, err := rand.Read(tokenBytes); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate session token: %w", err) + } + + mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, s.hmacKey) + mac.Write(tokenBytes) + mac.Write([]byte(peerDID)) + token := hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil)) + + now := time.Now() + sess := &Session{ + PeerDID: peerDID, + Token: token, + CreatedAt: now, + ExpiresAt: now.Add(s.ttl), + ZKVerified: zkVerified, + } + + s.mu.Lock() + s.sessions[peerDID] = sess + s.mu.Unlock() + + return sess, nil +} + +// Validate checks if a session token is valid for the given peer DID. +func (s *SessionStore) Validate(peerDID, token string) bool { + s.mu.RLock() + sess, ok := s.sessions[peerDID] + s.mu.RUnlock() + + if !ok || sess.IsExpired() || sess.Invalidated { + if ok { + s.Remove(peerDID) + } + return false + } + + return sess.Token == token +} + +// Get returns the session for the given peer DID, or nil if not found/expired/invalidated. +func (s *SessionStore) Get(peerDID string) *Session { + s.mu.RLock() + sess, ok := s.sessions[peerDID] + s.mu.RUnlock() + + if !ok { + return nil + } + if sess.IsExpired() || sess.Invalidated { + s.Remove(peerDID) + return nil + } + return sess +} + +// Remove deletes a session. +func (s *SessionStore) Remove(peerDID string) { + s.mu.Lock() + delete(s.sessions, peerDID) + s.mu.Unlock() +} + +// ActiveSessions returns all non-expired, non-invalidated sessions. +func (s *SessionStore) ActiveSessions() []*Session { + s.mu.RLock() + defer s.mu.RUnlock() + + var active []*Session + for _, sess := range s.sessions { + if !sess.IsExpired() && !sess.Invalidated { + active = append(active, sess) + } + } + return active +} + +// Cleanup removes all expired and invalidated sessions. +func (s *SessionStore) Cleanup() int { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + + removed := 0 + for did, sess := range s.sessions { + if sess.IsExpired() || sess.Invalidated { + delete(s.sessions, did) + removed++ + } + } + return removed +} + +// Invalidate marks a session as invalidated, removes it from active sessions, +// records the invalidation, and fires the onInvalidate callback. +func (s *SessionStore) Invalidate(peerDID string, reason InvalidationReason) { + s.mu.Lock() + sess, ok := s.sessions[peerDID] + if ok { + sess.Invalidated = true + sess.InvalidatedReason = reason + delete(s.sessions, peerDID) + } + s.invalidationHistory = append(s.invalidationHistory, InvalidationRecord{ + PeerDID: peerDID, + Reason: reason, + InvalidatedAt: time.Now(), + }) + cb := s.onInvalidate + s.mu.Unlock() + + if cb != nil { + cb(peerDID, reason) + } +} + +// InvalidateAll invalidates all active sessions with the given reason. +func (s *SessionStore) InvalidateAll(reason InvalidationReason) { + s.mu.Lock() + now := time.Now() + var dids []string + for did, sess := range s.sessions { + sess.Invalidated = true + sess.InvalidatedReason = reason + dids = append(dids, did) + s.invalidationHistory = append(s.invalidationHistory, InvalidationRecord{ + PeerDID: did, + Reason: reason, + InvalidatedAt: now, + }) + } + for _, did := range dids { + delete(s.sessions, did) + } + cb := s.onInvalidate + s.mu.Unlock() + + if cb != nil { + for _, did := range dids { + cb(did, reason) + } + } +} + +// InvalidateByCondition invalidates sessions matching the predicate. +func (s *SessionStore) InvalidateByCondition(reason InvalidationReason, predicate func(*Session) bool) { + s.mu.Lock() + now := time.Now() + var dids []string + for did, sess := range s.sessions { + if predicate(sess) { + sess.Invalidated = true + sess.InvalidatedReason = reason + dids = append(dids, did) + s.invalidationHistory = append(s.invalidationHistory, InvalidationRecord{ + PeerDID: did, + Reason: reason, + InvalidatedAt: now, + }) + } + } + for _, did := range dids { + delete(s.sessions, did) + } + cb := s.onInvalidate + s.mu.Unlock() + + if cb != nil { + for _, did := range dids { + cb(did, reason) + } + } +} + +// InvalidationHistory returns all recorded invalidation events. +func (s *SessionStore) InvalidationHistory() []InvalidationRecord { + s.mu.RLock() + defer s.mu.RUnlock() + + history := make([]InvalidationRecord, len(s.invalidationHistory)) + copy(history, s.invalidationHistory) + return history +} + +// SetInvalidationCallback sets a function to be called when a session is invalidated. +func (s *SessionStore) SetInvalidationCallback(fn func(peerDID string, reason InvalidationReason)) { + s.mu.Lock() + s.onInvalidate = fn + s.mu.Unlock() +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/handshake/session_test.go b/internal/p2p/handshake/session_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dabf3eeb --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/handshake/session_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +package handshake + +import ( + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func TestInvalidate_SessionBecomesInvalid(t *testing.T) { + store, err := NewSessionStore(24 * time.Hour) + require.NoError(t, err) + + sess, err := store.Create("did:lango:peer1", false) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NotEmpty(t, sess.Token) + + // Session should be valid before invalidation. + assert.True(t, store.Validate("did:lango:peer1", sess.Token)) + + // Invalidate the session. + store.Invalidate("did:lango:peer1", ReasonManualRevoke) + + // Session should no longer validate. + assert.False(t, store.Validate("did:lango:peer1", sess.Token)) + + // Get should return nil for invalidated session. + assert.Nil(t, store.Get("did:lango:peer1")) +} + +func TestInvalidateAll_AllSessionsInvalidated(t *testing.T) { + store, err := NewSessionStore(24 * time.Hour) + require.NoError(t, err) + + _, err = store.Create("did:lango:peer1", false) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = store.Create("did:lango:peer2", true) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = store.Create("did:lango:peer3", false) + require.NoError(t, err) + + assert.Len(t, store.ActiveSessions(), 3) + + store.InvalidateAll(ReasonSecurityEvent) + + assert.Empty(t, store.ActiveSessions()) + + // History should contain all three invalidations. + history := store.InvalidationHistory() + assert.Len(t, history, 3) + for _, rec := range history { + assert.Equal(t, ReasonSecurityEvent, rec.Reason) + } +} + +func TestInvalidateByCondition_SelectiveInvalidation(t *testing.T) { + store, err := NewSessionStore(24 * time.Hour) + require.NoError(t, err) + + sess1, err := store.Create("did:lango:peer1", false) + require.NoError(t, err) + sess2, err := store.Create("did:lango:peer2", true) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // Invalidate only non-ZK-verified sessions. + store.InvalidateByCondition(ReasonSecurityEvent, func(s *Session) bool { + return !s.ZKVerified + }) + + // peer1 (non-ZK) should be invalidated; peer2 (ZK) should remain. + assert.False(t, store.Validate("did:lango:peer1", sess1.Token)) + assert.True(t, store.Validate("did:lango:peer2", sess2.Token)) + + active := store.ActiveSessions() + assert.Len(t, active, 1) + assert.Equal(t, "did:lango:peer2", active[0].PeerDID) +} + +func TestValidate_ReturnsFalseForInvalidated(t *testing.T) { + store, err := NewSessionStore(24 * time.Hour) + require.NoError(t, err) + + sess, err := store.Create("did:lango:peer1", false) + require.NoError(t, err) + + assert.True(t, store.Validate("did:lango:peer1", sess.Token)) + + store.Invalidate("did:lango:peer1", ReasonLogout) + + assert.False(t, store.Validate("did:lango:peer1", sess.Token)) +} + +func TestInvalidationHistory_ReturnsRecords(t *testing.T) { + store, err := NewSessionStore(24 * time.Hour) + require.NoError(t, err) + + _, err = store.Create("did:lango:peer1", false) + require.NoError(t, err) + _, err = store.Create("did:lango:peer2", false) + require.NoError(t, err) + + assert.Empty(t, store.InvalidationHistory()) + + store.Invalidate("did:lango:peer1", ReasonReputationDrop) + store.Invalidate("did:lango:peer2", ReasonRepeatedFailures) + + history := store.InvalidationHistory() + assert.Len(t, history, 2) + + assert.Equal(t, "did:lango:peer1", history[0].PeerDID) + assert.Equal(t, ReasonReputationDrop, history[0].Reason) + assert.False(t, history[0].InvalidatedAt.IsZero()) + + assert.Equal(t, "did:lango:peer2", history[1].PeerDID) + assert.Equal(t, ReasonRepeatedFailures, history[1].Reason) +} + +func TestInvalidationCallback_FiredOnInvalidate(t *testing.T) { + store, err := NewSessionStore(24 * time.Hour) + require.NoError(t, err) + + var callbackDID string + var callbackReason InvalidationReason + store.SetInvalidationCallback(func(peerDID string, reason InvalidationReason) { + callbackDID = peerDID + callbackReason = reason + }) + + _, err = store.Create("did:lango:peer1", false) + require.NoError(t, err) + + store.Invalidate("did:lango:peer1", ReasonManualRevoke) + + assert.Equal(t, "did:lango:peer1", callbackDID) + assert.Equal(t, ReasonManualRevoke, callbackReason) +} + +func TestInvalidateNonExistent_StillRecordsHistory(t *testing.T) { + store, err := NewSessionStore(24 * time.Hour) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // Invalidating a non-existent session should still record history. + store.Invalidate("did:lango:unknown", ReasonSecurityEvent) + + history := store.InvalidationHistory() + assert.Len(t, history, 1) + assert.Equal(t, "did:lango:unknown", history[0].PeerDID) +} + +func TestCleanup_RemovesInvalidatedSessions(t *testing.T) { + store, err := NewSessionStore(1 * time.Millisecond) + require.NoError(t, err) + + _, err = store.Create("did:lango:peer1", false) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // Wait for expiry. + time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond) + + removed := store.Cleanup() + assert.Equal(t, 1, removed) +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/identity/identity.go b/internal/p2p/identity/identity.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4b8c83d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/identity/identity.go @@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ +// Package identity provides decentralized identity (DID) derivation from wallet public keys. +// DIDs are deterministically derived from compressed secp256k1 public keys and mapped to +// libp2p peer IDs for P2P networking. Private keys never leave the wallet layer. +package identity + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/hex" + "fmt" + "strings" + "sync" + + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" + "go.uber.org/zap" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/wallet" +) + +const ( + // DIDPrefix is the method-specific prefix for Lango DIDs. + DIDPrefix = "did:lango:" +) + +// DID represents a decentralized identifier derived from a wallet public key. +type DID struct { + ID string `json:"id"` // "did:lango:" + PublicKey []byte `json:"publicKey"` // compressed secp256k1 public key + PeerID peer.ID `json:"peerId"` // libp2p peer ID derived from pubkey +} + +// Provider creates and verifies DIDs. +type Provider interface { + // DID returns the DID for the current wallet. + DID(ctx context.Context) (*DID, error) + // VerifyDID checks that a DID matches the claimed peer ID. + VerifyDID(did *DID, peerID peer.ID) error +} + +// WalletDIDProvider derives DIDs from a wallet's public key. +type WalletDIDProvider struct { + wallet wallet.WalletProvider + logger *zap.SugaredLogger + mu sync.RWMutex + cached *DID +} + +// Compile-time interface check. +var _ Provider = (*WalletDIDProvider)(nil) + +// NewProvider creates a new WalletDIDProvider. +func NewProvider(w wallet.WalletProvider, logger *zap.SugaredLogger) *WalletDIDProvider { + return &WalletDIDProvider{ + wallet: w, + logger: logger, + } +} + +// DID returns the DID for the current wallet, caching the result since the +// wallet key does not change. +func (p *WalletDIDProvider) DID(ctx context.Context) (*DID, error) { + p.mu.RLock() + if p.cached != nil { + defer p.mu.RUnlock() + return p.cached, nil + } + p.mu.RUnlock() + + pubkey, err := p.wallet.PublicKey(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("get wallet public key: %w", err) + } + + did, err := DIDFromPublicKey(pubkey) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("derive DID from public key: %w", err) + } + + p.mu.Lock() + p.cached = did + p.mu.Unlock() + + p.logger.Infow("derived DID from wallet", "did", did.ID, "peerID", did.PeerID) + return did, nil +} + +// VerifyDID checks that a DID's public key produces the claimed peer ID. +func (p *WalletDIDProvider) VerifyDID(did *DID, peerID peer.ID) error { + if did == nil { + return fmt.Errorf("nil DID") + } + + derivedPeerID, err := peerIDFromPublicKey(did.PublicKey) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("derive peer ID from DID public key: %w", err) + } + + if derivedPeerID != peerID { + return fmt.Errorf("peer ID mismatch: DID derives %s, claimed %s", derivedPeerID, peerID) + } + + return nil +} + +// ParseDID parses a "did:lango:" string into a DID. +func ParseDID(didStr string) (*DID, error) { + if !strings.HasPrefix(didStr, DIDPrefix) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid DID scheme: expected prefix %q, got %q", DIDPrefix, didStr) + } + + hexKey := strings.TrimPrefix(didStr, DIDPrefix) + if hexKey == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("empty public key in DID %q", didStr) + } + + pubkey, err := hex.DecodeString(hexKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode hex public key: %w", err) + } + + peerID, err := peerIDFromPublicKey(pubkey) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("derive peer ID: %w", err) + } + + return &DID{ + ID: didStr, + PublicKey: pubkey, + PeerID: peerID, + }, nil +} + +// DIDFromPublicKey creates a DID from a compressed secp256k1 public key. +func DIDFromPublicKey(pubkey []byte) (*DID, error) { + if len(pubkey) == 0 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("empty public key") + } + + peerID, err := peerIDFromPublicKey(pubkey) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("derive peer ID: %w", err) + } + + return &DID{ + ID: DIDPrefix + hex.EncodeToString(pubkey), + PublicKey: pubkey, + PeerID: peerID, + }, nil +} + +// peerIDFromPublicKey derives a libp2p peer ID from a compressed secp256k1 public key. +func peerIDFromPublicKey(pubkey []byte) (peer.ID, error) { + libp2pKey, err := crypto.UnmarshalSecp256k1PublicKey(pubkey) + if err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("unmarshal secp256k1 public key: %w", err) + } + + peerID, err := peer.IDFromPublicKey(libp2pKey) + if err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("derive peer ID from public key: %w", err) + } + + return peerID, nil +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/identity/identity_test.go b/internal/p2p/identity/identity_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6f9b364c --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/identity/identity_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +package identity + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/hex" + "fmt" + "math/big" + "strings" + "testing" + + ethcrypto "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +func testLogger() *zap.SugaredLogger { + return zap.NewNop().Sugar() +} + +// generateTestPubkey creates a compressed secp256k1 public key for testing. +func generateTestPubkey(t *testing.T) []byte { + t.Helper() + key, err := ethcrypto.GenerateKey() + require.NoError(t, err) + return ethcrypto.CompressPubkey(&key.PublicKey) +} + +func TestDIDPrefix_Constant(t *testing.T) { + assert.Equal(t, "did:lango:", DIDPrefix) +} + +func TestDIDFromPublicKey_Valid(t *testing.T) { + pubkey := generateTestPubkey(t) + + did, err := DIDFromPublicKey(pubkey) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NotNil(t, did) + + assert.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(did.ID, DIDPrefix)) + assert.Equal(t, pubkey, did.PublicKey) + assert.NotEmpty(t, did.PeerID) + + // Verify the hex encoding in the DID string. + hexPart := strings.TrimPrefix(did.ID, DIDPrefix) + decoded, err := hex.DecodeString(hexPart) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, pubkey, decoded) +} + +func TestDIDFromPublicKey_EmptyKey(t *testing.T) { + did, err := DIDFromPublicKey(nil) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Nil(t, did) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "empty public key") + + did, err = DIDFromPublicKey([]byte{}) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Nil(t, did) +} + +func TestParseDID_Valid_Roundtrip(t *testing.T) { + pubkey := generateTestPubkey(t) + + original, err := DIDFromPublicKey(pubkey) + require.NoError(t, err) + + parsed, err := ParseDID(original.ID) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NotNil(t, parsed) + + assert.Equal(t, original.ID, parsed.ID) + assert.Equal(t, original.PublicKey, parsed.PublicKey) + assert.Equal(t, original.PeerID, parsed.PeerID) +} + +func TestParseDID_InvalidPrefix(t *testing.T) { + did, err := ParseDID("did:other:abc123") + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Nil(t, did) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid DID scheme") +} + +func TestParseDID_EmptyKey(t *testing.T) { + did, err := ParseDID("did:lango:") + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Nil(t, did) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "empty public key") +} + +func TestParseDID_InvalidHex(t *testing.T) { + did, err := ParseDID("did:lango:ZZZZ_not_hex") + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Nil(t, did) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "decode hex") +} + +func TestVerifyDID_Matching(t *testing.T) { + pubkey := generateTestPubkey(t) + did, err := DIDFromPublicKey(pubkey) + require.NoError(t, err) + + provider := NewProvider(&mockWalletProvider{pubkey: pubkey}, testLogger()) + err = provider.VerifyDID(did, did.PeerID) + assert.NoError(t, err) +} + +func TestVerifyDID_Mismatched(t *testing.T) { + pubkey := generateTestPubkey(t) + did, err := DIDFromPublicKey(pubkey) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // Generate a different peer ID. + otherPubkey := generateTestPubkey(t) + otherDID, err := DIDFromPublicKey(otherPubkey) + require.NoError(t, err) + + provider := NewProvider(&mockWalletProvider{pubkey: pubkey}, testLogger()) + err = provider.VerifyDID(did, otherDID.PeerID) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "peer ID mismatch") +} + +func TestVerifyDID_NilDID(t *testing.T) { + provider := NewProvider(&mockWalletProvider{}, testLogger()) + err := provider.VerifyDID(nil, peer.ID("somepeerid")) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "nil DID") +} + +func TestWalletDIDProvider_DID_Caching(t *testing.T) { + pubkey := generateTestPubkey(t) + mock := &mockWalletProvider{pubkey: pubkey} + provider := NewProvider(mock, testLogger()) + + did1, err := provider.DID(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + + did2, err := provider.DID(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + + assert.Same(t, did1, did2, "second call should return cached DID") + assert.Equal(t, 1, mock.calls, "PublicKey should only be called once due to caching") +} + +func TestWalletDIDProvider_DID_WalletError(t *testing.T) { + mock := &mockWalletProvider{err: fmt.Errorf("wallet locked")} + provider := NewProvider(mock, testLogger()) + + did, err := provider.DID(context.Background()) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Nil(t, did) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "wallet locked") +} + +// mockWalletProvider implements wallet.WalletProvider for testing. +type mockWalletProvider struct { + pubkey []byte + err error + calls int +} + +func (m *mockWalletProvider) PublicKey(_ context.Context) ([]byte, error) { + m.calls++ + return m.pubkey, m.err +} + +func (m *mockWalletProvider) SignMessage(_ context.Context, _ []byte) ([]byte, error) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("not implemented") +} + +func (m *mockWalletProvider) SignTransaction(_ context.Context, _ []byte) ([]byte, error) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("not implemented") +} + +func (m *mockWalletProvider) Address(_ context.Context) (string, error) { + return "", fmt.Errorf("not implemented") +} + +func (m *mockWalletProvider) Balance(_ context.Context) (*big.Int, error) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("not implemented") +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/node.go b/internal/p2p/node.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b5d021c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/node.go @@ -0,0 +1,341 @@ +package p2p + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/rand" + "fmt" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "sync" + + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p" + dht "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-kad-dht" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/host" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/network" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/protocol" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/p2p/discovery/mdns" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/p2p/net/connmgr" + ma "github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr" + "go.uber.org/zap" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/security" +) + +const nodeKeyFile = "node.key" + +// nodeKeySecret is the SecretsStore key name for the encrypted P2P node key. +const nodeKeySecret = "p2p.node.privatekey" + +// Node wraps a libp2p host with DHT-based peer discovery. +type Node struct { + host host.Host + dht *dht.IpfsDHT + cfg config.P2PConfig + logger *zap.SugaredLogger + cancel context.CancelFunc + + mdnsSvc mdns.Service +} + +// NewNode creates a libp2p node with Noise encryption and TCP/QUIC transports. +// The node key is persisted in SecretsStore (encrypted) when available, falling +// back to cfg.KeyDir for backward compatibility. +func NewNode(cfg config.P2PConfig, logger *zap.SugaredLogger, secrets *security.SecretsStore) (*Node, error) { + privKey, err := loadOrGenerateKey(cfg.KeyDir, secrets, logger) //nolint:staticcheck // KeyDir used for backward-compatible migration + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("load node key: %w", err) + } + + lowWatermark := cfg.MaxPeers * 80 / 100 + cm, err := connmgr.NewConnManager(lowWatermark, cfg.MaxPeers) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("new conn manager: %w", err) + } + + opts := []libp2p.Option{ + libp2p.Identity(privKey), + libp2p.ListenAddrStrings(cfg.ListenAddrs...), + libp2p.ConnectionManager(cm), + } + + if cfg.EnableRelay { + opts = append(opts, libp2p.EnableRelayService()) + } + + h, err := libp2p.New(opts...) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("new libp2p host: %w", err) + } + + logger.Infow("libp2p node created", + "peerID", h.ID(), + "addrs", h.Addrs(), + ) + + return &Node{ + host: h, + cfg: cfg, + logger: logger, + }, nil +} + +// Start bootstraps the Kademlia DHT and optionally starts mDNS discovery. +// The WaitGroup is incremented so callers can wait for graceful shutdown. +func (n *Node) Start(wg *sync.WaitGroup) error { + ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background()) + n.cancel = cancel + + // Bootstrap the DHT. + kadDHT, err := dht.New(ctx, n.host, dht.Mode(dht.ModeAutoServer)) + if err != nil { + cancel() + return fmt.Errorf("new DHT: %w", err) + } + n.dht = kadDHT + + if err := n.dht.Bootstrap(ctx); err != nil { + cancel() + return fmt.Errorf("DHT bootstrap: %w", err) + } + + // Connect to bootstrap peers. + for _, addr := range n.cfg.BootstrapPeers { + maddr, err := ma.NewMultiaddr(addr) + if err != nil { + n.logger.Warnw("invalid bootstrap multiaddr", "addr", addr, "err", err) + continue + } + pi, err := peer.AddrInfoFromP2pAddr(maddr) + if err != nil { + n.logger.Warnw("parse bootstrap peer info", "addr", addr, "err", err) + continue + } + wg.Add(1) + go func(pi peer.AddrInfo) { + defer wg.Done() + if err := n.host.Connect(ctx, pi); err != nil { + n.logger.Warnw("connect bootstrap peer", "peer", pi.ID, "err", err) + } else { + n.logger.Infow("connected to bootstrap peer", "peer", pi.ID) + } + }(*pi) + } + + // Optional mDNS discovery for LAN peers. + if n.cfg.EnableMDNS { + svc := mdns.NewMdnsService(n.host, "", &mdnsNotifee{ + host: n.host, + ctx: ctx, + logger: n.logger, + }) + if err := svc.Start(); err != nil { + n.logger.Warnw("start mDNS", "err", err) + } else { + n.mdnsSvc = svc + n.logger.Info("mDNS discovery started") + } + } + + n.logger.Infow("P2P node started", + "peerID", n.host.ID(), + "listenAddrs", n.host.Addrs(), + ) + + return nil +} + +// Stop shuts down the DHT, mDNS service, and libp2p host. +func (n *Node) Stop() error { + if n.cancel != nil { + n.cancel() + } + + if n.mdnsSvc != nil { + if err := n.mdnsSvc.Close(); err != nil { + n.logger.Warnw("close mDNS", "err", err) + } + } + + if n.dht != nil { + if err := n.dht.Close(); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("close DHT: %w", err) + } + } + + if err := n.host.Close(); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("close host: %w", err) + } + + n.logger.Info("P2P node stopped") + return nil +} + +// PeerID returns the node's libp2p peer ID. +func (n *Node) PeerID() peer.ID { return n.host.ID() } + +// Multiaddrs returns the listen addresses of the underlying host. +func (n *Node) Multiaddrs() []ma.Multiaddr { return n.host.Addrs() } + +// ConnectedPeers returns the peer IDs of all currently connected peers. +func (n *Node) ConnectedPeers() []peer.ID { + conns := n.host.Network().Conns() + seen := make(map[peer.ID]struct{}, len(conns)) + peers := make([]peer.ID, 0, len(conns)) + for _, c := range conns { + pid := c.RemotePeer() + if _, ok := seen[pid]; !ok { + seen[pid] = struct{}{} + peers = append(peers, pid) + } + } + return peers +} + +// Host returns the underlying libp2p host for protocol registration. +func (n *Node) Host() host.Host { return n.host } + +// SetStreamHandler registers a protocol stream handler on the host. +func (n *Node) SetStreamHandler(protocolID string, handler network.StreamHandler) { + n.host.SetStreamHandler(protocol.ID(protocolID), handler) +} + +// loadOrGenerateKey loads an Ed25519 node key with the following priority: +// 1. SecretsStore (encrypted, preferred) +// 2. Legacy plaintext file (keyDir/node.key) — auto-migrated to SecretsStore +// 3. Generate new key +// +// When secrets is nil, falls back to file-based storage for backward compatibility. +func loadOrGenerateKey(keyDir string, secrets *security.SecretsStore, log *zap.SugaredLogger) (crypto.PrivKey, error) { + keyDir = expandHome(keyDir) + if keyDir == "" { + home, err := os.UserHomeDir() + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("get home dir: %w", err) + } + keyDir = filepath.Join(home, ".lango", "p2p") + } + + // 1. Try SecretsStore first. + if secrets != nil { + ctx := context.Background() + data, err := secrets.Get(ctx, nodeKeySecret) + if err == nil { + defer zeroBytes(data) + key, parseErr := crypto.UnmarshalPrivateKey(data) + if parseErr != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal node key from secrets store: %w", parseErr) + } + return key, nil + } + // Not found in SecretsStore — fall through to legacy file or generation. + } + + // 2. Try legacy plaintext file. + keyPath := filepath.Join(keyDir, nodeKeyFile) + data, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath) + if err == nil { + defer zeroBytes(data) + key, parseErr := crypto.UnmarshalPrivateKey(data) + if parseErr != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal node key: %w", parseErr) + } + + // Auto-migrate to SecretsStore if available. + if secrets != nil { + if migErr := migrateKeyToSecrets(secrets, data, keyPath, log); migErr != nil { + log.Warnw("node key migration to secrets store failed (will retry on next restart)", "error", migErr) + } + } + + return key, nil + } + if !os.IsNotExist(err) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("read node key: %w", err) + } + + // 3. Generate new key. + privKey, _, err := crypto.GenerateEd25519Key(rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate ed25519 key: %w", err) + } + + raw, err := crypto.MarshalPrivateKey(privKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal node key: %w", err) + } + defer zeroBytes(raw) + + // Store in SecretsStore if available, otherwise fall back to file. + if secrets != nil { + if storeErr := secrets.Store(context.Background(), nodeKeySecret, raw); storeErr != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("store node key in secrets store: %w", storeErr) + } + } else { + if mkErr := os.MkdirAll(keyDir, 0o700); mkErr != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("create key dir %q: %w", keyDir, mkErr) + } + if writeErr := os.WriteFile(keyPath, raw, 0o600); writeErr != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("write node key: %w", writeErr) + } + } + + return privKey, nil +} + +// migrateKeyToSecrets stores a legacy plaintext key into SecretsStore and +// removes the plaintext file. Migration failure is non-fatal (warn + retry +// on next restart). +func migrateKeyToSecrets(secrets *security.SecretsStore, keyData []byte, keyPath string, log *zap.SugaredLogger) error { + ctx := context.Background() + + if err := secrets.Store(ctx, nodeKeySecret, keyData); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("store in secrets: %w", err) + } + + if err := os.Remove(keyPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) { + log.Warnw("stored key in secrets store but could not remove legacy file", "path", keyPath, "error", err) + } else { + log.Infow("migrated P2P node key from plaintext file to encrypted secrets store", "legacyPath", keyPath) + } + + return nil +} + +// zeroBytes overwrites a byte slice with zeros for immediate memory cleanup. +func zeroBytes(b []byte) { + for i := range b { + b[i] = 0 + } +} + +// expandHome replaces a leading ~ with the user's home directory. +func expandHome(path string) string { + if len(path) == 0 || path[0] != '~' { + return path + } + home, err := os.UserHomeDir() + if err != nil { + return path + } + return filepath.Join(home, path[1:]) +} + +// mdnsNotifee handles mDNS peer discovery events. +type mdnsNotifee struct { + host host.Host + ctx context.Context + logger *zap.SugaredLogger +} + +func (n *mdnsNotifee) HandlePeerFound(pi peer.AddrInfo) { + if pi.ID == n.host.ID() { + return + } + n.logger.Infow("mDNS peer discovered", "peer", pi.ID) + if err := n.host.Connect(n.ctx, pi); err != nil { + n.logger.Warnw("connect mDNS peer", "peer", pi.ID, "err", err) + } +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/node_key_test.go b/internal/p2p/node_key_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0ceafdb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/node_key_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +package p2p + +import ( + "os" + "path/filepath" + "testing" + + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +func TestLoadOrGenerateKey_NewKeyWithoutSecrets(t *testing.T) { + tmpDir := t.TempDir() + log := zap.NewNop().Sugar() + + // Generate new key (no SecretsStore). + key, err := loadOrGenerateKey(tmpDir, nil, log) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NotNil(t, key) + + // Verify key file was written. + keyPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, nodeKeyFile) + _, err = os.Stat(keyPath) + assert.NoError(t, err) + + // Load the same key again. + key2, err := loadOrGenerateKey(tmpDir, nil, log) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // Verify same key is loaded. + raw1, err := crypto.MarshalPrivateKey(key) + require.NoError(t, err) + raw2, err := crypto.MarshalPrivateKey(key2) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, raw1, raw2) +} + +func TestLoadOrGenerateKey_LegacyFileLoaded(t *testing.T) { + tmpDir := t.TempDir() + log := zap.NewNop().Sugar() + + // Pre-create a legacy key file. + privKey, _, err := crypto.GenerateEd25519Key(nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + raw, err := crypto.MarshalPrivateKey(privKey) + require.NoError(t, err) + keyPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, nodeKeyFile) + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(keyPath, raw, 0o600)) + + // Load with no secrets — should use legacy file. + loaded, err := loadOrGenerateKey(tmpDir, nil, log) + require.NoError(t, err) + + loadedRaw, err := crypto.MarshalPrivateKey(loaded) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, raw, loadedRaw) +} + +func TestExpandHome(t *testing.T) { + home, err := os.UserHomeDir() + require.NoError(t, err) + + tests := []struct { + give string + want string + }{ + {give: "~/foo", want: filepath.Join(home, "foo")}, + {give: "~/.lango/p2p", want: filepath.Join(home, ".lango", "p2p")}, + {give: "/absolute/path", want: "/absolute/path"}, + {give: "relative/path", want: "relative/path"}, + {give: "", want: ""}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + assert.Equal(t, tt.want, expandHome(tt.give)) + }) + } +} + +func TestLoadOrGenerateKey_EmptyKeyDirUsesDefault(t *testing.T) { + // Use a temp dir to avoid writing to real ~/.lango/p2p. + tmpDir := t.TempDir() + subDir := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "p2p") + log := zap.NewNop().Sugar() + + // Generate in explicit subdir (simulates resolved default). + key, err := loadOrGenerateKey(subDir, nil, log) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NotNil(t, key) + + // Verify key file was created in the subdir. + keyPath := filepath.Join(subDir, nodeKeyFile) + _, err = os.Stat(keyPath) + assert.NoError(t, err) +} + +func TestZeroBytes(t *testing.T) { + data := []byte{0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05} + zeroBytes(data) + for _, b := range data { + assert.Equal(t, byte(0), b) + } +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/paygate/gate.go b/internal/p2p/paygate/gate.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..66cf12c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/paygate/gate.go @@ -0,0 +1,359 @@ +// Package paygate implements a payment gate that checks tool pricing and +// verifies EIP-3009 payment authorizations between the firewall and tool +// executor in the P2P protocol. +package paygate + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + "math/big" + "time" + + "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common" + "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethclient" + "go.uber.org/zap" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/payment/contracts" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/payment/eip3009" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/wallet" +) + +// PricingFunc returns the price (decimal USDC string like "0.50") and whether +// the tool is free. +type PricingFunc func(toolName string) (price string, isFree bool) + +// ResultStatus describes the outcome of a payment gate check. +type ResultStatus string + +// DefaultQuoteExpiry is the validity window for a price quote. +const DefaultQuoteExpiry = 5 * time.Minute + +const ( + // StatusFree means the tool is free; no payment required. + StatusFree ResultStatus = "free" + + // StatusVerified means a valid payment authorization was provided. + StatusVerified ResultStatus = "verified" + + // StatusPaymentRequired means the tool is paid but no authorization was + // provided; the PriceQuote tells the caller what to pay. + StatusPaymentRequired ResultStatus = "payment_required" + + // StatusInvalid means the provided payment authorization is invalid. + StatusInvalid ResultStatus = "invalid" +) + +// Result describes the outcome of a payment gate check. +type Result struct { + Status ResultStatus `json:"status"` + Auth *eip3009.Authorization `json:"auth,omitempty"` + PriceQuote *PriceQuote `json:"priceQuote,omitempty"` + Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty"` +} + +// PriceQuote tells a buyer what to pay for a tool invocation. +type PriceQuote struct { + ToolName string `json:"toolName"` + Price string `json:"price"` + Currency string `json:"currency"` + USDCContract string `json:"usdcContract"` + ChainID int64 `json:"chainId"` + SellerAddr string `json:"sellerAddr"` + QuoteExpiry int64 `json:"quoteExpiry"` +} + +// Config holds construction parameters for a Gate. +type Config struct { + PricingFn PricingFunc + LocalAddr string + ChainID int64 + USDCAddr common.Address + RPCClient *ethclient.Client + Logger *zap.SugaredLogger +} + +// Gate sits between the firewall and the tool executor, enforcing payment +// requirements for paid tools. +type Gate struct { + pricingFn PricingFunc + localAddr string + chainID int64 + usdcAddr common.Address + rpcClient *ethclient.Client + logger *zap.SugaredLogger +} + +// New creates a payment gate from the given configuration. +func New(cfg Config) *Gate { + return &Gate{ + pricingFn: cfg.PricingFn, + localAddr: cfg.LocalAddr, + chainID: cfg.ChainID, + usdcAddr: cfg.USDCAddr, + rpcClient: cfg.RPCClient, + logger: cfg.Logger, + } +} + +// Check evaluates whether a tool invocation should proceed. It looks up the +// tool price, and if payment is required, validates the EIP-3009 authorization +// embedded in the payload. +func (g *Gate) Check(peerDID, toolName string, payload map[string]interface{}) (*Result, error) { + price, isFree := g.pricingFn(toolName) + if isFree { + return &Result{Status: StatusFree}, nil + } + + // Look for payment authorization in the payload. + authRaw, ok := payload["paymentAuth"] + if !ok { + quote := g.BuildQuote(toolName, price) + return &Result{ + Status: StatusPaymentRequired, + PriceQuote: quote, + }, nil + } + + authMap, ok := authRaw.(map[string]interface{}) + if !ok { + return &Result{ + Status: StatusInvalid, + Reason: "paymentAuth is not a valid object", + }, nil + } + + auth, err := parseAuthorization(authMap) + if err != nil { + return &Result{ + Status: StatusInvalid, + Reason: fmt.Sprintf("parse paymentAuth: %v", err), + }, nil + } + + // Verify: recipient must be the local address. + if auth.To != common.HexToAddress(g.localAddr) { + return &Result{ + Status: StatusInvalid, + Reason: fmt.Sprintf("recipient mismatch: got %s, want %s", auth.To.Hex(), g.localAddr), + }, nil + } + + // Verify: amount must cover the price. + requiredAmount, err := ParseUSDC(price) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse tool price %q: %w", price, err) + } + if auth.Value.Cmp(requiredAmount) < 0 { + return &Result{ + Status: StatusInvalid, + Reason: fmt.Sprintf("insufficient payment: got %s, need %s", auth.Value, requiredAmount), + }, nil + } + + // Verify: authorization must not be expired. + now := time.Now().Unix() + if auth.ValidBefore.Int64() <= now { + return &Result{ + Status: StatusInvalid, + Reason: "payment authorization expired", + }, nil + } + + // Verify: USDC contract must be canonical for this chain. + if !contracts.IsCanonical(g.chainID, g.usdcAddr) { + return &Result{ + Status: StatusInvalid, + Reason: fmt.Sprintf("non-canonical USDC contract for chain %d", g.chainID), + }, nil + } + + return &Result{ + Status: StatusVerified, + Auth: auth, + }, nil +} + +// SubmitOnChain encodes the authorization as calldata and submits the +// transferWithAuthorization transaction to the USDC contract. For MVP this logs +// the intent and returns a placeholder hash, since actual submission requires a +// signed transaction from the seller's wallet. +func (g *Gate) SubmitOnChain(ctx context.Context, auth *eip3009.Authorization) (string, error) { + calldata := eip3009.EncodeCalldata(auth) + g.logger.Infow("submit transferWithAuthorization", + "from", auth.From.Hex(), + "to", auth.To.Hex(), + "value", auth.Value.String(), + "calldataLen", len(calldata), + ) + + // TODO: Build and submit the actual transaction via g.rpcClient when + // seller-side signing is available. For now return a deterministic + // placeholder derived from the nonce. + placeholder := fmt.Sprintf("0x%x", auth.Nonce[:16]) + return placeholder, nil +} + +// BuildQuote creates a PriceQuote for the given tool and price. +func (g *Gate) BuildQuote(toolName, price string) *PriceQuote { + return &PriceQuote{ + ToolName: toolName, + Price: price, + Currency: wallet.CurrencyUSDC, + USDCContract: g.usdcAddr.Hex(), + ChainID: g.chainID, + SellerAddr: g.localAddr, + QuoteExpiry: time.Now().Add(DefaultQuoteExpiry).Unix(), + } +} + +// ParseUSDC converts a decimal USDC string (e.g. "0.50") into the smallest +// unit (*big.Int with 6 decimals, e.g. 500000). +func ParseUSDC(amount string) (*big.Int, error) { + rat := new(big.Rat) + if _, ok := rat.SetString(amount); !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid USDC amount: %q", amount) + } + + // Multiply by 10^6. + multiplier := new(big.Rat).SetInt(new(big.Int).Exp(big.NewInt(10), big.NewInt(6), nil)) + rat.Mul(rat, multiplier) + + if !rat.IsInt() { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("USDC amount %q exceeds 6 decimal places", amount) + } + + return rat.Num(), nil +} + +// parseAuthorization converts a JSON-decoded map into an eip3009.Authorization. +func parseAuthorization(m map[string]interface{}) (*eip3009.Authorization, error) { + auth := &eip3009.Authorization{} + + from, err := getHexAddress(m, "from") + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("from: %w", err) + } + auth.From = from + + to, err := getHexAddress(m, "to") + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("to: %w", err) + } + auth.To = to + + value, err := getBigInt(m, "value") + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("value: %w", err) + } + auth.Value = value + + validAfter, err := getBigInt(m, "validAfter") + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("validAfter: %w", err) + } + auth.ValidAfter = validAfter + + validBefore, err := getBigInt(m, "validBefore") + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("validBefore: %w", err) + } + auth.ValidBefore = validBefore + + nonce, err := getBytes32(m, "nonce") + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("nonce: %w", err) + } + auth.Nonce = nonce + + v, err := getUint8(m, "v") + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("v: %w", err) + } + auth.V = v + + r, err := getBytes32(m, "r") + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("r: %w", err) + } + auth.R = r + + s, err := getBytes32(m, "s") + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("s: %w", err) + } + auth.S = s + + return auth, nil +} + +// getHexAddress extracts a hex-encoded Ethereum address from a map field. +func getHexAddress(m map[string]interface{}, key string) (common.Address, error) { + v, ok := m[key] + if !ok { + return common.Address{}, fmt.Errorf("missing field %q", key) + } + s, ok := v.(string) + if !ok { + return common.Address{}, fmt.Errorf("field %q is not a string", key) + } + if !common.IsHexAddress(s) { + return common.Address{}, fmt.Errorf("field %q is not a valid hex address", key) + } + return common.HexToAddress(s), nil +} + +// getBigInt extracts a big.Int from a map field (accepts string or float64). +func getBigInt(m map[string]interface{}, key string) (*big.Int, error) { + v, ok := m[key] + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing field %q", key) + } + + switch val := v.(type) { + case string: + n, ok := new(big.Int).SetString(val, 0) + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("field %q: invalid integer %q", key, val) + } + return n, nil + case float64: + return big.NewInt(int64(val)), nil + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("field %q: unsupported type %T", key, v) + } +} + +// getBytes32 extracts a [32]byte from a map field (hex string). +func getBytes32(m map[string]interface{}, key string) ([32]byte, error) { + var result [32]byte + v, ok := m[key] + if !ok { + return result, fmt.Errorf("missing field %q", key) + } + s, ok := v.(string) + if !ok { + return result, fmt.Errorf("field %q is not a string", key) + } + b := common.FromHex(s) + if len(b) != 32 { + return result, fmt.Errorf("field %q: expected 32 bytes, got %d", key, len(b)) + } + copy(result[:], b) + return result, nil +} + +// getUint8 extracts a uint8 from a map field (float64 from JSON). +func getUint8(m map[string]interface{}, key string) (uint8, error) { + v, ok := m[key] + if !ok { + return 0, fmt.Errorf("missing field %q", key) + } + f, ok := v.(float64) + if !ok { + return 0, fmt.Errorf("field %q is not a number", key) + } + if f < 0 || f > 255 { + return 0, fmt.Errorf("field %q out of uint8 range: %f", key, f) + } + return uint8(f), nil +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/paygate/gate_test.go b/internal/p2p/paygate/gate_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..27c685b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/paygate/gate_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,193 @@ +package paygate + +import ( + "fmt" + "math/big" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + "go.uber.org/zap" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/wallet" +) + +// testGate creates a Gate configured for Base Sepolia testnet. +func testGate(pricingFn PricingFunc) *Gate { + logger := zap.NewNop().Sugar() + return New(Config{ + PricingFn: pricingFn, + LocalAddr: "0x1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678", + ChainID: 84532, // Base Sepolia + USDCAddr: common.HexToAddress("0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e"), + Logger: logger, + }) +} + +func makeValidAuth(to string, amount *big.Int) map[string]interface{} { + nonce := "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001" + r := "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002" + s := "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003" + + return map[string]interface{}{ + "from": "0xaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", + "to": to, + "value": amount.String(), + "validAfter": "0", + "validBefore": fmt.Sprintf("%d", time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute).Unix()), + "nonce": nonce, + "v": float64(27), + "r": r, + "s": s, + } +} + +func TestCheck_FreeTool(t *testing.T) { + gate := testGate(func(toolName string) (string, bool) { + return "", true + }) + + result, err := gate.Check("did:peer:buyer", "free-tool", nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StatusFree, result.Status) + assert.Nil(t, result.PriceQuote) + assert.Nil(t, result.Auth) +} + +func TestCheck_PaidNoAuth(t *testing.T) { + gate := testGate(func(toolName string) (string, bool) { + return "0.50", false + }) + + result, err := gate.Check("did:peer:buyer", "paid-tool", map[string]interface{}{}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StatusPaymentRequired, result.Status) + require.NotNil(t, result.PriceQuote) + assert.Equal(t, "paid-tool", result.PriceQuote.ToolName) + assert.Equal(t, "0.50", result.PriceQuote.Price) + assert.Equal(t, wallet.CurrencyUSDC, result.PriceQuote.Currency) + assert.Equal(t, "0x1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678", result.PriceQuote.SellerAddr) +} + +func TestCheck_PaidWithValidAuth(t *testing.T) { + gate := testGate(func(toolName string) (string, bool) { + return "0.50", false + }) + + amount := big.NewInt(500000) // 0.50 USDC in 6 decimals + authMap := makeValidAuth("0x1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678", amount) + + result, err := gate.Check("did:peer:buyer", "paid-tool", map[string]interface{}{ + "paymentAuth": authMap, + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StatusVerified, result.Status) + require.NotNil(t, result.Auth) +} + +func TestCheck_PaidInsufficientAmount(t *testing.T) { + gate := testGate(func(toolName string) (string, bool) { + return "1.00", false + }) + + amount := big.NewInt(500000) // 0.50 USDC — insufficient for $1.00 + authMap := makeValidAuth("0x1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678", amount) + + result, err := gate.Check("did:peer:buyer", "paid-tool", map[string]interface{}{ + "paymentAuth": authMap, + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StatusInvalid, result.Status) + assert.Contains(t, result.Reason, "insufficient payment") +} + +func TestCheck_ExpiredAuth(t *testing.T) { + gate := testGate(func(toolName string) (string, bool) { + return "0.50", false + }) + + amount := big.NewInt(500000) + authMap := makeValidAuth("0x1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678", amount) + // Set validBefore to the past. + authMap["validBefore"] = fmt.Sprintf("%d", time.Now().Add(-10*time.Minute).Unix()) + + result, err := gate.Check("did:peer:buyer", "paid-tool", map[string]interface{}{ + "paymentAuth": authMap, + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StatusInvalid, result.Status) + assert.Contains(t, result.Reason, "expired") +} + +func TestCheck_RecipientMismatch(t *testing.T) { + gate := testGate(func(toolName string) (string, bool) { + return "0.50", false + }) + + amount := big.NewInt(500000) + // Wrong recipient address. + authMap := makeValidAuth("0xdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef", amount) + + result, err := gate.Check("did:peer:buyer", "paid-tool", map[string]interface{}{ + "paymentAuth": authMap, + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StatusInvalid, result.Status) + assert.Contains(t, result.Reason, "recipient mismatch") +} + +func TestCheck_InvalidAuthType(t *testing.T) { + gate := testGate(func(toolName string) (string, bool) { + return "0.50", false + }) + + result, err := gate.Check("did:peer:buyer", "paid-tool", map[string]interface{}{ + "paymentAuth": "not-a-map", + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, StatusInvalid, result.Status) + assert.Contains(t, result.Reason, "not a valid object") +} + +func TestParseUSDC(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give string + want int64 + wantErr bool + }{ + {give: "0.50", want: 500000}, + {give: "1.00", want: 1000000}, + {give: "0.000001", want: 1}, + {give: "100", want: 100000000}, + {give: "0", want: 0}, + {give: "1.123456", want: 1123456}, + {give: "0.0000001", wantErr: true}, + {give: "abc", wantErr: true}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + got, err := ParseUSDC(tt.give) + if tt.wantErr { + assert.Error(t, err) + return + } + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, big.NewInt(tt.want), got) + }) + } +} + +func TestBuildQuote(t *testing.T) { + gate := testGate(nil) + quote := gate.BuildQuote("my-tool", "2.50") + + assert.Equal(t, "my-tool", quote.ToolName) + assert.Equal(t, "2.50", quote.Price) + assert.Equal(t, wallet.CurrencyUSDC, quote.Currency) + assert.Equal(t, int64(84532), quote.ChainID) + assert.Equal(t, "0x1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678", quote.SellerAddr) + assert.Greater(t, quote.QuoteExpiry, time.Now().Unix()) +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/protocol/handler.go b/internal/p2p/protocol/handler.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c9ba5472 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/protocol/handler.go @@ -0,0 +1,575 @@ +package protocol + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/sha256" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "time" + + "github.com/google/uuid" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/network" + "go.uber.org/zap" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/firewall" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/handshake" +) + +// ToolExecutor executes a tool by name with the given parameters. +// Uses the callback pattern to avoid import cycles with the agent package. +type ToolExecutor func(ctx context.Context, toolName string, params map[string]interface{}) (map[string]interface{}, error) + +// ToolApprovalFunc asks the local owner for approval before executing a remote +// tool invocation. Returns true if approved, false if denied. +// Uses the callback pattern to avoid import cycles with the approval package. +type ToolApprovalFunc func(ctx context.Context, peerDID, toolName string, params map[string]interface{}) (bool, error) + +// SecurityEventTracker records tool execution outcomes for security monitoring. +// Uses the callback pattern to avoid import cycles with the handshake package. +type SecurityEventTracker interface { + RecordToolFailure(peerDID string) + RecordToolSuccess(peerDID string) +} + +// CardProvider returns the local agent card as a map. +type CardProvider func() map[string]interface{} + +// PayGateChecker checks payment for a tool invocation. +type PayGateChecker interface { + Check(peerDID, toolName string, payload map[string]interface{}) (PayGateResult, error) +} + +// PayGate status values returned by PayGateChecker.Check. +const ( + payGateStatusFree = "free" + payGateStatusVerified = "verified" + payGateStatusPaymentRequired = "payment_required" + payGateStatusInvalid = "invalid" +) + +// PayGateResult represents the payment check outcome. +type PayGateResult struct { + Status string // payGateStatusFree, payGateStatusVerified, payGateStatusPaymentRequired, payGateStatusInvalid + Auth interface{} // the verified authorization (opaque to handler) + PriceQuote map[string]interface{} // price quote when payment required +} + +// Handler processes A2A-over-P2P messages on libp2p streams. +type Handler struct { + sessions *handshake.SessionStore + firewall *firewall.Firewall + executor ToolExecutor + sandboxExec ToolExecutor + cardFn CardProvider + payGate PayGateChecker + approvalFn ToolApprovalFunc + securityEvents SecurityEventTracker + localDID string + logger *zap.SugaredLogger +} + +// HandlerConfig configures the protocol handler. +type HandlerConfig struct { + Sessions *handshake.SessionStore + Firewall *firewall.Firewall + Executor ToolExecutor + CardFn CardProvider + LocalDID string + Logger *zap.SugaredLogger +} + +// NewHandler creates a new A2A-over-P2P protocol handler. +func NewHandler(cfg HandlerConfig) *Handler { + return &Handler{ + sessions: cfg.Sessions, + firewall: cfg.Firewall, + executor: cfg.Executor, + cardFn: cfg.CardFn, + localDID: cfg.LocalDID, + logger: cfg.Logger, + } +} + +// SetExecutor sets the tool executor callback. +func (h *Handler) SetExecutor(exec ToolExecutor) { + h.executor = exec +} + +// SetPayGate sets the payment gate checker for paid tool invocations. +func (h *Handler) SetPayGate(gate PayGateChecker) { + h.payGate = gate +} + +// SetApprovalFunc sets the owner approval callback for remote tool invocations. +func (h *Handler) SetApprovalFunc(fn ToolApprovalFunc) { + h.approvalFn = fn +} + +// SetSandboxExecutor sets an isolated executor for remote tool invocations. +// When set, tool calls from remote peers use this executor instead of the +// default in-process executor, preventing access to parent process memory. +func (h *Handler) SetSandboxExecutor(exec ToolExecutor) { + h.sandboxExec = exec +} + +// SetSecurityEvents sets the security event tracker for recording tool +// execution outcomes and triggering auto-invalidation on repeated failures. +func (h *Handler) SetSecurityEvents(tracker SecurityEventTracker) { + h.securityEvents = tracker +} + +// StreamHandler returns a libp2p stream handler for incoming A2A messages. +func (h *Handler) StreamHandler() network.StreamHandler { + return func(s network.Stream) { + defer s.Close() + + ctx := context.Background() + + var req Request + if err := json.NewDecoder(s).Decode(&req); err != nil { + h.sendError(s, "", fmt.Sprintf("decode request: %v", err)) + return + } + + resp := h.handleRequest(ctx, s, &req) + if err := json.NewEncoder(s).Encode(resp); err != nil { + h.logger.Warnw("encode response", "error", err) + } + } +} + +// handleRequest processes a single A2A request. +func (h *Handler) handleRequest(ctx context.Context, s network.Stream, req *Request) *Response { + // Validate session token. + peerDID := h.resolvePeerDID(s, req.SessionToken) + if peerDID == "" { + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusDenied, + Error: ErrInvalidSession.Error(), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + + switch req.Type { + case RequestAgentCard: + return h.handleAgentCard(req) + case RequestCapabilityQuery: + return h.handleCapabilityQuery(req, peerDID) + case RequestToolInvoke: + return h.handleToolInvoke(ctx, req, peerDID) + case RequestPriceQuery: + return h.handlePriceQuery(ctx, req, peerDID) + case RequestToolInvokePaid: + return h.handleToolInvokePaid(ctx, req, peerDID) + default: + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusError, + Error: fmt.Sprintf("unknown request type: %s", req.Type), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } +} + +// handleAgentCard returns the local agent card. +func (h *Handler) handleAgentCard(req *Request) *Response { + if h.cardFn == nil { + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusError, + Error: ErrAgentCardUnavailable.Error(), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusOK, + Result: h.cardFn(), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } +} + +// handleCapabilityQuery returns available capabilities. +func (h *Handler) handleCapabilityQuery(req *Request, peerDID string) *Response { + // Return the agent card with capabilities. + if h.cardFn != nil { + card := h.cardFn() + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusOK, + Result: card, + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusOK, + Result: map[string]interface{}{"capabilities": []string{}}, + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } +} + +// handleToolInvoke executes a tool and returns the result. +func (h *Handler) handleToolInvoke(ctx context.Context, req *Request, peerDID string) *Response { + toolName, _ := req.Payload["toolName"].(string) + if toolName == "" { + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusError, + Error: ErrMissingToolName.Error(), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + + // Firewall check. + if h.firewall != nil { + if err := h.firewall.FilterQuery(ctx, peerDID, toolName); err != nil { + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusDenied, + Error: err.Error(), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + } + + // Owner approval check (default-deny when no approval handler is configured). + params, _ := req.Payload["params"].(map[string]interface{}) + if params == nil { + params = map[string]interface{}{} + } + + if h.approvalFn == nil { + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusDenied, + Error: ErrNoApprovalHandler.Error(), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + approved, err := h.approvalFn(ctx, peerDID, toolName, params) + if err != nil { + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusError, + Error: fmt.Sprintf("approval check: %v", err), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + if !approved { + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusDenied, + Error: ErrDeniedByOwner.Error(), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + + // Execute tool (prefer sandbox executor for process isolation). + exec := h.executor + if h.sandboxExec != nil { + exec = h.sandboxExec + } + result, err := exec(ctx, toolName, params) + if err != nil { + if h.securityEvents != nil { + h.securityEvents.RecordToolFailure(peerDID) + } + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusError, + Error: err.Error(), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + + if h.securityEvents != nil { + h.securityEvents.RecordToolSuccess(peerDID) + } + + // Sanitize response through firewall. + if h.firewall != nil { + result = h.firewall.SanitizeResponse(result) + } + + // Generate ZK attestation if available. + resp := &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusOK, + Result: result, + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + if h.firewall != nil { + resultBytes, _ := json.Marshal(result) + hash := sha256.Sum256(resultBytes) + didHash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(h.localDID)) + ar, _ := h.firewall.AttestResponse(hash[:], didHash[:]) + if ar != nil { + resp.Attestation = &AttestationData{ + Proof: ar.Proof, + PublicInputs: ar.PublicInputs, + CircuitID: ar.CircuitID, + Scheme: ar.Scheme, + } + resp.AttestationProof = ar.Proof // backward compat + } + } + + return resp +} + +// handlePriceQuery returns pricing information for a tool. +func (h *Handler) handlePriceQuery(ctx context.Context, req *Request, peerDID string) *Response { + toolName, _ := req.Payload["toolName"].(string) + if toolName == "" { + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusError, + Error: ErrMissingToolName.Error(), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + + if h.payGate == nil { + // No payment gate configured — everything is free. + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusOK, + Result: map[string]interface{}{ + "toolName": toolName, + "isFree": true, + }, + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + + result, err := h.payGate.Check(peerDID, toolName, nil) + if err != nil { + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusError, + Error: fmt.Sprintf("price query %s: %v", toolName, err), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + + if result.Status == payGateStatusFree { + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusOK, + Result: map[string]interface{}{ + "toolName": toolName, + "isFree": true, + }, + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusOK, + Result: result.PriceQuote, + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } +} + +// handleToolInvokePaid executes a paid tool invocation with payment verification. +func (h *Handler) handleToolInvokePaid(ctx context.Context, req *Request, peerDID string) *Response { + toolName, _ := req.Payload["toolName"].(string) + if toolName == "" { + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusError, + Error: ErrMissingToolName.Error(), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + + // 1. Firewall ACL check. + if h.firewall != nil { + if err := h.firewall.FilterQuery(ctx, peerDID, toolName); err != nil { + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusDenied, + Error: err.Error(), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + } + + // 2. Payment gate check. + if h.payGate != nil { + result, err := h.payGate.Check(peerDID, toolName, req.Payload) + if err != nil { + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusError, + Error: fmt.Sprintf("payment check %s: %v", toolName, err), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + + switch result.Status { + case payGateStatusPaymentRequired: + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusPaymentRequired, + Result: result.PriceQuote, + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + case payGateStatusInvalid: + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusError, + Error: ErrInvalidPaymentAuth.Error(), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + case payGateStatusVerified, payGateStatusFree: + // Continue to execution. + } + } + + // 3. Owner approval check (default-deny when no approval handler is configured). + params, _ := req.Payload["params"].(map[string]interface{}) + if params == nil { + params = map[string]interface{}{} + } + + if h.approvalFn == nil { + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusDenied, + Error: ErrNoApprovalHandler.Error(), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + approved, err := h.approvalFn(ctx, peerDID, toolName, params) + if err != nil { + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusError, + Error: fmt.Sprintf("approval check: %v", err), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + if !approved { + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusDenied, + Error: ErrDeniedByOwner.Error(), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + + // 4. Execute tool (prefer sandbox executor for process isolation). + paidExec := h.executor + if h.sandboxExec != nil { + paidExec = h.sandboxExec + } + if paidExec == nil { + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusError, + Error: ErrExecutorNotConfigured.Error(), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + + result, err := paidExec(ctx, toolName, params) + if err != nil { + if h.securityEvents != nil { + h.securityEvents.RecordToolFailure(peerDID) + } + return &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusError, + Error: err.Error(), + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + } + + if h.securityEvents != nil { + h.securityEvents.RecordToolSuccess(peerDID) + } + + // 5. Sanitize response through firewall. + if h.firewall != nil { + result = h.firewall.SanitizeResponse(result) + } + + // 6. ZK attestation. + paidResp := &Response{ + RequestID: req.RequestID, + Status: ResponseStatusOK, + Result: result, + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + if h.firewall != nil { + resultBytes, _ := json.Marshal(result) + hash := sha256.Sum256(resultBytes) + didHash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(h.localDID)) + ar, _ := h.firewall.AttestResponse(hash[:], didHash[:]) + if ar != nil { + paidResp.Attestation = &AttestationData{ + Proof: ar.Proof, + PublicInputs: ar.PublicInputs, + CircuitID: ar.CircuitID, + Scheme: ar.Scheme, + } + paidResp.AttestationProof = ar.Proof // backward compat + } + } + + return paidResp +} + +// resolvePeerDID validates the session token and returns the peer DID. +func (h *Handler) resolvePeerDID(s network.Stream, token string) string { + if h.sessions == nil { + return "" + } + + // Check all active sessions for matching token. + for _, sess := range h.sessions.ActiveSessions() { + if h.sessions.Validate(sess.PeerDID, token) { + return sess.PeerDID + } + } + + return "" +} + +// sendError sends a quick error response on a stream. +func (h *Handler) sendError(s network.Stream, reqID, msg string) { + resp := Response{ + RequestID: reqID, + Status: ResponseStatusError, + Error: msg, + Timestamp: time.Now(), + } + _ = json.NewEncoder(s).Encode(resp) +} + +// SendRequest sends an A2A request to a remote peer over a stream. +func SendRequest(ctx context.Context, s network.Stream, reqType RequestType, token string, payload map[string]interface{}) (*Response, error) { + req := Request{ + Type: reqType, + SessionToken: token, + RequestID: uuid.New().String(), + Payload: payload, + } + + if err := json.NewEncoder(s).Encode(req); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("send request: %w", err) + } + + var resp Response + if err := json.NewDecoder(s).Decode(&resp); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("receive response: %w", err) + } + + return &resp, nil +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/protocol/handler_test.go b/internal/p2p/protocol/handler_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..76029802 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/protocol/handler_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,221 @@ +package protocol + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "testing" + "time" + + "go.uber.org/zap" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/firewall" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/handshake" +) + +// testHandler creates a Handler with pre-configured sessions and firewall. +func testHandler() (*Handler, *handshake.SessionStore) { + logger, _ := zap.NewDevelopment() + sugar := logger.Sugar() + + sessions, err := handshake.NewSessionStore(time.Hour) + if err != nil { + panic(fmt.Sprintf("create session store: %v", err)) + } + + fw := firewall.New([]firewall.ACLRule{ + {PeerDID: "did:key:peer-1", Action: firewall.ACLActionAllow, Tools: []string{firewall.WildcardAll}}, + {PeerDID: "did:key:peer-2", Action: firewall.ACLActionAllow, Tools: []string{firewall.WildcardAll}}, + {PeerDID: "did:key:peer-3", Action: firewall.ACLActionAllow, Tools: []string{firewall.WildcardAll}}, + {PeerDID: "did:key:peer-4", Action: firewall.ACLActionAllow, Tools: []string{firewall.WildcardAll}}, + {PeerDID: "did:key:peer-5", Action: firewall.ACLActionAllow, Tools: []string{firewall.WildcardAll}}, + {PeerDID: "did:key:peer-6", Action: firewall.ACLActionAllow, Tools: []string{firewall.WildcardAll}}, + {PeerDID: "did:key:peer-json", Action: firewall.ACLActionAllow, Tools: []string{firewall.WildcardAll}}, + }, sugar) + + h := NewHandler(HandlerConfig{ + Sessions: sessions, + Firewall: fw, + Executor: func(_ context.Context, toolName string, _ map[string]interface{}) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return map[string]interface{}{"tool": toolName, "executed": true}, nil + }, + LocalDID: "did:key:local", + Logger: sugar, + }) + + return h, sessions +} + +// createSession adds a session and returns the token. +func createSession(sessions *handshake.SessionStore, peerDID string) string { + sess, err := sessions.Create(peerDID, false) + if err != nil { + panic(fmt.Sprintf("create session: %v", err)) + } + return sess.Token +} + +func TestHandleToolInvoke_NilApprovalFn_DefaultDeny(t *testing.T) { + h, sessions := testHandler() + // Do NOT set approvalFn — it stays nil. + + peerDID := "did:key:peer-1" + token := createSession(sessions, peerDID) + + req := &Request{ + Type: RequestToolInvoke, + SessionToken: token, + RequestID: "req-1", + Payload: map[string]interface{}{"toolName": "echo"}, + } + + resp := h.handleRequest(context.Background(), nil, req) + if resp.Status != ResponseStatusDenied { + t.Errorf("expected status 'denied', got %q", resp.Status) + } + if resp.Error != ErrNoApprovalHandler.Error() { + t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %s", resp.Error) + } +} + +func TestHandleToolInvokePaid_NilApprovalFn_DefaultDeny(t *testing.T) { + h, sessions := testHandler() + // Do NOT set approvalFn. + + peerDID := "did:key:peer-2" + token := createSession(sessions, peerDID) + + req := &Request{ + Type: RequestToolInvokePaid, + SessionToken: token, + RequestID: "req-2", + Payload: map[string]interface{}{"toolName": "paid_tool"}, + } + + resp := h.handleRequest(context.Background(), nil, req) + if resp.Status != ResponseStatusDenied { + t.Errorf("expected status 'denied', got %q", resp.Status) + } + if resp.Error != ErrNoApprovalHandler.Error() { + t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %s", resp.Error) + } +} + +func TestHandleToolInvoke_Approved(t *testing.T) { + h, sessions := testHandler() + h.SetApprovalFunc(func(_ context.Context, _, _ string, _ map[string]interface{}) (bool, error) { + return true, nil + }) + + peerDID := "did:key:peer-3" + token := createSession(sessions, peerDID) + + req := &Request{ + Type: RequestToolInvoke, + SessionToken: token, + RequestID: "req-3", + Payload: map[string]interface{}{"toolName": "echo"}, + } + + resp := h.handleRequest(context.Background(), nil, req) + if resp.Status != ResponseStatusOK { + t.Errorf("expected status 'ok', got %q (error: %s)", resp.Status, resp.Error) + } +} + +func TestHandleToolInvoke_Denied(t *testing.T) { + h, sessions := testHandler() + h.SetApprovalFunc(func(_ context.Context, _, _ string, _ map[string]interface{}) (bool, error) { + return false, nil + }) + + peerDID := "did:key:peer-4" + token := createSession(sessions, peerDID) + + req := &Request{ + Type: RequestToolInvoke, + SessionToken: token, + RequestID: "req-4", + Payload: map[string]interface{}{"toolName": "exec"}, + } + + resp := h.handleRequest(context.Background(), nil, req) + if resp.Status != ResponseStatusDenied { + t.Errorf("expected status 'denied', got %q", resp.Status) + } + if resp.Error != ErrDeniedByOwner.Error() { + t.Errorf("unexpected error: %s", resp.Error) + } +} + +func TestHandleToolInvoke_ApprovalError(t *testing.T) { + h, sessions := testHandler() + h.SetApprovalFunc(func(_ context.Context, _, _ string, _ map[string]interface{}) (bool, error) { + return false, fmt.Errorf("approval service unavailable") + }) + + peerDID := "did:key:peer-5" + token := createSession(sessions, peerDID) + + req := &Request{ + Type: RequestToolInvoke, + SessionToken: token, + RequestID: "req-5", + Payload: map[string]interface{}{"toolName": "echo"}, + } + + resp := h.handleRequest(context.Background(), nil, req) + if resp.Status != ResponseStatusError { + t.Errorf("expected status 'error', got %q", resp.Status) + } +} + +func TestHandleToolInvokePaid_Approved(t *testing.T) { + h, sessions := testHandler() + h.SetApprovalFunc(func(_ context.Context, _, _ string, _ map[string]interface{}) (bool, error) { + return true, nil + }) + + peerDID := "did:key:peer-6" + token := createSession(sessions, peerDID) + + req := &Request{ + Type: RequestToolInvokePaid, + SessionToken: token, + RequestID: "req-6", + Payload: map[string]interface{}{"toolName": "paid_echo"}, + } + + resp := h.handleRequest(context.Background(), nil, req) + if resp.Status != ResponseStatusOK { + t.Errorf("expected status 'ok', got %q (error: %s)", resp.Status, resp.Error) + } +} + +func TestResponseJSON_DefaultDeny(t *testing.T) { + h, sessions := testHandler() + peerDID := "did:key:peer-json" + token := createSession(sessions, peerDID) + + req := &Request{ + Type: RequestToolInvoke, + SessionToken: token, + RequestID: "req-json", + Payload: map[string]interface{}{"toolName": "echo"}, + } + + resp := h.handleRequest(context.Background(), nil, req) + + data, err := json.Marshal(resp) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("marshal response: %v", err) + } + + var decoded Response + if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &decoded); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unmarshal response: %v", err) + } + if decoded.Status != ResponseStatusDenied { + t.Errorf("expected denied in JSON, got %q", decoded.Status) + } +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/protocol/messages.go b/internal/p2p/protocol/messages.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..651b87fb --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/protocol/messages.go @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +// Package protocol implements the A2A-over-P2P message exchange protocol. +package protocol + +import ( + "errors" + "time" +) + +// ProtocolID is the libp2p protocol identifier for A2A messages. +const ProtocolID = "/lango/a2a/1.0.0" + +// RequestType identifies the type of A2A request. +type RequestType string + +const ( + // RequestToolInvoke invokes a tool on the remote agent. + RequestToolInvoke RequestType = "tool_invoke" + + // RequestCapabilityQuery queries the capabilities of the remote agent. + RequestCapabilityQuery RequestType = "capability_query" + + // RequestAgentCard requests the agent card of the remote agent. + RequestAgentCard RequestType = "agent_card" + + // RequestPriceQuery queries the pricing for a tool on the remote agent. + RequestPriceQuery RequestType = "price_query" + + // RequestToolInvokePaid invokes a paid tool on the remote agent. + RequestToolInvokePaid RequestType = "tool_invoke_paid" +) + +// ResponseStatus identifies the status of an A2A response. +type ResponseStatus string + +const ( + // ResponseStatusOK indicates a successful response. + ResponseStatusOK ResponseStatus = "ok" + + // ResponseStatusError indicates an error response. + ResponseStatusError ResponseStatus = "error" + + // ResponseStatusDenied indicates the request was denied. + ResponseStatusDenied ResponseStatus = "denied" + + // ResponseStatusPaymentRequired indicates payment is needed. + ResponseStatusPaymentRequired ResponseStatus = "payment_required" +) + +// Valid reports whether s is a known response status. +func (s ResponseStatus) Valid() bool { + switch s { + case ResponseStatusOK, ResponseStatusError, ResponseStatusDenied, ResponseStatusPaymentRequired: + return true + } + return false +} + +// Sentinel errors for protocol-level failures. +var ( + ErrMissingToolName = errors.New("missing toolName in payload") + ErrAgentCardUnavailable = errors.New("agent card not available") + ErrNoApprovalHandler = errors.New("no approval handler configured for remote tool invocation") + ErrDeniedByOwner = errors.New("tool invocation denied by owner") + ErrExecutorNotConfigured = errors.New("tool executor not configured") + ErrInvalidSession = errors.New("invalid or expired session token") + ErrInvalidPaymentAuth = errors.New("invalid payment authorization") +) + +// Request is a P2P A2A request message. +type Request struct { + Type RequestType `json:"type"` + SessionToken string `json:"sessionToken"` + RequestID string `json:"requestId"` + Payload map[string]interface{} `json:"payload,omitempty"` +} + +// AttestationData holds structured ZK attestation proof with metadata. +type AttestationData struct { + Proof []byte `json:"proof"` + PublicInputs []byte `json:"publicInputs"` + CircuitID string `json:"circuitId"` + Scheme string `json:"scheme"` +} + +// Response is a P2P A2A response message. +type Response struct { + RequestID string `json:"requestId"` + Status ResponseStatus `json:"status"` // ResponseStatusOK, ResponseStatusError, ResponseStatusDenied + Result map[string]interface{} `json:"result,omitempty"` + Error string `json:"error,omitempty"` + AttestationProof []byte `json:"attestationProof,omitempty"` // Deprecated: use Attestation + Attestation *AttestationData `json:"attestation,omitempty"` + Timestamp time.Time `json:"timestamp"` +} + +// ToolInvokePayload is the payload for a tool invocation request. +type ToolInvokePayload struct { + ToolName string `json:"toolName"` + Params map[string]interface{} `json:"params"` +} + +// CapabilityQueryPayload is the payload for a capability query. +type CapabilityQueryPayload struct { + Filter string `json:"filter,omitempty"` // optional tool name prefix filter +} + +// PriceQuoteResult is returned when querying tool pricing. +type PriceQuoteResult struct { + ToolName string `json:"toolName"` + Price string `json:"price"` + Currency string `json:"currency"` + USDCContract string `json:"usdcContract"` + ChainID int64 `json:"chainId"` + SellerAddr string `json:"sellerAddr"` + QuoteExpiry int64 `json:"quoteExpiry"` + IsFree bool `json:"isFree"` +} + +// PaidInvokePayload is the payload for a paid tool invocation. +type PaidInvokePayload struct { + ToolName string `json:"toolName"` + Params map[string]interface{} `json:"params"` + PaymentAuth map[string]interface{} `json:"paymentAuth,omitempty"` +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/protocol/remote_agent.go b/internal/p2p/protocol/remote_agent.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5c613719 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/protocol/remote_agent.go @@ -0,0 +1,218 @@ +package protocol + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/host" + "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer" + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +// ZKAttestVerifyFunc verifies a ZK attestation proof from a remote peer. +type ZKAttestVerifyFunc func(ctx context.Context, attestation *AttestationData) (bool, error) + +const errMsgUnknown = "unknown error" + +// P2PRemoteAgent represents a remote agent accessible over P2P. +// It can be used as a sub-agent in the orchestration framework. +type P2PRemoteAgent struct { + name string + did string + peerID peer.ID + token string + host host.Host + capabilities []string + attestVerify ZKAttestVerifyFunc + logger *zap.SugaredLogger +} + +// RemoteAgentConfig configures a P2P remote agent. +type RemoteAgentConfig struct { + Name string + DID string + PeerID peer.ID + SessionToken string + Host host.Host + Capabilities []string + AttestVerifier ZKAttestVerifyFunc + Logger *zap.SugaredLogger +} + +// NewRemoteAgent creates a remote agent adapter for P2P communication. +func NewRemoteAgent(cfg RemoteAgentConfig) *P2PRemoteAgent { + return &P2PRemoteAgent{ + name: cfg.Name, + did: cfg.DID, + peerID: cfg.PeerID, + token: cfg.SessionToken, + host: cfg.Host, + capabilities: cfg.Capabilities, + attestVerify: cfg.AttestVerifier, + logger: cfg.Logger, + } +} + +// SetAttestVerifier sets the ZK attestation verification callback. +func (a *P2PRemoteAgent) SetAttestVerifier(fn ZKAttestVerifyFunc) { + a.attestVerify = fn +} + +// Name returns the remote agent's name. +func (a *P2PRemoteAgent) Name() string { return a.name } + +// DID returns the remote agent's decentralized identifier. +func (a *P2PRemoteAgent) DID() string { return a.did } + +// PeerID returns the remote agent's libp2p peer ID. +func (a *P2PRemoteAgent) PeerID() peer.ID { return a.peerID } + +// Capabilities returns the remote agent's advertised capabilities. +func (a *P2PRemoteAgent) Capabilities() []string { return a.capabilities } + +// InvokeTool sends a tool invocation to the remote agent. +func (a *P2PRemoteAgent) InvokeTool(ctx context.Context, toolName string, params map[string]interface{}) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + s, err := a.host.NewStream(ctx, a.peerID, ProtocolID) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("open stream to %s: %w", a.peerID, err) + } + defer s.Close() + + payload := map[string]interface{}{ + "toolName": toolName, + "params": params, + } + + resp, err := SendRequest(ctx, s, RequestToolInvoke, a.token, payload) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("tool invoke %s on %s: %w", toolName, a.name, err) + } + + if resp.Status != ResponseStatusOK { + errMsg := resp.Error + if errMsg == "" { + errMsg = errMsgUnknown + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("remote tool %s error: %s", toolName, errMsg) + } + + // Verify ZK attestation if present. + if resp.Attestation != nil && a.attestVerify != nil { + valid, err := a.attestVerify(ctx, resp.Attestation) + if err != nil { + a.logger.Warnw("attestation verification error", "tool", toolName, "remote", a.name, "error", err) + } else if valid { + a.logger.Debugw("attestation verified", "tool", toolName, "remote", a.name, "circuit", resp.Attestation.CircuitID) + } else { + a.logger.Warnw("attestation verification failed", "tool", toolName, "remote", a.name) + } + } else if len(resp.AttestationProof) > 0 { + a.logger.Debugw("response has legacy attestation proof (unverified)", "tool", toolName, "remote", a.name) + } + + return resp.Result, nil +} + +// QueryCapabilities fetches the remote agent's capabilities. +func (a *P2PRemoteAgent) QueryCapabilities(ctx context.Context) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + s, err := a.host.NewStream(ctx, a.peerID, ProtocolID) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("open stream to %s: %w", a.peerID, err) + } + defer s.Close() + + resp, err := SendRequest(ctx, s, RequestCapabilityQuery, a.token, nil) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("capability query %s: %w", a.name, err) + } + + if resp.Status != ResponseStatusOK { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("capability query error: %s", resp.Error) + } + + return resp.Result, nil +} + +// FetchAgentCard fetches the remote agent card. +func (a *P2PRemoteAgent) FetchAgentCard(ctx context.Context) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + s, err := a.host.NewStream(ctx, a.peerID, ProtocolID) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("open stream to %s: %w", a.peerID, err) + } + defer s.Close() + + resp, err := SendRequest(ctx, s, RequestAgentCard, a.token, nil) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent card fetch %s: %w", a.name, err) + } + + if resp.Status != ResponseStatusOK { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent card fetch error: %s", resp.Error) + } + + return resp.Result, nil +} + +// QueryPrice queries the pricing for a tool on the remote agent. +func (a *P2PRemoteAgent) QueryPrice(ctx context.Context, toolName string) (*PriceQuoteResult, error) { + s, err := a.host.NewStream(ctx, a.peerID, ProtocolID) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("open stream to %s: %w", a.peerID, err) + } + defer s.Close() + + payload := map[string]interface{}{"toolName": toolName} + resp, err := SendRequest(ctx, s, RequestPriceQuery, a.token, payload) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("price query %s on %s: %w", toolName, a.name, err) + } + + if resp.Status != ResponseStatusOK { + errMsg := resp.Error + if errMsg == "" { + errMsg = errMsgUnknown + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("price query %s error: %s", toolName, errMsg) + } + + // Parse result into PriceQuoteResult. + resultBytes, err := json.Marshal(resp.Result) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal price quote: %w", err) + } + + var quote PriceQuoteResult + if err := json.Unmarshal(resultBytes, "e); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal price quote: %w", err) + } + + return "e, nil +} + +// InvokeToolPaid sends a paid tool invocation to the remote agent. +func (a *P2PRemoteAgent) InvokeToolPaid( + ctx context.Context, + toolName string, + params map[string]interface{}, + paymentAuth map[string]interface{}, +) (*Response, error) { + s, err := a.host.NewStream(ctx, a.peerID, ProtocolID) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("open stream to %s: %w", a.peerID, err) + } + defer s.Close() + + payload := map[string]interface{}{ + "toolName": toolName, + "params": params, + "paymentAuth": paymentAuth, + } + + resp, err := SendRequest(ctx, s, RequestToolInvokePaid, a.token, payload) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("paid invoke %s on %s: %w", toolName, a.name, err) + } + + return resp, nil +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/reputation/store.go b/internal/p2p/reputation/store.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..75ca7827 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/reputation/store.go @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +// Package reputation tracks peer trust scores based on exchange outcomes. +package reputation + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + "time" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/peerreputation" + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +// PeerDetails holds full reputation information for a single peer. +type PeerDetails struct { + PeerDID string `json:"peerDid"` + TrustScore float64 `json:"trustScore"` + SuccessfulExchanges int `json:"successfulExchanges"` + FailedExchanges int `json:"failedExchanges"` + TimeoutCount int `json:"timeoutCount"` + FirstSeen time.Time `json:"firstSeen"` + LastInteraction time.Time `json:"lastInteraction"` +} + +// Store persists and queries peer reputation data. +type Store struct { + client *ent.Client + logger *zap.SugaredLogger + onChangeCallback func(peerDID string, newScore float64) +} + +// NewStore creates a reputation store backed by the given ent client. +func NewStore(client *ent.Client, logger *zap.SugaredLogger) *Store { + return &Store{client: client, logger: logger} +} + +// SetOnChangeCallback registers a function to be called whenever a peer's +// trust score changes. This enables reactive security measures such as +// session invalidation when scores drop below a threshold. +func (s *Store) SetOnChangeCallback(fn func(peerDID string, newScore float64)) { + s.onChangeCallback = fn +} + +// RecordSuccess increments the successful exchange count for a peer and +// recalculates the trust score. +func (s *Store) RecordSuccess(ctx context.Context, peerDID string) error { + return s.upsert(ctx, peerDID, func(successes, failures, timeouts int) (int, int, int) { + return successes + 1, failures, timeouts + }) +} + +// RecordFailure increments the failed exchange count for a peer and +// recalculates the trust score. +func (s *Store) RecordFailure(ctx context.Context, peerDID string) error { + return s.upsert(ctx, peerDID, func(successes, failures, timeouts int) (int, int, int) { + return successes, failures + 1, timeouts + }) +} + +// RecordTimeout increments the timeout count for a peer and recalculates the +// trust score. +func (s *Store) RecordTimeout(ctx context.Context, peerDID string) error { + return s.upsert(ctx, peerDID, func(successes, failures, timeouts int) (int, int, int) { + return successes, failures, timeouts + 1 + }) +} + +// GetDetails returns full reputation details for a peer. Returns nil if the +// peer has no reputation record. +func (s *Store) GetDetails(ctx context.Context, peerDID string) (*PeerDetails, error) { + rep, err := s.client.PeerReputation.Query(). + Where(peerreputation.PeerDid(peerDID)). + Only(ctx) + if err != nil { + if ent.IsNotFound(err) { + return nil, nil + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("query peer reputation %q: %w", peerDID, err) + } + return &PeerDetails{ + PeerDID: rep.PeerDid, + TrustScore: rep.TrustScore, + SuccessfulExchanges: rep.SuccessfulExchanges, + FailedExchanges: rep.FailedExchanges, + TimeoutCount: rep.TimeoutCount, + FirstSeen: rep.FirstSeen, + LastInteraction: rep.LastInteraction, + }, nil +} + +// GetScore returns the current trust score for a peer. Returns 0.0 if the peer +// has no reputation record. +func (s *Store) GetScore(ctx context.Context, peerDID string) (float64, error) { + rep, err := s.client.PeerReputation.Query(). + Where(peerreputation.PeerDid(peerDID)). + Only(ctx) + if err != nil { + if ent.IsNotFound(err) { + return 0.0, nil + } + return 0.0, fmt.Errorf("query peer reputation %q: %w", peerDID, err) + } + return rep.TrustScore, nil +} + +// IsTrusted returns true if the peer's trust score meets the minimum threshold. +// New peers with no reputation record are given the benefit of the doubt and +// return true. +func (s *Store) IsTrusted(ctx context.Context, peerDID string, minScore float64) (bool, error) { + rep, err := s.client.PeerReputation.Query(). + Where(peerreputation.PeerDid(peerDID)). + Only(ctx) + if err != nil { + if ent.IsNotFound(err) { + return true, nil // benefit of the doubt for new peers + } + return false, fmt.Errorf("query peer reputation %q: %w", peerDID, err) + } + return rep.TrustScore >= minScore, nil +} + +// upsert finds or creates a peer reputation record, applies the mutator to +// adjust counters, recalculates the score, and saves. +func (s *Store) upsert( + ctx context.Context, + peerDID string, + mutate func(successes, failures, timeouts int) (int, int, int), +) error { + rep, err := s.client.PeerReputation.Query(). + Where(peerreputation.PeerDid(peerDID)). + Only(ctx) + if err != nil && !ent.IsNotFound(err) { + return fmt.Errorf("query peer reputation %q: %w", peerDID, err) + } + + if ent.IsNotFound(err) { + // Create new record. + successes, failures, timeouts := mutate(0, 0, 0) + score := CalculateScore(successes, failures, timeouts) + _, createErr := s.client.PeerReputation.Create(). + SetPeerDid(peerDID). + SetSuccessfulExchanges(successes). + SetFailedExchanges(failures). + SetTimeoutCount(timeouts). + SetTrustScore(score). + Save(ctx) + if createErr != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("create peer reputation %q: %w", peerDID, createErr) + } + s.logger.Debugw("peer reputation created", "peerDID", peerDID, "score", score) + if s.onChangeCallback != nil { + s.onChangeCallback(peerDID, score) + } + return nil + } + + // Update existing record. + successes, failures, timeouts := mutate( + rep.SuccessfulExchanges, + rep.FailedExchanges, + rep.TimeoutCount, + ) + score := CalculateScore(successes, failures, timeouts) + _, err = s.client.PeerReputation.UpdateOne(rep). + SetSuccessfulExchanges(successes). + SetFailedExchanges(failures). + SetTimeoutCount(timeouts). + SetTrustScore(score). + Save(ctx) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("update peer reputation %q: %w", peerDID, err) + } + s.logger.Debugw("peer reputation updated", "peerDID", peerDID, "score", score) + if s.onChangeCallback != nil { + s.onChangeCallback(peerDID, score) + } + return nil +} + +// Scoring weight constants used by CalculateScore. +const ( + FailureWeight = 2.0 + TimeoutWeight = 1.5 + BasePenalty = 1.0 +) + +// CalculateScore computes a trust score in the range [0, 1). +// Formula: successes / (successes + failures*FailureWeight + timeouts*TimeoutWeight + BasePenalty) +func CalculateScore(successes, failures, timeouts int) float64 { + s := float64(successes) + return s / (s + float64(failures)*FailureWeight + float64(timeouts)*TimeoutWeight + BasePenalty) +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/reputation/store_test.go b/internal/p2p/reputation/store_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2590fb0c --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/reputation/store_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +package reputation + +import ( + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" +) + +func TestCalculateScore(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give string + successes int + failures int + timeouts int + want float64 + }{ + { + give: "zero history", + successes: 0, + failures: 0, + timeouts: 0, + want: 0.0, + }, + { + give: "one success", + successes: 1, + failures: 0, + timeouts: 0, + want: 0.5, // 1 / (1 + 0 + 0 + 1) + }, + { + give: "one success one failure", + successes: 1, + failures: 1, + timeouts: 0, + want: 0.25, // 1 / (1 + 2 + 0 + 1) + }, + { + give: "one success one timeout", + successes: 1, + failures: 0, + timeouts: 1, + want: 1.0 / 3.5, // 1 / (1 + 0 + 1.5 + 1) + }, + { + give: "ten successes no failures", + successes: 10, + failures: 0, + timeouts: 0, + want: 10.0 / 11.0, // 10 / (10 + 0 + 0 + 1) + }, + { + give: "ten successes two failures one timeout", + successes: 10, + failures: 2, + timeouts: 1, + want: 10.0 / (10.0 + 4.0 + 1.5 + 1.0), // 10 / 16.5 + }, + { + give: "only failures", + successes: 0, + failures: 5, + timeouts: 0, + want: 0.0, // 0 / (0 + 10 + 0 + 1) + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + got := CalculateScore(tt.successes, tt.failures, tt.timeouts) + assert.InDelta(t, tt.want, got, 1e-9) + }) + } +} + +func TestCalculateScore_Progression(t *testing.T) { + // Score should monotonically increase as successes grow with no failures. + var prev float64 + for i := 1; i <= 100; i++ { + score := CalculateScore(i, 0, 0) + assert.Greater(t, score, prev, "score should increase at successes=%d", i) + prev = score + } + + // Score should approach 1.0 with many successes. + score := CalculateScore(10000, 0, 0) + assert.Greater(t, score, 0.999, "score should approach 1.0 with many successes") +} + +func TestCalculateScore_FailurePenalty(t *testing.T) { + // Failures should penalize more heavily than timeouts. + scoreWithFailure := CalculateScore(5, 1, 0) + scoreWithTimeout := CalculateScore(5, 0, 1) + assert.Less(t, scoreWithFailure, scoreWithTimeout, + "failures (weight 2) should penalize more than timeouts (weight 1.5)") +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/zkp/circuits/attestation.go b/internal/p2p/zkp/circuits/attestation.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5f782f00 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/zkp/circuits/attestation.go @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +package circuits + +import ( + "github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend" + "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/hash/mimc" +) + +// ResponseAttestationCircuit proves that an agent produced a response derived +// from specific source data, without revealing the source data or agent key. +// +// Public inputs: ResponseHash, AgentDIDHash, Timestamp, MinTimestamp, MaxTimestamp +// Private witness: SourceDataHash, AgentKeyProof +// +// Constraints: +// - MiMC(AgentKeyProof) == AgentDIDHash +// - MiMC(SourceDataHash, AgentKeyProof, Timestamp) == ResponseHash +// - MinTimestamp <= Timestamp <= MaxTimestamp (freshness) +type ResponseAttestationCircuit struct { + ResponseHash frontend.Variable `gnark:",public"` + AgentDIDHash frontend.Variable `gnark:",public"` + Timestamp frontend.Variable `gnark:",public"` + MinTimestamp frontend.Variable `gnark:",public"` + MaxTimestamp frontend.Variable `gnark:",public"` + + SourceDataHash frontend.Variable `gnark:""` + AgentKeyProof frontend.Variable `gnark:""` +} + +// Define implements frontend.Circuit and constrains the attestation proof. +func (c *ResponseAttestationCircuit) Define(api frontend.API) error { + // Prove agent authority: MiMC(AgentKeyProof) == AgentDIDHash + hAgent, err := mimc.NewMiMC(api) + if err != nil { + return err + } + hAgent.Write(c.AgentKeyProof) + computedDID := hAgent.Sum() + api.AssertIsEqual(computedDID, c.AgentDIDHash) + + // Prove response derivation: MiMC(SourceDataHash, AgentKeyProof, Timestamp) == ResponseHash + hResp, err := mimc.NewMiMC(api) + if err != nil { + return err + } + hResp.Write(c.SourceDataHash, c.AgentKeyProof, c.Timestamp) + computedResp := hResp.Sum() + api.AssertIsEqual(computedResp, c.ResponseHash) + + // Prove timestamp freshness: MinTimestamp <= Timestamp <= MaxTimestamp + api.AssertIsLessOrEqual(c.MinTimestamp, c.Timestamp) + api.AssertIsLessOrEqual(c.Timestamp, c.MaxTimestamp) + + return nil +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/zkp/circuits/balance.go b/internal/p2p/zkp/circuits/balance.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..73c7b997 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/zkp/circuits/balance.go @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +package circuits + +import ( + "github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend" +) + +// BalanceRangeCircuit proves that a private balance is greater than or equal +// to a public threshold, without revealing the actual balance value. +// +// Constraint: Balance >= Threshold +type BalanceRangeCircuit struct { + Threshold frontend.Variable `gnark:",public"` + Balance frontend.Variable `gnark:""` +} + +// Define implements frontend.Circuit and constrains the balance range proof. +func (c *BalanceRangeCircuit) Define(api frontend.API) error { + // Cmp returns 1 if Balance > Threshold, -1 if Balance < Threshold, 0 if equal. + // We need Balance >= Threshold, so Cmp(Balance, Threshold) must be 0 or 1. + // Equivalent: Balance - Threshold >= 0, which AssertIsLessOrEqual(Threshold, Balance) enforces. + api.AssertIsLessOrEqual(c.Threshold, c.Balance) + return nil +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/zkp/circuits/capability.go b/internal/p2p/zkp/circuits/capability.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c5293088 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/zkp/circuits/capability.go @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +package circuits + +import ( + "github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend" + "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/hash/mimc" +) + +// AgentCapabilityCircuit proves that an agent possesses a specific capability +// with a score meeting a minimum threshold, without revealing the actual score +// or test details. +// +// Public inputs: CapabilityHash, AgentDIDHash, MinScore, AgentTestBinding +// Private witness: ActualScore, TestHash +// +// Constraints: +// - ActualScore >= MinScore +// - MiMC(TestHash, ActualScore) == CapabilityHash +// - MiMC(TestHash, AgentDIDHash) == AgentTestBinding +type AgentCapabilityCircuit struct { + CapabilityHash frontend.Variable `gnark:",public"` + AgentDIDHash frontend.Variable `gnark:",public"` + MinScore frontend.Variable `gnark:",public"` + AgentTestBinding frontend.Variable `gnark:",public"` + + ActualScore frontend.Variable `gnark:""` + TestHash frontend.Variable `gnark:""` +} + +// Define implements frontend.Circuit and constrains the capability proof. +func (c *AgentCapabilityCircuit) Define(api frontend.API) error { + // Prove score meets minimum threshold. + api.AssertIsLessOrEqual(c.MinScore, c.ActualScore) + + // Prove capability hash derivation: MiMC(TestHash, ActualScore) == CapabilityHash + hCap, err := mimc.NewMiMC(api) + if err != nil { + return err + } + hCap.Write(c.TestHash, c.ActualScore) + computedCap := hCap.Sum() + api.AssertIsEqual(computedCap, c.CapabilityHash) + + // Prove agent identity binding: MiMC(TestHash, AgentDIDHash) links the test to the agent. + // This ensures the capability was evaluated for this specific agent. + hAgent, err := mimc.NewMiMC(api) + if err != nil { + return err + } + hAgent.Write(c.TestHash, c.AgentDIDHash) + api.AssertIsEqual(hAgent.Sum(), c.AgentTestBinding) + + return nil +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/zkp/circuits/circuits_test.go b/internal/p2p/zkp/circuits/circuits_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..46665dbc --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/zkp/circuits/circuits_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,356 @@ +package circuits + +import ( + "math/big" + "testing" + + "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc" + "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/fr" + nativemimc "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/fr/mimc" + "github.com/consensys/gnark/test" +) + +// mimcHash computes the native MiMC hash of the given field elements. +// Each element is written as a 32-byte big-endian representation. +func mimcHash(elems ...*big.Int) *big.Int { + h := nativemimc.NewMiMC() + for _, e := range elems { + var elem fr.Element + elem.SetBigInt(e) + b := elem.Bytes() // 32-byte big-endian + h.Write(b[:]) + } + result := h.Sum(nil) + var out big.Int + out.SetBytes(result) + return &out +} + +// --- WalletOwnership Tests --- + +func TestWalletOwnership_Valid(t *testing.T) { + assert := test.NewAssert(t) + + response := big.NewInt(42) + challenge := big.NewInt(123) + publicKeyHash := mimcHash(response, challenge) + + circuit := &WalletOwnershipCircuit{} + assignment := &WalletOwnershipCircuit{ + PublicKeyHash: publicKeyHash, + Challenge: challenge, + Response: response, + } + + assert.ProverSucceeded(circuit, assignment, test.WithCurves(ecc.BN254)) +} + +func TestWalletOwnership_InvalidResponse(t *testing.T) { + assert := test.NewAssert(t) + + response := big.NewInt(42) + challenge := big.NewInt(123) + publicKeyHash := mimcHash(response, challenge) + + wrongResponse := big.NewInt(99) + + circuit := &WalletOwnershipCircuit{} + assignment := &WalletOwnershipCircuit{ + PublicKeyHash: publicKeyHash, + Challenge: challenge, + Response: wrongResponse, + } + + assert.ProverFailed(circuit, assignment, test.WithCurves(ecc.BN254)) +} + +func TestWalletOwnership_WrongChallenge(t *testing.T) { + assert := test.NewAssert(t) + + response := big.NewInt(42) + challenge := big.NewInt(123) + publicKeyHash := mimcHash(response, challenge) + + wrongChallenge := big.NewInt(456) + + circuit := &WalletOwnershipCircuit{} + assignment := &WalletOwnershipCircuit{ + PublicKeyHash: publicKeyHash, + Challenge: wrongChallenge, + Response: response, + } + + assert.ProverFailed(circuit, assignment, test.WithCurves(ecc.BN254)) +} + +// --- ResponseAttestation Tests --- + +func TestResponseAttestation_Valid(t *testing.T) { + assert := test.NewAssert(t) + + agentKeyProof := big.NewInt(777) + sourceDataHash := big.NewInt(555) + timestamp := big.NewInt(1700000000) + minTimestamp := big.NewInt(1699999700) // 5 min before + maxTimestamp := big.NewInt(1700000030) // 30s after + + agentDIDHash := mimcHash(agentKeyProof) + responseHash := mimcHash(sourceDataHash, agentKeyProof, timestamp) + + circuit := &ResponseAttestationCircuit{} + assignment := &ResponseAttestationCircuit{ + ResponseHash: responseHash, + AgentDIDHash: agentDIDHash, + Timestamp: timestamp, + MinTimestamp: minTimestamp, + MaxTimestamp: maxTimestamp, + SourceDataHash: sourceDataHash, + AgentKeyProof: agentKeyProof, + } + + assert.ProverSucceeded(circuit, assignment, test.WithCurves(ecc.BN254)) +} + +func TestResponseAttestation_WrongAgentKey(t *testing.T) { + assert := test.NewAssert(t) + + agentKeyProof := big.NewInt(777) + sourceDataHash := big.NewInt(555) + timestamp := big.NewInt(1700000000) + minTimestamp := big.NewInt(1699999700) + maxTimestamp := big.NewInt(1700000030) + + agentDIDHash := mimcHash(agentKeyProof) + responseHash := mimcHash(sourceDataHash, agentKeyProof, timestamp) + + wrongAgentKey := big.NewInt(888) + + circuit := &ResponseAttestationCircuit{} + assignment := &ResponseAttestationCircuit{ + ResponseHash: responseHash, + AgentDIDHash: agentDIDHash, + Timestamp: timestamp, + MinTimestamp: minTimestamp, + MaxTimestamp: maxTimestamp, + SourceDataHash: sourceDataHash, + AgentKeyProof: wrongAgentKey, + } + + assert.ProverFailed(circuit, assignment, test.WithCurves(ecc.BN254)) +} + +func TestResponseAttestation_WrongTimestamp(t *testing.T) { + assert := test.NewAssert(t) + + agentKeyProof := big.NewInt(777) + sourceDataHash := big.NewInt(555) + timestamp := big.NewInt(1700000000) + minTimestamp := big.NewInt(1699999700) + maxTimestamp := big.NewInt(1700000030) + + agentDIDHash := mimcHash(agentKeyProof) + responseHash := mimcHash(sourceDataHash, agentKeyProof, timestamp) + + wrongTimestamp := big.NewInt(1700000001) + + circuit := &ResponseAttestationCircuit{} + assignment := &ResponseAttestationCircuit{ + ResponseHash: responseHash, + AgentDIDHash: agentDIDHash, + Timestamp: wrongTimestamp, + MinTimestamp: minTimestamp, + MaxTimestamp: maxTimestamp, + SourceDataHash: sourceDataHash, + AgentKeyProof: agentKeyProof, + } + + assert.ProverFailed(circuit, assignment, test.WithCurves(ecc.BN254)) +} + +func TestResponseAttestation_TimestampBelowMin(t *testing.T) { + assert := test.NewAssert(t) + + agentKeyProof := big.NewInt(777) + sourceDataHash := big.NewInt(555) + timestamp := big.NewInt(1699999600) // before minTimestamp + minTimestamp := big.NewInt(1699999700) + maxTimestamp := big.NewInt(1700000030) + + agentDIDHash := mimcHash(agentKeyProof) + responseHash := mimcHash(sourceDataHash, agentKeyProof, timestamp) + + circuit := &ResponseAttestationCircuit{} + assignment := &ResponseAttestationCircuit{ + ResponseHash: responseHash, + AgentDIDHash: agentDIDHash, + Timestamp: timestamp, + MinTimestamp: minTimestamp, + MaxTimestamp: maxTimestamp, + SourceDataHash: sourceDataHash, + AgentKeyProof: agentKeyProof, + } + + assert.ProverFailed(circuit, assignment, test.WithCurves(ecc.BN254)) +} + +func TestResponseAttestation_TimestampAboveMax(t *testing.T) { + assert := test.NewAssert(t) + + agentKeyProof := big.NewInt(777) + sourceDataHash := big.NewInt(555) + timestamp := big.NewInt(1700000100) // after maxTimestamp + minTimestamp := big.NewInt(1699999700) + maxTimestamp := big.NewInt(1700000030) + + agentDIDHash := mimcHash(agentKeyProof) + responseHash := mimcHash(sourceDataHash, agentKeyProof, timestamp) + + circuit := &ResponseAttestationCircuit{} + assignment := &ResponseAttestationCircuit{ + ResponseHash: responseHash, + AgentDIDHash: agentDIDHash, + Timestamp: timestamp, + MinTimestamp: minTimestamp, + MaxTimestamp: maxTimestamp, + SourceDataHash: sourceDataHash, + AgentKeyProof: agentKeyProof, + } + + assert.ProverFailed(circuit, assignment, test.WithCurves(ecc.BN254)) +} + +// --- BalanceRange Tests --- + +func TestBalanceRange_Above(t *testing.T) { + assert := test.NewAssert(t) + + circuit := &BalanceRangeCircuit{} + assignment := &BalanceRangeCircuit{ + Threshold: big.NewInt(50), + Balance: big.NewInt(100), + } + + assert.ProverSucceeded(circuit, assignment, test.WithCurves(ecc.BN254)) +} + +func TestBalanceRange_Below(t *testing.T) { + assert := test.NewAssert(t) + + circuit := &BalanceRangeCircuit{} + assignment := &BalanceRangeCircuit{ + Threshold: big.NewInt(50), + Balance: big.NewInt(30), + } + + assert.ProverFailed(circuit, assignment, test.WithCurves(ecc.BN254)) +} + +func TestBalanceRange_Equal(t *testing.T) { + assert := test.NewAssert(t) + + circuit := &BalanceRangeCircuit{} + assignment := &BalanceRangeCircuit{ + Threshold: big.NewInt(50), + Balance: big.NewInt(50), + } + + assert.ProverSucceeded(circuit, assignment, test.WithCurves(ecc.BN254)) +} + +// --- AgentCapability Tests --- + +func TestAgentCapability_Valid(t *testing.T) { + assert := test.NewAssert(t) + + testHash := big.NewInt(1234) + actualScore := big.NewInt(85) + minScore := big.NewInt(70) + agentDIDHash := big.NewInt(9999) + + capabilityHash := mimcHash(testHash, actualScore) + agentTestBinding := mimcHash(testHash, agentDIDHash) + + circuit := &AgentCapabilityCircuit{} + assignment := &AgentCapabilityCircuit{ + CapabilityHash: capabilityHash, + AgentDIDHash: agentDIDHash, + MinScore: minScore, + AgentTestBinding: agentTestBinding, + ActualScore: actualScore, + TestHash: testHash, + } + + assert.ProverSucceeded(circuit, assignment, test.WithCurves(ecc.BN254)) +} + +func TestAgentCapability_BelowMinimum(t *testing.T) { + assert := test.NewAssert(t) + + testHash := big.NewInt(1234) + actualScore := big.NewInt(40) + minScore := big.NewInt(70) + agentDIDHash := big.NewInt(9999) + + capabilityHash := mimcHash(testHash, actualScore) + agentTestBinding := mimcHash(testHash, agentDIDHash) + + circuit := &AgentCapabilityCircuit{} + assignment := &AgentCapabilityCircuit{ + CapabilityHash: capabilityHash, + AgentDIDHash: agentDIDHash, + MinScore: minScore, + AgentTestBinding: agentTestBinding, + ActualScore: actualScore, + TestHash: testHash, + } + + assert.ProverFailed(circuit, assignment, test.WithCurves(ecc.BN254)) +} + +func TestAgentCapability_WrongBinding(t *testing.T) { + assert := test.NewAssert(t) + + testHash := big.NewInt(1234) + actualScore := big.NewInt(85) + minScore := big.NewInt(70) + agentDIDHash := big.NewInt(9999) + + wrongCapabilityHash := big.NewInt(111111) + agentTestBinding := mimcHash(testHash, agentDIDHash) + + circuit := &AgentCapabilityCircuit{} + assignment := &AgentCapabilityCircuit{ + CapabilityHash: wrongCapabilityHash, + AgentDIDHash: agentDIDHash, + MinScore: minScore, + AgentTestBinding: agentTestBinding, + ActualScore: actualScore, + TestHash: testHash, + } + + assert.ProverFailed(circuit, assignment, test.WithCurves(ecc.BN254)) +} + +func TestAgentCapability_WrongAgentTestBinding(t *testing.T) { + assert := test.NewAssert(t) + + testHash := big.NewInt(1234) + actualScore := big.NewInt(85) + minScore := big.NewInt(70) + agentDIDHash := big.NewInt(9999) + + capabilityHash := mimcHash(testHash, actualScore) + wrongBinding := big.NewInt(111111) // wrong agent-test binding + + circuit := &AgentCapabilityCircuit{} + assignment := &AgentCapabilityCircuit{ + CapabilityHash: capabilityHash, + AgentDIDHash: agentDIDHash, + MinScore: minScore, + AgentTestBinding: wrongBinding, + ActualScore: actualScore, + TestHash: testHash, + } + + assert.ProverFailed(circuit, assignment, test.WithCurves(ecc.BN254)) +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/zkp/circuits/ownership.go b/internal/p2p/zkp/circuits/ownership.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5af648bd --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/zkp/circuits/ownership.go @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +// Package circuits provides gnark circuit definitions for zero-knowledge proofs +// used in agent identity, attestation, and capability verification. +package circuits + +import ( + "github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend" + "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/hash/mimc" +) + +// WalletOwnershipCircuit proves knowledge of a secret response that, when +// hashed with a public challenge, produces the expected public key hash. +// This is a simplified commitment scheme using MiMC: +// +// MiMC(Response, Challenge) == PublicKeyHash +type WalletOwnershipCircuit struct { + // Public inputs + PublicKeyHash frontend.Variable `gnark:",public"` + Challenge frontend.Variable `gnark:",public"` + + // Private witness + Response frontend.Variable `gnark:""` +} + +// Define implements frontend.Circuit and constrains the ownership proof. +func (c *WalletOwnershipCircuit) Define(api frontend.API) error { + h, err := mimc.NewMiMC(api) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + h.Write(c.Response, c.Challenge) + computed := h.Sum() + + api.AssertIsEqual(computed, c.PublicKeyHash) + return nil +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/zkp/zkp.go b/internal/p2p/zkp/zkp.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4624746c --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/zkp/zkp.go @@ -0,0 +1,392 @@ +// Package zkp provides zero-knowledge proof generation and verification +// using the gnark library with support for PlonK and Groth16 proving schemes. +package zkp + +import ( + "bufio" + "bytes" + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "sync" + + "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc" + "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/kzg" + "github.com/consensys/gnark/backend/groth16" + "github.com/consensys/gnark/backend/plonk" + "github.com/consensys/gnark/constraint" + "github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend" + "github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend/cs/r1cs" + "github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend/cs/scs" + "github.com/consensys/gnark/test/unsafekzg" + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +// ProofScheme identifies the zero-knowledge proving scheme. +type ProofScheme string + +const ( + SchemePlonk ProofScheme = "plonk" + SchemeGroth16 ProofScheme = "groth16" +) + +// Valid reports whether s is a recognized proving scheme. +func (s ProofScheme) Valid() bool { + switch s { + case SchemePlonk, SchemeGroth16: + return true + } + return false +} + +// SRSMode identifies how the structured reference string is sourced. +type SRSMode string + +const ( + SRSModeUnsafe SRSMode = "unsafe" + SRSModeFile SRSMode = "file" +) + +// Valid reports whether m is a recognized SRS mode. +func (m SRSMode) Valid() bool { + switch m { + case SRSModeUnsafe, SRSModeFile: + return true + } + return false +} + +// ErrUnsupportedScheme is returned when an unrecognized proving scheme is used. +var ErrUnsupportedScheme = errors.New("unsupported proving scheme") + +// Proof holds the serialized proof data and metadata. +type Proof struct { + Data []byte `json:"data"` + PublicInputs []byte `json:"publicInputs"` + CircuitID string `json:"circuitId"` + Scheme ProofScheme `json:"scheme"` +} + +// CompiledCircuit stores a compiled constraint system with its proving and verifying keys. +type CompiledCircuit struct { + CCS constraint.ConstraintSystem + ProvingKey any // groth16.ProvingKey or plonk.ProvingKey + VerifyingKey any // groth16.VerifyingKey or plonk.VerifyingKey +} + +// Config configures the ProverService. +type Config struct { + CacheDir string + Scheme ProofScheme // SchemePlonk (default) or SchemeGroth16 + Logger *zap.SugaredLogger + SRSMode SRSMode // SRSModeUnsafe (default) or SRSModeFile + SRSPath string // path to SRS file (used when SRSMode == SRSModeFile) +} + +// ProverService manages circuit compilation, proof generation, and verification. +type ProverService struct { + cacheDir string + scheme ProofScheme + srsMode SRSMode + srsPath string + logger *zap.SugaredLogger + mu sync.RWMutex + compiled map[string]*CompiledCircuit +} + +// NewProverService creates a new ZKP prover service. +func NewProverService(cfg Config) (*ProverService, error) { + scheme := cfg.Scheme + if scheme == "" { + scheme = SchemePlonk + } + + cacheDir := cfg.CacheDir + if cacheDir == "" { + home, err := os.UserHomeDir() + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("get home dir: %w", err) + } + cacheDir = filepath.Join(home, ".lango", "zkp", "cache") + } + + if err := os.MkdirAll(cacheDir, 0o700); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("create ZKP cache dir: %w", err) + } + + srsMode := cfg.SRSMode + if srsMode == "" { + srsMode = SRSModeUnsafe + } + + svc := &ProverService{ + cacheDir: cacheDir, + scheme: scheme, + srsMode: srsMode, + srsPath: cfg.SRSPath, + logger: cfg.Logger, + compiled: make(map[string]*CompiledCircuit), + } + + cfg.Logger.Infow("ZKP prover service initialized", + "scheme", scheme, + "cacheDir", cacheDir, + "srsMode", srsMode, + ) + + return svc, nil +} + +// Scheme returns the proving scheme. +func (s *ProverService) Scheme() ProofScheme { return s.scheme } + +// Compile compiles the given circuit and caches the result under circuitID. +func (s *ProverService) Compile(circuitID string, circuit frontend.Circuit) error { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + + if _, ok := s.compiled[circuitID]; ok { + s.logger.Debugw("circuit already compiled", "circuitID", circuitID) + return nil + } + + s.logger.Infow("compiling circuit", "circuitID", circuitID, "scheme", s.scheme) + + var ( + ccs constraint.ConstraintSystem + err error + ) + + switch s.scheme { + case SchemePlonk: + ccs, err = frontend.Compile(ecc.BN254.ScalarField(), scs.NewBuilder, circuit) + case SchemeGroth16: + ccs, err = frontend.Compile(ecc.BN254.ScalarField(), r1cs.NewBuilder, circuit) + default: + return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrUnsupportedScheme, s.scheme) + } + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("compile circuit %q: %w", circuitID, err) + } + + compiled := &CompiledCircuit{CCS: ccs} + + switch s.scheme { + case SchemePlonk: + canonical, lagrange, err := s.loadSRS(ccs, circuitID) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("load SRS for %q: %w", circuitID, err) + } + pk, vk, err := plonk.Setup(ccs, canonical, lagrange) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("plonk setup for %q: %w", circuitID, err) + } + compiled.ProvingKey = pk + compiled.VerifyingKey = vk + + case SchemeGroth16: + pk, vk, err := groth16.Setup(ccs) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("groth16 setup for %q: %w", circuitID, err) + } + compiled.ProvingKey = pk + compiled.VerifyingKey = vk + } + + s.compiled[circuitID] = compiled + s.logger.Infow("circuit compiled", + "circuitID", circuitID, + "constraints", ccs.GetNbConstraints(), + ) + return nil +} + +// Prove generates a zero-knowledge proof for the given circuit assignment. +func (s *ProverService) Prove(ctx context.Context, circuitID string, assignment frontend.Circuit) (*Proof, error) { + s.mu.RLock() + compiled, ok := s.compiled[circuitID] + s.mu.RUnlock() + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("circuit %q not compiled", circuitID) + } + + fullWitness, err := frontend.NewWitness(assignment, ecc.BN254.ScalarField()) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("create witness for %q: %w", circuitID, err) + } + + publicWitness, err := frontend.NewWitness(assignment, ecc.BN254.ScalarField(), frontend.PublicOnly()) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("create public witness for %q: %w", circuitID, err) + } + + var proofBuf bytes.Buffer + + switch s.scheme { + case SchemePlonk: + pk, ok := compiled.ProvingKey.(plonk.ProvingKey) + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid plonk proving key for %q", circuitID) + } + proof, err := plonk.Prove(compiled.CCS, pk, fullWitness) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("plonk prove for %q: %w", circuitID, err) + } + if _, err := proof.WriteTo(&proofBuf); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("serialize plonk proof for %q: %w", circuitID, err) + } + + case SchemeGroth16: + pk, ok := compiled.ProvingKey.(groth16.ProvingKey) + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid groth16 proving key for %q", circuitID) + } + proof, err := groth16.Prove(compiled.CCS, pk, fullWitness) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("groth16 prove for %q: %w", circuitID, err) + } + if _, err := proof.WriteTo(&proofBuf); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("serialize groth16 proof for %q: %w", circuitID, err) + } + + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrUnsupportedScheme, s.scheme) + } + + var publicBuf bytes.Buffer + if _, err := publicWitness.WriteTo(&publicBuf); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("serialize public witness for %q: %w", circuitID, err) + } + + s.logger.Debugw("proof generated", + "circuitID", circuitID, + "proofSize", proofBuf.Len(), + ) + + return &Proof{ + Data: proofBuf.Bytes(), + PublicInputs: publicBuf.Bytes(), + CircuitID: circuitID, + Scheme: s.scheme, + }, nil +} + +// Verify checks whether the given proof is valid for the circuit's public inputs. +func (s *ProverService) Verify(ctx context.Context, proof *Proof, circuit frontend.Circuit) (bool, error) { + if proof == nil || len(proof.Data) == 0 { + return false, fmt.Errorf("empty proof") + } + + s.mu.RLock() + compiled, ok := s.compiled[proof.CircuitID] + s.mu.RUnlock() + if !ok { + return false, fmt.Errorf("circuit %q not compiled", proof.CircuitID) + } + + publicWitness, err := frontend.NewWitness(circuit, ecc.BN254.ScalarField(), frontend.PublicOnly()) + if err != nil { + return false, fmt.Errorf("create public witness for %q: %w", proof.CircuitID, err) + } + + switch s.scheme { + case SchemePlonk: + vk, ok := compiled.VerifyingKey.(plonk.VerifyingKey) + if !ok { + return false, fmt.Errorf("invalid plonk verifying key for %q", proof.CircuitID) + } + p := plonk.NewProof(ecc.BN254) + if _, err := p.ReadFrom(bytes.NewReader(proof.Data)); err != nil { + return false, fmt.Errorf("deserialize plonk proof for %q: %w", proof.CircuitID, err) + } + if err := plonk.Verify(p, vk, publicWitness); err != nil { + return false, nil + } + return true, nil + + case SchemeGroth16: + vk, ok := compiled.VerifyingKey.(groth16.VerifyingKey) + if !ok { + return false, fmt.Errorf("invalid groth16 verifying key for %q", proof.CircuitID) + } + p := groth16.NewProof(ecc.BN254) + if _, err := p.ReadFrom(bytes.NewReader(proof.Data)); err != nil { + return false, fmt.Errorf("deserialize groth16 proof for %q: %w", proof.CircuitID, err) + } + if err := groth16.Verify(p, vk, publicWitness); err != nil { + return false, nil + } + return true, nil + + default: + return false, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrUnsupportedScheme, s.scheme) + } +} + +// IsCompiled reports whether the circuit with the given ID has been compiled. +func (s *ProverService) IsCompiled(circuitID string) bool { + s.mu.RLock() + defer s.mu.RUnlock() + _, ok := s.compiled[circuitID] + return ok +} + +// loadSRS returns canonical and lagrange SRS for a compiled constraint system. +// When SRSMode is "file", it attempts to load from the configured SRS file, +// falling back to unsafe generation if the file does not exist. +func (s *ProverService) loadSRS( + ccs constraint.ConstraintSystem, circuitID string, +) (kzg.SRS, kzg.SRS, error) { + if s.srsMode == SRSModeFile && s.srsPath != "" { + canonical, lagrange, err := loadSRSFromFile(s.srsPath) + if err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) { + s.logger.Warnw("SRS file not found, falling back to unsafe SRS", + "path", s.srsPath, + "circuitID", circuitID, + ) + } else { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("load SRS from file: %w", err) + } + } else { + s.logger.Infow("loaded SRS from file", + "path", s.srsPath, + "circuitID", circuitID, + ) + return canonical, lagrange, nil + } + } + + // Default: generate unsafe SRS (for testing/development). + canonical, lagrange, err := unsafekzg.NewSRS(ccs) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("generate unsafe SRS: %w", err) + } + return canonical, lagrange, nil +} + +// loadSRSFromFile reads canonical and lagrange KZG SRS from a file. +// The file must contain both SRS written sequentially (canonical first, then lagrange). +func loadSRSFromFile(path string) (kzg.SRS, kzg.SRS, error) { + f, err := os.Open(path) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("open SRS file %q: %w", path, err) + } + defer f.Close() + + r := bufio.NewReaderSize(f, 1<<20) + + canonical := kzg.NewSRS(ecc.BN254) + lagrange := kzg.NewSRS(ecc.BN254) + + if _, err := canonical.ReadFrom(r); err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("read canonical SRS: %w", err) + } + if _, err := lagrange.ReadFrom(r); err != nil { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("read lagrange SRS: %w", err) + } + + return canonical, lagrange, nil +} diff --git a/internal/p2p/zkp/zkp_test.go b/internal/p2p/zkp/zkp_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0606e24a --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/p2p/zkp/zkp_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +package zkp + +import ( + "context" + "math/big" + "testing" + + "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/fr" + nativemimc "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/fr/mimc" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/p2p/zkp/circuits" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + "go.uber.org/zap" +) + +func mimcHash(elems ...*big.Int) *big.Int { + h := nativemimc.NewMiMC() + for _, e := range elems { + var elem fr.Element + elem.SetBigInt(e) + b := elem.Bytes() + h.Write(b[:]) + } + result := h.Sum(nil) + var out big.Int + out.SetBytes(result) + return &out +} + +func newTestLogger() *zap.SugaredLogger { + logger, _ := zap.NewDevelopment() + return logger.Sugar() +} + +func validOwnershipAssignment() (*circuits.WalletOwnershipCircuit, *circuits.WalletOwnershipCircuit) { + response := big.NewInt(42) + challenge := big.NewInt(123) + publicKeyHash := mimcHash(response, challenge) + + circuit := &circuits.WalletOwnershipCircuit{} + assignment := &circuits.WalletOwnershipCircuit{ + PublicKeyHash: publicKeyHash, + Challenge: challenge, + Response: response, + } + return circuit, assignment +} + +func TestProverService_CompileAndProve_PlonK(t *testing.T) { + cfg := Config{ + CacheDir: t.TempDir(), + Scheme: SchemePlonk, + Logger: newTestLogger(), + } + ps, err := NewProverService(cfg) + require.NoError(t, err) + + circuit, assignment := validOwnershipAssignment() + + err = ps.Compile("wallet_ownership", circuit) + require.NoError(t, err) + + proof, err := ps.Prove(context.Background(), "wallet_ownership", assignment) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NotNil(t, proof) + assert.Equal(t, "wallet_ownership", proof.CircuitID) + assert.Equal(t, SchemePlonk, proof.Scheme) + assert.NotEmpty(t, proof.Data) + assert.NotEmpty(t, proof.PublicInputs) +} + +func TestProverService_CompileAndProve_Groth16(t *testing.T) { + cfg := Config{ + CacheDir: t.TempDir(), + Scheme: SchemeGroth16, + Logger: newTestLogger(), + } + ps, err := NewProverService(cfg) + require.NoError(t, err) + + circuit, assignment := validOwnershipAssignment() + + err = ps.Compile("wallet_ownership", circuit) + require.NoError(t, err) + + proof, err := ps.Prove(context.Background(), "wallet_ownership", assignment) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NotNil(t, proof) + assert.Equal(t, "wallet_ownership", proof.CircuitID) + assert.Equal(t, SchemeGroth16, proof.Scheme) + assert.NotEmpty(t, proof.Data) +} + +func TestProverService_Verify_Valid(t *testing.T) { + cfg := Config{ + CacheDir: t.TempDir(), + Scheme: SchemePlonk, + Logger: newTestLogger(), + } + ps, err := NewProverService(cfg) + require.NoError(t, err) + + circuit, assignment := validOwnershipAssignment() + + err = ps.Compile("wallet_ownership", circuit) + require.NoError(t, err) + + proof, err := ps.Prove(context.Background(), "wallet_ownership", assignment) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // Build a verification circuit with only the public inputs set. + verifyCircuit := &circuits.WalletOwnershipCircuit{ + PublicKeyHash: assignment.PublicKeyHash, + Challenge: assignment.Challenge, + } + + valid, err := ps.Verify(context.Background(), proof, verifyCircuit) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, valid) +} + +func TestProverService_Verify_Invalid(t *testing.T) { + cfg := Config{ + CacheDir: t.TempDir(), + Scheme: SchemePlonk, + Logger: newTestLogger(), + } + ps, err := NewProverService(cfg) + require.NoError(t, err) + + circuit, assignment := validOwnershipAssignment() + + err = ps.Compile("wallet_ownership", circuit) + require.NoError(t, err) + + proof, err := ps.Prove(context.Background(), "wallet_ownership", assignment) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // Tamper with proof bytes. + tampered := make([]byte, len(proof.Data)) + copy(tampered, proof.Data) + for i := 0; i < len(tampered) && i < 32; i++ { + tampered[i] ^= 0xFF + } + tamperedProof := &Proof{ + Data: tampered, + PublicInputs: proof.PublicInputs, + CircuitID: proof.CircuitID, + Scheme: proof.Scheme, + } + + verifyCircuit := &circuits.WalletOwnershipCircuit{ + PublicKeyHash: assignment.PublicKeyHash, + Challenge: assignment.Challenge, + } + + valid, err := ps.Verify(context.Background(), tamperedProof, verifyCircuit) + // Tampered proof should either fail verification (valid=false) or return an error. + if err == nil { + assert.False(t, valid) + } +} + +func TestProverService_DoubleCompile_Idempotent(t *testing.T) { + cfg := Config{ + CacheDir: t.TempDir(), + Scheme: SchemePlonk, + Logger: newTestLogger(), + } + ps, err := NewProverService(cfg) + require.NoError(t, err) + + circuit := &circuits.WalletOwnershipCircuit{} + + err = ps.Compile("wallet_ownership", circuit) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, ps.IsCompiled("wallet_ownership")) + + // Compile the same circuit again — should succeed silently. + err = ps.Compile("wallet_ownership", circuit) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.True(t, ps.IsCompiled("wallet_ownership")) +} + +func TestProverService_ProveUncompiled_Error(t *testing.T) { + cfg := Config{ + CacheDir: t.TempDir(), + Scheme: SchemePlonk, + Logger: newTestLogger(), + } + ps, err := NewProverService(cfg) + require.NoError(t, err) + + _, assignment := validOwnershipAssignment() + + _, err = ps.Prove(context.Background(), "nonexistent", assignment) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "not compiled") +} diff --git a/internal/payment/contracts/registry.go b/internal/payment/contracts/registry.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..57e21ac6 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/payment/contracts/registry.go @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +// Package contracts provides canonical USDC contract addresses and on-chain +// verification utilities for supported EVM chains. +package contracts + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + "math/big" + "strings" + + "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum" + "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common" + "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto" + "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethclient" +) + +// CanonicalUSDC maps chain IDs to their official USDC contract addresses. +var CanonicalUSDC = map[int64]string{ + 1: "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48", // Ethereum Mainnet + 8453: "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913", // Base + 84532: "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e", // Base Sepolia + 11155111: "0x1c7D4B196Cb0C7B01d743Fbc6116a902379C7238", // Sepolia +} + +// symbolSelector is the function selector for symbol(). +var symbolSelector = crypto.Keccak256([]byte("symbol()"))[:4] + +// decimalsSelector is the function selector for decimals(). +var decimalsSelector = crypto.Keccak256([]byte("decimals()"))[:4] + +// LookupUSDC returns the canonical USDC contract address for the given chain. +func LookupUSDC(chainID int64) (common.Address, error) { + addr, ok := CanonicalUSDC[chainID] + if !ok { + return common.Address{}, fmt.Errorf("unknown chain ID %d", chainID) + } + return common.HexToAddress(addr), nil +} + +// IsCanonical checks whether the given address matches the canonical USDC +// contract for the specified chain. +func IsCanonical(chainID int64, addr common.Address) bool { + canonical, ok := CanonicalUSDC[chainID] + if !ok { + return false + } + return common.HexToAddress(canonical) == addr +} + +// ContractCaller abstracts the eth_call method for on-chain verification. +type ContractCaller interface { + CallContract(ctx context.Context, msg ethereum.CallMsg, blockNumber *big.Int) ([]byte, error) +} + +// Ensure *ethclient.Client satisfies ContractCaller at compile time. +var _ ContractCaller = (*ethclient.Client)(nil) + +// VerifyOnChain calls symbol() and decimals() on the contract to confirm it is +// a USDC token (symbol == "USDC", decimals == 6). +func VerifyOnChain( + ctx context.Context, + caller ContractCaller, + addr common.Address, +) error { + // Call symbol() + symbolResult, err := caller.CallContract(ctx, ethereum.CallMsg{ + To: &addr, + Data: symbolSelector, + }, nil) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("call symbol(): %w", err) + } + + symbol, err := decodeABIString(symbolResult) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("decode symbol: %w", err) + } + if symbol != "USDC" { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected symbol %q, want \"USDC\"", symbol) + } + + // Call decimals() + decimalsResult, err := caller.CallContract(ctx, ethereum.CallMsg{ + To: &addr, + Data: decimalsSelector, + }, nil) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("call decimals(): %w", err) + } + + decimals, err := decodeABIUint8(decimalsResult) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("decode decimals: %w", err) + } + if decimals != 6 { + return fmt.Errorf("unexpected decimals %d, want 6", decimals) + } + + return nil +} + +// decodeABIString decodes an ABI-encoded string return value. +// ABI layout: [32-byte offset][32-byte length][padded data...] +func decodeABIString(data []byte) (string, error) { + if len(data) < 64 { + return "", fmt.Errorf("response too short: %d bytes", len(data)) + } + + // First 32 bytes: offset to string data (should be 0x20 = 32) + offset := new(big.Int).SetBytes(data[:32]).Int64() + if offset < 0 || offset+32 > int64(len(data)) { + return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid string offset: %d", offset) + } + + // Next 32 bytes at offset: string length + strLen := new(big.Int).SetBytes(data[offset : offset+32]).Int64() + if strLen < 0 || offset+32+strLen > int64(len(data)) { + return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid string length: %d", strLen) + } + + raw := string(data[offset+32 : offset+32+strLen]) + return strings.TrimRight(raw, "\x00"), nil +} + +// decodeABIUint8 decodes a uint8 (encoded as uint256) return value. +func decodeABIUint8(data []byte) (uint8, error) { + if len(data) < 32 { + return 0, fmt.Errorf("response too short: %d bytes", len(data)) + } + val := new(big.Int).SetBytes(data[:32]) + if !val.IsInt64() || val.Int64() > 255 || val.Int64() < 0 { + return 0, fmt.Errorf("value out of uint8 range: %s", val) + } + return uint8(val.Int64()), nil +} diff --git a/internal/payment/contracts/registry_test.go b/internal/payment/contracts/registry_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1317ebd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/payment/contracts/registry_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,254 @@ +package contracts + +import ( + "context" + "math/big" + "testing" + + "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum" + "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func TestLookupUSDC(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give int64 + wantAddr string + wantErr bool + }{ + { + give: 1, + wantAddr: "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48", + }, + { + give: 8453, + wantAddr: "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913", + }, + { + give: 84532, + wantAddr: "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e", + }, + { + give: 11155111, + wantAddr: "0x1c7D4B196Cb0C7B01d743Fbc6116a902379C7238", + }, + { + give: 999999, + wantErr: true, + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(big.NewInt(tt.give).String(), func(t *testing.T) { + addr, err := LookupUSDC(tt.give) + if tt.wantErr { + require.Error(t, err) + return + } + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, common.HexToAddress(tt.wantAddr), addr) + }) + } +} + +func TestIsCanonical(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give string + giveChain int64 + giveAddr common.Address + wantResult bool + }{ + { + give: "matching mainnet USDC", + giveChain: 1, + giveAddr: common.HexToAddress("0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48"), + wantResult: true, + }, + { + give: "matching base USDC", + giveChain: 8453, + giveAddr: common.HexToAddress("0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913"), + wantResult: true, + }, + { + give: "wrong address on mainnet", + giveChain: 1, + giveAddr: common.HexToAddress("0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001"), + wantResult: false, + }, + { + give: "unknown chain", + giveChain: 42, + giveAddr: common.HexToAddress("0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48"), + wantResult: false, + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + result := IsCanonical(tt.giveChain, tt.giveAddr) + assert.Equal(t, tt.wantResult, result) + }) + } +} + +// mockCaller implements ContractCaller for testing VerifyOnChain. +type mockCaller struct { + calls []ethereum.CallMsg + results [][]byte + errs []error + idx int +} + +func (m *mockCaller) CallContract( + _ context.Context, + msg ethereum.CallMsg, + _ *big.Int, +) ([]byte, error) { + i := m.idx + m.calls = append(m.calls, msg) + m.idx++ + if i < len(m.errs) && m.errs[i] != nil { + return nil, m.errs[i] + } + if i < len(m.results) { + return m.results[i], nil + } + return nil, nil +} + +// encodeABIString produces an ABI-encoded string suitable for contract return. +func encodeABIString(s string) []byte { + // offset (32 bytes) + length (32 bytes) + padded data (32 bytes per chunk) + padded := (len(s) + 31) / 32 * 32 + if padded == 0 { + padded = 32 + } + buf := make([]byte, 64+padded) + // Offset = 0x20 + big.NewInt(32).FillBytes(buf[:32]) + // Length + big.NewInt(int64(len(s))).FillBytes(buf[32:64]) + // Data + copy(buf[64:], s) + return buf +} + +// encodeABIUint8 produces an ABI-encoded uint256 for a uint8 value. +func encodeABIUint8(v uint8) []byte { + buf := make([]byte, 32) + big.NewInt(int64(v)).FillBytes(buf) + return buf +} + +func TestVerifyOnChain(t *testing.T) { + addr := common.HexToAddress("0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48") + + t.Run("valid USDC contract", func(t *testing.T) { + caller := &mockCaller{ + results: [][]byte{ + encodeABIString("USDC"), + encodeABIUint8(6), + }, + } + err := VerifyOnChain(context.Background(), caller, addr) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Len(t, caller.calls, 2) + }) + + t.Run("wrong symbol", func(t *testing.T) { + caller := &mockCaller{ + results: [][]byte{ + encodeABIString("USDT"), + encodeABIUint8(6), + }, + } + err := VerifyOnChain(context.Background(), caller, addr) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "unexpected symbol") + }) + + t.Run("wrong decimals", func(t *testing.T) { + caller := &mockCaller{ + results: [][]byte{ + encodeABIString("USDC"), + encodeABIUint8(18), + }, + } + err := VerifyOnChain(context.Background(), caller, addr) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "unexpected decimals") + }) + + t.Run("symbol call error", func(t *testing.T) { + caller := &mockCaller{ + errs: []error{assert.AnError}, + } + err := VerifyOnChain(context.Background(), caller, addr) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "call symbol()") + }) +} + +func TestDecodeABIString(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give []byte + want string + wantErr bool + }{ + { + give: encodeABIString("USDC"), + want: "USDC", + }, + { + give: encodeABIString(""), + want: "", + }, + { + give: []byte{0x01, 0x02}, + wantErr: true, + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + got, err := decodeABIString(tt.give) + if tt.wantErr { + require.Error(t, err) + continue + } + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, tt.want, got) + } +} + +func TestDecodeABIUint8(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give []byte + want uint8 + wantErr bool + }{ + { + give: encodeABIUint8(6), + want: 6, + }, + { + give: encodeABIUint8(18), + want: 18, + }, + { + give: []byte{0x01}, + wantErr: true, + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + got, err := decodeABIUint8(tt.give) + if tt.wantErr { + require.Error(t, err) + continue + } + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, tt.want, got) + } +} diff --git a/internal/payment/eip3009/builder.go b/internal/payment/eip3009/builder.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..19b80a21 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/payment/eip3009/builder.go @@ -0,0 +1,273 @@ +// Package eip3009 implements EIP-3009 transferWithAuthorization typed data +// building and signing for USDC gasless transfers. +package eip3009 + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/rand" + "fmt" + "math/big" + "time" + + "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common" + "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto" +) + +// WalletSigner abstracts wallet signing to avoid direct wallet package imports. +type WalletSigner interface { + SignMessage(ctx context.Context, message []byte) ([]byte, error) + Address(ctx context.Context) (string, error) +} + +// Authorization is a fully signed EIP-3009 transferWithAuthorization. +type Authorization struct { + From common.Address + To common.Address + Value *big.Int + ValidAfter *big.Int + ValidBefore *big.Int + Nonce [32]byte + V uint8 + R, S [32]byte +} + +// UnsignedAuth holds the authorization parameters before signing. +type UnsignedAuth struct { + From common.Address + To common.Address + Value *big.Int + ValidAfter *big.Int + ValidBefore *big.Int + Nonce [32]byte +} + +// EIP-712 type hashes for USDC v2 domain and TransferWithAuthorization. +var ( + eip712DomainTypeHash = crypto.Keccak256([]byte( + "EIP712Domain(string name,string version,uint256 chainId," + + "address verifyingContract)", + )) + + transferAuthTypeHash = crypto.Keccak256([]byte( + "TransferWithAuthorization(address from,address to," + + "uint256 value,uint256 validAfter,uint256 validBefore," + + "bytes32 nonce)", + )) + + // transferWithAuthSelector is the 4-byte function selector for + // transferWithAuthorization(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes32,bytes32). + transferWithAuthSelector = crypto.Keccak256([]byte( + "transferWithAuthorization(address,address,uint256,uint256," + + "uint256,bytes32,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)", + ))[:4] + + usdcName = crypto.Keccak256([]byte("USD Coin")) + usdcVersion = crypto.Keccak256([]byte("2")) +) + +// NewUnsigned creates an unsigned EIP-3009 authorization with a random nonce. +// validAfter is set to now; validBefore is set to the given deadline. +func NewUnsigned( + from, to common.Address, + value *big.Int, + deadline time.Time, +) *UnsignedAuth { + var nonce [32]byte + // crypto/rand.Read never returns an error on supported platforms. + _, _ = rand.Read(nonce[:]) + + return &UnsignedAuth{ + From: from, + To: to, + Value: new(big.Int).Set(value), + ValidAfter: big.NewInt(time.Now().Unix()), + ValidBefore: big.NewInt(deadline.Unix()), + Nonce: nonce, + } +} + +// TypedDataHash computes the EIP-712 hash to be signed for a +// transferWithAuthorization on the given chain and USDC contract. +func TypedDataHash( + auth *UnsignedAuth, + chainID int64, + usdcAddr common.Address, +) ([]byte, error) { + domainSep := domainSeparator(chainID, usdcAddr) + structHash := authStructHash(auth) + + // EIP-712: keccak256("\x19\x01" || domainSeparator || structHash) + msg := make([]byte, 2+32+32) + msg[0] = 0x19 + msg[1] = 0x01 + copy(msg[2:34], domainSep) + copy(msg[34:66], structHash) + + return crypto.Keccak256(msg), nil +} + +// Sign computes the typed data hash and signs it with the provided wallet. +func Sign( + ctx context.Context, + wallet WalletSigner, + auth *UnsignedAuth, + chainID int64, + usdcAddr common.Address, +) (*Authorization, error) { + hash, err := TypedDataHash(auth, chainID, usdcAddr) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("typed data hash: %w", err) + } + + sig, err := wallet.SignMessage(ctx, hash) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("sign message: %w", err) + } + + if len(sig) != 65 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid signature length %d, want 65", len(sig)) + } + + result := &Authorization{ + From: auth.From, + To: auth.To, + Value: new(big.Int).Set(auth.Value), + ValidAfter: new(big.Int).Set(auth.ValidAfter), + ValidBefore: new(big.Int).Set(auth.ValidBefore), + Nonce: auth.Nonce, + } + + copy(result.R[:], sig[:32]) + copy(result.S[:], sig[32:64]) + + // go-ethereum uses V=0/1 (recovery id); EIP-3009 expects 27/28. + v := sig[64] + if v < 27 { + v += 27 + } + result.V = v + + return result, nil +} + +// Verify recovers the signer from the authorization signature and checks that +// it matches the expected from address. +func Verify( + auth *Authorization, + expectedFrom common.Address, + chainID int64, + usdcAddr common.Address, +) error { + // Reconstruct the unsigned auth to compute the hash. + unsigned := &UnsignedAuth{ + From: auth.From, + To: auth.To, + Value: auth.Value, + ValidAfter: auth.ValidAfter, + ValidBefore: auth.ValidBefore, + Nonce: auth.Nonce, + } + + hash, err := TypedDataHash(unsigned, chainID, usdcAddr) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("typed data hash: %w", err) + } + + // Reconstruct the 65-byte signature with recovery id 0/1. + var sig [65]byte + copy(sig[:32], auth.R[:]) + copy(sig[32:64], auth.S[:]) + v := auth.V + if v >= 27 { + v -= 27 + } + sig[64] = v + + pubKey, err := crypto.Ecrecover(hash, sig[:]) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("ecrecover: %w", err) + } + + // Convert uncompressed public key (65 bytes) to address. + recovered := common.BytesToAddress(crypto.Keccak256(pubKey[1:])[12:]) + if recovered != expectedFrom { + return fmt.Errorf( + "signer mismatch: recovered %s, want %s", + recovered.Hex(), expectedFrom.Hex(), + ) + } + + return nil +} + +// EncodeCalldata ABI-encodes the transferWithAuthorization call for on-chain +// submission. Layout: selector(4) + from(32) + to(32) + value(32) + +// validAfter(32) + validBefore(32) + nonce(32) + v(32) + r(32) + s(32). +func EncodeCalldata(auth *Authorization) []byte { + // 4-byte selector + 9 * 32-byte parameters = 292 bytes + data := make([]byte, 4+9*32) + copy(data[:4], transferWithAuthSelector) + + off := 4 + // from (left-padded address) + copy(data[off+12:off+32], auth.From.Bytes()) + off += 32 + + // to (left-padded address) + copy(data[off+12:off+32], auth.To.Bytes()) + off += 32 + + // value + auth.Value.FillBytes(data[off : off+32]) + off += 32 + + // validAfter + auth.ValidAfter.FillBytes(data[off : off+32]) + off += 32 + + // validBefore + auth.ValidBefore.FillBytes(data[off : off+32]) + off += 32 + + // nonce + copy(data[off:off+32], auth.Nonce[:]) + off += 32 + + // v (uint8 as uint256) + data[off+31] = auth.V + off += 32 + + // r + copy(data[off:off+32], auth.R[:]) + off += 32 + + // s + copy(data[off:off+32], auth.S[:]) + + return data +} + +// domainSeparator computes the EIP-712 domain separator for USDC v2. +func domainSeparator(chainID int64, verifyingContract common.Address) []byte { + // abi.encode(typeHash, nameHash, versionHash, chainId, verifyingContract) + buf := make([]byte, 5*32) + copy(buf[:32], eip712DomainTypeHash) + copy(buf[32:64], usdcName) + copy(buf[64:96], usdcVersion) + big.NewInt(chainID).FillBytes(buf[96:128]) + copy(buf[128+12:160], verifyingContract.Bytes()) + return crypto.Keccak256(buf) +} + +// authStructHash computes the struct hash for TransferWithAuthorization. +func authStructHash(auth *UnsignedAuth) []byte { + buf := make([]byte, 7*32) + copy(buf[:32], transferAuthTypeHash) + copy(buf[32+12:64], auth.From.Bytes()) + copy(buf[64+12:96], auth.To.Bytes()) + auth.Value.FillBytes(buf[96:128]) + auth.ValidAfter.FillBytes(buf[128:160]) + auth.ValidBefore.FillBytes(buf[160:192]) + copy(buf[192:224], auth.Nonce[:]) + return crypto.Keccak256(buf) +} diff --git a/internal/payment/eip3009/builder_test.go b/internal/payment/eip3009/builder_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8035be76 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/payment/eip3009/builder_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ +package eip3009 + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "math/big" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common" + "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +var ( + testFrom = common.HexToAddress("0xaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa") + testTo = common.HexToAddress("0xbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb") + testUSDCAddr = common.HexToAddress("0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48") + testChainID = int64(1) +) + +func TestNewUnsigned(t *testing.T) { + value := big.NewInt(1_000_000) // 1 USDC + deadline := time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour) + + auth := NewUnsigned(testFrom, testTo, value, deadline) + + assert.Equal(t, testFrom, auth.From) + assert.Equal(t, testTo, auth.To) + assert.Equal(t, value, auth.Value) + assert.Equal(t, big.NewInt(deadline.Unix()), auth.ValidBefore) + assert.NotEqual(t, [32]byte{}, auth.Nonce, "nonce should be random, not zero") + + // Value should be a copy, not shared reference. + value.SetInt64(999) + assert.NotEqual(t, value, auth.Value) +} + +func TestTypedDataHash(t *testing.T) { + auth := &UnsignedAuth{ + From: testFrom, + To: testTo, + Value: big.NewInt(1_000_000), + ValidAfter: big.NewInt(1000), + ValidBefore: big.NewInt(2000), + Nonce: [32]byte{0x01, 0x02, 0x03}, + } + + hash1, err := TypedDataHash(auth, testChainID, testUSDCAddr) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Len(t, hash1, 32) + + // Same inputs produce same hash (deterministic). + hash2, err := TypedDataHash(auth, testChainID, testUSDCAddr) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, hash1, hash2) + + // Different chain ID produces different hash. + hash3, err := TypedDataHash(auth, 8453, testUSDCAddr) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.NotEqual(t, hash1, hash3) + + // Different nonce produces different hash. + auth2 := *auth + auth2.Nonce = [32]byte{0x04, 0x05, 0x06} + hash4, err := TypedDataHash(&auth2, testChainID, testUSDCAddr) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.NotEqual(t, hash1, hash4) +} + +// testWallet implements WalletSigner using a raw ECDSA key for testing. +type testWallet struct { + key *ecdsa.PrivateKey +} + +func (w *testWallet) SignMessage(_ context.Context, message []byte) ([]byte, error) { + return crypto.Sign(message, w.key) +} + +func (w *testWallet) Address(_ context.Context) (string, error) { + addr := crypto.PubkeyToAddress(w.key.PublicKey) + return addr.Hex(), nil +} + +func TestSignAndVerify(t *testing.T) { + key, err := crypto.GenerateKey() + require.NoError(t, err) + + wallet := &testWallet{key: key} + fromAddr := crypto.PubkeyToAddress(key.PublicKey) + + auth := &UnsignedAuth{ + From: fromAddr, + To: testTo, + Value: big.NewInt(5_000_000), + ValidAfter: big.NewInt(100), + ValidBefore: big.NewInt(9999), + Nonce: [32]byte{0xAA, 0xBB}, + } + + signed, err := Sign( + context.Background(), wallet, auth, testChainID, testUSDCAddr, + ) + require.NoError(t, err) + + assert.Equal(t, fromAddr, signed.From) + assert.Equal(t, testTo, signed.To) + assert.True(t, signed.V == 27 || signed.V == 28, "V should be 27 or 28") + assert.NotEqual(t, [32]byte{}, signed.R) + assert.NotEqual(t, [32]byte{}, signed.S) + + // Verify should succeed with the correct from address. + err = Verify(signed, fromAddr, testChainID, testUSDCAddr) + require.NoError(t, err) + + // Verify should fail with wrong expected address. + wrongAddr := common.HexToAddress("0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001") + err = Verify(signed, wrongAddr, testChainID, testUSDCAddr) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "signer mismatch") +} + +func TestVerifyBadSignature(t *testing.T) { + auth := &Authorization{ + From: testFrom, + To: testTo, + Value: big.NewInt(1_000_000), + ValidAfter: big.NewInt(0), + ValidBefore: big.NewInt(9999), + Nonce: [32]byte{0x01}, + V: 27, + R: [32]byte{0xFF}, + S: [32]byte{0xFF}, + } + + err := Verify(auth, testFrom, testChainID, testUSDCAddr) + require.Error(t, err) +} + +func TestEncodeCalldata(t *testing.T) { + auth := &Authorization{ + From: testFrom, + To: testTo, + Value: big.NewInt(1_000_000), + ValidAfter: big.NewInt(100), + ValidBefore: big.NewInt(200), + Nonce: [32]byte{0x01}, + V: 28, + R: [32]byte{0xAA}, + S: [32]byte{0xBB}, + } + + data := EncodeCalldata(auth) + + // 4-byte selector + 9 * 32-byte params = 292 bytes + assert.Len(t, data, 4+9*32) + + // Verify selector matches transferWithAuthorization. + assert.Equal(t, transferWithAuthSelector, data[:4]) + + // Verify from address is at offset 4, left-padded. + assert.Equal(t, testFrom.Bytes(), data[4+12:4+32]) + + // Verify to address is at offset 36, left-padded. + assert.Equal(t, testTo.Bytes(), data[36+12:36+32]) +} + +func TestEncodeCalldataRoundTrip(t *testing.T) { + key, err := crypto.GenerateKey() + require.NoError(t, err) + + wallet := &testWallet{key: key} + fromAddr := crypto.PubkeyToAddress(key.PublicKey) + + unsigned := &UnsignedAuth{ + From: fromAddr, + To: testTo, + Value: big.NewInt(10_000_000), + ValidAfter: big.NewInt(0), + ValidBefore: big.NewInt(99999), + Nonce: [32]byte{0xDE, 0xAD}, + } + + signed, err := Sign( + context.Background(), wallet, unsigned, testChainID, testUSDCAddr, + ) + require.NoError(t, err) + + calldata := EncodeCalldata(signed) + assert.Len(t, calldata, 4+9*32) + + // Verify the signed auth still passes verification. + err = Verify(signed, fromAddr, testChainID, testUSDCAddr) + require.NoError(t, err) +} diff --git a/internal/payment/service.go b/internal/payment/service.go index 4eeb9dbb..1072f88b 100644 --- a/internal/payment/service.go +++ b/internal/payment/service.go @@ -17,6 +17,11 @@ import ( "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/wallet" ) +// DefaultHistoryLimit is the default number of transactions returned by History. +const DefaultHistoryLimit = 20 + +const purposeX402AutoPayment = "X402 auto-payment" + // Service orchestrates blockchain payment operations. type Service struct { wallet wallet.WalletProvider @@ -126,9 +131,8 @@ func (s *Service) Send(ctx context.Context, req PaymentRequest) (*PaymentReceipt SaveX(ctx) // Record spending - if err := s.limiter.Record(ctx, amount); err != nil { - // Non-fatal: tx already submitted - } + // Non-fatal: tx already submitted, ignore spending record error. + _ = s.limiter.Record(ctx, amount) return &PaymentReceipt{ TxHash: txHashHex, @@ -150,9 +154,8 @@ func (s *Service) Balance(ctx context.Context) (string, error) { } contract := s.builder.USDCContract() - balanceOfSelector := []byte{0x70, 0xa0, 0x82, 0x31} // balanceOf(address) data := make([]byte, 4+32) - copy(data[:4], balanceOfSelector) + copy(data[:4], BalanceOfSelector) addrBytes := common.HexToAddress(addr) copy(data[4+12:4+32], addrBytes.Bytes()) @@ -171,7 +174,7 @@ func (s *Service) Balance(ctx context.Context) (string, error) { // History returns recent payment transactions. func (s *Service) History(ctx context.Context, limit int) ([]TransactionInfo, error) { if limit <= 0 { - limit = 20 + limit = DefaultHistoryLimit } txs, err := s.client.PaymentTx.Query(). @@ -212,7 +215,7 @@ func (s *Service) RecordX402Payment(ctx context.Context, record X402PaymentRecor SetAmount(record.Amount). SetChainID(record.ChainID). SetStatus(paymenttx.StatusSubmitted). - SetPurpose("X402 auto-payment"). + SetPurpose(purposeX402AutoPayment). SetX402URL(record.URL). SetPaymentMethod(paymenttx.PaymentMethodX402V2). Save(ctx) diff --git a/internal/payment/tx_builder.go b/internal/payment/tx_builder.go index 6e272937..655a48ca 100644 --- a/internal/payment/tx_builder.go +++ b/internal/payment/tx_builder.go @@ -13,6 +13,17 @@ import ( "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethclient" ) +// Gas fee defaults for EIP-1559 transactions. +const ( + DefaultBaseFeeWei = 1_000_000_000 // 1 gwei + DefaultMaxPriorityFeeWei = 1_500_000_000 // 1.5 gwei + BaseFeeMultiplier = 2 + EthAddressLength = 42 +) + +// BalanceOfSelector is the function selector for balanceOf(address). +var BalanceOfSelector = []byte{0x70, 0xa0, 0x82, 0x31} + // ERC20TransferMethodID is the function selector for transfer(address,uint256). var ERC20TransferMethodID = crypto.Keccak256([]byte("transfer(address,uint256)"))[:4] @@ -62,13 +73,12 @@ func (b *TxBuilder) BuildTransferTx(ctx context.Context, from common.Address, to baseFee := header.BaseFee if baseFee == nil { - baseFee = big.NewInt(1_000_000_000) // 1 gwei fallback + baseFee = big.NewInt(DefaultBaseFeeWei) } - // maxPriorityFee = 1.5 gwei, maxFee = 2 * baseFee + maxPriorityFee - maxPriorityFee := big.NewInt(1_500_000_000) + maxPriorityFee := big.NewInt(DefaultMaxPriorityFeeWei) maxFee := new(big.Int).Add( - new(big.Int).Mul(baseFee, big.NewInt(2)), + new(big.Int).Mul(baseFee, big.NewInt(BaseFeeMultiplier)), maxPriorityFee, ) @@ -103,7 +113,7 @@ func (b *TxBuilder) USDCContract() common.Address { // ValidateAddress checks if a string is a valid Ethereum address. func ValidateAddress(addr string) error { - if !strings.HasPrefix(addr, "0x") || len(addr) != 42 { + if !strings.HasPrefix(addr, "0x") || len(addr) != EthAddressLength { return fmt.Errorf("invalid address format: %q", addr) } if !common.IsHexAddress(addr) { diff --git a/internal/prompt/defaults_test.go b/internal/prompt/defaults_test.go index 585e56bd..a3467755 100644 --- a/internal/prompt/defaults_test.go +++ b/internal/prompt/defaults_test.go @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ func TestDefaultBuilder_SectionOrder(t *testing.T) { func TestDefaultBuilder_UsesEmbeddedContent(t *testing.T) { result := DefaultBuilder().Build() // Verify embedded content is loaded (not fallbacks) - assert.Contains(t, result, "nine tool categories") + assert.Contains(t, result, "ten tool categories") assert.Contains(t, result, "Never expose secrets") assert.Contains(t, result, "Exec Tool") } diff --git a/internal/provider/anthropic/anthropic.go b/internal/provider/anthropic/anthropic.go index 4662e617..2fb1f78d 100644 --- a/internal/provider/anthropic/anthropic.go +++ b/internal/provider/anthropic/anthropic.go @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package anthropic import ( "context" + "fmt" "iter" "github.com/anthropics/anthropic-sdk-go" @@ -45,14 +46,15 @@ func (p *AnthropicProvider) Generate(ctx context.Context, params provider.Genera switch evt.Type { case "content_block_delta": - if evt.Delta.Type == "text_delta" { + switch evt.Delta.Type { + case "text_delta": if !yield(provider.StreamEvent{ Type: provider.StreamEventPlainText, Text: evt.Delta.Text, }, nil) { return } - } else if evt.Delta.Type == "input_json_delta" { + case "input_json_delta": if !yield(provider.StreamEvent{ Type: provider.StreamEventToolCall, ToolCall: &provider.ToolCall{ @@ -89,11 +91,25 @@ func (p *AnthropicProvider) Generate(ctx context.Context, params provider.Genera } func (p *AnthropicProvider) ListModels(ctx context.Context) ([]provider.ModelInfo, error) { - return []provider.ModelInfo{ - {ID: "claude-3-5-sonnet-latest", Name: "Claude 3.5 Sonnet"}, - {ID: "claude-3-opus-latest", Name: "Claude 3 Opus"}, - {ID: "claude-3-haiku-20240307", Name: "Claude 3 Haiku"}, - }, nil + pager := p.client.Models.ListAutoPaging(ctx, anthropic.ModelListParams{ + Limit: param.NewOpt[int64](1000), + }) + + var models []provider.ModelInfo + for pager.Next() { + m := pager.Current() + models = append(models, provider.ModelInfo{ + ID: m.ID, + Name: m.DisplayName, + }) + } + if err := pager.Err(); err != nil { + if len(models) > 0 { + return models, nil + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("list anthropic models: %w", err) + } + return models, nil } func (p *AnthropicProvider) convertParams(params provider.GenerateParams) (anthropic.MessageNewParams, error) { diff --git a/internal/provider/anthropic/anthropic_test.go b/internal/provider/anthropic/anthropic_test.go index c294b8b0..f015805e 100644 --- a/internal/provider/anthropic/anthropic_test.go +++ b/internal/provider/anthropic/anthropic_test.go @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package anthropic import ( "context" + "os" "testing" ) @@ -13,7 +14,12 @@ func TestNewProvider(t *testing.T) { } func TestAnthropicProvider_ListModels(t *testing.T) { - p := NewProvider("anthropic", "test-key") + apiKey := os.Getenv("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY") + if apiKey == "" { + t.Skip("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY not set; skipping live API test") + } + + p := NewProvider("anthropic", apiKey) models, err := p.ListModels(context.Background()) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("ListModels: %v", err) @@ -21,15 +27,10 @@ func TestAnthropicProvider_ListModels(t *testing.T) { if len(models) == 0 { t.Fatal("expected at least one model") } - // Verify known models exist - found := false + // Verify the API returns model IDs for _, m := range models { - if m.ID == "claude-3-5-sonnet-latest" { - found = true - break + if m.ID == "" { + t.Error("expected non-empty model ID") } } - if !found { - t.Error("expected claude-3-5-sonnet-latest in model list") - } } diff --git a/internal/provider/gemini/gemini.go b/internal/provider/gemini/gemini.go index dfe08206..c037b8e3 100644 --- a/internal/provider/gemini/gemini.go +++ b/internal/provider/gemini/gemini.go @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import ( "encoding/json" "fmt" "iter" + "strings" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/provider" "google.golang.org/genai" @@ -197,15 +198,22 @@ func (p *GeminiProvider) Generate(ctx context.Context, params provider.GenerateP } func (p *GeminiProvider) ListModels(ctx context.Context) ([]provider.ModelInfo, error) { - // Basic implementation using configured client - // p.client.Models.List(ctx, nil) returns iterator - - // Example hardcoded for now as API exploration might take time - return []provider.ModelInfo{ - {ID: "gemini-2.0-flash-exp", Name: "Gemini 2.0 Flash Exp"}, - {ID: "gemini-1.5-pro", Name: "Gemini 1.5 Pro"}, - {ID: "gemini-1.5-flash", Name: "Gemini 1.5 Flash"}, - }, nil + var models []provider.ModelInfo + for m, err := range p.client.Models.All(ctx) { + if err != nil { + if len(models) > 0 { + return models, nil + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("list gemini models: %w", err) + } + id := strings.TrimPrefix(m.Name, "models/") + models = append(models, provider.ModelInfo{ + ID: id, + Name: m.DisplayName, + ContextWindow: int(m.InputTokenLimit), + }) + } + return models, nil } func convertSchema(schemaMap map[string]interface{}) (*genai.Schema, error) { diff --git a/internal/sandbox/container_executor.go b/internal/sandbox/container_executor.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..eede7637 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/sandbox/container_executor.go @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +package sandbox + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" +) + +// ContainerExecutor runs tool invocations through a container runtime. +// It probes available runtimes in priority order and falls back to native +// subprocess execution when no container runtime is available. +type ContainerExecutor struct { + runtime ContainerRuntime + cfg Config + image string + networkMode string + readOnly bool + cpuQuotaUS int64 +} + +// NewContainerExecutor creates a ContainerExecutor by probing runtimes in order. +// Priority: docker (if requested or auto) > gvisor (if requested or auto) > native. +func NewContainerExecutor(cfg Config, containerCfg config.ContainerSandboxConfig) (*ContainerExecutor, error) { + ctx := context.Background() + runtimeName := containerCfg.Runtime + + readOnly := true + if containerCfg.ReadOnlyRootfs != nil { + readOnly = *containerCfg.ReadOnlyRootfs + } + + exec := &ContainerExecutor{ + cfg: cfg, + image: containerCfg.Image, + networkMode: containerCfg.NetworkMode, + readOnly: readOnly, + cpuQuotaUS: containerCfg.CPUQuotaUS, + } + + // Try Docker runtime. + if runtimeName == "docker" || runtimeName == "auto" { + dr, err := NewDockerRuntime() + if err == nil && dr.IsAvailable(ctx) { + exec.runtime = dr + return exec, nil + } + if runtimeName == "docker" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("docker runtime requested but unavailable: %w", ErrRuntimeUnavailable) + } + } + + // Try gVisor runtime. + if runtimeName == "gvisor" || runtimeName == "auto" { + gr := NewGVisorRuntime() + if gr.IsAvailable(ctx) { + exec.runtime = gr + return exec, nil + } + if runtimeName == "gvisor" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("gvisor runtime requested but unavailable: %w", ErrRuntimeUnavailable) + } + } + + // Fallback to native (subprocess). + exec.runtime = NewNativeRuntime(cfg) + return exec, nil +} + +// Execute runs a tool through the container runtime. +func (e *ContainerExecutor) Execute(ctx context.Context, toolName string, params map[string]interface{}) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + ccfg := ContainerConfig{ + Image: e.image, + ToolName: toolName, + NetworkMode: e.networkMode, + Params: params, + MemoryLimitMB: int64(e.cfg.MaxMemoryMB), + CPUQuotaUS: e.cpuQuotaUS, + ReadOnlyRootfs: e.readOnly, + Timeout: e.cfg.TimeoutPerTool, + } + + result, err := e.runtime.Run(ctx, ccfg) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return result.Output, nil +} + +// RuntimeName returns the name of the active container runtime. +func (e *ContainerExecutor) RuntimeName() string { + return e.runtime.Name() +} + +// Runtime returns the underlying ContainerRuntime for advanced operations. +func (e *ContainerExecutor) Runtime() ContainerRuntime { + return e.runtime +} diff --git a/internal/sandbox/container_executor_test.go b/internal/sandbox/container_executor_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a620131f --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/sandbox/container_executor_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +package sandbox + +import ( + "context" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +// mockRuntime is a test double for ContainerRuntime. +type mockRuntime struct { + name string + available bool + runResult *ExecutionResult + runErr error +} + +func (m *mockRuntime) Run(_ context.Context, _ ContainerConfig) (*ExecutionResult, error) { + return m.runResult, m.runErr +} + +func (m *mockRuntime) Cleanup(_ context.Context, _ string) error { + return nil +} + +func (m *mockRuntime) IsAvailable(_ context.Context) bool { + return m.available +} + +func (m *mockRuntime) Name() string { + return m.name +} + +func TestContainerExecutor_FallbackToNative(t *testing.T) { + // When runtime is "auto" and Docker/gVisor are unavailable, should fall back to native. + cfg := Config{ + Enabled: true, + TimeoutPerTool: 30 * time.Second, + MaxMemoryMB: 256, + } + containerCfg := config.ContainerSandboxConfig{ + Runtime: "auto", + Image: "test-image:latest", + NetworkMode: "none", + } + + exec, err := NewContainerExecutor(cfg, containerCfg) + require.NoError(t, err) + // On CI/local without Docker, should fall back to native. + assert.Contains(t, []string{"docker", "native"}, exec.RuntimeName()) +} + +func TestContainerExecutor_RuntimeName(t *testing.T) { + exec := &ContainerExecutor{ + runtime: &mockRuntime{name: "test-runtime", available: true}, + } + assert.Equal(t, "test-runtime", exec.RuntimeName()) +} + +func TestContainerExecutor_Execute_Success(t *testing.T) { + mock := &mockRuntime{ + name: "mock", + available: true, + runResult: &ExecutionResult{ + Output: map[string]interface{}{"status": "ok"}, + }, + } + + exec := &ContainerExecutor{ + runtime: mock, + cfg: Config{TimeoutPerTool: 10 * time.Second, MaxMemoryMB: 128}, + image: "test:latest", + networkMode: "none", + readOnly: true, + } + + result, err := exec.Execute(context.Background(), "echo", map[string]interface{}{"msg": "hello"}) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "ok", result["status"]) +} + +func TestContainerExecutor_Execute_Error(t *testing.T) { + mock := &mockRuntime{ + name: "mock", + available: true, + runResult: nil, + runErr: ErrContainerTimeout, + } + + exec := &ContainerExecutor{ + runtime: mock, + cfg: Config{TimeoutPerTool: 10 * time.Second}, + image: "test:latest", + networkMode: "none", + } + + _, err := exec.Execute(context.Background(), "slow-tool", nil) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrContainerTimeout) +} + +func TestContainerExecutor_NativeRuntime_Explicit(t *testing.T) { + cfg := Config{ + Enabled: true, + TimeoutPerTool: 5 * time.Second, + } + containerCfg := config.ContainerSandboxConfig{ + Runtime: "native", + Image: "unused", + } + + // "native" is not docker/gvisor, so it falls through to native fallback. + exec, err := NewContainerExecutor(cfg, containerCfg) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "native", exec.RuntimeName()) +} + +func TestContainerExecutor_DockerUnavailable_Explicit(t *testing.T) { + if testing.Short() { + t.Skip("skipping Docker check in short mode") + } + + cfg := Config{Enabled: true} + containerCfg := config.ContainerSandboxConfig{ + Runtime: "docker", + Image: "test:latest", + } + + exec, err := NewContainerExecutor(cfg, containerCfg) + if err != nil { + // Docker requested but unavailable — expected on some machines. + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrRuntimeUnavailable) + return + } + // Docker is available on this machine. + assert.Equal(t, "docker", exec.RuntimeName()) + _ = exec +} + +func TestContainerExecutor_GVisorUnavailable_Explicit(t *testing.T) { + cfg := Config{Enabled: true} + containerCfg := config.ContainerSandboxConfig{ + Runtime: "gvisor", + Image: "test:latest", + } + + _, err := NewContainerExecutor(cfg, containerCfg) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrRuntimeUnavailable) +} + +func TestContainerExecutor_Runtime(t *testing.T) { + mock := &mockRuntime{name: "mock", available: true} + exec := &ContainerExecutor{runtime: mock} + assert.Equal(t, mock, exec.Runtime()) +} diff --git a/internal/sandbox/container_pool.go b/internal/sandbox/container_pool.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ff98da19 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/sandbox/container_pool.go @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +package sandbox + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + "sync" + "time" +) + +// ContainerPool manages a pool of pre-warmed containers for faster execution. +// It is only activated when PoolSize > 0. +type ContainerPool struct { + runtime ContainerRuntime + image string + size int + idleTimeout time.Duration + pool chan string // buffered channel of container IDs + mu sync.Mutex + closed bool +} + +// NewContainerPool creates a container pool with the specified size. +// If size is 0, the pool is effectively disabled (Acquire always returns empty). +func NewContainerPool(runtime ContainerRuntime, image string, size int, idleTimeout time.Duration) *ContainerPool { + p := &ContainerPool{ + runtime: runtime, + image: image, + size: size, + idleTimeout: idleTimeout, + pool: make(chan string, size), + } + return p +} + +// Acquire retrieves a pre-warmed container ID from the pool. +// If the pool is empty, it returns an empty string (caller should create on demand). +func (p *ContainerPool) Acquire(ctx context.Context) (string, error) { + p.mu.Lock() + if p.closed { + p.mu.Unlock() + return "", fmt.Errorf("pool is closed") + } + p.mu.Unlock() + + select { + case id := <-p.pool: + return id, nil + case <-ctx.Done(): + return "", ctx.Err() + default: + // Pool empty — caller should create container on demand. + return "", nil + } +} + +// Release returns a container ID to the pool for reuse. +// If the pool is full or closed, the container is discarded. +func (p *ContainerPool) Release(containerID string) { + p.mu.Lock() + defer p.mu.Unlock() + + if p.closed { + return + } + + select { + case p.pool <- containerID: + // Returned to pool. + default: + // Pool full, discard. + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second) + defer cancel() + _ = p.runtime.Cleanup(ctx, containerID) + } +} + +// Close drains the pool and cleans up all pre-warmed containers. +func (p *ContainerPool) Close() { + p.mu.Lock() + if p.closed { + p.mu.Unlock() + return + } + p.closed = true + p.mu.Unlock() + + close(p.pool) + for id := range p.pool { + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second) + _ = p.runtime.Cleanup(ctx, id) + cancel() + } +} + +// Size returns the current number of containers in the pool. +func (p *ContainerPool) Size() int { + return len(p.pool) +} + +// Capacity returns the maximum pool capacity. +func (p *ContainerPool) Capacity() int { + return p.size +} diff --git a/internal/sandbox/container_pool_test.go b/internal/sandbox/container_pool_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..664a3c5b --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/sandbox/container_pool_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +package sandbox + +import ( + "context" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func TestContainerPool_AcquireRelease(t *testing.T) { + rt := &mockRuntime{name: "mock", available: true} + pool := NewContainerPool(rt, "test:latest", 3, 5*time.Minute) + defer pool.Close() + + // Pool starts empty. + assert.Equal(t, 0, pool.Size()) + assert.Equal(t, 3, pool.Capacity()) + + // Acquire from empty pool returns empty string (no block). + id, err := pool.Acquire(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Empty(t, id) + + // Release a container ID. + pool.Release("container-1") + assert.Equal(t, 1, pool.Size()) + + // Acquire retrieves it. + id, err = pool.Acquire(context.Background()) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "container-1", id) + assert.Equal(t, 0, pool.Size()) +} + +func TestContainerPool_ReleaseFullPool(t *testing.T) { + rt := &mockRuntime{name: "mock", available: true} + pool := NewContainerPool(rt, "test:latest", 2, 5*time.Minute) + defer pool.Close() + + pool.Release("c-1") + pool.Release("c-2") + assert.Equal(t, 2, pool.Size()) + + // Releasing when full should discard. + pool.Release("c-3") + assert.Equal(t, 2, pool.Size()) +} + +func TestContainerPool_Close(t *testing.T) { + rt := &mockRuntime{name: "mock", available: true} + pool := NewContainerPool(rt, "test:latest", 3, 5*time.Minute) + + pool.Release("c-1") + pool.Release("c-2") + pool.Close() + + // Acquire after close returns error. + _, err := pool.Acquire(context.Background()) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "pool is closed") + + // Release after close is no-op. + pool.Release("c-3") // should not panic +} + +func TestContainerPool_DoubleClose(t *testing.T) { + rt := &mockRuntime{name: "mock", available: true} + pool := NewContainerPool(rt, "test:latest", 2, 5*time.Minute) + + pool.Close() + pool.Close() // should not panic +} + +func TestContainerPool_AcquireContextCancelled(t *testing.T) { + rt := &mockRuntime{name: "mock", available: true} + pool := NewContainerPool(rt, "test:latest", 3, 5*time.Minute) + defer pool.Close() + + ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background()) + cancel() + + // With cancelled context and empty pool, Acquire may return either + // empty string (default case) or context error (ctx.Done case). + id, err := pool.Acquire(ctx) + if err != nil { + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, context.Canceled) + } + assert.Empty(t, id) +} + +func TestContainerPool_FIFO(t *testing.T) { + rt := &mockRuntime{name: "mock", available: true} + pool := NewContainerPool(rt, "test:latest", 5, 5*time.Minute) + defer pool.Close() + + pool.Release("c-1") + pool.Release("c-2") + pool.Release("c-3") + + id1, _ := pool.Acquire(context.Background()) + id2, _ := pool.Acquire(context.Background()) + id3, _ := pool.Acquire(context.Background()) + + assert.Equal(t, "c-1", id1) + assert.Equal(t, "c-2", id2) + assert.Equal(t, "c-3", id3) +} diff --git a/internal/sandbox/container_runtime.go b/internal/sandbox/container_runtime.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..24201c67 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/sandbox/container_runtime.go @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +package sandbox + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "time" +) + +// ContainerConfig defines parameters for a containerized tool execution. +type ContainerConfig struct { + // Image is the Docker image to use for the container. + Image string + + // ToolName is the name of the tool to execute. + ToolName string + + // NetworkMode is the Docker network mode (e.g. "none", "bridge"). + NetworkMode string + + // Params are the tool invocation parameters. + Params map[string]interface{} + + // MemoryLimitMB is the hard memory limit in megabytes. + MemoryLimitMB int64 + + // CPUQuotaUS is the CPU quota in microseconds. + CPUQuotaUS int64 + + // ReadOnlyRootfs mounts the root filesystem as read-only. + ReadOnlyRootfs bool + + // Timeout is the maximum execution duration. + Timeout time.Duration +} + +// ContainerRuntime provides an execution environment for isolated tool runs. +type ContainerRuntime interface { + // Run executes a tool inside a container and returns the result. + Run(ctx context.Context, cfg ContainerConfig) (*ExecutionResult, error) + + // Cleanup removes containers associated with the given container ID. + Cleanup(ctx context.Context, containerID string) error + + // IsAvailable checks whether the runtime is operational. + IsAvailable(ctx context.Context) bool + + // Name returns the human-readable runtime name. + Name() string +} + +var ( + // ErrRuntimeUnavailable indicates the container runtime is not installed or accessible. + ErrRuntimeUnavailable = errors.New("container runtime unavailable") + + // ErrContainerTimeout indicates the container execution exceeded its deadline. + ErrContainerTimeout = errors.New("container execution timed out") + + // ErrContainerOOM indicates the container was killed due to out-of-memory. + ErrContainerOOM = errors.New("container killed due to out-of-memory") +) diff --git a/internal/sandbox/container_runtime_test.go b/internal/sandbox/container_runtime_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a2c71ee0 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/sandbox/container_runtime_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +package sandbox + +import ( + "context" + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func TestNativeRuntime_Name(t *testing.T) { + rt := NewNativeRuntime(Config{TimeoutPerTool: 0}) + assert.Equal(t, "native", rt.Name()) +} + +func TestNativeRuntime_IsAvailable(t *testing.T) { + rt := NewNativeRuntime(Config{}) + assert.True(t, rt.IsAvailable(context.Background())) +} + +func TestNativeRuntime_Cleanup(t *testing.T) { + rt := NewNativeRuntime(Config{}) + err := rt.Cleanup(context.Background(), "some-id") + assert.NoError(t, err) +} + +func TestGVisorRuntime_Name(t *testing.T) { + rt := NewGVisorRuntime() + assert.Equal(t, "gvisor", rt.Name()) +} + +func TestGVisorRuntime_IsAvailable(t *testing.T) { + rt := NewGVisorRuntime() + assert.False(t, rt.IsAvailable(context.Background())) +} + +func TestGVisorRuntime_Run(t *testing.T) { + rt := NewGVisorRuntime() + _, err := rt.Run(context.Background(), ContainerConfig{}) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrRuntimeUnavailable) +} + +func TestGVisorRuntime_Cleanup(t *testing.T) { + rt := NewGVisorRuntime() + err := rt.Cleanup(context.Background(), "some-id") + assert.NoError(t, err) +} + +func TestContainerConfig_Fields(t *testing.T) { + cfg := ContainerConfig{ + Image: "test-image:latest", + ToolName: "echo", + NetworkMode: "none", + MemoryLimitMB: 256, + CPUQuotaUS: 50000, + ReadOnlyRootfs: true, + } + assert.Equal(t, "test-image:latest", cfg.Image) + assert.Equal(t, "echo", cfg.ToolName) + assert.Equal(t, "none", cfg.NetworkMode) + assert.Equal(t, int64(256), cfg.MemoryLimitMB) + assert.Equal(t, int64(50000), cfg.CPUQuotaUS) + assert.True(t, cfg.ReadOnlyRootfs) +} + +func TestErrorSentinels(t *testing.T) { + assert.Error(t, ErrRuntimeUnavailable) + assert.Error(t, ErrContainerTimeout) + assert.Error(t, ErrContainerOOM) + assert.Equal(t, "container runtime unavailable", ErrRuntimeUnavailable.Error()) + assert.Equal(t, "container execution timed out", ErrContainerTimeout.Error()) + assert.Equal(t, "container killed due to out-of-memory", ErrContainerOOM.Error()) +} diff --git a/internal/sandbox/docker_runtime.go b/internal/sandbox/docker_runtime.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a10b3a3f --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/sandbox/docker_runtime.go @@ -0,0 +1,209 @@ +package sandbox + +import ( + "bytes" + "context" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "io" + "time" + + "github.com/docker/docker/api/types/container" + "github.com/docker/docker/client" +) + +// DockerRuntime executes tools inside Docker containers. +type DockerRuntime struct { + cli *client.Client +} + +// NewDockerRuntime creates a DockerRuntime using the default Docker client. +func NewDockerRuntime() (*DockerRuntime, error) { + cli, err := client.NewClientWithOpts(client.FromEnv, client.WithAPIVersionNegotiation()) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("create docker client: %w", err) + } + return &DockerRuntime{cli: cli}, nil +} + +// Run executes a tool inside a Docker container, communicating via stdin/stdout JSON. +func (r *DockerRuntime) Run(ctx context.Context, cfg ContainerConfig) (*ExecutionResult, error) { + if cfg.Timeout > 0 { + var cancel context.CancelFunc + ctx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(ctx, cfg.Timeout) + defer cancel() + } + + // Prepare the execution request. + req := ExecutionRequest{ + Version: 1, + ToolName: cfg.ToolName, + Params: cfg.Params, + } + reqBytes, err := json.Marshal(req) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal execution request: %w", err) + } + + // Container configuration. + containerCfg := &container.Config{ + Image: cfg.Image, + Cmd: []string{"--sandbox-worker"}, + OpenStdin: true, + StdinOnce: true, + AttachStdin: true, + AttachStdout: true, + AttachStderr: true, + Labels: map[string]string{ + "lango.sandbox": "true", + "lango.tool": cfg.ToolName, + }, + } + + hostCfg := &container.HostConfig{ + NetworkMode: container.NetworkMode(cfg.NetworkMode), + Resources: container.Resources{ + Memory: cfg.MemoryLimitMB * 1024 * 1024, + CPUQuota: cfg.CPUQuotaUS, + }, + ReadonlyRootfs: cfg.ReadOnlyRootfs, + Tmpfs: map[string]string{ + "/tmp": "", + }, + } + + // Create the container. + resp, err := r.cli.ContainerCreate(ctx, containerCfg, hostCfg, nil, nil, "") + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("create container: %w", err) + } + containerID := resp.ID + + // Always remove the container when done. + defer func() { + removeCtx, removeCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second) + defer removeCancel() + _ = r.cli.ContainerRemove(removeCtx, containerID, container.RemoveOptions{Force: true}) + }() + + // Attach to container for stdin/stdout hijacking. + attachResp, err := r.cli.ContainerAttach(ctx, containerID, container.AttachOptions{ + Stream: true, + Stdin: true, + Stdout: true, + Stderr: true, + }) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("attach container: %w", err) + } + defer attachResp.Close() + + // Start the container. + if err := r.cli.ContainerStart(ctx, containerID, container.StartOptions{}); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("start container: %w", err) + } + + // Write JSON request to stdin, then close. + if _, err := attachResp.Conn.Write(reqBytes); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("write to container stdin: %w", err) + } + if err := attachResp.CloseWrite(); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("close container stdin: %w", err) + } + + // Read stdout. + var stdout bytes.Buffer + if _, err := io.Copy(&stdout, attachResp.Reader); err != nil { + // Ignore read errors if context was cancelled (timeout). + if ctx.Err() != nil { + return nil, ErrContainerTimeout + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("read container stdout: %w", err) + } + + // Wait for the container to finish. + waitCh, errCh := r.cli.ContainerWait(ctx, containerID, container.WaitConditionNotRunning) + select { + case waitResp := <-waitCh: + // Exit code 137 indicates OOM kill (128 + SIGKILL=9). + if waitResp.StatusCode == 137 { + return nil, ErrContainerOOM + } + case err := <-errCh: + if ctx.Err() != nil { + return nil, ErrContainerTimeout + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("wait for container: %w", err) + case <-ctx.Done(): + return nil, ErrContainerTimeout + } + + // Parse result from stdout. + // Docker multiplexes stdout/stderr with an 8-byte header per frame. + // Try to parse the raw output first; if it fails, strip headers. + rawOutput := stdout.Bytes() + var result ExecutionResult + if err := json.Unmarshal(rawOutput, &result); err != nil { + // Try stripping Docker stream headers (8-byte prefix per frame). + stripped := stripDockerStreamHeaders(rawOutput) + if jsonErr := json.Unmarshal(stripped, &result); jsonErr != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal container result: %w (raw: %s)", err, string(rawOutput)) + } + } + + if result.Error != "" { + return &result, fmt.Errorf("tool %q: %s", cfg.ToolName, result.Error) + } + + return &result, nil +} + +// stripDockerStreamHeaders removes Docker multiplexed stream headers. +// Each frame has: [type(1)][padding(3)][size(4)][payload(size)]. +func stripDockerStreamHeaders(data []byte) []byte { + var out bytes.Buffer + for len(data) >= 8 { + size := int(data[4])<<24 | int(data[5])<<16 | int(data[6])<<8 | int(data[7]) + data = data[8:] + if size > len(data) { + size = len(data) + } + out.Write(data[:size]) + data = data[size:] + } + return out.Bytes() +} + +// Cleanup removes orphaned sandbox containers with the "lango.sandbox=true" label. +func (r *DockerRuntime) Cleanup(ctx context.Context, _ string) error { + containers, err := r.cli.ContainerList(ctx, container.ListOptions{ + All: true, + }) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("list containers: %w", err) + } + + var removed int + for _, c := range containers { + if c.Labels["lango.sandbox"] == "true" { + if err := r.cli.ContainerRemove(ctx, c.ID, container.RemoveOptions{Force: true}); err != nil { + continue + } + removed++ + } + } + return nil +} + +// IsAvailable checks if Docker daemon is reachable. +func (r *DockerRuntime) IsAvailable(ctx context.Context) bool { + pingCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 2*time.Second) + defer cancel() + _, err := r.cli.Ping(pingCtx) + return err == nil +} + +// Name returns the runtime name. +func (r *DockerRuntime) Name() string { + return "docker" +} diff --git a/internal/sandbox/docker_runtime_test.go b/internal/sandbox/docker_runtime_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cf4feaab --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/sandbox/docker_runtime_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +package sandbox + +import ( + "bytes" + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" +) + +func TestDockerRuntime_Name(t *testing.T) { + if testing.Short() { + t.Skip("skipping Docker integration test in short mode") + } + dr, err := NewDockerRuntime() + if err != nil { + t.Skipf("Docker client unavailable: %v", err) + } + assert.Equal(t, "docker", dr.Name()) +} + +func TestStripDockerStreamHeaders(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give string + want string + }{ + { + give: "already plain JSON", + want: "already plain JSON", + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + // Build a Docker-style frame: [type=1][0,0,0][size_be32][payload]. + payload := []byte(tt.want) + frame := make([]byte, 8+len(payload)) + frame[0] = 1 // stdout + frame[4] = byte(len(payload) >> 24) + frame[5] = byte(len(payload) >> 16) + frame[6] = byte(len(payload) >> 8) + frame[7] = byte(len(payload)) + copy(frame[8:], payload) + + result := stripDockerStreamHeaders(frame) + assert.True(t, bytes.Equal(payload, result)) + }) + } +} + +func TestStripDockerStreamHeaders_MultipleFrames(t *testing.T) { + part1 := []byte(`{"output":`) + part2 := []byte(`{"ok":true}}`) + + var buf bytes.Buffer + // Frame 1 + frame1 := make([]byte, 8+len(part1)) + frame1[0] = 1 + frame1[7] = byte(len(part1)) + copy(frame1[8:], part1) + buf.Write(frame1) + + // Frame 2 + frame2 := make([]byte, 8+len(part2)) + frame2[0] = 1 + frame2[7] = byte(len(part2)) + copy(frame2[8:], part2) + buf.Write(frame2) + + result := stripDockerStreamHeaders(buf.Bytes()) + expected := append(part1, part2...) + assert.Equal(t, expected, result) +} + +func TestStripDockerStreamHeaders_EmptyInput(t *testing.T) { + result := stripDockerStreamHeaders(nil) + assert.Empty(t, result) +} diff --git a/internal/sandbox/executor.go b/internal/sandbox/executor.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5c136d81 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/sandbox/executor.go @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +// Package sandbox provides process isolation for tool execution. +// Remote peer tool invocations run in isolated subprocesses to prevent +// access to process memory (passphrases, private keys, session tokens). +package sandbox + +import ( + "context" + "time" +) + +// Executor runs a tool invocation, optionally in an isolated subprocess. +type Executor interface { + Execute(ctx context.Context, toolName string, params map[string]interface{}) (map[string]interface{}, error) +} + +// Config controls sandbox execution behavior. +type Config struct { + // Enabled turns on subprocess isolation for remote tool calls. + Enabled bool + + // TimeoutPerTool is the maximum duration for a single tool execution. + // Zero means no timeout. + TimeoutPerTool time.Duration + + // MaxMemoryMB is a soft memory limit for the subprocess (Phase 2). + MaxMemoryMB int +} + +// ExecutionRequest is the JSON message sent to the sandbox worker via stdin. +type ExecutionRequest struct { + // Version is the protocol version for backward compatibility (0 = original). + Version int `json:"version,omitempty"` + ToolName string `json:"toolName"` + Params map[string]interface{} `json:"params"` +} + +// ExecutionResult is the JSON message received from the sandbox worker via stdout. +type ExecutionResult struct { + Output map[string]interface{} `json:"output,omitempty"` + Error string `json:"error,omitempty"` +} diff --git a/internal/sandbox/executor_test.go b/internal/sandbox/executor_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d0fa94dd --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/sandbox/executor_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +package sandbox + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func TestInProcessExecutor_Execute(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give string + giveParams map[string]interface{} + wantResult map[string]interface{} + wantErr bool + }{ + { + give: "echo", + giveParams: map[string]interface{}{"msg": "hello"}, + wantResult: map[string]interface{}{"msg": "hello"}, + }, + { + give: "empty", + giveParams: nil, + wantResult: map[string]interface{}{}, + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + exec := NewInProcessExecutor(func(ctx context.Context, toolName string, params map[string]interface{}) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + if params == nil { + return map[string]interface{}{}, nil + } + return params, nil + }) + + result, err := exec.Execute(context.Background(), tt.give, tt.giveParams) + if tt.wantErr { + require.Error(t, err) + return + } + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, tt.wantResult, result) + }) + } +} + +func TestExecutionRequest_JSON(t *testing.T) { + req := ExecutionRequest{ + ToolName: "search", + Params: map[string]interface{}{"query": "test", "limit": float64(10)}, + } + + data, err := json.Marshal(req) + require.NoError(t, err) + + var decoded ExecutionRequest + err = json.Unmarshal(data, &decoded) + require.NoError(t, err) + + assert.Equal(t, req.ToolName, decoded.ToolName) + assert.Equal(t, req.Params["query"], decoded.Params["query"]) + assert.Equal(t, req.Params["limit"], decoded.Params["limit"]) +} + +func TestExecutionResult_JSON(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give string + giveData ExecutionResult + }{ + { + give: "success", + giveData: ExecutionResult{ + Output: map[string]interface{}{"status": "ok", "count": float64(42)}, + }, + }, + { + give: "error", + giveData: ExecutionResult{ + Error: "tool not found", + }, + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + data, err := json.Marshal(tt.giveData) + require.NoError(t, err) + + var decoded ExecutionResult + err = json.Unmarshal(data, &decoded) + require.NoError(t, err) + + assert.Equal(t, tt.giveData.Output, decoded.Output) + assert.Equal(t, tt.giveData.Error, decoded.Error) + }) + } +} + +func TestSubprocessExecutor_Timeout(t *testing.T) { + exec := NewSubprocessExecutor(Config{ + TimeoutPerTool: 1 * time.Millisecond, + }) + + // Use a context that is already expired to force immediate timeout. + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 1*time.Millisecond) + defer cancel() + time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond) // ensure context is expired + + _, err := exec.Execute(ctx, "slow-tool", map[string]interface{}{}) + require.Error(t, err) + // The error should indicate timeout or context cancellation. + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "timed out") +} + +func TestIsWorkerMode(t *testing.T) { + // IsWorkerMode checks os.Args, which we cannot safely mutate in parallel tests. + // Just verify the function exists and returns false in normal test mode. + assert.False(t, IsWorkerMode()) +} + +func TestCleanEnv(t *testing.T) { + env := cleanEnv() + // Should contain at most PATH and HOME. + assert.LessOrEqual(t, len(env), 2) + for _, e := range env { + assert.True(t, len(e) > 0) + // Each entry should be either PATH= or HOME=. + assert.Regexp(t, `^(PATH|HOME)=`, e) + } +} + +func TestConfig_Defaults(t *testing.T) { + cfg := Config{} + assert.False(t, cfg.Enabled) + assert.Equal(t, time.Duration(0), cfg.TimeoutPerTool) + assert.Equal(t, 0, cfg.MaxMemoryMB) +} diff --git a/internal/sandbox/gvisor_runtime.go b/internal/sandbox/gvisor_runtime.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..18dc3613 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/sandbox/gvisor_runtime.go @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +package sandbox + +import ( + "context" +) + +// GVisorRuntime is a stub for future gVisor-based container isolation. +// It always reports as unavailable and returns ErrRuntimeUnavailable on Run. +type GVisorRuntime struct{} + +// NewGVisorRuntime creates a GVisorRuntime stub. +func NewGVisorRuntime() *GVisorRuntime { + return &GVisorRuntime{} +} + +// Run returns ErrRuntimeUnavailable — gVisor support is not yet implemented. +func (r *GVisorRuntime) Run(_ context.Context, _ ContainerConfig) (*ExecutionResult, error) { + return nil, ErrRuntimeUnavailable +} + +// Cleanup is a no-op for the gVisor stub. +func (r *GVisorRuntime) Cleanup(_ context.Context, _ string) error { + return nil +} + +// IsAvailable always returns false for the gVisor stub. +func (r *GVisorRuntime) IsAvailable(_ context.Context) bool { + return false +} + +// Name returns the runtime name. +func (r *GVisorRuntime) Name() string { + return "gvisor" +} diff --git a/internal/sandbox/in_process.go b/internal/sandbox/in_process.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..91850236 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/sandbox/in_process.go @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +package sandbox + +import "context" + +// ToolFunc is the signature for a tool handler function. +type ToolFunc func(ctx context.Context, toolName string, params map[string]interface{}) (map[string]interface{}, error) + +// InProcessExecutor delegates directly to a ToolFunc without isolation. +// Use this for local/trusted tool executions where isolation is unnecessary. +type InProcessExecutor struct { + fn ToolFunc +} + +// NewInProcessExecutor wraps an existing tool function as an Executor. +func NewInProcessExecutor(fn ToolFunc) *InProcessExecutor { + return &InProcessExecutor{fn: fn} +} + +// Execute runs the tool in the current process. +func (e *InProcessExecutor) Execute(ctx context.Context, toolName string, params map[string]interface{}) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + return e.fn(ctx, toolName, params) +} diff --git a/internal/sandbox/native_runtime.go b/internal/sandbox/native_runtime.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..97787c57 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/sandbox/native_runtime.go @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +package sandbox + +import ( + "context" +) + +// NativeRuntime wraps the SubprocessExecutor as a ContainerRuntime fallback. +// It provides process-level isolation without containerization. +type NativeRuntime struct { + executor *SubprocessExecutor +} + +// NewNativeRuntime creates a NativeRuntime backed by a SubprocessExecutor. +func NewNativeRuntime(cfg Config) *NativeRuntime { + return &NativeRuntime{ + executor: NewSubprocessExecutor(cfg), + } +} + +// Run executes the tool via the subprocess executor, adapting ContainerConfig +// parameters to the subprocess model. +func (r *NativeRuntime) Run(ctx context.Context, cfg ContainerConfig) (*ExecutionResult, error) { + output, err := r.executor.Execute(ctx, cfg.ToolName, cfg.Params) + if err != nil { + return &ExecutionResult{Error: err.Error()}, err + } + return &ExecutionResult{Output: output}, nil +} + +// Cleanup is a no-op for native runtime — subprocesses are cleaned up on exit. +func (r *NativeRuntime) Cleanup(_ context.Context, _ string) error { + return nil +} + +// IsAvailable always returns true for native runtime. +func (r *NativeRuntime) IsAvailable(_ context.Context) bool { + return true +} + +// Name returns the runtime name. +func (r *NativeRuntime) Name() string { + return "native" +} diff --git a/internal/sandbox/subprocess.go b/internal/sandbox/subprocess.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ca92a20a --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/sandbox/subprocess.go @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +package sandbox + +import ( + "bytes" + "context" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "os" + "os/exec" +) + +// SubprocessExecutor runs tool invocations in isolated child processes. +// The child process inherits only PATH and HOME environment variables, +// preventing access to in-memory secrets of the parent process. +type SubprocessExecutor struct { + cfg Config +} + +// NewSubprocessExecutor creates a subprocess executor with the given config. +func NewSubprocessExecutor(cfg Config) *SubprocessExecutor { + return &SubprocessExecutor{cfg: cfg} +} + +// Execute launches a child process running in sandbox worker mode and +// communicates via JSON over stdin/stdout. +func (e *SubprocessExecutor) Execute(ctx context.Context, toolName string, params map[string]interface{}) (map[string]interface{}, error) { + // Apply per-tool timeout if configured. + if e.cfg.TimeoutPerTool > 0 { + var cancel context.CancelFunc + ctx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(ctx, e.cfg.TimeoutPerTool) + defer cancel() + } + + // Resolve the current executable path for the child process. + selfPath, err := os.Executable() + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolve executable path: %w", err) + } + + cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, selfPath, workerFlag) + + // Clean environment: only PATH and HOME. + cmd.Env = cleanEnv() + + // Prepare JSON request for stdin. + req := ExecutionRequest{ + ToolName: toolName, + Params: params, + } + reqBytes, err := json.Marshal(req) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal execution request: %w", err) + } + cmd.Stdin = bytes.NewReader(reqBytes) + + // Capture stdout and stderr. + var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer + cmd.Stdout = &stdout + cmd.Stderr = &stderr + + // Run the subprocess. + if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil { + // Check for timeout. + if ctx.Err() == context.DeadlineExceeded { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("tool %q timed out after %v", toolName, e.cfg.TimeoutPerTool) + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("subprocess execution of tool %q: %w (stderr: %s)", toolName, err, stderr.String()) + } + + // Parse result from stdout. + var result ExecutionResult + if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &result); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal execution result: %w (raw: %s)", err, stdout.String()) + } + + if result.Error != "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("tool %q: %s", toolName, result.Error) + } + + return result.Output, nil +} + +// cleanEnv returns a minimal environment with only PATH and HOME. +func cleanEnv() []string { + var env []string + if v := os.Getenv("PATH"); v != "" { + env = append(env, "PATH="+v) + } + if v := os.Getenv("HOME"); v != "" { + env = append(env, "HOME="+v) + } + return env +} diff --git a/internal/sandbox/worker.go b/internal/sandbox/worker.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..00a9bc1d --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/sandbox/worker.go @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +package sandbox + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "os" +) + +// workerFlag is the CLI flag that triggers sandbox worker mode. +const workerFlag = "--sandbox-worker" + +// IsWorkerMode returns true if the process was launched as a sandbox worker. +func IsWorkerMode() bool { + for _, arg := range os.Args[1:] { + if arg == workerFlag { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// ToolHandler is a function that executes a named tool with parameters. +type ToolHandler func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) + +// ToolRegistry maps tool names to their handlers for the worker process. +type ToolRegistry map[string]ToolHandler + +// RunWorker is the entry point for the sandbox worker subprocess. +// It reads an ExecutionRequest from stdin, executes the named tool +// from the registry, and writes an ExecutionResult to stdout. +// The worker exits with code 0 on success, 1 on failure. +func RunWorker(registry ToolRegistry) { + var req ExecutionRequest + if err := json.NewDecoder(os.Stdin).Decode(&req); err != nil { + writeResult(ExecutionResult{Error: fmt.Sprintf("decode request: %v", err)}) + os.Exit(1) + } + + handler, ok := registry[req.ToolName] + if !ok { + writeResult(ExecutionResult{Error: fmt.Sprintf("tool %q not registered in worker", req.ToolName)}) + os.Exit(1) + } + + ctx := context.Background() + result, err := handler(ctx, req.Params) + if err != nil { + writeResult(ExecutionResult{Error: err.Error()}) + os.Exit(0) // exit 0 — error is communicated via JSON + } + + // Coerce result to map[string]interface{}. + var output map[string]interface{} + switch v := result.(type) { + case map[string]interface{}: + output = v + default: + output = map[string]interface{}{"result": v} + } + + writeResult(ExecutionResult{Output: output}) +} + +// writeResult encodes an ExecutionResult to stdout. +func writeResult(r ExecutionResult) { + _ = json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout).Encode(r) +} diff --git a/internal/security/aws_kms_provider.go b/internal/security/aws_kms_provider.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e84e4275 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/security/aws_kms_provider.go @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +//go:build kms_aws || kms_all + +package security + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "strings" + "time" + + "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws" + awsconfig "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/config" + "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/kms" + "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/kms/types" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/logging" +) + +var awsLogger = logging.SubsystemSugar("aws-kms") + +// AWSKMSProvider implements CryptoProvider using AWS KMS. +type AWSKMSProvider struct { + client *kms.Client + defaultKeyID string + maxRetries int + timeout time.Duration +} + +var _ CryptoProvider = (*AWSKMSProvider)(nil) + +func newAWSKMSProvider(kmsConfig config.KMSConfig) (CryptoProvider, error) { + if kmsConfig.KeyID == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("new AWS KMS provider: %w", ErrKMSInvalidKey) + } + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second) + defer cancel() + + var optFns []func(*awsconfig.LoadOptions) error + if kmsConfig.Region != "" { + optFns = append(optFns, awsconfig.WithRegion(kmsConfig.Region)) + } + + cfg, err := awsconfig.LoadDefaultConfig(ctx, optFns...) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("load AWS config: %w", err) + } + + var kmsOptFns []func(*kms.Options) + if kmsConfig.Endpoint != "" { + kmsOptFns = append(kmsOptFns, func(o *kms.Options) { + o.BaseEndpoint = aws.String(kmsConfig.Endpoint) + }) + } + + client := kms.NewFromConfig(cfg, kmsOptFns...) + + maxRetries := kmsConfig.MaxRetries + if maxRetries <= 0 { + maxRetries = 3 + } + timeout := kmsConfig.TimeoutPerOperation + if timeout <= 0 { + timeout = 5 * time.Second + } + + awsLogger.Infow("AWS KMS provider initialized", + "region", kmsConfig.Region, + "keyId", kmsConfig.KeyID, + "maxRetries", maxRetries, + ) + + return &AWSKMSProvider{ + client: client, + defaultKeyID: kmsConfig.KeyID, + maxRetries: maxRetries, + timeout: timeout, + }, nil +} + +// Sign generates a signature using AWS KMS ECDSA_SHA_256. +func (p *AWSKMSProvider) Sign(ctx context.Context, keyID string, payload []byte) ([]byte, error) { + resolved := p.resolveKey(keyID) + + var result []byte + err := withRetry(ctx, p.maxRetries, func() error { + opCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, p.timeout) + defer cancel() + + out, err := p.client.Sign(opCtx, &kms.SignInput{ + KeyId: aws.String(resolved), + Message: payload, + SigningAlgorithm: types.SigningAlgorithmSpecEcdsaSha256, + MessageType: types.MessageTypeRaw, + }) + if err != nil { + return p.classifyError("sign", resolved, err) + } + result = out.Signature + return nil + }) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return result, nil +} + +// Encrypt encrypts plaintext using AWS KMS symmetric encryption. +func (p *AWSKMSProvider) Encrypt(ctx context.Context, keyID string, plaintext []byte) ([]byte, error) { + resolved := p.resolveKey(keyID) + + var result []byte + err := withRetry(ctx, p.maxRetries, func() error { + opCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, p.timeout) + defer cancel() + + out, err := p.client.Encrypt(opCtx, &kms.EncryptInput{ + KeyId: aws.String(resolved), + Plaintext: plaintext, + EncryptionAlgorithm: types.EncryptionAlgorithmSpecSymmetricDefault, + }) + if err != nil { + return p.classifyError("encrypt", resolved, err) + } + result = out.CiphertextBlob + return nil + }) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return result, nil +} + +// Decrypt decrypts ciphertext using AWS KMS symmetric encryption. +func (p *AWSKMSProvider) Decrypt(ctx context.Context, keyID string, ciphertext []byte) ([]byte, error) { + resolved := p.resolveKey(keyID) + + var result []byte + err := withRetry(ctx, p.maxRetries, func() error { + opCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, p.timeout) + defer cancel() + + out, err := p.client.Decrypt(opCtx, &kms.DecryptInput{ + KeyId: aws.String(resolved), + CiphertextBlob: ciphertext, + EncryptionAlgorithm: types.EncryptionAlgorithmSpecSymmetricDefault, + }) + if err != nil { + return p.classifyError("decrypt", resolved, err) + } + result = out.Plaintext + return nil + }) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return result, nil +} + +// resolveKey maps "local" and "default" aliases to the configured default key. +func (p *AWSKMSProvider) resolveKey(keyID string) string { + if keyID == "local" || keyID == "default" || keyID == "" { + return p.defaultKeyID + } + return keyID +} + +// classifyError maps AWS KMS errors to sentinel errors wrapped in KMSError. +func (p *AWSKMSProvider) classifyError(op, keyID string, err error) error { + kmsErr := &KMSError{ + Provider: "aws", + Op: op, + KeyID: keyID, + } + + var accessDenied *types.AccessDeniedException + var disabled *types.DisabledException + var notFound *types.NotFoundException + var invalidKeyUsage *types.InvalidKeyUsageException + var kmsInvalidState *types.KMSInvalidStateException + + switch { + case errors.As(err, &accessDenied): + kmsErr.Err = fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrKMSAccessDenied, err) + case errors.As(err, &disabled): + kmsErr.Err = fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrKMSKeyDisabled, err) + case errors.As(err, ¬Found): + kmsErr.Err = fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrKMSInvalidKey, err) + case errors.As(err, &invalidKeyUsage): + kmsErr.Err = fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrKMSInvalidKey, err) + case errors.As(err, &kmsInvalidState): + kmsErr.Err = fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrKMSKeyDisabled, err) + case isAWSThrottling(err): + kmsErr.Err = fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrKMSThrottled, err) + case isAWSUnavailable(err): + kmsErr.Err = fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrKMSUnavailable, err) + default: + kmsErr.Err = err + } + + return kmsErr +} + +// isAWSThrottling checks if the error message indicates throttling. +func isAWSThrottling(err error) bool { + msg := err.Error() + return strings.Contains(msg, "ThrottlingException") || + strings.Contains(msg, "Throttling") || + strings.Contains(msg, "Rate exceeded") +} + +// isAWSUnavailable checks if the error message indicates service unavailability. +func isAWSUnavailable(err error) bool { + msg := err.Error() + return strings.Contains(msg, "ServiceUnavailableException") || + strings.Contains(msg, "connection refused") || + strings.Contains(msg, "no such host") +} diff --git a/internal/security/aws_kms_provider_stub.go b/internal/security/aws_kms_provider_stub.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..43c4dfcc --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/security/aws_kms_provider_stub.go @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +//go:build !kms_aws && !kms_all + +package security + +import ( + "fmt" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" +) + +func newAWSKMSProvider(_ config.KMSConfig) (CryptoProvider, error) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS KMS support not compiled: rebuild with -tags kms_aws") +} diff --git a/internal/security/aws_kms_provider_test.go b/internal/security/aws_kms_provider_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ade45fcd --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/security/aws_kms_provider_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +//go:build kms_aws || kms_all + +package security + +import ( + "errors" + "testing" + + "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/kms/types" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func TestAWSKMSProvider_ResolveKey(t *testing.T) { + p := &AWSKMSProvider{ + defaultKeyID: "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key-id", + } + + tests := []struct { + give string + want string + }{ + { + give: "local", + want: "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key-id", + }, + { + give: "default", + want: "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key-id", + }, + { + give: "", + want: "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key-id", + }, + { + give: "arn:aws:kms:us-west-2:123456789012:key/other-key", + want: "arn:aws:kms:us-west-2:123456789012:key/other-key", + }, + { + give: "alias/my-key", + want: "alias/my-key", + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + got := p.resolveKey(tt.give) + assert.Equal(t, tt.want, got) + }) + } +} + +func TestAWSKMSProvider_NewWithoutKeyID(t *testing.T) { + _, err := newAWSKMSProvider(config.KMSConfig{ + Region: "us-east-1", + KeyID: "", + }) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrKMSInvalidKey) +} + +func TestAWSKMSProvider_ClassifyError(t *testing.T) { + p := &AWSKMSProvider{defaultKeyID: "test-key"} + + tests := []struct { + give error + wantSent error + name string + }{ + { + name: "access denied", + give: &types.AccessDeniedException{Message: strPtr("access denied")}, + wantSent: ErrKMSAccessDenied, + }, + { + name: "key disabled", + give: &types.DisabledException{Message: strPtr("key is disabled")}, + wantSent: ErrKMSKeyDisabled, + }, + { + name: "key not found", + give: &types.NotFoundException{Message: strPtr("key not found")}, + wantSent: ErrKMSInvalidKey, + }, + { + name: "invalid key usage", + give: &types.InvalidKeyUsageException{Message: strPtr("invalid usage")}, + wantSent: ErrKMSInvalidKey, + }, + { + name: "invalid state", + give: &types.KMSInvalidStateException{Message: strPtr("invalid state")}, + wantSent: ErrKMSKeyDisabled, + }, + { + name: "throttling string match", + give: errors.New("ThrottlingException: rate exceeded"), + wantSent: ErrKMSThrottled, + }, + { + name: "unavailable string match", + give: errors.New("ServiceUnavailableException: service down"), + wantSent: ErrKMSUnavailable, + }, + { + name: "unknown error passthrough", + give: errors.New("some other error"), + wantSent: nil, + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { + got := p.classifyError("test-op", "test-key", tt.give) + require.Error(t, got) + + var kmsErr *KMSError + require.ErrorAs(t, got, &kmsErr) + assert.Equal(t, "aws", kmsErr.Provider) + assert.Equal(t, "test-op", kmsErr.Op) + assert.Equal(t, "test-key", kmsErr.KeyID) + + if tt.wantSent != nil { + assert.ErrorIs(t, got, tt.wantSent) + } + }) + } +} + +func TestAWSKMSProvider_Defaults(t *testing.T) { + // Verify that default maxRetries and timeout are applied. + // We cannot create a real provider without AWS credentials, + // but we can test that the struct fields are populated correctly + // by inspecting the AWSKMSProvider directly. + p := &AWSKMSProvider{ + defaultKeyID: "test-key", + maxRetries: 0, + timeout: 0, + } + // Zero values indicate no override; the constructor would set defaults. + assert.Equal(t, "test-key", p.defaultKeyID) +} + +func strPtr(s string) *string { + return &s +} diff --git a/internal/security/azure_kv_provider.go b/internal/security/azure_kv_provider.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..99292210 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/security/azure_kv_provider.go @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +//go:build kms_azure || kms_all + +package security + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/sha256" + "errors" + "fmt" + "net/http" + "time" + + "github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/azcore" + "github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/azidentity" + "github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/security/keyvault/azkeys" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/logging" +) + +var azureLogger = logging.SubsystemSugar("azure-kv") + +// AzureKVProvider implements CryptoProvider using Azure Key Vault. +type AzureKVProvider struct { + client *azkeys.Client + defaultKeyName string + keyVersion string + maxRetries int + timeout time.Duration +} + +var _ CryptoProvider = (*AzureKVProvider)(nil) + +func newAzureKVProvider(kmsConfig config.KMSConfig) (CryptoProvider, error) { + if kmsConfig.Azure.VaultURL == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("new Azure KV provider: vault URL is required") + } + if kmsConfig.KeyID == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("new Azure KV provider: %w", ErrKMSInvalidKey) + } + + cred, err := azidentity.NewDefaultAzureCredential(nil) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("new Azure credential: %w", err) + } + + client, err := azkeys.NewClient(kmsConfig.Azure.VaultURL, cred, nil) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("new Azure KV client: %w", err) + } + + maxRetries := kmsConfig.MaxRetries + if maxRetries <= 0 { + maxRetries = 3 + } + timeout := kmsConfig.TimeoutPerOperation + if timeout <= 0 { + timeout = 5 * time.Second + } + + azureLogger.Infow("Azure Key Vault provider initialized", + "vaultUrl", kmsConfig.Azure.VaultURL, + "keyId", kmsConfig.KeyID, + "maxRetries", maxRetries, + ) + + return &AzureKVProvider{ + client: client, + defaultKeyName: kmsConfig.KeyID, + keyVersion: kmsConfig.Azure.KeyVersion, + maxRetries: maxRetries, + timeout: timeout, + }, nil +} + +// Sign generates a signature using Azure Key Vault ES256. +func (p *AzureKVProvider) Sign(ctx context.Context, keyID string, payload []byte) ([]byte, error) { + resolved := p.resolveKey(keyID) + + // Compute SHA-256 digest for ES256 signing. + digest := sha256.Sum256(payload) + + var result []byte + err := withRetry(ctx, p.maxRetries, func() error { + opCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, p.timeout) + defer cancel() + + alg := azkeys.JSONWebKeySignatureAlgorithmES256 + resp, err := p.client.Sign(opCtx, resolved, p.keyVersion, azkeys.SignParameters{ + Algorithm: &alg, + Value: digest[:], + }, nil) + if err != nil { + return p.classifyError("sign", resolved, err) + } + result = resp.Result + return nil + }) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return result, nil +} + +// Encrypt encrypts plaintext using Azure Key Vault RSA-OAEP. +func (p *AzureKVProvider) Encrypt(ctx context.Context, keyID string, plaintext []byte) ([]byte, error) { + resolved := p.resolveKey(keyID) + + var result []byte + err := withRetry(ctx, p.maxRetries, func() error { + opCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, p.timeout) + defer cancel() + + alg := azkeys.JSONWebKeyEncryptionAlgorithmRSAOAEP + resp, err := p.client.Encrypt(opCtx, resolved, p.keyVersion, azkeys.KeyOperationParameters{ + Algorithm: &alg, + Value: plaintext, + }, nil) + if err != nil { + return p.classifyError("encrypt", resolved, err) + } + result = resp.Result + return nil + }) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return result, nil +} + +// Decrypt decrypts ciphertext using Azure Key Vault RSA-OAEP. +func (p *AzureKVProvider) Decrypt(ctx context.Context, keyID string, ciphertext []byte) ([]byte, error) { + resolved := p.resolveKey(keyID) + + var result []byte + err := withRetry(ctx, p.maxRetries, func() error { + opCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, p.timeout) + defer cancel() + + alg := azkeys.JSONWebKeyEncryptionAlgorithmRSAOAEP + resp, err := p.client.Decrypt(opCtx, resolved, p.keyVersion, azkeys.KeyOperationParameters{ + Algorithm: &alg, + Value: ciphertext, + }, nil) + if err != nil { + return p.classifyError("decrypt", resolved, err) + } + result = resp.Result + return nil + }) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return result, nil +} + +// resolveKey maps "local" and "default" aliases to the configured default key. +func (p *AzureKVProvider) resolveKey(keyID string) string { + if keyID == "local" || keyID == "default" || keyID == "" { + return p.defaultKeyName + } + return keyID +} + +// classifyError maps Azure Key Vault errors to sentinel errors wrapped in KMSError. +func (p *AzureKVProvider) classifyError(op, keyID string, err error) error { + kmsErr := &KMSError{ + Provider: "azure", + Op: op, + KeyID: keyID, + } + + var respErr *azcore.ResponseError + if errors.As(err, &respErr) { + switch respErr.StatusCode { + case http.StatusUnauthorized, http.StatusForbidden: + kmsErr.Err = fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrKMSAccessDenied, err) + case http.StatusTooManyRequests: + kmsErr.Err = fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrKMSThrottled, err) + case http.StatusServiceUnavailable: + kmsErr.Err = fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrKMSUnavailable, err) + default: + kmsErr.Err = err + } + } else { + kmsErr.Err = err + } + + return kmsErr +} diff --git a/internal/security/azure_kv_provider_stub.go b/internal/security/azure_kv_provider_stub.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..272b3825 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/security/azure_kv_provider_stub.go @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +//go:build !kms_azure && !kms_all + +package security + +import ( + "fmt" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" +) + +func newAzureKVProvider(_ config.KMSConfig) (CryptoProvider, error) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("azure Key Vault support not compiled: rebuild with -tags kms_azure") +} diff --git a/internal/security/azure_kv_provider_test.go b/internal/security/azure_kv_provider_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..480e4d06 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/security/azure_kv_provider_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +//go:build kms_azure || kms_all + +package security + +import ( + "testing" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func TestAzureKVProvider_ResolveKey(t *testing.T) { + p := &AzureKVProvider{ + defaultKeyName: "my-default-key", + } + + tests := []struct { + give string + want string + }{ + {give: "local", want: "my-default-key"}, + {give: "default", want: "my-default-key"}, + {give: "", want: "my-default-key"}, + {give: "custom-key", want: "custom-key"}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + got := p.resolveKey(tt.give) + assert.Equal(t, tt.want, got) + }) + } +} + +func TestAzureKVProvider_NewWithoutVaultURL(t *testing.T) { + cfg := config.KMSConfig{ + KeyID: "test-key", + Azure: config.AzureKVConfig{ + VaultURL: "", + }, + } + + _, err := newAzureKVProvider(cfg) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "vault URL is required") +} + +func TestAzureKVProvider_NewWithoutKeyID(t *testing.T) { + cfg := config.KMSConfig{ + KeyID: "", + Azure: config.AzureKVConfig{ + VaultURL: "https://myvault.vault.azure.net", + }, + } + + _, err := newAzureKVProvider(cfg) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrKMSInvalidKey) +} diff --git a/internal/security/errors.go b/internal/security/errors.go index 8d760bff..1afa6aa2 100644 --- a/internal/security/errors.go +++ b/internal/security/errors.go @@ -1,9 +1,42 @@ package security -import "errors" +import ( + "errors" + "fmt" +) var ( ErrKeyNotFound = errors.New("key not found") ErrNoEncryptionKeys = errors.New("no encryption keys available") ErrDecryptionFailed = errors.New("decryption failed") + + // KMS errors + ErrKMSUnavailable = errors.New("KMS service unavailable") + ErrKMSAccessDenied = errors.New("KMS access denied") + ErrKMSKeyDisabled = errors.New("KMS key is disabled") + ErrKMSThrottled = errors.New("KMS request throttled") + ErrKMSInvalidKey = errors.New("KMS invalid key") + ErrPKCS11Module = errors.New("PKCS#11 module error") + ErrPKCS11Session = errors.New("PKCS#11 session error") ) + +// KMSError wraps a KMS operation error with context. +type KMSError struct { + Provider string + Op string + KeyID string + Err error +} + +func (e *KMSError) Error() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("kms %s %s (key=%s): %v", e.Provider, e.Op, e.KeyID, e.Err) +} + +func (e *KMSError) Unwrap() error { + return e.Err +} + +// IsTransient reports whether err is a transient KMS error eligible for retry. +func IsTransient(err error) bool { + return errors.Is(err, ErrKMSUnavailable) || errors.Is(err, ErrKMSThrottled) +} diff --git a/internal/security/gcp_kms_provider.go b/internal/security/gcp_kms_provider.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a700b899 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/security/gcp_kms_provider.go @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +//go:build kms_gcp || kms_all + +package security + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/sha256" + "fmt" + "time" + + kmsapi "cloud.google.com/go/kms/apiv1" + "cloud.google.com/go/kms/apiv1/kmspb" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/logging" + "google.golang.org/api/option" + "google.golang.org/grpc/codes" + "google.golang.org/grpc/status" +) + +var gcpLogger = logging.SubsystemSugar("gcp-kms") + +// GCPKMSProvider implements CryptoProvider using Google Cloud KMS. +type GCPKMSProvider struct { + client *kmsapi.KeyManagementClient + defaultKeyID string + maxRetries int + timeout time.Duration +} + +var _ CryptoProvider = (*GCPKMSProvider)(nil) + +func newGCPKMSProvider(kmsConfig config.KMSConfig) (CryptoProvider, error) { + if kmsConfig.KeyID == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("new GCP KMS provider: %w", ErrKMSInvalidKey) + } + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second) + defer cancel() + + var opts []option.ClientOption + if kmsConfig.Endpoint != "" { + opts = append(opts, option.WithEndpoint(kmsConfig.Endpoint)) + } + + client, err := kmsapi.NewKeyManagementClient(ctx, opts...) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("create GCP KMS client: %w", err) + } + + maxRetries := kmsConfig.MaxRetries + if maxRetries <= 0 { + maxRetries = 3 + } + timeout := kmsConfig.TimeoutPerOperation + if timeout <= 0 { + timeout = 5 * time.Second + } + + gcpLogger.Infow("GCP KMS provider initialized", + "keyId", kmsConfig.KeyID, + "maxRetries", maxRetries, + ) + + return &GCPKMSProvider{ + client: client, + defaultKeyID: kmsConfig.KeyID, + maxRetries: maxRetries, + timeout: timeout, + }, nil +} + +// Sign generates a signature using GCP KMS asymmetric signing. +// The payload is SHA-256 hashed before signing. +func (p *GCPKMSProvider) Sign(ctx context.Context, keyID string, payload []byte) ([]byte, error) { + resolved := p.resolveKey(keyID) + + digest := sha256.Sum256(payload) + + var result []byte + err := withRetry(ctx, p.maxRetries, func() error { + opCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, p.timeout) + defer cancel() + + resp, err := p.client.AsymmetricSign(opCtx, &kmspb.AsymmetricSignRequest{ + Name: resolved, + Digest: &kmspb.Digest{ + Digest: &kmspb.Digest_Sha256{ + Sha256: digest[:], + }, + }, + }) + if err != nil { + return p.classifyError("sign", resolved, err) + } + result = resp.Signature + return nil + }) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return result, nil +} + +// Encrypt encrypts plaintext using GCP KMS symmetric encryption. +func (p *GCPKMSProvider) Encrypt(ctx context.Context, keyID string, plaintext []byte) ([]byte, error) { + resolved := p.resolveKey(keyID) + + var result []byte + err := withRetry(ctx, p.maxRetries, func() error { + opCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, p.timeout) + defer cancel() + + resp, err := p.client.Encrypt(opCtx, &kmspb.EncryptRequest{ + Name: resolved, + Plaintext: plaintext, + }) + if err != nil { + return p.classifyError("encrypt", resolved, err) + } + result = resp.Ciphertext + return nil + }) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return result, nil +} + +// Decrypt decrypts ciphertext using GCP KMS symmetric encryption. +func (p *GCPKMSProvider) Decrypt(ctx context.Context, keyID string, ciphertext []byte) ([]byte, error) { + resolved := p.resolveKey(keyID) + + var result []byte + err := withRetry(ctx, p.maxRetries, func() error { + opCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, p.timeout) + defer cancel() + + resp, err := p.client.Decrypt(opCtx, &kmspb.DecryptRequest{ + Name: resolved, + Ciphertext: ciphertext, + }) + if err != nil { + return p.classifyError("decrypt", resolved, err) + } + result = resp.Plaintext + return nil + }) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return result, nil +} + +// resolveKey maps "local" and "default" aliases to the configured default key. +func (p *GCPKMSProvider) resolveKey(keyID string) string { + if keyID == "local" || keyID == "default" || keyID == "" { + return p.defaultKeyID + } + return keyID +} + +// classifyError maps gRPC status codes to sentinel errors wrapped in KMSError. +func (p *GCPKMSProvider) classifyError(op, keyID string, err error) error { + kmsErr := &KMSError{ + Provider: "gcp", + Op: op, + KeyID: keyID, + } + + st, ok := status.FromError(err) + if !ok { + kmsErr.Err = err + return kmsErr + } + + switch st.Code() { + case codes.PermissionDenied, codes.Unauthenticated: + kmsErr.Err = fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrKMSAccessDenied, st.Message()) + case codes.NotFound: + kmsErr.Err = fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrKMSInvalidKey, st.Message()) + case codes.FailedPrecondition: + kmsErr.Err = fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrKMSKeyDisabled, st.Message()) + case codes.ResourceExhausted: + kmsErr.Err = fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrKMSThrottled, st.Message()) + case codes.Unavailable, codes.Internal: + kmsErr.Err = fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrKMSUnavailable, st.Message()) + case codes.InvalidArgument: + kmsErr.Err = fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrKMSInvalidKey, st.Message()) + default: + kmsErr.Err = err + } + + return kmsErr +} diff --git a/internal/security/gcp_kms_provider_stub.go b/internal/security/gcp_kms_provider_stub.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3179cee1 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/security/gcp_kms_provider_stub.go @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +//go:build !kms_gcp && !kms_all + +package security + +import ( + "fmt" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" +) + +func newGCPKMSProvider(_ config.KMSConfig) (CryptoProvider, error) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("GCP KMS support not compiled: rebuild with -tags kms_gcp") +} diff --git a/internal/security/gcp_kms_provider_test.go b/internal/security/gcp_kms_provider_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b2bf0cb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/security/gcp_kms_provider_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +//go:build kms_gcp || kms_all + +package security + +import ( + "testing" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + "google.golang.org/grpc/codes" + "google.golang.org/grpc/status" +) + +func TestGCPKMSProvider_ResolveKey(t *testing.T) { + p := &GCPKMSProvider{ + defaultKeyID: "projects/my-project/locations/us-central1/keyRings/my-ring/cryptoKeys/my-key", + } + + tests := []struct { + give string + want string + }{ + { + give: "local", + want: "projects/my-project/locations/us-central1/keyRings/my-ring/cryptoKeys/my-key", + }, + { + give: "default", + want: "projects/my-project/locations/us-central1/keyRings/my-ring/cryptoKeys/my-key", + }, + { + give: "", + want: "projects/my-project/locations/us-central1/keyRings/my-ring/cryptoKeys/my-key", + }, + { + give: "projects/other/locations/global/keyRings/ring2/cryptoKeys/key2", + want: "projects/other/locations/global/keyRings/ring2/cryptoKeys/key2", + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + got := p.resolveKey(tt.give) + assert.Equal(t, tt.want, got) + }) + } +} + +func TestGCPKMSProvider_NewWithoutKeyID(t *testing.T) { + _, err := newGCPKMSProvider(config.KMSConfig{ + KeyID: "", + }) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrKMSInvalidKey) +} + +func TestGCPKMSProvider_ClassifyError(t *testing.T) { + p := &GCPKMSProvider{defaultKeyID: "test-key"} + + tests := []struct { + name string + give error + wantSent error + }{ + { + name: "permission denied", + give: status.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "caller lacks permission"), + wantSent: ErrKMSAccessDenied, + }, + { + name: "unauthenticated", + give: status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "invalid credentials"), + wantSent: ErrKMSAccessDenied, + }, + { + name: "not found", + give: status.Error(codes.NotFound, "key not found"), + wantSent: ErrKMSInvalidKey, + }, + { + name: "failed precondition (disabled)", + give: status.Error(codes.FailedPrecondition, "key is disabled"), + wantSent: ErrKMSKeyDisabled, + }, + { + name: "resource exhausted (throttled)", + give: status.Error(codes.ResourceExhausted, "quota exceeded"), + wantSent: ErrKMSThrottled, + }, + { + name: "unavailable", + give: status.Error(codes.Unavailable, "service unavailable"), + wantSent: ErrKMSUnavailable, + }, + { + name: "internal error", + give: status.Error(codes.Internal, "internal error"), + wantSent: ErrKMSUnavailable, + }, + { + name: "invalid argument", + give: status.Error(codes.InvalidArgument, "bad request"), + wantSent: ErrKMSInvalidKey, + }, + { + name: "unknown code passthrough", + give: status.Error(codes.Canceled, "operation canceled"), + wantSent: nil, + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { + got := p.classifyError("test-op", "test-key", tt.give) + require.Error(t, got) + + var kmsErr *KMSError + require.ErrorAs(t, got, &kmsErr) + assert.Equal(t, "gcp", kmsErr.Provider) + assert.Equal(t, "test-op", kmsErr.Op) + assert.Equal(t, "test-key", kmsErr.KeyID) + + if tt.wantSent != nil { + assert.ErrorIs(t, got, tt.wantSent) + } + }) + } +} + +func TestGCPKMSProvider_ClassifyNonGRPCError(t *testing.T) { + p := &GCPKMSProvider{defaultKeyID: "test-key"} + + // Non-gRPC errors should be wrapped as-is. + plainErr := assert.AnError + got := p.classifyError("encrypt", "test-key", plainErr) + + var kmsErr *KMSError + require.ErrorAs(t, got, &kmsErr) + assert.Equal(t, "gcp", kmsErr.Provider) + assert.Equal(t, plainErr, kmsErr.Err) +} diff --git a/internal/security/kms_all.go b/internal/security/kms_all.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..32906e0c --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/security/kms_all.go @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +//go:build kms_all + +package security diff --git a/internal/security/kms_checker.go b/internal/security/kms_checker.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..208b3eea --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/security/kms_checker.go @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +package security + +import ( + "context" + "sync" + "time" +) + +// KMSHealthChecker implements ConnectionChecker for KMS providers. +// It caches the connection status with a configurable probe interval. +type KMSHealthChecker struct { + mu sync.RWMutex + provider CryptoProvider + probeInterval time.Duration + lastCheck time.Time + lastResult bool + testKeyID string +} + +// NewKMSHealthChecker creates a health checker that probes the KMS provider +// by attempting a small encrypt/decrypt roundtrip on probeInterval. +func NewKMSHealthChecker(provider CryptoProvider, testKeyID string, probeInterval time.Duration) *KMSHealthChecker { + if probeInterval <= 0 { + probeInterval = 30 * time.Second + } + return &KMSHealthChecker{ + provider: provider, + probeInterval: probeInterval, + testKeyID: testKeyID, + } +} + +// IsConnected implements ConnectionChecker. Returns the cached result if fresh, +// otherwise performs a synchronous probe. +func (h *KMSHealthChecker) IsConnected() bool { + h.mu.RLock() + if !h.lastCheck.IsZero() && time.Since(h.lastCheck) < h.probeInterval { + result := h.lastResult + h.mu.RUnlock() + return result + } + h.mu.RUnlock() + + h.mu.Lock() + defer h.mu.Unlock() + + // Double-check after acquiring write lock. + if !h.lastCheck.IsZero() && time.Since(h.lastCheck) < h.probeInterval { + return h.lastResult + } + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second) + defer cancel() + + testData := []byte("kms-health-probe") + encrypted, err := h.provider.Encrypt(ctx, h.testKeyID, testData) + if err != nil { + h.lastResult = false + h.lastCheck = time.Now() + return false + } + + _, err = h.provider.Decrypt(ctx, h.testKeyID, encrypted) + h.lastResult = err == nil + h.lastCheck = time.Now() + return h.lastResult +} diff --git a/internal/security/kms_checker_test.go b/internal/security/kms_checker_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4c32f935 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/security/kms_checker_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +package security + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +// mockCryptoProvider implements CryptoProvider for testing the health checker. +type mockHealthCryptoProvider struct { + encryptErr error + decryptErr error +} + +func (m *mockHealthCryptoProvider) Encrypt(_ context.Context, _ string, data []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if m.encryptErr != nil { + return nil, m.encryptErr + } + return data, nil +} + +func (m *mockHealthCryptoProvider) Decrypt(_ context.Context, _ string, data []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if m.decryptErr != nil { + return nil, m.decryptErr + } + return data, nil +} + +func (m *mockHealthCryptoProvider) Sign(_ context.Context, _ string, _ []byte) ([]byte, error) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("not implemented") +} + +func TestNewKMSHealthChecker_DefaultProbeInterval(t *testing.T) { + checker := NewKMSHealthChecker(&mockHealthCryptoProvider{}, "test-key", 0) + require.NotNil(t, checker) + assert.Equal(t, 30*time.Second, checker.probeInterval) +} + +func TestNewKMSHealthChecker_CustomProbeInterval(t *testing.T) { + checker := NewKMSHealthChecker(&mockHealthCryptoProvider{}, "test-key", 10*time.Second) + assert.Equal(t, 10*time.Second, checker.probeInterval) +} + +func TestKMSHealthChecker_Healthy(t *testing.T) { + provider := &mockHealthCryptoProvider{} + checker := NewKMSHealthChecker(provider, "test-key", time.Minute) + + assert.True(t, checker.IsConnected()) +} + +func TestKMSHealthChecker_Unhealthy_EncryptFails(t *testing.T) { + provider := &mockHealthCryptoProvider{encryptErr: fmt.Errorf("kms unreachable")} + checker := NewKMSHealthChecker(provider, "test-key", time.Minute) + + assert.False(t, checker.IsConnected()) +} + +func TestKMSHealthChecker_Unhealthy_DecryptFails(t *testing.T) { + provider := &mockHealthCryptoProvider{decryptErr: fmt.Errorf("decrypt failed")} + checker := NewKMSHealthChecker(provider, "test-key", time.Minute) + + assert.False(t, checker.IsConnected()) +} + +func TestKMSHealthChecker_CacheFresh(t *testing.T) { + callCount := 0 + provider := &countingCryptoProvider{count: &callCount} + checker := NewKMSHealthChecker(provider, "test-key", time.Minute) + + // First call triggers probe. + result1 := checker.IsConnected() + assert.True(t, result1) + assert.Equal(t, 1, callCount) + + // Second call within probe interval returns cached result. + result2 := checker.IsConnected() + assert.True(t, result2) + assert.Equal(t, 1, callCount, "should not re-probe within interval") +} + +func TestKMSHealthChecker_CacheExpired(t *testing.T) { + callCount := 0 + provider := &countingCryptoProvider{count: &callCount} + checker := NewKMSHealthChecker(provider, "test-key", 10*time.Millisecond) + + checker.IsConnected() + assert.Equal(t, 1, callCount) + + // Wait for cache to expire. + time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond) + + checker.IsConnected() + assert.Equal(t, 2, callCount, "should re-probe after interval") +} + +// countingCryptoProvider counts encrypt calls for cache testing. +type countingCryptoProvider struct { + count *int +} + +func (c *countingCryptoProvider) Encrypt(_ context.Context, _ string, data []byte) ([]byte, error) { + *c.count++ + return data, nil +} + +func (c *countingCryptoProvider) Decrypt(_ context.Context, _ string, data []byte) ([]byte, error) { + return data, nil +} + +func (c *countingCryptoProvider) Sign(_ context.Context, _ string, _ []byte) ([]byte, error) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("not implemented") +} diff --git a/internal/security/kms_factory.go b/internal/security/kms_factory.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..49dfa30e --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/security/kms_factory.go @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +package security + +import ( + "fmt" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" +) + +// KMSProviderName identifies a supported KMS backend. +type KMSProviderName string + +const ( + KMSProviderAWS KMSProviderName = "aws-kms" + KMSProviderGCP KMSProviderName = "gcp-kms" + KMSProviderAzure KMSProviderName = "azure-kv" + KMSProviderPKCS11 KMSProviderName = "pkcs11" +) + +// Valid reports whether n is a recognised KMS provider name. +func (n KMSProviderName) Valid() bool { + switch n { + case KMSProviderAWS, KMSProviderGCP, KMSProviderAzure, KMSProviderPKCS11: + return true + } + return false +} + +// NewKMSProvider creates a CryptoProvider for the named KMS backend. +// Supported providers: "aws-kms", "gcp-kms", "azure-kv", "pkcs11". +// Build tags control which providers are compiled in; uncompiled providers +// return a descriptive error. +func NewKMSProvider(providerName KMSProviderName, kmsConfig config.KMSConfig) (CryptoProvider, error) { + switch providerName { + case KMSProviderAWS: + return newAWSKMSProvider(kmsConfig) + case KMSProviderGCP: + return newGCPKMSProvider(kmsConfig) + case KMSProviderAzure: + return newAzureKVProvider(kmsConfig) + case KMSProviderPKCS11: + return newPKCS11Provider(kmsConfig) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown KMS provider: %q (supported: aws-kms, gcp-kms, azure-kv, pkcs11)", providerName) + } +} diff --git a/internal/security/kms_factory_test.go b/internal/security/kms_factory_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9532a5ad --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/security/kms_factory_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +package security + +import ( + "testing" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" +) + +func TestKMSProviderName_Valid(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + name KMSProviderName + valid bool + }{ + {KMSProviderAWS, true}, + {KMSProviderGCP, true}, + {KMSProviderAzure, true}, + {KMSProviderPKCS11, true}, + {"unknown", false}, + {"", false}, + {"local", false}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(string(tt.name), func(t *testing.T) { + assert.Equal(t, tt.valid, tt.name.Valid()) + }) + } +} + +func TestKMSProviderName_Constants(t *testing.T) { + assert.Equal(t, KMSProviderName("aws-kms"), KMSProviderAWS) + assert.Equal(t, KMSProviderName("gcp-kms"), KMSProviderGCP) + assert.Equal(t, KMSProviderName("azure-kv"), KMSProviderAzure) + assert.Equal(t, KMSProviderName("pkcs11"), KMSProviderPKCS11) +} + +func TestNewKMSProvider_UnknownProvider(t *testing.T) { + provider, err := NewKMSProvider("unknown-provider", config.KMSConfig{}) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Nil(t, provider) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "unknown KMS provider") + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "unknown-provider") +} diff --git a/internal/security/kms_retry.go b/internal/security/kms_retry.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..58f6ec82 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/security/kms_retry.go @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +package security + +import ( + "context" + "time" +) + +// withRetry retries op with exponential backoff for transient KMS errors. +// Base delay is 100ms, doubled each attempt. Only errors where IsTransient +// returns true are retried. +func withRetry(ctx context.Context, maxRetries int, op func() error) error { + var lastErr error + for attempt := 0; attempt <= maxRetries; attempt++ { + lastErr = op() + if lastErr == nil { + return nil + } + if !IsTransient(lastErr) { + return lastErr + } + if attempt < maxRetries { + delay := 100 * time.Millisecond * (1 << uint(attempt)) + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + return ctx.Err() + case <-time.After(delay): + } + } + } + return lastErr +} diff --git a/internal/security/kms_retry_test.go b/internal/security/kms_retry_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5e5fdd50 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/security/kms_retry_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +package security + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func TestWithRetry_ImmediateSuccess(t *testing.T) { + calls := 0 + err := withRetry(context.Background(), 3, func() error { + calls++ + return nil + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, 1, calls) +} + +func TestWithRetry_TransientThenSuccess(t *testing.T) { + calls := 0 + err := withRetry(context.Background(), 3, func() error { + calls++ + if calls < 3 { + return ErrKMSThrottled + } + return nil + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, 3, calls) +} + +func TestWithRetry_NonTransientError(t *testing.T) { + calls := 0 + err := withRetry(context.Background(), 3, func() error { + calls++ + return ErrKMSAccessDenied + }) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.True(t, errors.Is(err, ErrKMSAccessDenied)) + assert.Equal(t, 1, calls, "non-transient errors should not be retried") +} + +func TestWithRetry_ExhaustsRetries(t *testing.T) { + calls := 0 + err := withRetry(context.Background(), 2, func() error { + calls++ + return ErrKMSUnavailable + }) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.True(t, errors.Is(err, ErrKMSUnavailable)) + assert.Equal(t, 3, calls, "should attempt 1 + 2 retries") +} + +func TestWithRetry_ContextCancelled(t *testing.T) { + ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background()) + cancel() + + calls := 0 + err := withRetry(ctx, 5, func() error { + calls++ + return ErrKMSThrottled + }) + // First call happens, then context cancel prevents retries. + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.LessOrEqual(t, calls, 2) +} + +func TestIsTransient(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give error + want bool + }{ + {ErrKMSUnavailable, true}, + {ErrKMSThrottled, true}, + {ErrKMSAccessDenied, false}, + {ErrKMSKeyDisabled, false}, + {ErrKMSInvalidKey, false}, + {errors.New("random error"), false}, + {&KMSError{Provider: "aws", Op: "encrypt", KeyID: "k1", Err: ErrKMSThrottled}, true}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give.Error(), func(t *testing.T) { + assert.Equal(t, tt.want, IsTransient(tt.give)) + }) + } +} diff --git a/internal/passphrase/acquire.go b/internal/security/passphrase/acquire.go similarity index 66% rename from internal/passphrase/acquire.go rename to internal/security/passphrase/acquire.go index a3c14eef..60a1a168 100644 --- a/internal/passphrase/acquire.go +++ b/internal/security/passphrase/acquire.go @@ -1,12 +1,14 @@ package passphrase import ( + "errors" "fmt" "os" "path/filepath" "syscall" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/cli/prompt" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/keyring" "golang.org/x/term" ) @@ -17,12 +19,14 @@ const ( SourceKeyfile Source = iota // from ~/.lango/keyfile SourceInteractive // from interactive terminal prompt SourceStdin // from piped stdin + SourceKeyring // from hardware keyring (Touch ID / TPM) ) // Options configures passphrase acquisition behavior. type Options struct { - KeyfilePath string // default: ~/.lango/keyfile - AllowCreation bool // if true, prompt for confirmation on new passphrase + KeyfilePath string // default: ~/.lango/keyfile + AllowCreation bool // if true, prompt for confirmation on new passphrase + KeyringProvider keyring.Provider // if non-nil, try secure keyring first (biometric/TPM) } // defaultKeyfilePath returns the default keyfile path (~/.lango/keyfile). @@ -35,7 +39,7 @@ func defaultKeyfilePath() (string, error) { } // Acquire obtains a passphrase from the highest-priority available source. -// Priority: keyfile -> interactive terminal -> stdin pipe -> error +// Priority: keyring -> keyfile -> interactive terminal -> stdin pipe -> error func Acquire(opts Options) (string, Source, error) { keyfilePath := opts.KeyfilePath if keyfilePath == "" { @@ -46,12 +50,24 @@ func Acquire(opts Options) (string, Source, error) { } } - // 1. Try keyfile + // 1. Try secure keyring (highest priority — biometric/TPM). + if opts.KeyringProvider != nil { + pass, err := opts.KeyringProvider.Get(keyring.Service, keyring.KeyMasterPassphrase) + if err == nil && pass != "" { + return pass, SourceKeyring, nil + } + // Fall through on ErrNotFound or any other keyring error. + if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, keyring.ErrNotFound) { + fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: keyring read failed: %v\n", err) + } + } + + // 2. Try keyfile. if pass, err := ReadKeyfile(keyfilePath); err == nil { return pass, SourceKeyfile, nil } - // 2. Try interactive terminal + // 3. Try interactive terminal. if term.IsTerminal(int(syscall.Stdin)) { pass, err := acquireInteractive(opts.AllowCreation) if err != nil { @@ -60,7 +76,7 @@ func Acquire(opts Options) (string, Source, error) { return pass, SourceInteractive, nil } - // 3. Try stdin pipe + // 4. Try stdin pipe. pass, err := ReadStdinPipe() if err != nil { return "", 0, fmt.Errorf("stdin passphrase: %w", err) diff --git a/internal/passphrase/acquire_test.go b/internal/security/passphrase/acquire_test.go similarity index 100% rename from internal/passphrase/acquire_test.go rename to internal/security/passphrase/acquire_test.go diff --git a/internal/passphrase/keyfile.go b/internal/security/passphrase/keyfile.go similarity index 100% rename from internal/passphrase/keyfile.go rename to internal/security/passphrase/keyfile.go diff --git a/internal/passphrase/keyfile_test.go b/internal/security/passphrase/keyfile_test.go similarity index 100% rename from internal/passphrase/keyfile_test.go rename to internal/security/passphrase/keyfile_test.go diff --git a/internal/passphrase/stdin.go b/internal/security/passphrase/stdin.go similarity index 100% rename from internal/passphrase/stdin.go rename to internal/security/passphrase/stdin.go diff --git a/internal/passphrase/stdin_test.go b/internal/security/passphrase/stdin_test.go similarity index 100% rename from internal/passphrase/stdin_test.go rename to internal/security/passphrase/stdin_test.go diff --git a/internal/security/pkcs11_provider.go b/internal/security/pkcs11_provider.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d1c233d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/security/pkcs11_provider.go @@ -0,0 +1,369 @@ +//go:build kms_pkcs11 || kms_all + +package security + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/rand" + "fmt" + "io" + "os" + "sync" + "time" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/logging" + "github.com/miekg/pkcs11" +) + +const ( + pkcs11GCMIVSize = 12 + pkcs11GCMTagBits = 128 +) + +var pkcs11Logger = logging.SubsystemSugar("pkcs11") + +// PKCS11Provider implements CryptoProvider using a PKCS#11 HSM. +type PKCS11Provider struct { + mu sync.Mutex + ctx *pkcs11.Ctx + session pkcs11.SessionHandle + keyMap map[string]pkcs11.ObjectHandle + config config.PKCS11Config + maxRetries int + timeout time.Duration +} + +var _ CryptoProvider = (*PKCS11Provider)(nil) + +func newPKCS11Provider(kmsConfig config.KMSConfig) (CryptoProvider, error) { + if kmsConfig.PKCS11.ModulePath == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("new PKCS#11 provider: module path is required") + } + + p11ctx := pkcs11.New(kmsConfig.PKCS11.ModulePath) + if p11ctx == nil { + return nil, &KMSError{ + Provider: "pkcs11", + Op: "init", + KeyID: "", + Err: fmt.Errorf("%w: load module %s", ErrPKCS11Module, kmsConfig.PKCS11.ModulePath), + } + } + + if err := p11ctx.Initialize(); err != nil { + p11ctx.Destroy() + return nil, &KMSError{ + Provider: "pkcs11", + Op: "init", + KeyID: "", + Err: fmt.Errorf("%w: initialize: %v", ErrPKCS11Module, err), + } + } + + session, err := p11ctx.OpenSession(uint(kmsConfig.PKCS11.SlotID), pkcs11.CKF_SERIAL_SESSION|pkcs11.CKF_RW_SESSION) + if err != nil { + p11ctx.Finalize() + p11ctx.Destroy() + return nil, &KMSError{ + Provider: "pkcs11", + Op: "open-session", + KeyID: "", + Err: fmt.Errorf("%w: slot %d: %v", ErrPKCS11Session, kmsConfig.PKCS11.SlotID, err), + } + } + + // PIN: environment variable takes priority over config. + pin := os.Getenv("LANGO_PKCS11_PIN") + if pin == "" { + pin = kmsConfig.PKCS11.Pin + } + + if pin != "" { + if err := p11ctx.Login(session, pkcs11.CKU_USER, pin); err != nil { + p11ctx.CloseSession(session) + p11ctx.Finalize() + p11ctx.Destroy() + return nil, &KMSError{ + Provider: "pkcs11", + Op: "login", + KeyID: "", + Err: fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrPKCS11Session, err), + } + } + } + + maxRetries := kmsConfig.MaxRetries + if maxRetries <= 0 { + maxRetries = 3 + } + timeout := kmsConfig.TimeoutPerOperation + if timeout <= 0 { + timeout = 5 * time.Second + } + + provider := &PKCS11Provider{ + ctx: p11ctx, + session: session, + keyMap: make(map[string]pkcs11.ObjectHandle), + config: kmsConfig.PKCS11, + maxRetries: maxRetries, + timeout: timeout, + } + + // Discover key objects. + if err := provider.findKeys(); err != nil { + provider.Close() + return nil, err + } + + pkcs11Logger.Infow("PKCS#11 provider initialized", + "module", kmsConfig.PKCS11.ModulePath, + "slot", kmsConfig.PKCS11.SlotID, + "keys", len(provider.keyMap), + ) + + return provider, nil +} + +// findKeys enumerates key objects in the session and populates keyMap. +func (p *PKCS11Provider) findKeys() error { + template := []*pkcs11.Attribute{ + pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_CLASS, pkcs11.CKO_SECRET_KEY), + } + + if err := p.ctx.FindObjectsInit(p.session, template); err != nil { + return &KMSError{ + Provider: "pkcs11", + Op: "find-keys-init", + KeyID: "", + Err: fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrPKCS11Session, err), + } + } + + objs, _, err := p.ctx.FindObjects(p.session, 100) + if err != nil { + p.ctx.FindObjectsFinal(p.session) + return &KMSError{ + Provider: "pkcs11", + Op: "find-keys", + KeyID: "", + Err: fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrPKCS11Session, err), + } + } + + if err := p.ctx.FindObjectsFinal(p.session); err != nil { + return &KMSError{ + Provider: "pkcs11", + Op: "find-keys-final", + KeyID: "", + Err: fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrPKCS11Session, err), + } + } + + // Also search for private keys (for signing). + templatePriv := []*pkcs11.Attribute{ + pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_CLASS, pkcs11.CKO_PRIVATE_KEY), + } + + if err := p.ctx.FindObjectsInit(p.session, templatePriv); err == nil { + privObjs, _, err := p.ctx.FindObjects(p.session, 100) + if err == nil { + objs = append(objs, privObjs...) + } + p.ctx.FindObjectsFinal(p.session) + } + + for _, obj := range objs { + attrs, err := p.ctx.GetAttributeValue(p.session, obj, []*pkcs11.Attribute{ + pkcs11.NewAttribute(pkcs11.CKA_LABEL, nil), + }) + if err != nil { + continue + } + for _, a := range attrs { + if a.Type == pkcs11.CKA_LABEL && len(a.Value) > 0 { + label := string(a.Value) + p.keyMap[label] = obj + } + } + } + + return nil +} + +// Sign generates a signature using PKCS#11 ECDSA. +func (p *PKCS11Provider) Sign(ctx context.Context, keyID string, payload []byte) ([]byte, error) { + p.mu.Lock() + defer p.mu.Unlock() + + handle, err := p.resolveKey(keyID) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var result []byte + retryErr := withRetry(ctx, p.maxRetries, func() error { + mechanism := []*pkcs11.Mechanism{pkcs11.NewMechanism(pkcs11.CKM_ECDSA, nil)} + if err := p.ctx.SignInit(p.session, mechanism, handle); err != nil { + return &KMSError{ + Provider: "pkcs11", + Op: "sign-init", + KeyID: keyID, + Err: fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrPKCS11Session, err), + } + } + + sig, err := p.ctx.Sign(p.session, payload) + if err != nil { + return &KMSError{ + Provider: "pkcs11", + Op: "sign", + KeyID: keyID, + Err: fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrPKCS11Session, err), + } + } + result = sig + return nil + }) + if retryErr != nil { + return nil, retryErr + } + return result, nil +} + +// Encrypt encrypts plaintext using PKCS#11 AES-GCM. +// The IV is randomly generated and prepended to the ciphertext. +func (p *PKCS11Provider) Encrypt(ctx context.Context, keyID string, plaintext []byte) ([]byte, error) { + p.mu.Lock() + defer p.mu.Unlock() + + handle, err := p.resolveKey(keyID) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Generate random IV. + iv := make([]byte, pkcs11GCMIVSize) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, iv); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate IV: %w", err) + } + + var result []byte + retryErr := withRetry(ctx, p.maxRetries, func() error { + params := pkcs11.NewGCMParams(iv, nil, pkcs11GCMTagBits) + mechanism := []*pkcs11.Mechanism{pkcs11.NewMechanism(pkcs11.CKM_AES_GCM, params)} + if err := p.ctx.EncryptInit(p.session, mechanism, handle); err != nil { + return &KMSError{ + Provider: "pkcs11", + Op: "encrypt-init", + KeyID: keyID, + Err: fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrPKCS11Session, err), + } + } + + ciphertext, err := p.ctx.Encrypt(p.session, plaintext) + if err != nil { + return &KMSError{ + Provider: "pkcs11", + Op: "encrypt", + KeyID: keyID, + Err: fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrPKCS11Session, err), + } + } + // Prepend IV to ciphertext. + result = make([]byte, pkcs11GCMIVSize+len(ciphertext)) + copy(result, iv) + copy(result[pkcs11GCMIVSize:], ciphertext) + return nil + }) + if retryErr != nil { + return nil, retryErr + } + return result, nil +} + +// Decrypt decrypts ciphertext using PKCS#11 AES-GCM. +// The IV is extracted from the first 12 bytes of the ciphertext. +func (p *PKCS11Provider) Decrypt(ctx context.Context, keyID string, ciphertext []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if len(ciphertext) < pkcs11GCMIVSize { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ciphertext too short") + } + + p.mu.Lock() + defer p.mu.Unlock() + + handle, err := p.resolveKey(keyID) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + iv := ciphertext[:pkcs11GCMIVSize] + encData := ciphertext[pkcs11GCMIVSize:] + + var result []byte + retryErr := withRetry(ctx, p.maxRetries, func() error { + params := pkcs11.NewGCMParams(iv, nil, pkcs11GCMTagBits) + mechanism := []*pkcs11.Mechanism{pkcs11.NewMechanism(pkcs11.CKM_AES_GCM, params)} + if err := p.ctx.DecryptInit(p.session, mechanism, handle); err != nil { + return &KMSError{ + Provider: "pkcs11", + Op: "decrypt-init", + KeyID: keyID, + Err: fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrPKCS11Session, err), + } + } + + plaintext, err := p.ctx.Decrypt(p.session, encData) + if err != nil { + return &KMSError{ + Provider: "pkcs11", + Op: "decrypt", + KeyID: keyID, + Err: fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrPKCS11Session, err), + } + } + result = plaintext + return nil + }) + if retryErr != nil { + return nil, retryErr + } + return result, nil +} + +// resolveKey looks up the key handle by label, falling back to the default key label. +func (p *PKCS11Provider) resolveKey(keyID string) (pkcs11.ObjectHandle, error) { + resolved := keyID + if resolved == "local" || resolved == "default" || resolved == "" { + resolved = p.config.KeyLabel + } + + handle, ok := p.keyMap[resolved] + if !ok { + return 0, &KMSError{ + Provider: "pkcs11", + Op: "resolve-key", + KeyID: resolved, + Err: ErrKMSInvalidKey, + } + } + return handle, nil +} + +// Close releases PKCS#11 resources. +func (p *PKCS11Provider) Close() error { + p.mu.Lock() + defer p.mu.Unlock() + + if p.ctx == nil { + return nil + } + + p.ctx.Logout(p.session) + p.ctx.CloseSession(p.session) + p.ctx.Finalize() + p.ctx.Destroy() + p.ctx = nil + return nil +} diff --git a/internal/security/pkcs11_provider_stub.go b/internal/security/pkcs11_provider_stub.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a7c04054 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/security/pkcs11_provider_stub.go @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +//go:build !kms_pkcs11 && !kms_all + +package security + +import ( + "fmt" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" +) + +func newPKCS11Provider(_ config.KMSConfig) (CryptoProvider, error) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("PKCS#11 support not compiled: rebuild with -tags kms_pkcs11") +} diff --git a/internal/security/pkcs11_provider_test.go b/internal/security/pkcs11_provider_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0a01331c --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/security/pkcs11_provider_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +//go:build kms_pkcs11 || kms_all + +package security + +import ( + "testing" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func TestPKCS11Provider_NewWithoutModulePath(t *testing.T) { + cfg := config.KMSConfig{ + PKCS11: config.PKCS11Config{ + ModulePath: "", + }, + } + + _, err := newPKCS11Provider(cfg) + require.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "module path is required") +} + +func TestPKCS11Provider_PinFromEnv(t *testing.T) { + // Verify that LANGO_PKCS11_PIN env var is read (we can't fully test + // PKCS#11 without a real module, but we can verify the env logic). + t.Setenv("LANGO_PKCS11_PIN", "test-pin-from-env") + + cfg := config.KMSConfig{ + PKCS11: config.PKCS11Config{ + ModulePath: "/nonexistent/module.so", + Pin: "config-pin", + }, + } + + // This will fail at pkcs11.New since the module doesn't exist, + // but we verify that the function reads the env var by checking + // it doesn't fail on PIN validation. + _, err := newPKCS11Provider(cfg) + require.Error(t, err) + // Should fail at module loading, not at PIN stage. + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "pkcs11") +} diff --git a/internal/session/ent_store.go b/internal/session/ent_store.go index 59ea772c..ac5ff038 100644 --- a/internal/session/ent_store.go +++ b/internal/session/ent_store.go @@ -20,13 +20,10 @@ import ( "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/message" entschema "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/schema" entsession "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ent/session" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/logging" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/types" - _ "github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3" // Use cgo driver for SQLCipher support + _ "github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3" ) -var logger = logging.SubsystemSugar("session") - // StoreOption defines the functional option pattern for EntStore type StoreOption func(*EntStore) @@ -241,7 +238,7 @@ func (s *EntStore) Get(key string) (*Session, error) { // Check TTL if s.ttl > 0 && time.Since(entSession.UpdatedAt) > s.ttl { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("session expired: %s", key) + return nil, fmt.Errorf("get session %q: %w", key, ErrSessionExpired) } return s.entToSession(entSession), nil @@ -670,11 +667,11 @@ func (s *EntStore) MigrateSecrets(ctx context.Context, reencryptFn func([]byte) } defer func() { if r := recover(); r != nil { - tx.Rollback() + _ = tx.Rollback() panic(r) } if err != nil { - tx.Rollback() + _ = tx.Rollback() } }() diff --git a/internal/session/errors.go b/internal/session/errors.go index 09837440..8a0ef9f7 100644 --- a/internal/session/errors.go +++ b/internal/session/errors.go @@ -4,5 +4,6 @@ import "errors" var ( ErrSessionNotFound = errors.New("session not found") + ErrSessionExpired = errors.New("session expired") ErrDuplicateSession = errors.New("duplicate session") ) diff --git a/internal/session/store_test.go b/internal/session/store_test.go index 335d69ab..10bb5c5f 100644 --- a/internal/session/store_test.go +++ b/internal/session/store_test.go @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ package session import ( + "errors" "os" "testing" "time" @@ -194,19 +195,58 @@ func TestEntStore_MaxHistoryTurns(t *testing.T) { } func TestEntStore_TTL(t *testing.T) { - store := newTestEntStore(t, WithTTL(1*time.Millisecond)) + store := newTestEntStore(t, WithTTL(50*time.Millisecond)) - session := &Session{Key: "sess-ttl"} - if err := store.Create(session); err != nil { + sess := &Session{Key: "sess-ttl"} + if err := store.Create(sess); err != nil { t.Fatalf("Create: %v", err) } - time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond) + time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond) _, err := store.Get("sess-ttl") if err == nil { t.Fatal("expected session expired error") } + if !errors.Is(err, ErrSessionExpired) { + t.Errorf("expected ErrSessionExpired, got: %v", err) + } +} + +func TestEntStore_TTL_DeleteAndRecreate(t *testing.T) { + store := newTestEntStore(t, WithTTL(50*time.Millisecond)) + + sess := &Session{Key: "sess-ttl-renew", Model: "old-model"} + if err := store.Create(sess); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Create: %v", err) + } + + time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond) + + // Verify expired + _, err := store.Get("sess-ttl-renew") + if !errors.Is(err, ErrSessionExpired) { + t.Fatalf("expected ErrSessionExpired, got: %v", err) + } + + // Delete expired session + if err := store.Delete("sess-ttl-renew"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Delete expired: %v", err) + } + + // Recreate with new data + newSess := &Session{Key: "sess-ttl-renew", Model: "new-model"} + if err := store.Create(newSess); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Recreate: %v", err) + } + + got, err := store.Get("sess-ttl-renew") + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Get after recreate: %v", err) + } + if got.Model != "new-model" { + t.Errorf("Model: want %q, got %q", "new-model", got.Model) + } } func TestEntStore_GetSetSalt(t *testing.T) { diff --git a/internal/skill/file_store.go b/internal/skill/file_store.go index dca463ec..90d77729 100644 --- a/internal/skill/file_store.go +++ b/internal/skill/file_store.go @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import ( "io/fs" "os" "path/filepath" + "strings" "go.uber.org/zap" ) @@ -83,7 +84,7 @@ func (s *FileSkillStore) ListActive(_ context.Context) ([]SkillEntry, error) { var result []SkillEntry for _, e := range entries { - if !e.IsDir() { + if !e.IsDir() || strings.HasPrefix(e.Name(), ".") { continue } @@ -160,7 +161,7 @@ func (s *FileSkillStore) EnsureDefaults(defaultFS fs.FS) error { // path is like "serve/SKILL.md" — extract skill name from parent dir. skillName := filepath.Dir(path) - if skillName == "." { + if skillName == "." || strings.HasPrefix(skillName, ".") { return nil } diff --git a/internal/skill/importer_test.go b/internal/skill/importer_test.go index 70d77578..25be798e 100644 --- a/internal/skill/importer_test.go +++ b/internal/skill/importer_test.go @@ -418,17 +418,17 @@ Content for skill two.` w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") path := r.URL.Path - switch { - case path == "/repos/owner/repo/contents/": + switch path { + case "/repos/owner/repo/contents/": // Directory listing. json.NewEncoder(w).Encode([]gitHubContentsEntry{ {Name: "skill-one", Type: "dir"}, {Name: "skill-two", Type: "dir"}, {Name: "README.md", Type: "file"}, }) - case path == "/repos/owner/repo/contents/skill-one/SKILL.md": + case "/repos/owner/repo/contents/skill-one/SKILL.md": json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(gitHubFileResponse{Content: encoded1, Encoding: "base64"}) - case path == "/repos/owner/repo/contents/skill-two/SKILL.md": + case "/repos/owner/repo/contents/skill-two/SKILL.md": json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(gitHubFileResponse{Content: encoded2, Encoding: "base64"}) default: http.NotFound(w, r) diff --git a/internal/skill/parser.go b/internal/skill/parser.go index 44e81259..270b4858 100644 --- a/internal/skill/parser.go +++ b/internal/skill/parser.go @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ func RenderSkillMD(entry *SkillEntry) ([]byte, error) { if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal step %d: %w", i, err) } - buf.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("### Step %d\n\n", i+1)) + fmt.Fprintf(&buf, "### Step %d\n\n", i+1) buf.WriteString("```json\n") buf.Write(stepJSON) buf.WriteString("\n```\n\n") @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ func RenderSkillMD(entry *SkillEntry) ([]byte, error) { } } - if entry.Parameters != nil && len(entry.Parameters) > 0 { + if len(entry.Parameters) > 0 { paramJSON, err := json.MarshalIndent(entry.Parameters, "", " ") if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal parameters: %w", err) diff --git a/internal/skill/registry.go b/internal/skill/registry.go index 202b2df4..f7d0801a 100644 --- a/internal/skill/registry.go +++ b/internal/skill/registry.go @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ func (r *Registry) skillToTool(sk SkillEntry) *agent.Tool { }, }, } - if skillEntry.Parameters != nil && len(skillEntry.Parameters) > 0 { + if len(skillEntry.Parameters) > 0 { params = skillEntry.Parameters } diff --git a/internal/toolchain/middleware.go b/internal/toolchain/middleware.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bdb9ae2f --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/toolchain/middleware.go @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +package toolchain + +import ( + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/agent" +) + +// Middleware wraps a tool handler. It receives the tool (for metadata access) and the next handler. +type Middleware func(tool *agent.Tool, next agent.ToolHandler) agent.ToolHandler + +// Chain applies middlewares to a single tool, returning a new tool with wrapped handler. +// Middlewares are applied in order: first middleware is outermost (executed first). +func Chain(tool *agent.Tool, middlewares ...Middleware) *agent.Tool { + if len(middlewares) == 0 { + return tool + } + // Build from inside out: last middleware wraps original, first middleware is outermost. + handler := tool.Handler + for i := len(middlewares) - 1; i >= 0; i-- { + handler = middlewares[i](tool, handler) + } + return &agent.Tool{ + Name: tool.Name, + Description: tool.Description, + Parameters: tool.Parameters, + SafetyLevel: tool.SafetyLevel, + Handler: handler, + } +} + +// ChainAll applies the same middleware stack to all tools. +func ChainAll(tools []*agent.Tool, middlewares ...Middleware) []*agent.Tool { + if len(middlewares) == 0 { + return tools + } + result := make([]*agent.Tool, len(tools)) + for i, t := range tools { + result[i] = Chain(t, middlewares...) + } + return result +} diff --git a/internal/toolchain/middleware_test.go b/internal/toolchain/middleware_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b9e7f922 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/toolchain/middleware_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,772 @@ +package toolchain + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "testing" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/agent" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/approval" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/tools/browser" +) + +func makeTool(name string, handler agent.ToolHandler) *agent.Tool { + return &agent.Tool{ + Name: name, + Handler: handler, + } +} + +func TestChain_NoMiddleware(t *testing.T) { + tool := makeTool("test", func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + return "ok", nil + }) + result := Chain(tool) + if result != tool { + t.Error("expected same tool when no middlewares") + } +} + +func TestChain_OrderOuterToInner(t *testing.T) { + var order []string + + mw := func(label string) Middleware { + return func(tool *agent.Tool, next agent.ToolHandler) agent.ToolHandler { + return func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + order = append(order, label+":before") + result, err := next(ctx, params) + order = append(order, label+":after") + return result, err + } + } + } + + tool := makeTool("test", func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + order = append(order, "handler") + return "ok", nil + }) + + wrapped := Chain(tool, mw("A"), mw("B"), mw("C")) + _, _ = wrapped.Handler(context.Background(), nil) + + want := []string{"A:before", "B:before", "C:before", "handler", "C:after", "B:after", "A:after"} + if len(order) != len(want) { + t.Fatalf("got %v, want %v", order, want) + } + for i := range want { + if order[i] != want[i] { + t.Errorf("order[%d] = %q, want %q", i, order[i], want[i]) + } + } +} + +func TestChain_PreservesToolMetadata(t *testing.T) { + tool := &agent.Tool{ + Name: "my_tool", + Description: "desc", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Parameters: map[string]interface{}{"key": "val"}, + Handler: func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + return nil, nil + }, + } + + noop := func(_ *agent.Tool, next agent.ToolHandler) agent.ToolHandler { return next } + result := Chain(tool, noop) + + if result.Name != tool.Name { + t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", result.Name, tool.Name) + } + if result.Description != tool.Description { + t.Errorf("Description = %q, want %q", result.Description, tool.Description) + } + if result.SafetyLevel != tool.SafetyLevel { + t.Errorf("SafetyLevel = %d, want %d", result.SafetyLevel, tool.SafetyLevel) + } +} + +func TestChainAll_WrapsAllTools(t *testing.T) { + var calls int + counter := func(_ *agent.Tool, next agent.ToolHandler) agent.ToolHandler { + return func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + calls++ + return next(ctx, params) + } + } + + tools := []*agent.Tool{ + makeTool("a", func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { return nil, nil }), + makeTool("b", func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { return nil, nil }), + makeTool("c", func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { return nil, nil }), + } + + wrapped := ChainAll(tools, counter) + for _, w := range wrapped { + _, _ = w.Handler(context.Background(), nil) + } + + if calls != 3 { + t.Errorf("calls = %d, want 3", calls) + } +} + +func TestChainAll_NoMiddleware(t *testing.T) { + tools := []*agent.Tool{ + makeTool("a", nil), + makeTool("b", nil), + } + result := ChainAll(tools) + if len(result) != len(tools) { + t.Fatalf("len = %d, want %d", len(result), len(tools)) + } + for i, r := range result { + if r != tools[i] { + t.Errorf("result[%d] is not the same tool", i) + } + } +} + +func TestConditionalMiddleware_BrowserRecoverySkipsNonBrowser(t *testing.T) { + var called bool + // Simulate WithBrowserRecovery's conditional logic: only applies to browser_ tools. + conditional := func(tool *agent.Tool, next agent.ToolHandler) agent.ToolHandler { + if tool.Name != "browser_navigate" { + return next + } + return func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + called = true + return next(ctx, params) + } + } + + // Non-browser tool: middleware should be skipped. + tool := makeTool("exec", func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + return "ok", nil + }) + wrapped := Chain(tool, conditional) + _, _ = wrapped.Handler(context.Background(), nil) + if called { + t.Error("conditional middleware should not have been called for non-browser tool") + } + + // Browser tool: middleware should be called. + browserTool := makeTool("browser_navigate", func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + return "ok", nil + }) + wrapped = Chain(browserTool, conditional) + _, _ = wrapped.Handler(context.Background(), nil) + if !called { + t.Error("conditional middleware should have been called for browser tool") + } +} + +func TestMiddleware_ShortCircuit(t *testing.T) { + denied := errors.New("denied") + blocker := func(_ *agent.Tool, _ agent.ToolHandler) agent.ToolHandler { + return func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + return nil, denied + } + } + + var innerCalled bool + tool := makeTool("test", func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + innerCalled = true + return "ok", nil + }) + + wrapped := Chain(tool, blocker) + _, err := wrapped.Handler(context.Background(), nil) + if !errors.Is(err, denied) { + t.Errorf("err = %v, want %v", err, denied) + } + if innerCalled { + t.Error("inner handler should not have been called when middleware short-circuits") + } +} + +func TestNeedsApproval(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give string + tool *agent.Tool + ic config.InterceptorConfig + wantNeed bool + }{ + { + give: "exempt tool bypasses approval", + tool: &agent.Tool{Name: "fs_read", SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous}, + ic: config.InterceptorConfig{ApprovalPolicy: config.ApprovalPolicyAll, ExemptTools: []string{"fs_read"}}, + wantNeed: false, + }, + { + give: "sensitive tool always requires approval", + tool: &agent.Tool{Name: "custom", SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe}, + ic: config.InterceptorConfig{ApprovalPolicy: config.ApprovalPolicyNone, SensitiveTools: []string{"custom"}}, + wantNeed: true, + }, + { + give: "policy all requires all tools", + tool: &agent.Tool{Name: "safe_tool", SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe}, + ic: config.InterceptorConfig{ApprovalPolicy: config.ApprovalPolicyAll}, + wantNeed: true, + }, + { + give: "policy dangerous only dangerous tools", + tool: &agent.Tool{Name: "exec", SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous}, + ic: config.InterceptorConfig{ApprovalPolicy: config.ApprovalPolicyDangerous}, + wantNeed: true, + }, + { + give: "policy dangerous skips safe tools", + tool: &agent.Tool{Name: "fs_read", SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe}, + ic: config.InterceptorConfig{ApprovalPolicy: config.ApprovalPolicyDangerous}, + wantNeed: false, + }, + { + give: "policy configured only sensitive tools", + tool: &agent.Tool{Name: "exec", SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous}, + ic: config.InterceptorConfig{ApprovalPolicy: config.ApprovalPolicyConfigured}, + wantNeed: false, + }, + { + give: "policy none disables all", + tool: &agent.Tool{Name: "exec", SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous}, + ic: config.InterceptorConfig{ApprovalPolicy: config.ApprovalPolicyNone}, + wantNeed: false, + }, + { + give: "unknown policy fails safe", + tool: &agent.Tool{Name: "exec", SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe}, + ic: config.InterceptorConfig{ApprovalPolicy: "unknown"}, + wantNeed: true, + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + got := NeedsApproval(tt.tool, tt.ic) + if got != tt.wantNeed { + t.Errorf("NeedsApproval() = %v, want %v", got, tt.wantNeed) + } + }) + } +} + +func TestBuildApprovalSummary(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give string + toolName string + params map[string]interface{} + wantPrefix string + }{ + { + give: "exec tool", + toolName: "exec", + params: map[string]interface{}{"command": "ls -la"}, + wantPrefix: "Execute: ls -la", + }, + { + give: "fs_write tool", + toolName: "fs_write", + params: map[string]interface{}{"path": "/tmp/test.txt", "content": "hello"}, + wantPrefix: "Write to /tmp/test.txt (5 bytes)", + }, + { + give: "unknown tool fallback", + toolName: "custom_tool", + params: map[string]interface{}{}, + wantPrefix: "Tool: custom_tool", + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + got := BuildApprovalSummary(tt.toolName, tt.params) + if got != tt.wantPrefix { + t.Errorf("BuildApprovalSummary() = %q, want %q", got, tt.wantPrefix) + } + }) + } +} + +// --- WithLearning middleware tests --- + +type mockObserver struct { + calls []observerCall +} + +type observerCall struct { + sessionKey string + toolName string + params map[string]interface{} + result interface{} + err error +} + +func (m *mockObserver) OnToolResult(_ context.Context, sessionKey, toolName string, params map[string]interface{}, result interface{}, err error) { + m.calls = append(m.calls, observerCall{ + sessionKey: sessionKey, + toolName: toolName, + params: params, + result: result, + err: err, + }) +} + +func TestWithLearning_ObservesToolResult(t *testing.T) { + obs := &mockObserver{} + mw := WithLearning(obs) + + tool := makeTool("my_tool", func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + return "result-value", nil + }) + + wrapped := Chain(tool, mw) + params := map[string]interface{}{"key": "val"} + result, err := wrapped.Handler(context.Background(), params) + + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err) + } + if result != "result-value" { + t.Errorf("result = %v, want %q", result, "result-value") + } + if len(obs.calls) != 1 { + t.Fatalf("observer calls = %d, want 1", len(obs.calls)) + } + call := obs.calls[0] + if call.toolName != "my_tool" { + t.Errorf("toolName = %q, want %q", call.toolName, "my_tool") + } + if call.result != "result-value" { + t.Errorf("result = %v, want %q", call.result, "result-value") + } + if call.err != nil { + t.Errorf("err = %v, want nil", call.err) + } +} + +func TestWithLearning_ObservesError(t *testing.T) { + obs := &mockObserver{} + mw := WithLearning(obs) + wantErr := errors.New("tool failed") + + tool := makeTool("fail_tool", func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + return nil, wantErr + }) + + wrapped := Chain(tool, mw) + _, err := wrapped.Handler(context.Background(), nil) + + if !errors.Is(err, wantErr) { + t.Errorf("err = %v, want %v", err, wantErr) + } + if len(obs.calls) != 1 { + t.Fatalf("observer calls = %d, want 1", len(obs.calls)) + } + if obs.calls[0].err != wantErr { + t.Errorf("observed err = %v, want %v", obs.calls[0].err, wantErr) + } +} + +// --- WithApproval middleware tests --- + +type mockApprovalProvider struct { + response approval.ApprovalResponse + err error + received *approval.ApprovalRequest +} + +func (m *mockApprovalProvider) RequestApproval(_ context.Context, req approval.ApprovalRequest) (approval.ApprovalResponse, error) { + m.received = &req + return m.response, m.err +} + +func (m *mockApprovalProvider) CanHandle(_ string) bool { return true } + +func TestWithApproval_DeniedExecution(t *testing.T) { + ap := &mockApprovalProvider{response: approval.ApprovalResponse{Approved: false}} + ic := config.InterceptorConfig{ApprovalPolicy: config.ApprovalPolicyAll} + + tool := &agent.Tool{ + Name: "exec", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Handler: func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + t.Error("handler should not be called when denied") + return nil, nil + }, + } + + mw := WithApproval(ic, ap, nil, nil) + wrapped := Chain(tool, mw) + _, err := wrapped.Handler(context.Background(), nil) + + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error when denied") + } + if ap.received == nil { + t.Fatal("approval provider was not consulted") + } +} + +func TestWithApproval_ApprovedExecution(t *testing.T) { + ap := &mockApprovalProvider{response: approval.ApprovalResponse{Approved: true}} + ic := config.InterceptorConfig{ApprovalPolicy: config.ApprovalPolicyAll} + + var called bool + tool := &agent.Tool{ + Name: "exec", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Handler: func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + called = true + return "ok", nil + }, + } + + mw := WithApproval(ic, ap, nil, nil) + wrapped := Chain(tool, mw) + result, err := wrapped.Handler(context.Background(), nil) + + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err) + } + if !called { + t.Error("handler was not called after approval") + } + if result != "ok" { + t.Errorf("result = %v, want %q", result, "ok") + } +} + +func TestWithApproval_GrantStoreAutoApproves(t *testing.T) { + ap := &mockApprovalProvider{response: approval.ApprovalResponse{Approved: false}} + gs := approval.NewGrantStore() + gs.Grant("", "exec") // pre-grant for empty session key + ic := config.InterceptorConfig{ApprovalPolicy: config.ApprovalPolicyAll} + + var called bool + tool := &agent.Tool{ + Name: "exec", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Handler: func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + called = true + return "ok", nil + }, + } + + mw := WithApproval(ic, ap, gs, nil) + wrapped := Chain(tool, mw) + _, err := wrapped.Handler(context.Background(), nil) + + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err) + } + if !called { + t.Error("handler should be auto-approved via grant store") + } + if ap.received != nil { + t.Error("approval provider should not have been consulted (grant store bypass)") + } +} + +func TestWithApproval_AlwaysAllowRecordsGrant(t *testing.T) { + ap := &mockApprovalProvider{response: approval.ApprovalResponse{Approved: true, AlwaysAllow: true}} + gs := approval.NewGrantStore() + ic := config.InterceptorConfig{ApprovalPolicy: config.ApprovalPolicyAll} + + tool := &agent.Tool{ + Name: "exec", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelDangerous, + Handler: func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + return "ok", nil + }, + } + + mw := WithApproval(ic, ap, gs, nil) + wrapped := Chain(tool, mw) + _, _ = wrapped.Handler(context.Background(), nil) + + if !gs.IsGranted("", "exec") { + t.Error("grant should have been recorded for always-allow response") + } +} + +func TestWithApproval_ExemptToolSkipsApproval(t *testing.T) { + ap := &mockApprovalProvider{response: approval.ApprovalResponse{Approved: false}} + ic := config.InterceptorConfig{ + ApprovalPolicy: config.ApprovalPolicyAll, + ExemptTools: []string{"fs_read"}, + } + + var called bool + tool := &agent.Tool{ + Name: "fs_read", + SafetyLevel: agent.SafetyLevelSafe, + Handler: func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + called = true + return "ok", nil + }, + } + + mw := WithApproval(ic, ap, nil, nil) + wrapped := Chain(tool, mw) + _, err := wrapped.Handler(context.Background(), nil) + + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err) + } + if !called { + t.Error("exempt tool should bypass approval") + } +} + +// --- WithBrowserRecovery middleware tests --- + +func TestWithBrowserRecovery_PanicRecovery(t *testing.T) { + mw := WithBrowserRecovery(nil) // nil SessionManager — Close will not be called on first attempt + + attempts := 0 + tool := makeTool("browser_navigate", func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + attempts++ + if attempts == 1 { + panic("rod crashed") + } + return "recovered", nil + }) + + wrapped := Chain(tool, mw) + // The first call panics, recover wraps it in ErrBrowserPanic, then retry succeeds. + // Note: sm.Close() will panic on nil receiver, so we test the panic→error conversion path. + // To test full retry, we need a non-nil SessionManager. Instead, we verify the panic + // is converted to an ErrBrowserPanic error. + result, err := wrapped.Handler(context.Background(), nil) + + // With nil SessionManager, sm.Close() will panic too. The deferred recover catches the + // initial panic and wraps it. The retry path calls sm.Close() which panics on nil. + // So we expect an ErrBrowserPanic error from the original panic. + if err != nil { + // Expected: the panic was caught and wrapped. + if !errors.Is(err, browser.ErrBrowserPanic) { + t.Errorf("err = %v, want ErrBrowserPanic", err) + } + } else { + // If somehow recovery + retry worked, check result. + if result != "recovered" { + t.Errorf("result = %v, want %q", result, "recovered") + } + } + if attempts < 1 { + t.Error("handler should have been called at least once") + } +} + +func TestWithBrowserRecovery_ErrorRetryOnce(t *testing.T) { + // Create a mock session manager via a browser tool mock is complex, + // so we test the ErrBrowserPanic error path directly. + mw := WithBrowserRecovery(nil) + + tool := makeTool("browser_navigate", func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("connection lost: %w", browser.ErrBrowserPanic) + }) + + wrapped := Chain(tool, mw) + _, err := wrapped.Handler(context.Background(), nil) + + // The handler returns ErrBrowserPanic, middleware tries sm.Close() (nil → panic). + // The deferred recovery catches that and returns ErrBrowserPanic. + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("expected error") + } +} + +func TestWithBrowserRecovery_NonBrowserToolPassthrough(t *testing.T) { + mw := WithBrowserRecovery(nil) + + var called bool + tool := makeTool("exec", func(_ context.Context, _ map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + called = true + return "ok", nil + }) + + wrapped := Chain(tool, mw) + result, err := wrapped.Handler(context.Background(), nil) + + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err) + } + if !called { + t.Error("handler was not called") + } + if result != "ok" { + t.Errorf("result = %v, want %q", result, "ok") + } +} + +// --- BuildApprovalSummary extended tests --- + +func TestBuildApprovalSummary_Extended(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give string + toolName string + params map[string]interface{} + want string + }{ + { + give: "fs_edit tool", + toolName: "fs_edit", + params: map[string]interface{}{"path": "/tmp/main.go"}, + want: "Edit file: /tmp/main.go", + }, + { + give: "fs_delete tool", + toolName: "fs_delete", + params: map[string]interface{}{"path": "/tmp/old.log"}, + want: "Delete: /tmp/old.log", + }, + { + give: "browser_navigate tool", + toolName: "browser_navigate", + params: map[string]interface{}{"url": "https://example.com"}, + want: "Navigate to: https://example.com", + }, + { + give: "browser_action with selector", + toolName: "browser_action", + params: map[string]interface{}{"action": "click", "selector": "#submit-btn"}, + want: "Browser click on: #submit-btn", + }, + { + give: "browser_action without selector", + toolName: "browser_action", + params: map[string]interface{}{"action": "screenshot"}, + want: "Browser action: screenshot", + }, + { + give: "secrets_store tool", + toolName: "secrets_store", + params: map[string]interface{}{"name": "api_key"}, + want: "Store secret: api_key", + }, + { + give: "secrets_get tool", + toolName: "secrets_get", + params: map[string]interface{}{"name": "api_key"}, + want: "Retrieve secret: api_key", + }, + { + give: "secrets_delete tool", + toolName: "secrets_delete", + params: map[string]interface{}{"name": "old_key"}, + want: "Delete secret: old_key", + }, + { + give: "crypto_encrypt tool", + toolName: "crypto_encrypt", + params: map[string]interface{}{}, + want: "Encrypt data", + }, + { + give: "crypto_decrypt tool", + toolName: "crypto_decrypt", + params: map[string]interface{}{}, + want: "Decrypt ciphertext", + }, + { + give: "crypto_sign tool", + toolName: "crypto_sign", + params: map[string]interface{}{}, + want: "Generate digital signature", + }, + { + give: "payment_send tool", + toolName: "payment_send", + params: map[string]interface{}{"amount": "1.5", "to": "0xABC123", "purpose": "test"}, + want: "Send 1.5 USDC to 0xABC123 (test)", + }, + { + give: "payment_create_wallet tool", + toolName: "payment_create_wallet", + params: map[string]interface{}{}, + want: "Create new blockchain wallet", + }, + { + give: "cron_add tool", + toolName: "cron_add", + params: map[string]interface{}{"name": "daily-backup", "schedule_type": "cron", "schedule": "0 0 * * *"}, + want: "Create cron job: daily-backup (cron=0 0 * * *)", + }, + { + give: "cron_remove tool", + toolName: "cron_remove", + params: map[string]interface{}{"id": "job-123"}, + want: "Remove cron job: job-123", + }, + { + give: "bg_submit tool", + toolName: "bg_submit", + params: map[string]interface{}{"prompt": "analyze the data"}, + want: "Submit background task: analyze the data", + }, + { + give: "workflow_run with file", + toolName: "workflow_run", + params: map[string]interface{}{"file_path": "pipelines/deploy.yaml"}, + want: "Run workflow: pipelines/deploy.yaml", + }, + { + give: "workflow_run inline", + toolName: "workflow_run", + params: map[string]interface{}{}, + want: "Run inline workflow", + }, + { + give: "workflow_cancel tool", + toolName: "workflow_cancel", + params: map[string]interface{}{"run_id": "run-456"}, + want: "Cancel workflow: run-456", + }, + { + give: "p2p_pay tool", + toolName: "p2p_pay", + params: map[string]interface{}{"amount": "0.5", "peer_did": "did:example:peer1", "memo": "thanks"}, + want: "Pay 0.5 USDC to peer did:example:peer... (thanks)", + }, + { + give: "p2p_pay no memo", + toolName: "p2p_pay", + params: map[string]interface{}{"amount": "1.0", "peer_did": "did:example:x"}, + want: "Pay 1.0 USDC to peer did:example:x (P2P payment)", + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + got := BuildApprovalSummary(tt.toolName, tt.params) + if got != tt.want { + t.Errorf("BuildApprovalSummary(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.toolName, got, tt.want) + } + }) + } +} + +func TestTruncate(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give string + maxLen int + want string + }{ + {"short", 10, "short"}, + {"exactly10!", 10, "exactly10!"}, + {"this is a long string", 10, "this is a ..."}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("%d/%s", tt.maxLen, tt.give), func(t *testing.T) { + got := Truncate(tt.give, tt.maxLen) + if got != tt.want { + t.Errorf("Truncate(%q, %d) = %q, want %q", tt.give, tt.maxLen, got, tt.want) + } + }) + } +} diff --git a/internal/toolchain/mw_approval.go b/internal/toolchain/mw_approval.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a658e5d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/toolchain/mw_approval.go @@ -0,0 +1,206 @@ +package toolchain + +import ( + "context" + "fmt" + "time" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/agent" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/approval" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/config" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/wallet" +) + +// WithApproval returns a middleware that gates tool execution behind an approval flow. +// Uses fail-closed: denies execution unless explicitly approved. +// The Provider routes requests to the appropriate channel (Gateway, Telegram, Discord, Slack, TTY). +// The GrantStore tracks "always allow" grants to auto-approve repeat invocations within a session. +// When limiter is non-nil, payment tools with an amount below the auto-approve threshold +// are executed without explicit user confirmation. +func WithApproval(ic config.InterceptorConfig, ap approval.Provider, gs *approval.GrantStore, limiter wallet.SpendingLimiter) Middleware { + return func(tool *agent.Tool, next agent.ToolHandler) agent.ToolHandler { + if !NeedsApproval(tool, ic) { + return next + } + + return func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + sessionKey := session.SessionKeyFromContext(ctx) + if target := approval.ApprovalTargetFromContext(ctx); target != "" { + sessionKey = target + } + + // Check persistent grant — auto-approve if previously "always allowed". + if gs != nil && gs.IsGranted(sessionKey, tool.Name) { + return next(ctx, params) + } + + // Auto-approve small payments via spending limiter threshold. + if limiter != nil && (tool.Name == "p2p_pay" || tool.Name == "payment_send") { + if amountStr, ok := params["amount"].(string); ok && amountStr != "" { + amt, err := wallet.ParseUSDC(amountStr) + if err == nil { + if autoOK, checkErr := limiter.IsAutoApprovable(ctx, amt); checkErr == nil && autoOK { + return next(ctx, params) + } + } + } + } + + req := approval.ApprovalRequest{ + ID: fmt.Sprintf("req-%d", time.Now().UnixNano()), + ToolName: tool.Name, + SessionKey: sessionKey, + Params: params, + Summary: BuildApprovalSummary(tool.Name, params), + CreatedAt: time.Now(), + } + resp, err := ap.RequestApproval(ctx, req) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("tool '%s' approval: %w", tool.Name, err) + } + if !resp.Approved { + sk := session.SessionKeyFromContext(ctx) + if sk == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("tool '%s' execution denied: no approval channel available (session key missing)", tool.Name) + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("tool '%s' execution denied: user did not approve the action", tool.Name) + } + + // Record persistent grant for this session+tool. + if resp.AlwaysAllow && gs != nil { + gs.Grant(sessionKey, tool.Name) + } + + return next(ctx, params) + } + } +} + +// NeedsApproval determines whether a tool requires approval based on the +// configured policy, explicit exemptions, and sensitive tool lists. +func NeedsApproval(t *agent.Tool, ic config.InterceptorConfig) bool { + // ExemptTools always bypass approval. + for _, name := range ic.ExemptTools { + if name == t.Name { + return false + } + } + + // SensitiveTools always require approval. + for _, name := range ic.SensitiveTools { + if name == t.Name { + return true + } + } + + switch ic.ApprovalPolicy { + case config.ApprovalPolicyAll: + return true + case config.ApprovalPolicyDangerous: + return t.SafetyLevel.IsDangerous() + case config.ApprovalPolicyConfigured: + return false // only SensitiveTools (handled above) + case config.ApprovalPolicyNone: + return false + default: + return true // unknown policy → fail-safe + } +} + +// BuildApprovalSummary returns a human-readable description of what a tool +// invocation will do, suitable for display in approval messages. +func BuildApprovalSummary(toolName string, params map[string]interface{}) string { + switch toolName { + case "exec", "exec_bg": + if cmd, ok := params["command"].(string); ok { + return "Execute: " + Truncate(cmd, 200) + } + case "fs_write": + path, _ := params["path"].(string) + content, _ := params["content"].(string) + return fmt.Sprintf("Write to %s (%d bytes)", path, len(content)) + case "fs_edit": + path, _ := params["path"].(string) + return "Edit file: " + path + case "fs_delete": + path, _ := params["path"].(string) + return "Delete: " + path + case "browser_navigate": + url, _ := params["url"].(string) + return "Navigate to: " + Truncate(url, 200) + case "browser_action": + action, _ := params["action"].(string) + selector, _ := params["selector"].(string) + if selector != "" { + return fmt.Sprintf("Browser %s on: %s", action, Truncate(selector, 100)) + } + return "Browser action: " + action + case "secrets_store": + name, _ := params["name"].(string) + return "Store secret: " + name + case "secrets_get": + name, _ := params["name"].(string) + return "Retrieve secret: " + name + case "secrets_delete": + name, _ := params["name"].(string) + return "Delete secret: " + name + case "crypto_encrypt": + return "Encrypt data" + case "crypto_decrypt": + return "Decrypt ciphertext" + case "crypto_sign": + return "Generate digital signature" + case "payment_send": + amount, _ := params["amount"].(string) + to, _ := params["to"].(string) + purpose, _ := params["purpose"].(string) + return fmt.Sprintf("Send %s USDC to %s (%s)", amount, Truncate(to, 12), Truncate(purpose, 50)) + case "payment_create_wallet": + return "Create new blockchain wallet" + case "payment_x402_fetch": + url, _ := params["url"].(string) + method, _ := params["method"].(string) + if method == "" { + method = "GET" + } + return fmt.Sprintf("X402 %s %s (auto-pay enabled)", method, Truncate(url, 150)) + case "cron_add": + name, _ := params["name"].(string) + scheduleType, _ := params["schedule_type"].(string) + schedule, _ := params["schedule"].(string) + return fmt.Sprintf("Create cron job: %s (%s=%s)", name, scheduleType, schedule) + case "cron_remove": + id, _ := params["id"].(string) + return "Remove cron job: " + id + case "bg_submit": + prompt, _ := params["prompt"].(string) + return "Submit background task: " + Truncate(prompt, 100) + case "workflow_run": + filePath, _ := params["file_path"].(string) + if filePath != "" { + return "Run workflow: " + filePath + } + return "Run inline workflow" + case "workflow_cancel": + runID, _ := params["run_id"].(string) + return "Cancel workflow: " + runID + case "p2p_pay": + amount, _ := params["amount"].(string) + peerDID, _ := params["peer_did"].(string) + memo, _ := params["memo"].(string) + if memo == "" { + memo = "P2P payment" + } + return fmt.Sprintf("Pay %s USDC to peer %s (%s)", amount, Truncate(peerDID, 16), Truncate(memo, 50)) + } + return "Tool: " + toolName +} + +// Truncate shortens s to maxLen characters, appending "..." if truncated. +func Truncate(s string, maxLen int) string { + if len(s) <= maxLen { + return s + } + return s[:maxLen] + "..." +} diff --git a/internal/toolchain/mw_browser.go b/internal/toolchain/mw_browser.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..25460075 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/toolchain/mw_browser.go @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +package toolchain + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "strings" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/agent" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/logging" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/tools/browser" +) + +// WithBrowserRecovery returns a middleware that provides panic recovery and +// auto-reconnect for browser tools. It only applies to tools whose name +// starts with "browser_"; other tools pass through unchanged. +func WithBrowserRecovery(sm *browser.SessionManager) Middleware { + return func(tool *agent.Tool, next agent.ToolHandler) agent.ToolHandler { + if !strings.HasPrefix(tool.Name, "browser_") { + return next + } + return func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (result interface{}, retErr error) { + defer func() { + if r := recover(); r != nil { + logging.App().Errorw("browser tool panic recovered", "tool", tool.Name, "panic", r) + retErr = fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", browser.ErrBrowserPanic, r) + } + }() + + result, retErr = next(ctx, params) + if retErr != nil && errors.Is(retErr, browser.ErrBrowserPanic) { + // Connection likely dead — close and retry once. + logging.App().Warnw("browser panic detected, closing session and retrying", "tool", tool.Name, "error", retErr) + _ = sm.Close() + result, retErr = next(ctx, params) + } + return + } + } +} diff --git a/internal/toolchain/mw_learning.go b/internal/toolchain/mw_learning.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b4b5ecd4 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/toolchain/mw_learning.go @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +package toolchain + +import ( + "context" + + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/agent" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/learning" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/session" +) + +// WithLearning returns a middleware that observes tool results for learning. +// After each handler execution the observer is called with session key, tool name, +// parameters, result, and any error. +func WithLearning(observer learning.ToolResultObserver) Middleware { + return func(tool *agent.Tool, next agent.ToolHandler) agent.ToolHandler { + return func(ctx context.Context, params map[string]interface{}) (interface{}, error) { + result, err := next(ctx, params) + sessionKey := session.SessionKeyFromContext(ctx) + observer.OnToolResult(ctx, sessionKey, tool.Name, params, result, err) + return result, err + } + } +} diff --git a/internal/tools/exec/exec.go b/internal/tools/exec/exec.go index 5a23a061..b2a2e87d 100644 --- a/internal/tools/exec/exec.go +++ b/internal/tools/exec/exec.go @@ -36,12 +36,30 @@ type Tool struct { bgMu sync.RWMutex } +// syncBuffer is a thread-safe wrapper around bytes.Buffer. +type syncBuffer struct { + mu sync.Mutex + buf bytes.Buffer +} + +func (sb *syncBuffer) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + sb.mu.Lock() + defer sb.mu.Unlock() + return sb.buf.Write(p) +} + +func (sb *syncBuffer) String() string { + sb.mu.Lock() + defer sb.mu.Unlock() + return sb.buf.String() +} + // BackgroundProcess represents a running background command type BackgroundProcess struct { ID string Command string Cmd *exec.Cmd - Output *bytes.Buffer + Output *syncBuffer StartTime time.Time Done bool ExitCode int @@ -156,7 +174,7 @@ func (t *Tool) RunWithPTY(ctx context.Context, command string, timeout time.Dura // Wait for completion or timeout select { case <-ctx.Done(): - cmd.Process.Signal(syscall.SIGTERM) + _ = cmd.Process.Signal(syscall.SIGTERM) return &Result{ Stdout: output.String(), TimedOut: true, @@ -195,7 +213,7 @@ func (t *Tool) StartBackground(command string) (string, error) { cmd.Dir = t.config.WorkDir cmd.Env = t.filterEnv(os.Environ()) - output := &bytes.Buffer{} + output := &syncBuffer{} cmd.Stdout = output cmd.Stderr = output @@ -259,7 +277,7 @@ func (t *Tool) StopBackground(id string) error { if !bp.Done { if err := bp.Cmd.Process.Signal(syscall.SIGTERM); err != nil { - bp.Cmd.Process.Kill() + _ = bp.Cmd.Process.Kill() } } @@ -327,7 +345,7 @@ func (t *Tool) Cleanup() { for id, bp := range t.bgProcesses { if !bp.Done { - bp.Cmd.Process.Kill() + _ = bp.Cmd.Process.Kill() } delete(t.bgProcesses, id) } diff --git a/internal/tools/payment/payment.go b/internal/tools/payment/payment.go index c3981cc5..68897118 100644 --- a/internal/tools/payment/payment.go +++ b/internal/tools/payment/payment.go @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ func buildBalanceTool(svc *payment.Service) *agent.Tool { return map[string]interface{}{ "balance": balance, - "currency": "USDC", + "currency": wallet.CurrencyUSDC, "address": addr, "chainId": svc.ChainID(), "network": wallet.NetworkName(svc.ChainID()), @@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ func buildLimitsTool(limiter wallet.SpendingLimiter) *agent.Tool { return map[string]interface{}{ "dailySpent": wallet.FormatUSDC(spent), "dailyRemaining": wallet.FormatUSDC(remaining), - "currency": "USDC", + "currency": wallet.CurrencyUSDC, }, nil } @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ func buildLimitsTool(limiter wallet.SpendingLimiter) *agent.Tool { "maxDaily": wallet.FormatUSDC(entLimiter.MaxDaily()), "dailySpent": wallet.FormatUSDC(spent), "dailyRemaining": wallet.FormatUSDC(remaining), - "currency": "USDC", + "currency": wallet.CurrencyUSDC, }, nil }, } diff --git a/internal/ctxutil/detach.go b/internal/types/context.go similarity index 85% rename from internal/ctxutil/detach.go rename to internal/types/context.go index c5a36c69..4386b430 100644 --- a/internal/ctxutil/detach.go +++ b/internal/types/context.go @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -package ctxutil +package types import ( "context" @@ -18,10 +18,10 @@ func (c *detachedCtx) Done() <-chan struct{} { return nil } func (c *detachedCtx) Err() error { return nil } func (c *detachedCtx) Value(key any) any { return c.parent.Value(key) } -// Detach returns a new context that is independent of the parent's +// DetachContext returns a new context that is independent of the parent's // cancellation and deadline but preserves all context values. // Use this when spawning long-running goroutines that must not be // cancelled when the originating request completes. -func Detach(ctx context.Context) context.Context { +func DetachContext(ctx context.Context) context.Context { return &detachedCtx{parent: ctx} } diff --git a/internal/ctxutil/detach_test.go b/internal/types/context_test.go similarity index 78% rename from internal/ctxutil/detach_test.go rename to internal/types/context_test.go index 02293c84..f718f463 100644 --- a/internal/ctxutil/detach_test.go +++ b/internal/types/context_test.go @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -package ctxutil +package types import ( "context" @@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ import ( type testKey struct{} -func TestDetach_ParentCancelDoesNotAffectChild(t *testing.T) { +func TestDetachContext_ParentCancelDoesNotAffectChild(t *testing.T) { parent, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background()) - detached := Detach(parent) + detached := DetachContext(parent) cancel() // cancel parent @@ -25,9 +25,9 @@ func TestDetach_ParentCancelDoesNotAffectChild(t *testing.T) { } } -func TestDetach_PreservesValues(t *testing.T) { +func TestDetachContext_PreservesValues(t *testing.T) { parent := context.WithValue(context.Background(), testKey{}, "hello") - detached := Detach(parent) + detached := DetachContext(parent) got := detached.Value(testKey{}) if got != "hello" { @@ -35,20 +35,20 @@ func TestDetach_PreservesValues(t *testing.T) { } } -func TestDetach_NoDeadline(t *testing.T) { +func TestDetachContext_NoDeadline(t *testing.T) { parent, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Hour) defer cancel() - detached := Detach(parent) + detached := DetachContext(parent) if _, ok := detached.Deadline(); ok { t.Fatal("detached context should have no deadline") } } -func TestDetach_WithCancelWrapping(t *testing.T) { +func TestDetachContext_WithCancelWrapping(t *testing.T) { parent, parentCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background()) - detached := Detach(parent) + detached := DetachContext(parent) child, childCancel := context.WithCancel(detached) // Cancel parent — child should be unaffected. @@ -64,9 +64,9 @@ func TestDetach_WithCancelWrapping(t *testing.T) { } } -func TestDetach_WithTimeoutWrapping(t *testing.T) { +func TestDetachContext_WithTimeoutWrapping(t *testing.T) { parent := context.WithValue(context.Background(), testKey{}, "timeout-test") - detached := Detach(parent) + detached := DetachContext(parent) child, cancel := context.WithTimeout(detached, 50*time.Millisecond) defer cancel() diff --git a/internal/wallet/composite_wallet.go b/internal/wallet/composite_wallet.go index 62c60754..1a142869 100644 --- a/internal/wallet/composite_wallet.go +++ b/internal/wallet/composite_wallet.go @@ -81,6 +81,22 @@ func (w *CompositeWallet) SignMessage(ctx context.Context, message []byte) ([]by return w.fallback.SignMessage(ctx, message) } +// PublicKey returns the compressed public key from the active provider. +func (w *CompositeWallet) PublicKey(ctx context.Context) ([]byte, error) { + if w.checker != nil && w.checker.IsConnected() { + pk, err := w.primary.PublicKey(ctx) + if err == nil { + return pk, nil + } + } + + w.mu.Lock() + w.usedLocal = true + w.mu.Unlock() + + return w.fallback.PublicKey(ctx) +} + // UsedLocal returns true if the fallback (local) wallet was used at any point. func (w *CompositeWallet) UsedLocal() bool { w.mu.RLock() diff --git a/internal/wallet/create.go b/internal/wallet/create.go index 503bc788..f5c4c408 100644 --- a/internal/wallet/create.go +++ b/internal/wallet/create.go @@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ import ( "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/security" ) -const walletKeyName = "wallet.privatekey" +// WalletKeyName is the secrets store key for the wallet private key. +const WalletKeyName = "wallet.privatekey" // ErrWalletExists is returned when attempting to create a wallet that already exists. var ErrWalletExists = errors.New("wallet already exists") @@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ var ErrWalletExists = errors.New("wallet already exists") // exists, it returns ErrWalletExists along with the existing address. func CreateWallet(ctx context.Context, secrets *security.SecretsStore) (string, error) { // Check if wallet already exists - existing, err := secrets.Get(ctx, walletKeyName) + existing, err := secrets.Get(ctx, WalletKeyName) if err == nil { defer zeroBytes(existing) @@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ func CreateWallet(ctx context.Context, secrets *security.SecretsStore) (string, defer zeroBytes(keyBytes) // Store encrypted in SecretsStore - if err := secrets.Store(ctx, walletKeyName, keyBytes); err != nil { + if err := secrets.Store(ctx, WalletKeyName, keyBytes); err != nil { return "", fmt.Errorf("store wallet key: %w", err) } diff --git a/internal/wallet/local_wallet.go b/internal/wallet/local_wallet.go index 966cab87..cdf10f92 100644 --- a/internal/wallet/local_wallet.go +++ b/internal/wallet/local_wallet.go @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ func NewLocalWallet(secrets *security.SecretsStore, rpcURL string, chainID int64 secrets: secrets, rpcURL: rpcURL, chainID: chainID, - keyName: walletKeyName, + keyName: WalletKeyName, } } @@ -133,6 +133,22 @@ func (w *LocalWallet) getClient() (*ethclient.Client, error) { return client, nil } +// PublicKey returns the compressed public key bytes. +func (w *LocalWallet) PublicKey(ctx context.Context) ([]byte, error) { + keyBytes, err := w.secrets.Get(ctx, w.keyName) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("load wallet key: %w", err) + } + defer zeroBytes(keyBytes) + + privateKey, err := crypto.ToECDSA(keyBytes) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse wallet key: %w", err) + } + + return crypto.CompressPubkey(&privateKey.PublicKey), nil +} + // zeroBytes overwrites a byte slice with zeros. func zeroBytes(b []byte) { for i := range b { diff --git a/internal/wallet/rpc_wallet.go b/internal/wallet/rpc_wallet.go index b4378c05..ad708776 100644 --- a/internal/wallet/rpc_wallet.go +++ b/internal/wallet/rpc_wallet.go @@ -217,6 +217,11 @@ func (w *RPCWallet) HandleSignMsgResponse(resp SignMsgResponse) { } } +// PublicKey is not supported via RPC — returns an error. +func (w *RPCWallet) PublicKey(_ context.Context) ([]byte, error) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("RPC wallet: PublicKey not supported (use local wallet for P2P identity)") +} + // HandleAddressResponse dispatches an address response from the companion. func (w *RPCWallet) HandleAddressResponse(resp AddressResponse) { w.mu.Lock() diff --git a/internal/wallet/spending.go b/internal/wallet/spending.go index a0784dde..62a858f8 100644 --- a/internal/wallet/spending.go +++ b/internal/wallet/spending.go @@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ type SpendingLimiter interface { // DailyRemaining returns the remaining daily budget. DailyRemaining(ctx context.Context) (*big.Int, error) + + // IsAutoApprovable checks whether the given amount can be auto-approved + // without explicit user confirmation, based on the autoApproveBelow threshold + // and spending limits. + IsAutoApprovable(ctx context.Context, amount *big.Int) (bool, error) } // USDCDecimals is the number of decimal places for USDC (6). @@ -62,13 +67,16 @@ func FormatUSDC(amount *big.Int) string { // EntSpendingLimiter uses Ent PaymentTx records to enforce spending limits. type EntSpendingLimiter struct { - client *ent.Client - maxPerTx *big.Int - maxDaily *big.Int + client *ent.Client + maxPerTx *big.Int + maxDaily *big.Int + autoApproveBelow *big.Int } // NewEntSpendingLimiter creates a spending limiter backed by Ent PaymentTx records. -func NewEntSpendingLimiter(client *ent.Client, maxPerTx, maxDaily string) (*EntSpendingLimiter, error) { +// autoApproveBelow is the USDC amount threshold below which transactions can be +// auto-approved without explicit user confirmation. Pass "" or "0" to disable. +func NewEntSpendingLimiter(client *ent.Client, maxPerTx, maxDaily, autoApproveBelow string) (*EntSpendingLimiter, error) { perTx, err := ParseUSDC(maxPerTx) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse maxPerTx: %w", err) @@ -79,10 +87,20 @@ func NewEntSpendingLimiter(client *ent.Client, maxPerTx, maxDaily string) (*EntS return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse maxDaily: %w", err) } + autoApprove := big.NewInt(0) + if autoApproveBelow != "" { + parsed, err := ParseUSDC(autoApproveBelow) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse autoApproveBelow: %w", err) + } + autoApprove = parsed + } + return &EntSpendingLimiter{ - client: client, - maxPerTx: perTx, - maxDaily: daily, + client: client, + maxPerTx: perTx, + maxDaily: daily, + autoApproveBelow: autoApprove, }, nil } @@ -165,6 +183,25 @@ func (l *EntSpendingLimiter) MaxDaily() *big.Int { return new(big.Int).Set(l.maxDaily) } +// IsAutoApprovable checks whether amount can be auto-approved without user confirmation. +// Returns false when auto-approve is disabled (threshold is 0), when amount exceeds the +// threshold, or when spending limits would be exceeded. +func (l *EntSpendingLimiter) IsAutoApprovable(ctx context.Context, amount *big.Int) (bool, error) { + if l.autoApproveBelow.Sign() == 0 { + return false, nil + } + + if amount.Cmp(l.autoApproveBelow) > 0 { + return false, nil + } + + if err := l.Check(ctx, amount); err != nil { + return false, err + } + + return true, nil +} + func startOfToday() time.Time { now := time.Now() return time.Date(now.Year(), now.Month(), now.Day(), 0, 0, 0, 0, now.Location()) diff --git a/internal/wallet/spending_test.go b/internal/wallet/spending_test.go index d5c066e4..e995c43c 100644 --- a/internal/wallet/spending_test.go +++ b/internal/wallet/spending_test.go @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ package wallet import ( + "fmt" "math/big" "testing" ) @@ -62,6 +63,107 @@ func TestFormatUSDC(t *testing.T) { } } +func TestIsAutoApprovable(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give string + autoApproveBelow string + wantOK bool + wantErr bool + }{ + {give: "0.05", autoApproveBelow: "0.10", wantOK: true}, + {give: "0.10", autoApproveBelow: "0.10", wantOK: true}, + {give: "0.11", autoApproveBelow: "0.10", wantOK: false}, + {give: "1.00", autoApproveBelow: "0.10", wantOK: false}, + {give: "0.05", autoApproveBelow: "0", wantOK: false}, // disabled + {give: "0.05", autoApproveBelow: "", wantOK: false}, // disabled + {give: "0.00", autoApproveBelow: "0.10", wantOK: true}, // zero amount + {give: "5.00", autoApproveBelow: "10.00", wantOK: true}, // large threshold + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + name := fmt.Sprintf("amount=%s,threshold=%s", tt.give, tt.autoApproveBelow) + t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) { + limiter := &EntSpendingLimiter{ + maxPerTx: big.NewInt(100_000_000), // 100 USDC + maxDaily: big.NewInt(100_000_000), // 100 USDC + autoApproveBelow: big.NewInt(0), + } + + // Parse auto-approve threshold. + if tt.autoApproveBelow != "" { + parsed, err := ParseUSDC(tt.autoApproveBelow) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("parse autoApproveBelow: %v", err) + } + limiter.autoApproveBelow = parsed + } + + amt, err := ParseUSDC(tt.give) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("parse amount: %v", err) + } + + // IsAutoApprovable uses Check() which requires an ent client for DailySpent. + // Since we can't create a real ent client in unit tests, we test the + // threshold logic directly. The client-dependent path is covered by + // integration tests. + if limiter.autoApproveBelow.Sign() == 0 { + if tt.wantOK { + t.Error("expected auto-approvable but threshold is 0") + } + return + } + + if amt.Cmp(limiter.autoApproveBelow) > 0 { + if tt.wantOK { + t.Errorf("amount %s > threshold %s, expected not auto-approvable", + tt.give, tt.autoApproveBelow) + } + return + } + + // Amount is within threshold. + if !tt.wantOK { + t.Errorf("amount %s <= threshold %s, expected auto-approvable", + tt.give, tt.autoApproveBelow) + } + }) + } +} + +func TestNewEntSpendingLimiter_AutoApproveBelow(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + give string + want int64 + wantErr bool + }{ + {give: "0.10", want: 100_000}, + {give: "1.00", want: 1_000_000}, + {give: "0", want: 0}, + {give: "", want: 0}, + {give: "invalid", wantErr: true}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.give, func(t *testing.T) { + limiter, err := NewEntSpendingLimiter(nil, "1.00", "10.00", tt.give) + if tt.wantErr { + if err == nil { + t.Error("expected error, got nil") + } + return + } + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err) + } + if limiter.autoApproveBelow.Int64() != tt.want { + t.Errorf("autoApproveBelow = %d, want %d", + limiter.autoApproveBelow.Int64(), tt.want) + } + }) + } +} + func TestNetworkName(t *testing.T) { tests := []struct { give int64 diff --git a/internal/wallet/wallet.go b/internal/wallet/wallet.go index ed426e40..d855b059 100644 --- a/internal/wallet/wallet.go +++ b/internal/wallet/wallet.go @@ -21,8 +21,26 @@ type WalletProvider interface { // SignMessage signs an arbitrary message and returns the signature. SignMessage(ctx context.Context, message []byte) ([]byte, error) + + // PublicKey returns the compressed public key bytes. + // Used for P2P identity derivation (DID). Private key is never exposed. + PublicKey(ctx context.Context) ([]byte, error) } +// ChainID identifies a blockchain network. +type ChainID int64 + +const ( + ChainEthereumMainnet ChainID = 1 + ChainBase ChainID = 8453 + ChainBaseSepolia ChainID = 84532 + ChainSepolia ChainID = 11155111 +) + +// CurrencyUSDC is the ticker symbol for the USDC stablecoin used across the +// payment system. +const CurrencyUSDC = "USDC" + // WalletInfo holds public wallet metadata. type WalletInfo struct { Address string `json:"address"` @@ -32,14 +50,14 @@ type WalletInfo struct { // NetworkName returns a human-readable network name for common chain IDs. func NetworkName(chainID int64) string { - switch chainID { - case 1: + switch ChainID(chainID) { + case ChainEthereumMainnet: return "Ethereum Mainnet" - case 8453: + case ChainBase: return "Base" - case 84532: + case ChainBaseSepolia: return "Base Sepolia" - case 11155111: + case ChainSepolia: return "Sepolia" default: return "Unknown" diff --git a/internal/workflow/dag_test.go b/internal/workflow/dag_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a0082828 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/workflow/dag_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +package workflow + +import ( + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func TestNewDAG_Linear(t *testing.T) { + steps := []Step{ + {ID: "a"}, + {ID: "b", DependsOn: []string{"a"}}, + {ID: "c", DependsOn: []string{"b"}}, + } + dag, err := NewDAG(steps) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NotNil(t, dag) + + roots := dag.Roots() + assert.Equal(t, []string{"a"}, roots) +} + +func TestNewDAG_Diamond(t *testing.T) { + // A -> B, A -> C, B -> D, C -> D + steps := []Step{ + {ID: "a"}, + {ID: "b", DependsOn: []string{"a"}}, + {ID: "c", DependsOn: []string{"a"}}, + {ID: "d", DependsOn: []string{"b", "c"}}, + } + dag, err := NewDAG(steps) + require.NoError(t, err) + + layers, err := dag.TopologicalSort() + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, layers, 3, "diamond graph should have 3 layers") + assert.Len(t, layers[0], 1, "layer 0 should have 1 root") + assert.Len(t, layers[1], 2, "layer 1 should have 2 nodes") + assert.Len(t, layers[2], 1, "layer 2 should have 1 node") +} + +func TestNewDAG_Parallel(t *testing.T) { + steps := []Step{ + {ID: "a"}, + {ID: "b"}, + {ID: "c"}, + } + dag, err := NewDAG(steps) + require.NoError(t, err) + + layers, err := dag.TopologicalSort() + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, layers, 1, "all-parallel graph should have 1 layer") + assert.Len(t, layers[0], 3) +} + +func TestNewDAG_CircularDependency(t *testing.T) { + steps := []Step{ + {ID: "a", DependsOn: []string{"b"}}, + {ID: "b", DependsOn: []string{"a"}}, + } + dag, err := NewDAG(steps) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Nil(t, dag) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "circular dependency") +} + +func TestTopologicalSort_Layers(t *testing.T) { + // a -> b -> c (linear chain) + steps := []Step{ + {ID: "a"}, + {ID: "b", DependsOn: []string{"a"}}, + {ID: "c", DependsOn: []string{"b"}}, + } + dag, err := NewDAG(steps) + require.NoError(t, err) + + layers, err := dag.TopologicalSort() + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, layers, 3) + assert.Contains(t, layers[0], "a") + assert.Contains(t, layers[1], "b") + assert.Contains(t, layers[2], "c") +} + +func TestRoots(t *testing.T) { + steps := []Step{ + {ID: "root1"}, + {ID: "root2"}, + {ID: "child", DependsOn: []string{"root1", "root2"}}, + } + dag, err := NewDAG(steps) + require.NoError(t, err) + + roots := dag.Roots() + assert.Len(t, roots, 2) + assert.Contains(t, roots, "root1") + assert.Contains(t, roots, "root2") +} + +func TestReady_NoneCompleted(t *testing.T) { + steps := []Step{ + {ID: "a"}, + {ID: "b", DependsOn: []string{"a"}}, + } + dag, err := NewDAG(steps) + require.NoError(t, err) + + ready := dag.Ready(map[string]bool{}) + assert.Equal(t, []string{"a"}, ready, "only root should be ready when nothing is completed") +} + +func TestReady_SomeCompleted(t *testing.T) { + steps := []Step{ + {ID: "a"}, + {ID: "b", DependsOn: []string{"a"}}, + {ID: "c", DependsOn: []string{"a"}}, + } + dag, err := NewDAG(steps) + require.NoError(t, err) + + ready := dag.Ready(map[string]bool{"a": true}) + assert.Len(t, ready, 2) + assert.Contains(t, ready, "b") + assert.Contains(t, ready, "c") +} + +func TestReady_AllCompleted(t *testing.T) { + steps := []Step{ + {ID: "a"}, + {ID: "b", DependsOn: []string{"a"}}, + } + dag, err := NewDAG(steps) + require.NoError(t, err) + + ready := dag.Ready(map[string]bool{"a": true, "b": true}) + assert.Empty(t, ready) +} diff --git a/internal/workflow/engine.go b/internal/workflow/engine.go index 2a4aa4cc..2fc8a6aa 100644 --- a/internal/workflow/engine.go +++ b/internal/workflow/engine.go @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import ( "sync" "time" - "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/ctxutil" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/types" "go.uber.org/zap" ) @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ func (e *Engine) Run(ctx context.Context, w *Workflow) (*RunResult, error) { } // Detach from parent context to prevent cascading cancellation. - detached := ctxutil.Detach(ctx) + detached := types.DetachContext(ctx) runID, err := e.state.CreateRun(detached, w) if err != nil { @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ func (e *Engine) RunAsync(ctx context.Context, w *Workflow) (string, error) { } // Detach from parent context to prevent cascading cancellation. - detached := ctxutil.Detach(ctx) + detached := types.DetachContext(ctx) runID, err := e.state.CreateRun(detached, w) if err != nil { @@ -404,9 +404,9 @@ func (e *Engine) Shutdown() { // buildSummary formats a human-readable summary of workflow results. func (e *Engine) buildSummary(workflowName string, results map[string]string) string { var b strings.Builder - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("Workflow '%s' completed.\n\n", workflowName)) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "Workflow '%s' completed.\n\n", workflowName) for stepID, result := range results { - b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("--- %s ---\n%s\n\n", stepID, result)) + fmt.Fprintf(&b, "--- %s ---\n%s\n\n", stepID, result) } return b.String() } diff --git a/internal/workflow/parser.go b/internal/workflow/parser.go index ca43a0ff..da559469 100644 --- a/internal/workflow/parser.go +++ b/internal/workflow/parser.go @@ -89,9 +89,7 @@ func detectCycles(steps []Step) error { // For cycle detection we traverse the depends_on edges. adj := make(map[string][]string, len(steps)) for _, s := range steps { - for _, dep := range s.DependsOn { - adj[s.ID] = append(adj[s.ID], dep) - } + adj[s.ID] = append(adj[s.ID], s.DependsOn...) } color := make(map[string]int, len(steps)) diff --git a/internal/workflow/parser_test.go b/internal/workflow/parser_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1a3c5b5a --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/workflow/parser_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +package workflow + +import ( + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func TestParse_ValidWorkflow(t *testing.T) { + yaml := ` +name: test-workflow +description: A test workflow +steps: + - id: step1 + agent: executor + prompt: "Do something" + - id: step2 + agent: researcher + prompt: "Research {{step1.result}}" + depends_on: [step1] +` + w, err := Parse([]byte(yaml)) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NotNil(t, w) + assert.Equal(t, "test-workflow", w.Name) + assert.Len(t, w.Steps, 2) +} + +func TestParse_InvalidYAML(t *testing.T) { + w, err := Parse([]byte("{{invalid yaml")) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Nil(t, w) +} + +func TestValidate_EmptyName(t *testing.T) { + w := &Workflow{Steps: []Step{{ID: "a"}}} + err := Validate(w) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrWorkflowNameEmpty) +} + +func TestValidate_NoSteps(t *testing.T) { + w := &Workflow{Name: "test"} + err := Validate(w) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNoWorkflowSteps) +} + +func TestValidate_EmptyStepID(t *testing.T) { + w := &Workflow{ + Name: "test", + Steps: []Step{{ID: ""}}, + } + err := Validate(w) + assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrStepIDEmpty) +} + +func TestValidate_DuplicateStepID(t *testing.T) { + w := &Workflow{ + Name: "test", + Steps: []Step{ + {ID: "a"}, + {ID: "a"}, + }, + } + err := Validate(w) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "duplicate step id") +} + +func TestValidate_UnknownDependency(t *testing.T) { + w := &Workflow{ + Name: "test", + Steps: []Step{ + {ID: "a", DependsOn: []string{"nonexistent"}}, + }, + } + err := Validate(w) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "unknown step") +} + +func TestValidate_UnknownAgent(t *testing.T) { + w := &Workflow{ + Name: "test", + Steps: []Step{ + {ID: "a", Agent: "unknown-agent"}, + }, + } + err := Validate(w) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "unknown agent") +} + +func TestValidate_ValidAgents(t *testing.T) { + for _, agent := range []string{"executor", "researcher", "planner", "memory-manager"} { + w := &Workflow{ + Name: "test", + Steps: []Step{{ID: "a", Agent: agent}}, + } + assert.NoError(t, Validate(w), "agent %q should be valid", agent) + } +} + +func TestValidate_EmptyAgent_Valid(t *testing.T) { + w := &Workflow{ + Name: "test", + Steps: []Step{{ID: "a", Agent: ""}}, + } + assert.NoError(t, Validate(w), "empty agent should be valid (uses default)") +} + +func TestValidate_CircularDependency(t *testing.T) { + w := &Workflow{ + Name: "test", + Steps: []Step{ + {ID: "a", DependsOn: []string{"c"}}, + {ID: "b", DependsOn: []string{"a"}}, + {ID: "c", DependsOn: []string{"b"}}, + }, + } + err := Validate(w) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "circular dependency") +} + +func TestDetectCycles_NoCycles(t *testing.T) { + steps := []Step{ + {ID: "a"}, + {ID: "b", DependsOn: []string{"a"}}, + {ID: "c", DependsOn: []string{"a"}}, + } + assert.NoError(t, detectCycles(steps)) +} + +func TestDetectCycles_DirectCycle(t *testing.T) { + steps := []Step{ + {ID: "a", DependsOn: []string{"b"}}, + {ID: "b", DependsOn: []string{"a"}}, + } + err := detectCycles(steps) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "circular dependency") +} + +func TestDetectCycles_IndirectCycle(t *testing.T) { + steps := []Step{ + {ID: "a", DependsOn: []string{"c"}}, + {ID: "b", DependsOn: []string{"a"}}, + {ID: "c", DependsOn: []string{"b"}}, + } + err := detectCycles(steps) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "circular dependency") +} diff --git a/internal/workflow/template_test.go b/internal/workflow/template_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2eb722d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/workflow/template_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +package workflow + +import ( + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func TestRenderPrompt_NoPlaceholders(t *testing.T) { + rendered, err := RenderPrompt("Hello world", nil) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "Hello world", rendered) +} + +func TestRenderPrompt_SingleSubstitution(t *testing.T) { + results := map[string]string{"step1": "result-value"} + rendered, err := RenderPrompt("Use {{step1.result}} here", results) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "Use result-value here", rendered) +} + +func TestRenderPrompt_MultipleSubstitutions(t *testing.T) { + results := map[string]string{ + "research": "research output", + "analyze": "analysis output", + } + tmpl := "Combine {{research.result}} with {{analyze.result}}" + rendered, err := RenderPrompt(tmpl, results) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "Combine research output with analysis output", rendered) +} + +func TestRenderPrompt_MissingKey(t *testing.T) { + results := map[string]string{} + _, err := RenderPrompt("Use {{missing.result}}", results) + assert.Error(t, err) + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "missing results for steps") + assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "missing") +} + +func TestRenderPrompt_HyphenatedStepID(t *testing.T) { + results := map[string]string{"my-step": "hyphen-value"} + rendered, err := RenderPrompt("{{my-step.result}}", results) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "hyphen-value", rendered) +} + +func TestRenderPrompt_UnderscoreStepID(t *testing.T) { + results := map[string]string{"my_step": "underscore-value"} + rendered, err := RenderPrompt("{{my_step.result}}", results) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "underscore-value", rendered) +} + +func TestPlaceholderRe_Matches(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + input string + matches bool + }{ + {"{{step1.result}}", true}, + {"{{my-step.result}}", true}, + {"{{my_step.result}}", true}, + {"{{Step1.result}}", true}, + {"{{123.result}}", true}, + {"{{.result}}", false}, // empty step ID + {"{{step1.output}}", false}, // wrong suffix + {"{{ step1.result }}", false}, // spaces + {"text without placeholders", false}, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + matched := placeholderRe.MatchString(tt.input) + assert.Equal(t, tt.matches, matched, "input: %q", tt.input) + } +} diff --git a/internal/x402/handler.go b/internal/x402/handler.go index c3089a22..0e14683a 100644 --- a/internal/x402/handler.go +++ b/internal/x402/handler.go @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ package x402 import ( + "context" + x402sdk "github.com/coinbase/x402/go" evmclient "github.com/coinbase/x402/go/mechanisms/evm/exact/client" ) @@ -8,7 +10,7 @@ import ( // NewX402Client creates an X402 SDK client configured for the given chain and signer. // The client is registered with the exact EVM scheme for the specified CAIP-2 network. func NewX402Client(signerProvider SignerProvider, chainID int64) (*x402sdk.X402Client, error) { - signer, err := signerProvider.EvmSigner(nil) + signer, err := signerProvider.EvmSigner(context.TODO()) if err != nil { return nil, err } diff --git a/internal/x402/signer.go b/internal/x402/signer.go index 324a0984..279c93db 100644 --- a/internal/x402/signer.go +++ b/internal/x402/signer.go @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import ( evmsigners "github.com/coinbase/x402/go/signers/evm" "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/security" + "github.com/langoai/lango/internal/wallet" ) // SignerProvider creates an EVM signer for X402 payments. @@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ type LocalSignerProvider struct { func NewLocalSignerProvider(secrets *security.SecretsStore) *LocalSignerProvider { return &LocalSignerProvider{ secrets: secrets, - keyName: "wallet.privatekey", + keyName: wallet.WalletKeyName, } } diff --git a/mkdocs.yml b/mkdocs.yml index 712a347e..ffbc148e 100644 --- a/mkdocs.yml +++ b/mkdocs.yml @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ nav: - Knowledge Graph: features/knowledge-graph.md - Multi-Agent Orchestration: features/multi-agent.md - A2A Protocol: features/a2a-protocol.md + - P2P Network: features/p2p-network.md - Skill System: features/skills.md - Proactive Librarian: features/librarian.md - System Prompts: features/system-prompts.md @@ -136,6 +137,7 @@ nav: - Agent & Memory: cli/agent-memory.md - Security Commands: cli/security.md - Payment Commands: cli/payment.md + - P2P Commands: cli/p2p.md - Automation Commands: cli/automation.md - Gateway & API: - gateway/index.md diff --git a/openspec/changes/add-eventbus-package/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/add-eventbus-package/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/add-eventbus-package/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/add-eventbus-package/design.md b/openspec/changes/add-eventbus-package/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..742dbd4a --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/add-eventbus-package/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +# Design: Event Bus Package + +## Architecture + +``` +internal/eventbus/ +├── bus.go # Bus struct, New, Subscribe, Publish, SubscribeTyped +├── events.go # Concrete event types and Triple mirror type +└── bus_test.go # Comprehensive test suite +``` + +## Key Decisions + +### Synchronous Dispatch + +All current callbacks are synchronous. The event bus preserves this behavior +to ensure drop-in replacement compatibility. Async dispatch can be added later +as a separate `PublishAsync` method if needed. + +### Handler Slice Copy on Publish + +`Publish` copies the handler slice under the read lock before invoking handlers. +This prevents deadlock when a handler calls `Subscribe` during dispatch and +avoids observing a partially-mutated slice. + +### Generic SubscribeTyped + +Uses Go generics to provide type-safe subscriptions: + +```go +SubscribeTyped(bus, func(e ContentSavedEvent) { + // e is already typed, no assertion needed +}) +``` + +Internally creates a `HandlerFunc` that type-asserts before calling the typed +handler. The event name is derived from the zero value of the type parameter. + +### Mirror Types + +`eventbus.Triple` mirrors `graph.Triple` to keep the eventbus package +completely dependency-free. Conversion between the two types will happen at +the boundary (in wiring code) during the migration phase. + +## Thread Safety + +| Operation | Lock | Notes | +|------------|-----------|--------------------------------------------| +| Subscribe | Write | Appends to handler slice | +| Publish | Read | Copies slice under lock, invokes outside | + +This allows concurrent publishes (common path) while serializing subscriptions +(rare path, typically at startup). + +## Test Coverage + +- Single handler receives published event +- Multiple handlers receive in registration order +- No panic on publish with no handlers +- SubscribeTyped type-safe handling +- Different event types route to different handlers +- Concurrent publish/subscribe (race detector) +- All event types have distinct names +- Round-trip tests for each concrete event type diff --git a/openspec/changes/add-eventbus-package/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/add-eventbus-package/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..922ea0ee --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/add-eventbus-package/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# Proposal: Add Typed Event Bus Package + +## Problem + +There are 13+ `SetXxxCallback()` calls scattered through wiring code (`internal/app/wiring.go`). +These callbacks are: +1. Synchronously invoked +2. Optional (nil-checked before invocation) +3. Set via setter methods after construction + +This creates tight coupling between producers and consumers, making it hard to +add new subscribers or change wiring without touching multiple files. + +## Solution + +Create a new `internal/eventbus/` package that provides a synchronous, typed +event bus. The bus acts as a central dispatcher that decouples event producers +from consumers. + +**Phase 4 scope:** Create the package only. No existing code is modified. +Future phases will incrementally migrate callbacks to publish/subscribe. + +## Benefits + +- Decouples producers from consumers (no more SetXxxCallback) +- Type-safe subscriptions via generics +- Thread-safe by design (RWMutex) +- Zero external dependencies +- Dependency-free mirror types avoid import cycles diff --git a/openspec/changes/add-eventbus-package/specs/eventbus/spec.md b/openspec/changes/add-eventbus-package/specs/eventbus/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..db69f2aa --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/add-eventbus-package/specs/eventbus/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +# Spec: Event Bus + +## Overview + +`internal/eventbus/` provides a synchronous, typed event bus for decoupling +callback-based wiring between components. + +## Interface + +### Event + +```go +type Event interface { + EventName() string +} +``` + +All events must implement this interface. The `EventName()` return value is +used as the routing key for subscriptions. + +### Bus + +```go +type Bus struct { ... } + +func New() *Bus +func (b *Bus) Subscribe(eventName string, handler HandlerFunc) +func (b *Bus) Publish(event Event) +func SubscribeTyped[T Event](bus *Bus, handler func(T)) +``` + +- `Subscribe` registers a handler for a specific event name. +- `Publish` dispatches an event to all registered handlers synchronously, in + registration order. +- `SubscribeTyped` is a generic helper that provides compile-time type safety. + +### Concurrency + +- `Subscribe` acquires a write lock. +- `Publish` acquires a read lock, copies the handler slice, releases the lock, + then invokes handlers outside the lock to prevent deadlock from handlers + that call `Subscribe`. + +## Event Types + +| Event Type | EventName | Replaces | +|-------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------------------------| +| ContentSavedEvent | content.saved | SetEmbedCallback, SetGraphCallback on stores | +| TriplesExtractedEvent | triples.extracted | SetGraphCallback on learning engines/analyzers | +| TurnCompletedEvent | turn.completed | Gateway.OnTurnComplete | +| ReputationChangedEvent | reputation.changed | reputation.Store.SetOnChangeCallback | +| MemoryGraphEvent | memory.graph | memory.Store.SetGraphHooks | + +### Triple Type + +`eventbus.Triple` mirrors `graph.Triple` to avoid importing the graph package, +keeping eventbus dependency-free. + +## Constraints + +- Zero external dependencies (stdlib only) +- No import of any other internal package +- Handlers are invoked synchronously in registration order +- No handler is registered for an event: publish is a silent no-op diff --git a/openspec/changes/add-eventbus-package/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/add-eventbus-package/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7188d3c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/add-eventbus-package/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +# Tasks: Add Event Bus Package + +## Implementation + +- [x] Create `internal/eventbus/bus.go` with Bus struct, New, Subscribe, Publish, SubscribeTyped +- [x] Create `internal/eventbus/events.go` with ContentSavedEvent, TriplesExtractedEvent, TurnCompletedEvent, ReputationChangedEvent, MemoryGraphEvent, Triple +- [x] Create `internal/eventbus/bus_test.go` with comprehensive test suite + +## Verification + +- [x] `go build ./internal/eventbus/...` passes +- [x] `go test -v -race ./internal/eventbus/...` passes (10/10 tests) +- [x] `go build ./...` passes (full project build) +- [x] No modifications to existing files diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cbbb5783 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-22 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ef263602 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +## Context + +The P2P networking core is fully implemented across `internal/p2p/` (node, identity, handshake, firewall, discovery, protocol, ZKP) but has zero user-facing surface. Users cannot inspect, configure, or interact with P2P features from the CLI, and agents have no awareness of P2P tools in their prompts. Documentation does not mention P2P capabilities. + +This change adds the presentation layer: CLI commands, agent prompts, embedded skills, and documentation. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Expose all P2P core functionality through `lango p2p` CLI commands +- Make the agent aware of P2P tools via updated prompts +- Provide embedded skills for common P2P operations +- Document P2P features, CLI commands, and configuration + +**Non-Goals:** +- Modifying P2P core behavior (node, handshake, firewall logic) +- Adding new P2P protocol features +- Creating agent tools (tool registration in `internal/tools/p2p/`) — that is a separate change +- TUI integration for P2P settings + +## Decisions + +### D1: CLI follows bootstrap Result loader pattern +**Decision**: Use `bootLoader func() (*bootstrap.Result, error)` pattern from `cli/payment/`. +**Rationale**: P2P Node requires config from bootstrap. Consistent with existing CLI patterns. The `initP2PDeps` function creates a temporary P2P node for the duration of the CLI command. +**Alternative considered**: Config-only loader (like `cli/memory/`) — rejected because P2P commands need a live libp2p host to query peers and connect. + +### D2: CLI creates its own P2P Node instance +**Decision**: Each CLI invocation creates and starts its own P2P node via `p2p.NewNode()`, then stops it on cleanup. +**Rationale**: CLI commands are short-lived and independent of `lango serve`. Creating a dedicated node avoids IPC complexity with a running server. +**Trade-off**: The CLI node won't see peers connected to the server's node. Commands like `peers` show the CLI node's connections, not the server's. This is acceptable for the initial implementation. + +### D3: Firewall CLI reads config, not runtime state +**Decision**: `lango p2p firewall list` reads rules from `P2PConfig.FirewallRules`, not from a running firewall instance. +**Rationale**: The CLI-created node has a fresh firewall with only config rules. Runtime-added rules (via agent tools) only exist in the server process. Config-based listing is the correct behavior for a CLI inspection tool. + +### D4: Prompt changes are additive only +**Decision**: Add a 10th tool category and new TOOL_USAGE section without restructuring existing content. +**Rationale**: Minimizes risk of breaking existing prompt behavior. The P2P section follows the same format as existing tool sections. + +### D5: Skills use script type with direct CLI mapping +**Decision**: Each skill is a simple `type: script` that maps to `lango p2p `. +**Rationale**: Matches the pattern of all 30 existing embedded skills. No composite or template skills needed since each P2P operation maps to a single CLI command. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **[CLI node isolation]** CLI P2P commands operate on a fresh node, not the server's node → Users may be confused when `lango p2p peers` shows different results than what the running server sees. → Mitigation: Document this behavior clearly; future work can add IPC to query the server. +- **[Firewall add is runtime-only]** `lango p2p firewall add` prints a message but cannot persist rules → Mitigation: Output includes guidance to edit config for persistence. +- **[Discovery requires bootstrap peers]** `lango p2p discover` on a fresh node finds no peers without pre-configured bootstrap peers → Mitigation: Command output includes guidance when no agents are found. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..02033815 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +## Why + +The P2P networking core (libp2p node, ZKP, handshake, firewall, discovery, protocol) is fully implemented in the core and application layers, but there is no user-facing surface: no CLI commands, no documentation, no agent prompts, and no skills reference the P2P subsystem. Users cannot interact with P2P features without this change. + +## What Changes + +- Add `lango p2p` CLI command group with 7 subcommands (status, peers, connect, disconnect, firewall, discover, identity) following the existing `cli/payment` bootstrap-loader pattern +- Wire `clip2p.NewP2PCmd` into `cmd/lango/main.go` +- Update agent prompts: add P2P as the 10th tool category in AGENTS.md, add P2P tool usage section in TOOL_USAGE.md, extend vault agent identity with P2P role +- Create 8 embedded skills (p2p-status, p2p-peers, p2p-connect, p2p-disconnect, p2p-discover, p2p-identity, p2p-firewall-list, p2p-firewall-add) +- Update README.md with P2P features, CLI commands, configuration reference, and architecture entry +- Update mkdocs.yml navigation with P2P feature and CLI pages +- Create new docs: features/p2p-network.md, cli/p2p.md +- Update existing docs: features/index.md (P2P card), features/a2a-protocol.md (HTTP vs P2P comparison), configuration.md (P2P config section) + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `cli-p2p-management`: CLI commands for P2P node status, peer management, firewall rules, agent discovery, and identity inspection +- `p2p-agent-prompts`: Agent prompt sections describing P2P tools and vault agent P2P role +- `p2p-skills`: Embedded skill files mapping to P2P CLI commands +- `p2p-documentation`: User-facing documentation for P2P features, CLI reference, and configuration + +### Modified Capabilities +- `embedded-prompt-files`: Tool category count changes from nine to ten, new P2P section added +- `mkdocs-documentation-site`: Navigation updated with P2P feature and CLI pages +- `docs-config-format`: Configuration reference expanded with P2P section + +## Impact + +- **CLI**: New `internal/cli/p2p/` package (8 files), `cmd/lango/main.go` import addition +- **Prompts**: 3 embedded prompt files modified (AGENTS.md, TOOL_USAGE.md, agents/vault/IDENTITY.md) +- **Skills**: 8 new skill directories under `skills/` +- **Docs**: 2 new doc files, 5 existing docs modified, mkdocs nav updated +- **Tests**: `internal/prompt/defaults_test.go` assertion updated for new tool count +- **Dependencies**: No new Go dependencies; all P2P CLI commands use existing `internal/p2p/` package diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/cli-p2p-management/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/cli-p2p-management/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..058fe0b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/cli-p2p-management/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P CLI command group +The system SHALL provide a `lango p2p` command group with subcommands for P2P network management, wired into `cmd/lango/main.go` using the bootstrap Result loader pattern. + +#### Scenario: Root command shows help +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p` +- **THEN** system displays help text listing all available P2P subcommands + +### Requirement: P2P status command +The system SHALL provide `lango p2p status [--json]` that displays node peer ID, listen addresses, connected peer count, max peers, mDNS status, relay status, and ZK handshake status. + +#### Scenario: Status in text format +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p status` +- **THEN** system prints peer ID, listen addrs, connected peers count, and feature flags in human-readable format + +#### Scenario: Status in JSON format +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p status --json` +- **THEN** system outputs a JSON object with fields: peerId, listenAddrs, connectedPeers, maxPeers, mdns, relay, zkHandshake + +### Requirement: P2P peers command +The system SHALL provide `lango p2p peers [--json]` that lists all connected peers with peer ID and remote multiaddrs using tabwriter output. + +#### Scenario: No connected peers +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p peers` with no connected peers +- **THEN** system prints "No connected peers." + +#### Scenario: Connected peers in table format +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p peers` with connected peers +- **THEN** system prints a table with PEER ID and ADDRESS columns + +### Requirement: P2P connect command +The system SHALL provide `lango p2p connect ` that parses the multiaddr, extracts peer info, and connects to the peer via the libp2p host. + +#### Scenario: Successful connection +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p connect /ip4/1.2.3.4/tcp/9000/p2p/QmPeerId` +- **THEN** system connects and prints "Connected to peer QmPeerId" + +#### Scenario: Invalid multiaddr +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p connect invalid-addr` +- **THEN** system returns an error "parse multiaddr: ..." + +### Requirement: P2P disconnect command +The system SHALL provide `lango p2p disconnect ` that closes the connection to the specified peer. + +#### Scenario: Successful disconnection +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p disconnect QmPeerId` +- **THEN** system closes the peer connection and prints "Disconnected from peer QmPeerId" + +### Requirement: P2P firewall command group +The system SHALL provide `lango p2p firewall [list|add|remove]` subcommands for managing knowledge firewall ACL rules. + +#### Scenario: Firewall list shows config rules +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p firewall list` +- **THEN** system displays configured firewall rules in a table with PEER DID, ACTION, TOOLS, and RATE LIMIT columns + +#### Scenario: Firewall add prints runtime-only notice +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p firewall add --peer-did "did:lango:02abc" --action allow` +- **THEN** system prints the rule details and a notice to persist via configuration + +### Requirement: P2P discover command +The system SHALL provide `lango p2p discover [--tag ] [--json]` that creates a GossipService and searches for agents by capability. + +#### Scenario: Discover with tag filter +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p discover --tag research` +- **THEN** system displays agents matching the "research" capability in a table with NAME, DID, CAPABILITIES, and PEER ID columns + +### Requirement: P2P identity command +The system SHALL provide `lango p2p identity [--json]` that displays the local peer ID, key directory, and listen addresses. + +#### Scenario: Identity in text format +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p identity` +- **THEN** system prints peer ID, key directory path, and listen addresses + +### Requirement: P2P disabled error +All P2P CLI commands SHALL return a clear error when `p2p.enabled` is false. + +#### Scenario: P2P not enabled +- **WHEN** user runs any `lango p2p` subcommand with P2P disabled +- **THEN** system returns error "P2P networking is not enabled (set p2p.enabled = true)" diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/docs-config-format/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/docs-config-format/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..55636eeb --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/docs-config-format/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Configuration reference includes P2P section +The docs/configuration.md SHALL include a P2P Network section with JSON example, settings table covering all P2PConfig and ZKPConfig fields, and a firewall rule entry sub-table. + +#### Scenario: P2P config section present +- **WHEN** the configuration reference documentation is opened +- **THEN** it contains a "P2P Network" section between Payment and Cron with experimental warning badge + +#### Scenario: P2P config table complete +- **WHEN** the P2P Network configuration table is read +- **THEN** it includes entries for: p2p.enabled, p2p.listenAddrs, p2p.bootstrapPeers, p2p.keyDir, p2p.enableRelay, p2p.enableMdns, p2p.maxPeers, p2p.handshakeTimeout, p2p.sessionTokenTtl, p2p.autoApproveKnownPeers, p2p.firewallRules, p2p.gossipInterval, p2p.zkHandshake, p2p.zkAttestation, p2p.zkp.proofCacheDir, p2p.zkp.provingScheme diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/embedded-prompt-files/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/embedded-prompt-files/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3276e409 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/embedded-prompt-files/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Embedded prompt file content +The embedded AGENTS.md SHALL reference "ten tool categories" (previously nine) and include a P2P Network entry in the tool category list. The TOOL_USAGE.md SHALL include a P2P Networking Tool section after the existing Error Handling section. + +#### Scenario: Tool category count updated +- **WHEN** the AGENTS.md embedded content is loaded +- **THEN** it contains the text "ten tool categories" + +#### Scenario: P2P tool usage section present +- **WHEN** the TOOL_USAGE.md embedded content is loaded +- **THEN** it contains a "### P2P Networking Tool" section + +### Requirement: Prompt test compatibility +The defaults_test.go SHALL assert "ten tool categories" instead of "nine tool categories" to match the updated embedded content. + +#### Scenario: Test passes with updated count +- **WHEN** `go test ./internal/prompt/...` is run +- **THEN** all tests pass including the embedded content verification diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/mkdocs-documentation-site/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/mkdocs-documentation-site/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0fab9176 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/mkdocs-documentation-site/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Navigation includes P2P pages +The mkdocs.yml navigation SHALL include "P2P Network: features/p2p-network.md" in the Features section and "P2P Commands: cli/p2p.md" in the CLI Reference section. + +#### Scenario: P2P feature in nav +- **WHEN** the mkdocs site is built +- **THEN** the Features navigation section includes a "P2P Network" entry after "A2A Protocol" + +#### Scenario: P2P CLI in nav +- **WHEN** the mkdocs site is built +- **THEN** the CLI Reference navigation section includes a "P2P Commands" entry after "Payment Commands" diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/p2p-agent-prompts/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/p2p-agent-prompts/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a6db0698 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/p2p-agent-prompts/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P tool category in agent identity +The AGENTS.md prompt SHALL include P2P Network as the 10th tool category describing peer connectivity, firewall ACL management, remote agent querying, capability-based discovery, and peer payments with Noise encryption and DID identity verification. + +#### Scenario: Agent identity includes P2P +- **WHEN** the agent system prompt is built +- **THEN** the identity section references "ten tool categories" and includes a P2P Network bullet + +### Requirement: P2P tool usage guidelines +The TOOL_USAGE.md prompt SHALL include a "P2P Networking Tool" section documenting all P2P tools: p2p_status, p2p_connect, p2p_disconnect, p2p_peers, p2p_query, p2p_discover, p2p_firewall_rules, p2p_firewall_add, p2p_firewall_remove, p2p_pay. + +#### Scenario: Tool usage includes P2P section +- **WHEN** the agent system prompt is built +- **THEN** the tool usage section includes P2P Networking Tool guidelines with session token and firewall deny behavior notes + +### Requirement: Vault agent P2P role +The vault agent IDENTITY.md SHALL include P2P peer management and firewall rule management as part of its responsibilities. + +#### Scenario: Vault identity covers P2P +- **WHEN** the vault sub-agent prompt is built +- **THEN** the identity mentions P2P networking alongside crypto, secrets, and payment operations diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/p2p-documentation/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/p2p-documentation/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ad6e99fa --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/p2p-documentation/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P feature documentation +The system SHALL provide docs/features/p2p-network.md covering: overview, identity (DID scheme), handshake flow, knowledge firewall (ACL rules, response sanitization, ZK attestation), discovery (GossipSub, agent card structure), ZK circuits, configuration, and CLI commands. + +#### Scenario: Feature doc exists with all sections +- **WHEN** the P2P feature documentation is opened +- **THEN** it contains sections for Overview, Identity, Handshake, Knowledge Firewall, Discovery, ZK Circuits, Configuration, and CLI Commands + +### Requirement: P2P CLI reference documentation +The system SHALL provide docs/cli/p2p.md with usage, flags, arguments, and examples for all P2P commands: status, peers, connect, disconnect, firewall (list/add/remove), discover, and identity. + +#### Scenario: CLI doc covers all commands +- **WHEN** the P2P CLI reference is opened +- **THEN** each P2P subcommand has its own section with usage syntax, flag table, and example output + +### Requirement: README P2P sections +The README.md SHALL include P2P in the features list, CLI commands section, configuration reference table, and architecture tree. + +#### Scenario: README features include P2P +- **WHEN** the README is opened +- **THEN** the Features section includes a P2P Network bullet point + +#### Scenario: README CLI includes P2P commands +- **WHEN** the README CLI commands section is read +- **THEN** it lists all 9 P2P CLI commands (status, peers, connect, disconnect, firewall list/add/remove, discover, identity) + +### Requirement: Features index P2P card +The docs/features/index.md SHALL include a P2P Network card in the grid layout with experimental badge and a row in the Feature Status table. + +#### Scenario: Feature index includes P2P card +- **WHEN** the features index page is rendered +- **THEN** a P2P Network card appears with experimental badge linking to p2p-network.md + +### Requirement: A2A protocol HTTP vs P2P comparison +The docs/features/a2a-protocol.md SHALL include a comparison section distinguishing A2A-over-HTTP from A2A-over-P2P across transport, discovery, identity, auth, firewall, and use case dimensions. + +#### Scenario: A2A doc includes comparison table +- **WHEN** the A2A protocol documentation is opened +- **THEN** it contains an "A2A-over-HTTP vs A2A-over-P2P" section with a comparison table diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/p2p-skills/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/p2p-skills/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a717aa6d --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/p2p-skills/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P embedded skills +The system SHALL provide 8 embedded skills for P2P operations, each using `type: script` with `status: active` and mapping to a `lango p2p` CLI command. + +#### Scenario: All P2P skills present +- **WHEN** the skills directory is scanned +- **THEN** the following skill directories exist with valid SKILL.md files: p2p-status, p2p-peers, p2p-connect, p2p-disconnect, p2p-discover, p2p-identity, p2p-firewall-list, p2p-firewall-add + +### Requirement: Skill format consistency +Each P2P skill SKILL.md SHALL follow the existing skill format with YAML frontmatter (name, description, type, status) and a shell code block with the corresponding CLI command. + +#### Scenario: Skill file structure +- **WHEN** any P2P SKILL.md file is parsed +- **THEN** it contains valid YAML frontmatter with `type: script` and `status: active`, and a shell code block executing `lango p2p ` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1667966c --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +## 1. CLI P2P Command Group + +- [x] 1.1 Create `internal/cli/p2p/p2p.go` with `NewP2PCmd`, `p2pDeps` struct, and `initP2PDeps` using bootstrap Result loader pattern +- [x] 1.2 Create `internal/cli/p2p/status.go` with `lango p2p status [--json]` command +- [x] 1.3 Create `internal/cli/p2p/peers.go` with `lango p2p peers [--json]` command using tabwriter +- [x] 1.4 Create `internal/cli/p2p/connect.go` with `lango p2p connect ` command +- [x] 1.5 Create `internal/cli/p2p/disconnect.go` with `lango p2p disconnect ` command +- [x] 1.6 Create `internal/cli/p2p/firewall.go` with `lango p2p firewall [list|add|remove]` subcommands +- [x] 1.7 Create `internal/cli/p2p/discover.go` with `lango p2p discover [--tag] [--json]` command +- [x] 1.8 Create `internal/cli/p2p/identity.go` with `lango p2p identity [--json]` command +- [x] 1.9 Wire `clip2p.NewP2PCmd` into `cmd/lango/main.go` with bootstrap loader + +## 2. Agent Prompts + +- [x] 2.1 Update `prompts/AGENTS.md`: change "nine" to "ten" tool categories, add P2P Network bullet +- [x] 2.2 Update `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md`: add P2P Networking Tool section with all P2P tool guidelines +- [x] 2.3 Update `prompts/agents/vault/IDENTITY.md`: add P2P peer management to vault agent role + +## 3. Embedded Skills + +- [x] 3.1 Create `skills/p2p-status/SKILL.md` (type: script, `lango p2p status`) +- [x] 3.2 Create `skills/p2p-peers/SKILL.md` (type: script, `lango p2p peers`) +- [x] 3.3 Create `skills/p2p-connect/SKILL.md` (type: script, `lango p2p connect $MULTIADDR`) +- [x] 3.4 Create `skills/p2p-disconnect/SKILL.md` (type: script, `lango p2p disconnect $PEER_ID`) +- [x] 3.5 Create `skills/p2p-discover/SKILL.md` (type: script, `lango p2p discover`) +- [x] 3.6 Create `skills/p2p-identity/SKILL.md` (type: script, `lango p2p identity`) +- [x] 3.7 Create `skills/p2p-firewall-list/SKILL.md` (type: script, `lango p2p firewall list`) +- [x] 3.8 Create `skills/p2p-firewall-add/SKILL.md` (type: script, `lango p2p firewall add`) + +## 4. Documentation + +- [x] 4.1 Create `docs/features/p2p-network.md` with overview, identity, handshake, firewall, discovery, ZK circuits, config, CLI sections +- [x] 4.2 Create `docs/cli/p2p.md` with usage, flags, examples for all P2P commands +- [x] 4.3 Update `docs/features/index.md`: add P2P Network card and Feature Status row +- [x] 4.4 Update `docs/features/a2a-protocol.md`: add A2A-over-HTTP vs A2A-over-P2P comparison +- [x] 4.5 Update `mkdocs.yml`: add P2P feature and CLI pages to navigation +- [x] 4.6 Update `docs/configuration.md`: add P2P Network config section with JSON example and table +- [x] 4.7 Update `README.md`: add P2P to features, CLI commands, config table, architecture tree, and new P2P section + +## 5. Test Updates + +- [x] 5.1 Update `internal/prompt/defaults_test.go`: change "nine tool categories" assertion to "ten tool categories" +- [x] 5.2 Verify `go build ./...` passes +- [x] 5.3 Verify `go test ./...` passes diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cbbb5783 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-22 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6cb27836 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +## Context + +Lango is a Go AI agent platform with HTTP-based A2A communication, ECDSA wallet (USDC on Base), and a security layer (CryptoProvider/SecretsStore). All inter-agent communication currently depends on a central HTTP server, making discovery and communication registry-dependent. This change adds a decentralized P2P networking layer — allowing agents to discover each other, mutually authenticate, and exchange A2A messages without any central coordinator, while preserving the existing wallet and security infrastructure. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +### Goals + +- Platform-independent agent discovery via Kademlia DHT and mDNS (LAN fallback) +- Zero-trust mutual authentication using ZK-enhanced handshakes derived from existing wallet keys +- Knowledge privacy enforcement via a default deny-all firewall on all incoming P2P queries +- User sovereignty (HITL): agent-to-agent interactions require explicit user approval during handshake +- Peer-to-peer USDC payments over P2P streams using existing payment service +- Zero new key management: DID identity is derived from the existing wallet ECDSA public key + +### Non-Goals + +- Production MPC ceremony for gnark SRS parameters (trusted setup) +- Smart contract deployment or on-chain DID registry +- Mobile or browser P2P support +- GUI/TUI for real-time P2P management +- Per-message ZKP verification (proof generation latency is acceptable only at handshake time) + +## Decisions + +### 1. libp2p over Custom Networking + +**Options considered**: +- Custom TCP/TLS with self-signed certs +- WebRTC with STUN/TURN +- libp2p (go-libp2p) + +**Decision**: libp2p v0.47.0 + +libp2p provides Noise protocol encryption, TCP and QUIC transports, Kademlia DHT, mDNS discovery, and GossipSub pub/sub — all battle-tested in IPFS and Filecoin production networks. Building equivalent functionality from scratch would introduce significant security surface. libp2p's `peer.ID` maps naturally to a content-addressed identity, and its stream multiplexing integrates cleanly with the A2A request/response pattern. + +### 2. DID Derived from Wallet Key + +**Options considered**: +- Separate Ed25519 keypair for P2P identity +- did:key method with new key generation +- did:lango derived from existing ECDSA wallet public key + +**Decision**: `did:lango:` + +The existing wallet (`payment.enabled`) already holds an ECDSA keypair used for on-chain transactions. Deriving the DID from the same public key ties P2P identity to on-chain identity at zero operational cost — no additional key generation, rotation policies, or backup procedures. The `PublicKey()` method was added to the `WalletProvider` interface to surface the compressed public key. P2P is gated on `payment.enabled`; agents without a wallet cannot participate in the P2P network. + +### 3. ZKP: gnark Circuits with Hash-Based Fallback + +**Options considered**: +- Pure signature-based authentication (no ZKP) +- External ZKP service (snarkjs/rapidsnark via subprocess) +- gnark native Go circuits (PlonK on BN254) + +**Decision**: gnark v0.14.0 with hash-based development fallback + +Four circuits are defined: `OwnershipCircuit` (proves control of DID private key), `BalanceCircuit` (proves USDC balance above threshold without revealing amount), `AttestationCircuit` (proves possession of a signed credential), and `CapabilityCircuit` (proves agent capability without revealing implementation). PlonK on BN254 is used for its universal trusted setup (no per-circuit ceremony). A hash-based placeholder (`zkp.HashProver`) is provided for development and testing environments where gnark's trusted setup is unavailable. The `ZKProverFunc` callback in `HandshakeConfig` allows injection of either implementation. + +**Trade-off**: gnark adds approximately 6-8 MB to the binary. This is acceptable for a server-side agent platform. Proof generation takes 50-200ms per proof, which is acceptable at handshake time but not per-message. + +### 4. Callback Pattern for Import Cycle Avoidance + +**Options considered**: +- Direct interface imports between `internal/p2p/` and `internal/app/` +- Separate adapter package +- Callback functions injected at wiring time + +**Decision**: Callback functions injected at wiring time + +This matches the existing `EmbedCallback`/`GraphCallback` pattern established in the codebase. Four callback types are defined on P2P config structures: `ToolExecutor` (executes agent tools on behalf of remote peers), `CardProvider` (returns the local agent's A2A card), `ApprovalFunc` (HITL: blocks handshake until user approves), and `ZKProverFunc` (generates ZK proofs). All are wired in `internal/app/wiring.go`. The `internal/p2p/` package has no import dependency on `internal/app/`. + +### 5. Default Deny-All Knowledge Firewall + +**Decision**: `KnowledgeFirewall` blocks all incoming P2P queries by default. Explicit allow rules are required per-capability, per-peer, or per-DID pattern. + +Zero-trust by design: an agent joining the P2P network does not automatically share any knowledge. Operators must explicitly configure which capabilities remote peers may invoke and from which DIDs. Rules are evaluated in order; the first match wins. A catch-all deny rule is always appended as the final rule. Response sanitization strips fields matching configured patterns before returning results to remote peers. + +### 6. Session-Based Auth with HMAC-SHA256 Tokens + +**Decision**: After a successful handshake (wallet signature verification + optional ZKP verification + HITL approval), a session token is issued using HMAC-SHA256 over `(peerID + sessionID + timestamp)` with a configurable TTL (default 24h). Subsequent A2A messages over P2P streams present this token to skip the full handshake overhead. + +Session state is held in memory (map protected by `sync.RWMutex`) on each node. Sessions are not persisted across restarts — reconnection triggers a new handshake. This is intentional: it keeps the session store simple and avoids persistent storage dependencies in the P2P layer. + +### 7. GossipSub for Agent Card Propagation + +**Decision**: Agent cards (extended with DID, multiaddrs, capabilities, pricing, and ZK credentials) are broadcast periodically over a GossipSub topic (`lango/agent-cards/v1`). Received cards are verified against the sender's DID before being indexed for capability search. + +**Trade-off**: GossipSub fans out messages to all subscribers, which can amplify traffic in large networks. Mitigation: per-peer rate limiting on card reception (max 1 card/minute per peer), and card deduplication by content hash. DHT advertisements (`dht.Provide`) are used in parallel for targeted capability lookup without broadcast. + +### 8. ConnManager with High/Low Watermarks + +**Decision**: `connmgr.NewConnManager` with configurable `maxPeers` (default 50), low watermark at 80% of max (40), and graceful trim on excess. This prevents unbounded peer accumulation while maintaining a healthy routing table for DHT. + +### 9. Vault Agent Routes p2p_ Tools + +**Decision**: The 10 P2P tools (`p2p_status`, `p2p_connect`, `p2p_disconnect`, `p2p_peers`, `p2p_query`, `p2p_firewall_rules`, `p2p_firewall_add`, `p2p_firewall_remove`, `p2p_discover`, `p2p_pay`) are routed through the vault agent, consistent with the existing pattern for security-sensitive tools (`crypto_*`, `secrets_*`, `payment_*`). This centralizes privileged tool routing without requiring a separate P2P agent role. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +| Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation | +|------|------------|--------|------------| +| gnark binary size increase (+6-8 MB) | Certain | Low | Acceptable for server-side platform; document in release notes | +| GossipSub message amplification in large networks | Medium | Medium | Per-peer rate limiting (1 card/min), content-hash deduplication | +| DHT bootstrap cold start (no known peers) | High | Medium | mDNS as automatic LAN fallback; configurable bootstrap peer list | +| ZKP proof generation latency (50-200ms) | Certain | Low | ZKP only at handshake; session tokens amortize cost for subsequent messages | +| gnark trusted setup (SRS) in production | Medium | High | Hash-based fallback for dev; document MPC ceremony requirement for production | +| In-memory session state lost on restart | Certain | Low | Intentional design; reconnect triggers new handshake; document behavior | +| P2P port exposure in Docker/firewall | Medium | Medium | Configurable listen addresses; document required port (default 4001/tcp+udp) | +| HITL approval blocking async P2P queries | Low | Medium | Approval timeout configurable; timeout → auto-deny to prevent hangs | diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2c47fea0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +## Why + +Lango currently relies on centralized HTTP-based A2A communication. To achieve platform-independent, censorship-resistant agent networking — like IPFS/Bitcoin for AI agents — we need a decentralized P2P layer where agents can discover, authenticate, communicate, and transact without central registries. + +## What Changes + +- Add libp2p-based P2P networking node with Kademlia DHT and mDNS discovery +- Introduce DID identity system derived from existing wallet public keys (`did:lango:`) +- Implement ZK-enhanced peer authentication (handshake with wallet signatures + optional ZKP) +- Add Knowledge Firewall with default deny-all ACL and response sanitization +- Implement A2A-over-P2P protocol for tool invocation over encrypted libp2p streams +- Add GossipSub-based agent card propagation and DHT-based agent advertisements +- Extend Agent Card with P2P fields (DID, multiaddrs, capabilities, pricing, ZK credentials) +- Add ZKP core using gnark (PlonK/Groth16) for ownership, balance, attestation, and capability circuits +- Add peer-to-peer USDC payment via existing payment service +- Add 11 new agent tools (`p2p_status`, `p2p_connect`, `p2p_disconnect`, `p2p_peers`, `p2p_query`, `p2p_firewall_rules`, `p2p_firewall_add`, `p2p_firewall_remove`, `p2p_discover`, `p2p_pay`) + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `p2p-networking`: libp2p node lifecycle, DHT bootstrap, mDNS discovery, peer connection management +- `p2p-identity`: DID derivation from wallet, peer identity verification +- `p2p-handshake`: ZK-enhanced mutual authentication with session tokens, HITL approval +- `p2p-firewall`: Knowledge firewall with ACL rules, response sanitization, ZK attestation +- `p2p-protocol`: A2A message exchange over libp2p streams, remote agent adapter +- `p2p-discovery`: GossipSub agent card propagation, DHT agent advertisements, capability search +- `zkp-core`: gnark-based ProverService with PlonK/Groth16, ownership/balance/attestation/capability circuits +- `p2p-payment`: Peer-to-peer USDC payment with session verification + +### Modified Capabilities +- `a2a-protocol`: Agent Card extended with DID, multiaddrs, capabilities, pricing, ZK credentials +- `blockchain-wallet`: PublicKey() method added to WalletProvider interface + +## Impact + +- **New packages**: `internal/p2p/` (node, identity, handshake, firewall, protocol, discovery), `internal/zkp/` (circuits) +- **Modified files**: config/types.go, wallet/*.go, a2a/server.go, app/wiring.go, app/app.go, app/tools.go, app/types.go, orchestration/tools.go +- **Dependencies**: go-libp2p v0.47.0, go-libp2p-kad-dht v0.38.0, go-libp2p-pubsub v0.15.0, go-multiaddr v0.16.1, gnark v0.14.0 +- **Config**: New `p2p` section with enabled flag, listen addresses, bootstrap peers, firewall rules, ZK settings +- **Orchestration**: vault agent now routes `p2p_*` tools diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/a2a-protocol/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/a2a-protocol/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..73379e1e --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/a2a-protocol/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Agent Card Extended with P2P Fields + +The `AgentCard` struct (served at `GET /.well-known/agent.json`) SHALL be extended with the following optional P2P fields in addition to its existing `name`, `description`, `url`, and `skills` fields: + +- `did` (`string`, omitempty): The agent's decentralized identifier in `did:lango:` format, populated when P2P is enabled. +- `multiaddrs` (`[]string`, omitempty): The list of libp2p multiaddresses the agent is reachable at over the P2P network. +- `capabilities` (`[]string`, omitempty): A list of capability identifiers the agent advertises for P2P capability-based discovery. +- `pricing` (`*PricingInfo`, omitempty): Optional pricing structure containing `currency`, `perQuery`, `perMinute`, and `toolPrices` map. Currency SHALL be `"USDC"`. +- `zkCredentials` (`[]ZKCredential`, omitempty): Optional list of ZK-attested capability credentials, each containing `capabilityId`, `proof` (bytes), `issuedAt`, and `expiresAt`. + +When P2P is disabled, all P2P extension fields SHALL be omitted from the JSON output (via `omitempty`). The HTTP endpoint behavior, path, and content-type SHALL remain unchanged. + +#### Scenario: Agent card includes P2P fields when P2P enabled +- **WHEN** `GET /.well-known/agent.json` is called and P2P is enabled with a DID and multiaddrs configured +- **THEN** the response JSON SHALL include `did`, `multiaddrs`, and `capabilities` fields with their configured values + +#### Scenario: P2P fields absent when P2P disabled +- **WHEN** `GET /.well-known/agent.json` is called and P2P is disabled +- **THEN** the response JSON SHALL NOT contain `did`, `multiaddrs`, `capabilities`, `pricing`, or `zkCredentials` fields + +#### Scenario: SetP2PInfo populates card fields +- **WHEN** `Server.SetP2PInfo(did, multiaddrs, capabilities)` is called on an A2A server +- **THEN** subsequent calls to `GET /.well-known/agent.json` SHALL return the provided DID, multiaddrs, and capabilities + +#### Scenario: Pricing info serialized correctly +- **WHEN** `Server.SetPricing(&PricingInfo{Currency: "USDC", PerQuery: "0.01"})` is called +- **THEN** the agent card JSON SHALL contain `"pricing": {"currency": "USDC", "perQuery": "0.01"}` + +#### Scenario: ZK credentials included in agent card +- **WHEN** `AgentCard.ZKCredentials` contains a credential with a non-expired `ExpiresAt` +- **THEN** the credential SHALL appear in the JSON output with all fields present + +--- + +### Requirement: Agent Card Served Without Authentication + +The `GET /.well-known/agent.json` endpoint SHALL remain publicly accessible without any authentication requirement. P2P extension fields in the card (DID, multiaddrs) are intentionally public information used for peer discovery and SHALL be served to any requester. + +#### Scenario: Unauthenticated request receives full agent card +- **WHEN** an unauthenticated HTTP GET is made to `/.well-known/agent.json` +- **THEN** the server SHALL respond with HTTP 200 and the full agent card JSON including any P2P extension fields + +--- + +### Requirement: GossipCard Mirrors AgentCard P2P Fields + +The `GossipCard` type used for GossipSub propagation SHALL carry the same P2P-related fields as the `AgentCard` extension: `name`, `description`, `did`, `multiaddrs`, `capabilities`, `pricing`, `zkCredentials`, `peerId`, and `timestamp`. The `GossipCard` is separate from `AgentCard` but SHALL be structurally consistent with the P2P extension fields to enable seamless conversion between the two representations. + +#### Scenario: GossipCard fields match AgentCard P2P fields +- **WHEN** a `GossipCard` is constructed from an `AgentCard` with P2P fields set +- **THEN** all P2P extension fields (`did`, `multiaddrs`, `capabilities`, `pricing`, `zkCredentials`) SHALL be preserved in the `GossipCard` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/blockchain-wallet/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/blockchain-wallet/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..95b4e7c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/blockchain-wallet/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: PublicKey() Added to WalletProvider Interface + +The `WalletProvider` interface SHALL be extended with a `PublicKey(ctx context.Context) ([]byte, error)` method. This method SHALL return the compressed secp256k1 public key bytes (33 bytes) corresponding to the wallet's private key. The private key MUST NOT be exposed by this or any other method. The returned public key SHALL be deterministic: repeated calls with the same wallet MUST return the same bytes. + +`PublicKey` is required for P2P identity derivation: the DID system calls `WalletProvider.PublicKey()` to derive `did:lango:` and the corresponding libp2p peer ID. P2P is gated on `payment.enabled`; therefore `PublicKey` is only called when a wallet is present. + +#### Scenario: PublicKey returns 33-byte compressed public key +- **WHEN** `WalletProvider.PublicKey(ctx)` is called on a wallet initialized with an ECDSA keypair +- **THEN** the method SHALL return a 33-byte slice (compressed secp256k1 format, prefix `0x02` or `0x03`) + +#### Scenario: PublicKey is deterministic +- **WHEN** `WalletProvider.PublicKey(ctx)` is called multiple times on the same wallet +- **THEN** all calls SHALL return identical byte slices + +#### Scenario: PublicKey never exposes private key +- **WHEN** `WalletProvider.PublicKey(ctx)` is called +- **THEN** the returned bytes SHALL contain only the public key; the private key bytes SHALL NOT appear in any return value or log output + +#### Scenario: All WalletProvider implementations satisfy interface +- **WHEN** the codebase is compiled +- **THEN** all types that implemented the previous `WalletProvider` interface (`LocalWallet`, `RPCWallet`, `CompositeWallet`) SHALL implement `PublicKey` and satisfy the updated interface at compile time + +#### Scenario: PublicKey error propagates to DID derivation +- **WHEN** `WalletProvider.PublicKey(ctx)` returns an error (e.g., wallet not initialized, RPC failure) +- **THEN** `WalletDIDProvider.DID(ctx)` SHALL return a wrapped error containing "get wallet public key" and SHALL NOT cache a nil result + +--- + +### Requirement: Existing WalletProvider Methods Unchanged + +The pre-existing `WalletProvider` methods SHALL remain unchanged in signature and semantics: + +- `Address(ctx context.Context) (string, error)` — returns the wallet's checksummed Ethereum address +- `Balance(ctx context.Context) (*big.Int, error)` — returns native token balance in wei +- `SignTransaction(ctx context.Context, rawTx []byte) ([]byte, error)` — signs a raw transaction +- `SignMessage(ctx context.Context, message []byte) ([]byte, error)` — signs an arbitrary message + +Adding `PublicKey` to the interface constitutes a breaking change for any external implementations. Internal implementations (`LocalWallet`, `RPCWallet`, `CompositeWallet`) MUST all implement `PublicKey` before the interface change is merged. + +#### Scenario: Existing wallet methods continue to function +- **WHEN** `WalletProvider.Address(ctx)` is called on any implementation after the interface extension +- **THEN** the method SHALL return the same result as before the change (no regression) + +#### Scenario: Compile-time interface compliance check +- **WHEN** the package containing `LocalWallet` is compiled +- **THEN** the compile-time assertion `var _ WalletProvider = (*LocalWallet)(nil)` SHALL succeed without error diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-discovery/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-discovery/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..eaf04a91 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-discovery/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: GossipSub Agent Card Propagation + +The `GossipService` SHALL join the GossipSub topic `/lango/agentcard/1.0.0` and periodically publish the local `GossipCard` at the configured interval. The card SHALL be published immediately on service start. Own messages SHALL be discarded (filtered by comparing `msg.ReceivedFrom` to `host.ID()`). The publisher and subscriber SHALL run in separate goroutines tracked by a `sync.WaitGroup`. + +#### Scenario: Card published immediately on start +- **WHEN** `GossipService.Start(wg)` is called +- **THEN** the local agent card SHALL be published to the topic within the first tick cycle (immediately) + +#### Scenario: Card published periodically +- **WHEN** `GossipService.Start` is called with `Interval=30s` +- **THEN** the card SHALL be re-published every 30 seconds with an updated `Timestamp` + +#### Scenario: Own messages ignored +- **WHEN** the GossipSub subscription delivers a message whose `ReceivedFrom` equals the local host ID +- **THEN** the `subscribeLoop` SHALL discard the message without updating the peer map + +#### Scenario: Nil local card skips publication +- **WHEN** `GossipService` is initialized with a nil `LocalCard` +- **THEN** `publishCard` SHALL return immediately without encoding or publishing + +--- + +### Requirement: ZK Credential Verification on Received Cards + +When a `GossipCard` is received containing `ZKCredentials`, the `GossipService` SHALL verify each non-expired credential using the configured `ZKCredentialVerifier`. If any credential fails verification, the entire card MUST be discarded. Expired credentials SHALL be skipped (logged at debug level) and SHALL NOT cause the card to be discarded. + +#### Scenario: Card with valid ZK credentials stored +- **WHEN** a received `GossipCard` has one ZK credential that passes `ZKCredentialVerifier` +- **THEN** the card SHALL be stored in the peer map under its DID + +#### Scenario: Card with invalid ZK credential discarded +- **WHEN** a received `GossipCard` has a ZK credential for which the `ZKCredentialVerifier` returns `(false, nil)` or an error +- **THEN** the card SHALL NOT be stored and the discardal SHALL be logged as a warning + +#### Scenario: Card with expired credential not discarded for that credential +- **WHEN** a received `GossipCard` has a ZK credential whose `ExpiresAt` is before `time.Now()` +- **THEN** that credential SHALL be skipped (debug log) and the card SHALL still be accepted if all other credentials are valid + +--- + +### Requirement: Peer Card Deduplication by Timestamp + +The `GossipService` SHALL update the peer map only when the incoming card's `Timestamp` is strictly after the stored card's `Timestamp`. If the incoming card is older or equal in timestamp, it SHALL be silently discarded. Cards with an empty `DID` field MUST be discarded unconditionally. + +#### Scenario: Newer card replaces older card +- **WHEN** a card with a newer `Timestamp` arrives for an already-known DID +- **THEN** the peer map SHALL be updated with the new card + +#### Scenario: Older card not stored +- **WHEN** a card with a `Timestamp` older than the stored card arrives for the same DID +- **THEN** the peer map SHALL retain the existing card + +#### Scenario: Card with empty DID discarded +- **WHEN** a received `GossipCard` has `DID: ""` +- **THEN** `handleMessage` SHALL return immediately without storing the card + +--- + +### Requirement: Capability and DID Lookup on Known Peers + +`GossipService.FindByCapability` SHALL return all stored `GossipCard` entries that list the requested capability string in their `Capabilities` slice. `GossipService.FindByDID` SHALL return the stored card for an exact DID match, or nil if not found. `GossipService.KnownPeers` SHALL return a snapshot of all stored cards. + +#### Scenario: Capability search returns matching peers +- **WHEN** `FindByCapability("code_execution")` is called and two peers advertise that capability +- **THEN** both cards SHALL be returned + +#### Scenario: DID lookup returns exact match +- **WHEN** `FindByDID("did:lango:abc")` is called and the DID is in the peer map +- **THEN** the corresponding `GossipCard` SHALL be returned + +#### Scenario: DID lookup returns nil for unknown DID +- **WHEN** `FindByDID("did:lango:unknown")` is called +- **THEN** nil SHALL be returned + +--- + +### Requirement: DHT Agent Advertisement + +The `AdService` SHALL publish the local `AgentAd` to the Kademlia DHT under the key `/lango/agentad/` using `dht.PutValue`. `AdService.Discover` SHALL filter stored `AgentAd` entries by tag match (any tag matches). `AdService.StoreAd` SHALL verify ZK credentials before storing and MUST reject ads with empty DIDs. + +#### Scenario: Agent ad published to DHT +- **WHEN** `AdService.Advertise(ctx)` is called +- **THEN** the local `AgentAd` SHALL be JSON-marshaled and stored in the DHT under `/lango/agentad/` + +#### Scenario: Discovery by tag returns matching ads +- **WHEN** `AdService.Discover(ctx, []string{"researcher"})` is called and one stored ad has tag `"researcher"` +- **THEN** only that ad SHALL be returned + +#### Scenario: Discover with no tags returns all ads +- **WHEN** `AdService.Discover(ctx, nil)` is called +- **THEN** all stored ads SHALL be returned + +#### Scenario: Ad with invalid ZK credential rejected on store +- **WHEN** `StoreAd` is called with an ad containing a ZK credential that fails verification +- **THEN** `StoreAd` SHALL return an error and SHALL NOT store the ad + +#### Scenario: Ad with empty DID rejected +- **WHEN** `StoreAd` is called with an ad where `DID == ""` +- **THEN** `StoreAd` SHALL return an error containing "agent ad missing DID" diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-firewall/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-firewall/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c6309832 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-firewall/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Default Deny-All ACL Policy + +The `Firewall` SHALL enforce a deny-all default policy on all incoming P2P queries. A query from a peer SHALL be denied unless at least one ACL rule with `action="allow"` matches both the peer DID and tool name. An explicit `action="deny"` rule that matches SHALL immediately reject the query, overriding any prior allow. Rules SHALL be evaluated in insertion order. + +#### Scenario: Query allowed by explicit rule +- **WHEN** an ACL rule `{PeerDID: "did:lango:abc", Action: "allow", Tools: ["search"]}` exists and `FilterQuery("did:lango:abc", "search")` is called +- **THEN** `FilterQuery` SHALL return nil (allowed) + +#### Scenario: Query denied when no matching allow rule +- **WHEN** no ACL rule exists for the requesting peer DID and tool combination +- **THEN** `FilterQuery` SHALL return an error containing "no matching allow rule" + +#### Scenario: Explicit deny rule overrides allow +- **WHEN** both an allow rule and a deny rule match the same peer DID and tool +- **THEN** the deny rule SHALL cause `FilterQuery` to return an error containing "query denied by firewall rule" + +#### Scenario: Wildcard peer DID matches all peers +- **WHEN** an ACL rule has `PeerDID: "*"` and `Action: "allow"` with `Tools: ["*"]` +- **THEN** `FilterQuery` SHALL return nil for any peer DID and any tool name + +--- + +### Requirement: Per-Peer Rate Limiting + +The `Firewall` SHALL enforce per-peer rate limits using a token-bucket rate limiter keyed by peer DID. When an ACL rule specifies `RateLimit > 0`, a limiter SHALL be created allowing at most `RateLimit` requests per minute. A wildcard rate limiter on `PeerDID="*"` SHALL apply globally to all peers. Rate limit checks MUST occur before ACL evaluation. + +#### Scenario: Rate limit exceeded returns error +- **WHEN** a peer DID's rate limiter has no remaining tokens +- **THEN** `FilterQuery` SHALL return an error containing "rate limit exceeded" + +#### Scenario: Global wildcard rate limit applied +- **WHEN** a rule with `PeerDID="*"` and `RateLimit=60` exists and 61 requests arrive in one minute +- **THEN** the 61st request SHALL be denied with "global rate limit exceeded" + +#### Scenario: Peer without rate limit rule is not throttled +- **WHEN** no rate limit rule exists for a peer DID +- **THEN** the peer SHALL not be rate-limited regardless of request frequency + +--- + +### Requirement: Tool Name Pattern Matching + +ACL rule `Tools` fields SHALL support exact matches, prefix wildcard matching (e.g. `"search*"` matches `"search_web"` and `"search_local"`), and a bare `"*"` to match all tool names. An empty `Tools` slice SHALL match all tool names. + +#### Scenario: Exact tool name match +- **WHEN** a rule has `Tools: ["search_web"]` and `FilterQuery` is called with tool `"search_web"` +- **THEN** the rule SHALL match + +#### Scenario: Wildcard suffix tool match +- **WHEN** a rule has `Tools: ["search*"]` and `FilterQuery` is called with tool `"search_local"` +- **THEN** the rule SHALL match + +#### Scenario: Non-matching tool name +- **WHEN** a rule has `Tools: ["search"]` and `FilterQuery` is called with tool `"payment_send"` +- **THEN** the rule SHALL NOT match + +--- + +### Requirement: Response Sanitization + +`Firewall.SanitizeResponse` SHALL remove all fields from a response map whose names match sensitive key patterns (case-insensitive): `db_path`, `file_path`, `internal_id`, `_internal`, and any field containing `password`, `secret`, `private_key`, or `token`. String values containing absolute file paths of 3 or more path segments SHALL have the path replaced with `[path-redacted]`. Nested maps SHALL be sanitized recursively. + +#### Scenario: Sensitive key removed from response +- **WHEN** `SanitizeResponse` is called on `{"result": "ok", "private_key": "0xdeadbeef"}` +- **THEN** the returned map SHALL contain `"result"` but SHALL NOT contain `"private_key"` + +#### Scenario: File path in string value redacted +- **WHEN** a response string value contains `/home/user/.lango/data/bolt.db` +- **THEN** `SanitizeResponse` SHALL replace it with `[path-redacted]` + +#### Scenario: Nested sensitive fields removed +- **WHEN** `SanitizeResponse` is called on `{"data": {"token": "abc123", "value": 42}}` +- **THEN** the nested `"token"` field SHALL be removed and `"value"` SHALL be preserved + +--- + +### Requirement: ZK Attestation for Responses + +`Firewall.AttestResponse` SHALL call the configured `ZKAttestFunc` with the SHA-256 hash of the response and the SHA-256 hash of the agent's DID, returning the serialized ZK attestation proof. If no `ZKAttestFunc` is configured, the method SHALL return `(nil, nil)`. + +#### Scenario: Attestation proof generated when function configured +- **WHEN** `SetZKAttestFunc` has been called with a non-nil function and `AttestResponse` is called +- **THEN** `AttestResponse` SHALL invoke the function and return the resulting proof bytes + +#### Scenario: No attestation when function not configured +- **WHEN** `SetZKAttestFunc` has not been called and `AttestResponse` is called +- **THEN** `AttestResponse` SHALL return `(nil, nil)` without error + +--- + +### Requirement: Dynamic Rule Management + +`Firewall.AddRule` SHALL append a new ACL rule and create a rate limiter if `RateLimit > 0`. `Firewall.RemoveRule` SHALL remove all rules matching the given peer DID and delete the associated rate limiter. `Firewall.Rules` SHALL return a copy of the current rule slice to prevent external mutation. + +#### Scenario: Rule added at runtime takes immediate effect +- **WHEN** `AddRule` is called with an allow rule for a peer DID +- **THEN** subsequent `FilterQuery` calls for that peer DID SHALL be evaluated against the new rule + +#### Scenario: Rules returns independent copy +- **WHEN** the caller modifies the slice returned by `Firewall.Rules()` +- **THEN** the internal rule list SHALL NOT be affected diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-handshake/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-handshake/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..61bf0ead --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-handshake/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Challenge-Response Mutual Authentication + +The `Handshaker` SHALL implement a three-message challenge-response protocol over libp2p streams using protocol ID `/lango/handshake/1.0.0`. The initiator SHALL send a `Challenge` containing a 32-byte cryptographically random nonce, a Unix timestamp, and the sender's DID. The responder SHALL reply with a `ChallengeResponse` containing the echoed nonce, the responder's DID, the responder's compressed public key, and either a ZK proof or an ECDSA signature. The initiator SHALL send a `SessionAck` containing the session token and expiry on successful verification. + +#### Scenario: Successful handshake with ECDSA signature +- **WHEN** `Handshaker.Initiate` is called with `ZKEnabled=false` and the remote peer completes the challenge-response +- **THEN** `Initiate` SHALL return a valid `*Session` with `ZKVerified=false` and the remote DID populated + +#### Scenario: Successful handshake with ZK proof +- **WHEN** `Handshaker.Initiate` is called with `ZKEnabled=true` and the remote peer returns a ZK proof +- **THEN** `Initiate` SHALL call the `ZKVerifierFunc`, and if valid, return a `*Session` with `ZKVerified=true` + +#### Scenario: ZK proof verification failure rejects handshake +- **WHEN** the `ZKVerifierFunc` returns `false` for the received ZK proof +- **THEN** `Handshaker.Initiate` SHALL return an error containing "ZK proof invalid" + +#### Scenario: Nonce mismatch rejects response +- **WHEN** the `ChallengeResponse` nonce differs from the nonce in the `Challenge` +- **THEN** `verifyResponse` SHALL return an error containing "nonce mismatch" + +#### Scenario: Response with neither proof nor signature rejected +- **WHEN** the `ChallengeResponse` has empty `ZKProof` and empty `Signature` +- **THEN** `verifyResponse` SHALL return an error containing "no proof or signature in response" + +#### Scenario: Handshake timeout enforced +- **WHEN** the remote peer does not respond within `cfg.Timeout` duration +- **THEN** `Handshaker.Initiate` SHALL return a context deadline exceeded error + +--- + +### Requirement: Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) Approval on Incoming Handshake + +When a peer initiates an incoming handshake, the `Handshaker.HandleIncoming` method MUST invoke the `ApprovalFunc` before sending a response. If the user denies approval, the handshake SHALL be rejected with an error containing "handshake denied by user". Known peers with an active unexpired session MAY be auto-approved if `AutoApproveKnown=true`. + +#### Scenario: New peer requires user approval +- **WHEN** `HandleIncoming` is called and no existing session exists for the sender's DID +- **THEN** `ApprovalFunc` SHALL be called with a `PendingHandshake` containing the peer ID, DID, remote address, and timestamp + +#### Scenario: User denies incoming handshake +- **WHEN** the `ApprovalFunc` returns `(false, nil)` +- **THEN** `HandleIncoming` SHALL return an error containing "handshake denied by user" and SHALL NOT send a response + +#### Scenario: Known peer with AutoApproveKnown skips approval +- **WHEN** `HandleIncoming` is called, `AutoApproveKnown=true`, and a valid session already exists for the sender's DID +- **THEN** `ApprovalFunc` SHALL NOT be called and the handshake SHALL proceed directly to response generation + +#### Scenario: ApprovalFunc error propagates +- **WHEN** `ApprovalFunc` returns a non-nil error +- **THEN** `HandleIncoming` SHALL return a wrapped error and SHALL NOT proceed with the handshake + +--- + +### Requirement: ZK Proof Fallback to Signature + +When `ZKEnabled=true` but the `ZKProverFunc` returns an error, `HandleIncoming` SHALL fall back to ECDSA wallet signature. The fallback MUST be logged as a warning. The response SHALL contain the signature in the `Signature` field with `ZKProof` empty. + +#### Scenario: ZK prover failure triggers signature fallback +- **WHEN** `ZKProverFunc` returns an error during `HandleIncoming` +- **THEN** the handler SHALL log a warning, call `wallet.SignMessage` with the challenge nonce, and set `resp.Signature` + +#### Scenario: Signature fallback failure rejects handshake +- **WHEN** `ZKProverFunc` fails AND `wallet.SignMessage` also returns an error +- **THEN** `HandleIncoming` SHALL return a wrapped error containing "sign challenge" + +--- + +### Requirement: Session Store with TTL Eviction + +The `SessionStore` SHALL store authenticated peer sessions keyed by peer DID. Session tokens SHALL be generated as HMAC-SHA256 over random bytes and the peer DID using a 32-byte randomly generated HMAC key created at store initialization. Sessions SHALL have a configurable TTL. Expired sessions SHALL be evicted lazily on access and proactively via `Cleanup()`. + +#### Scenario: Session created with correct fields +- **WHEN** `SessionStore.Create("did:lango:abc", true)` is called +- **THEN** a `Session` SHALL be stored with `PeerDID="did:lango:abc"`, `ZKVerified=true`, a non-empty `Token`, and `ExpiresAt = now + TTL` + +#### Scenario: Valid session token validates successfully +- **WHEN** `SessionStore.Validate(peerDID, token)` is called with the correct peerDID and token from an unexpired session +- **THEN** `Validate` SHALL return `true` + +#### Scenario: Expired session returns false on validation +- **WHEN** `SessionStore.Validate` is called and the session's `ExpiresAt` is in the past +- **THEN** `Validate` SHALL return `false` and SHALL remove the session from the store + +#### Scenario: Session cleanup removes all expired entries +- **WHEN** `SessionStore.Cleanup()` is called +- **THEN** all sessions where `ExpiresAt` is before `time.Now()` SHALL be deleted and the count of removed sessions SHALL be returned diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-identity/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-identity/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2db7052a --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-identity/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: DID Derivation from Wallet Public Key + +The `WalletDIDProvider` SHALL derive a decentralized identifier (DID) deterministically from the compressed secp256k1 public key returned by `WalletProvider.PublicKey()`. The DID format SHALL be `did:lango:`. The derived DID SHALL be cached after the first derivation; subsequent calls to `DID()` SHALL return the cached value without calling the wallet again. + +#### Scenario: DID derived on first call +- **WHEN** `WalletDIDProvider.DID(ctx)` is called for the first time +- **THEN** the provider SHALL call `wallet.PublicKey(ctx)`, construct a DID with prefix `did:lango:`, encode the public key as lowercase hex, and cache the result + +#### Scenario: DID returned from cache on subsequent calls +- **WHEN** `WalletDIDProvider.DID(ctx)` is called after a successful first call +- **THEN** the provider SHALL return the cached DID without calling `wallet.PublicKey` again + +#### Scenario: Wallet public key error propagates +- **WHEN** `wallet.PublicKey(ctx)` returns an error +- **THEN** `WalletDIDProvider.DID(ctx)` SHALL return a nil DID and a wrapped error; the cache SHALL NOT be populated + +--- + +### Requirement: Peer ID Derivation from secp256k1 Public Key + +The system SHALL derive a libp2p `peer.ID` from a compressed secp256k1 public key by unmarshaling it via `crypto.UnmarshalSecp256k1PublicKey` and calling `peer.IDFromPublicKey`. The derived `peer.ID` SHALL be embedded in the `DID` struct. This mapping SHALL be deterministic: the same public key always produces the same peer ID. + +#### Scenario: Valid compressed public key produces peer ID +- **WHEN** `DIDFromPublicKey` is called with a valid 33-byte compressed secp256k1 public key +- **THEN** a `DID` struct SHALL be returned with a non-empty `PeerID` field derived from the key + +#### Scenario: Empty public key rejected +- **WHEN** `DIDFromPublicKey` is called with an empty byte slice +- **THEN** the function SHALL return an error containing "empty public key" + +#### Scenario: Invalid public key bytes rejected +- **WHEN** `DIDFromPublicKey` is called with malformed bytes that are not a valid secp256k1 point +- **THEN** the function SHALL return an error from `crypto.UnmarshalSecp256k1PublicKey` + +--- + +### Requirement: DID Verification Against Peer ID + +The `WalletDIDProvider.VerifyDID` method SHALL re-derive the `peer.ID` from the public key embedded in a `DID` struct and compare it to the claimed `peer.ID`. If they do not match, the method MUST return an error describing the mismatch. A nil DID MUST return an error. + +#### Scenario: Valid DID matches peer ID +- **WHEN** `VerifyDID` is called with a DID whose public key was used to derive the provided peer ID +- **THEN** `VerifyDID` SHALL return nil (no error) + +#### Scenario: DID public key does not match claimed peer ID +- **WHEN** `VerifyDID` is called with a DID whose public key produces a different peer ID than the one provided +- **THEN** `VerifyDID` SHALL return an error containing "peer ID mismatch" + +#### Scenario: Nil DID rejected +- **WHEN** `VerifyDID` is called with a nil `DID` pointer +- **THEN** `VerifyDID` SHALL return an error containing "nil DID" + +--- + +### Requirement: DID Parsing from String + +`ParseDID` SHALL parse a DID string in `did:lango:` format. It MUST validate the `did:lango:` prefix, decode the hex-encoded public key, and derive the peer ID. Any malformed input SHALL result in an error. + +#### Scenario: Valid DID string parsed +- **WHEN** `ParseDID("did:lango:")` is called +- **THEN** the function SHALL return a `DID` struct with the correct `ID`, `PublicKey`, and `PeerID` fields + +#### Scenario: Missing prefix rejected +- **WHEN** `ParseDID` is called with a string that does not start with `did:lango:` +- **THEN** the function SHALL return an error containing "invalid DID scheme" + +#### Scenario: Empty key portion rejected +- **WHEN** `ParseDID("did:lango:")` is called with an empty hex key +- **THEN** the function SHALL return an error containing "empty public key in DID" + +#### Scenario: Non-hex key portion rejected +- **WHEN** `ParseDID("did:lango:gg00ff")` is called with invalid hex characters +- **THEN** the function SHALL return an error from hex decoding diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-networking/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-networking/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..75613e55 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-networking/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: libp2p Node Lifecycle + +The P2P `Node` SHALL encapsulate a libp2p host with an Ed25519 identity key persisted at `{keyDir}/node.key`. The node key SHALL be loaded from disk on startup and SHALL be generated and persisted automatically if the file does not exist, ensuring peer identity survives restarts. The node MUST use Noise protocol encryption on all connections. + +#### Scenario: Node key persists across restarts +- **WHEN** a `Node` is created with a `keyDir` that already contains `node.key` +- **THEN** the node SHALL load the existing key and present the same peer ID as the previous instance + +#### Scenario: Node key generated on first start +- **WHEN** a `Node` is created with a `keyDir` that does not contain `node.key` +- **THEN** the node SHALL generate a new Ed25519 keypair, persist it to `node.key` with permissions `0600`, and use it as the peer identity + +#### Scenario: Node creation with invalid keyDir +- **WHEN** `NewNode` is called with a `keyDir` path that cannot be created +- **THEN** `NewNode` SHALL return an error and SHALL NOT start any host or network listener + +--- + +### Requirement: Kademlia DHT Bootstrap + +The `Node.Start` method SHALL initialize a Kademlia DHT in `ModeAutoServer` and call `Bootstrap` to enter the DHT routing table. The node SHALL attempt to connect to each configured bootstrap peer concurrently using goroutines bounded by the caller-provided `sync.WaitGroup`. Bootstrap peer connection failures MUST be logged as warnings and SHALL NOT prevent the node from starting. + +#### Scenario: Successful DHT bootstrap with bootstrap peers +- **WHEN** `Node.Start` is called with one or more valid bootstrap peer multiaddrs +- **THEN** the node SHALL connect to each bootstrap peer and log "connected to bootstrap peer" + +#### Scenario: Invalid bootstrap peer address +- **WHEN** a configured bootstrap peer address is not a valid multiaddr +- **THEN** the node SHALL log a warning with the invalid address and SHALL continue starting with the remaining peers + +#### Scenario: DHT bootstrap failure +- **WHEN** `dht.Bootstrap` returns an error +- **THEN** `Node.Start` SHALL call the context cancel function, close the DHT, and return a wrapped error + +--- + +### Requirement: mDNS LAN Discovery + +When `cfg.EnableMDNS` is true, the `Node.Start` method SHALL start an mDNS service using the libp2p `mdns.NewMdnsService`. The mDNS notifee SHALL automatically connect to discovered LAN peers. The node's own peer ID SHALL be excluded from connection attempts. mDNS startup failures MUST be logged as warnings and SHALL NOT prevent the node from completing startup. + +#### Scenario: mDNS peer discovery and auto-connect +- **WHEN** a peer on the same LAN broadcasts its presence via mDNS +- **THEN** the local node SHALL call `host.Connect` with the discovered peer info and log "mDNS peer discovered" + +#### Scenario: mDNS discovers own peer ID +- **WHEN** the mDNS service receives a discovery event for the local node's own peer ID +- **THEN** the notifee SHALL silently ignore the event and SHALL NOT attempt to connect to itself + +--- + +### Requirement: Connection Manager Watermarks + +The `Node` SHALL create a `connmgr.ConnManager` with `maxPeers` as the high watermark and `maxPeers * 80 / 100` as the low watermark. The connection manager MUST trim excess connections when the high watermark is reached, pruning down to the low watermark. + +#### Scenario: Connections pruned at high watermark +- **WHEN** the number of connected peers reaches `cfg.MaxPeers` +- **THEN** the connection manager SHALL trim the least-recently-used connections until the peer count reaches the low watermark + +#### Scenario: Zero maxPeers rejected +- **WHEN** `connmgr.NewConnManager` is called with a zero or negative high watermark +- **THEN** `NewNode` SHALL return an error from the connection manager initialization + +--- + +### Requirement: Graceful Shutdown + +`Node.Stop` SHALL cancel the internal context, close the mDNS service (if started), close the DHT, and close the libp2p host in that order. Any error from DHT or host close SHALL be returned. mDNS close errors MUST be logged as warnings and SHALL NOT prevent further shutdown steps. + +#### Scenario: Clean stop sequence +- **WHEN** `Node.Stop` is called on a running node +- **THEN** the node SHALL cancel its context, close mDNS, close the DHT, close the host, and log "P2P node stopped" + +#### Scenario: Stop on partially initialized node +- **WHEN** `Node.Stop` is called on a node where `Start` was not called +- **THEN** `Node.Stop` SHALL return nil without panicking (nil checks on `cancel`, `mdnsSvc`, and `dht`) + +--- + +### Requirement: Protocol Stream Handler Registration + +The `Node.SetStreamHandler` method SHALL register a `network.StreamHandler` for the given protocol ID on the underlying libp2p host. The `Node.Host()` method SHALL expose the underlying `host.Host` for direct protocol registration by sub-packages. + +#### Scenario: Stream handler registration +- **WHEN** `Node.SetStreamHandler("/lango/a2a/1.0.0", handler)` is called +- **THEN** all incoming streams with protocol `/lango/a2a/1.0.0` SHALL be dispatched to `handler` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-payment/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-payment/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4fd22390 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-payment/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: p2p_pay Tool for Peer-to-Peer USDC Payment + +The system SHALL expose a `p2p_pay` agent tool (safety level: `Dangerous`) that sends a USDC payment on the Base blockchain to a connected peer identified by their DID. The tool SHALL require `peer_did` and `amount` parameters and MAY accept an optional `memo`. The tool SHALL NOT be available if the payment service is not initialized. + +#### Scenario: Successful payment to connected peer +- **WHEN** `p2p_pay` is called with a valid `peer_did` and `amount` for a peer with an active session +- **THEN** the tool SHALL submit a USDC transfer and return a receipt containing `txHash`, `from`, `to`, `peerDID`, `amount`, `currency`, `chainId`, `memo`, and `timestamp` + +#### Scenario: Payment rejected when no active session +- **WHEN** `p2p_pay` is called with a `peer_did` for which no active session exists in the `SessionStore` +- **THEN** the tool SHALL return an error containing "no active session for peer" and SHALL NOT submit any transaction + +#### Scenario: Missing required parameters rejected +- **WHEN** `p2p_pay` is called without `peer_did` or without `amount` +- **THEN** the tool SHALL return an error containing "peer_did and amount are required" + +#### Scenario: Tool unavailable without payment service +- **WHEN** the application is initialized with `payment.enabled=false` +- **THEN** `buildP2PPaymentTool` SHALL return nil and `p2p_pay` SHALL NOT be registered with the agent + +--- + +### Requirement: Recipient Address Derivation from DID + +The `p2p_pay` tool SHALL derive the recipient's Ethereum wallet address from their DID by parsing the DID using `identity.ParseDID`, extracting the 33-byte compressed secp256k1 public key, and using the first 20 bytes as the Ethereum address (formatted as `0x`). An invalid or unparseable DID MUST cause the tool to return an error before any payment is attempted. + +#### Scenario: Valid DID yields deterministic Ethereum address +- **WHEN** `p2p_pay` is called with `peer_did="did:lango:<33-byte-pubkey-hex>"` +- **THEN** the payment SHALL be sent to `0x` as the `To` address + +#### Scenario: Unparseable DID returns error +- **WHEN** `p2p_pay` is called with `peer_did="invalid"` (no `did:lango:` prefix) +- **THEN** the tool SHALL return an error containing "parse peer DID" + +--- + +### Requirement: P2P Requirement for Payment Feature + +The P2P subsystem SHALL require `payment.enabled=true` at configuration validation time. If a user configures `p2p.enabled=true` without `payment.enabled=true`, the configuration loader MUST reject the configuration with an error containing "p2p requires payment.enabled (wallet needed for identity)". This enforces that a wallet is always present for DID derivation when P2P is active. + +#### Scenario: P2P with payment enabled accepted +- **WHEN** the configuration has `p2p.enabled=true` and `payment.enabled=true` +- **THEN** configuration validation SHALL succeed + +#### Scenario: P2P without payment rejected +- **WHEN** the configuration has `p2p.enabled=true` and `payment.enabled=false` +- **THEN** configuration validation SHALL return an error containing "p2p requires payment.enabled" + +--- + +### Requirement: Default Payment Memo + +When the `memo` parameter is not provided or is an empty string, the `p2p_pay` tool SHALL use `"P2P payment"` as the default memo value in the `PaymentRequest.Purpose` field. + +#### Scenario: Empty memo defaults to "P2P payment" +- **WHEN** `p2p_pay` is called without a `memo` parameter +- **THEN** the `PaymentRequest.Purpose` field SHALL be `"P2P payment"` + +#### Scenario: Provided memo is used as-is +- **WHEN** `p2p_pay` is called with `memo="service fee for code review"` +- **THEN** the `PaymentRequest.Purpose` field SHALL be `"service fee for code review"` + +--- + +### Requirement: Spending Limit Enforcement on P2P Payments + +P2P payments SHALL be subject to the same `SpendingLimiter` constraints as all other USDC transfers. The `payment.Service.Send` method SHALL check per-transaction and daily spending limits before submitting the transaction. If the payment would exceed any limit, `Send` SHALL return an error and no transaction SHALL be submitted. + +#### Scenario: Payment within limits succeeds +- **WHEN** the requested amount is within both per-transaction and daily remaining limits +- **THEN** the payment SHALL be submitted and a receipt returned + +#### Scenario: Payment exceeding per-transaction limit rejected +- **WHEN** the requested amount exceeds `maxPerTx` +- **THEN** `payment.Service.Send` SHALL return an error containing "exceeds per-transaction limit" and `p2p_pay` SHALL propagate it diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-protocol/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-protocol/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d4c98e65 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/p2p-protocol/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: A2A-over-P2P Message Protocol + +The system SHALL implement A2A message exchange over libp2p streams using protocol ID `/lango/a2a/1.0.0`. All messages SHALL be JSON-encoded. Each `Request` SHALL carry a `type` field (`tool_invoke`, `capability_query`, or `agent_card`), a `sessionToken`, a UUID `requestId`, and an optional `payload` map. Each `Response` SHALL carry the matching `requestId`, a `status` field (`"ok"`, `"error"`, or `"denied"`), an optional `result` map, an optional `error` string, an optional `attestationProof` byte slice, and a `timestamp`. + +#### Scenario: Tool invoke request routed to executor +- **WHEN** an incoming stream delivers a `Request` with `type="tool_invoke"` and `payload.toolName="search"` +- **THEN** the `Handler` SHALL call the registered `ToolExecutor` with the tool name and params map + +#### Scenario: Agent card request served +- **WHEN** an incoming stream delivers a `Request` with `type="agent_card"` +- **THEN** the `Handler` SHALL call the `CardProvider` function and return its result with `status="ok"` + +#### Scenario: Capability query returns agent card +- **WHEN** an incoming stream delivers a `Request` with `type="capability_query"` +- **THEN** the `Handler` SHALL return the agent card contents with `status="ok"` as a capability listing + +#### Scenario: Unknown request type returns error +- **WHEN** an incoming stream delivers a `Request` with an unrecognized `type` value +- **THEN** the `Handler` SHALL return a `Response` with `status="error"` and an error describing the unknown type + +--- + +### Requirement: Session Token Validation on Every Request + +The `Handler` SHALL validate the session token on every incoming request before dispatching to the type-specific handler. Token validation SHALL iterate over all active sessions in the `SessionStore` and check for a matching token using `SessionStore.Validate`. If no session matches, the handler MUST return a `Response` with `status="denied"` and `error="invalid or expired session token"`. + +#### Scenario: Valid session token grants access +- **WHEN** a `Request` arrives with a `sessionToken` that matches an active non-expired session +- **THEN** the handler SHALL resolve the peer DID and proceed with the request + +#### Scenario: Invalid session token denied +- **WHEN** a `Request` arrives with a `sessionToken` that does not match any active session +- **THEN** the handler SHALL return `{"status": "denied", "error": "invalid or expired session token"}` + +#### Scenario: Expired session token denied +- **WHEN** a `Request` arrives with a token from a session whose `ExpiresAt` is in the past +- **THEN** the handler SHALL return `{"status": "denied"}` and the expired session SHALL be removed from the store + +--- + +### Requirement: Firewall Enforcement on Tool Invocations + +The `Handler.handleToolInvoke` method MUST call `Firewall.FilterQuery(peerDID, toolName)` before executing any tool. A non-nil error from the firewall SHALL cause the handler to return a `Response` with `status="denied"`. The tool executor SHALL NOT be called if the firewall rejects the query. + +#### Scenario: Firewall blocks unauthorized tool +- **WHEN** a peer requests a tool that is not in its allow list +- **THEN** `handleToolInvoke` SHALL return `{"status": "denied"}` without calling the `ToolExecutor` + +#### Scenario: Missing toolName in payload +- **WHEN** a `tool_invoke` request arrives with no `toolName` field in the payload +- **THEN** the handler SHALL return `{"status": "error", "error": "missing toolName in payload"}` + +--- + +### Requirement: Response Sanitization and ZK Attestation on Tool Results + +After successful tool execution, the `Handler` SHALL pass the result through `Firewall.SanitizeResponse` to remove sensitive fields. If a `ZKAttestFunc` is configured on the firewall, the handler SHALL compute a SHA-256 hash of the sanitized result and the local agent DID and include the resulting attestation proof in `Response.AttestationProof`. + +#### Scenario: Tool result sanitized before returning +- **WHEN** a tool returns a result containing a sensitive field (e.g., `"token": "secret"`) +- **THEN** the `Response.Result` SHALL have the sensitive field removed + +#### Scenario: ZK attestation included when available +- **WHEN** the firewall has a `ZKAttestFunc` configured and a tool invocation succeeds +- **THEN** `Response.AttestationProof` SHALL contain a non-empty byte slice + +--- + +### Requirement: P2PRemoteAgent Adapter + +The `P2PRemoteAgent` SHALL implement a remote agent adapter that wraps a peer ID and session token to send requests over P2P streams. `InvokeTool` SHALL open a new libp2p stream to the peer's ID using protocol `/lango/a2a/1.0.0`, encode the tool invoke request, and decode the response. Non-"ok" responses MUST return an error using the `Response.Error` field. `QueryCapabilities` and `FetchAgentCard` SHALL use the same stream-open-encode-decode pattern. + +#### Scenario: InvokeTool sends request and returns result +- **WHEN** `P2PRemoteAgent.InvokeTool(ctx, "search", params)` is called +- **THEN** a new stream to the target peer SHALL be opened, a `tool_invoke` request encoded, and the `Response.Result` returned on `status="ok"` + +#### Scenario: Remote error response propagated +- **WHEN** the remote `Handler` returns `{"status": "error", "error": "tool not found"}` +- **THEN** `InvokeTool` SHALL return an error containing "tool not found" + +#### Scenario: Stream open failure returns error +- **WHEN** `host.NewStream` fails (e.g., peer unreachable) +- **THEN** `InvokeTool` SHALL return a wrapped error containing "open stream to" + +#### Scenario: ZK attestation proof logged on receipt +- **WHEN** `InvokeTool` receives a `Response` with a non-empty `AttestationProof` +- **THEN** the adapter SHALL log "response has ZK attestation" at debug level diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/zkp-core/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/zkp-core/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..54f7041d --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/specs/zkp-core/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: ProverService Lifecycle and Scheme Selection + +The `ProverService` SHALL support two proving schemes: `"plonk"` (default) and `"groth16"`. The scheme SHALL be set at construction time via `Config.Scheme` and SHALL NOT change after construction. If `Config.Scheme` is empty, the service SHALL default to `"plonk"`. The service SHALL create and maintain a cache directory at `{CacheDir}` (defaulting to `~/.lango/zkp/cache`) with permissions `0700`. An unsupported scheme name MUST cause `Compile` and `Prove` to return an error. + +#### Scenario: Default scheme is plonk +- **WHEN** `NewProverService` is called with an empty `Config.Scheme` +- **THEN** `ProverService.Scheme()` SHALL return `"plonk"` + +#### Scenario: Unsupported scheme rejected at compile time +- **WHEN** a `ProverService` is created with `Scheme: "snark"` and `Compile` is called +- **THEN** `Compile` SHALL return an error containing "unsupported proving scheme" + +#### Scenario: Cache directory created on initialization +- **WHEN** `NewProverService` is called with a non-existent `CacheDir` +- **THEN** the directory SHALL be created with permissions `0700` + +--- + +### Requirement: Circuit Compilation and Idempotency + +`ProverService.Compile` SHALL compile the given `frontend.Circuit` using the BN254 scalar field and the configured scheme's constraint system builder (`scs.NewBuilder` for PlonK, `r1cs.NewBuilder` for Groth16). A SRS SHALL be generated for PlonK using `unsafekzg.NewSRS`. Proving and verifying keys SHALL be derived via `plonk.Setup` or `groth16.Setup`. If a circuit with the given `circuitID` is already compiled, `Compile` SHALL return nil without recompiling. + +#### Scenario: Circuit compiled and cached on first call +- **WHEN** `Compile("ownership", &WalletOwnershipCircuit{})` is called for the first time +- **THEN** the circuit SHALL be compiled, keys generated, and stored in the compiled map under `"ownership"` + +#### Scenario: Second compile call is a no-op +- **WHEN** `Compile("ownership", ...)` is called after a successful first compilation +- **THEN** `Compile` SHALL return nil immediately without recompiling + +#### Scenario: Compilation error returns wrapped error +- **WHEN** `frontend.Compile` fails for the given circuit +- **THEN** `Compile` SHALL return an error containing `compile circuit "ownership"` + +--- + +### Requirement: Proof Generation + +`ProverService.Prove` SHALL create a full witness and public witness from the circuit assignment, generate a proof using the compiled proving key, serialize the proof to bytes, and return a `Proof` struct containing `Data`, `PublicInputs`, `CircuitID`, and `Scheme`. The circuit MUST be compiled before `Prove` can be called. + +#### Scenario: Proof generated for compiled circuit +- **WHEN** `Prove(ctx, "ownership", assignment)` is called on a compiled circuit +- **THEN** the returned `Proof` SHALL have non-empty `Data`, the correct `CircuitID="ownership"`, and `Scheme` matching the service scheme + +#### Scenario: Uncompiled circuit returns error +- **WHEN** `Prove(ctx, "missing", assignment)` is called for a circuit ID that was never compiled +- **THEN** `Prove` SHALL return an error containing `circuit "missing" not compiled` + +#### Scenario: Invalid assignment returns witness error +- **WHEN** `Prove` is called with an assignment that is inconsistent with the circuit constraints +- **THEN** `Prove` SHALL return an error from the proving step + +--- + +### Requirement: Proof Verification + +`ProverService.Verify` SHALL deserialize the proof bytes, reconstruct the public witness from the provided circuit (public inputs only), and call `plonk.Verify` or `groth16.Verify` against the compiled verifying key. A cryptographically invalid proof SHALL return `(false, nil)`. An empty or nil proof SHALL return `(false, error)`. + +#### Scenario: Valid proof verifies successfully +- **WHEN** `Verify(ctx, proof, circuit)` is called with a proof generated by `Prove` for the same circuit +- **THEN** `Verify` SHALL return `(true, nil)` + +#### Scenario: Tampered proof returns false +- **WHEN** `Verify` is called with a `Proof.Data` that has been modified after generation +- **THEN** `Verify` SHALL return `(false, nil)` (cryptographic failure, not a Go error) + +#### Scenario: Empty proof data returns error +- **WHEN** `Verify` is called with a `Proof` where `Data` is nil or empty +- **THEN** `Verify` SHALL return `(false, error)` containing "empty proof" + +--- + +### Requirement: WalletOwnershipCircuit (Circuit ID: "ownership") + +The `WalletOwnershipCircuit` SHALL prove knowledge of a `Response` such that `MiMC(Response, Challenge) == PublicKeyHash`. Public inputs are `PublicKeyHash` and `Challenge`. The private witness is `Response`. This circuit is used during handshake to prove control of the DID private key without revealing it. + +#### Scenario: Valid witness satisfies circuit +- **WHEN** `Define` is called with a `Response` such that `MiMC(Response, Challenge) == PublicKeyHash` +- **THEN** the circuit constraints SHALL be satisfied (no assertion failure) + +#### Scenario: Invalid witness fails circuit +- **WHEN** `Define` is called with a `Response` that does not satisfy the MiMC equation +- **THEN** the constraint `api.AssertIsEqual(computed, c.PublicKeyHash)` SHALL fail + +--- + +### Requirement: BalanceRangeCircuit (Circuit ID: "balance_range") + +The `BalanceRangeCircuit` SHALL prove that a private `Balance` is greater than or equal to a public `Threshold`, without revealing the actual balance value. The constraint is `AssertIsLessOrEqual(Threshold, Balance)`. This circuit is used to prove USDC balance sufficiency for payment-gated capabilities. + +#### Scenario: Balance at threshold satisfies circuit +- **WHEN** `Balance == Threshold` +- **THEN** the circuit SHALL be satisfied + +#### Scenario: Balance below threshold fails circuit +- **WHEN** `Balance < Threshold` +- **THEN** `AssertIsLessOrEqual` SHALL fail + +--- + +### Requirement: ResponseAttestationCircuit (Circuit ID: "attestation") + +The `ResponseAttestationCircuit` SHALL prove that an agent produced a specific response from specific source data without revealing the source data or agent key. Constraints: `MiMC(AgentKeyProof) == AgentDIDHash` AND `MiMC(SourceDataHash, AgentKeyProof, Timestamp) == ResponseHash`. Public inputs are `ResponseHash`, `AgentDIDHash`, and `Timestamp`. Private witnesses are `SourceDataHash` and `AgentKeyProof`. + +#### Scenario: Valid attestation witness satisfies both constraints +- **WHEN** all MiMC equations hold for the given witness +- **THEN** both `AssertIsEqual` constraints SHALL pass + +#### Scenario: Wrong agent key fails DID hash check +- **WHEN** `MiMC(AgentKeyProof) != AgentDIDHash` +- **THEN** the first `AssertIsEqual` SHALL fail + +--- + +### Requirement: AgentCapabilityCircuit (Circuit ID: "capability") + +The `AgentCapabilityCircuit` SHALL prove that an agent has a capability with an `ActualScore >= MinScore` and that `MiMC(TestHash, ActualScore) == CapabilityHash`, without revealing `ActualScore` or `TestHash`. Public inputs are `CapabilityHash`, `AgentDIDHash`, and `MinScore`. Private witnesses are `ActualScore` and `TestHash`. + +#### Scenario: Score above minimum satisfies circuit +- **WHEN** `ActualScore >= MinScore` and `MiMC(TestHash, ActualScore) == CapabilityHash` +- **THEN** both constraints SHALL be satisfied + +#### Scenario: Score below minimum fails circuit +- **WHEN** `ActualScore < MinScore` +- **THEN** `AssertIsLessOrEqual(MinScore, ActualScore)` SHALL fail diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b3622145 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-22-san-p2p-a2a-architecture/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +## 1. Config Extension + +- [x] 1.1 Add P2PConfig struct to internal/config/types.go (Enabled, ListenAddrs, BootstrapPeers, KeyDir, EnableRelay, EnableMDNS, MaxPeers, HandshakeTimeout, SessionTokenTTL, AutoApproveKnownPeers, FirewallRules, GossipInterval, ZKHandshake, ZKAttestation) +- [x] 1.2 Add P2P field to root Config struct +- [x] 1.3 Add default config values and validation in loader.go + +## 2. Dependencies + +- [x] 2.1 Install go-libp2p v0.47.0, go-libp2p-kad-dht, go-libp2p-pubsub, go-multiaddr +- [x] 2.2 Install gnark v0.14.0 for ZKP circuits +- [x] 2.3 Run go mod tidy + +## 3. Wallet Extension + +- [x] 3.1 Add PublicKey(ctx) ([]byte, error) to WalletProvider interface +- [x] 3.2 Implement PublicKey in LocalWallet (crypto.CompressPubkey) +- [x] 3.3 Implement PublicKey delegation in RPCWallet and CompositeWallet + +## 4. P2P Node + +- [x] 4.1 Create internal/p2p/node.go with libp2p host (Noise, TCP/QUIC, ConnManager) +- [x] 4.2 Implement loadOrGenerateKey for Ed25519 node key persistence +- [x] 4.3 Implement Start() with DHT bootstrap, mDNS discovery, bootstrap peer connection +- [x] 4.4 Implement Stop() with graceful shutdown (mDNS -> DHT -> host) + +## 5. Identity/DID + +- [x] 5.1 Create internal/p2p/identity/identity.go with DID struct and Provider interface +- [x] 5.2 Implement WalletDIDProvider (did:lango: from wallet public key) +- [x] 5.3 Implement ParseDID and DIDFromPublicKey helper functions +- [x] 5.4 Implement VerifyDID for peer identity verification + +## 6. ZKP Core + +- [x] 6.1 Create internal/zkp/zkp.go with ProverService (PlonK/Groth16 on BN254) +- [x] 6.2 Implement Compile, Prove, Verify with gnark backend +- [x] 6.3 Create WalletOwnershipCircuit (circuits/ownership.go) +- [x] 6.4 Create BalanceRangeCircuit (circuits/balance.go) +- [x] 6.5 Create ResponseAttestationCircuit (circuits/attestation.go) +- [x] 6.6 Create AgentCapabilityCircuit (circuits/capability.go) + +## 7. Handshake + +- [x] 7.1 Create internal/p2p/handshake/handshake.go with Handshaker (Challenge-Response-Ack) +- [x] 7.2 Implement ZK-enhanced mode with ECDSA signature fallback +- [x] 7.3 Implement HITL approval callback pattern (ApprovalFunc) +- [x] 7.4 Create internal/p2p/handshake/session.go with HMAC-SHA256 token store and TTL eviction + +## 8. Knowledge Firewall + +- [x] 8.1 Create internal/p2p/firewall/firewall.go with default deny-all ACL +- [x] 8.2 Implement FilterQuery with per-peer rate limiting +- [x] 8.3 Implement SanitizeResponse for sensitive field removal +- [x] 8.4 Implement AttestResponse for ZK attestation callback +- [x] 8.5 Implement dynamic rule Add/Remove operations + +## 9. A2A-over-P2P Protocol + +- [x] 9.1 Create internal/p2p/protocol/messages.go with Request/Response types +- [x] 9.2 Create internal/p2p/protocol/handler.go with session validation + firewall + attestation +- [x] 9.3 Create internal/p2p/protocol/remote_agent.go as P2P remote agent adapter +- [x] 9.4 Implement SendRequest utility for client-side stream communication + +## 10. Discovery + +- [x] 10.1 Create internal/p2p/discovery/gossip.go with GossipSub agent card propagation +- [x] 10.2 Implement ZK credential verification on received cards +- [x] 10.3 Implement FindByCapability and FindByDID peer lookups +- [x] 10.4 Create internal/p2p/discovery/agentad.go with DHT-based agent advertisements + +## 11. Agent Card P2P Extension + +- [x] 11.1 Add DID, Multiaddrs, Capabilities, Pricing, ZKCredentials to AgentCard in a2a/server.go +- [x] 11.2 Add PricingInfo and ZKCredential types +- [x] 11.3 Add SetP2PInfo and SetPricing methods to A2A Server +- [x] 11.4 Add Card() accessor method + +## 12. App Wiring + +- [x] 12.1 Add P2PNode field to App struct in types.go +- [x] 12.2 Create initP2P() in wiring.go (node, identity, sessions, handshaker, firewall, protocol handler, gossip) +- [x] 12.3 Wire P2P Start/Stop in app.go lifecycle +- [x] 12.4 Register handshake and A2A protocol handlers on libp2p host + +## 13. P2P Tools + +- [x] 13.1 Implement p2p_status tool (Safe) +- [x] 13.2 Implement p2p_connect tool (Dangerous) with handshake +- [x] 13.3 Implement p2p_disconnect tool (Moderate) +- [x] 13.4 Implement p2p_peers tool (Safe) +- [x] 13.5 Implement p2p_query tool (Moderate) with remote agent adapter +- [x] 13.6 Implement p2p_firewall_rules/add/remove tools +- [x] 13.7 Implement p2p_discover tool (Safe) + +## 14. P2P Payment + +- [x] 14.1 Implement p2p_pay tool (Dangerous) using payment.Service.Send +- [x] 14.2 Wire session verification and DID-to-address derivation + +## 15. Orchestration + +- [x] 15.1 Add "p2p_" prefix to vault agent Prefixes in orchestration/tools.go +- [x] 15.2 Add P2P-related keywords to vault agent Keywords + +## 16. Build Verification + +- [x] 16.1 Run go build ./... — all packages compile +- [x] 16.2 Run go test ./... — all existing tests pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..eac8ef7a --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-23 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e53b9084 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +## Context + +The P2P paid value exchange system was introduced with `autoApproveBelow` as a config field (default "0.10" USDC) exposed in TUI settings, but the `EntSpendingLimiter` never reads or uses it. Inbound P2P tool invocations pass through firewall ACL only — no owner approval gate exists. Outbound `p2p_pay` uses `SafetyLevelDangerous` which triggers `wrapWithApproval`, but has no awareness of the auto-approve threshold. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Wire `autoApproveBelow` from config into `EntSpendingLimiter` so the threshold is enforced. +- Add owner approval gate for inbound P2P tool invocations (both free and paid) via callback pattern. +- Enable amount-based auto-approval for outbound payment tools in `wrapWithApproval`. +- Maintain fail-closed semantics: deny by default when approval provider is unavailable. + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing the approval UI/UX in TUI or Gateway WebSocket. +- Adding new config fields beyond using the existing `autoApproveBelow`. +- Modifying the P2P firewall ACL system or reputation scoring. +- Per-peer approval granularity (future enhancement). + +## Decisions + +### 1. `IsAutoApprovable` on `SpendingLimiter` interface (not standalone function) + +Adding `IsAutoApprovable(ctx, amount) (bool, error)` to the `SpendingLimiter` interface keeps the auto-approve decision co-located with the spending limit check. The method composes threshold check + limit check atomically, preventing race conditions where a threshold-passing amount could exceed daily limits. + +**Alternative**: Standalone function taking threshold + limiter — rejected because it splits the decision across two call sites and requires callers to parse the threshold themselves. + +### 2. Callback pattern for inbound approval (`ToolApprovalFunc`) + +Using `ToolApprovalFunc func(ctx, peerDID, toolName, params) (bool, error)` as a callback on the Handler avoids import cycles between `p2p/protocol` and `approval`/`wallet` packages. The closure is wired in `app.go` where all dependencies are available. + +**Alternative**: Direct dependency on approval package — rejected due to import cycle with `app` package. + +### 3. Limiter parameter on `wrapWithApproval` (nil-safe) + +Adding `limiter wallet.SpendingLimiter` as a parameter (nil allowed) to `wrapWithApproval` keeps the auto-approve logic centralized in the approval wrapper. When nil, behavior is unchanged. When non-nil, payment tools (`p2p_pay`, `payment_send`) extract the amount parameter and check `IsAutoApprovable` before falling through to interactive approval. + +**Alternative**: Separate wrapper function — rejected because it would require re-implementing all of `wrapWithApproval`'s grant logic. + +### 4. Inbound approval uses pricing function to determine auto-approvability + +For inbound paid tool invocations, the approval callback uses `pricingFn` to look up the tool's price, then checks `IsAutoApprovable`. This means the owner auto-approves based on the price they set, not the amount the peer pays. For free tools, the approval always goes to the interactive provider. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **[Auto-approve threshold too high]** → Users can set it to "0" to disable. Default "0.10" USDC is conservative. +- **[Inbound approval blocks P2P latency]** → TTY/Gateway approval is synchronous, adding latency to remote tool calls. Mitigated by auto-approve for small paid tools. +- **[Breaking change: `NewEntSpendingLimiter` signature]** → Only two call sites (wiring.go, cli/payment.go), both updated. Not a public API. +- **[Breaking change: `SpendingLimiter` interface]** → Adding `IsAutoApprovable` is a breaking interface change. Only one implementation exists (`EntSpendingLimiter`), so impact is contained. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..af387a7a --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## Why + +The P2P paid value exchange system has three critical gaps in its user approval (HITL) layer: the `autoApproveBelow` config field is defined and exposed in TUI settings but never wired into the `EntSpendingLimiter`, inbound remote tool invocations bypass owner approval entirely (only checking firewall ACL), and outbound `p2p_pay` payments require manual approval even for trivially small amounts that should be auto-approved. + +## What Changes + +- Add `autoApproveBelow` field to `EntSpendingLimiter` and expose `IsAutoApprovable()` on the `SpendingLimiter` interface for threshold-based auto-approval decisions. +- Add `ToolApprovalFunc` callback to the P2P protocol handler, inserting an owner approval gate between firewall ACL and tool execution for both free and paid inbound invocations. +- Integrate spending limiter into the `wrapWithApproval` tool wrapper so that outbound payment tools (`p2p_pay`, `payment_send`) auto-approve amounts below the configured threshold. +- Wire all components together in `app.go` and `wiring.go` — approval callback for inbound P2P, limiter for outbound approval wrapper. + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +### Modified Capabilities +- `approval-policy`: `wrapWithApproval` gains a `SpendingLimiter` parameter for amount-based auto-approval of payment tools. +- `p2p-protocol`: Protocol handler gains `ToolApprovalFunc` callback for owner approval of inbound remote tool invocations. +- `blockchain-wallet`: `SpendingLimiter` interface adds `IsAutoApprovable` method; `EntSpendingLimiter` constructor accepts `autoApproveBelow` parameter. + +## Impact + +- **Core**: `internal/wallet/spending.go` — interface change (`IsAutoApprovable` added), constructor signature change (new parameter). +- **Core**: `internal/p2p/protocol/handler.go` — new callback type and approval gate in request handling. +- **Application**: `internal/app/tools.go` — `wrapWithApproval` signature change, auto-approve logic for payment tools. +- **Application**: `internal/app/app.go` — approval callback wiring for P2P handler, limiter passed to tool wrapper. +- **Application**: `internal/app/wiring.go` — `NewEntSpendingLimiter` call updated, `pricingFn` exposed on `p2pComponents`. +- **CLI**: `internal/cli/payment/payment.go` — `NewEntSpendingLimiter` call updated. +- **Tests**: `internal/wallet/spending_test.go` — new unit tests for `IsAutoApprovable`. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/specs/approval-policy/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/specs/approval-policy/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..21fc3347 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/specs/approval-policy/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Amount-based auto-approve for payment tools +wrapWithApproval SHALL accept an optional SpendingLimiter parameter (nil allowed). When non-nil and the tool is a payment tool (`p2p_pay` or `payment_send`), it SHALL check the amount parameter against `IsAutoApprovable` before requesting interactive approval. + +#### Scenario: Auto-approve small payment +- **WHEN** tool is `p2p_pay` with amount "0.05" AND limiter.IsAutoApprovable returns true +- **THEN** the tool SHALL execute without interactive approval + +#### Scenario: Require approval for large payment +- **WHEN** tool is `p2p_pay` with amount "5.00" AND limiter.IsAutoApprovable returns false +- **THEN** the tool SHALL request interactive approval via the approval provider + +#### Scenario: No limiter provided +- **WHEN** limiter is nil +- **THEN** wrapWithApproval SHALL behave as before (no amount-based auto-approve) + +#### Scenario: Non-payment tool unaffected +- **WHEN** tool is `exec` AND limiter is non-nil +- **THEN** wrapWithApproval SHALL ignore the limiter and follow normal approval policy + +### Requirement: P2P payment approval summary +buildApprovalSummary SHALL return a human-readable summary for `p2p_pay` tool invocations including amount, peer DID (truncated), and memo. + +#### Scenario: p2p_pay approval summary +- **WHEN** buildApprovalSummary is called with toolName "p2p_pay" and params containing amount, peer_did, and memo +- **THEN** it SHALL return a string containing the amount, truncated peer DID, and memo diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/specs/blockchain-wallet/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/specs/blockchain-wallet/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8fe0caa9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/specs/blockchain-wallet/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: SpendingLimiter auto-approve threshold +SpendingLimiter interface SHALL include `IsAutoApprovable(ctx context.Context, amount *big.Int) (bool, error)` for threshold-based auto-approval decisions. EntSpendingLimiter SHALL implement this method using the `autoApproveBelow` field. + +#### Scenario: IsAutoApprovable returns true for amount below threshold +- **WHEN** autoApproveBelow is "0.10" and amount is 0.05 USDC and daily limit is not exceeded +- **THEN** IsAutoApprovable SHALL return (true, nil) + +#### Scenario: IsAutoApprovable returns false for amount above threshold +- **WHEN** autoApproveBelow is "0.10" and amount is 0.50 USDC +- **THEN** IsAutoApprovable SHALL return (false, nil) + +#### Scenario: IsAutoApprovable returns false when threshold is zero +- **WHEN** autoApproveBelow is "0" or empty +- **THEN** IsAutoApprovable SHALL return (false, nil) regardless of amount + +#### Scenario: IsAutoApprovable returns error when daily limit exceeded +- **WHEN** amount is below threshold but daily spending limit would be exceeded +- **THEN** IsAutoApprovable SHALL return (false, error) with the limit error + +### Requirement: EntSpendingLimiter autoApproveBelow parameter +NewEntSpendingLimiter SHALL accept an `autoApproveBelow` string parameter (4th argument) representing the USDC amount threshold for auto-approval. Empty string or "0" SHALL disable auto-approval. + +#### Scenario: Valid autoApproveBelow value +- **WHEN** NewEntSpendingLimiter is called with autoApproveBelow "0.10" +- **THEN** the limiter SHALL store the parsed threshold as 100000 (smallest USDC units) + +#### Scenario: Empty autoApproveBelow disables auto-approval +- **WHEN** NewEntSpendingLimiter is called with autoApproveBelow "" +- **THEN** the limiter SHALL set autoApproveBelow to 0 (disabled) + +#### Scenario: Invalid autoApproveBelow returns error +- **WHEN** NewEntSpendingLimiter is called with autoApproveBelow "invalid" +- **THEN** NewEntSpendingLimiter SHALL return an error diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/specs/p2p-protocol/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/specs/p2p-protocol/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d0be83b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/specs/p2p-protocol/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: ToolApprovalFunc callback type +The protocol package SHALL define a `ToolApprovalFunc` callback type with signature `func(ctx context.Context, peerDID, toolName string, params map[string]interface{}) (bool, error)` that asks the local owner for approval before executing a remote tool invocation. + +#### Scenario: Approval function defined +- **WHEN** the protocol package is compiled +- **THEN** ToolApprovalFunc type SHALL be available for use by callers + +### Requirement: Handler owner approval for free tool invocations +Handler.handleToolInvoke SHALL check the approvalFn callback after firewall ACL check and before tool execution. If the approval function returns false, the handler SHALL return a "denied" response with error "tool invocation denied by owner". + +#### Scenario: Approval granted for free tool +- **WHEN** a remote peer invokes a free tool AND approvalFn returns true +- **THEN** the tool SHALL execute normally + +#### Scenario: Approval denied for free tool +- **WHEN** a remote peer invokes a free tool AND approvalFn returns false +- **THEN** the handler SHALL return status "denied" with error "tool invocation denied by owner" + +#### Scenario: No approval function configured +- **WHEN** a remote peer invokes a tool AND approvalFn is nil +- **THEN** the tool SHALL execute without approval check (backward compatible) + +### Requirement: Handler owner approval for paid tool invocations +Handler.handleToolInvokePaid SHALL check the approvalFn callback after payment verification and before tool execution. + +#### Scenario: Approval granted for paid tool +- **WHEN** a remote peer invokes a paid tool with valid payment AND approvalFn returns true +- **THEN** the tool SHALL execute normally + +#### Scenario: Approval denied for paid tool +- **WHEN** a remote peer invokes a paid tool with valid payment AND approvalFn returns false +- **THEN** the handler SHALL return status "denied" with error "tool invocation denied by owner" + +### Requirement: SetApprovalFunc setter +Handler SHALL expose a `SetApprovalFunc(fn ToolApprovalFunc)` method to set the owner approval callback. + +#### Scenario: SetApprovalFunc wires callback +- **WHEN** SetApprovalFunc is called with a non-nil function +- **THEN** subsequent tool invocations SHALL use the provided function for approval checks diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ef523d29 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-approval-gaps-fix/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +## 1. SpendingLimiter autoApproveBelow Wiring + +- [x] 1.1 Add `autoApproveBelow *big.Int` field to `EntSpendingLimiter` struct +- [x] 1.2 Add `autoApproveBelow string` parameter to `NewEntSpendingLimiter` constructor +- [x] 1.3 Add `IsAutoApprovable(ctx, amount) (bool, error)` to `SpendingLimiter` interface +- [x] 1.4 Implement `IsAutoApprovable` on `EntSpendingLimiter` +- [x] 1.5 Update `NewEntSpendingLimiter` call in `internal/app/wiring.go` with `cfg.Payment.Limits.AutoApproveBelow` +- [x] 1.6 Update `NewEntSpendingLimiter` call in `internal/cli/payment/payment.go` with `cfg.Payment.Limits.AutoApproveBelow` +- [x] 1.7 Add unit tests for `IsAutoApprovable` and `NewEntSpendingLimiter` autoApproveBelow parsing + +## 2. Inbound P2P Tool Approval Layer + +- [x] 2.1 Define `ToolApprovalFunc` callback type in `internal/p2p/protocol/handler.go` +- [x] 2.2 Add `approvalFn ToolApprovalFunc` field to `Handler` struct +- [x] 2.3 Add `SetApprovalFunc(fn ToolApprovalFunc)` setter method +- [x] 2.4 Insert approval check in `handleToolInvoke` after firewall, before executor +- [x] 2.5 Insert approval check in `handleToolInvokePaid` after payment verification, before executor +- [x] 2.6 Add `pricingFn` field to `p2pComponents` struct and populate in `initP2P` return + +## 3. Outbound Payment Auto-Approve Integration + +- [x] 3.1 Add `limiter wallet.SpendingLimiter` parameter to `wrapWithApproval` function +- [x] 3.2 Add amount-based auto-approve logic for `p2p_pay` and `payment_send` tools +- [x] 3.3 Add `p2p_pay` case to `buildApprovalSummary` +- [x] 3.4 Add `wallet` import to `internal/app/tools.go` + +## 4. Application Wiring + +- [x] 4.1 Pass `pc.limiter` to `wrapWithApproval` in `app.go` (nil when payment disabled) +- [x] 4.2 Wire `SetApprovalFunc` on P2P handler in `app.go` with pricingFn + limiter + composite approval +- [x] 4.3 Add `wallet` and `time` imports to `app.go` + +## 5. Verification + +- [x] 5.1 `go build ./...` passes +- [x] 5.2 `go test ./internal/wallet/...` passes (IsAutoApprovable tests) +- [x] 5.3 `go test ./internal/p2p/...` passes diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..eac8ef7a --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-23 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..27468eae --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +## Context + +P2P networking, A2A protocol, and Payment subsystems exist independently. Agents can discover peers and establish sessions, but cannot execute paid tool invocations. The protocol handler lacks an executor callback, ZK circuits are compiled but unwired, and no pricing/payment flow exists. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Enable paid tool invocations between P2P agents using EIP-3009 USDC authorization +- Protect owner privacy with a hard-block PII filter on all P2P responses +- Track peer trust via reputation scoring to prevent abuse +- Wire existing ZK circuits for handshake verification and response attestation +- Connect the protocol handler executor so P2P tool calls actually work + +**Non-Goals:** +- Full on-chain transaction submission (MVP uses placeholder; real tx requires seller-side signing) +- Cross-chain payment bridging +- Dispute resolution or escrow mechanisms +- Automated pricing optimization + +## Decisions + +### Pre-Signed Authorization (EIP-3009) over Direct Transfer +**Decision:** Buyer signs an EIP-3009 `transferWithAuthorization` off-chain; seller verifies and submits on-chain after service delivery. +**Rationale:** Prevents buyer fraud (seller holds auth, can submit anytime before deadline). Eliminates gas costs for buyer. Standard USDC mechanism supported on all major chains. +**Alternative:** Direct ERC-20 transfer before tool execution — rejected because seller could take payment without delivering service. + +### Adapter Pattern for PayGate ↔ Handler +**Decision:** Use `payGateAdapter` struct to bridge `paygate.Gate` (concrete) to `protocol.PayGateChecker` (interface). +**Rationale:** Avoids import cycle between protocol and paygate packages. Handler only depends on its own interface type. + +### Reputation Score Formula +**Decision:** `score = successes / (successes + failures*2 + timeouts*1.5 + 1.0)` +**Rationale:** New peers start at 0.0 (not trusted by default). Failures weigh double, timeouts weigh 1.5x. The +1.0 denominator prevents division-by-zero and requires at least a few successful exchanges to build trust. Default min threshold of 0.3 allows peers through after ~1-2 successful exchanges. + +### Closure-Based Executor over App Method +**Decision:** Wire P2P executor as a closure capturing the tools slice, rather than an App method. +**Rationale:** Tools list is a local variable in `New()`. A closure avoids adding a new field to the App struct or leaking the tools slice. The closure directly dispatches to tool handlers by name. + +### Owner Shield as Firewall Layer +**Decision:** Owner Shield is integrated into the Firewall's `SanitizeResponse()` rather than as a separate middleware. +**Rationale:** Single point of enforcement. All P2P responses pass through firewall sanitization. No way to bypass the shield regardless of payment amount. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **[MVP: No real on-chain submission]** → SubmitOnChain returns placeholder hash. Mitigation: documented as TODO, auth is verified and can be submitted when seller-side signing is implemented. +- **[Reputation cold start]** → New peers have 0.0 score but are allowed through (benefit of doubt). Mitigation: minTrustScore default 0.3 is low enough that 1-2 successful exchanges suffice. +- **[ZK circuit compilation cost]** → All 4 circuits compiled at startup. Mitigation: compilation is one-time; results can be cached to disk via ProofCacheDir config. +- **[Single-chain assumption]** → Payment gate assumes one chain per node. Mitigation: canonical registry supports multiple chains; multi-chain can be added later. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8e60dfe0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +## Why + +The P2P, A2A, and Payment systems are fully isolated, preventing agents from executing a "provide value → receive USDC payment" flow. ZK proof circuits (4) are defined but not wired, PricingInfo is declared but unused, and the protocol handler's executor callback is disconnected, meaning P2P tool invocations don't actually work. + +## What Changes + +- Add canonical USDC contract registry with per-chain addresses and on-chain verification +- Add EIP-3009 `transferWithAuthorization` builder for gasless USDC payments +- Add Owner Privacy Shield that hard-blocks owner PII from P2P responses +- Add per-peer DID reputation system with trust scoring (Ent-backed) +- Add Payment Gate between firewall and tool executor for paid tool invocations +- Extend P2P protocol with `price_query` and `tool_invoke_paid` message types +- Wire all 4 ZK circuits (wallet ownership, response attestation, balance range, agent capability) +- Wire executor callback so P2P tool invocations actually execute +- Add buyer-side methods (`QueryPrice`, `InvokeToolPaid`) to remote agent + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `p2p-payment-gate`: Payment verification gate for P2P tool invocations using EIP-3009 pre-signed authorizations +- `p2p-owner-shield`: Hard-block layer preventing owner PII leakage through P2P responses +- `p2p-reputation`: Per-peer trust scoring based on exchange outcomes (success/failure/timeout) +- `usdc-registry`: Canonical USDC contract address registry with on-chain verification + +### Modified Capabilities +- `p2p-protocol`: Add price_query and tool_invoke_paid request types, payment_required status +- `p2p-firewall`: Add reputation checking and owner shield integration +- `p2p-networking`: Wire ZK proofs into handshake and attestation, wire executor callback + +## Impact + +- New packages: `internal/payment/contracts/`, `internal/payment/eip3009/`, `internal/p2p/paygate/`, `internal/p2p/reputation/`, `internal/p2p/firewall/owner_shield.go` +- New Ent schema: `PeerReputation` with trust score tracking +- Modified: `internal/p2p/protocol/handler.go`, `internal/p2p/protocol/messages.go`, `internal/p2p/protocol/remote_agent.go` +- Modified: `internal/p2p/firewall/firewall.go` (reputation + owner shield) +- Modified: `internal/app/wiring.go` (full wiring), `internal/app/app.go` (executor callback) +- Modified: `internal/config/types.go` (pricing, owner protection, min trust score configs) +- Dependencies: go-ethereum (already present), gnark (already present) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/specs/p2p-owner-shield/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/specs/p2p-owner-shield/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5956b6a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/specs/p2p-owner-shield/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +## Purpose + +Hard-block privacy layer that prevents owner PII from being leaked through P2P responses, regardless of payment amount. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: PII Redaction +The system SHALL redact owner personal information from all P2P responses. + +#### Scenario: Owner name in response +- **WHEN** a P2P response contains the configured owner name +- **THEN** the system replaces it with "[owner-data-redacted]" + +#### Scenario: Email pattern in response +- **WHEN** a P2P response contains an email address matching the configured owner email or general email patterns +- **THEN** the system replaces it with "[owner-data-redacted]" + +#### Scenario: Phone pattern in response +- **WHEN** a P2P response contains a phone number matching the configured owner phone or general phone patterns +- **THEN** the system replaces it with "[owner-data-redacted]" + +### Requirement: Conversation Blocking +The system SHALL block conversation history fields from P2P responses by default. + +#### Scenario: Conversation data in response +- **WHEN** a P2P response contains keys like "conversation", "message_history", "chat_log", "session_history", or "chat_history" +- **THEN** the system replaces the value with "[owner-data-redacted]" + +#### Scenario: Conversation blocking disabled +- **WHEN** blockConversations is explicitly set to false +- **THEN** conversation fields are not redacted + +### Requirement: Recursive Scanning +The system SHALL recursively scan nested maps and slices for owner data. + +#### Scenario: Nested PII +- **WHEN** owner data appears in a deeply nested map within the response +- **THEN** the system detects and redacts it diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/specs/p2p-payment-gate/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/specs/p2p-payment-gate/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dea9f2a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/specs/p2p-payment-gate/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +## Purpose + +Payment gate that sits between the P2P firewall and tool executor, enforcing USDC payment requirements for paid tool invocations using EIP-3009 pre-signed authorizations. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: Price Query +The system SHALL allow remote peers to query tool pricing before invocation. + +#### Scenario: Free tool query +- **WHEN** a peer queries the price of a tool with no configured price +- **THEN** the system returns isFree=true + +#### Scenario: Paid tool query +- **WHEN** a peer queries the price of a tool with configured pricing +- **THEN** the system returns a PriceQuote containing toolName, price, currency, USDC contract, chainId, sellerAddr, and quoteExpiry + +### Requirement: Payment Verification +The system SHALL verify EIP-3009 payment authorizations before executing paid tools. + +#### Scenario: Valid authorization +- **WHEN** a paid tool invocation includes a valid EIP-3009 authorization with correct recipient, sufficient amount, and unexpired deadline +- **THEN** the system returns StatusVerified and proceeds with tool execution + +#### Scenario: Missing authorization +- **WHEN** a paid tool invocation does not include paymentAuth +- **THEN** the system returns StatusPaymentRequired with a PriceQuote + +#### Scenario: Insufficient payment +- **WHEN** the authorization value is less than the tool price +- **THEN** the system returns StatusInvalid with reason "insufficient payment" + +#### Scenario: Expired authorization +- **WHEN** the authorization's validBefore is in the past +- **THEN** the system returns StatusInvalid with reason "payment authorization expired" + +### Requirement: Canonical USDC Verification +The system SHALL verify that the USDC contract address matches the canonical address for the chain. + +#### Scenario: Non-canonical contract +- **WHEN** the configured USDC contract does not match the canonical address for the chain +- **THEN** the system returns StatusInvalid with reason indicating non-canonical USDC contract diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/specs/p2p-reputation/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/specs/p2p-reputation/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4bd6da0c --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/specs/p2p-reputation/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +## Purpose + +Per-peer DID trust scoring system that tracks exchange outcomes and integrates with the firewall to reject untrusted peers. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: Trust Score Calculation +The system SHALL calculate peer trust scores based on exchange outcomes. + +#### Scenario: Successful exchange +- **WHEN** a successful exchange is recorded for a peer +- **THEN** the peer's trust score increases + +#### Scenario: Failed exchange +- **WHEN** a failed exchange is recorded for a peer +- **THEN** the peer's trust score decreases (failures weigh 2x) + +#### Scenario: Timeout +- **WHEN** a timeout is recorded for a peer +- **THEN** the peer's trust score decreases (timeouts weigh 1.5x) + +### Requirement: New Peer Handling +The system SHALL give new peers the benefit of the doubt. + +#### Scenario: Unknown peer +- **WHEN** a peer has no reputation record +- **THEN** the peer is considered trusted (benefit of doubt) + +### Requirement: Firewall Integration +The system SHALL integrate with the P2P firewall to reject untrusted peers. + +#### Scenario: Peer below threshold +- **WHEN** a peer's trust score is above 0 but below the minimum threshold +- **THEN** the firewall rejects their requests + +#### Scenario: Peer above threshold +- **WHEN** a peer's trust score meets or exceeds the minimum threshold +- **THEN** the firewall allows their requests + +### Requirement: Persistence +The system SHALL persist reputation data in the database using Ent ORM. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/specs/usdc-registry/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/specs/usdc-registry/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4877fda3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/specs/usdc-registry/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +## Purpose + +Canonical USDC contract address registry for preventing fake token attacks in P2P payments. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: Canonical Address Lookup +The system SHALL provide canonical USDC contract addresses for supported chains. + +#### Scenario: Supported chain +- **WHEN** looking up the USDC address for Ethereum Mainnet (chain 1) +- **THEN** the system returns the canonical Circle USDC address + +#### Scenario: Unsupported chain +- **WHEN** looking up the USDC address for an unsupported chain ID +- **THEN** the system returns an error + +### Requirement: Address Verification +The system SHALL verify that a given address matches the canonical USDC address for a chain. + +#### Scenario: Matching address +- **WHEN** checking if an address matches the canonical USDC for a chain +- **THEN** the system returns true for exact matches (case-insensitive) + +#### Scenario: Non-matching address +- **WHEN** checking if a different address is canonical for a chain +- **THEN** the system returns false + +### Requirement: On-Chain Verification +The system SHALL support on-chain verification of USDC contracts by checking symbol and decimals. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..06f186cb --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-paid-value-exchange/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +## Tasks + +### Step 1: Canonical USDC Contract Registry +- [x] Create `internal/payment/contracts/registry.go` with canonical addresses for chains 1, 8453, 84532, 11155111 +- [x] Implement `LookupUSDC()`, `IsCanonical()`, `VerifyOnChain()` functions +- [x] Create `internal/payment/contracts/registry_test.go` with table-driven tests + +### Step 2: EIP-3009 Authorization Builder +- [x] Create `internal/payment/eip3009/builder.go` with Authorization struct +- [x] Implement `NewUnsigned()`, `TypedDataHash()`, `Sign()`, `Verify()`, `EncodeCalldata()` +- [x] Create `internal/payment/eip3009/builder_test.go` + +### Step 3: Owner Data Shield +- [x] Create `internal/p2p/firewall/owner_shield.go` with OwnerShield struct +- [x] Implement `ScanAndRedact()` with recursive map/slice scanning +- [x] Implement conversation key blocking (default true) +- [x] Create `internal/p2p/firewall/owner_shield_test.go` +- [x] Update `internal/p2p/firewall/firewall.go` to integrate OwnerShield + +### Step 4: Reputation System +- [x] Create `internal/ent/schema/peer_reputation.go` Ent schema +- [x] Run `go generate ./internal/ent/...` for codegen +- [x] Create `internal/p2p/reputation/store.go` with RecordSuccess/Failure/Timeout +- [x] Implement `CalculateScore()` formula +- [x] Create `internal/p2p/reputation/store_test.go` +- [x] Add `ReputationChecker` callback to `internal/p2p/firewall/firewall.go` + +### Step 5: Payment Gate +- [x] Create `internal/p2p/paygate/gate.go` with Check/SubmitOnChain/BuildQuote +- [x] Implement EIP-3009 auth parsing from JSON map +- [x] Implement ParseUSDC for decimal-to-smallest-unit conversion +- [x] Create `internal/p2p/paygate/gate_test.go` + +### Step 6: Protocol Extension +- [x] Add `RequestPriceQuery`, `RequestToolInvokePaid` to messages.go +- [x] Add `StatusPaymentRequired` response status +- [x] Add `PriceQuoteResult` and `PaidInvokePayload` types +- [x] Add `handlePriceQuery()` and `handleToolInvokePaid()` to handler.go +- [x] Add `PayGateChecker` interface and `SetPayGate()` method +- [x] Add `QueryPrice()` and `InvokeToolPaid()` to remote_agent.go + +### Step 7: ZK Proof Wiring +- [x] Create `initZKP()` function in wiring.go that compiles all 4 circuits +- [x] Wire ZK prover/verifier into handshake config +- [x] Wire ZK attestation function into firewall + +### Step 8: Full Wiring +- [x] Add new imports to wiring.go (paygate, reputation, contracts, zkp, circuits, common, frontend, ent) +- [x] Extend `p2pComponents` struct with payGate and reputation fields +- [x] Change `initP2P()` signature to accept paymentComponents and ent.Client +- [x] Wire Owner Shield in initP2P +- [x] Wire Reputation system in initP2P +- [x] Wire Payment Gate in initP2P with PricingFunc +- [x] Wire PricingInfo on GossipCard +- [x] Create `payGateAdapter` to bridge paygate.Gate → protocol.PayGateChecker +- [x] Update `initP2P()` call in app.go with new parameters +- [x] Wire executor callback via closure after agent creation in app.go + +### Step 9: Config Extensions +- [x] Add `P2PPricingConfig` struct to config/types.go +- [x] Add `OwnerProtectionConfig` struct to config/types.go +- [x] Add `MinTrustScore` field to P2PConfig + +### Verification +- [x] `go build ./...` passes +- [x] `go test ./internal/p2p/...` passes +- [x] `go test ./internal/payment/...` passes diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..eac8ef7a --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-23 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9f665f13 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +## Context + +Lango's P2P networking and payment systems are implemented across `internal/p2p/`, `internal/payment/`, and `internal/wallet/`. The gateway (`internal/gateway/`) serves HTTP and WebSocket endpoints on a chi router. Currently, P2P node state is only accessible via CLI commands that create ephemeral libp2p nodes — separate from the running server's node. Wallet private keys can only be injected interactively via `lango security secrets set`, blocking Docker-based automation. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Enable non-interactive wallet key injection for Docker/CI environments +- Expose P2P node state (peer ID, connected peers, DID) via REST API on the running gateway +- Provide a complete Docker Compose example that proves 3 agents can discover each other and transact USDC + +**Non-Goals:** +- Replacing CLI P2P commands (they remain for ad-hoc debugging) +- Adding LLM provider integration to the Docker example (tests P2P + payment only) +- Production-grade Docker deployment (this is an integration test example) +- Modifying the P2P or payment core logic + +## Decisions + +### 1. P2P routes live in `internal/app/p2p_routes.go` (not `internal/gateway/`) + +**Rationale**: The routes depend on `p2pComponents` which is an app-layer type from `wiring.go`. Placing them in gateway would create an import cycle or require leaking p2p internals into the gateway package. This follows the existing pattern where A2A routes are registered from app.go via `a2aServer.RegisterRoutes(router)`. + +**Alternative**: Create a gateway sub-package — rejected as over-engineering for 3 simple handlers. + +### 2. `--value-hex` flag (not stdin pipe) + +**Rationale**: A hex string flag is simplest for Docker entrypoints where the value comes from an environment variable. Stdin piping (`echo $KEY | lango secrets set`) would require additional plumbing and is less explicit. The `0x` prefix is optionally stripped to match Ethereum key conventions. + +**Alternative**: `--value-file` reading from a file — could be added later but hex flag covers the immediate need. + +### 3. Anvil deterministic accounts for agents + +**Rationale**: Anvil generates the same 10 accounts on every run. Using accounts 0-2 for Alice/Bob/Charlie and account 9 for the deployer avoids key generation complexity and ensures test reproducibility. + +### 4. MockUSDC instead of real ERC-20 fork + +**Rationale**: A minimal 50-line Solidity contract with `mint()` is simpler and faster than forking mainnet USDC. The payment system interacts via standard ERC-20 `transfer`/`balanceOf`, so the mock is functionally equivalent for integration testing. + +### 5. P2P REST endpoints are public (no auth middleware) + +**Rationale**: The endpoints expose only node metadata (peer ID, listen addresses, DID). No secrets or session data are returned. The existing `/health` endpoint follows the same pattern. In production, operators would use network-level access control. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **mDNS in Docker**: Docker bridge networks support multicast by default, but some Docker Desktop configurations may block it → Mitigation: 15-second wait with retry in test script; fallback to explicit bootstrap peers if needed +- **Test flakiness**: P2P discovery timing is non-deterministic → Mitigation: generous timeouts and retry loops in test script +- **MockUSDC divergence**: Mock may not match real USDC behavior for edge cases → Mitigation: tests only use basic `transfer`/`balanceOf` which are standard ERC-20 +- **Foundry image availability**: `ghcr.io/foundry-rs/foundry` may change tags → Mitigation: use `latest` tag; pin version in production diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..29ab396c --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +## Why + +The P2P/A2A architecture is implemented but lacks an end-to-end integration test proving that multiple agents can discover each other via mDNS, establish P2P connections, and execute USDC payments over a local blockchain. A Docker Compose example with 3 agents (Alice, Bob, Charlie) and a local Anvil node provides a reproducible verification environment. Two blockers prevent headless agent setup: CLI P2P commands create ephemeral nodes (not the running server's), and wallet key injection requires an interactive terminal. + +## What Changes + +- Add `--value-hex` flag to `lango security secrets set` for non-interactive hex-encoded secret injection (e.g., wallet private keys in Docker) +- Add P2P REST API endpoints (`/api/p2p/status`, `/api/p2p/peers`, `/api/p2p/identity`) on the gateway router, enabling external tooling to query P2P node state without ephemeral CLI nodes +- Create `examples/p2p-trading/` Docker Compose integration example with 3 Lango agents, Anvil (local EVM), MockUSDC contract deployment, and an E2E test script verifying health, P2P discovery, DID identity, and USDC payment + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `p2p-rest-api`: REST endpoints for querying P2P node status, connected peers, and local DID identity via the gateway +- `p2p-trading-example`: Docker Compose integration example with 3 agents, local blockchain, and E2E test scripts + +### Modified Capabilities +- `cli-secrets-management`: Add `--value-hex` flag to `secrets set` for non-interactive hex value injection + +## Impact + +- **Modified files**: `internal/cli/security/secrets.go` (new flag), `internal/app/app.go` (P2P route wiring) +- **New files**: `internal/app/p2p_routes.go` (P2P REST handlers), full `examples/p2p-trading/` directory tree +- **Dependencies**: No new Go dependencies; Docker example uses Foundry (Anvil/Forge/Cast) images +- **APIs**: New public REST endpoints at `/api/p2p/*` (no auth required, metadata only) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/specs/cli-secrets-management/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/specs/cli-secrets-management/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e1ae756b --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/specs/cli-secrets-management/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Set secret value +The `secrets set` command SHALL support storing a secret value either interactively (via passphrase prompt) or non-interactively (via `--value-hex` flag). When `--value-hex` is provided, the command SHALL hex-decode the input (stripping an optional `0x` prefix) and store the raw bytes. When `--value-hex` is not provided, the command SHALL require an interactive terminal and prompt for the value. + +#### Scenario: Interactive secret storage +- **WHEN** user runs `lango security secrets set mykey` in an interactive terminal without `--value-hex` +- **THEN** the command SHALL prompt for the secret value and store it encrypted + +#### Scenario: Non-interactive hex secret storage +- **WHEN** user runs `lango security secrets set wallet.privatekey --value-hex 0xac0974...` in a non-interactive environment +- **THEN** the command SHALL hex-decode the value (stripping `0x` prefix), store the raw bytes encrypted, and print success + +#### Scenario: Non-interactive without value-hex flag +- **WHEN** user runs `lango security secrets set mykey` in a non-interactive terminal without `--value-hex` +- **THEN** the command SHALL return an error suggesting `--value-hex` for non-interactive use + +#### Scenario: Invalid hex value +- **WHEN** user runs `lango security secrets set mykey --value-hex "not-hex"` +- **THEN** the command SHALL return a hex decode error diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/specs/p2p-rest-api/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/specs/p2p-rest-api/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5e4260d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/specs/p2p-rest-api/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P status endpoint +The gateway SHALL expose `GET /api/p2p/status` that returns the local node's peer ID, listen addresses, and connected peer count as JSON. + +#### Scenario: Query P2P status when node is running +- **WHEN** a client sends `GET /api/p2p/status` to the gateway +- **THEN** the response SHALL be HTTP 200 with JSON containing `peerId` (string), `listenAddrs` (string array), and `connectedPeers` (integer) + +### Requirement: P2P peers endpoint +The gateway SHALL expose `GET /api/p2p/peers` that returns a list of currently connected peers with their IDs and multiaddresses. + +#### Scenario: Query connected peers +- **WHEN** a client sends `GET /api/p2p/peers` to the gateway +- **THEN** the response SHALL be HTTP 200 with JSON containing `peers` (array of objects with `peerId` and `addrs` fields) and `count` (integer) + +### Requirement: P2P identity endpoint +The gateway SHALL expose `GET /api/p2p/identity` that returns the local DID string derived from the wallet. + +#### Scenario: Query identity with wallet configured +- **WHEN** a client sends `GET /api/p2p/identity` and the identity provider is available +- **THEN** the response SHALL be HTTP 200 with JSON containing `did` (string starting with `did:lango:`) and `peerId` (string) + +#### Scenario: Query identity without identity provider +- **WHEN** a client sends `GET /api/p2p/identity` and the identity provider is nil +- **THEN** the response SHALL be HTTP 200 with JSON containing `did` as null and `peerId` (string) + +### Requirement: P2P routes registration +The P2P REST endpoints SHALL be registered on the gateway router only when P2P components are initialized (i.e., `p2pComponents` is non-nil). + +#### Scenario: P2P disabled +- **WHEN** P2P is disabled in configuration +- **THEN** no `/api/p2p/*` routes SHALL be registered on the gateway diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/specs/p2p-trading-example/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/specs/p2p-trading-example/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1e6475bf --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/specs/p2p-trading-example/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Docker Compose multi-agent environment +The `examples/p2p-trading/` directory SHALL contain a Docker Compose configuration that starts a local Ethereum node (Anvil), deploys a MockUSDC contract, and launches 3 Lango agents (Alice, Bob, Charlie) with P2P and payment enabled. + +#### Scenario: All services start successfully +- **WHEN** `docker compose up -d` is run in the example directory +- **THEN** Anvil SHALL be healthy on port 8545, the setup service SHALL deploy MockUSDC and fund agents, and all 3 agents SHALL respond to `/health` within 90 seconds + +### Requirement: MockUSDC contract +The `contracts/MockUSDC.sol` SHALL implement a minimal ERC-20 with `mint()`, `transfer()`, `transferFrom()`, `approve()`, `balanceOf()`, and `allowance()` functions with 6 decimals. + +#### Scenario: Initial token distribution +- **WHEN** the setup script completes +- **THEN** each agent address SHALL have 1000 USDC (1000000000 smallest units) + +### Requirement: P2P discovery between agents +The 3 agents SHALL discover each other via mDNS on the Docker bridge network within 15 seconds of startup. + +#### Scenario: Peer discovery +- **WHEN** all agents have been running for 15 seconds +- **THEN** each agent's `GET /api/p2p/peers` SHALL report at least 2 connected peers + +### Requirement: Extended Docker entrypoint +The `docker-entrypoint-p2p.sh` SHALL wait for the USDC contract address from the setup sidecar, substitute it into the config, import the config, and inject the wallet private key via `--value-hex` flag. + +#### Scenario: Agent startup with key injection +- **WHEN** the agent container starts with AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY environment variable +- **THEN** the entrypoint SHALL store the private key via `lango security secrets set wallet.privatekey --value-hex` before starting the server + +### Requirement: Integration test script +The `scripts/test-p2p-trading.sh` SHALL verify health, P2P status, peer discovery, DID identity, USDC balances, and a payment transfer via REST API and on-chain queries. + +#### Scenario: End-to-end payment verification +- **WHEN** the test script executes a 1.00 USDC payment from Alice to Bob +- **THEN** Bob's on-chain USDC balance SHALL increase by 1000000 (1.00 USDC with 6 decimals) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4aecf1c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-trading-docker-compose/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +## 1. CLI Secrets Non-Interactive Support + +- [x] 1.1 Add `--value-hex` string flag to `newSecretsSetCmd` in `internal/cli/security/secrets.go` +- [x] 1.2 Implement hex decode logic (strip `0x` prefix, `hex.DecodeString`) and store raw bytes +- [x] 1.3 Update error message for non-interactive terminals to suggest `--value-hex` + +## 2. P2P REST API + +- [x] 2.1 Create `internal/app/p2p_routes.go` with `registerP2PRoutes(chi.Router, *p2pComponents)` +- [x] 2.2 Implement `GET /api/p2p/status` handler (peer ID, listen addrs, connected peer count) +- [x] 2.3 Implement `GET /api/p2p/peers` handler (list connected peers with addrs) +- [x] 2.4 Implement `GET /api/p2p/identity` handler (DID from identity provider) +- [x] 2.5 Wire `registerP2PRoutes` in `internal/app/app.go` after gateway creation and P2P init + +## 3. Docker Compose Example Structure + +- [x] 3.1 Create `examples/p2p-trading/` directory with subdirs: configs, secrets, scripts, contracts +- [x] 3.2 Create `docker-compose.yml` with 5 services: anvil, setup, alice, bob, charlie +- [x] 3.3 Create `docker-entrypoint-p2p.sh` extending base entrypoint with USDC address wait, config substitution, and wallet key injection + +## 4. Agent Configs and Secrets + +- [x] 4.1 Create `configs/alice.json` (port 18789, P2P 9001, payment enabled, no LLM) +- [x] 4.2 Create `configs/bob.json` (port 18790, P2P 9002) +- [x] 4.3 Create `configs/charlie.json` (port 18791, P2P 9003) +- [x] 4.4 Create passphrase files in `secrets/` for each agent + +## 5. Smart Contract and Setup + +- [x] 5.1 Create `contracts/MockUSDC.sol` — minimal ERC-20 with mint, 6 decimals +- [x] 5.2 Create `scripts/setup-anvil.sh` — deploy MockUSDC, mint 1000 USDC to each agent + +## 6. Test Scripts and Build + +- [x] 6.1 Create `scripts/wait-for-health.sh` — poll URL until HTTP 200 +- [x] 6.2 Create `scripts/test-p2p-trading.sh` — E2E test: health, P2P status, discovery, identity, balances, payment +- [x] 6.3 Create `Makefile` with build/up/test/down/clean targets +- [x] 6.4 Create `README.md` with architecture diagram and usage guide + +## 7. Verification + +- [x] 7.1 Run `go build ./...` — all packages compile +- [x] 7.2 Run `go test ./internal/app/...` — existing tests pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..eac8ef7a --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-23 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aeaa89fc --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +## Context + +P2P Paid Value Exchange features (Payment Gate, Owner Shield, Reputation tracking, USDC Registry, ZK wiring) are fully implemented in the core layer (`internal/p2p/`), but user-facing layers lack exposure. Users have no CLI commands to check reputation or pricing, no agent tools for paid workflow orchestration, no REST endpoints for external integration, and no documentation explaining these features. + +The core reputation store already tracks successes/failures/timeouts and computes trust scores, but only exposes `GetScore()` and `IsTrusted()`. The ent schema has `FirstSeen` and `LastInteraction` fields that are unused by existing API surfaces. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Expose full peer reputation details via CLI, agent tools, and REST API +- Expose pricing configuration via CLI, agent tools, and REST API +- Create skill definitions for reputation, pricing, and owner shield operations +- Update all prompts to guide agents through paid value exchange workflows +- Document Paid Value Exchange, Reputation System, and Owner Shield in feature docs +- Update example configs to demonstrate pricing and owner protection settings + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing the trust score formula or reputation calculation logic +- Adding new payment flows or modifying the Payment Gate protocol +- Implementing dynamic pricing (prices remain config-driven) +- Adding reputation history or audit trails (only current state) + +## Decisions + +### 1. GetDetails returns nil for unknown peers (not error) +**Rationale**: Consistent with existing `GetScore()` pattern (returns 0.0 for unknown). Callers distinguish "not found" from "error" without sentinel errors. CLI/API surfaces display "no reputation record" message. + +### 2. pricingCfg stored as value on p2pComponents (not pointer) +**Rationale**: P2PPricingConfig is a small struct (bool + 2 strings + map). Value semantics are simpler and avoid nil checks. The config is read-only after initialization. + +### 3. CLI reputation command uses DB directly (not ephemeral P2P node) +**Rationale**: Reputation data is in the database, not on the P2P network. No need to spin up an ephemeral node just to query local DB. The `bootLoader` provides DB access directly. + +### 4. Agent tools added to existing buildP2PTools slice (not separate function) +**Rationale**: Both new tools (`p2p_price_query`, `p2p_reputation`) are P2P-scoped and share the same `p2pComponents` dependency. Keeping them in the same builder maintains consistency with existing tools. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **[Pricing config is static]** → Prices are read from config at startup and don't change at runtime. Mitigation: acceptable for MVP; dynamic pricing can be added later via a pricing service. +- **[Reputation REST endpoint exposes trust data publicly]** → No auth on `/api/p2p/reputation`. Mitigation: follows existing pattern (status/peers/identity are also public). Only exposes aggregate scores, not sensitive data. +- **[GetDetails couples to ent schema fields]** → If ent schema changes, GetDetails must update. Mitigation: PeerDetails struct provides decoupling layer; ent fields are stable. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c98d1fdf --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +## Why + +P2P Paid Value Exchange (Payment Gate, Owner Shield, Reputation, USDC Registry, Protocol Extensions, ZK Wiring) has been fully implemented at the core level, but the user-facing layers (README, prompts, docs, skills, CLI, REST API, example configs) have not been updated to reflect these capabilities. Users cannot discover, use, or understand the paid exchange features without proper CLI commands, agent tools, documentation, and prompt guidance. + +## What Changes + +- Add `PeerDetails` struct and `GetDetails()` method to `internal/p2p/reputation/store.go` for full reputation info retrieval +- Add `pricingCfg` field to `p2pComponents` struct in wiring for REST API access to pricing config +- Add `lango p2p reputation` CLI subcommand to query peer trust scores and exchange history +- Add `lango p2p pricing` CLI subcommand to display pricing configuration +- Add `p2p_price_query` agent tool to query remote peer pricing before tool invocation +- Add `p2p_reputation` agent tool to check peer trust scores and exchange history +- Add `GET /api/p2p/reputation` REST endpoint for peer reputation queries +- Add `GET /api/p2p/pricing` REST endpoint for pricing configuration queries +- Create 3 new skills: `p2p-reputation`, `p2p-pricing`, `p2p-owner-shield` +- Update prompts (AGENTS.md, TOOL_USAGE.md, vault IDENTITY.md) with paid value exchange guidance +- Update docs (p2p-network.md, configuration.md, cli/p2p.md) with new sections +- Update README.md P2P section with Payment Gate, Reputation, Owner Shield +- Update example configs (alice/bob/charlie.json) with pricing, ownerProtection, minTrustScore + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +- `p2p-reputation-cli`: CLI and REST API for querying peer reputation details and trust scores +- `p2p-pricing-cli`: CLI and REST API for querying P2P tool pricing configuration +- `p2p-value-exchange-tools`: Agent tools for price query and reputation check in paid P2P workflows + +### Modified Capabilities + +- `p2p-reputation`: Add `GetDetails()` method for full reputation data retrieval +- `p2p-rest-api`: Add `/reputation` and `/pricing` endpoints +- `p2p-skills`: Add 3 new skill definitions (reputation, pricing, owner-shield) +- `p2p-agent-prompts`: Update prompts with paid value exchange guidance and new tool documentation +- `p2p-documentation`: Add Paid Value Exchange, Reputation System, Owner Shield sections +- `p2p-trading-example`: Add pricing, ownerProtection, minTrustScore to example configs + +## Impact + +- **Core**: `internal/p2p/reputation/store.go` (new struct + method), `internal/app/wiring.go` (new field) +- **CLI**: `internal/cli/p2p/` (2 new files + p2p.go modification) +- **Agent Tools**: `internal/app/tools.go` (2 new tools in buildP2PTools) +- **REST API**: `internal/app/p2p_routes.go` (2 new handlers) +- **Skills**: `skills/p2p-reputation/`, `skills/p2p-pricing/`, `skills/p2p-owner-shield/` +- **Prompts**: `prompts/AGENTS.md`, `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md`, `prompts/agents/vault/IDENTITY.md` +- **Docs**: `docs/features/p2p-network.md`, `docs/configuration.md`, `docs/cli/p2p.md` +- **README**: `README.md` +- **Examples**: `examples/p2p-trading/configs/{alice,bob,charlie}.json` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-agent-prompts/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-agent-prompts/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c6a733cb --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-agent-prompts/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Agent prompts include paid value exchange +The agent prompt files SHALL describe paid value exchange capabilities including pricing query, reputation checking, and owner shield protection. + +#### Scenario: AGENTS.md describes paid P2P features +- **WHEN** agent loads AGENTS.md system prompt +- **THEN** P2P Network description includes pricing query, reputation tracking, owner shield, and USDC Payment Gate + +#### Scenario: TOOL_USAGE.md documents new tools +- **WHEN** agent loads TOOL_USAGE.md +- **THEN** P2P section includes `p2p_price_query`, `p2p_reputation` tool descriptions and paid tool workflow guidance + +#### Scenario: Vault IDENTITY.md includes new capabilities +- **WHEN** vault agent loads IDENTITY.md +- **THEN** role description includes reputation and pricing management, and REST API list includes `/api/p2p/reputation` and `/api/p2p/pricing` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-documentation/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-documentation/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3d6754d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-documentation/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P feature documentation includes paid value exchange +The P2P documentation SHALL include sections for Paid Value Exchange, Reputation System, and Owner Shield. + +#### Scenario: p2p-network.md has Paid Value Exchange section +- **WHEN** user reads `docs/features/p2p-network.md` +- **THEN** document includes Payment Gate flow, USDC Registry description, and pricing config example + +#### Scenario: p2p-network.md has Reputation System section +- **WHEN** user reads `docs/features/p2p-network.md` +- **THEN** document includes trust score formula, exchange tracking description, and querying methods (CLI/tool/API) + +#### Scenario: p2p-network.md has Owner Shield section +- **WHEN** user reads `docs/features/p2p-network.md` +- **THEN** document includes PII protection description and config example + +#### Scenario: configuration.md has pricing and protection config +- **WHEN** user reads `docs/configuration.md` +- **THEN** P2P section includes 9 new config fields for pricing, ownerProtection, and minTrustScore + +#### Scenario: cli/p2p.md has new command references +- **WHEN** user reads `docs/cli/p2p.md` +- **THEN** document includes `reputation` and `pricing` command references with flags and examples diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-pricing-cli/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-pricing-cli/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..13646e72 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-pricing-cli/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: CLI pricing command +The system SHALL provide a `lango p2p pricing` CLI command that displays P2P tool pricing configuration. + +#### Scenario: Show all pricing +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p pricing` +- **THEN** system displays enabled status, default per-query price, and tool-specific price overrides in table format + +#### Scenario: Show pricing for specific tool +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p pricing --tool "knowledge_search"` +- **THEN** system displays the price for that specific tool (or default per-query price if no override) + +#### Scenario: Show pricing as JSON +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p pricing --json` +- **THEN** system outputs full pricing config as JSON to stdout + +### Requirement: CLI pricing registered as subcommand +The `pricing` command SHALL be registered as a subcommand of `lango p2p` in `internal/cli/p2p/p2p.go`. + +#### Scenario: Help shows pricing command +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p --help` +- **THEN** output lists `pricing` as an available subcommand diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-reputation-cli/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-reputation-cli/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b445b580 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-reputation-cli/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: CLI reputation command +The system SHALL provide a `lango p2p reputation` CLI command that queries peer reputation details from the local database. + +#### Scenario: Query reputation for known peer +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p reputation --peer-did "did:lango:abc123"` +- **THEN** system displays trust score, successful exchanges, failed exchanges, timeout count, first seen date, and last interaction date in table format + +#### Scenario: Query reputation with JSON output +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p reputation --peer-did "did:lango:abc123" --json` +- **THEN** system outputs full PeerDetails as JSON to stdout + +#### Scenario: Query reputation for unknown peer +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p reputation --peer-did "did:lango:unknown"` +- **THEN** system displays "No reputation record found" message + +#### Scenario: Missing peer-did flag +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p reputation` without `--peer-did` +- **THEN** system returns an error stating `--peer-did is required` + +### Requirement: CLI reputation registered as subcommand +The `reputation` command SHALL be registered as a subcommand of `lango p2p` in `internal/cli/p2p/p2p.go`. + +#### Scenario: Help shows reputation command +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p --help` +- **THEN** output lists `reputation` as an available subcommand diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-reputation/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-reputation/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..70203fe4 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-reputation/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Reputation data retrieval +The reputation Store SHALL provide a `GetDetails(ctx, peerDID)` method that returns full `PeerDetails` including PeerDID, TrustScore, SuccessfulExchanges, FailedExchanges, TimeoutCount, FirstSeen, and LastInteraction. + +#### Scenario: Get details for known peer +- **WHEN** `GetDetails` is called with a peerDID that has a reputation record +- **THEN** system returns a `PeerDetails` struct populated from the ent PeerReputation entity + +#### Scenario: Get details for unknown peer +- **WHEN** `GetDetails` is called with a peerDID that has no reputation record +- **THEN** system returns nil, nil (no error) + +#### Scenario: Database error +- **WHEN** `GetDetails` is called and the database query fails +- **THEN** system returns nil and a wrapped error diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-rest-api/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-rest-api/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1404279c --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-rest-api/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P REST API endpoints +The P2P REST API SHALL expose reputation and pricing endpoints alongside existing status, peers, and identity endpoints. + +#### Scenario: GET /api/p2p/reputation with valid peer_did +- **WHEN** client sends `GET /api/p2p/reputation?peer_did=did:lango:abc123` +- **THEN** server returns JSON with full PeerDetails (peerDid, trustScore, successfulExchanges, failedExchanges, timeoutCount, firstSeen, lastInteraction) + +#### Scenario: GET /api/p2p/reputation without peer_did +- **WHEN** client sends `GET /api/p2p/reputation` without peer_did query parameter +- **THEN** server returns 400 with error message "peer_did query parameter is required" + +#### Scenario: GET /api/p2p/reputation for unknown peer +- **WHEN** client sends `GET /api/p2p/reputation?peer_did=did:lango:unknown` +- **THEN** server returns JSON with trustScore 0.0 and "no reputation record found" message + +#### Scenario: GET /api/p2p/pricing without tool filter +- **WHEN** client sends `GET /api/p2p/pricing` +- **THEN** server returns JSON with enabled status, perQuery default price, toolPrices map, and currency + +#### Scenario: GET /api/p2p/pricing with tool filter +- **WHEN** client sends `GET /api/p2p/pricing?tool=knowledge_search` +- **THEN** server returns JSON with tool name, specific price (or default), and currency diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-skills/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-skills/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..29d8cac6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-skills/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P skill definitions +The skills directory SHALL include skill definitions for P2P reputation, pricing, and owner shield operations. + +#### Scenario: p2p-reputation skill exists +- **WHEN** system loads skills from `skills/` directory +- **THEN** `skills/p2p-reputation/SKILL.md` exists with type `script`, status `active`, and command `lango p2p reputation --peer-did "$PEER_DID"` + +#### Scenario: p2p-pricing skill exists +- **WHEN** system loads skills from `skills/` directory +- **THEN** `skills/p2p-pricing/SKILL.md` exists with type `script`, status `active`, and command `lango p2p pricing` + +#### Scenario: p2p-owner-shield skill exists +- **WHEN** system loads skills from `skills/` directory +- **THEN** `skills/p2p-owner-shield/SKILL.md` exists with type `script`, status `active`, and command `lango p2p status --json | jq '.ownerShield'` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-trading-example/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-trading-example/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c62b9203 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-trading-example/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Example configs include paid value exchange settings +The P2P trading example configs SHALL include pricing, owner protection, and minimum trust score settings. + +#### Scenario: Alice config has pricing enabled +- **WHEN** user reads `examples/p2p-trading/configs/alice.json` +- **THEN** P2P section includes `pricing` object with enabled=true, perQuery="0.10", and toolPrices map + +#### Scenario: Alice config has owner protection +- **WHEN** user reads `examples/p2p-trading/configs/alice.json` +- **THEN** P2P section includes `ownerProtection` object with ownerName="Alice" and blockConversations=true + +#### Scenario: All configs have minTrustScore +- **WHEN** user reads any of alice.json, bob.json, or charlie.json +- **THEN** P2P section includes `minTrustScore: 0.3` + +#### Scenario: Each agent has correct ownerName +- **WHEN** user reads bob.json +- **THEN** ownerProtection.ownerName is "Bob" +- **WHEN** user reads charlie.json +- **THEN** ownerProtection.ownerName is "Charlie" diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-value-exchange-tools/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-value-exchange-tools/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..682f306a --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/specs/p2p-value-exchange-tools/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: p2p_price_query agent tool +The system SHALL provide a `p2p_price_query` agent tool with SafetyLevel Safe that queries remote peer pricing. + +#### Scenario: Query price for a tool +- **WHEN** agent invokes `p2p_price_query` with `peer_did` and `tool_name` +- **THEN** system looks up active session, creates RemoteAgent, calls QueryPrice, and returns PriceQuoteResult with toolName, price, currency, isFree + +#### Scenario: No active session +- **WHEN** agent invokes `p2p_price_query` with a peer_did that has no active session +- **THEN** system returns error "no active session for peer — connect first" + +### Requirement: p2p_reputation agent tool +The system SHALL provide a `p2p_reputation` agent tool with SafetyLevel Safe that checks peer trust scores. + +#### Scenario: Check reputation for known peer +- **WHEN** agent invokes `p2p_reputation` with `peer_did` for a peer with reputation data +- **THEN** system returns trustScore, isTrusted, successfulExchanges, failedExchanges, timeoutCount, firstSeen, lastInteraction + +#### Scenario: Check reputation for new peer +- **WHEN** agent invokes `p2p_reputation` with `peer_did` for a peer with no reputation record +- **THEN** system returns score 0.0, isTrusted true, and "new peer" message + +#### Scenario: Reputation system unavailable +- **WHEN** agent invokes `p2p_reputation` but reputation store is nil (no database) +- **THEN** system returns error "reputation system not available" diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2e46983e --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills-v2/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +## 1. Core — Reputation GetDetails + Wiring + +- [x] 1.1 Add `PeerDetails` struct and `GetDetails()` method to `internal/p2p/reputation/store.go` +- [x] 1.2 Add `pricingCfg config.P2PPricingConfig` field to `p2pComponents` struct in `internal/app/wiring.go` +- [x] 1.3 Wire `pricingCfg: cfg.P2P.Pricing` in `initP2P()` return statement + +## 2. CLI — Reputation and Pricing Subcommands + +- [x] 2.1 Create `internal/cli/p2p/reputation.go` with `newReputationCmd()` — table and JSON output +- [x] 2.2 Create `internal/cli/p2p/pricing.go` with `newPricingCmd()` — full list and tool filter modes +- [x] 2.3 Register `reputation` and `pricing` commands in `internal/cli/p2p/p2p.go` + +## 3. Agent Tools — Price Query and Reputation + +- [x] 3.1 Add `p2p_price_query` tool to `buildP2PTools()` in `internal/app/tools.go` +- [x] 3.2 Add `p2p_reputation` tool to `buildP2PTools()` in `internal/app/tools.go` + +## 4. REST API — Reputation and Pricing Endpoints + +- [x] 4.1 Add `p2pReputationHandler` to `internal/app/p2p_routes.go` +- [x] 4.2 Add `p2pPricingHandler` to `internal/app/p2p_routes.go` +- [x] 4.3 Register `/reputation` and `/pricing` routes in `registerP2PRoutes()` + +## 5. Skills — New Definitions + +- [x] 5.1 Create `skills/p2p-reputation/SKILL.md` +- [x] 5.2 Create `skills/p2p-pricing/SKILL.md` +- [x] 5.3 Create `skills/p2p-owner-shield/SKILL.md` + +## 6. Prompts — Update Agent Guidance + +- [x] 6.1 Update `prompts/AGENTS.md` P2P Network description with paid value exchange +- [x] 6.2 Update `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md` with `p2p_price_query`, `p2p_reputation`, and paid workflow +- [x] 6.3 Update `prompts/agents/vault/IDENTITY.md` with reputation, pricing, and new REST endpoints + +## 7. Documentation — Feature, Config, CLI Docs + +- [x] 7.1 Add Paid Value Exchange section to `docs/features/p2p-network.md` +- [x] 7.2 Add Reputation System section to `docs/features/p2p-network.md` +- [x] 7.3 Add Owner Shield section to `docs/features/p2p-network.md` +- [x] 7.4 Add 9 config entries to `docs/configuration.md` (pricing, ownerProtection, minTrustScore) +- [x] 7.5 Add `reputation` and `pricing` command references to `docs/cli/p2p.md` + +## 8. README — P2P Section Update + +- [x] 8.1 Add Payment Gate, Reputation System, Owner Shield bullets to README.md P2P section +- [x] 8.2 Add Paid Value Exchange subsection with workflow steps + +## 9. Example Configs + +- [x] 9.1 Add pricing, ownerProtection, minTrustScore to `examples/p2p-trading/configs/alice.json` +- [x] 9.2 Add pricing, ownerProtection, minTrustScore to `examples/p2p-trading/configs/bob.json` +- [x] 9.3 Add pricing, ownerProtection, minTrustScore to `examples/p2p-trading/configs/charlie.json` + +## 10. Verification + +- [x] 10.1 Run `go build ./...` — confirm no compilation errors +- [x] 10.2 Run `go test ./internal/p2p/reputation/...` — confirm tests pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..eac8ef7a --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-23 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4eaf026f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +## Context + +This is a documentation-only change. The P2P REST API endpoints, `--value-hex` flag, and Docker Compose example were implemented in the `p2p-trading-docker-compose` change. This change updates all surrounding documentation, prompts, CLI help text, and docs site to reflect those features. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Ensure all user-facing documentation reflects P2P REST API, `--value-hex`, and Docker example +- Keep prompts and agent identity files accurate for multi-agent orchestration +- Maintain consistency between code behavior and documentation + +**Non-Goals:** +- No code changes beyond CLI help text (Long descriptions) +- No new features or behavior changes + +## Decisions + +### 1. Documentation-only, no delta specs + +**Rationale**: No spec-level requirements changed. The underlying behavior was already specified in `p2p-trading-docker-compose`. This change only updates docs, prompts, and CLI help text. + +### 2. REST API note in P2P CLI Long descriptions + +**Rationale**: P2P CLI commands create ephemeral nodes separate from the running server. Adding a Long description clarifies this distinction and points users to the REST API for querying the running server's node. + +### 3. Examples section in README + +**Rationale**: The `examples/p2p-trading/` directory is a significant addition but was not referenced from the main README. Adding an Examples section makes it discoverable. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- Minimal risk — documentation changes only +- CLI Long descriptions add minor verbosity to `--help` output diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4e91e089 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +## Why + +The P2P Trading Docker Compose integration (`p2p-trading-docker-compose`) added P2P REST API endpoints, a `--value-hex` secrets flag, and a Docker example, but the surrounding documentation, prompts, and UI/UX layers were not updated. Users reading the docs, README, or agent prompts would not know about the new REST API, the non-interactive secrets flag, or the P2P trading example. + +## What Changes + +- Add P2P REST API documentation to `docs/gateway/http-api.md` (3 new endpoints) +- Add `--value-hex` flag documentation to `docs/cli/security.md` +- Add REST API reference to `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md` P2P section +- Add REST API section to `docs/features/p2p-network.md` +- Add Examples section with P2P trading link to `README.md` +- Add P2P REST API mention to `README.md` P2P section +- Update `prompts/agents/vault/IDENTITY.md` with REST API awareness +- Add `Long` descriptions to P2P CLI commands referencing REST API +- Add P2P Network card to `docs/index.md` features grid + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +(none — all changes are documentation/prompt updates) + +### Modified Capabilities + +(none — no spec-level requirement changes, only documentation) + +## Impact + +- **Docs**: `docs/gateway/http-api.md`, `docs/cli/security.md`, `docs/features/p2p-network.md`, `docs/index.md` +- **README**: `README.md` (examples section, P2P REST API, secrets flag hint) +- **Prompts**: `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md`, `prompts/agents/vault/IDENTITY.md` +- **CLI**: `internal/cli/p2p/status.go`, `internal/cli/p2p/peers.go`, `internal/cli/p2p/identity.go` (Long descriptions only) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/docs-only/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/docs-only/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2a796547 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/specs/docs-only/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Documentation accuracy +Documentation, prompts, and CLI help text SHALL accurately reflect all implemented features including P2P REST API endpoints, CLI flags, and example projects. + +#### Scenario: P2P REST API documented +- **WHEN** a user reads the HTTP API documentation +- **THEN** the P2P REST endpoints (`/api/p2p/status`, `/api/p2p/peers`, `/api/p2p/identity`) SHALL be documented with request/response examples + +#### Scenario: Secrets --value-hex documented +- **WHEN** a user reads the secrets set CLI documentation +- **THEN** the `--value-hex` flag SHALL be documented with non-interactive usage examples + +#### Scenario: P2P trading example discoverable +- **WHEN** a user reads the README +- **THEN** the `examples/p2p-trading/` directory SHALL be referenced in an Examples section diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..088deca0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-23-p2p-ui-docs-prompts-skills/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +## 1. Gateway HTTP API Docs + +- [x] 1.1 Add P2P Network section to `docs/gateway/http-api.md` with `GET /api/p2p/status`, `/peers`, `/identity` endpoints, curl examples, and JSON response formats +- [x] 1.2 Add note explaining REST API vs CLI ephemeral node distinction + +## 2. CLI Security Docs + +- [x] 2.1 Update `docs/cli/security.md` `secrets set` section with `--value-hex` flag, flags table, and non-interactive examples +- [x] 2.2 Add tip about using `--value-hex` in Docker/CI environments + +## 3. Agent Prompts + +- [x] 3.1 Add REST API endpoint reference to `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md` P2P Networking Tool section +- [x] 3.2 Add REST API mention to `prompts/agents/vault/IDENTITY.md` Output Format + +## 4. P2P Feature Docs + +- [x] 4.1 Add REST API section to `docs/features/p2p-network.md` with endpoint table and curl examples +- [x] 4.2 Clarify CLI commands create ephemeral nodes + +## 5. README Updates + +- [x] 5.1 Add REST API subsection under P2P Network section in `README.md` +- [x] 5.2 Add Examples section with P2P Trading Docker Compose link +- [x] 5.3 Update `secrets set` CLI line to mention `--value-hex` + +## 6. CLI Help Text + +- [x] 6.1 Add `Long` description to `internal/cli/p2p/status.go` referencing REST API +- [x] 6.2 Add `Long` description to `internal/cli/p2p/peers.go` referencing REST API +- [x] 6.3 Add `Long` description to `internal/cli/p2p/identity.go` referencing REST API + +## 7. Docs Site Homepage + +- [x] 7.1 Add P2P Network card to `docs/index.md` features grid + +## 8. Verification + +- [x] 8.1 Run `go build ./...` — all packages compile diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..69e221fb --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-24 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d0e2c5ed --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +## Context + +The P2P networking layer stores its Ed25519 node key as plaintext binary at `~/.lango/p2p/node.key` with `0600` file permissions. Meanwhile, wallet private keys are encrypted via `SecretsStore` (AES-256-GCM backed by Ent/SQLite) and zeroed from memory after use. This inconsistency means a filesystem compromise exposes P2P identity while wallet identity remains protected. + +The handshake protocol (`internal/p2p/handshake/handshake.go`) has a stub at `verifyResponse()` that accepts any non-empty signature as valid, bypassing actual cryptographic verification. + +Existing infrastructure: `SecretsStore.Store()/Get()`, `go-ethereum/crypto` (Keccak256, SigToPub, CompressPubkey), `zeroBytes()` pattern in wallet. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Encrypt P2P node keys at rest using existing `SecretsStore` +- Auto-migrate legacy plaintext `node.key` files to encrypted storage +- Complete ECDSA secp256k1 signature verification in handshake +- Apply constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks on nonces +- Zero key material from memory after use +- Deprecate `KeyDir` config field in favor of encrypted storage + +**Non-Goals:** +- OS Keyring integration (P1-4, separate change) +- Process isolation for tool execution (P1-5, separate change) +- Session invalidation (P1-6, separate change) +- HSM/Cloud KMS integration (P2-9, separate change) + +## Decisions + +### D1: SecretsStore for node key storage (not keyring, not separate encryption) + +**Choice**: Reuse existing `SecretsStore` (AES-256-GCM + Ent persistence) for P2P node keys. + +**Alternatives considered**: +- OS Keyring: Cross-platform complexity, not available in all environments (CI, containers) +- Separate encryption file: Would duplicate crypto infrastructure already in SecretsStore +- Keep file-based with better permissions: Still vulnerable to filesystem compromise + +**Rationale**: SecretsStore is battle-tested for wallet keys, available in all environments, and requires zero new dependencies. + +### D2: Graceful fallback when SecretsStore unavailable + +**Choice**: When `secrets == nil`, retain file-based storage for backward compatibility. + +**Rationale**: CLI commands (`lango p2p identity`) may bootstrap without full security initialization. Forcing SecretsStore would break standalone CLI usage. + +### D3: Non-blocking migration + +**Choice**: Migration failure logs a warning but does not block startup. Retry occurs on next restart. + +**Rationale**: A failed migration (e.g., DB locked) should not prevent the node from starting. The plaintext key still works and migration retries automatically. + +### D4: ECDSA recovery verification (not signature verification) + +**Choice**: Use `ethcrypto.SigToPub()` to recover the public key from the signature, then compare with the claimed `resp.PublicKey`. + +**Alternatives considered**: +- `ethcrypto.VerifySignature()`: Does not recover the key, only verifies. Recovery provides stronger proof of identity. + +**Rationale**: Recovery-based verification is the standard pattern in Ethereum (used in `ecrecover`), and matches the wallet's `SignMessage` which produces recoverable signatures (65 bytes with V field). + +### D5: Constant-time nonce comparison + +**Choice**: Replace byte-by-byte nonce comparison with `hmac.Equal()`. + +**Rationale**: Prevents timing side-channel attacks where an attacker could determine nonce match length by measuring response time. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **[Risk] SecretsStore unavailable at CLI time** → Mitigation: `secrets == nil` fallback to file-based storage +- **[Risk] Migration interrupted (crash during store + delete)** → Mitigation: Store first, delete second. On restart, SecretsStore takes priority, so double-storage is harmless +- **[Risk] Legacy plaintext file left behind after failed delete** → Mitigation: Warn log; next restart retries. Key is already safely in SecretsStore +- **[Trade-off] `NewNode()` API change** → All callers must pass `*security.SecretsStore` (can be nil). Breaking change for external consumers, but this is internal API only diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..666f8740 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +## Why + +The P2P node key (`~/.lango/p2p/node.key`) is stored as plaintext binary protected only by file permissions (`0600`), while wallet keys are properly encrypted in `SecretsStore` (AES-256-GCM). This architectural inconsistency creates a critical security gap. Additionally, the handshake signature verification stub accepts any non-empty signature, and the `KeyDir` config field unnecessarily exposes the key storage path. + +## What Changes + +- Migrate P2P node key storage from plaintext file to `SecretsStore` (encrypted), with auto-migration of legacy files and fallback for backward compatibility +- Complete ECDSA signature verification in handshake using `go-ethereum/crypto` public key recovery, replacing the stub that accepted any non-empty signature +- Apply `zeroBytes()` memory cleanup pattern to P2P node key material (matching wallet key handling) +- Deprecate `KeyDir` config field and replace identity CLI output with `keyStorage` info +- Add constant-time nonce comparison (`hmac.Equal`) to prevent timing attacks + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `p2p-node-key-encryption`: Encrypted storage of P2P node keys in SecretsStore with auto-migration from legacy plaintext files + +### Modified Capabilities +- `p2p-handshake`: Complete ECDSA signature verification with secp256k1 public key recovery, constant-time nonce comparison, and 65-byte signature length validation +- `p2p-identity`: Replace `keyDir` output with `keyStorage` info reflecting encrypted vs file-based storage +- `p2p-networking`: Accept `*security.SecretsStore` parameter for encrypted node key management + +## Impact + +- **Code**: `internal/p2p/node.go`, `internal/p2p/handshake/handshake.go`, `internal/app/wiring.go`, `internal/app/app.go`, `internal/cli/p2p/p2p.go`, `internal/cli/p2p/identity.go`, `internal/config/types.go`, `internal/config/loader.go` +- **APIs**: `NewNode()` signature gains `*security.SecretsStore` parameter; `initP2P()` gains `*security.SecretsStore` parameter +- **Dependencies**: No new dependencies (reuses existing `go-ethereum/crypto`) +- **Migration**: Automatic on startup (legacy `node.key` detected, stored in SecretsStore, plaintext deleted); failure is non-fatal (warn log, retry on next restart) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/specs/p2p-handshake/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/specs/p2p-handshake/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0e85660c --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/specs/p2p-handshake/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Signature verification +The handshake verifier SHALL perform full ECDSA secp256k1 signature verification by recovering the public key from the signature and comparing it with the claimed public key, instead of accepting any non-empty signature. + +#### Scenario: Valid signature accepted +- **WHEN** a challenge response contains a 65-byte ECDSA signature that recovers to a public key matching `resp.PublicKey` +- **THEN** the verifier SHALL accept the response as authenticated + +#### Scenario: Invalid signature rejected +- **WHEN** a challenge response contains a signature that recovers to a public key NOT matching `resp.PublicKey` +- **THEN** the verifier SHALL reject the response with "signature public key mismatch" error + +#### Scenario: Wrong signature length rejected +- **WHEN** a challenge response contains a signature that is not exactly 65 bytes +- **THEN** the verifier SHALL reject the response with "invalid signature length" error + +#### Scenario: Corrupted signature rejected +- **WHEN** a challenge response contains a 65-byte signature that cannot be recovered to a valid public key +- **THEN** the verifier SHALL reject the response with an error + +#### Scenario: No proof or signature rejected +- **WHEN** a challenge response contains neither a ZK proof nor a signature +- **THEN** the verifier SHALL reject the response with "no proof or signature in response" error + +### Requirement: Constant-time nonce comparison +The handshake verifier SHALL use `hmac.Equal()` for nonce comparison to prevent timing side-channel attacks. + +#### Scenario: Nonce mismatch detected securely +- **WHEN** the response nonce does not match the challenge nonce +- **THEN** the verifier SHALL reject the response with "nonce mismatch" error using constant-time comparison diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/specs/p2p-identity/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/specs/p2p-identity/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1258e576 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/specs/p2p-identity/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Identity command output +The `lango p2p identity` command SHALL display `keyStorage` information (either "secrets-store" or "file") instead of the raw `keyDir` filesystem path. + +#### Scenario: Identity with encrypted storage +- **WHEN** the user runs `lango p2p identity` and SecretsStore is available +- **THEN** the output SHALL show `Key Storage: secrets-store` instead of a directory path + +#### Scenario: Identity with file storage +- **WHEN** the user runs `lango p2p identity` and SecretsStore is not available +- **THEN** the output SHALL show `Key Storage: file` + +#### Scenario: JSON output reflects key storage +- **WHEN** the user runs `lango p2p identity --json` +- **THEN** the JSON SHALL contain `"keyStorage": "secrets-store"` or `"keyStorage": "file"` instead of `"keyDir"` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/specs/p2p-networking/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/specs/p2p-networking/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..285310c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/specs/p2p-networking/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Node constructor accepts SecretsStore +`NewNode()` SHALL accept an optional `*security.SecretsStore` parameter for encrypted node key management. When nil, file-based storage is used. + +#### Scenario: Node created with SecretsStore +- **WHEN** `NewNode(cfg, logger, secrets)` is called with a non-nil SecretsStore +- **THEN** the node SHALL use SecretsStore for key storage + +#### Scenario: Node created without SecretsStore +- **WHEN** `NewNode(cfg, logger, nil)` is called +- **THEN** the node SHALL fall back to file-based key storage in `cfg.KeyDir` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/specs/p2p-node-key-encryption/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/specs/p2p-node-key-encryption/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3a6f161a --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/specs/p2p-node-key-encryption/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P node key encrypted storage +The system SHALL store P2P Ed25519 node keys in `SecretsStore` (AES-256-GCM) under the key name `p2p.node.privatekey` instead of as plaintext files. + +#### Scenario: New node key generation with SecretsStore available +- **WHEN** a P2P node starts for the first time and `SecretsStore` is available +- **THEN** the system SHALL generate an Ed25519 key, store it encrypted in SecretsStore under `p2p.node.privatekey`, and NOT create a plaintext `node.key` file + +#### Scenario: Existing key loaded from SecretsStore +- **WHEN** a P2P node starts and SecretsStore contains `p2p.node.privatekey` +- **THEN** the system SHALL load and decrypt the key from SecretsStore without checking the filesystem + +### Requirement: Legacy key auto-migration +The system SHALL automatically migrate plaintext `node.key` files to SecretsStore when both a legacy file exists and SecretsStore is available. + +#### Scenario: Auto-migration of legacy node key +- **WHEN** a P2P node starts, SecretsStore is available, SecretsStore does NOT contain `p2p.node.privatekey`, and a plaintext `node.key` file exists +- **THEN** the system SHALL store the key in SecretsStore, delete the plaintext file, and log an info message confirming migration + +#### Scenario: Migration failure is non-fatal +- **WHEN** migration to SecretsStore fails (e.g., DB locked) +- **THEN** the system SHALL log a warning, continue using the legacy file, and retry migration on next startup + +### Requirement: Fallback to file-based storage +The system SHALL fall back to file-based key storage when `SecretsStore` is nil (not available). + +#### Scenario: New key without SecretsStore +- **WHEN** a P2P node starts for the first time and `SecretsStore` is nil +- **THEN** the system SHALL generate an Ed25519 key and write it to `keyDir/node.key` with `0600` permissions + +#### Scenario: Existing key loaded from file without SecretsStore +- **WHEN** a P2P node starts, `SecretsStore` is nil, and `keyDir/node.key` exists +- **THEN** the system SHALL load the key from the file + +### Requirement: Key material memory cleanup +The system SHALL zero all key material byte slices from memory immediately after use using the `zeroBytes()` pattern. + +#### Scenario: Key bytes zeroed after load +- **WHEN** node key bytes are loaded from SecretsStore or file +- **THEN** the raw byte slice SHALL be overwritten with zeros via `defer zeroBytes(data)` before the function returns diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2fe711c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p0-security-hardening/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +## 1. P2P Node Key Encrypted Storage + +- [x] 1.1 Add `security` import and `nodeKeySecret` constant to `internal/p2p/node.go` +- [x] 1.2 Change `NewNode()` signature to accept `*security.SecretsStore` parameter +- [x] 1.3 Refactor `loadOrGenerateKey()` with SecretsStore priority: secrets → legacy file → generate +- [x] 1.4 Implement `migrateKeyToSecrets()` for auto-migration of legacy plaintext keys +- [x] 1.5 Add `zeroBytes()` function and apply `defer zeroBytes(data)` to all key material paths + +## 2. Handshake Signature Verification + +- [x] 2.1 Add `ethcrypto`, `bytes`, `hmac` imports to `internal/p2p/handshake/handshake.go` +- [x] 2.2 Replace nonce comparison with `hmac.Equal()` for constant-time comparison +- [x] 2.3 Implement ECDSA recovery verification: Keccak256 hash → SigToPub → CompressPubkey comparison +- [x] 2.4 Add 65-byte signature length validation + +## 3. Wiring and CLI Updates + +- [x] 3.1 Add `*security.SecretsStore` parameter to `initP2P()` in `internal/app/wiring.go` +- [x] 3.2 Update `initP2P()` call in `internal/app/app.go` to pass `app.Secrets` +- [x] 3.3 Build `SecretsStore` from bootstrap result in `initP2PDeps()` (`internal/cli/p2p/p2p.go`) +- [x] 3.4 Replace `keyDir` output with `keyStorage` in `internal/cli/p2p/identity.go` + +## 4. Config Cleanup + +- [x] 4.1 Add `omitempty` to `KeyDir` json tag and deprecated comment in `internal/config/types.go` +- [x] 4.2 Add `nodeKeyName` default in `internal/config/loader.go` + +## 5. Tests + +- [x] 5.1 Write `TestVerifyResponse_ValidSignature` — valid sig accepted +- [x] 5.2 Write `TestVerifyResponse_InvalidSignature` — pubkey mismatch rejected +- [x] 5.3 Write `TestVerifyResponse_WrongSignatureLength` — non-65-byte rejected +- [x] 5.4 Write `TestVerifyResponse_NonceMismatch` — constant-time nonce rejection +- [x] 5.5 Write `TestVerifyResponse_NoProofOrSignature` — empty response rejected +- [x] 5.6 Write `TestVerifyResponse_CorruptedSignature` — corrupted sig rejected +- [x] 5.7 Write `TestLoadOrGenerateKey_NewKeyWithoutSecrets` — file fallback +- [x] 5.8 Write `TestLoadOrGenerateKey_LegacyFileLoaded` — legacy file loading +- [x] 5.9 Write `TestZeroBytes` — memory zeroing verification + +## 6. Verification + +- [x] 6.1 `go build ./...` passes with no errors +- [x] 6.2 `go test ./internal/p2p/...` all tests pass +- [x] 6.3 `go test ./internal/p2p/handshake/...` all tests pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p1-security-hardening/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p1-security-hardening/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2027bc5b --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p1-security-hardening/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +# P1 Security Hardening — Design + +## Architecture + +### P1-4: OS Keyring Integration + +``` +passphrase.Acquire() + 1. keyring (if KeyringProvider set and available) + 2. keyfile (~/.lango/keyfile) + 3. interactive terminal prompt + 4. stdin pipe +``` + +- `keyring.Provider` interface: `Get/Set/Delete(service, key)` +- `keyring.OSProvider` wraps `github.com/zalando/go-keyring` +- `keyring.IsAvailable()` probes with write/read/delete cycle +- Graceful fallback: CI/headless silently skip to keyfile +- CLI: `lango security keyring store/clear/status` + +### P1-5: Tool Execution Process Isolation + +``` +Remote peer request → handler.handleToolInvoke() + if sandboxExec != nil: + SubprocessExecutor.Execute() + → os.Executable() --sandbox-worker + → JSON stdin: ExecutionRequest{ToolName, Params} + → JSON stdout: ExecutionResult{Output, Error} + → Clean env (PATH, HOME only) + → context.WithTimeout + cmd.Process.Kill() + else: + h.executor() (in-process, existing behavior) +``` + +- `sandbox.Executor` interface: `Execute(ctx, toolName, params) (map[string]interface{}, error)` +- `InProcessExecutor` for trusted local tools +- `SubprocessExecutor` for P2P remote invocations +- `sandbox.RunWorker()` entry point in child process +- Phase 1: timeout only; Phase 2 (P2-8): rlimit/container + +### P1-6: Session Explicit Invalidation + +``` +SessionStore enhanced with: + - Invalidate(peerDID, reason) + - InvalidateAll(reason) + - InvalidateByCondition(reason, predicate) + - InvalidationHistory() + - onInvalidate callback + +SecurityEventHandler: + - Tracks consecutive tool failures per peer + - Auto-invalidates at threshold (default 5) + - Listens for reputation drops via callback +``` + +- `InvalidationReason` enum: logout, reputation_drop, repeated_failures, manual_revoke, security_event +- Callback pattern (like EmbedCallback/GraphCallback) avoids import cycles +- `reputation.Store.SetOnChangeCallback()` fires on score updates +- CLI: `lango p2p session list/revoke/revoke-all` + +## File Layout + +| Component | New Files | Modified Files | +|-----------|-----------|----------------| +| P1-4 Keyring | `internal/keyring/keyring.go`, `os_keyring.go`, `keyring_test.go`; `cli/security/keyring.go` | `passphrase/acquire.go`, `bootstrap/bootstrap.go`, `config/types.go`, `config/loader.go`, `cli/security/migrate.go`, `go.mod` | +| P1-5 Sandbox | `internal/sandbox/executor.go`, `in_process.go`, `subprocess.go`, `worker.go`, `executor_test.go` | `config/types.go`, `config/loader.go`, `p2p/protocol/handler.go`, `app/app.go`, `cmd/lango/main.go` | +| P1-6 Session | `handshake/security_events.go`, `session_test.go`, `security_events_test.go`; `cli/p2p/session.go` | `handshake/session.go`, `p2p/protocol/handler.go`, `reputation/store.go`, `app/wiring.go`, `cli/p2p/p2p.go` | diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p1-security-hardening/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p1-security-hardening/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b0d055d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p1-security-hardening/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +# P1 Security Hardening + +## Problem + +The P2P network layer has three medium-priority security gaps: + +1. **Passphrase storage**: Passphrases are stored only as disk-based keyfiles, which are vulnerable to filesystem access. No OS-native secure storage integration exists. + +2. **Tool isolation**: Remote peer tool invocations execute in the same process as the main application, exposing passphrases, private keys, and session tokens in shared process memory. + +3. **Session management**: Sessions rely solely on TTL-based expiration with no explicit invalidation. There is no mechanism to revoke sessions on security events (repeated failures, reputation drops) or via CLI. + +## Solution + +Three independent security hardening items: + +- **P1-4: OS Keyring Integration** — Use macOS Keychain / Linux secret-service / Windows DPAPI as the highest-priority passphrase source, with graceful fallback to keyfile/interactive/stdin. + +- **P1-5: Tool Execution Process Isolation** — Execute remote P2P tool invocations in isolated subprocesses with clean environments, timeout enforcement, and JSON protocol communication. + +- **P1-6: Session Explicit Invalidation** — Add explicit session invalidation methods, auto-invalidation on security events (repeated failures, reputation drops), and CLI management commands. + +## Impact + +- Prerequisite for P2 work (P1-4 → P2-7 SQLCipher, P1-5 → P2-8 Container Sandbox) +- Strengthens security posture for production P2P deployments +- Minimal shared-file conflicts between the three items diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p1-security-hardening/specs/os-keyring/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p1-security-hardening/specs/os-keyring/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dcb42d6b --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p1-security-hardening/specs/os-keyring/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +# OS Keyring Integration + +## Overview + +OS-native keyring integration for secure passphrase storage using macOS Keychain, Linux secret-service (D-Bus), or Windows DPAPI. + +## Interface + +```go +// Provider abstracts OS keyring operations. +type Provider interface { + Get(service, key string) (string, error) + Set(service, key, value string) error + Delete(service, key string) error +} +``` + +## Constants + +- Service: `"lango"` +- Key: `"master-passphrase"` + +## Priority Chain + +1. Keyring (if provider set and available) +2. Keyfile (`~/.lango/keyfile`) +3. Interactive terminal prompt +4. stdin pipe + +## Availability Detection + +`IsAvailable()` performs a write/read/delete probe cycle to verify the OS keyring daemon is accessible. Returns `Status{Available, Backend, Error}`. + +## Configuration + +```yaml +security: + keyring: + enabled: true # default +``` + +## CLI Commands + +- `lango security keyring status` — show keyring availability +- `lango security keyring store` — store passphrase in keyring +- `lango security keyring clear` — remove passphrase from keyring + +## Graceful Fallback + +When keyring is unavailable (CI, headless Linux, SSH session), the system silently falls back to keyfile-based passphrase acquisition with no user-visible error. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p1-security-hardening/specs/session-invalidation/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p1-security-hardening/specs/session-invalidation/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8e5e0eed --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p1-security-hardening/specs/session-invalidation/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +# Session Explicit Invalidation + +## Overview + +Extends the TTL-only `SessionStore` with explicit invalidation, auto-invalidation on security events, and CLI management. + +## Invalidation Reasons + +| Reason | Trigger | +|--------|---------| +| `logout` | User logout | +| `reputation_drop` | Peer trust score falls below threshold | +| `repeated_failures` | Consecutive tool execution failures (default: 5) | +| `manual_revoke` | CLI `lango p2p session revoke` | +| `security_event` | Generic security event | + +## SessionStore Enhancements + +### New Methods + +- `Invalidate(peerDID, reason)` — marks session invalidated, removes from active map, records history, fires callback +- `InvalidateAll(reason)` — invalidates all active sessions +- `InvalidateByCondition(reason, predicate)` — conditional invalidation +- `InvalidationHistory()` — returns invalidation records +- `SetInvalidationCallback(fn)` — registers callback for invalidation events + +### Updated Behavior + +`Validate()` now returns `false` for sessions with `Invalidated == true`. + +## SecurityEventHandler + +Automatic session invalidation based on security events: + +- **Consecutive failures**: Tracks per-peer failure count. Auto-invalidates at configurable threshold (default 5). Success resets the counter. +- **Reputation drops**: Listens via `reputation.Store.SetOnChangeCallback()`. Invalidates when score falls below `cfg.P2P.MinTrustScore`. + +## Protocol Handler Integration + +`SecurityEventTracker` interface on `handler.go`: +- `RecordToolSuccess(peerDID)` called after successful tool execution +- `RecordToolFailure(peerDID)` called after failed tool execution + +## CLI Commands + +- `lango p2p session list [--json]` — show active sessions +- `lango p2p session revoke --peer-did ` — revoke specific session +- `lango p2p session revoke-all` — revoke all sessions diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p1-security-hardening/specs/tool-sandbox/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p1-security-hardening/specs/tool-sandbox/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9b123210 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p1-security-hardening/specs/tool-sandbox/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +# Tool Execution Process Isolation + +## Overview + +Subprocess-based isolation for remote P2P tool invocations. Prevents remote peers from accessing process memory containing passphrases, private keys, and session tokens. + +## Interface + +```go +// Executor runs tool invocations in isolation. +type Executor interface { + Execute(ctx context.Context, toolName string, params map[string]interface{}) (map[string]interface{}, error) +} +``` + +## Implementations + +### InProcessExecutor + +Wraps an existing `ToolExecutor` function for trusted local tool calls. No isolation—direct delegation. + +### SubprocessExecutor + +Launches a child process using the same binary with `--sandbox-worker` flag. Communication via JSON over stdin/stdout. + +**Protocol:** +- stdin → `ExecutionRequest{ToolName, Params}` +- stdout ← `ExecutionResult{Output, Error}` + +**Security measures:** +- Clean environment: only `PATH` and `HOME` +- `exec.CommandContext` with configurable timeout +- Explicit `cmd.Process.Kill()` on deadline exceeded + +## Configuration + +```yaml +p2p: + toolIsolation: + enabled: false # default (opt-in) + timeoutPerTool: 30s + maxMemoryMB: 256 +``` + +## Wiring + +- `handler.SetSandboxExecutor()` follows existing setter pattern +- When `sandboxExec` is set, `handleToolInvoke`/`handleToolInvokePaid` use it instead of `h.executor` +- Fallback to in-process execution when sandbox is nil + +## Future (P2-8) + +Phase 2 will add rlimit/cgroup/container-based resource limits on top of this subprocess foundation. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p1-security-hardening/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p1-security-hardening/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5d81949a --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p1-security-hardening/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +# P1 Security Hardening — Tasks + +## P1-4: OS Keyring Integration + +- [x] Create `internal/keyring/keyring.go` with Provider interface, constants, Status type +- [x] Create `internal/keyring/os_keyring.go` with OSProvider using go-keyring, IsAvailable() +- [x] Create `internal/keyring/keyring_test.go` with mock Provider unit tests +- [x] Create `internal/cli/security/keyring.go` with store/clear/status CLI commands +- [x] Add SourceKeyring to passphrase/acquire.go, update Acquire() priority chain +- [x] Wire OSProvider in bootstrap/bootstrap.go when keyring available +- [x] Add KeyringConfig to config/types.go SecurityConfig +- [x] Add keyring defaults to config/loader.go +- [x] Register keyring command in cli/security/migrate.go +- [x] Add github.com/zalando/go-keyring dependency + +## P1-5: Tool Execution Process Isolation + +- [x] Create `internal/sandbox/executor.go` with Executor interface, Config, Request/Result types +- [x] Create `internal/sandbox/in_process.go` with InProcessExecutor +- [x] Create `internal/sandbox/subprocess.go` with SubprocessExecutor (JSON protocol, clean env, timeout) +- [x] Create `internal/sandbox/worker.go` with RunWorker() and IsWorkerMode() +- [x] Create `internal/sandbox/executor_test.go` with unit tests +- [x] Add ToolIsolationConfig to config/types.go P2PConfig +- [x] Add tool isolation defaults to config/loader.go +- [x] Add sandboxExec field + SetSandboxExecutor() to protocol/handler.go +- [x] Wire SubprocessExecutor in app/app.go when ToolIsolation.Enabled +- [x] Add --sandbox-worker early check in cmd/lango/main.go + +## P1-6: Session Explicit Invalidation + +- [x] Add InvalidationReason, InvalidationRecord types to handshake/session.go +- [x] Add Invalidate(), InvalidateAll(), InvalidateByCondition(), InvalidationHistory() to SessionStore +- [x] Add SetInvalidationCallback() and update Validate() for invalidation flag +- [x] Create `internal/p2p/handshake/security_events.go` with SecurityEventHandler +- [x] Create `internal/p2p/handshake/session_test.go` with invalidation tests +- [x] Create `internal/p2p/handshake/security_events_test.go` with event handler tests +- [x] Add SecurityEventTracker interface + SetSecurityEvents() to protocol/handler.go +- [x] Track tool success/failure in handleToolInvoke/handleToolInvokePaid +- [x] Add SetOnChangeCallback() to reputation/store.go +- [x] Wire SecurityEventHandler + reputation callback in app/wiring.go +- [x] Create `internal/cli/p2p/session.go` with list/revoke/revoke-all commands +- [x] Register session command in cli/p2p/p2p.go + +## Verification + +- [x] `go build ./...` — zero compilation errors +- [x] `go test ./...` — all tests pass +- [x] `go vet ./...` — no vet warnings diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p2p-approval-docs-update/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p2p-approval-docs-update/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..69e221fb --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p2p-approval-docs-update/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-24 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p2p-approval-docs-update/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p2p-approval-docs-update/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9d3b1bed --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p2p-approval-docs-update/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +## Context + +The `p2p-approval-gaps-fix` change implemented three features: SpendingLimiter auto-approval (`IsAutoApprovable`), inbound P2P tool owner approval (`ToolApprovalFunc` callback), and outbound payment auto-approval. These features are fully wired and tested but undocumented. Seven files need updates: feature docs, README, prompts, HTTP API docs, payment docs, example README, and Makefile. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Document the 3-stage inbound approval pipeline (firewall → owner approval → execution) with Mermaid diagram +- Document auto-approval behavior for `autoApproveBelow`, `autoApproveKnownPeers` +- Add missing REST API endpoints (`/api/p2p/reputation`, `/api/p2p/pricing`) with curl examples and JSON responses +- Add missing CLI commands (`lango p2p reputation`, `lango p2p pricing`) +- Add missing config fields to README reference table +- Update tool usage prompts with approval semantics +- Add `test-p2p` Makefile target + +**Non-Goals:** +- No code changes to the P2P implementation +- No new features or behavioral changes +- No changes to existing test suites + +## Decisions + +1. **Documentation structure**: Add "Approval Pipeline" as a new top-level section in `p2p-network.md` positioned between Knowledge Firewall and Discovery, since it builds on the firewall concept and is a core P2P feature. + +2. **Mermaid diagram**: Use a flowchart showing the 3-stage gate with auto-approve shortcut path, matching the actual flow in `handler.go` (`RequestToolInvoke` and `RequestToolInvokePaid` methods). + +3. **Cross-reference approach**: The `autoApproveBelow` threshold is a cross-cutting concern (payment + P2P). Document it in `usdc.md` with a P2P integration note and link to the P2P approval pipeline section, rather than duplicating content. + +4. **Makefile target scope**: `test-p2p` runs `./internal/p2p/...` and `./internal/wallet/...` together because the spending limiter auto-approval is a wallet feature directly consumed by P2P. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Docs drift] Documentation may diverge from implementation if approval logic changes → Mitigation: All examples reference actual config field names and endpoint paths verified against source code. +- [Example config values] The p2p-trading example uses high thresholds (`50.00`) for convenience → Mitigation: Added explicit production warning note. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p2p-approval-docs-update/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p2p-approval-docs-update/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1a062772 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p2p-approval-docs-update/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +## Why + +The `p2p-approval-gaps-fix` implementation added three key features — SpendingLimiter auto-approval, inbound P2P tool owner approval, and outbound payment auto-approval — but the related documentation, prompts, examples, and Makefile were not updated. Users and developers cannot discover these capabilities from docs alone. + +## What Changes + +- Add "Approval Pipeline" section to `docs/features/p2p-network.md` describing the 3-stage inbound gate (firewall → owner approval → execution) with Mermaid diagram +- Add "Auto-Approval for Small Amounts" subsection to the Paid Value Exchange section in P2P docs +- Add `GET /api/p2p/reputation` and `GET /api/p2p/pricing` to REST API tables and curl examples across all relevant docs +- Add `lango p2p reputation` and `lango p2p pricing` to CLI command listings +- Update `README.md` P2P feature list, config reference, and REST API section with approval pipeline details and missing config fields +- Update `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md` with auto-approval behavior for `p2p_pay`, owner approval notes for `p2p_query`, and inbound invocation description +- Add reputation/pricing endpoint documentation to `docs/gateway/http-api.md` +- Add P2P integration note to `docs/payments/usdc.md` explaining `autoApproveBelow` cross-cutting behavior +- Add "Configuration Highlights" section to `examples/p2p-trading/README.md` +- Add `test-p2p` Makefile target for P2P and wallet spending tests + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +- `docs-only`: Documentation-only update covering approval pipeline, auto-approval, and missing endpoint references across 7 files + +### Modified Capabilities + +## Impact + +- **Documentation**: 6 markdown files updated (`docs/features/p2p-network.md`, `README.md`, `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md`, `docs/gateway/http-api.md`, `docs/payments/usdc.md`, `examples/p2p-trading/README.md`) +- **Build**: `Makefile` gains `test-p2p` target +- **No code changes**: All modifications are documentation and build tooling only diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p2p-approval-docs-update/specs/docs-only/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p2p-approval-docs-update/specs/docs-only/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e443085c --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p2p-approval-docs-update/specs/docs-only/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Approval Pipeline documentation in P2P feature docs +The `docs/features/p2p-network.md` file SHALL include an "Approval Pipeline" section describing the three-stage inbound gate (Firewall ACL → Owner Approval → Tool Execution) with a Mermaid flowchart diagram and auto-approval shortcut rules table. + +#### Scenario: Approval Pipeline section present +- **WHEN** a user reads `docs/features/p2p-network.md` +- **THEN** there SHALL be an "Approval Pipeline" section between Knowledge Firewall and Discovery with a Mermaid diagram and descriptions of all three stages + +### Requirement: Auto-Approval for Small Amounts in Paid Value Exchange docs +The Paid Value Exchange section in `docs/features/p2p-network.md` SHALL include an "Auto-Approval for Small Amounts" subsection describing the three conditions checked by `IsAutoApprovable`: threshold, maxPerTx, and maxDaily. + +#### Scenario: Auto-approval subsection present +- **WHEN** a user reads the Paid Value Exchange section +- **THEN** there SHALL be a subsection documenting the three auto-approval conditions and fallback to interactive approval + +### Requirement: Reputation and Pricing endpoints in REST API tables +All REST API documentation (p2p-network.md, http-api.md, README.md, examples/p2p-trading/README.md) SHALL list `GET /api/p2p/reputation` and `GET /api/p2p/pricing` with curl examples and JSON response samples. + +#### Scenario: Endpoints in p2p-network.md +- **WHEN** a user reads the REST API table in `docs/features/p2p-network.md` +- **THEN** reputation and pricing endpoints SHALL be listed with curl examples + +#### Scenario: Endpoints in http-api.md +- **WHEN** a user reads `docs/gateway/http-api.md` +- **THEN** there SHALL be full endpoint sections for reputation and pricing with query parameters, JSON response examples, and curl commands + +### Requirement: Reputation and Pricing CLI commands documented +The CLI command listings in `docs/features/p2p-network.md` and `README.md` SHALL include `lango p2p reputation` and `lango p2p pricing` commands. + +#### Scenario: CLI commands in feature docs +- **WHEN** a user reads the CLI Commands section of `docs/features/p2p-network.md` +- **THEN** reputation and pricing commands SHALL be listed + +### Requirement: README P2P config fields complete +The README.md P2P configuration reference table SHALL include `p2p.autoApproveKnownPeers`, `p2p.minTrustScore`, `p2p.pricing.enabled`, and `p2p.pricing.perQuery` fields. + +#### Scenario: Missing config fields added +- **WHEN** a user reads the P2P Network section of the Configuration Reference in README.md +- **THEN** all four fields SHALL be present with correct types, defaults, and descriptions + +### Requirement: Tool usage prompts reflect approval behavior +The `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md` file SHALL describe auto-approval behavior for `p2p_pay`, the remote owner's approval pipeline for `p2p_query`, and inbound tool invocation gates. + +#### Scenario: p2p_pay auto-approval documented +- **WHEN** a user reads the `p2p_pay` description +- **THEN** it SHALL mention that payments below `autoApproveBelow` are auto-approved + +#### Scenario: Inbound invocation gates documented +- **WHEN** a user reads the P2P Networking Tool section +- **THEN** there SHALL be a description of the three-stage inbound gate + +### Requirement: USDC docs cross-reference P2P auto-approval +The `docs/payments/usdc.md` file SHALL include a P2P integration note explaining that `autoApproveBelow` applies to both outbound payments and inbound paid tool approval. + +#### Scenario: P2P integration note present +- **WHEN** a user reads `docs/payments/usdc.md` +- **THEN** there SHALL be a note after the config table linking to the P2P approval pipeline + +### Requirement: P2P trading example documents configuration highlights +The `examples/p2p-trading/README.md` SHALL include a "Configuration Highlights" section with a table of key approval and payment settings used in the example. + +#### Scenario: Configuration highlights section present +- **WHEN** a user reads the example README +- **THEN** there SHALL be a Configuration Highlights section with autoApproveBelow, autoApproveKnownPeers, pricing settings, and a production warning + +### Requirement: test-p2p Makefile target +The root `Makefile` SHALL include a `test-p2p` target that runs `go test -v -race ./internal/p2p/... ./internal/wallet/...` and SHALL be listed in the `.PHONY` declaration. + +#### Scenario: test-p2p target runs successfully +- **WHEN** a user runs `make test-p2p` +- **THEN** P2P and wallet tests SHALL execute with race detector enabled diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p2p-approval-docs-update/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p2p-approval-docs-update/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..505df153 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-24-p2p-approval-docs-update/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +## 1. P2P Feature Docs (docs/features/p2p-network.md) + +- [x] 1.1 Add "Approval Pipeline" section with Mermaid flowchart after Knowledge Firewall section +- [x] 1.2 Add "Auto-Approval for Small Amounts" subsection in Paid Value Exchange section +- [x] 1.3 Add reputation and pricing endpoints to REST API table with curl examples +- [x] 1.4 Add reputation and pricing CLI commands to CLI Commands listing + +## 2. README.md + +- [x] 2.1 Add "Approval Pipeline" bullet to P2P feature list +- [x] 2.2 Add auto-approval note after Paid Value Exchange flow +- [x] 2.3 Add missing P2P config fields (autoApproveKnownPeers, minTrustScore, pricing.enabled, pricing.perQuery) to config reference table +- [x] 2.4 Add reputation and pricing curl examples to REST API section + +## 3. Prompts (prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md) + +- [x] 3.1 Update p2p_pay description with auto-approval behavior +- [x] 3.2 Update p2p_query description with remote owner approval pipeline +- [x] 3.3 Update paid tool workflow with auto-approval and approval pipeline notes +- [x] 3.4 Add inbound tool invocation three-stage gate description + +## 4. HTTP API Docs (docs/gateway/http-api.md) + +- [x] 4.1 Add GET /api/p2p/reputation section with query params, JSON response, and curl example +- [x] 4.2 Add GET /api/p2p/pricing section with query params, JSON response, and curl examples + +## 5. Payment Docs (docs/payments/usdc.md) + +- [x] 5.1 Add P2P integration note after config table explaining cross-cutting autoApproveBelow behavior + +## 6. Example Docs (examples/p2p-trading/README.md) + +- [x] 6.1 Add "Configuration Highlights" section with approval and payment settings table +- [x] 6.2 Add reputation and pricing endpoints to REST API table + +## 7. Build (Makefile) + +- [x] 7.1 Add test-p2p target running P2P and wallet tests with race detector +- [x] 7.2 Add test-p2p to .PHONY declaration + +## 8. Verification + +- [x] 8.1 Run go build ./... to verify no build errors +- [x] 8.2 Run make test-p2p to verify new Makefile target works diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..69e221fb --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-24 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..10b63905 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +## Context + +The security stack provides `CryptoProvider` (Sign/Encrypt/Decrypt by keyID) with `LocalCryptoProvider` (PBKDF2+AES-256-GCM) and `RPCProvider` (generic delegation). The `CompositeCryptoProvider` already supports primary/fallback with `ConnectionChecker`. `KeyRegistry` tracks keys with `RemoteKeyID` for external mapping. All P0-P2-8 security items are complete. + +Cloud KMS SDKs (AWS, GCP, Azure) add heavy transitive dependencies. The project already uses CGO (`mattn/go-sqlite3`), so PKCS#11 (`miekg/pkcs11`) is compatible. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Add 4 KMS backends (AWS KMS, GCP KMS, Azure Key Vault, PKCS#11) implementing `CryptoProvider` +- Zero impact on default builds via build tag isolation +- Automatic fallback to local provider when KMS is unavailable +- Retry with exponential backoff for transient KMS errors +- CLI commands for KMS status, testing, and key listing + +**Non-Goals:** +- Automatic key rotation orchestration (cloud services handle this transparently for symmetric keys) +- Key creation/provisioning through the CLI (use cloud console/terraform) +- Multi-region KMS failover +- Custom PKCS#11 mechanism configuration beyond ECDSA and AES-GCM + +## Decisions + +### Build Tag Isolation +Each provider gets two files: implementation (`//go:build kms_aws || kms_all`) and stub (`//go:build !kms_aws && !kms_all`). Stubs return descriptive error messages. This keeps the default binary lean while allowing opt-in compilation. + +**Alternative**: Plugin system with `plugin.Open()`. Rejected — Go plugins have platform limitations and complex deployment. + +### Provider Selection via signer.provider +Reuse existing `security.signer.provider` config field with new values (`aws-kms`, `gcp-kms`, `azure-kv`, `pkcs11`). KMS-specific config lives under `security.kms.*`. + +**Alternative**: Separate `security.kms.provider` field. Rejected — would create ambiguity with `signer.provider`. + +### Error Hierarchy with Sentinel Types +KMS-specific sentinel errors (`ErrKMSUnavailable`, `ErrKMSThrottled`, etc.) wrapped in `KMSError` struct. `IsTransient()` helper determines retry eligibility. + +**Alternative**: Flat error strings. Rejected — callers need programmatic error classification for retry/fallback decisions. + +### Health Checker with Cached Probes +`KMSHealthChecker` probes KMS availability via encrypt/decrypt roundtrip, caching results for 30 seconds. Plugs into existing `CompositeCryptoProvider` via `ConnectionChecker` interface. + +**Alternative**: Passive health detection from operation failures. Rejected — would cause latency spikes on first failure after outage. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Cloud SDK dependency size] → Mitigated by build tags; only included when explicitly requested +- [KMS API latency (10-100ms per call)] → Mitigated by retry with backoff; fallback to local for availability +- [PKCS#11 CGO requirement] → Already required by `mattn/go-sqlite3`; no additional constraint +- [Stub compilation errors if function signatures drift] → Both stub and impl must match factory signature; compilation catches mismatches immediately +- [Cloud credential misconfiguration] → Clear error messages from SDK default credential chains; config validation catches missing required fields diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..66462313 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +## Why + +The existing `CryptoProvider` stack only supports local (PBKDF2/AES-256-GCM) and generic RPC providers. In production deployments, private keys should never exist in software memory — HSMs and Cloud KMS services provide hardware-backed key management with audit logging, automatic rotation, and compliance guarantees. This is the final item (P2-9) on the security roadmap. + +## What Changes + +- Add 4 new KMS backend implementations behind build tags: AWS KMS, GCP KMS, Azure Key Vault, PKCS#11 +- Add KMS-specific config structs (`KMSConfig`, `AzureKVConfig`, `PKCS11Config`) to `SecurityConfig` +- Add KMS error hierarchy (`ErrKMSUnavailable`, `ErrKMSAccessDenied`, `ErrKMSThrottled`, etc.) with `IsTransient()` helper +- Add retry logic with exponential backoff for transient KMS errors +- Add `KMSHealthChecker` implementing `ConnectionChecker` for KMS liveness probing +- Add `NewKMSProvider()` factory function dispatching to the 4 backends +- Extend `initSecurity()` wiring with KMS provider cases + `CompositeCryptoProvider` fallback +- Add CLI commands: `lango security kms status|test|keys` +- Extend `lango security status` output with KMS fields +- Build tag strategy: `kms_aws`, `kms_gcp`, `kms_azure`, `kms_pkcs11`, `kms_all` + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `cloud-kms`: Cloud KMS and HSM backend integration for CryptoProvider with build-tag isolation, retry logic, health checking, and CLI management + +### Modified Capabilities +- `secure-signer`: Extended with KMS provider types in config validation and signer.provider enum +- `key-registry`: KMS keys registered with RemoteKeyID mapped to cloud key ARNs/IDs + +## Impact + +- **Config**: `security.signer.provider` enum extended with `aws-kms`, `gcp-kms`, `azure-kv`, `pkcs11`; new `security.kms.*` block +- **Dependencies**: AWS SDK v2, GCP Cloud KMS, Azure Key Vault SDK, miekg/pkcs11 — all behind build tags, zero impact on default builds +- **CLI**: New `lango security kms` subcommand group +- **Wiring**: `internal/app/wiring.go` initSecurity extended +- **No breaking changes**: `CryptoProvider` interface unchanged diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/specs/cloud-kms/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/specs/cloud-kms/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e021510d --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/specs/cloud-kms/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: KMS Provider Factory +The system SHALL provide a `NewKMSProvider(providerName, kmsConfig)` factory that dispatches to the correct KMS backend based on provider name. Supported names: `aws-kms`, `gcp-kms`, `azure-kv`, `pkcs11`. + +#### Scenario: Valid provider name +- **WHEN** `NewKMSProvider("aws-kms", validConfig)` is called with a compiled build tag +- **THEN** the factory returns an initialized `CryptoProvider` and nil error + +#### Scenario: Unknown provider name +- **WHEN** `NewKMSProvider("unknown", config)` is called +- **THEN** the factory returns an error containing the unknown name and lists supported providers + +#### Scenario: Provider not compiled +- **WHEN** `NewKMSProvider("aws-kms", config)` is called without the `kms_aws` build tag +- **THEN** the stub returns an error indicating the provider was not compiled and which build tag is needed + +### Requirement: Build Tag Isolation +Each KMS provider SHALL be gated behind build tags. The default build (no tags) SHALL compile successfully using stub files that return descriptive errors. Build tags: `kms_aws`, `kms_gcp`, `kms_azure`, `kms_pkcs11`, `kms_all`. + +#### Scenario: Default build without tags +- **WHEN** `go build ./...` is run without any KMS build tags +- **THEN** the project compiles successfully using stub implementations + +#### Scenario: Build with kms_all tag +- **WHEN** `go build -tags kms_all ./...` is run +- **THEN** all four KMS providers are compiled into the binary + +### Requirement: Transient Error Retry +KMS operations SHALL be retried with exponential backoff (100ms base, doubled each attempt) for transient errors. Only errors classified as `ErrKMSUnavailable` or `ErrKMSThrottled` SHALL be retried. + +#### Scenario: Transient error succeeds on retry +- **WHEN** a KMS operation returns `ErrKMSThrottled` on the first attempt +- **AND** succeeds on the second attempt +- **THEN** the operation returns success + +#### Scenario: Non-transient error not retried +- **WHEN** a KMS operation returns `ErrKMSAccessDenied` +- **THEN** the error is returned immediately without retry + +#### Scenario: Retries exhausted +- **WHEN** a KMS operation returns transient errors for all configured retry attempts +- **THEN** the last error is returned + +### Requirement: KMS Health Checker +The system SHALL provide a `KMSHealthChecker` implementing `ConnectionChecker` that probes KMS availability via encrypt/decrypt roundtrip. Results SHALL be cached for 30 seconds. + +#### Scenario: KMS reachable +- **WHEN** the health checker probes and the roundtrip succeeds +- **THEN** `IsConnected()` returns true + +#### Scenario: KMS unreachable with cache +- **WHEN** the last probe failed less than 30 seconds ago +- **THEN** `IsConnected()` returns the cached false result without re-probing + +### Requirement: KMS Error Classification +Each KMS provider SHALL classify cloud-specific errors into sentinel error types: `ErrKMSUnavailable`, `ErrKMSAccessDenied`, `ErrKMSKeyDisabled`, `ErrKMSThrottled`, `ErrKMSInvalidKey`. Errors SHALL be wrapped in `KMSError` with Provider, Op, KeyID context. + +#### Scenario: AWS access denied +- **WHEN** AWS KMS returns `AccessDeniedException` +- **THEN** the error wraps `ErrKMSAccessDenied` and includes provider="aws", operation, and key ID + +#### Scenario: GCP throttled +- **WHEN** GCP KMS returns gRPC `ResourceExhausted` status +- **THEN** the error wraps `ErrKMSThrottled` + +### Requirement: AWS KMS Provider +The AWS KMS provider SHALL implement `CryptoProvider` using `aws-sdk-go-v2/service/kms`. Sign uses `ECDSA_SHA_256` with `MessageType: RAW`. Encrypt/Decrypt use `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT`. Authentication uses SDK default credential chain. + +#### Scenario: Encrypt and decrypt roundtrip +- **WHEN** data is encrypted with `Encrypt()` then decrypted with `Decrypt()` +- **THEN** the original plaintext is recovered + +#### Scenario: Key alias resolution +- **WHEN** `keyID` is "local" or "default" +- **THEN** the configured default key ID is used + +### Requirement: GCP KMS Provider +The GCP KMS provider SHALL implement `CryptoProvider` using `cloud.google.com/go/kms/apiv1`. Sign uses `AsymmetricSign` with SHA-256 digest. Encrypt/Decrypt use symmetric operations. Authentication uses Application Default Credentials. + +#### Scenario: Sign with SHA-256 digest +- **WHEN** `Sign()` is called with a payload +- **THEN** the payload is SHA-256 hashed before sending to GCP AsymmetricSign + +### Requirement: Azure Key Vault Provider +The Azure KV provider SHALL implement `CryptoProvider` using `azkeys`. Sign uses ES256. Encrypt/Decrypt use RSA-OAEP. Authentication uses `DefaultAzureCredential`. + +#### Scenario: Missing vault URL rejected +- **WHEN** `newAzureKVProvider()` is called with empty `VaultURL` +- **THEN** an error is returned indicating vault URL is required + +### Requirement: PKCS#11 Provider +The PKCS#11 provider SHALL implement `CryptoProvider` using `miekg/pkcs11`. Sign uses `CKM_ECDSA`. Encrypt/Decrypt use `CKM_AES_GCM` with 12-byte IV prepended to ciphertext. PIN is read from `LANGO_PKCS11_PIN` env var with config fallback. + +#### Scenario: PIN from environment variable +- **WHEN** `LANGO_PKCS11_PIN` environment variable is set +- **THEN** it takes priority over the config pin value + +#### Scenario: Session cleanup on Close +- **WHEN** `Close()` is called on the PKCS#11 provider +- **THEN** the session is logged out, closed, and the module is finalized + +### Requirement: KMS Fallback to Local +When `security.kms.fallbackToLocal` is true, the system SHALL wrap the KMS provider in `CompositeCryptoProvider` with the local crypto provider as fallback and `KMSHealthChecker` as the connection checker. + +#### Scenario: KMS unavailable with fallback enabled +- **WHEN** the KMS provider is unreachable and `fallbackToLocal` is true +- **THEN** operations transparently fall back to the local crypto provider + +### Requirement: KMS CLI Commands +The system SHALL provide `lango security kms status`, `lango security kms test`, and `lango security kms keys` CLI commands. + +#### Scenario: KMS status display +- **WHEN** `lango security kms status` is run with a KMS provider configured +- **THEN** the output shows provider type, key ID, region, fallback status, and connection status + +#### Scenario: KMS roundtrip test +- **WHEN** `lango security kms test` is run +- **THEN** the system performs an encrypt/decrypt roundtrip and reports success or failure + +#### Scenario: KMS keys listing +- **WHEN** `lango security kms keys` is run +- **THEN** all keys from KeyRegistry are displayed with ID, name, type, and remote key ID + +### Requirement: KMS Config Structure +The system SHALL define `KMSConfig` with fields: Region, KeyID, Endpoint, FallbackToLocal, TimeoutPerOperation, MaxRetries, Azure (AzureKVConfig), PKCS11 (PKCS11Config). Defaults: FallbackToLocal=true, TimeoutPerOperation=5s, MaxRetries=3. + +#### Scenario: Default config values +- **WHEN** no KMS config is provided +- **THEN** FallbackToLocal is true, TimeoutPerOperation is 5 seconds, MaxRetries is 3 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/specs/key-registry/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/specs/key-registry/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0aa443e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/specs/key-registry/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: KMS Key Registration in Wiring +When a KMS provider is initialized, the system SHALL register the KMS key in KeyRegistry with the cloud key ARN/ID as `RemoteKeyID` and name `kms-default`. + +#### Scenario: KMS provider wiring registers key +- **WHEN** `initSecurity()` initializes a KMS provider (aws-kms, gcp-kms, azure-kv, pkcs11) +- **THEN** a key named `kms-default` SHALL be registered in KeyRegistry +- **AND** its RemoteKeyID SHALL be set to `security.kms.keyId` +- **AND** its type SHALL be `encryption` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/specs/secure-signer/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/specs/secure-signer/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..649b8336 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/specs/secure-signer/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Composite Provider Strategy +The system SHALL use a composite provider that tries the primary provider first, then falls back to local. The primary provider MAY be a companion (RPC), Cloud KMS, or PKCS#11 backend. + +#### Scenario: Companion available +- **WHEN** companion is connected +- **THEN** the system SHALL delegate crypto operations to companion via RPCProvider + +#### Scenario: Companion unavailable with fallback +- **WHEN** companion is not connected +- **AND** local fallback is configured +- **AND** terminal is interactive (TTY available) +- **THEN** the system SHALL use local provider + +#### Scenario: KMS primary with local fallback +- **WHEN** a KMS provider is configured as `security.signer.provider` +- **AND** `security.kms.fallbackToLocal` is true +- **THEN** the system SHALL wrap KMS in CompositeCryptoProvider with local as fallback and KMSHealthChecker as ConnectionChecker + +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: KMS Provider Configuration Validation +The config validator SHALL accept `aws-kms`, `gcp-kms`, `azure-kv`, and `pkcs11` as valid values for `security.signer.provider`. Provider-specific fields SHALL be validated when the corresponding provider is selected. + +#### Scenario: AWS KMS requires keyId +- **WHEN** `security.signer.provider` is `aws-kms` +- **AND** `security.kms.keyId` is empty +- **THEN** config validation SHALL fail with a descriptive error + +#### Scenario: Azure KV requires vaultUrl and keyId +- **WHEN** `security.signer.provider` is `azure-kv` +- **AND** `security.kms.azure.vaultUrl` is empty +- **THEN** config validation SHALL fail with a descriptive error + +#### Scenario: PKCS#11 requires modulePath +- **WHEN** `security.signer.provider` is `pkcs11` +- **AND** `security.kms.pkcs11.modulePath` is empty +- **THEN** config validation SHALL fail with a descriptive error diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a57247f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-hsm-cloud-kms-integration/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +## 1. Foundation + +- [x] 1.1 Add KMSConfig, AzureKVConfig, PKCS11Config structs to config/types.go +- [x] 1.2 Add KMS defaults to config/loader.go DefaultConfig and viper defaults +- [x] 1.3 Add KMS provider validation to config/loader.go Validate() +- [x] 1.4 Add KMS sentinel errors and KMSError type to security/errors.go +- [x] 1.5 Create kms_retry.go with withRetry exponential backoff +- [x] 1.6 Create kms_checker.go with KMSHealthChecker implementing ConnectionChecker +- [x] 1.7 Create kms_factory.go with NewKMSProvider dispatch function + +## 2. Provider Implementations + +- [x] 2.1 Create aws_kms_provider.go (build tag: kms_aws || kms_all) +- [x] 2.2 Create aws_kms_provider_stub.go (build tag: !kms_aws && !kms_all) +- [x] 2.3 Create gcp_kms_provider.go (build tag: kms_gcp || kms_all) +- [x] 2.4 Create gcp_kms_provider_stub.go (build tag: !kms_gcp && !kms_all) +- [x] 2.5 Create azure_kv_provider.go (build tag: kms_azure || kms_all) +- [x] 2.6 Create azure_kv_provider_stub.go (build tag: !kms_azure && !kms_all) +- [x] 2.7 Create pkcs11_provider.go (build tag: kms_pkcs11 || kms_all) +- [x] 2.8 Create pkcs11_provider_stub.go (build tag: !kms_pkcs11 && !kms_all) +- [x] 2.9 Create kms_all.go build tag grouping file + +## 3. Tests + +- [x] 3.1 Create kms_retry_test.go with transient/non-transient/exhaust/cancel tests +- [x] 3.2 Create aws_kms_provider_test.go (build tag: kms_aws || kms_all) +- [x] 3.3 Create gcp_kms_provider_test.go (build tag: kms_gcp || kms_all) +- [x] 3.4 Create azure_kv_provider_test.go (build tag: kms_azure || kms_all) +- [x] 3.5 Create pkcs11_provider_test.go (build tag: kms_pkcs11 || kms_all) + +## 4. CLI and Wiring + +- [x] 4.1 Create cli/security/kms.go with status, test, keys subcommands +- [x] 4.2 Register KMS command in NewSecurityCmd (migrate.go) +- [x] 4.3 Extend statusOutput in status.go with KMS fields +- [x] 4.4 Add KMS provider cases to initSecurity in wiring.go with CompositeCryptoProvider fallback + +## 5. Documentation + +- [x] 5.1 Update security-roadmap.md P2-9 to COMPLETED status +- [x] 5.2 Run OpenSpec workflow (ff, apply, verify, sync, archive) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-7-sqlcipher-db-encryption/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-7-sqlcipher-db-encryption/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..69e221fb --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-7-sqlcipher-db-encryption/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-24 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-7-sqlcipher-db-encryption/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-7-sqlcipher-db-encryption/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bc04292b --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-7-sqlcipher-db-encryption/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +## Context + +The application database (`~/.lango/lango.db`) uses `mattn/go-sqlite3` with standard SQLite. P0/P1 security hardening is complete (node key encryption, keyring, session invalidation, subprocess sandbox). The DB stores session history, config profiles, peer reputation, and encryption salt/checksum — all as plaintext on disk. + +SQLCipher extends SQLite with AES-256-CBC encryption, activated via `PRAGMA key`. The same `mattn/go-sqlite3` driver supports SQLCipher when linked against `libsqlcipher` at build time, making this a zero-code-change-to-driver approach. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Transparent encryption of the entire application DB using SQLCipher `PRAGMA key` +- Reversible migration tools: plaintext→encrypted and encrypted→plaintext +- Backwards-compatible bootstrap: unencrypted DBs continue to work when encryption is disabled +- Detection of encryption status via SQLite header magic bytes +- CLI commands for migration and status inspection + +**Non-Goals:** +- Replacing the `mattn/go-sqlite3` driver (kept for sqlite-vec compatibility) +- Key management via external KMS (deferred to P2-9) +- Per-column or per-table encryption (SQLCipher encrypts entire DB) +- Automatic migration on first boot (explicit CLI command required) + +## Decisions + +1. **Keep `mattn/go-sqlite3` driver** — `mutecomm/go-sqlcipher/v4` bundles its own SQLite amalgamation which conflicts with `sqlite-vec-go-bindings` (also CGO SQLite). Instead, link against system `libsqlcipher` at build time; the same driver transparently supports `PRAGMA key`. + +2. **Use raw passphrase as DB key** — SQLCipher's internal PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 (256K iterations) derives the actual encryption key. Avoids circular dependency: can't use `CryptoProvider` (needs DB open → needs key → needs provider). The passphrase is acquired before DB open. + +3. **Bootstrap restructure: passphrase-first** — Detect encryption via header check → acquire passphrase → open DB with `PRAGMA key`. For new DBs, passphrase is acquired first anyway (same path). + +4. **Migration via `sqlcipher_export()`** — Atomic: open source → `ATTACH target KEY` → export → DETACH → swap files. Backup with secure delete (zero-overwrite before removal). Verify target DB before removing backup. + +5. **`IsDBEncrypted()` via header check** — Standard SQLite files start with "SQLite format 3\0". Encrypted files have random bytes. Simple, reliable, no SQL required. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **Build dependency**: Encryption requires system `libsqlcipher-dev`. Without it, `PRAGMA key` is silently ignored. The `IsSQLCipherAvailable()` function checks `PRAGMA cipher_version` at runtime. +- **Migration data loss**: Interrupted migration could leave DB in inconsistent state. Mitigated by atomic rename (original→.bak, temp→original) and backup retention on failure. +- **Performance**: SQLCipher adds ~5-15% overhead for encrypted I/O. Acceptable for this use case. +- **sqlite-vec compatibility**: Verified — both use the same underlying SQLite library via CGO. SQLCipher PRAGMAs don't affect sqlite-vec extension loading. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-7-sqlcipher-db-encryption/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-7-sqlcipher-db-encryption/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fd5aa21d --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-7-sqlcipher-db-encryption/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +## Why + +The SQLite database (`~/.lango/lango.db`) stores session history, configuration profiles, peer reputation scores, and encryption metadata as plaintext. While `SecretsStore` encrypts individual secrets at the application level, the bulk of persisted data remains unencrypted and exposed to any process or user with file-system read access. P0/P1 security phases are complete, making transparent DB encryption the next priority. + +## What Changes + +- Add `DBEncryptionConfig` to `SecurityConfig` with `enabled` and `cipherPageSize` fields +- Restructure the bootstrap sequence to detect DB encryption, acquire passphrase before opening DB, and pass `PRAGMA key` / `PRAGMA cipher_page_size` to enable SQLCipher transparent encryption +- Export `IsDBEncrypted()` helper for header-based encryption detection (checks SQLite magic bytes) +- Create `internal/dbmigrate` package with `MigrateToEncrypted` and `DecryptToPlaintext` functions using `ATTACH DATABASE ... KEY` + `sqlcipher_export()` workflow +- Add CLI commands: `lango security db-migrate` (plaintext→encrypted) and `lango security db-decrypt` (encrypted→plaintext) with `--force` flag for non-interactive use +- Update `lango security status` to display DB encryption state: "encrypted (active)" / "enabled (pending migration)" / "disabled (plaintext)" +- Update doctor security check to warn when encryption is enabled but DB is still plaintext +- Add `Confirm()` helper to `internal/cli/prompt` for interactive yes/no prompts + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `db-encryption`: Transparent SQLite database encryption via SQLCipher PRAGMA key, including migration tools and bootstrap integration + +### Modified Capabilities +- `security-config`: Add `DBEncryption` sub-config with `enabled` and `cipherPageSize` fields +- `bootstrap`: Restructure DB open sequence to support encrypted databases (detect → passphrase → open with key) + +## Impact + +- **Config**: `internal/config/types.go` (SecurityConfig), `internal/config/loader.go` (defaults) +- **Bootstrap**: `internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go` — new `openDatabase` signature, `IsDBEncrypted` export, restructured `Run()` +- **New package**: `internal/dbmigrate/` — migration and decryption tools with secure file deletion +- **CLI**: `internal/cli/security/` — db-migrate, db-decrypt commands; status output updated +- **CLI prompt**: `internal/cli/prompt/prompt.go` — added `Confirm()` function +- **Doctor**: `internal/cli/doctor/checks/security.go` — DB encryption status warning +- **Build**: Requires system libsqlcipher for encryption functionality; standard SQLite build operates without encryption (PRAGMA key is no-op) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-7-sqlcipher-db-encryption/specs/db-encryption/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-7-sqlcipher-db-encryption/specs/db-encryption/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c24a3f4d --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-7-sqlcipher-db-encryption/specs/db-encryption/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: DB encryption configuration +The system MUST support a `security.dbEncryption` configuration with `enabled` (bool) and `cipherPageSize` (int, default 4096) fields. + +#### Scenario: Default configuration +- **WHEN** no dbEncryption config is specified +- **THEN** `enabled` defaults to `false` and `cipherPageSize` defaults to `4096` + +### Requirement: Encrypted DB detection +The system MUST detect whether a database file is encrypted by inspecting the first 16 bytes of the file header. Standard SQLite files start with "SQLite format 3\0"; encrypted files do not. + +#### Scenario: Plaintext DB detection +- **WHEN** the DB file starts with "SQLite format 3" +- **THEN** `IsDBEncrypted()` returns `false` + +#### Scenario: Encrypted DB detection +- **WHEN** the DB file does not start with "SQLite format 3" +- **THEN** `IsDBEncrypted()` returns `true` + +#### Scenario: Non-existent DB +- **WHEN** the DB file does not exist +- **THEN** `IsDBEncrypted()` returns `false` + +### Requirement: Bootstrap with encrypted DB +The bootstrap sequence MUST acquire the passphrase BEFORE opening the database when encryption is detected or enabled. The passphrase is passed as `PRAGMA key` followed by `PRAGMA cipher_page_size`. + +#### Scenario: Opening encrypted DB +- **WHEN** the DB is encrypted or `dbEncryption.enabled` is true +- **THEN** the passphrase is acquired first, and `PRAGMA key` + `PRAGMA cipher_page_size` are executed after `sql.Open` + +#### Scenario: Opening plaintext DB +- **WHEN** the DB is not encrypted and `dbEncryption.enabled` is false +- **THEN** the database opens without any encryption PRAGMAs + +### Requirement: Plaintext to encrypted migration +`MigrateToEncrypted(dbPath, passphrase, cipherPageSize)` MUST convert a plaintext SQLite DB to SQLCipher format using `ATTACH DATABASE ... KEY` + `sqlcipher_export()`. + +#### Scenario: Successful migration +- **WHEN** the source DB is plaintext and passphrase is non-empty +- **THEN** an encrypted copy is created, verified, atomically swapped, and the plaintext backup is securely deleted + +#### Scenario: Already encrypted +- **WHEN** the source DB is already encrypted +- **THEN** the function returns an error without modifying the file + +#### Scenario: Empty passphrase +- **WHEN** passphrase is empty +- **THEN** the function returns an error + +### Requirement: Encrypted to plaintext decryption +`DecryptToPlaintext(dbPath, passphrase, cipherPageSize)` MUST convert a SQLCipher-encrypted DB back to plaintext using reverse `sqlcipher_export()`. + +#### Scenario: Successful decryption +- **WHEN** the source DB is encrypted and correct passphrase is provided +- **THEN** a plaintext copy is created, verified, atomically swapped, and the encrypted backup is securely deleted + +#### Scenario: Not encrypted +- **WHEN** the source DB is not encrypted +- **THEN** the function returns an error + +### Requirement: CLI db-migrate command +`lango security db-migrate` MUST encrypt the application database. It requires interactive confirmation unless `--force` is used. + +#### Scenario: Interactive migration +- **WHEN** the user runs `lango security db-migrate` in an interactive terminal +- **THEN** a confirmation prompt is shown before proceeding + +#### Scenario: Non-interactive with --force +- **WHEN** the user runs `lango security db-migrate --force` +- **THEN** migration proceeds without confirmation + +### Requirement: CLI db-decrypt command +`lango security db-decrypt` MUST decrypt the application database back to plaintext. Same confirmation behavior as db-migrate. + +### Requirement: Security status display +`lango security status` MUST display the DB encryption state as one of: "encrypted (active)", "enabled (pending migration)", or "disabled (plaintext)". + +#### Scenario: Encrypted DB +- **WHEN** the DB file is encrypted +- **THEN** status shows "encrypted (active)" + +#### Scenario: Config enabled, DB plaintext +- **WHEN** `dbEncryption.enabled` is true but DB is not encrypted +- **THEN** status shows "enabled (pending migration)" + +#### Scenario: Config disabled +- **WHEN** `dbEncryption.enabled` is false and DB is not encrypted +- **THEN** status shows "disabled (plaintext)" + +### Requirement: Secure file deletion +Plaintext backup files MUST be overwritten with zeros before removal to prevent recovery from disk. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-7-sqlcipher-db-encryption/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-7-sqlcipher-db-encryption/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e4de70e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-7-sqlcipher-db-encryption/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +- [x] Add `DBEncryptionConfig` struct to `internal/config/types.go` with `Enabled` and `CipherPageSize` fields +- [x] Add `DBEncryption` field to `SecurityConfig` in `internal/config/types.go` +- [x] Add default values in `internal/config/loader.go` (Enabled: false, CipherPageSize: 4096) +- [x] Add viper defaults for `security.dbEncryption.enabled` and `security.dbEncryption.cipherPageSize` +- [x] Add `DBEncryption config.DBEncryptionConfig` field to `bootstrap.Options` +- [x] Implement `IsDBEncrypted(dbPath)` function in `internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go` +- [x] Change `openDatabase` signature to accept `encryptionKey string` and `cipherPageSize int` +- [x] Add `PRAGMA key` and `PRAGMA cipher_page_size` execution when encryption key is non-empty +- [x] Restructure `Run()` to detect encryption and acquire passphrase before DB open +- [x] Create `internal/dbmigrate/migrate.go` with `MigrateToEncrypted()` function +- [x] Create `DecryptToPlaintext()` function in `internal/dbmigrate/migrate.go` +- [x] Implement `IsEncrypted()` and `IsSQLCipherAvailable()` helpers in dbmigrate +- [x] Implement `secureDeleteFile()` for zero-overwrite backup deletion +- [x] Implement `verifySQLCipherAvailable()`, `verifyEncryptedDB()`, `verifyPlaintextDB()` helpers +- [x] Create `internal/cli/security/db_migrate.go` with `newDBMigrateCmd` and `newDBDecryptCmd` +- [x] Register `db-migrate` and `db-decrypt` commands in `NewSecurityCmd` +- [x] Add `Confirm()` function to `internal/cli/prompt/prompt.go` +- [x] Update `lango security status` to display `DBEncryption` state +- [x] Update doctor security check to warn on pending migration +- [x] Write `internal/dbmigrate/migrate_test.go` with table-driven tests +- [x] Write `internal/bootstrap/bootstrap_encryption_test.go` +- [x] Verify `go build ./...` passes +- [x] Verify `go test ./...` passes diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-8-container-sandbox/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-8-container-sandbox/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..69e221fb --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-8-container-sandbox/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-24 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-8-container-sandbox/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-8-container-sandbox/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..665ae1e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-8-container-sandbox/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +## Context + +P1-5 introduced `SubprocessExecutor` that runs tools in child processes with clean environments (only PATH/HOME). This provides memory isolation but no filesystem, network, or syscall restriction. For untrusted remote peer tool invocations, stronger isolation is needed. + +Docker provides container-level isolation: separate filesystem namespace, configurable network mode ("none" for complete isolation), read-only rootfs, memory/CPU limits, and automatic cleanup. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Abstract container execution behind a `ContainerRuntime` interface for pluggable runtimes +- Implement Docker-based isolation with resource limits, network isolation, and read-only rootfs +- Automatic fallback to subprocess when container runtime unavailable +- Reuse existing JSON stdin/stdout protocol from P1-5 +- Optional container pool for reduced cold-start latency +- CLI for status inspection, smoke testing, and orphan cleanup + +**Non-Goals:** +- gVisor implementation (stub only, future work) +- Custom seccomp profiles (rely on Docker defaults) +- Image registry or automated image building (manual `make sandbox-image`) +- Windows container support + +## Decisions + +1. **`ContainerRuntime` interface** — `Run(ctx, ContainerConfig)`, `Cleanup(ctx, id)`, `IsAvailable(ctx)`, `Name()`. Clean abstraction allows Docker, gVisor, native fallback without changing callers. + +2. **Docker SDK over CLI** — `github.com/docker/docker/client` provides type-safe API, proper error handling, and stream hijacking for stdin/stdout communication. No shell escaping risks. + +3. **Runtime probe chain** — `NewContainerExecutor` probes: Docker (if available) → gVisor (if available) → Native (always available). Config `runtime` field can force specific runtime or "auto" for probe. + +4. **Docker stream headers** — Docker multiplexes stdout/stderr with 8-byte headers per frame. The `stripDockerStreamHeaders` function handles this when raw JSON parsing fails. + +5. **Ephemeral containers** — Each tool invocation creates a container, executes, collects result, and removes the container. Labels (`lango.sandbox=true`, `lango.tool=`) enable orphan cleanup. + +6. **Pool as optional optimization** — `ContainerPool` (channel-based, PoolSize > 0 to enable) pre-warms containers. Default disabled (PoolSize: 0) to avoid Docker daemon dependency at startup. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **Docker daemon dependency**: Container mode requires Docker installed and running. Mitigated by automatic fallback to subprocess. +- **Cold start latency**: Container creation adds 100ms-2s per invocation. Pool helps but adds complexity. +- **Image availability**: `lango-sandbox:latest` must be built and available. `lango p2p sandbox test` validates this. +- **Resource overhead**: Each container adds ~10-50MB memory overhead. Controlled by pool size and idle timeout. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-8-container-sandbox/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-8-container-sandbox/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5cb81908 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-8-container-sandbox/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +## Why + +P1-5's subprocess isolation provides basic memory separation for P2P tool execution, but lacks filesystem, network, and syscall-level isolation. A malicious tool invoked by a remote peer could still access the host filesystem or make network calls. Container-based execution provides comprehensive isolation boundaries needed for untrusted remote tool invocations. + +## What Changes + +- Add `ContainerSandboxConfig` to `ToolIsolationConfig` with runtime, image, network mode, resource limits, and pool settings +- Create `ContainerRuntime` interface abstracting container execution environments +- Implement `DockerRuntime` using Docker Go SDK for full container-based isolation +- Implement `NativeRuntime` wrapping existing `SubprocessExecutor` as a `ContainerRuntime` fallback +- Implement `GVisorRuntime` stub (always unavailable, placeholder for future) +- Create `ContainerExecutor` that probes runtimes in priority order: Docker → gVisor → Native +- Create optional `ContainerPool` for pre-warmed container management +- Add protocol version field to `ExecutionRequest` for forward compatibility +- Update app wiring to use `ContainerExecutor` when container mode is enabled, with subprocess fallback +- Add CLI commands: `lango p2p sandbox status/test/cleanup` +- Create sandbox Docker image (`build/sandbox/Dockerfile`) +- Add `sandbox-image` Makefile target + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `container-sandbox`: Container-based tool execution isolation with Docker, gVisor (stub), and native subprocess fallback runtimes +- `container-pool`: Optional pre-warmed container pool for reduced cold-start latency + +### Modified Capabilities +- `tool-isolation`: Extended with container runtime selection and configuration + +## Impact + +- **Config**: `internal/config/types.go` (ToolIsolationConfig + ContainerSandboxConfig), `internal/config/loader.go` (defaults) +- **New files**: `internal/sandbox/container_runtime.go`, `docker_runtime.go`, `native_runtime.go`, `gvisor_runtime.go`, `container_executor.go`, `container_pool.go` +- **Modified**: `internal/sandbox/executor.go` (Version field), `internal/app/app.go` (wiring) +- **CLI**: `internal/cli/p2p/sandbox.go` (status/test/cleanup), `internal/cli/p2p/p2p.go` (registration) +- **Build**: `build/sandbox/Dockerfile`, `Makefile` (sandbox-image target) +- **Dependencies**: `github.com/docker/docker` (Docker Go SDK) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-8-container-sandbox/specs/container-sandbox/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-8-container-sandbox/specs/container-sandbox/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b5c4e728 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-8-container-sandbox/specs/container-sandbox/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Container sandbox configuration +The system MUST support a `p2p.toolIsolation.container` configuration block with `enabled`, `runtime`, `image`, `networkMode`, `readOnlyRootfs`, `cpuQuotaUs`, `poolSize`, and `poolIdleTimeout` fields. + +#### Scenario: Default configuration +- **WHEN** no container config is specified +- **THEN** defaults are: `runtime: "auto"`, `image: "lango-sandbox:latest"`, `networkMode: "none"`, `readOnlyRootfs: true`, `poolSize: 0`, `poolIdleTimeout: 5m` + +### Requirement: ContainerRuntime interface +The system MUST define a `ContainerRuntime` interface with `Run(ctx, ContainerConfig)`, `Cleanup(ctx, id)`, `IsAvailable(ctx)`, and `Name()` methods. + +### Requirement: Error types +The system MUST define sentinel errors: `ErrRuntimeUnavailable`, `ErrContainerTimeout`, `ErrContainerOOM`. + +#### Scenario: OOM kill +- **WHEN** a container exits with code 137 (SIGKILL) +- **THEN** `ErrContainerOOM` is returned + +#### Scenario: Timeout +- **WHEN** container execution exceeds the configured timeout +- **THEN** `ErrContainerTimeout` is returned + +### Requirement: DockerRuntime +The system MUST implement `ContainerRuntime` using Docker Go SDK with container create, attach, start, stdin write, stdout read, wait, and force-remove lifecycle. + +#### Scenario: Container creation +- **WHEN** `Run` is called +- **THEN** a container is created with the configured image, `--sandbox-worker` command, labels `lango.sandbox=true` and `lango.tool=`, resource limits, network mode, read-only rootfs, and tmpfs `/tmp` + +#### Scenario: Docker unavailable +- **WHEN** `IsAvailable()` is called and Docker daemon is not reachable +- **THEN** returns `false` + +#### Scenario: Orphan cleanup +- **WHEN** `Cleanup` is called +- **THEN** all containers with label `lango.sandbox=true` are force-removed + +### Requirement: NativeRuntime fallback +The system MUST provide a `NativeRuntime` that wraps `SubprocessExecutor` as a `ContainerRuntime` implementation. It MUST always report `IsAvailable() = true`. + +### Requirement: GVisorRuntime stub +The system MUST provide a `GVisorRuntime` stub that always reports `IsAvailable() = false` and returns `ErrRuntimeUnavailable` on `Run`. + +### Requirement: ContainerExecutor runtime probe +`NewContainerExecutor` MUST probe runtimes in order: Docker → gVisor → Native. The first available runtime is used. + +#### Scenario: Auto mode with Docker available +- **WHEN** runtime is "auto" and Docker is available +- **THEN** Docker runtime is selected + +#### Scenario: Auto mode without Docker +- **WHEN** runtime is "auto" and Docker is unavailable +- **THEN** Native runtime is selected as fallback + +#### Scenario: Explicit runtime requested but unavailable +- **WHEN** runtime is "docker" but Docker is unavailable +- **THEN** an error wrapping `ErrRuntimeUnavailable` is returned + +### Requirement: Protocol version +`ExecutionRequest` MUST include an optional `version` field (default 0) for forward compatibility. + +### Requirement: App wiring +When `p2p.toolIsolation.container.enabled` is true, the app MUST attempt to create a `ContainerExecutor`. On failure, it MUST fall back to `SubprocessExecutor` with a warning log. + +### Requirement: Container pool +When `poolSize > 0`, the system MUST maintain a pool of pre-warmed containers with `Acquire`/`Release` lifecycle and idle timeout cleanup. + +### Requirement: CLI sandbox commands +The system MUST provide `lango p2p sandbox status`, `lango p2p sandbox test`, and `lango p2p sandbox cleanup` commands. + +#### Scenario: Sandbox status +- **WHEN** `lango p2p sandbox status` is run +- **THEN** it displays tool isolation config, container mode status, active runtime name, and pool info + +#### Scenario: Sandbox test +- **WHEN** `lango p2p sandbox test` is run +- **THEN** it executes an echo tool through the sandbox and reports success/failure + +#### Scenario: Sandbox cleanup +- **WHEN** `lango p2p sandbox cleanup` is run +- **THEN** orphaned containers with label `lango.sandbox=true` are removed + +### Requirement: Sandbox Docker image +A `build/sandbox/Dockerfile` MUST define a minimal Debian-based image with the lango binary, running as non-root `sandbox` user with `--sandbox-worker` entrypoint. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-8-container-sandbox/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-8-container-sandbox/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..736919ab --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2-8-container-sandbox/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +- [x] Add `ContainerSandboxConfig` struct to `internal/config/types.go` +- [x] Add `Container` field to `ToolIsolationConfig` +- [x] Add defaults in `internal/config/loader.go` (Runtime: "auto", Image: "lango-sandbox:latest", NetworkMode: "none", etc.) +- [x] Add viper defaults for container sandbox configuration +- [x] Create `internal/sandbox/container_runtime.go` with `ContainerConfig`, `ContainerRuntime` interface, and error types +- [x] Add `Version int` field to `ExecutionRequest` in `internal/sandbox/executor.go` +- [x] Create `internal/sandbox/docker_runtime.go` with Docker Go SDK implementation +- [x] Implement container create, attach, start, stdin/stdout, wait, remove lifecycle +- [x] Implement `stripDockerStreamHeaders` for Docker multiplexed output +- [x] Implement `Cleanup` for orphaned container removal by label +- [x] Create `internal/sandbox/native_runtime.go` wrapping `SubprocessExecutor` +- [x] Create `internal/sandbox/gvisor_runtime.go` stub (IsAvailable=false) +- [x] Create `internal/sandbox/container_executor.go` with runtime probe chain +- [x] Implement `NewContainerExecutor` with Docker → gVisor → Native fallback +- [x] Create `internal/sandbox/container_pool.go` with channel-based pool +- [x] Implement `Acquire`, `Release`, `Close` pool lifecycle +- [x] Create `build/sandbox/Dockerfile` with Debian slim, sandbox user, entrypoint +- [x] Add `sandbox-image` target to `Makefile` +- [x] Update `internal/app/app.go` wiring for container executor with fallback +- [x] Create `internal/cli/p2p/sandbox.go` with status, test, cleanup subcommands +- [x] Register sandbox command in `internal/cli/p2p/p2p.go` +- [x] Add `github.com/docker/docker` dependency to `go.mod` +- [x] Write `internal/sandbox/container_runtime_test.go` (NativeRuntime tests) +- [x] Write `internal/sandbox/docker_runtime_test.go` (integration tests, skip in short) +- [x] Write `internal/sandbox/container_executor_test.go` (mock runtime fallback tests) +- [x] Write `internal/sandbox/container_pool_test.go` (acquire/release/expiry tests) +- [x] Verify `go build ./...` passes +- [x] Verify `go test ./...` passes diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-auth-zk-hardening/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-auth-zk-hardening/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8824f249 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-auth-zk-hardening/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +# Design: P2P Auth & ZK Hardening + +## Architecture Decisions + +### 1. Dual Protocol Versioning +**Decision**: Register both `/lango/handshake/1.0.0` and `/lango/handshake/1.1.0` handlers. +**Rationale**: Zero-downtime migration. Old peers continue working, new peers get signed challenges. +**Alternative rejected**: Breaking protocol change with forced upgrade. + +### 2. NonceCache as Struct (not interface) +**Decision**: Concrete `NonceCache` struct with Start/Stop lifecycle. +**Rationale**: Simple, single implementation needed. Goroutine cleanup matches existing buffer patterns (EmbeddingBuffer, GraphBuffer). + +### 3. AttestationResult in Firewall Package +**Decision**: Define `AttestationResult` struct in `firewall` package instead of `protocol`. +**Rationale**: Avoids circular imports (`firewall` → `protocol` → `firewall`). Firewall is the producer, protocol is the consumer. + +### 4. ZKAttestVerifyFunc as Callback +**Decision**: Use callback pattern for attestation verification on remote agent. +**Rationale**: Consistent with existing codebase patterns (ApprovalFunc, ZKProverFunc, ZKVerifierFunc). Avoids import cycles. + +### 5. SRS Mode as Config (not Build Tag) +**Decision**: Runtime config `srsMode: "unsafe"|"file"` instead of build tags. +**Rationale**: Build tags are for dependency isolation (KMS providers). SRS is a runtime choice, not a dependency. + +## Dependency Flow + +``` +config/types.go (RequireSignedChallenge, SRSMode, MaxCredentialAge) + ↓ +config/loader.go (defaults) + ↓ +app/wiring.go (creates NonceCache, wires to Handshaker, registers dual protocols, + updates attestation callback, passes config to gossip) + ↓ +p2p/handshake/ (NonceCache + signed challenge + timestamp validation) +p2p/firewall/ (AttestationResult) +p2p/protocol/ (AttestationData + verification callback) +p2p/discovery/ (credential revocation) +zkp/circuits/ (attestation freshness + capability binding) +zkp/ (SRS file support) +``` + +## Files Modified + +| File | Layer | Changes | +|------|-------|---------| +| handshake/nonce_cache.go | Core | NEW — TTL nonce cache | +| handshake/nonce_cache_test.go | Test | NEW — 7 test cases | +| handshake/handshake.go | Core | Signed challenge, timestamp validation, nonce cache | +| circuits/attestation.go | Core | MinTimestamp/MaxTimestamp | +| circuits/capability.go | Core | AgentTestBinding fix | +| circuits/circuits_test.go | Test | NEW — 15 circuit tests | +| zkp/zkp.go | Core | SRS file support | +| zkp/zkp_test.go | Test | NEW — 6 prover tests | +| protocol/messages.go | Core | AttestationData struct | +| protocol/handler.go | Application | Structured attestation construction | +| protocol/remote_agent.go | Application | Attestation verification | +| firewall/firewall.go | Core | AttestationResult, typed ZKAttestFunc | +| discovery/gossip.go | Application | Credential revocation | +| config/types.go | Core | New config fields | +| config/loader.go | Core | Default values | +| app/wiring.go | Application | NonceCache, dual protocol, attestation wiring | diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-auth-zk-hardening/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-auth-zk-hardening/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bc0d27bc --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-auth-zk-hardening/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +# P2P Security Hardening: Authentication (B- → A) & ZK Proofs (C → B+) + +## Problem + +The P2P security roadmap had all P0/P1/P2 items completed, but two critical areas remained at low grades: + +1. **P2P Authentication (B-)**: P0-2 signature verification was complete, but Challenge messages were unsigned, allowing initiator identity spoofing. No nonce replay protection or timestamp validation existed. + +2. **ZK Proofs (C)**: Four circuits were defined but had zero test coverage, ResponseAttestation had no timestamp freshness enforcement, AgentCapability circuit had a discarded binding (line 48: `_ = hAgent.Sum()`), and attestation data was opaque bytes with no structured verification. + +## Solution + +### Authentication Hardening (B- → A) +- Sign Challenge messages with ECDSA (nonce || bigEndian(timestamp) || senderDID → Keccak256 → secp256k1) +- Add NonceCache with TTL-based replay detection +- Validate challenge timestamps (5 min past + 30s future) +- Dual protocol versioning (v1.0 legacy + v1.1 signed) +- Configurable `requireSignedChallenge` for strict mode + +### ZK Proof Hardening (C → B+) +- Complete test suite: 15 circuit tests + 6 ProverService tests +- Attestation timestamp freshness (MinTimestamp/MaxTimestamp range constraints) +- Capability binding fix (AgentTestBinding properly constrained) +- Structured AttestationData wire format (proof + publicInputs + circuitID + scheme) +- Attestation verification callback on remote agent +- SRS production file path support +- Credential revocation in gossip discovery + +## Scope + +- 16 files modified/created +- All changes backward compatible (default settings preserve existing behavior) +- No breaking protocol changes (dual version registration) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-auth-zk-hardening/specs/signed-challenge.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-auth-zk-hardening/specs/signed-challenge.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fb0249a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-auth-zk-hardening/specs/signed-challenge.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +# Signed Challenge Protocol Spec + +## Overview + +Extends the P2P handshake protocol to sign Challenge messages, preventing initiator identity spoofing. + +## Protocol + +### v1.0 (Legacy) +- Protocol ID: `/lango/handshake/1.0.0` +- Challenge: `{nonce, timestamp, senderDID}` +- No signature, no timestamp validation, no nonce replay protection + +### v1.1 (Signed) +- Protocol ID: `/lango/handshake/1.1.0` +- Challenge: `{nonce, timestamp, senderDID, publicKey, signature}` +- Signature: ECDSA over `Keccak256(nonce || bigEndian(timestamp, 8) || utf8(senderDID))` +- Verification: `SigToPub(payload, signature)` → compare `CompressPubkey(recovered)` vs `publicKey` + +### Challenge Validation (HandleIncoming) +1. Timestamp validation: reject if > 5 min old or > 30s in future +2. Nonce replay: NonceCache.CheckAndRecord() — reject duplicates +3. Signature verification (if present): ECDSA recovery + public key comparison +4. If signature absent: check `requireSignedChallenge` config → reject or allow legacy + +### NonceCache +- Data structure: `map[[32]byte]time.Time` with `sync.Mutex` +- TTL: 2 × handshake timeout (default 60s) +- Periodic cleanup via `time.Ticker` goroutine (interval = TTL/2) +- Start/Stop lifecycle + +## Configuration + +| Key | Type | Default | Description | +|-----|------|---------|-------------| +| `p2p.requireSignedChallenge` | bool | false | Reject unsigned challenges | + +## Backward Compatibility + +- Both v1.0 and v1.1 stream handlers registered on host +- Initiate() always signs (falls back gracefully if wallet unavailable) +- HandleIncoming() accepts both signed and unsigned (unless requireSignedChallenge=true) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-auth-zk-hardening/specs/zk-hardening.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-auth-zk-hardening/specs/zk-hardening.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1baa28db --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-auth-zk-hardening/specs/zk-hardening.md @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +# ZK Proof Hardening Spec + +## Overview + +Hardens all four ZK circuits with proper testing, timestamp freshness, capability binding, structured attestation data, and production SRS support. + +## Circuit Changes + +### ResponseAttestationCircuit +- **Added public inputs**: `MinTimestamp`, `MaxTimestamp` +- **New constraints**: `MinTimestamp <= Timestamp <= MaxTimestamp` +- Ensures attestation proofs cannot be replayed outside the freshness window + +### AgentCapabilityCircuit +- **Added public input**: `AgentTestBinding` (MiMC(TestHash, AgentDIDHash)) +- **Fixed constraint**: `api.AssertIsEqual(hAgent.Sum(), c.AgentTestBinding)` (was `_ = hAgent.Sum()`) +- Makes the agent-test binding verifiable externally + +### WalletOwnershipCircuit & BalanceRangeCircuit +- No structural changes, test coverage added + +## Test Coverage + +### Circuit Tests (circuits_test.go) +- 15 test cases across 4 circuits +- Framework: gnark `test.NewAssert(t)` with `test.WithCurves(ecc.BN254)` +- Both plonk and groth16 proving systems tested automatically +- MiMC hash computation via native `bn254/fr/mimc` package + +### ProverService Tests (zkp_test.go) +- 6 integration tests: compile, prove, verify (valid/invalid), idempotent compile, uncompiled error +- Both plonk and groth16 schemes tested + +## AttestationData Wire Format + +```go +type AttestationData struct { + Proof []byte `json:"proof"` + PublicInputs []byte `json:"publicInputs"` + CircuitID string `json:"circuitId"` + Scheme string `json:"scheme"` +} +``` + +### Firewall Integration +- `AttestationResult` struct in firewall package (avoids circular imports) +- `ZKAttestFunc` returns `*AttestationResult` instead of `[]byte` +- `AttestResponse()` returns structured data + +### Remote Agent Verification +- `ZKAttestVerifyFunc` callback type for attestation verification +- `P2PRemoteAgent.SetAttestVerifier()` setter +- Verification logged in `InvokeTool()` response handling + +### Backward Compatibility +- `Response.AttestationProof []byte` field retained (deprecated) +- New `Response.Attestation *AttestationData` field added +- Handler sets both fields for backward compat + +## SRS Production Path + +| Config Key | Type | Default | Description | +|------------|------|---------|-------------| +| `p2p.zkp.srsMode` | string | "unsafe" | SRS generation: "unsafe" or "file" | +| `p2p.zkp.srsPath` | string | "" | Path to SRS file | +| `p2p.zkp.maxCredentialAge` | string | "24h" | Max credential age | + +## Credential Revocation + +- `GossipService.revokedDIDs map[string]time.Time` +- `RevokeDID(did)` / `IsRevoked(did) bool` +- `SetMaxCredentialAge(d time.Duration)` +- Credential rejection: expired (ExpiresAt), stale (IssuedAt + maxCredentialAge), revoked (IsRevoked) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-auth-zk-hardening/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-auth-zk-hardening/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..eac2c1b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-auth-zk-hardening/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +# Tasks: P2P Auth & ZK Hardening + +## Phase 1: Foundation + +- [x] **1A**: NonceCache with TTL-based eviction (`nonce_cache.go` + tests) +- [x] **1B**: ZK Circuit Test Suite (15 circuit tests + 6 prover tests) +- [x] **1C**: Fix AgentCapability circuit binding (AgentTestBinding public field) + +## Phase 2: Core Protocol + +- [x] **2A**: Signed Challenge (ECDSA over canonical payload, timestamp validation, nonce replay, dual protocol v1.0/v1.1) +- [x] **2B**: Attestation Timestamp Freshness (MinTimestamp/MaxTimestamp range assertions) +- [x] **2C**: AttestationData Wire Format & Verification (AttestationData struct, AttestationResult, ZKAttestVerifyFunc) + +## Phase 3: Integration + +- [x] **3A**: Wiring & Config Integration (NonceCache, dual protocol, attestation callback, SRS/MaxCredentialAge) +- [x] **3B**: Credential Revocation in Gossip (revokedDIDs, maxCredentialAge validation) +- [x] **3C**: SRS Production Path (SRSMode "file" support) +- [x] **3D**: Security Roadmap Grade Update (Auth B-→A, ZK C→B+, P3 items) + +## Verification + +- [x] `go build ./...` — build success +- [x] `go test ./internal/p2p/handshake/...` — 29 tests pass +- [x] `go test ./internal/zkp/circuits/...` — 15 circuit tests pass (plonk + groth16) +- [x] `go test ./internal/zkp/...` — 6 prover tests pass +- [x] `go vet ./...` — static analysis clean diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e331c975 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-25 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..481c056b --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +## Context + +The P2P tool invocation pipeline (`handler.go` → `approvalFn` → `composite.go` → executor) has 5 security gaps discovered during audit. Sandbox isolation, KMS, and security events were already added in recent commits, but the approval path itself—the decision layer that determines whether a remote peer's tool request should execute—had critical bypass vectors. + +Current state: remote peers authenticate via handshake sessions, pass through firewall ACL, and then reach the approval check. If `approvalFn` is nil (e.g., no payment module), the check is silently skipped. HeadlessProvider (designed for Docker environments) auto-approves everything, including P2P sessions. Grant entries never expire. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Eliminate all known approval-path bypass vectors for P2P tool invocations +- Ensure fail-closed behavior at every decision point (nil handler, missing provider, unknown tool) +- Prevent HeadlessProvider from ever approving P2P remote peer requests +- Block overly permissive firewall rules that would allow any peer to access any tool +- Add time-based expiration to approval grants to limit implicit trust windows +- Prevent double-prompting when handler approval and tool-level approval both trigger + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing the handshake/authentication layer (already hardened in P2-10/11/12) +- Adding new approval provider types (e.g., webhook-based approval for CI/CD) +- Modifying sandbox or container isolation behavior +- Persistent grant storage (grants remain in-memory, cleared on restart) + +## Decisions + +### 1. Default-deny on nil approvalFn (vs. optional approval) +**Decision**: Return "denied" response when `approvalFn` is nil. +**Rationale**: The previous behavior silently skipped approval, which is fail-open. Any code path that reaches the handler without configuring approval (e.g., P2P enabled without payment module) would execute tools unconditionally. Default-deny is the only safe choice for a security boundary. +**Alternative considered**: Making approvalFn required in HandlerConfig. Rejected because it would break backward compatibility and the handler is also used for non-tool requests (agent card, capability query). + +### 2. Dedicated P2P fallback slot in CompositeProvider (vs. prefix-matching) +**Decision**: Add `p2pFallback` field that intercepts all `"p2p:..."` session keys before TTY fallback. +**Rationale**: The TTY fallback slot is shared between local and P2P sessions. When HeadlessProvider occupies it, P2P sessions get auto-approved. A dedicated slot ensures P2P sessions are always routed to an appropriate provider regardless of the TTY fallback configuration. +**Alternative considered**: Adding a `CanHandleP2P()` method to Provider interface. Rejected as it would require changes to all provider implementations. + +### 3. SafetyLevel check before price-based auto-approve +**Decision**: Check `tool.SafetyLevel.IsDangerous()` before any auto-approve logic. Unknown tools (not in toolIndex) are treated as dangerous. +**Rationale**: A low-priced dangerous tool (e.g., `payment_send` at $0.01) should never be auto-approved by a remote peer. The SafetyLevel metadata already exists on all tools; using it here closes the gap without introducing new abstractions. + +### 4. AddRule returns error (vs. silent reject) +**Decision**: Change `AddRule(rule)` from void to `error` return, with `ValidateRule()` as a separate public function. +**Rationale**: Silent rejection would hide configuration errors. Returning an error lets callers (CLI tools, config loaders) provide actionable feedback. `ValidateRule()` is public so it can be used independently for validation UIs. +**Migration**: Existing `New()` constructor warns but still loads overly permissive rules for backward compatibility. + +### 5. Grant TTL with per-field timestamps +**Decision**: Replace `map[string]struct{}` with `map[string]grantEntry{grantedAt}`. TTL defaults to 0 (no expiry) for backward compatibility; P2P sets 1-hour TTL. +**Rationale**: Indefinite grants mean a single approval creates permanent trust. TTL bounds the window. The `grantedAt` field enables per-entry expiration without requiring a background goroutine (lazy expiration on `IsGranted` + explicit `CleanExpired`). + +### 6. Double-approval prevention via grant recording +**Decision**: When P2P `approvalFn` approves a tool, immediately record a grant for `"p2p:"+peerDID`. The tool's internal `wrapWithApproval` checks `IsGranted` and skips the second prompt. +**Rationale**: Without this, the user would see two approval prompts for one remote tool call (one from handler, one from tool wrapper). The grant is TTL-bounded so it doesn't create permanent trust. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **[TTY unavailable in headless P2P]** → P2P sessions with TTYProvider as fallback will fail with "stdin is not a terminal" in headless environments. Mitigation: users must either use a Gateway companion for approval or disable P2P in headless mode. This is intentionally fail-closed. +- **[AddRule API break]** → Callers that ignore the return value will get a compile error. Mitigation: only one caller (`p2p_firewall_add` tool handler) exists; already updated. +- **[Grant TTL clock skew]** → `nowFn` is injectable for testing but uses `time.Now` in production. If system clock jumps, grants may expire prematurely or persist too long. Mitigation: 1-hour TTL is coarse enough that clock jitter is negligible. +- **[Backward-compatible overly permissive rules]** → `New()` still loads wildcard allow rules with a warning. Mitigation: `AddRule()` rejects them going forward; existing configs get logged warnings encouraging cleanup. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7c370d6b --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +## Why + +The P2P remote tool invocation path has 5 critical security gaps in its approval pipeline. When `approvalFn` is nil, tools execute without any owner consent. HeadlessProvider can auto-approve P2P requests from remote peers. Dangerous tools (e.g., `payment_send`) can be auto-approved via P2P if the price is low. Firewall allows overly permissive wildcard allow rules. Approval grants never expire, creating an indefinite trust window. + +## What Changes + +- **Default-deny when approvalFn is nil**: Both `handleToolInvoke()` and `handleToolInvokePaid()` now return "denied" instead of silently skipping the approval check. +- **P2P-specific approval fallback**: CompositeProvider gains a dedicated `p2pFallback` slot. P2P sessions (`"p2p:..."` keys) never route to HeadlessProvider. +- **SafetyLevel enforcement for P2P auto-approve**: Dangerous tools are never auto-approved via P2P, regardless of price. Unknown tools are treated as dangerous. +- **Firewall wildcard rule validation**: New `ValidateRule()` rejects allow rules with wildcard peer + wildcard tools. `AddRule()` now returns an error. +- **Grant TTL support**: GrantStore gains time-based expiration. P2P grants default to 1-hour TTL. `CleanExpired()` removes stale entries. +- **Double-approval prevention**: P2P approvalFn records grants so tools' internal `wrapWithApproval` skips the second prompt. + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +### Modified Capabilities + +- `p2p-protocol`: handler.go default-deny when approvalFn is nil; both invoke paths affected +- `approval-policy`: CompositeProvider P2P fallback slot; HeadlessProvider blocked for P2P sessions +- `persistent-approval-grant`: TTL-based expiration for grants; CleanExpired cleanup method +- `p2p-firewall`: ValidateRule function; AddRule returns error; overly permissive rules rejected +- `tool-safety-level`: P2P auto-approve respects SafetyLevel; dangerous tools require explicit approval + +## Impact + +- **Files modified**: `internal/p2p/protocol/handler.go`, `internal/approval/composite.go`, `internal/approval/grant.go`, `internal/p2p/firewall/firewall.go`, `internal/app/app.go`, `internal/app/tools.go` +- **API change**: `firewall.AddRule()` now returns `error` (previously void) — callers must handle the error +- **Behavior change**: P2P requests denied by default if no approval handler is set; headless environments must configure a P2P-compatible approval provider or disable P2P +- **New tests**: handler_test.go (7 cases), firewall_test.go (6 cases), approval_test.go (3 new cases), grant_test.go (4 new cases) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/specs/approval-policy/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/specs/approval-policy/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c83a0c47 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/specs/approval-policy/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P approval fallback isolation +The CompositeProvider SHALL provide a dedicated P2P fallback slot (`p2pFallback`) that is used exclusively for approval requests with session keys prefixed with `"p2p:"`. P2P sessions MUST never be routed to the TTY fallback slot, preventing HeadlessProvider from auto-approving remote peer requests. + +#### Scenario: P2P session with no P2P fallback configured +- **WHEN** a P2P approval request (session key `"p2p:..."`) is received and no P2P fallback is set +- **THEN** the provider SHALL return an error stating "headless auto-approve is not allowed for remote peers" + +#### Scenario: P2P session routes to dedicated fallback +- **WHEN** a P2P approval request is received and a P2P fallback provider is configured +- **THEN** the request SHALL be routed to the P2P fallback provider, not the TTY fallback + +#### Scenario: Non-P2P session still uses TTY fallback +- **WHEN** a non-P2P approval request (session key without `"p2p:"` prefix) is received +- **THEN** the request SHALL be routed to the TTY fallback as before + +#### Scenario: HeadlessProvider as TTY fallback with P2P request +- **WHEN** HeadlessProvider is configured as TTY fallback and a P2P approval request arrives +- **THEN** HeadlessProvider SHALL NOT be called; the request SHALL use the P2P fallback or be denied + +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P approval wiring +When P2P is enabled, the application SHALL configure `TTYProvider` as the P2P fallback on `CompositeProvider`. This ensures P2P approval requests are always routed to an interactive provider, regardless of whether HeadlessProvider is configured as the TTY fallback. + +#### Scenario: P2P enabled wiring +- **WHEN** the application initializes with `cfg.P2P.Enabled = true` +- **THEN** `composite.SetP2PFallback(&approval.TTYProvider{})` SHALL be called diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/specs/p2p-firewall/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/specs/p2p-firewall/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..680310d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/specs/p2p-firewall/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Validate overly permissive ACL rules +The firewall SHALL provide a `ValidateRule()` function that rejects allow rules with wildcard peer (`"*"`) combined with wildcard tools (empty list or containing `"*"`). Deny rules SHALL always pass validation. + +#### Scenario: Wildcard peer with empty tools (allow) +- **WHEN** `ValidateRule` is called with `{PeerDID: "*", Action: "allow", Tools: []}` +- **THEN** it SHALL return an error "overly permissive rule: allow all peers with all tools is prohibited" + +#### Scenario: Wildcard peer with wildcard tool (allow) +- **WHEN** `ValidateRule` is called with `{PeerDID: "*", Action: "allow", Tools: ["*"]}` +- **THEN** it SHALL return an error + +#### Scenario: Wildcard peer with specific tools (allow) +- **WHEN** `ValidateRule` is called with `{PeerDID: "*", Action: "allow", Tools: ["echo"]}` +- **THEN** it SHALL return nil (allowed) + +#### Scenario: Specific peer with wildcard tools (allow) +- **WHEN** `ValidateRule` is called with `{PeerDID: "did:key:abc", Action: "allow", Tools: ["*"]}` +- **THEN** it SHALL return nil (allowed) + +#### Scenario: Wildcard deny rule +- **WHEN** `ValidateRule` is called with `{PeerDID: "*", Action: "deny", Tools: ["*"]}` +- **THEN** it SHALL return nil (deny rules always safe) + +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: AddRule validates before adding +`AddRule()` SHALL validate the rule using `ValidateRule()` before adding it. If validation fails, it SHALL return the error without adding the rule. The return type changes from void to `error`. + +#### Scenario: AddRule rejects overly permissive rule +- **WHEN** `AddRule` is called with a wildcard allow-all rule +- **THEN** it SHALL return an error and NOT add the rule to the firewall + +#### Scenario: AddRule accepts valid rule +- **WHEN** `AddRule` is called with a specific peer allow rule +- **THEN** it SHALL add the rule and return nil + +### Requirement: Initial rules backward compatibility +When constructing a Firewall with `New()`, overly permissive initial rules SHALL be loaded with a warning log (not rejected). This preserves backward compatibility with existing configurations while alerting operators. + +#### Scenario: Overly permissive initial rule +- **WHEN** `New()` is called with a wildcard allow-all rule in the initial rules slice +- **THEN** the rule SHALL be loaded (backward compat) and a warning SHALL be logged diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/specs/p2p-protocol/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/specs/p2p-protocol/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..520c3859 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/specs/p2p-protocol/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Tool invocation approval check +The protocol handler SHALL deny tool invocation requests when no approval handler (`approvalFn`) is configured. The handler MUST return a response with status "denied" and error message "no approval handler configured for remote tool invocation". This applies to both free (`tool_invoke`) and paid (`tool_invoke_paid`) request types. + +#### Scenario: No approval handler configured for tool_invoke +- **WHEN** a remote peer sends a `tool_invoke` request and `approvalFn` is nil +- **THEN** the handler SHALL return status "denied" with error "no approval handler configured for remote tool invocation" + +#### Scenario: No approval handler configured for tool_invoke_paid +- **WHEN** a remote peer sends a `tool_invoke_paid` request and `approvalFn` is nil +- **THEN** the handler SHALL return status "denied" with error "no approval handler configured for remote tool invocation" + +#### Scenario: Approval handler configured and approves +- **WHEN** a remote peer sends a `tool_invoke` request and `approvalFn` returns (true, nil) +- **THEN** the handler SHALL proceed to execute the tool and return status "ok" + +#### Scenario: Approval handler configured and denies +- **WHEN** a remote peer sends a `tool_invoke` request and `approvalFn` returns (false, nil) +- **THEN** the handler SHALL return status "denied" with error "tool invocation denied by owner" + +#### Scenario: Approval handler returns error +- **WHEN** a remote peer sends a `tool_invoke` request and `approvalFn` returns an error +- **THEN** the handler SHALL return status "error" with the approval error message diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/specs/persistent-approval-grant/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/specs/persistent-approval-grant/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d4f14eba --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/specs/persistent-approval-grant/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Grant TTL expiration +GrantStore SHALL support an optional time-to-live (TTL) for grants. When TTL is set to a positive duration, `IsGranted()` MUST check whether the grant has expired (current time minus `grantedAt` exceeds TTL). A TTL of zero MUST preserve backward-compatible behavior (no expiration). + +#### Scenario: Grant within TTL +- **WHEN** a grant was created 5 minutes ago and TTL is 10 minutes +- **THEN** `IsGranted()` SHALL return true + +#### Scenario: Grant expired past TTL +- **WHEN** a grant was created 11 minutes ago and TTL is 10 minutes +- **THEN** `IsGranted()` SHALL return false + +#### Scenario: TTL zero means no expiry +- **WHEN** TTL is zero (default) and a grant was created 100 hours ago +- **THEN** `IsGranted()` SHALL return true + +### Requirement: Clean expired grants +GrantStore SHALL provide a `CleanExpired()` method that removes all grants whose `grantedAt` timestamp exceeds the configured TTL. The method SHALL return the count of removed entries. When TTL is zero, `CleanExpired()` SHALL be a no-op returning zero. + +#### Scenario: Clean expired entries +- **WHEN** `CleanExpired()` is called with TTL of 5 minutes and 2 of 3 grants are older than 5 minutes +- **THEN** the method SHALL remove the 2 expired grants and return 2 + +#### Scenario: Clean with zero TTL +- **WHEN** `CleanExpired()` is called with TTL of zero +- **THEN** the method SHALL remove nothing and return 0 + +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P grant TTL default +When P2P is enabled, the application SHALL set the GrantStore TTL to 1 hour. This limits the window of implicit trust from P2P approval grants. + +#### Scenario: P2P enabled sets 1-hour TTL +- **WHEN** the application initializes with `cfg.P2P.Enabled = true` +- **THEN** `grantStore.SetTTL(time.Hour)` SHALL be called + +### Requirement: Double-approval prevention via grant recording +When the P2P approval function approves a tool invocation, the system SHALL record a grant for `"p2p:"+peerDID` and the tool name. This prevents the tool's internal `wrapWithApproval` from prompting a second time. + +#### Scenario: Approved P2P tool records grant +- **WHEN** the P2P approval function approves tool "echo" for peer "did:key:abc" +- **THEN** a grant SHALL be recorded with session key `"p2p:did:key:abc"` and tool name `"echo"` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/specs/tool-safety-level/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/specs/tool-safety-level/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6f3be34c --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/specs/tool-safety-level/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P auto-approve respects SafetyLevel +The P2P approval function SHALL check the tool's SafetyLevel before applying price-based auto-approval. Dangerous tools (SafetyLevel == Dangerous or unknown/zero) MUST always go through explicit approval, regardless of price. Tools not found in the tool index SHALL be treated as dangerous. + +#### Scenario: Dangerous tool bypasses auto-approve +- **WHEN** a P2P remote peer invokes a tool with SafetyLevel "dangerous" and the price is within auto-approve limits +- **THEN** the system SHALL NOT auto-approve and SHALL route to the composite approval provider + +#### Scenario: Unknown tool treated as dangerous +- **WHEN** a P2P remote peer invokes a tool not found in the tool index +- **THEN** the system SHALL NOT auto-approve and SHALL route to the composite approval provider + +#### Scenario: Safe tool within price limit auto-approves +- **WHEN** a P2P remote peer invokes a tool with SafetyLevel "safe" and the price is within auto-approve limits +- **THEN** the system SHALL auto-approve and record a grant diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a9782ecb --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-25-p2p-security-hardening/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +## 1. Default-Deny on Nil ApprovalFn + +- [x] 1.1 Modify `handleToolInvoke()` in handler.go to return "denied" when `approvalFn` is nil +- [x] 1.2 Modify `handleToolInvokePaid()` in handler.go to return "denied" when `approvalFn` is nil +- [x] 1.3 Add handler_test.go with nil approval, approved, denied, and error test cases + +## 2. P2P Approval Fallback Isolation + +- [x] 2.1 Add `p2pFallback` field and `SetP2PFallback()` method to CompositeProvider +- [x] 2.2 Update `RequestApproval()` to route `"p2p:..."` sessions to P2P fallback instead of TTY fallback +- [x] 2.3 Wire `composite.SetP2PFallback(&approval.TTYProvider{})` in app.go when P2P is enabled +- [x] 2.4 Add tests for P2P session blocking HeadlessProvider, P2P fallback routing, non-P2P TTY routing + +## 3. SafetyLevel Enforcement for P2P Auto-Approve + +- [x] 3.1 Move approval func inside handler block to access `toolIndex` +- [x] 3.2 Add SafetyLevel check before price-based auto-approve in P2P approvalFn +- [x] 3.3 Record grants on approval success to prevent double-approval prompting + +## 4. Firewall Wildcard Rule Validation + +- [x] 4.1 Add `ValidateRule()` function to firewall.go +- [x] 4.2 Change `AddRule()` return type to `error` and call `ValidateRule()` +- [x] 4.3 Update `New()` to warn on overly permissive initial rules (backward compat) +- [x] 4.4 Update `p2p_firewall_add` tool handler in tools.go to handle `AddRule` error +- [x] 4.5 Add firewall_test.go with ValidateRule and AddRule test cases + +## 5. Grant TTL Support + +- [x] 5.1 Replace `map[string]struct{}` with `map[string]grantEntry{grantedAt}` in GrantStore +- [x] 5.2 Add `SetTTL()` and TTL expiration check in `IsGranted()` +- [x] 5.3 Add `CleanExpired()` method +- [x] 5.4 Wire `grantStore.SetTTL(time.Hour)` in app.go when P2P is enabled +- [x] 5.5 Add grant_test.go tests for TTL expired, TTL zero, CleanExpired + +## 6. Build & Test Verification + +- [x] 6.1 Verify `go build ./...` passes +- [x] 6.2 Verify `go test ./internal/approval/... ./internal/p2p/... ./internal/app/...` passes diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..85ae75c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-26 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..461d0b64 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +## Context + +The `lango settings` TUI editor is a Bubble Tea-based interactive configuration editor. It follows a consistent pattern: menu categories → form builders → config write-back via a centralized `UpdateConfigFromForm()` switch. All P2P and advanced security config types already exist in `internal/config/types.go` and are consumed by `internal/app/wiring.go`, but lack TUI exposure. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Expose all P2P and advanced security settings through the existing TUI settings editor +- Follow established patterns (form builders, state update switch, menu categories) +- Handle `*bool` config fields correctly with helper functions +- Maintain full test coverage for new forms and config mappings + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing config types or initialization logic +- Adding validation beyond what existing forms use (type checks, range checks) +- Implementing list management UIs for FirewallRules (complex struct arrays — out of scope) + +## Decisions + +### Split P2P into 5 sub-categories instead of 1 monolithic form +P2PConfig has 6 nested sub-domains totaling 30+ fields. A single form would be unwieldy. Splitting into P2P Network (14), ZKP (5), Pricing (3), Owner Protection (5), Sandbox (11) keeps each form manageable. + +**Alternative**: One "P2P" form with all fields — rejected because forms lack section dividers in the current TUI framework. + +### Separate security sub-categories instead of expanding existing Security form +The existing Security form has 15 fields (interceptor + signer). Adding Keyring (1), DB Encryption (2), and KMS (12) would create a 30-field form. Separate menu entries are clearer. + +### Reuse existing patterns for complex types +- `[]string` → comma-separated text with `splitCSV()` (same as RAG Collections) +- `map[string]string` → `key:value` comma-separated with `parseCustomPatterns()` (same as PII custom patterns) +- `*bool` → new `derefBool()`/`boolPtr()` helpers (new pattern, minimal) + +### Expand signer provider options in existing Security form +Adding KMS options (`aws-kms`, `gcp-kms`, `azure-kv`, `pkcs11`) to the existing dropdown avoids needing a separate form just for provider selection. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Menu length increases from 21 to 29 items] → Menu scrolls with j/k keys; acceptable for comprehensive settings +- [FirewallRules not editable in TUI] → Complex struct arrays need a list management UI; deferred to future change +- [`*bool` is new to the form system] → Contained to 2 fields with clear helper functions; well-tested diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..51f25c52 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +## Why + +The `lango settings` TUI editor exposes 21 configuration categories but is missing P2P networking, tool isolation/sandbox, keyring, DB encryption, and KMS settings. Users must manually edit encrypted config JSON to enable or tune these features, which is error-prone and inconsistent with the rest of the settings UX. + +## What Changes + +- Add 8 new menu categories to the settings TUI: P2P Network, P2P ZKP, P2P Pricing, P2P Owner Protection, P2P Sandbox, Security Keyring, Security DB Encryption, Security KMS +- Add form builders for each category with appropriate field types (bool, text, int, select, password) +- Add config write-back mappings for all ~53 new form fields +- Expand the existing Security form's signer provider options to include KMS backends (`aws-kms`, `gcp-kms`, `azure-kv`, `pkcs11`) +- Handle `*bool` config fields (ReadOnlyRootfs, BlockConversations) with `derefBool`/`boolPtr` helpers + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `settings-p2p`: TUI forms for P2P network, ZKP, pricing, owner protection, and sandbox settings in the settings editor +- `settings-security-advanced`: TUI forms for keyring, DB encryption, and KMS settings in the settings editor + +### Modified Capabilities +- `cli-settings`: Expanded menu with 8 new categories, updated signer provider options + +## Impact + +- `internal/cli/settings/menu.go` — 8 new menu entries +- `internal/cli/settings/forms_impl.go` — 8 new form builders + 2 helpers + signer option expansion +- `internal/cli/settings/editor.go` — 8 new case routes in handleMenuSelection() +- `internal/cli/tuicore/state_update.go` — ~53 new case entries + boolPtr helper +- `internal/cli/settings/forms_impl_test.go` — 13 new tests diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/specs/cli-settings/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/specs/cli-settings/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3dd781d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/specs/cli-settings/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Settings menu categories +The settings TUI menu SHALL include all configuration categories. The menu SHALL contain categories for: Providers, Agent, Server, Channels, Tools, Session, Security, Auth, Knowledge, Skill, Observational Memory, Embedding & RAG, Graph Store, Multi-Agent, A2A Protocol, Payment, Cron Scheduler, Background Tasks, Workflow Engine, Librarian, P2P Network, P2P ZKP, P2P Pricing, P2P Owner Protection, P2P Sandbox, Security Keyring, Security DB Encryption, Security KMS, Save & Exit, and Cancel. + +#### Scenario: Menu displays all 29 categories +- **WHEN** user opens the settings editor and navigates to the menu +- **THEN** the menu SHALL display 29 selectable categories plus Save & Exit and Cancel + +#### Scenario: P2P categories appear after Librarian +- **WHEN** user scrolls through the menu +- **THEN** P2P and advanced security categories SHALL appear between Librarian and Save & Exit + +### Requirement: Security form signer provider options +The Security form's signer provider dropdown SHALL include options for all supported providers: local, rpc, enclave, aws-kms, gcp-kms, azure-kv, pkcs11. + +#### Scenario: KMS providers available in signer dropdown +- **WHEN** user opens the Security form +- **THEN** the signer provider dropdown SHALL include "aws-kms", "gcp-kms", "azure-kv", and "pkcs11" as options diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/specs/settings-p2p/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/specs/settings-p2p/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9fc670a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/specs/settings-p2p/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P Network settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P Network" menu category with a form exposing core P2P configuration fields: enabled, listen addresses, bootstrap peers, relay, mDNS, max peers, handshake timeout, session token TTL, auto-approve known peers, gossip interval, ZK handshake, ZK attestation, require signed challenge, and min trust score. + +#### Scenario: User enables P2P networking +- **WHEN** user navigates to "P2P Network" and sets Enabled to true +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.enabled` field SHALL be set to true upon save + +#### Scenario: User sets listen addresses +- **WHEN** user enters comma-separated multiaddrs in "Listen Addresses" +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.listenAddrs` SHALL contain each address as a separate array element + +### Requirement: P2P ZKP settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P ZKP" menu category with fields for proof cache directory, proving scheme (plonk/groth16), SRS mode (unsafe/file), SRS path, and max credential age. + +#### Scenario: User selects groth16 proving scheme +- **WHEN** user selects "groth16" from the proving scheme dropdown +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.zkp.provingScheme` SHALL be set to "groth16" + +### Requirement: P2P Pricing settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P Pricing" menu category with fields for enabled, price per query, and tool-specific prices (as key:value comma-separated text). + +#### Scenario: User sets tool prices +- **WHEN** user enters "exec:0.10,browser:0.50" in the Tool Prices field +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.pricing.toolPrices` SHALL be a map with keys "exec" and "browser" and respective values + +### Requirement: P2P Owner Protection settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P Owner Protection" menu category with fields for owner name, email, phone, extra terms, and block conversations. + +#### Scenario: User sets block conversations with nil default +- **WHEN** the config's `blockConversations` is nil +- **THEN** the form SHALL display the checkbox as checked (default true) + +#### Scenario: User unchecks block conversations +- **WHEN** user unchecks "Block Conversations" +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.ownerProtection.blockConversations` SHALL be a pointer to false + +### Requirement: P2P Sandbox settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P Sandbox" menu category with fields for tool isolation (enabled, timeout, max memory) and container sandbox (enabled, runtime, image, network mode, read-only rootfs, CPU quota, pool size, pool idle timeout). + +#### Scenario: User configures container sandbox +- **WHEN** user enables container sandbox and selects "docker" runtime +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.toolIsolation.container.enabled` SHALL be true and `runtime` SHALL be "docker" + +#### Scenario: Container read-only rootfs defaults to true +- **WHEN** the config's `readOnlyRootfs` is nil +- **THEN** the form SHALL display the checkbox as checked (default true) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/specs/settings-security-advanced/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/specs/settings-security-advanced/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..518aeb91 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/specs/settings-security-advanced/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Security Keyring settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "Security Keyring" menu category with a single field for OS keyring enabled/disabled. + +#### Scenario: User enables keyring +- **WHEN** user checks "OS Keyring Enabled" +- **THEN** the config's `security.keyring.enabled` SHALL be set to true + +### Requirement: Security DB Encryption settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "Security DB Encryption" menu category with fields for SQLCipher encryption enabled and cipher page size. + +#### Scenario: User enables DB encryption +- **WHEN** user checks "SQLCipher Encryption" and sets page size to 4096 +- **THEN** the config's `security.dbEncryption.enabled` SHALL be true and `cipherPageSize` SHALL be 4096 + +#### Scenario: Cipher page size validation +- **WHEN** user enters 0 or a negative number for cipher page size +- **THEN** the form SHALL display a validation error "must be a positive integer" + +### Requirement: Security KMS settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "Security KMS" menu category with fields for region, key ID, endpoint, fallback to local, timeout, max retries, Azure vault URL, Azure key version, PKCS#11 module path, slot ID, PIN (password field), and key label. + +#### Scenario: User configures AWS KMS +- **WHEN** user enters region "us-east-1" and a key ARN +- **THEN** the config's `security.kms.region` and `security.kms.keyId` SHALL contain the entered values + +#### Scenario: PKCS#11 PIN is password field +- **WHEN** the KMS form is displayed +- **THEN** the PKCS#11 PIN field SHALL use InputPassword type to mask the value diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8a10fadc --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-add-p2p-security-settings-tui/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +## 1. Menu & Routing + +- [x] 1.1 Add 8 new categories to `NewMenuModel()` in `internal/cli/settings/menu.go` +- [x] 1.2 Add 8 new `case` entries in `handleMenuSelection()` in `internal/cli/settings/editor.go` + +## 2. Form Builders + +- [x] 2.1 Add `derefBool()` and `formatKeyValueMap()` helpers in `internal/cli/settings/forms_impl.go` +- [x] 2.2 Add `NewP2PForm()` — 14 fields for P2P Network settings +- [x] 2.3 Add `NewP2PZKPForm()` — 5 fields for ZKP settings +- [x] 2.4 Add `NewP2PPricingForm()` — 3 fields for pricing settings +- [x] 2.5 Add `NewP2POwnerProtectionForm()` — 5 fields for owner protection +- [x] 2.6 Add `NewP2PSandboxForm()` — 11 fields for tool isolation & container sandbox +- [x] 2.7 Add `NewKeyringForm()` — 1 field for OS keyring +- [x] 2.8 Add `NewDBEncryptionForm()` — 2 fields for SQLCipher encryption +- [x] 2.9 Add `NewKMSForm()` — 12 fields for Cloud KMS / HSM + +## 3. Config Write-back + +- [x] 3.1 Add `boolPtr()` helper in `internal/cli/tuicore/state_update.go` +- [x] 3.2 Add P2P Network case entries (~14) in `UpdateConfigFromForm()` +- [x] 3.3 Add P2P ZKP case entries (~5) in `UpdateConfigFromForm()` +- [x] 3.4 Add P2P Pricing case entries (~3) in `UpdateConfigFromForm()` +- [x] 3.5 Add P2P Owner Protection case entries (~5) in `UpdateConfigFromForm()` +- [x] 3.6 Add P2P Sandbox case entries (~11) in `UpdateConfigFromForm()` +- [x] 3.7 Add Security Keyring case entry in `UpdateConfigFromForm()` +- [x] 3.8 Add Security DB Encryption case entries (~2) in `UpdateConfigFromForm()` +- [x] 3.9 Add Security KMS case entries (~12) in `UpdateConfigFromForm()` + +## 4. Existing Form Update + +- [x] 4.1 Expand signer provider options in `NewSecurityForm()` to include KMS backends + +## 5. Tests + +- [x] 5.1 Add form field count/key tests for all 8 new forms +- [x] 5.2 Add menu category existence test for all 8 new categories +- [x] 5.3 Add config round-trip tests for P2P, Sandbox *bool, and KMS fields +- [x] 5.4 Add `derefBool` helper test + +## 6. Verification + +- [x] 6.1 Run `go build ./...` — no errors +- [x] 6.2 Run `go test ./internal/cli/settings/...` — all pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-check-progress-test-docs/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-check-progress-test-docs/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..05d56051 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-check-progress-test-docs/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +# Design: Test Coverage & Documentation Sync + +## Approach + +### Test Strategy +- Follow existing test patterns (testify assertions, zap nop logger, mock dependencies) +- Focus on unit tests that don't require external services (no Docker, no network) +- Use table-driven tests where applicable +- Test error paths and edge cases, not just happy paths + +### Documentation Strategy +- Fix incorrect references (owner-shield CLI command → configuration-only) +- Add missing configuration keys by cross-referencing `internal/config/types.go` +- Maintain existing documentation format and style + +### Prioritization +1. P2P discovery/identity (highest risk — network-facing code with no tests) +2. CLI commands (user-facing code with no validation) +3. Infrastructure (workflow, cron, background — core scheduling) +4. Security/sandbox (defense-in-depth validation) +5. Remaining packages (librarian, payment CLI, p2p routes) +6. Documentation fixes (lowest risk but important for coherence) + +## Key Design Decisions +- Tests should be self-contained (no external dependencies like Docker, DHT, blockchain) +- Use mocks/stubs for external interfaces (libp2p host, DHT, wallet) +- CLI tests verify command tree structure, not full execution (avoids bootstrap dependency) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-check-progress-test-docs/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-check-progress-test-docs/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2fc80915 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-check-progress-test-docs/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +# Proposal: Test Coverage & Documentation Sync + +## Problem + +The dev branch contains ~31,400 lines of new P2P networking, security hardening, and sandbox code across 394 files. While the code architecture is solid, **critical packages lack test coverage** and **documentation has drifted from implementation**. + +### Key Gaps +- **50+ source files** across 12 packages have zero test coverage +- `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md` references a non-existent CLI command +- `docs/configuration.md` is missing ~10 configuration keys +- No integration tests for P2P discovery, identity, or CLI commands + +## Proposed Solution + +Add comprehensive unit tests for all untested packages, fix documentation inconsistencies, and ensure docs/config/code are fully aligned. + +## Scope + +- ~16 new test files covering P2P, CLI, workflow, cron, background, security, sandbox, librarian, payment +- 3 documentation files updated (TOOL_USAGE.md, configuration.md, p2p-network.md) +- OpenSpec change entry for tracking diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-check-progress-test-docs/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-check-progress-test-docs/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c80cc7f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-check-progress-test-docs/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +## 1. Phase 1: P2P Core Package Tests + +- [x] 1.1 Create `internal/p2p/discovery/gossip_test.go` — KnownPeers, FindByCapability, FindByDID, RevokeDID, IsRevoked, SetMaxCredentialAge. +- [x] 1.2 Create `internal/p2p/discovery/agentad_test.go` — AdService creation, StoreAd, Discover, DiscoverByCapability, matchesTags, ZK credential verification, timestamp ordering. +- [x] 1.3 Create `internal/p2p/identity/identity_test.go` — DIDFromPublicKey, ParseDID/VerifyDID roundtrip, WalletDIDProvider caching, wallet error handling. + +## 2. Phase 2: CLI Tests + +- [x] 2.1 Create `internal/cli/p2p/p2p_test.go` — Command tree: 11 subcommands (status, peers, connect, disconnect, firewall, discover, identity, reputation, pricing, session, sandbox), sub-subcommands, --json flag. +- [x] 2.2 Create `internal/cli/security/security_test.go` — Command tree: 7 subcommands (migrate-passphrase, secrets, status, keyring, db-migrate, db-decrypt, kms), boolToStatus, isKMSProvider utility tests. + +## 3. Phase 3: Infrastructure Package Tests + +- [x] 3.1 Create `internal/workflow/dag_test.go` — Linear/diamond/parallel DAG, circular dependency detection, TopologicalSort, Roots, Ready with completion states. +- [x] 3.2 Create `internal/workflow/parser_test.go` — YAML parsing, Validate (empty name, no steps, empty step ID, duplicate IDs, unknown dependency, agents, circular deps). +- [x] 3.3 Create `internal/workflow/template_test.go` — RenderPrompt (no placeholders, substitution, missing key, hyphenated/underscored IDs), placeholderRe regex. +- [x] 3.4 Create `internal/background/manager_test.go` — Manager defaults, custom values, Submit+List, max tasks, Cancel/Status/Result not found, runner error, Status enum. + +## 4. Phase 4: Security/Sandbox Tests + +- [x] 4.1 Create `internal/security/kms_factory_test.go` — KMSProviderName.Valid for 4 providers + invalid, constants, NewKMSProvider unknown provider error. +- [x] 4.2 Create `internal/security/kms_checker_test.go` — KMSHealthChecker default/custom probe interval, healthy/unhealthy encrypt+decrypt, cache fresh/expired. +- [x] 4.3 Create `internal/sandbox/subprocess_test.go` — NewSubprocessExecutor, cleanEnv, workerFlag, IsWorkerMode default. + +## 5. Phase 5: Additional Package Tests + +- [x] 5.1 Create `internal/librarian/inquiry_processor_test.go` — stripCodeFence, parseAnswerMatches, parseAnalysisOutput, buildMatchPrompt, NewInquiryProcessor, confidence filtering. +- [x] 5.2 Create `internal/cli/payment/payment_test.go` — Command tree: 5 subcommands (balance, history, limits, info, send), --json flag, --force flag, required flags. +- [x] 5.3 Create `internal/app/p2p_routes_test.go` — p2pPricingHandler (all prices, specific tool, unknown fallback, disabled), p2pReputationHandler (missing peer_did, nil reputation). + +## 6. Phase 6: Documentation Fixes + +- [x] 6.1 Update `docs/configuration.md` — Add `p2p.requireSignedChallenge` to P2P table. +- [x] 6.2 Update `docs/configuration.md` — Add `p2p.zkp.srsMode`, `p2p.zkp.srsPath`, `p2p.zkp.maxCredentialAge` to ZKP keys. +- [x] 6.3 Update `docs/configuration.md` — Add P2P Tool Isolation section with all `p2p.toolIsolation.*` and `p2p.toolIsolation.container.*` keys. +- [x] 6.4 Update `docs/configuration.md` — Update JSON example to include all missing keys. + +## 7. Verification + +- [ ] 7.1 Run `go vet ./...` — static analysis passes (blocked by Go 1.25.4 toolchain in sandbox). +- [ ] 7.2 Run `go test ./...` — all tests pass (blocked by Go 1.25.4 toolchain in sandbox). diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b270b9a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: "2026-02-26" +name: codebase-consolidation diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..659aa500 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +# Design: Codebase Consolidation + +## Overview +Three independent consolidation efforts executed in parallel, plus one skipped due to constraints. + +## Phase 1: Generic AsyncBuffer + +### New Package: `internal/asyncbuf/` + +Two generic types replacing 5 duplicate buffer implementations: + +**BatchBuffer[T]** — Timer-based batch collection with configurable flush: +- `BatchConfig{QueueSize, BatchSize, BatchTimeout}` +- `ProcessBatchFunc[T] func(batch []T)` +- Non-blocking `Enqueue` with drop counting +- Drain-on-shutdown semantics + +**TriggerBuffer[T]** — Per-item async processing: +- `TriggerConfig{QueueSize}` +- `ProcessFunc[T] func(item T)` +- Non-blocking `Enqueue`, drain-on-shutdown + +### Migration Strategy +Each existing buffer becomes a thin wrapper: +- `EmbeddingBuffer` → `asyncbuf.BatchBuffer[EmbedRequest]` +- `GraphBuffer` → `asyncbuf.BatchBuffer[GraphRequest]` +- `Buffer` (memory) → `asyncbuf.TriggerBuffer[string]` +- `AnalysisBuffer` → `asyncbuf.TriggerBuffer[AnalysisRequest]` +- `ProactiveBuffer` → `asyncbuf.TriggerBuffer[string]` + +All public APIs remain identical. Domain-specific logic stays in the wrapper's process callback. + +## Phase 2: Package Merges + +### 2a. ctxutil → types +`Detach()` (28 LOC) moved to `internal/types/context.go` as `DetachContext()`. Better naming in the broader `types` namespace. + +### 2b. passphrase → security/passphrase +All files moved under `internal/security/passphrase/`. Package name unchanged. Logical grouping with security domain. + +### 2c. zkp → p2p/zkp +All files (including `circuits/` subdirectory) moved under `internal/p2p/zkp/`. ZKP is exclusively used for P2P proof verification. + +## Phase 3: CLI UX + +### Command Groups +``` +Core: serve, version, health +Configuration: config, settings, onboard, doctor +Data & AI: memory, graph, agent +Infrastructure: security, p2p, cron, workflow, payment +``` + +### Cross-References +Each config-related command's `Long` description includes "See Also" pointing to the other three. + +## Phase 4: Type Consolidation (SKIPPED) +`MessageProvider func(sessionKey string) ([]session.Message, error)` is duplicated in memory, learning, and librarian packages. Cannot consolidate into `types` because `session` imports `types` (for `MessageRole`), creating a cycle. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..daec59f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +# Proposal: Codebase Consolidation + +## Problem +As the project rapidly expanded with P2P, Security, KMS, Sandbox, and ZKP features, duplicate boilerplate patterns and underused packages accumulated. Five async buffer implementations share nearly identical lifecycle code, three small packages (ctxutil, passphrase, zkp) are imported by only 1-2 consumers, and CLI --help output lacks logical grouping. + +## Solution +1. **Generic AsyncBuffer**: Create `internal/asyncbuf/` with `BatchBuffer[T]` and `TriggerBuffer[T]` generics, then migrate all 5 existing buffers to thin wrappers. +2. **Package Consolidation**: Merge `ctxutil` into `types`, `passphrase` into `security/passphrase`, `zkp` into `p2p/zkp`. +3. **CLI UX**: Add Cobra command groups and cross-references between config-related commands. +4. **Type Deduplication**: Consolidate identical `MessageProvider` type (skipped due to import cycle). + +## Goals +- Reduce boilerplate by ~400 lines across 5 buffer packages. +- Improve package tree clarity by merging orphaned packages into logical parents. +- Improve CLI discoverability via grouped --help output. +- Zero breaking changes to any public API. + +## Non-Goals +- Restructuring P2P/Security packages (already well-organized). +- Moving `session.Message` into `types` (would require large refactor). +- Adding new features or changing behavior. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/specs/async-buffer/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/specs/async-buffer/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8bfcf057 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/specs/async-buffer/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +# Spec: Generic Async Buffer + +## Overview +Generic async buffer package (`internal/asyncbuf/`) providing two reusable buffer types that replace 5 duplicate implementations across the codebase. + +## Requirements + +### R1: BatchBuffer[T] — Batch-Oriented Async Processing +The system must provide a generic `BatchBuffer[T]` that: +- Accepts items via non-blocking `Enqueue(T)` +- Collects items into batches up to a configurable `BatchSize` +- Flushes batches on a configurable `BatchTimeout` timer +- Processes batches via a user-provided `ProcessBatchFunc[T]` +- Tracks dropped items when the queue is full (`DroppedCount()`) +- Drains remaining items on `Stop()` before returning +- Follows `Start(wg *sync.WaitGroup)` / `Stop()` lifecycle + +#### Scenarios +- **Normal batch flush**: Items accumulate until `BatchSize` is reached, then flush. +- **Timeout flush**: Partial batch flushes after `BatchTimeout` with no new items. +- **Queue full**: `Enqueue` drops silently and increments drop counter. +- **Graceful shutdown**: `Stop()` processes remaining queued items before returning. + +### R2: TriggerBuffer[T] — Per-Item Async Processing +The system must provide a generic `TriggerBuffer[T]` that: +- Accepts items via non-blocking `Enqueue(T)` +- Processes each item individually via `ProcessFunc[T]` +- Drains remaining items on `Stop()` before returning +- Follows `Start(wg *sync.WaitGroup)` / `Stop()` lifecycle + +#### Scenarios +- **Normal processing**: Each enqueued item processed one-at-a-time. +- **Queue full**: `Enqueue` drops silently (non-blocking). +- **Graceful shutdown**: `Stop()` processes remaining queued items before returning. + +### R3: Backward-Compatible Migration +All 5 existing buffers must be migrated to thin wrappers around asyncbuf types with zero public API changes: +- `embedding.EmbeddingBuffer` wraps `BatchBuffer[EmbedRequest]` +- `graph.GraphBuffer` wraps `BatchBuffer[GraphRequest]` +- `memory.Buffer` wraps `TriggerBuffer[string]` +- `learning.AnalysisBuffer` wraps `TriggerBuffer[AnalysisRequest]` +- `librarian.ProactiveBuffer` wraps `TriggerBuffer[string]` + +## Dependencies +- `sync`, `sync/atomic`, `time` (stdlib) +- `go.uber.org/zap` (logging) +- No imports from application packages (leaf dependency) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/specs/cli-command-groups/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/specs/cli-command-groups/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..be25aa63 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/specs/cli-command-groups/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +# Spec: CLI Command Groups + +## Overview +Improve CLI discoverability by organizing `lango --help` output into logical groups and adding cross-references between related configuration commands. + +## Requirements + +### R1: Command Grouping +The root command must define four Cobra groups and assign every subcommand to one: + +| Group ID | Title | Commands | +|----------|-------|----------| +| `core` | Core: | serve, version, health | +| `config` | Configuration: | config, settings, onboard, doctor | +| `data` | Data & AI: | memory, graph, agent | +| `infra` | Infrastructure: | security, p2p, cron, workflow, payment | + +#### Scenarios +- **lango --help**: Commands appear grouped under their titles instead of flat alphabetical list. + +### R2: Cross-References (See Also) +Each configuration-related command must include a "See Also" section in its `Long` description: +- `config` → settings, onboard, doctor +- `settings` → config, onboard, doctor +- `onboard` → settings, config, doctor +- `doctor` → settings, config, onboard + +#### Scenarios +- **lango config --help**: Shows "See Also" section with settings, onboard, doctor references. +- **lango doctor --help**: Shows "See Also" section with settings, config, onboard references. + +## Constraints +- No behavioral changes — only `--help` output affected +- All existing commands continue to work identically diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/specs/package-consolidation/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/specs/package-consolidation/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e70ace57 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/specs/package-consolidation/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +# Spec: Package Consolidation + +## Overview +Merge three underused packages into their logical parent packages to improve codebase clarity. + +## Requirements + +### R1: ctxutil → types +- Move `Detach()` function and `detachedCtx` type from `internal/ctxutil/` to `internal/types/context.go` +- Move tests to `internal/types/context_test.go` +- Update all importers to use new path +- Delete `internal/ctxutil/` directory + +#### Scenarios +- **Background task**: `types.DetachContext(ctx)` preserves `Value()` but detaches from cancellation. +- **No import cycle**: `types` package has no upstream dependencies. + +### R2: passphrase → security/passphrase +- Move all files from `internal/passphrase/` to `internal/security/passphrase/` +- Package name remains `passphrase` +- Update all importers (bootstrap.go, bootstrap_test.go) +- Delete `internal/passphrase/` directory + +#### Scenarios +- **Passphrase acquisition**: Priority order (keyring → keyfile → interactive → stdin) unchanged. +- **Keyfile operations**: Read/Write/Shred/ValidatePermissions unchanged. + +### R3: zkp → p2p/zkp +- Move all files from `internal/zkp/` to `internal/p2p/zkp/` (including `circuits/` subdirectory) +- Package names remain `zkp` and `circuits` +- Update all importers (wiring.go, internal cross-references) +- Delete `internal/zkp/` directory + +#### Scenarios +- **ZKP proving/verifying**: `ProverService` functionality unchanged. +- **Circuit compilation**: All 4 circuits (ownership, attestation, capability, balance) work identically. + +## Constraints +- Zero functional changes — only import paths change +- No import cycles introduced +- All existing tests must pass without modification diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..670e9138 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-codebase-consolidation/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +# Tasks: Codebase Consolidation + +## Phase 1: Generic AsyncBuffer +- [x] 1.1 Create `internal/asyncbuf/batch.go` — BatchBuffer[T] generic type +- [x] 1.2 Create `internal/asyncbuf/trigger.go` — TriggerBuffer[T] generic type +- [x] 1.3 Create `internal/asyncbuf/batch_test.go` — 6 tests for BatchBuffer +- [x] 1.4 Create `internal/asyncbuf/trigger_test.go` — 5 tests for TriggerBuffer +- [x] 1.5 Migrate `internal/embedding/buffer.go` to wrap BatchBuffer[EmbedRequest] +- [x] 1.6 Migrate `internal/graph/buffer.go` to wrap BatchBuffer[GraphRequest] +- [x] 1.7 Migrate `internal/memory/buffer.go` to wrap TriggerBuffer[string] +- [x] 1.8 Migrate `internal/learning/analysis_buffer.go` to wrap TriggerBuffer[AnalysisRequest] +- [x] 1.9 Migrate `internal/librarian/proactive_buffer.go` to wrap TriggerBuffer[string] + +## Phase 2: Package Merges +- [x] 2.1 Move ctxutil/Detach to `internal/types/context.go`, update importers, delete ctxutil/ +- [x] 2.2 Move passphrase/ to `internal/security/passphrase/`, update importers, delete passphrase/ +- [x] 2.3 Move zkp/ to `internal/p2p/zkp/`, update importers, delete zkp/ + +## Phase 3: CLI UX +- [x] 3.1 Add Cobra command groups (core, config, data, infra) to root command +- [x] 3.2 Set GroupID on all commands +- [x] 3.3 Add "See Also" cross-references to config, settings, onboard, doctor + +## Phase 4: Type Consolidation (SKIPPED) +- [x] 4.1 ~~Consolidate MessageProvider type~~ — SKIPPED: types→session→types import cycle diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..85ae75c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-26 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..639e9bce --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +## Context + +`mapCategory()` and `mapKnowledgeCategory()` are internal functions that translate LLM-produced type strings into `entknowledge.Category` enum values. Both silently default to `CategoryFact` for unrecognized input, creating a hallucination risk when these "facts" are injected into the agent system prompt. The same unsafe raw-cast pattern also exists in `InquiryProcessor` and the `save_knowledge` tool. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Eliminate silent miscategorization by returning errors for unrecognized types +- Add missing `"pattern"` and `"correction"` cases to all mapping functions +- Validate category values before persisting in all code paths +- Maintain backward compatibility — existing valid types continue to work identically + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing the ent schema (already has `CategoryPattern`/`CategoryCorrection`) +- Adding new UI/CLI commands +- Modifying the LLM prompts beyond adding missing type options to the observation analyzer + +## Decisions + +**1. Return `(Category, error)` instead of silent fallback** +- Rationale: Callers can log and skip unknown types rather than polluting the knowledge store with misclassified data +- Alternative considered: Using `CategoryValidator` at call sites — rejected because it duplicates the switch logic and doesn't add the missing cases + +**2. Callers skip + warn on error** +- Rationale: Non-fatal handling keeps the pipeline running while preventing bad data from being stored +- The extraction/inquiry continues processing remaining items + +**3. `save_knowledge` tool uses `CategoryValidator` before cast** +- Rationale: This is the tool boundary (external input from LLM tool calls). The ent-generated validator is the canonical validation source and catches any future enum additions automatically + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Risk] LLM outputs a type that was previously silently accepted → Mitigation: Warning log provides visibility; the data simply isn't stored rather than being stored incorrectly +- [Risk] Future category additions require updating switch statements → Mitigation: Tests cover all valid cases; a missing case will surface as a test failure diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..85e0fdbf --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +## Why + +`mapCategory()` and `mapKnowledgeCategory()` silently fall back to `CategoryFact` for any unrecognized LLM output type. This misclassified data is later injected into the system prompt as `[fact] key: content`, causing the agent to treat unverified information as established fact — a direct hallucination vector. The same unsafe pattern exists in 5 locations across the codebase. + +## What Changes + +- `mapCategory()` in `proactive_buffer.go`: returns `(Category, error)` instead of silently defaulting; adds `"pattern"` and `"correction"` cases +- `mapKnowledgeCategory()` in `parse.go`: same signature change and case additions +- Caller updates in `conversation_analyzer.go` and `session_learner.go`: error handling for new signature (future-proofing) +- `InquiryProcessor` in `inquiry_processor.go`: replaces raw `entknowledge.Category()` cast with validated `mapCategory()` call +- `save_knowledge` tool in `tools.go`: adds `"pattern"` and `"correction"` to enum, validates via `CategoryValidator` before cast +- Observation analyzer prompt: adds `pattern|correction` to allowed type list +- New table-driven tests for both `mapCategory` and `mapKnowledgeCategory` + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +_(none)_ + +### Modified Capabilities + +- `knowledge-store`: Category mapping functions now return errors for unrecognized types instead of silent fallback +- `proactive-librarian`: Extraction pipeline skips entries with unrecognized types and logs warnings +- `meta-tools`: `save_knowledge` tool validates category before saving and supports `pattern`/`correction` + +## Impact + +- `internal/librarian/proactive_buffer.go` — signature change + caller update +- `internal/learning/parse.go` — signature change +- `internal/learning/conversation_analyzer.go` — error handling added +- `internal/learning/session_learner.go` — error handling added +- `internal/librarian/inquiry_processor.go` — raw cast replaced with validated call +- `internal/app/tools.go` — enum expanded + validation added +- `internal/librarian/observation_analyzer.go` — prompt updated +- New test files: `proactive_buffer_test.go`, `parse_test.go` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/specs/knowledge-store/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/specs/knowledge-store/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b0d5e21f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/specs/knowledge-store/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Category Mapping +The system SHALL map LLM analysis type strings to valid `entknowledge.Category` enum values. The `mapCategory()` and `mapKnowledgeCategory()` functions SHALL return `(Category, error)` and SHALL return an error for any unrecognized type string instead of silently defaulting. Valid types SHALL include: `preference`, `fact`, `rule`, `definition`, `pattern`, `correction`. + +#### Scenario: Valid type mapping +- **WHEN** a recognized type string (preference, fact, rule, definition, pattern, correction) is passed to `mapCategory()` or `mapKnowledgeCategory()` +- **THEN** the corresponding `entknowledge.Category` value SHALL be returned with a nil error + +#### Scenario: Unrecognized type rejection +- **WHEN** an unrecognized type string is passed to `mapCategory()` or `mapKnowledgeCategory()` +- **THEN** an empty category and a non-nil error containing `"unrecognized knowledge type"` SHALL be returned + +#### Scenario: Case sensitivity +- **WHEN** a type string with incorrect casing (e.g., `"FACT"`, `"Preference"`) is passed +- **THEN** the function SHALL return an error (types are case-sensitive) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/specs/meta-tools/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/specs/meta-tools/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..59624ba2 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/specs/meta-tools/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: save_knowledge Tool Category Validation +The `save_knowledge` tool SHALL validate the category parameter using `entknowledge.CategoryValidator()` before persisting. The tool SHALL accept the following categories: `rule`, `definition`, `preference`, `fact`, `pattern`, `correction`. Invalid categories SHALL return an error to the caller. + +#### Scenario: Valid category accepted +- **WHEN** the `save_knowledge` tool is called with a valid category (rule, definition, preference, fact, pattern, correction) +- **THEN** the knowledge entry SHALL be saved successfully + +#### Scenario: Invalid category rejected +- **WHEN** the `save_knowledge` tool is called with an unrecognized category +- **THEN** the tool SHALL return an error indicating the invalid category without saving + +#### Scenario: Tool schema includes all categories +- **WHEN** the tool parameters are inspected +- **THEN** the `category` enum SHALL include all six valid values: rule, definition, preference, fact, pattern, correction diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/specs/proactive-librarian/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/specs/proactive-librarian/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..76b2fef6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/specs/proactive-librarian/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Extraction Processing +The proactive librarian extraction pipeline SHALL validate the type of each extraction before saving. When an extraction has an unrecognized type, the system SHALL log a warning and skip that extraction without affecting other extractions in the batch. + +#### Scenario: Valid extraction type saved +- **WHEN** an extraction with a recognized type (preference, fact, rule, definition, pattern, correction) meets the auto-save confidence threshold +- **THEN** the knowledge entry SHALL be saved with the correct category + +#### Scenario: Unknown extraction type skipped +- **WHEN** an extraction with an unrecognized type is encountered +- **THEN** the system SHALL log a warning with the key and type, skip that extraction, and continue processing remaining extractions + +### Requirement: Inquiry Answer Category Validation +The `InquiryProcessor` SHALL validate the category of matched knowledge through `mapCategory()` before saving. Raw casting of LLM-provided category strings to `entknowledge.Category` SHALL NOT be used. + +#### Scenario: Valid inquiry answer category +- **WHEN** an inquiry answer match contains a recognized category +- **THEN** the knowledge SHALL be saved and the inquiry resolved + +#### Scenario: Invalid inquiry answer category +- **WHEN** an inquiry answer match contains an unrecognized category +- **THEN** the knowledge save SHALL be skipped with a warning log, but the inquiry SHALL still be resolved + +### Requirement: Observation Analyzer Prompt Types +The observation analyzer prompt SHALL list all valid extraction types including `pattern` and `correction` in addition to `preference`, `fact`, `rule`, `definition`. + +#### Scenario: Prompt includes all types +- **WHEN** the observation analyzer generates its LLM prompt +- **THEN** the type field description SHALL include `preference|fact|rule|definition|pattern|correction` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..994389af --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-category-miscategorization/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +## 1. Category Mapping Functions + +- [x] 1.1 Change `mapCategory()` in `internal/librarian/proactive_buffer.go` to return `(entknowledge.Category, error)`, add `"pattern"` and `"correction"` cases, return error for unrecognized types +- [x] 1.2 Change `mapKnowledgeCategory()` in `internal/learning/parse.go` to return `(entknowledge.Category, error)`, add `"pattern"` and `"correction"` cases, return error for unrecognized types + +## 2. Caller Updates + +- [x] 2.1 Update `ProactiveBuffer.process()` in `proactive_buffer.go` to handle `mapCategory()` error: log warning and skip extraction on error +- [x] 2.2 Update `ConversationAnalyzer.saveResult()` in `conversation_analyzer.go` to handle `mapKnowledgeCategory()` error +- [x] 2.3 Update `SessionLearner.saveSessionResult()` in `session_learner.go` to handle `mapKnowledgeCategory()` error +- [x] 2.4 Replace raw `entknowledge.Category()` cast in `InquiryProcessor.ProcessAnswers()` with `mapCategory()` call, skip knowledge save on error while still resolving inquiry + +## 3. Tool & Prompt Updates + +- [x] 3.1 Add `"pattern"` and `"correction"` to `save_knowledge` tool enum in `internal/app/tools.go`, validate via `entknowledge.CategoryValidator()` before saving +- [x] 3.2 Update observation analyzer prompt in `internal/librarian/observation_analyzer.go` to include `pattern|correction` in type list + +## 4. Tests + +- [x] 4.1 Add table-driven test for `mapCategory()` in `internal/librarian/proactive_buffer_test.go` covering all 6 valid types and 3 invalid cases +- [x] 4.2 Add table-driven test for `mapKnowledgeCategory()` in `internal/learning/parse_test.go` covering all 6 valid types and 3 invalid cases + +## 5. Verification + +- [x] 5.1 Run `go build ./...` — confirm compilation succeeds +- [x] 5.2 Run `go test ./...` — confirm all tests pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-cli-passphrase-guard/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-cli-passphrase-guard/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..85ae75c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-cli-passphrase-guard/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-26 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-cli-passphrase-guard/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-cli-passphrase-guard/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c4e61da5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-cli-passphrase-guard/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## Context + +The agent's `exec` tool spawns shell commands as subprocesses. Every `lango` CLI command calls `bootstrap.Run()` which invokes `passphrase.Acquire()`. In subprocess contexts, stdin is not a TTY, so passphrase acquisition hangs or fails unless a keyring/keyfile is pre-configured. The existing `blockLangoExec()` guard only covered 3 automation subcommands (cron, bg, workflow), leaving the agent free to attempt `lango security`, `lango graph`, `lango p2p`, etc. — all of which fail identically. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Block ALL `lango` CLI invocations from the agent's exec tool +- Provide actionable guidance: for subcommands with in-process equivalents, list the tools; for others, tell the agent to ask the user +- Maintain backward compatibility with the existing guard structure +- Cover both `exec` and `exec_bg` paths (both already call `blockLangoExec`) + +**Non-Goals:** +- Adding new in-process tools for commands that lack them (config, doctor, settings, serve, onboard) +- Modifying the passphrase acquisition pipeline itself +- Changing the bootstrap flow to support non-interactive mode + +## Decisions + +1. **Two-phase guard structure** — Specific subcommand guards (Phase 1) take priority over the catch-all (Phase 2). This ensures precise tool alternative messages for known subcommands while still catching unknown/future ones. + +2. **Feature flag awareness for automation guards only** — Automation guards (cron, bg, workflow) check `automationAvailable` to provide "enable the feature" guidance. Non-automation guards (graph, memory, p2p, security, payment) are always-on since these tools are always available when the feature itself is enabled. + +3. **Prompt-level reinforcement** — In addition to the runtime guard, both `TOOL_USAGE.md` (system prompt) and the automation prompt section (dynamic) explicitly warn against `lango` CLI exec. Defense in depth: prompt prevents the attempt, guard catches it if attempted. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **False positives for non-CLI lango references** — Commands like `echo lango` or `cat lango.yaml` are not blocked because the guard checks `lango ` (with space) or exact `lango`. Risk is minimal. +- **New subcommands not in Phase 1** — Future `lango` subcommands will be caught by the catch-all but won't get specific tool alternative messages. Acceptable: the catch-all message is still helpful. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-cli-passphrase-guard/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-cli-passphrase-guard/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e5297c15 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-cli-passphrase-guard/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +## Why + +The agent's `exec` tool only blocked 3 `lango` CLI subcommands (cron, bg, workflow) from being invoked via subprocess. All other `lango` CLI commands (security, memory, graph, p2p, config, doctor, etc.) could still be attempted, but would fail silently because every `lango` command requires passphrase authentication via `bootstrap.Run()` — which hangs or errors in non-interactive subprocess contexts. + +## What Changes + +- Expand `blockLangoExec()` to block ALL `lango` CLI subcommands, not just 3 +- Add a catch-all guard for any `lango` prefix that doesn't match specific subcommands +- Provide per-subcommand guidance messages pointing to in-process tool equivalents (graph, memory, p2p, security, payment) +- For subcommands without in-process equivalents (config, doctor, settings), instruct the agent to ask the user to run them directly +- Update `TOOL_USAGE.md` prompt to explicitly warn against using exec with any `lango` command +- Broaden the automation prompt section in `wiring.go` to cover all `lango` subcommands + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +### Modified Capabilities +- `agent-tools`: Expanded CLI exec guard to block all lango subcommands with per-command tool alternatives + +## Impact + +- `internal/app/tools.go` — `blockLangoExec()` function rewritten with comprehensive guard list and catch-all +- `internal/app/tools_test.go` — New test cases for all subcommands and catch-all behavior +- `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md` — Added exec safety rules at top of Exec Tool section +- `internal/app/wiring.go` — Broadened automation prompt warning to cover all lango CLI commands diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-cli-passphrase-guard/specs/automation-agent-tools/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-cli-passphrase-guard/specs/automation-agent-tools/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..854cc2a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-cli-passphrase-guard/specs/automation-agent-tools/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Exec prohibition in automation prompt +The automation prompt section SHALL include an explicit instruction prohibiting the use of exec to run ANY lango CLI command, not only automation subcommands. The prohibition SHALL list all known subcommands (cron, bg, workflow, graph, memory, p2p, security, payment, config, doctor, and others) and explain that every lango CLI invocation requires passphrase authentication during bootstrap and will fail in non-interactive subprocess contexts. + +#### Scenario: Prompt includes comprehensive exec prohibition +- **WHEN** any automation feature (cron, background, or workflow) is enabled +- **THEN** the automation prompt section SHALL contain text instructing the agent to NEVER use exec to run ANY "lango" CLI command, covering all subcommands including but not limited to cron, bg, workflow, graph, memory, p2p, security, payment, config, and doctor +- **AND** the prohibition SHALL explain that spawning a new lango process requires passphrase authentication and will fail in non-interactive mode +- **AND** the prohibition SHALL instruct the agent to ask the user to run commands directly in their terminal when no built-in tool equivalent exists + +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Comprehensive CLI exec guard +The `blockLangoExec()` function SHALL block ALL `lango` CLI invocations attempted through `exec` or `exec_bg` tools, using a two-phase approach: (1) specific subcommand guards with per-command tool alternative messages, and (2) a catch-all guard for any remaining `lango` prefix. + +#### Scenario: Block subcommand with in-process equivalent +- **WHEN** the agent attempts to exec a `lango` subcommand that has in-process tool equivalents (graph, memory, p2p, security, payment, cron, bg, workflow) +- **THEN** the system SHALL return a blocked message listing the specific built-in tools to use instead + +#### Scenario: Block subcommand without in-process equivalent +- **WHEN** the agent attempts to exec a `lango` subcommand that has no in-process equivalent (config, doctor, settings, serve, onboard, agent) +- **THEN** the system SHALL return a blocked message explaining that passphrase authentication is required and the user should run the command directly in their terminal + +#### Scenario: Allow non-lango commands +- **WHEN** the agent attempts to exec a command that does not start with `lango ` or equal `lango` +- **THEN** the system SHALL allow the command to proceed (return empty string) + +#### Scenario: Case-insensitive matching +- **WHEN** the agent attempts to exec a lango command in any case (e.g., `LANGO SECURITY DB-MIGRATE`) +- **THEN** the system SHALL still block and return the appropriate guidance message + +### Requirement: Exec tool prompt safety rules +The `TOOL_USAGE.md` prompt SHALL include an explicit top-level rule under the Exec Tool section warning against using exec to run any `lango` CLI command. The rule SHALL list specific subcommands as examples and explain the passphrase failure mechanism. The rule SHALL also instruct the agent to inform the user and ask them to run commands directly when no built-in tool equivalent exists. + +#### Scenario: TOOL_USAGE.md contains exec safety rule +- **WHEN** the agent's tool usage prompt is loaded +- **THEN** the first bullet point under "### Exec Tool" SHALL warn against running any lango CLI command via exec diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-cli-passphrase-guard/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-cli-passphrase-guard/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d00194a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-fix-cli-passphrase-guard/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +## 1. Runtime Guard + +- [x] 1.1 Expand `blockLangoExec()` in `internal/app/tools.go` with guards for graph, memory, p2p, security, and payment subcommands (with in-process tool alternatives) +- [x] 1.2 Add catch-all guard for any `lango` prefix not matched by specific subcommands +- [x] 1.3 Add comprehensive test cases in `internal/app/tools_test.go` covering all subcommands, catch-all, case-insensitivity, and non-lango commands + +## 2. Prompt Reinforcement + +- [x] 2.1 Add exec safety rule as first bullet in `### Exec Tool` section of `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md` +- [x] 2.2 Broaden automation prompt warning in `internal/app/wiring.go` to cover all `lango` subcommands + +## 3. Verification + +- [x] 3.1 Run `go build ./...` to verify no compilation errors +- [x] 3.2 Run `go test ./internal/app/...` to verify all tests pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-hardcoded-literals-to-constants/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-hardcoded-literals-to-constants/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e331c975 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-hardcoded-literals-to-constants/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-25 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-hardcoded-literals-to-constants/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-hardcoded-literals-to-constants/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..253939f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-hardcoded-literals-to-constants/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +## Context + +The P2P, payment, and security subsystems grew rapidly with hardcoded string and integer literals scattered across ~25 files. These literals represented protocol statuses, firewall actions, chain IDs, proving schemes, KMS provider names, and display constants. The lack of typed constants meant typos compiled silently, refactoring required grep-and-pray, and the codebase diverged from Go style conventions. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Replace all hardcoded literals with typed constants, enums, or sentinel errors +- Maintain full JSON wire-format compatibility (underlying `string` types) +- Improve compile-time safety by using typed enums for domain values +- Add `Valid()` methods to enum types for runtime validation +- Follow Go naming conventions: `ErrX` for sentinel errors, `TypeValue` for enum constants + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing any wire protocol or API behavior +- Adding new validation logic beyond the `Valid()` methods +- Refactoring business logic or control flow +- Modifying test behavior (tests should pass unchanged except for literal references) + +## Decisions + +1. **`type X string` enums over `iota` ints**: String-based enums serialize naturally to/from JSON without custom marshalers. Since all target values are already strings in the wire protocol, this preserves backward compatibility with zero migration cost. + +2. **Sentinel errors over typed errors**: The error messages are static and callers primarily need `errors.Is()` matching, not field extraction. Sentinel errors with `errors.New` are simpler and sufficient. Wrapped with `%w` for context. + +3. **Phased leaf-first ordering**: Wallet/payment constants defined first since they are imported by 10+ other packages (e.g., `wallet.CurrencyUSDC`). This avoided circular dependencies and allowed parallel work on independent packages. + +4. **Type cast at boundaries**: Where config strings flow into typed parameters (e.g., `KMSProviderName(cfg.Security.Signer.Provider)`), explicit casts are used at the boundary rather than changing config struct types. This keeps config deserialization simple. + +5. **Local paygate status constants in handler.go**: The protocol handler has its own `PayGateResult` struct separate from `paygate.Result`. Rather than importing paygate types into the protocol package, local unexported constants mirror the paygate status values, maintaining the package boundary. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **Type casts at config boundaries** → Mitigated by `Valid()` methods available for runtime validation if needed later +- **Parallel agent edits** → Mitigated by assigning non-overlapping file sets to each agent, with integration build verification after merge +- **Breaking callers that compare `Response.Status` to raw strings** → No external callers exist; all comparisons are internal and were updated diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-hardcoded-literals-to-constants/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-hardcoded-literals-to-constants/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5c34406f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-hardcoded-literals-to-constants/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +## Why + +P2P/A2A/Payment packages accumulated 100+ hardcoded string and integer literals across ~25 files, undermining type safety, making refactoring error-prone, and violating the project's Go style guide. Replacing them with typed enums, named constants, and sentinel errors improves compile-time safety, maintainability, and consistency. + +## What Changes + +- Add `ChainID` type with named constants for Ethereum/Base/Sepolia chain IDs in the wallet package +- Add `CurrencyUSDC` constant and replace all 20+ occurrences of `"USDC"` across the codebase +- Export `WalletKeyName` constant and use it in x402 signer instead of duplicated string +- Add gas fee constants (`DefaultBaseFeeWei`, `DefaultMaxPriorityFeeWei`, `BaseFeeMultiplier`, `EthAddressLength`) and `BalanceOfSelector` in the payment package +- Add `ResponseStatus` enum type (`ok`/`error`/`denied`/`payment_required`) and 7 sentinel errors in the P2P protocol package, replacing ~40 hardcoded status strings +- Add `ACLAction` enum (`allow`/`deny`), `WildcardAll` constant, and 4 sentinel errors in the firewall package +- Add `ProofScheme` enum (`plonk`/`groth16`) and `SRSMode` enum (`unsafe`/`file`) with `ErrUnsupportedScheme` in the ZKP package +- Add scoring weight constants (`FailureWeight`, `TimeoutWeight`, `BasePenalty`) in the reputation package +- Add `KMSProviderName` enum (`aws-kms`/`gcp-kms`/`azure-kv`/`pkcs11`) in the security package +- Add route/header/tag constants in the A2A server package +- Add `DefaultQuoteExpiry` constant in the paygate package +- Add display truncation constants in CLI payment history + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +### Modified Capabilities +- `sentinel-errors`: Extended with new sentinel errors in protocol, firewall packages +- `enum-validation`: Extended with new enum types (ResponseStatus, ACLAction, ProofScheme, SRSMode, KMSProviderName, ChainID) + +## Impact + +- **25 files changed** across wallet, payment, protocol, firewall, zkp, reputation, security, a2a, paygate, x402, app, cli, and tools packages +- `Response.Status` field type changed from `string` to `ResponseStatus` — JSON wire format unchanged (underlying type is `string`) +- `ACLRule.Action` field type changed from `string` to `ACLAction` — JSON wire format unchanged +- `NewKMSProvider` signature changed from `string` to `KMSProviderName` — callsites updated with type casts +- ZKP Config/Proof types changed to use `ProofScheme`/`SRSMode` — callsites updated with type casts +- No breaking changes to external APIs or wire protocols diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-hardcoded-literals-to-constants/specs/enum-validation/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-hardcoded-literals-to-constants/specs/enum-validation/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..01b585e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-hardcoded-literals-to-constants/specs/enum-validation/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: ResponseStatus enum type +The system SHALL define `ResponseStatus` as a typed string enum in `protocol/messages.go` with constants `ResponseStatusOK`, `ResponseStatusError`, `ResponseStatusDenied`, `ResponseStatusPaymentRequired` and a `Valid()` method. + +#### Scenario: Response.Status uses typed enum +- **WHEN** the protocol handler constructs a `Response` +- **THEN** it SHALL set `Status` using `ResponseStatus` constants, never raw strings + +#### Scenario: JSON wire format preserved +- **WHEN** a `Response` with `ResponseStatus` is serialized to JSON +- **THEN** the `status` field SHALL contain the plain string value (e.g., `"ok"`) + +### Requirement: ACLAction enum type +The system SHALL define `ACLAction` as a typed string enum in `firewall/firewall.go` with constants `ACLActionAllow`, `ACLActionDeny` and a `Valid()` method. + +#### Scenario: ACLRule.Action uses typed enum +- **WHEN** an `ACLRule` is constructed +- **THEN** the `Action` field SHALL be `ACLAction` type, not raw string + +### Requirement: WildcardAll constant +The system SHALL define `WildcardAll = "*"` in `firewall/firewall.go`. + +#### Scenario: Wildcard comparisons use constant +- **WHEN** firewall code checks for wildcard peer or tool patterns +- **THEN** it SHALL compare against `WildcardAll`, not the literal `"*"` + +### Requirement: ProofScheme enum type +The system SHALL define `ProofScheme` as a typed string enum in `zkp/zkp.go` with constants `SchemePlonk`, `SchemeGroth16` and a `Valid()` method. + +#### Scenario: ZKP config and proof use typed scheme +- **WHEN** `Config.Scheme`, `ProverService.scheme`, or `Proof.Scheme` stores a proving scheme +- **THEN** it SHALL use the `ProofScheme` type + +### Requirement: SRSMode enum type +The system SHALL define `SRSMode` as a typed string enum in `zkp/zkp.go` with constants `SRSModeUnsafe`, `SRSModeFile` and a `Valid()` method. + +#### Scenario: ZKP config uses typed SRS mode +- **WHEN** `Config.SRSMode` or `ProverService.srsMode` stores the SRS mode +- **THEN** it SHALL use the `SRSMode` type + +### Requirement: KMSProviderName enum type +The system SHALL define `KMSProviderName` as a typed string enum in `security/kms_factory.go` with constants `KMSProviderAWS`, `KMSProviderGCP`, `KMSProviderAzure`, `KMSProviderPKCS11` and a `Valid()` method. + +#### Scenario: NewKMSProvider accepts typed name +- **WHEN** `NewKMSProvider` is called +- **THEN** the `providerName` parameter SHALL be `KMSProviderName` type + +### Requirement: ChainID type and constants +The system SHALL define `ChainID` as a typed `int64` in `wallet/wallet.go` with constants `ChainEthereumMainnet` (1), `ChainBase` (8453), `ChainBaseSepolia` (84532), `ChainSepolia` (11155111). + +#### Scenario: NetworkName uses typed constants +- **WHEN** `NetworkName()` switches on a chain ID +- **THEN** it SHALL compare against `ChainID` constants + +### Requirement: CurrencyUSDC constant +The system SHALL define `CurrencyUSDC = "USDC"` in `wallet/wallet.go`. + +#### Scenario: All USDC references use constant +- **WHEN** any package references the USDC currency ticker +- **THEN** it SHALL use `wallet.CurrencyUSDC` instead of the string literal `"USDC"` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-hardcoded-literals-to-constants/specs/sentinel-errors/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-hardcoded-literals-to-constants/specs/sentinel-errors/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8eb207d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-hardcoded-literals-to-constants/specs/sentinel-errors/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Protocol sentinel errors +The system SHALL define sentinel errors in `protocol/messages.go` for common P2P protocol error conditions: `ErrMissingToolName`, `ErrAgentCardUnavailable`, `ErrNoApprovalHandler`, `ErrDeniedByOwner`, `ErrExecutorNotConfigured`, `ErrInvalidSession`, `ErrInvalidPaymentAuth`. + +#### Scenario: Handler uses sentinel errors +- **WHEN** the protocol handler encounters a known error condition (missing tool name, no card, no approval handler, denied by owner, no executor, invalid session, invalid payment) +- **THEN** it SHALL use the sentinel error's `.Error()` message in the response Error field + +#### Scenario: Sentinel errors are matchable +- **WHEN** a caller receives a protocol error +- **THEN** it SHALL be able to use `errors.Is()` to match against the sentinel errors + +### Requirement: Firewall sentinel errors +The system SHALL define sentinel errors in `firewall/firewall.go`: `ErrRateLimitExceeded`, `ErrGlobalRateLimitExceeded`, `ErrQueryDenied`, `ErrNoMatchingAllowRule`. + +#### Scenario: Rate limit errors wrap sentinel +- **WHEN** a peer exceeds the rate limit +- **THEN** `FilterQuery` SHALL return an error wrapping `ErrRateLimitExceeded` with `%w` + +#### Scenario: ACL deny errors wrap sentinel +- **WHEN** a firewall deny rule matches +- **THEN** `FilterQuery` SHALL return an error wrapping `ErrQueryDenied` + +#### Scenario: No matching allow rule wraps sentinel +- **WHEN** no allow rule matches and default-deny applies +- **THEN** `FilterQuery` SHALL return an error wrapping `ErrNoMatchingAllowRule` + +### Requirement: ZKP unsupported scheme error +The system SHALL define `ErrUnsupportedScheme` in `zkp/zkp.go`. + +#### Scenario: Unknown scheme returns sentinel +- **WHEN** a ZKP operation encounters an unknown proving scheme +- **THEN** it SHALL return an error wrapping `ErrUnsupportedScheme` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-hardcoded-literals-to-constants/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-hardcoded-literals-to-constants/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8bfe92db --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-hardcoded-literals-to-constants/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +## 1. Leaf Dependencies (wallet, payment) + +- [x] 1.1 Add ChainID type and constants (ChainEthereumMainnet, ChainBase, ChainBaseSepolia, ChainSepolia) to wallet/wallet.go +- [x] 1.2 Add CurrencyUSDC constant to wallet/wallet.go +- [x] 1.3 Update NetworkName() to use ChainID constants +- [x] 1.4 Export WalletKeyName in wallet/create.go and update all internal references +- [x] 1.5 Add gas fee constants (DefaultBaseFeeWei, DefaultMaxPriorityFeeWei, BaseFeeMultiplier, EthAddressLength) and BalanceOfSelector to payment/tx_builder.go +- [x] 1.6 Replace magic numbers in BuildTransferTx and ValidateAddress with constants +- [x] 1.7 Add DefaultHistoryLimit and purposeX402AutoPayment to payment/service.go +- [x] 1.8 Replace BalanceOfSelector inline definition with package-level var in service.go +- [x] 1.9 Update x402/signer.go to use wallet.WalletKeyName + +## 2. P2P Protocol + +- [x] 2.1 Add ResponseStatus enum type with Valid() to protocol/messages.go +- [x] 2.2 Add 7 sentinel errors (ErrMissingToolName, ErrAgentCardUnavailable, etc.) to protocol/messages.go +- [x] 2.3 Change Response.Status field from string to ResponseStatus +- [x] 2.4 Replace all hardcoded status strings in handler.go (~17 occurrences) +- [x] 2.5 Add payGateStatus local constants in handler.go +- [x] 2.6 Replace error message strings with sentinel .Error() in handler.go +- [x] 2.7 Replace status comparisons in remote_agent.go with ResponseStatusOK +- [x] 2.8 Add errMsgUnknown constant in remote_agent.go +- [x] 2.9 Update handler_test.go to use typed constants + +## 3. Firewall + +- [x] 3.1 Add ACLAction enum type with Valid() to firewall/firewall.go +- [x] 3.2 Add WildcardAll constant to firewall/firewall.go +- [x] 3.3 Add 4 sentinel errors (ErrRateLimitExceeded, etc.) to firewall/firewall.go +- [x] 3.4 Change ACLRule.Action from string to ACLAction +- [x] 3.5 Replace all "allow"/"deny"/"*" literals in firewall.go +- [x] 3.6 Update firewall_test.go to use typed constants +- [x] 3.7 Update downstream callers (cli/p2p/firewall.go, app/tools.go, app/wiring.go) with ACLAction casts + +## 4. ZKP + +- [x] 4.1 Add ProofScheme enum type with Valid() to zkp/zkp.go +- [x] 4.2 Add SRSMode enum type with Valid() to zkp/zkp.go +- [x] 4.3 Add ErrUnsupportedScheme sentinel error +- [x] 4.4 Change Config.Scheme, ProverService.scheme, Proof.Scheme to ProofScheme type +- [x] 4.5 Change Config.SRSMode, ProverService.srsMode to SRSMode type +- [x] 4.6 Replace all "plonk"/"groth16"/"unsafe"/"file" literals in switch cases +- [x] 4.7 Update app/wiring.go with ProofScheme/SRSMode type casts +- [x] 4.8 Update zkp_test.go to use typed constants + +## 5. Reputation + +- [x] 5.1 Add FailureWeight, TimeoutWeight, BasePenalty constants to reputation/store.go +- [x] 5.2 Update CalculateScore() to use named constants + +## 6. KMS Factory + +- [x] 6.1 Add KMSProviderName enum type with Valid() to security/kms_factory.go +- [x] 6.2 Change NewKMSProvider parameter to KMSProviderName type +- [x] 6.3 Update callsites in app/wiring.go and cli/security/kms.go with type casts + +## 7. A2A Server + +- [x] 7.1 Add AgentCardRoute, ContentTypeJSON, SkillTagOrchestration, SkillTagSubAgentPrefix constants to a2a/server.go +- [x] 7.2 Replace hardcoded strings in server.go and server_test.go + +## 8. Paygate + +- [x] 8.1 Add DefaultQuoteExpiry constant to paygate/gate.go +- [x] 8.2 Replace "USDC" with wallet.CurrencyUSDC in gate.go and gate_test.go +- [x] 8.3 Replace 5*time.Minute with DefaultQuoteExpiry in BuildQuote + +## 9. Cross-cutting USDC + +- [x] 9.1 Replace "USDC" with wallet.CurrencyUSDC in app/wiring.go +- [x] 9.2 Replace "USDC" with wallet.CurrencyUSDC in app/p2p_routes.go +- [x] 9.3 Replace "USDC" with wallet.CurrencyUSDC in app/tools.go +- [x] 9.4 Replace "USDC" with wallet.CurrencyUSDC in tools/payment/payment.go +- [x] 9.5 Replace "USDC" with wallet.CurrencyUSDC in cli/payment/balance.go +- [x] 9.6 Replace "USDC" with wallet.CurrencyUSDC in cli/payment/limits.go +- [x] 9.7 Replace "USDC" with wallet.CurrencyUSDC in cli/p2p/pricing.go + +## 10. CLI Display Constants + +- [x] 10.1 Add maxHashDisplay, truncatedHashLen, maxPurposeDisplay, truncatedPurpLen constants to cli/payment/history.go +- [x] 10.2 Replace magic numbers with named constants diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..85ae75c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-26 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e11e8974 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +## Context + +The Lango ADK agent layer wraps Google ADK runners with Lango-specific features (memory, RAG, learning, orchestration). In production-like usage, three performance/reliability issues surfaced: + +1. **Unbounded loops**: Agent.Run() delegates to the ADK runner with no turn cap, so a stuck tool-call chain can spin indefinitely. +2. **Redundant computation**: `EventsAdapter.At(i)` iterates the full event list on every call; `truncatedHistory()` recomputes on every access. +3. **Memory bloat**: Long sessions accumulate reflections without consolidation, and the memory section injected into the system prompt grows unbounded. + +Additionally, the learning engine's 0.5 confidence threshold produced false-positive auto-fixes, and the orchestrator's 5-round default was too low for multi-step tasks. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Prevent infinite agent loops with a configurable turn limit (default 25) +- Enable self-correction by retrying with learned fixes on tool errors +- Scale token budgets per model family to use context windows efficiently +- Cache computed history/events for O(1) repeated access +- Bound memory section growth with token budgeting and auto meta-reflection +- Reduce false-positive learning auto-applies by raising confidence threshold +- Give the orchestrator more delegation headroom with budget guidance + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing the ADK runner internals or upgrading ADK version +- Persisting token budget configuration (derived at runtime from model name) +- Adding new memory types or changing the reflection/observation data model +- Modifying the learning store schema + +## Decisions + +### 1. Turn limit via event-stream wrapper (not ADK config) + +Wrap the ADK runner's event iterator in `Agent.Run()` and count events with function calls. This avoids depending on ADK-internal turn-limit features which don't exist in the current ADK version. + +**Alternative**: Modify the ADK runner to accept a max-turn config. Rejected because it couples us to ADK internals and requires upstream changes. + +### 2. Self-correction in RunAndCollect (not Run) + +The retry-with-fix logic lives in `RunAndCollect` after the initial run fails and no sub-agent fallback applies. This keeps `Run()` (the iterator) stateless and pure. + +**Alternative**: Inject correction into the event stream. Rejected because it would make the iterator stateful and harder to reason about. + +### 3. sync.Once for lazy caching in EventsAdapter + +Use `sync.Once` for both `truncatedHistory()` and the `At()` method's event list. EventsAdapter is created fresh per session access, so no invalidation is needed. + +**Alternative**: Pre-compute on construction. Rejected because not all code paths need both truncated history and converted events. + +### 4. Token budget via model name heuristic + +`ModelTokenBudget(modelName)` uses string matching on model family names (claude, gemini, gpt-4o, etc.) to return ~50% of the model's context window. Simple, zero-config, and correct for known models. + +**Alternative**: Config-file-based budget mapping. Rejected as over-engineering for the current need; the heuristic covers all supported providers. + +### 5. Memory token budget with reflection-first priority + +Reflections are compressed summaries with higher information density. The assembler includes reflections first, then fills remaining budget with observations. Default budget: 4000 tokens. + +### 6. Confidence threshold 0.7 (was 0.5) + +0.5 produced false positives from low-confidence early learnings. 0.7 requires more corroboration before auto-applying a fix. The `handleSuccess` boost is also scoped to exact tool triggers to avoid cross-contamination. + +### 7. Delegation rounds 10 (was 5) with budget guidance + +5 rounds was insufficient for multi-step tasks. 10 provides headroom. The orchestrator prompt now includes round-budget guidance (simple: 1-2, medium: 3-5, complex: 6-10) so the LLM self-manages. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **Turn limit too low for some tasks** → Configurable via `WithMaxTurns()`, default 25 is generous +- **Self-correction retry doubles latency on failure** → Only triggers when a high-confidence fix exists (>0.7), and only once +- **Model name heuristic misidentifies models** → Falls back to `DefaultTokenBudget` (32K) for unknown models +- **Meta-reflection threshold too aggressive** → Default 5 is conservative; only consolidates, doesn't delete +- **sync.Once prevents mid-session cache invalidation** → EventsAdapter is recreated per access, so staleness isn't possible diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e7b510e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +## Why + +The ADK agent layer suffers from unbounded tool-calling loops, inefficient session history handling, and uncontrolled memory growth in long-running sessions. These issues degrade response quality, waste tokens, and can cause the agent to spin indefinitely on errors without self-correcting. + +## What Changes + +- Add turn-limit enforcement to `Agent.Run()` to prevent unbounded tool-calling loops (default 25 turns) +- Implement learning-based self-correction: agent retries with a known fix when a tool error matches a high-confidence learning pattern +- Add token-budget-aware history truncation configurable per model family (Claude 100K, Gemini 200K, GPT-4o 64K) +- Cache truncated history and converted events with `sync.Once` for O(1) repeated access instead of O(n) recomputation +- Add memory token budgeting to `ContextAwareModelAdapter` — reflections prioritized over observations within a configurable budget (default 4000 tokens) +- Auto-trigger meta-reflection in `memory.Buffer` when reflections accumulate past a threshold (default 5) to prevent unbounded growth +- Raise learning engine auto-apply confidence threshold from 0.5 to 0.7 to reduce false-positive fix applications +- Scope learning confidence boosts to exact tool triggers to prevent unrelated learnings from being boosted +- Increase default orchestrator delegation rounds from 5 to 10 with round-budget guidance in the orchestrator prompt +- Fix two test assertion mismatches (`p2p_test.go` command name extraction, `orchestrator_test.go` delegation round string) + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `agent-turn-limit`: Enforcement of maximum tool-calling turns per agent run to prevent infinite loops +- `agent-self-correction`: Learning-based error correction that retries failed operations with known fixes +- `model-aware-token-budget`: Per-model-family token budgeting for session history truncation + +### Modified Capabilities +- `learning-engine`: Raise confidence threshold for auto-apply from 0.5 to 0.7; scope success boosts to exact tool triggers +- `observational-memory`: Add token budgeting to memory section assembly; auto-trigger meta-reflection on accumulation +- `multi-agent-orchestration`: Increase default delegation rounds from 5 to 10 with budget guidance prompt + +## Impact + +- **Core packages**: `internal/adk/` (agent.go, context_model.go, session_service.go, state.go) +- **Memory**: `internal/memory/buffer.go` (auto meta-reflection) +- **Learning**: `internal/learning/engine.go` (confidence threshold, scoped boosts) +- **Orchestration**: `internal/orchestration/orchestrator.go`, `tools.go` (delegation rounds, prompt) +- **Tests**: `internal/cli/p2p/p2p_test.go`, `internal/orchestration/orchestrator_test.go` (assertion fixes) +- **Dependencies**: `go.mod` / `go.sum` updates diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/specs/agent-self-correction/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/specs/agent-self-correction/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..38313443 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/specs/agent-self-correction/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Learning-based error correction on agent failure +The system SHALL support an optional `ErrorFixProvider` that returns known fixes for tool errors. When set and the initial agent run fails, the agent SHALL attempt one retry with the suggested fix. + +#### Scenario: Error fix provider configured and fix available +- **WHEN** `WithErrorFixProvider` has been called with a non-nil provider +- **AND** the initial run fails with an error +- **AND** the provider returns a fix with `ok == true` +- **THEN** the agent SHALL retry with a correction message containing the original error and suggested fix + +#### Scenario: Retry succeeds +- **WHEN** the retry with a learned fix succeeds +- **THEN** the agent SHALL return the retry response as the final result + +#### Scenario: Retry fails +- **WHEN** the retry with a learned fix also fails +- **THEN** the agent SHALL log a warning and continue with the original error handling path + +#### Scenario: No fix available +- **WHEN** the provider returns `ok == false` for the error +- **THEN** the agent SHALL proceed with normal error handling without retrying + +#### Scenario: No error fix provider configured +- **WHEN** `WithErrorFixProvider` has not been called +- **THEN** the agent SHALL skip the self-correction path entirely + +### Requirement: ErrorFixProvider interface +The `ErrorFixProvider` interface SHALL define `GetFixForError(ctx, toolName, err) (string, bool)` that returns a fix suggestion and whether one was found. + +#### Scenario: Interface compliance with learning.Engine +- **WHEN** `learning.Engine` implements `GetFixForError` +- **THEN** it SHALL satisfy the `ErrorFixProvider` interface diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/specs/agent-turn-limit/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/specs/agent-turn-limit/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b0cab508 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/specs/agent-turn-limit/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Maximum turn limit per agent run +The system SHALL enforce a configurable maximum number of tool-calling turns per `Agent.Run()` invocation. The default limit SHALL be 25 turns. + +#### Scenario: Turn limit reached +- **WHEN** the number of events containing function calls exceeds the configured maximum +- **THEN** the system SHALL stop iterating, log a warning with session ID and turn counts, and yield an error `"agent exceeded maximum turn limit (%d)"` + +#### Scenario: Normal completion within limit +- **WHEN** the agent completes its work within the turn limit +- **THEN** all events SHALL be yielded normally with no interruption + +#### Scenario: Custom turn limit via WithMaxTurns +- **WHEN** `WithMaxTurns(n)` is called with a positive value +- **THEN** the agent SHALL use `n` as the maximum turn limit instead of the default 25 + +#### Scenario: Zero or negative turn limit falls back to default +- **WHEN** `WithMaxTurns(0)` or `WithMaxTurns(-1)` is called +- **THEN** the agent SHALL use the default limit of 25 + +### Requirement: Function call detection in events +The system SHALL count only events that contain at least one `FunctionCall` part as tool-calling turns. + +#### Scenario: Event with function call parts +- **WHEN** an event's Content contains one or more parts with a non-nil `FunctionCall` +- **THEN** it SHALL be counted as a tool-calling turn + +#### Scenario: Event without function calls +- **WHEN** an event contains only text parts or no parts +- **THEN** it SHALL NOT be counted as a tool-calling turn diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/specs/learning-engine/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/specs/learning-engine/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..687c364f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/specs/learning-engine/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Tool Result Observation +The system SHALL observe every tool execution result to detect error patterns and track successes. + +#### Scenario: Tool execution success — scoped confidence boost +- **WHEN** `OnToolResult` is called with a nil error +- **THEN** the system SHALL search for related learnings using the trigger `"tool:"` and boost confidence ONLY for learnings whose trigger exactly matches + +#### Scenario: Skip duplicate high-confidence learnings +- **WHEN** an error occurs and a matching learning with confidence > 0.7 already exists +- **THEN** the system SHALL skip creating a new learning entry + +### Requirement: Auto-apply confidence threshold +The system SHALL use a confidence threshold of 0.7 (previously 0.5) for both `GetFixForError` and `handleError` skip-duplicate logic. + +#### Scenario: GetFixForError returns fix above threshold +- **WHEN** a learning entity exists with confidence > 0.7 and a non-empty fix +- **THEN** `GetFixForError` SHALL return the fix with `ok == true` + +#### Scenario: GetFixForError ignores low-confidence fix +- **WHEN** a learning entity exists with confidence <= 0.7 +- **THEN** `GetFixForError` SHALL return `ok == false` + +#### Scenario: Error handling skips known high-confidence learnings +- **WHEN** an error occurs and a matching learning has confidence > 0.7 +- **THEN** `handleError` SHALL log the known fix and skip creating a new entry diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/specs/model-aware-token-budget/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/specs/model-aware-token-budget/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f3335e5f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/specs/model-aware-token-budget/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Model-family-aware token budgeting +The system SHALL provide a `ModelTokenBudget(modelName)` function that returns an appropriate history token budget based on the model family's context window size. + +#### Scenario: Claude models +- **WHEN** the model name contains "claude" (case-insensitive) +- **THEN** the budget SHALL be 100,000 tokens (~50% of 200K context) + +#### Scenario: Gemini models +- **WHEN** the model name contains "gemini" (case-insensitive) +- **THEN** the budget SHALL be 200,000 tokens (~20% of 1M context) + +#### Scenario: GPT-4o and GPT-4-turbo models +- **WHEN** the model name contains "gpt-4o" or "gpt-4-turbo" (case-insensitive) +- **THEN** the budget SHALL be 64,000 tokens (~50% of 128K context) + +#### Scenario: GPT-4 base models +- **WHEN** the model name contains "gpt-4" but not "gpt-4o" or "gpt-4-turbo" +- **THEN** the budget SHALL be 32,000 tokens + +#### Scenario: GPT-3.5 models +- **WHEN** the model name contains "gpt-3.5" (case-insensitive) +- **THEN** the budget SHALL be 8,000 tokens (~50% of 16K context) + +#### Scenario: Unknown model fallback +- **WHEN** the model name does not match any known family +- **THEN** the budget SHALL be the DefaultTokenBudget (32,000 tokens) + +### Requirement: Token budget propagation through session service +The `SessionServiceAdapter` SHALL propagate a configured token budget to all `SessionAdapter` instances it creates, which in turn pass it to `EventsAdapter` for history truncation. + +#### Scenario: WithTokenBudget sets budget on adapter +- **WHEN** `WithTokenBudget(budget)` is called on the session service +- **THEN** all subsequently created sessions SHALL use that budget for history truncation + +### Requirement: Lazy caching of truncated history and events +The `EventsAdapter` SHALL lazily compute and cache truncated history and converted events using `sync.Once` for O(1) repeated access. + +#### Scenario: Multiple calls to truncatedHistory +- **WHEN** `truncatedHistory()` is called multiple times +- **THEN** the token-budget truncation SHALL execute only once; subsequent calls return the cached result + +#### Scenario: Multiple calls to At +- **WHEN** `At(i)` is called for different indices +- **THEN** the full event list SHALL be built once on first `At()` call and cached for subsequent calls + +#### Scenario: Out-of-bounds At access +- **WHEN** `At(i)` is called with `i < 0` or `i >= len(events)` +- **THEN** the method SHALL return nil diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/specs/multi-agent-orchestration/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/specs/multi-agent-orchestration/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..765bad39 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/specs/multi-agent-orchestration/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Hierarchical agent tree with sub-agents +The system SHALL support a multi-agent mode (`agent.multiAgent: true`) that creates an orchestrator root agent with specialized sub-agents: operator, navigator, vault, librarian, automator, planner, and chronicler. The orchestrator SHALL have NO direct tools (`Tools: nil`) and MUST delegate all tool-requiring tasks to sub-agents. + +#### Scenario: Default delegation rounds increased to 10 +- **WHEN** `MaxDelegationRounds` is zero or unset +- **THEN** the default SHALL be 10 rounds (previously 5) + +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Round budget guidance in orchestrator prompt +The orchestrator instruction SHALL include round-budget management guidance that helps the LLM self-regulate delegation efficiency. + +#### Scenario: Budget guidance included in prompt +- **WHEN** the orchestrator instruction is built +- **THEN** it SHALL contain guidance categorizing tasks by round cost: simple (1-2), medium (3-5), complex (6-10) + +#### Scenario: Prompt includes consolidation advice +- **WHEN** the orchestrator is running low on rounds +- **THEN** the prompt SHALL advise consolidating partial results and providing the best possible answer + +#### Scenario: Delegation rules formatting +- **WHEN** the orchestrator instruction is built +- **THEN** the "Maximum N delegation rounds" text SHALL appear as part of the round budget section, not the delegation rules section diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/specs/observational-memory/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/specs/observational-memory/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ca5808af --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/specs/observational-memory/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Memory token budgeting in context assembly +The `ContextAwareModelAdapter` SHALL enforce a token budget when assembling the memory section into the system prompt. Reflections SHALL be included first (higher information density), then observations fill the remaining budget. + +#### Scenario: Default memory token budget +- **WHEN** no explicit budget is configured via `WithMemoryTokenBudget` +- **THEN** the default budget SHALL be 4000 tokens + +#### Scenario: Reflections exceed budget +- **WHEN** reflections alone exceed the token budget +- **THEN** the system SHALL include reflections up to the budget limit and skip all observations + +#### Scenario: Budget shared between reflections and observations +- **WHEN** reflections use part of the budget +- **THEN** observations SHALL fill the remaining budget, stopping when the next observation would exceed it + +#### Scenario: Custom budget via WithMemoryTokenBudget +- **WHEN** `WithMemoryTokenBudget(budget)` is called with a positive value +- **THEN** the adapter SHALL use that budget instead of the default 4000 + +### Requirement: Auto meta-reflection on accumulation +The `memory.Buffer` SHALL automatically trigger meta-reflection when the number of reflections in a session exceeds a configurable consolidation threshold. + +#### Scenario: Default consolidation threshold +- **WHEN** no explicit threshold is configured +- **THEN** the default threshold SHALL be 5 reflections + +#### Scenario: Meta-reflection triggered +- **WHEN** `process()` completes and the session has >= threshold reflections +- **THEN** `ReflectOnReflections` SHALL be called to consolidate them + +#### Scenario: Meta-reflection failure is non-fatal +- **WHEN** `ReflectOnReflections` returns an error +- **THEN** the system SHALL log the error and continue normal operation diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1b570293 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-improve-agentic-performance/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +## 1. Agent Turn Limit + +- [x] 1.1 Add `ErrorFixProvider` interface and `defaultMaxTurns` constant to `internal/adk/agent.go` +- [x] 1.2 Add `maxTurns` and `errorFixProvider` fields to `Agent` struct +- [x] 1.3 Implement `WithMaxTurns(n)` and `WithErrorFixProvider(p)` builder methods +- [x] 1.4 Wrap `runner.Run()` iterator in `Agent.Run()` with turn-counting and limit enforcement +- [x] 1.5 Implement `hasFunctionCalls(event)` helper for detecting tool-calling events + +## 2. Agent Self-Correction + +- [x] 2.1 Add learning-based retry logic to `RunAndCollect` — retry with correction message when ErrorFixProvider returns a fix +- [x] 2.2 Log learned fix application and retry failure at appropriate levels + +## 3. Model-Aware Token Budget + +- [x] 3.1 Implement `ModelTokenBudget(modelName)` in `internal/adk/state.go` with per-family budgets +- [x] 3.2 Add `tokenBudget` field to `SessionServiceAdapter` and `WithTokenBudget()` builder +- [x] 3.3 Propagate token budget through `SessionServiceAdapter.Create/Get/getOrCreate` to `SessionAdapter` +- [x] 3.4 Pass token budget from `SessionAdapter.Events()` to `EventsAdapter` + +## 4. Event History Caching + +- [x] 4.1 Add `sync.Once` lazy caching for `truncatedHistory()` in `EventsAdapter` +- [x] 4.2 Refactor `At(i)` to build and cache full event list on first call instead of iterating per-call + +## 5. Memory Token Budgeting + +- [x] 5.1 Add `memoryTokenBudget` field and `WithMemoryTokenBudget()` to `ContextAwareModelAdapter` +- [x] 5.2 Implement budget-aware `assembleMemorySection` — reflections first, then observations fill remaining budget +- [x] 5.3 Use `memory.EstimateTokens()` for per-item token counting + +## 6. Auto Meta-Reflection + +- [x] 6.1 Add `reflectionConsolidationThreshold` field to `memory.Buffer` (default 5) +- [x] 6.2 Add meta-reflection trigger in `Buffer.process()` when reflections >= threshold +- [x] 6.3 Call `ReflectOnReflections` and log result + +## 7. Learning Engine Hardening + +- [x] 7.1 Raise `autoApplyConfidenceThreshold` from 0.5 to 0.7 in `internal/learning/engine.go` +- [x] 7.2 Update `GetFixForError` and `handleError` to use new threshold constant +- [x] 7.3 Scope `handleSuccess` confidence boost to exact `"tool:"` trigger match + +## 8. Orchestration Delegation Rounds + +- [x] 8.1 Change default `MaxDelegationRounds` from 5 to 10 in `internal/orchestration/orchestrator.go` +- [x] 8.2 Add round-budget management guidance to orchestrator prompt in `tools.go` +- [x] 8.3 Restructure prompt so delegation rules no longer contain inline round limit + +## 9. Test Fixes + +- [x] 9.1 Fix `TestNewP2PCmd_Structure` — use `strings.Fields(sub.Use)[0]` for command name extraction +- [x] 9.2 Fix `TestBuildOrchestratorInstruction_ContainsRoutingTable` — update assertion to match actual format string diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-p0-p2-security-docs-sync/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-p0-p2-security-docs-sync/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e331c975 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-p0-p2-security-docs-sync/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-25 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-p0-p2-security-docs-sync/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-p0-p2-security-docs-sync/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b1e32cf1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-p0-p2-security-docs-sync/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## Context + +All P0-P2 security hardening features are implemented in Go code but documentation (CLI docs, feature docs, README, agent prompts, security roadmap) has not been updated. Users cannot discover new features through `--help` cross-references, and the LLM agent lacks awareness of new P2P security capabilities in its system prompts. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Synchronize all documentation with the actual CLI implementation (exact flag names, output formats, JSON fields) +- Update agent prompts so the LLM knows about session management, sandbox, signed challenges, KMS, and credential revocation +- Mark all P0/P1 roadmap items as completed +- Ensure config key documentation matches `mapstructure` tags in `internal/config/types.go` + +**Non-Goals:** +- No code changes — documentation-only +- No new features or behavioral changes +- No restructuring of existing documentation architecture + +## Decisions + +1. **Source-of-truth verification**: All CLI output examples are derived from actual `fmt.Printf`/`fmt.Println` calls in source files (status.go, keyring.go, kms.go, db_migrate.go, session.go, sandbox.go). JSON field names match `json` struct tags. Flag names match `cmd.Flags()` registrations. + +2. **Documentation structure**: New CLI sections follow the existing pattern (Usage, Flags table, Example, JSON fields table). New feature sections follow existing heading hierarchy in each target file. + +3. **Config table format**: New config rows in README follow the existing table format with key, type, default, and description columns. Deprecated fields are annotated inline. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Risk] Documentation may drift again as new features are added → Mitigation: OpenSpec workflow enforces documentation sync as part of change lifecycle +- [Risk] Large number of files modified increases merge conflict potential → Mitigation: All changes are additive (no deletions of existing content) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-p0-p2-security-docs-sync/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-p0-p2-security-docs-sync/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..42c005bf --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-p0-p2-security-docs-sync/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## Why + +P0-P2 security hardening implementation is complete in code, but documentation, agent prompts, and UI-facing references have not been updated. Users and agents cannot discover the new security features (OS Keyring, DB Encryption, Cloud KMS, Session Management, Tool Sandbox, Signed Challenges, Credential Revocation) through docs or prompts, creating a gap between implementation and discoverability. + +## What Changes + +- Update `docs/cli/security.md` with new CLI commands: `keyring store/clear/status`, `db-migrate`, `db-decrypt`, `kms status/test/keys`, and updated `status` output +- Update `docs/cli/p2p.md` with new CLI commands: `session list/revoke/revoke-all`, `sandbox status/test/cleanup` +- Update `docs/security/encryption.md` with Cloud KMS Mode, OS Keyring Integration, Database Encryption sections +- Update `docs/security/index.md` with 6 new security layers and Cloud KMS encryption mode +- Update `docs/features/p2p-network.md` with signed challenges, session management, tool sandbox, ZK circuit updates, credential revocation +- Update `README.md` with 27+ new config rows, feature bullets, CLI examples, and security subsections +- Update `prompts/AGENTS.md` with expanded P2P Network description +- Update `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md` with session management, sandbox, signed challenge, KMS, and credential revocation guidance +- Update `openspec/security-roadmap.md` with P0/P1 completion markers + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `security-docs-sync`: Documentation synchronization for all P0-P2 security features across CLI docs, feature docs, README, agent prompts, and security roadmap + +### Modified Capabilities + +## Impact + +- 9 documentation/prompt files modified (~545 lines added/modified) +- No code changes — documentation-only change +- All CLI output examples verified against actual source code (status.go, keyring.go, kms.go, db_migrate.go, session.go, sandbox.go) +- All config keys verified against mapstructure tags in internal/config/types.go diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-p0-p2-security-docs-sync/specs/security-docs-sync/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-p0-p2-security-docs-sync/specs/security-docs-sync/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..91ff9c64 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-p0-p2-security-docs-sync/specs/security-docs-sync/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: CLI security docs include OS Keyring commands +The `docs/cli/security.md` file SHALL document `lango security keyring store`, `keyring clear` (with `--force`), and `keyring status` (with `--json`) commands with output examples matching the actual CLI implementation. + +#### Scenario: Keyring commands documented +- **WHEN** a user reads `docs/cli/security.md` +- **THEN** they find complete documentation for `keyring store`, `keyring clear`, and `keyring status` with flags, examples, and JSON output fields + +### Requirement: CLI security docs include DB encryption commands +The `docs/cli/security.md` file SHALL document `lango security db-migrate` and `lango security db-decrypt` commands with `--force` flag and output examples. + +#### Scenario: DB encryption commands documented +- **WHEN** a user reads `docs/cli/security.md` +- **THEN** they find complete documentation for `db-migrate` and `db-decrypt` with flags and examples + +### Requirement: CLI security docs include KMS commands +The `docs/cli/security.md` file SHALL document `lango security kms status` (with `--json`), `kms test`, and `kms keys` (with `--json`) commands with output examples. + +#### Scenario: KMS commands documented +- **WHEN** a user reads `docs/cli/security.md` +- **THEN** they find complete documentation for `kms status`, `kms test`, and `kms keys` with JSON output fields + +### Requirement: CLI security status output includes new fields +The `docs/cli/security.md` status example SHALL include `DB Encryption`, `KMS Provider`, `KMS Key ID`, and `KMS Fallback` fields matching `status.go` output. + +#### Scenario: Updated status output documented +- **WHEN** a user reads the `security status` example +- **THEN** they see all fields including `db_encryption`, `kms_provider`, `kms_key_id`, `kms_fallback` in the JSON fields table + +### Requirement: CLI P2P docs include session management commands +The `docs/cli/p2p.md` file SHALL document `lango p2p session list` (with `--json`), `session revoke` (with `--peer-did`), and `session revoke-all` commands. + +#### Scenario: Session commands documented +- **WHEN** a user reads `docs/cli/p2p.md` +- **THEN** they find complete documentation for session list, revoke, and revoke-all + +### Requirement: CLI P2P docs include sandbox commands +The `docs/cli/p2p.md` file SHALL document `lango p2p sandbox status`, `sandbox test`, and `sandbox cleanup` commands with output examples. + +#### Scenario: Sandbox commands documented +- **WHEN** a user reads `docs/cli/p2p.md` +- **THEN** they find complete documentation for sandbox status, test, and cleanup + +### Requirement: Feature docs cover signed handshake protocol +The `docs/features/p2p-network.md` SHALL document the signed challenge protocol (v1.0/v1.1), ECDSA signature, timestamp validation, and nonce replay protection. + +#### Scenario: Signed handshake documented +- **WHEN** a user reads the Handshake section +- **THEN** they understand protocol versioning, signed challenges, and `requireSignedChallenge` config + +### Requirement: Feature docs cover session management +The `docs/features/p2p-network.md` SHALL include a Session Management section with invalidation reasons and SecurityEventHandler. + +#### Scenario: Session management documented +- **WHEN** a user reads P2P feature docs +- **THEN** they find session invalidation reasons, auto-revocation triggers, and CLI commands + +### Requirement: Feature docs cover tool sandbox +The `docs/features/p2p-network.md` SHALL include a Tool Execution Sandbox section with isolation modes, runtime probe chain, and container pool. + +#### Scenario: Tool sandbox documented +- **WHEN** a user reads P2P feature docs +- **THEN** they find subprocess/container modes, runtime probe chain, and configuration + +### Requirement: Feature docs cover credential revocation +The `docs/features/p2p-network.md` SHALL include a Credential Revocation section with RevokeDID, IsRevoked, and maxCredentialAge. + +#### Scenario: Credential revocation documented +- **WHEN** a user reads P2P feature docs +- **THEN** they find revocation mechanisms and credential validation checks + +### Requirement: Security index includes new layers +The `docs/security/index.md` SHALL list OS Keyring, Database Encryption, Cloud KMS/HSM, P2P Session Management, P2P Tool Sandbox, and P2P Auth Hardening in the Security Layers table. + +#### Scenario: Security layers table updated +- **WHEN** a user reads the security index +- **THEN** they see all 10 security layers including the 6 new ones + +### Requirement: Encryption docs cover Cloud KMS +The `docs/security/encryption.md` SHALL include a Cloud KMS Mode section with all 4 backends, build tags, CompositeCryptoProvider, and configuration examples. + +#### Scenario: Cloud KMS documented +- **WHEN** a user reads encryption docs +- **THEN** they find all 4 KMS backends with configuration examples + +### Requirement: README config table includes new keys +The `README.md` configuration table SHALL include all P2P security, tool isolation, ZKP, keyring, DB encryption, and KMS config keys matching `mapstructure` tags. + +#### Scenario: Config table complete +- **WHEN** a user reads the README config table +- **THEN** they find 27+ new config rows covering all P0-P2 security features + +### Requirement: Agent prompts include P2P security awareness +The `prompts/AGENTS.md` and `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md` SHALL include references to signed challenges, session management, sandbox, KMS, and credential revocation. + +#### Scenario: Agent prompts updated +- **WHEN** the LLM agent loads prompts +- **THEN** it has awareness of all P0-P2 security features + +### Requirement: Security roadmap P0/P1 items marked complete +The `openspec/security-roadmap.md` SHALL have `✅ COMPLETED` markers on all P0 and P1 section headers. + +#### Scenario: Roadmap completion markers +- **WHEN** a user reads the security roadmap +- **THEN** all P0 (P0-1, P0-2, P0-3) and P1 (P1-4, P1-5, P1-6) items show completion markers diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-p0-p2-security-docs-sync/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-p0-p2-security-docs-sync/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c8c8456f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-p0-p2-security-docs-sync/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +## 1. CLI Documentation + +- [x] 1.1 Update `docs/cli/security.md` — add DB Encryption and KMS fields to security status output example +- [x] 1.2 Update `docs/cli/security.md` — add JSON fields table entries for `db_encryption`, `kms_provider`, `kms_key_id`, `kms_fallback` +- [x] 1.3 Update `docs/cli/security.md` — add OS Keyring section (store, clear, status commands) +- [x] 1.4 Update `docs/cli/security.md` — add Database Encryption section (db-migrate, db-decrypt commands) +- [x] 1.5 Update `docs/cli/security.md` — add Cloud KMS / HSM section (kms status, test, keys commands) +- [x] 1.6 Update `docs/cli/p2p.md` — add Session Management section (session list, revoke, revoke-all commands) +- [x] 1.7 Update `docs/cli/p2p.md` — add Tool Execution Sandbox section (sandbox status, test, cleanup commands) + +## 2. Feature Documentation + +- [x] 2.1 Update `docs/features/p2p-network.md` — expand Handshake section with signed challenge protocol and protocol versioning +- [x] 2.2 Update `docs/features/p2p-network.md` — add Session Management section with invalidation reasons and SecurityEventHandler +- [x] 2.3 Update `docs/features/p2p-network.md` — add Tool Execution Sandbox section with isolation modes and container runtime +- [x] 2.4 Update `docs/features/p2p-network.md` — expand ZK Circuits section with attestation freshness and SRS configuration +- [x] 2.5 Update `docs/features/p2p-network.md` — add Credential Revocation section +- [x] 2.6 Update `docs/features/p2p-network.md` — update Configuration JSON with new fields +- [x] 2.7 Update `docs/features/p2p-network.md` — update CLI Commands list + +## 3. Security Documentation + +- [x] 3.1 Update `docs/security/encryption.md` — add Cloud KMS Mode section with 4 backends +- [x] 3.2 Update `docs/security/encryption.md` — add OS Keyring Integration section +- [x] 3.3 Update `docs/security/encryption.md` — add Database Encryption section +- [x] 3.4 Update `docs/security/encryption.md` — update Configuration Reference JSON +- [x] 3.5 Update `docs/security/index.md` — add 6 new rows to Security Layers table +- [x] 3.6 Update `docs/security/index.md` — add Cloud KMS to Encryption Modes +- [x] 3.7 Update `docs/security/index.md` — update Quick Links + +## 4. README + +- [x] 4.1 Update `README.md` — add 27+ config rows to P2P Network and Security config tables +- [x] 4.2 Update `README.md` — mark `p2p.keyDir` as deprecated +- [x] 4.3 Update `README.md` — add P2P feature bullets (Signed Challenges, Session Management, etc.) +- [x] 4.4 Update `README.md` — add P2P CLI usage examples (session, sandbox commands) +- [x] 4.5 Update `README.md` — add Security subsections (OS Keyring, DB Encryption, Cloud KMS, P2P Hardening) + +## 5. Agent Prompts + +- [x] 5.1 Update `prompts/AGENTS.md` — expand P2P Network description with security features +- [x] 5.2 Update `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md` — add 5 P2P security guidance bullets + +## 6. Security Roadmap + +- [x] 6.1 Update `openspec/security-roadmap.md` — add ✅ COMPLETED to P0-1, P0-2, P0-3 +- [x] 6.2 Update `openspec/security-roadmap.md` — add ✅ COMPLETED to P1-4, P1-5, P1-6 + +## 7. Verification + +- [x] 7.1 Run `go build ./...` to confirm no code breakage diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..85ae75c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-26 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..818ac993 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +## Context + +Branch `claude/improve-lango-performance-JzdXK` added core performance primitives (turn limits, error correction, token budgets) to `internal/adk/`, `internal/memory/`, and `internal/orchestration/`. These features have builder methods and tests but are not connected to the config system or application wiring layer. The orchestrator's `MaxDelegationRounds` is hardcoded to `5` in `wiring.go` despite the default changing to `10` in `orchestrator.go`. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Wire all 6 performance features from config → application layer +- Expose new config fields with zero-value-means-default semantics +- Show performance settings in `lango agent status` +- Update documentation to reflect new config options + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing the core implementation of any performance feature +- Adding new performance features beyond what already exists +- Adding TUI settings pages for these fields +- Adding validation or integration tests (existing unit tests cover the core) + +## Decisions + +### D1: Functional Options for Agent Construction +**Decision**: Introduce `AgentOption` functional options for `NewAgent`/`NewAgentFromADK` instead of chaining builder methods after construction. + +**Rationale**: Builder methods (`WithMaxTurns`, `WithErrorFixProvider`) require the caller to set fields after construction, which means `SessionServiceAdapter.tokenBudget` cannot be set before `runner.New()`. Functional options allow all configuration to happen atomically during construction. + +**Alternative considered**: Keep builder methods only — rejected because token budget must be set on `SessionServiceAdapter` before the runner is created. + +### D2: Zero-Value Defaults +**Decision**: Use `0` to mean "use code default" for all integer config fields. Use `*bool` (nil = default true) for `errorCorrectionEnabled`. + +**Rationale**: Follows existing patterns in the codebase (`MaxReflectionsInContext`, `MaxObservationsInContext`). The `*bool` pattern matches `ReadOnlyRootfs *bool` in the same config package. + +### D3: Centralized `buildAgentOptions` Helper +**Decision**: Extract a `buildAgentOptions(cfg, kc)` function in `wiring.go` that both single-agent and multi-agent paths share. + +**Rationale**: Avoids duplicating option construction logic across the two code paths. Single source of truth for how config maps to agent options. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **[Signature change]** `NewAgent`/`NewAgentFromADK` gain `opts ...AgentOption` variadic parameter. This is backward compatible (existing callers pass no options). → No migration needed. +- **[Config field proliferation]** 5 new fields added to config. → Mitigated by zero-value defaults; existing configs work unchanged. +- **[Error correction default]** Error correction defaults to `true` when knowledge system is available. Users who don't want it must explicitly set `errorCorrectionEnabled: false`. → Acceptable because the feature is beneficial by default and has no cost when no fix is found. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a3d06939 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +## Why + +Branch `claude/improve-lango-performance-JzdXK` introduced 6 core performance features (agent turn limits, error correction, token budgets, delegation round config, memory token budget, reflection consolidation threshold) but none are wired into the application layer. The builder methods exist but are never called, config fields are missing, and the orchestrator's `MaxDelegationRounds` is hardcoded to `5` despite the default changing to `10`. + +## What Changes + +- Add 5 new config fields: `agent.maxTurns`, `agent.errorCorrectionEnabled`, `agent.maxDelegationRounds`, `observationalMemory.memoryTokenBudget`, `observationalMemory.reflectionConsolidationThreshold` +- Add `SetReflectionConsolidationThreshold` setter to memory `Buffer` +- Add `AgentOption` functional options pattern to `adk.NewAgent` / `adk.NewAgentFromADK` +- Wire all 6 features in `app/wiring.go` (token budget, max turns, error fix provider, delegation rounds, memory token budget, reflection threshold) +- Update CLI `agent status` to display new performance fields +- Update documentation (multi-agent.md, observational-memory.md, README.md) with new config entries + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +_None — this change wires existing internal capabilities to the config/CLI/docs layer._ + +### Modified Capabilities + +- `config-types`: Add 5 new config fields to `AgentConfig` and `ObservationalMemoryConfig` +- `agent-turn-limit`: Wire `maxTurns` config to agent constructor via `AgentOption` +- `agent-self-correction`: Wire `errorCorrectionEnabled` config to agent constructor +- `model-aware-token-budget`: Wire token budget to agent via `AgentOption` at construction time +- `multi-agent-orchestration`: Use `maxDelegationRounds` from config instead of hardcoded `5` +- `observational-memory`: Add `memoryTokenBudget` and `reflectionConsolidationThreshold` config wiring +- `cli-agent-inspection`: Add MaxTurns, ErrorCorrection, DelegationRounds to status output + +## Impact + +- **Config**: `internal/config/types.go` — 5 new fields across 2 structs +- **Memory**: `internal/memory/buffer.go` — 1 new setter method +- **ADK**: `internal/adk/agent.go` — new `AgentOption` type, modified constructor signatures +- **Wiring**: `internal/app/wiring.go` — 4 wiring locations updated +- **CLI**: `internal/cli/agent/status.go` — 3 new output fields +- **Docs**: `docs/features/multi-agent.md`, `docs/features/observational-memory.md`, `README.md` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/agent-self-correction/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/agent-self-correction/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1e85f6f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/agent-self-correction/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Configurable error correction +The wiring layer SHALL wire `learning.Engine` as the agent's `ErrorFixProvider` when `errorCorrectionEnabled` is true (default) and the knowledge system is available. + +#### Scenario: Error correction enabled by default +- **WHEN** config omits `agent.errorCorrectionEnabled` and knowledge system is enabled +- **THEN** the agent SHALL have error correction wired + +#### Scenario: Error correction explicitly disabled +- **WHEN** config sets `agent.errorCorrectionEnabled: false` +- **THEN** the agent SHALL NOT have error correction wired regardless of knowledge system state + +#### Scenario: Knowledge system unavailable +- **WHEN** knowledge system is disabled +- **THEN** error correction SHALL NOT be wired even if `errorCorrectionEnabled` is true diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/agent-turn-limit/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/agent-turn-limit/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8c91e234 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/agent-turn-limit/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Configurable max turns +The agent runtime SHALL accept `maxTurns` from config via `AgentOption`. When `maxTurns` is 0 or omitted, the default (25) SHALL be used. + +#### Scenario: Custom max turns from config +- **WHEN** config sets `agent.maxTurns: 15` +- **THEN** the agent SHALL enforce a 15-turn limit per run + +#### Scenario: Default max turns +- **WHEN** config omits `agent.maxTurns` +- **THEN** the agent SHALL enforce a 25-turn limit per run diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/cli-agent-inspection/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/cli-agent-inspection/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8a76e1b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/cli-agent-inspection/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Performance fields in agent status +`lango agent status` SHALL display MaxTurns, ErrorCorrectionEnabled, and MaxDelegationRounds (multi-agent only) with their effective values (config or default). + +#### Scenario: Default values displayed +- **WHEN** user runs `lango agent status` with no performance config +- **THEN** output SHALL show Max Turns: 25, Error Correction: true + +#### Scenario: Multi-agent delegation rounds +- **WHEN** user runs `lango agent status` with `agent.multiAgent: true` +- **THEN** output SHALL include Delegation Rounds field + +#### Scenario: JSON output includes new fields +- **WHEN** user runs `lango agent status --json` +- **THEN** JSON output SHALL include `max_turns`, `error_correction_enabled`, and `max_delegation_rounds` fields diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/config-types/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/config-types/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a30a2c5a --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/config-types/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: AgentConfig fields +`AgentConfig` SHALL include `MaxTurns int`, `ErrorCorrectionEnabled *bool`, and `MaxDelegationRounds int` fields with mapstructure/json tags. + +#### Scenario: Zero-value defaults +- **WHEN** config omits `maxTurns`, `errorCorrectionEnabled`, and `maxDelegationRounds` +- **THEN** the zero values (0, nil, 0) SHALL be interpreted as defaults (25, true, 10) by the wiring layer + +### Requirement: ObservationalMemoryConfig fields +`ObservationalMemoryConfig` SHALL include `MemoryTokenBudget int` and `ReflectionConsolidationThreshold int` fields with mapstructure/json tags. + +#### Scenario: Zero-value defaults +- **WHEN** config omits `memoryTokenBudget` and `reflectionConsolidationThreshold` +- **THEN** the zero values SHALL be interpreted as defaults (4000, 5) by the wiring layer diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/model-aware-token-budget/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/model-aware-token-budget/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9adfd118 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/model-aware-token-budget/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Token budget wired at construction +The wiring layer SHALL pass `ModelTokenBudget(cfg.Agent.Model)` to the agent constructor via `WithAgentTokenBudget` option. This sets the session history token budget on `SessionServiceAdapter` before the runner is created. + +#### Scenario: Token budget derived from model +- **WHEN** agent is constructed with model name "claude-3.5-sonnet" +- **THEN** `SessionServiceAdapter.tokenBudget` SHALL be set to the value returned by `ModelTokenBudget("claude-3.5-sonnet")` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/multi-agent-orchestration/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/multi-agent-orchestration/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3d71a988 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/multi-agent-orchestration/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Configurable delegation rounds +The orchestrator SHALL use `cfg.Agent.MaxDelegationRounds` instead of hardcoded `5`. When the config value is 0, the orchestrator default (10) SHALL be used. + +#### Scenario: Custom delegation rounds from config +- **WHEN** config sets `agent.maxDelegationRounds: 8` +- **THEN** the orchestrator SHALL limit delegation to 8 rounds per turn + +#### Scenario: Default delegation rounds +- **WHEN** config omits `agent.maxDelegationRounds` +- **THEN** the orchestrator SHALL use its default of 10 rounds diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/observational-memory/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/observational-memory/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..081e98dc --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/specs/observational-memory/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Configurable memory token budget +The wiring layer SHALL pass `observationalMemory.memoryTokenBudget` to `ContextAwareModelAdapter.WithMemoryTokenBudget()` when the value is greater than 0. + +#### Scenario: Custom memory token budget +- **WHEN** config sets `observationalMemory.memoryTokenBudget: 6000` +- **THEN** the memory section in the system prompt SHALL be capped at 6000 tokens + +#### Scenario: Default memory token budget +- **WHEN** config omits `observationalMemory.memoryTokenBudget` +- **THEN** the default (4000 tokens) SHALL be used + +### Requirement: Configurable reflection consolidation threshold +The wiring layer SHALL call `Buffer.SetReflectionConsolidationThreshold()` when `observationalMemory.reflectionConsolidationThreshold` is greater than 0. + +#### Scenario: Custom consolidation threshold +- **WHEN** config sets `observationalMemory.reflectionConsolidationThreshold: 3` +- **THEN** meta-reflection SHALL trigger after 3 reflections accumulate + +#### Scenario: Default consolidation threshold +- **WHEN** config omits `observationalMemory.reflectionConsolidationThreshold` +- **THEN** the default threshold (5) SHALL be used diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c8ea0dbf --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-26-wire-performance-improvements/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +## 1. Config Fields + +- [x] 1.1 Add `MaxTurns`, `ErrorCorrectionEnabled`, `MaxDelegationRounds` to `AgentConfig` in `internal/config/types.go` +- [x] 1.2 Add `MemoryTokenBudget`, `ReflectionConsolidationThreshold` to `ObservationalMemoryConfig` in `internal/config/types.go` + +## 2. Memory Buffer + +- [x] 2.1 Add `SetReflectionConsolidationThreshold(n int)` method to `Buffer` in `internal/memory/buffer.go` + +## 3. Agent Constructor Options + +- [x] 3.1 Add `AgentOption` type and option constructors (`WithAgentTokenBudget`, `WithAgentMaxTurns`, `WithAgentErrorFixProvider`) in `internal/adk/agent.go` +- [x] 3.2 Add `opts ...AgentOption` parameter to `NewAgent` and wire token budget, max turns, error fix provider +- [x] 3.3 Add `opts ...AgentOption` parameter to `NewAgentFromADK` and wire token budget, max turns, error fix provider + +## 4. Application Wiring + +- [x] 4.1 Create `buildAgentOptions(cfg, kc)` helper in `internal/app/wiring.go` +- [x] 4.2 Wire `buildAgentOptions` into single-agent path (`NewAgent` call) +- [x] 4.3 Wire `buildAgentOptions` into multi-agent path (`NewAgentFromADK` call) +- [x] 4.4 Change `MaxDelegationRounds: 5` to `cfg.Agent.MaxDelegationRounds` in orchestrator config +- [x] 4.5 Wire `MemoryTokenBudget` to `ctxAdapter.WithMemoryTokenBudget()` in both context-aware adapter paths +- [x] 4.6 Wire `ReflectionConsolidationThreshold` to `buffer.SetReflectionConsolidationThreshold()` after buffer creation + +## 5. CLI + +- [x] 5.1 Add `MaxTurns`, `ErrorCorrectionEnabled`, `MaxDelegationRounds` to `statusOutput` struct and table output in `internal/cli/agent/status.go` + +## 6. Documentation + +- [x] 6.1 Update `docs/features/multi-agent.md`: change default 5→10, add `maxDelegationRounds` config entry +- [x] 6.2 Update `docs/features/observational-memory.md`: add 2 config fields and auto-consolidation section +- [x] 6.3 Update `README.md`: add 5 new config entries to the config table + +## 7. Verification + +- [x] 7.1 `go build ./...` passes +- [x] 7.2 `go test ./internal/config/ ./internal/adk/ ./internal/memory/ ./internal/cli/agent/` passes diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-fix-settings-menu-esc-exit/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-fix-settings-menu-esc-exit/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d1c6cc6f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-fix-settings-menu-esc-exit/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-27 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-fix-settings-menu-esc-exit/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-fix-settings-menu-esc-exit/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a5ccddb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-fix-settings-menu-esc-exit/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +## Context + +The Settings TUI editor (`internal/cli/settings/editor.go`) uses Bubbletea for keyboard-driven navigation. Terminal arrow keys are transmitted as ANSI escape sequences (e.g., down arrow = `\x1b[B`). During rapid keystrokes, the escape byte `\x1b` can arrive in a separate read from `[B`, causing Bubbletea to interpret it as a standalone Esc keypress. At StepMenu, Esc was mapped directly to `tea.Quit`, resulting in accidental TUI exits during fast arrow key navigation. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Prevent accidental TUI exit when pressing arrow keys rapidly in StepMenu +- Maintain clean exit paths via ctrl+c and explicit menu actions (Save & Exit, Cancel) +- Keep the Esc key functional for intuitive back-navigation + +**Non-Goals:** +- Modifying Bubbletea's escape sequence parsing (upstream concern) +- Adding debounce or timing-based key disambiguation +- Changing Esc behavior at StepWelcome (no arrow navigation, so no split-sequence risk) + +## Decisions + +**Decision 1: Esc at StepMenu navigates back to StepWelcome instead of quitting** + +Rationale: StepWelcome has no arrow-key navigation, so the split-sequence bug cannot occur there. Users who intentionally press Esc can press it once more at StepWelcome to quit. This adds one extra keystroke for intentional exit but eliminates accidental exits entirely. + +Alternative considered: Adding a confirmation dialog on Esc at StepMenu. Rejected because it adds UI complexity for a simple navigation fix. + +Alternative considered: Debounce/timer to distinguish real Esc from split sequences. Rejected because it adds latency to all Esc handling and depends on timing heuristics. + +**Decision 2: Update help bar text from "Quit" to "Back"** + +Rationale: The help bar must accurately reflect the Esc key's behavior. Since Esc now navigates back rather than quitting, the label must change accordingly. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Extra keystroke for intentional quit] → Acceptable: Esc→Welcome→Esc→Quit is intuitive and standard for hierarchical menus +- [Users expecting Esc to quit from menu] → Mitigated by updated help bar showing "Back" and the Welcome screen still supporting Esc→Quit diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-fix-settings-menu-esc-exit/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-fix-settings-menu-esc-exit/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c40d1362 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-fix-settings-menu-esc-exit/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +## Why + +When pressing the down arrow key rapidly in the Settings menu, the TUI exits unexpectedly. Terminal arrow keys are sent as escape sequences (`\x1b[B`), and during rapid input the `\x1b` byte can arrive separately, being interpreted as a standalone Esc keypress. Since StepMenu maps Esc directly to `tea.Quit`, this causes accidental TUI termination. + +## What Changes + +- Change Esc behavior at StepMenu from quitting the TUI to navigating back to the Welcome screen +- Update the help bar text at StepMenu from "Quit" to "Back" to reflect the new behavior +- Add editor navigation tests covering Esc behavior at each step and ctrl+c quit behavior + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +(none) + +### Modified Capabilities + +- `cli-settings`: Change Esc key at StepMenu from quit to back-navigation to Welcome screen + +## Impact + +- `internal/cli/settings/editor.go`: Esc at StepMenu returns to StepWelcome instead of quitting +- `internal/cli/settings/menu.go`: Help bar text updated from "Quit" to "Back" +- `internal/cli/settings/editor_test.go`: New test file with 4 test cases for editor navigation diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-fix-settings-menu-esc-exit/specs/cli-settings/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-fix-settings-menu-esc-exit/specs/cli-settings/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a6c7b2f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-fix-settings-menu-esc-exit/specs/cli-settings/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: User Interface +The settings editor SHALL provide menu-based navigation with categories, free navigation between categories, and shared `tuicore.FormModel` for all forms. Provider and OIDC provider list views SHALL support managing collections. Pressing Esc at StepMenu SHALL navigate back to StepWelcome instead of quitting the TUI. The help bar at StepMenu SHALL display "Back" for the Esc key. + +#### Scenario: Launch settings +- **WHEN** user runs `lango settings` +- **THEN** the editor SHALL display a welcome screen followed by the configuration menu + +#### Scenario: Save from settings +- **WHEN** user selects "Save & Exit" from the menu +- **THEN** the configuration SHALL be saved as an encrypted profile + +#### Scenario: Esc at Welcome screen quits +- **WHEN** user presses Esc at the Welcome screen (StepWelcome) +- **THEN** the TUI SHALL quit + +#### Scenario: Esc at Menu navigates back to Welcome +- **WHEN** user presses Esc at the settings menu (StepMenu) while not in search mode +- **THEN** the editor SHALL navigate back to StepWelcome without quitting + +#### Scenario: Esc at Menu during search cancels search +- **WHEN** user presses Esc at the settings menu while search mode is active +- **THEN** the search SHALL be cancelled and the menu SHALL remain at StepMenu + +#### Scenario: Ctrl+C always quits +- **WHEN** user presses Ctrl+C at any step +- **THEN** the TUI SHALL quit immediately with Cancelled flag set + +#### Scenario: Menu help bar shows Back for Esc +- **WHEN** the settings menu is displayed in normal mode (not searching) +- **THEN** the help bar SHALL display "Back" as the label for the Esc key diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-fix-settings-menu-esc-exit/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-fix-settings-menu-esc-exit/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a42f19ba --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-fix-settings-menu-esc-exit/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +## 1. Editor Esc Behavior Fix + +- [x] 1.1 Change Esc at StepMenu in `editor.go` from `tea.Quit` to `e.step = StepWelcome` with `nil` cmd return +- [x] 1.2 Update help bar text in `menu.go` from `"Quit"` to `"Back"` for the Esc key entry + +## 2. Tests + +- [x] 2.1 Create `editor_test.go` with test: Esc at StepWelcome triggers quit +- [x] 2.2 Add test: Esc at StepMenu navigates to StepWelcome (no quit) +- [x] 2.3 Add test: Esc at StepMenu while searching stays at StepMenu (search cancelled) +- [x] 2.4 Add test: Ctrl+C at all steps triggers quit with Cancelled flag + +## 3. Verification + +- [x] 3.1 Run `go build ./...` — no compilation errors +- [x] 3.2 Run `go test ./internal/cli/settings/...` — all tests pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-form-intelligence/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-form-intelligence/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d1c6cc6f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-form-intelligence/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-27 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-form-intelligence/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-form-intelligence/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c340513b --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-form-intelligence/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +## Context + +The settings TUI editor renders forms via `tuicore.FormModel` containing `[]*Field`. Prior to this change, fields had no help text, no validation, model IDs were free-text only, embedding config carried a redundant field, and every field was unconditionally visible. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Give users inline guidance for every field without leaving the form +- Prevent invalid input at entry time with clear error messages +- Auto-populate model selection from live provider APIs where possible +- Simplify the embedding config by removing the redundant ProviderID field +- Reduce visual noise by hiding irrelevant fields based on current state + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing config struct shapes (only the embedding ProviderID deprecation) +- Adding new settings categories or menu items +- Real-time re-fetching of models when provider selection changes (fetch happens at form creation time) + +## Decisions + +### 1. Description rendered only for focused field +**Decision**: Show the `Description` string below the currently focused field only, prefixed with an info icon. + +**Rationale**: Showing all descriptions at once would make forms too tall. Focused-only display keeps the form compact while providing help exactly when needed. + +### 2. VisibleWhen as closure on Field +**Decision**: Add `VisibleWhen func() bool` to `Field`. When non-nil, the field is shown only when the function returns true. The closure captures a pointer to the controlling field (e.g. `telegramEnabled`), so toggling the parent immediately hides/shows dependent fields. + +**Rationale**: Closures avoid the need for a declarative dependency graph or string-based key references. Since the controlling field is defined in the same function scope, type safety is preserved. + +### 3. Cursor operates on visible fields only +**Decision**: `FormModel.Update()` and `View()` call `VisibleFields()` to get the filtered slice. The cursor indexes into this slice. After any toggle, the cursor is clamped to `len(visible)-1` to prevent out-of-bounds. + +**Rationale**: Navigating to hidden fields would be confusing. Re-evaluating visibility after every toggle ensures the cursor stays valid even when a toggle hides the currently focused field. + +### 4. Model fetching at form creation time with timeout +**Decision**: `fetchModelOptions()` runs synchronously during `NewXxxForm()` with a 5-second context timeout. If it fails or returns empty, the field remains a text input. + +**Rationale**: Synchronous fetch is simpler than async (no loading state needed in the TUI). The 5s timeout prevents blocking the UI. Graceful fallback to text input means the form always works even without network. + +### 5. Provider instantiation without full wiring +**Decision**: `newProviderFromConfig()` creates a lightweight provider instance from config alone (API key + base URL), without the full application bootstrap. It returns nil if the provider cannot be created. + +**Rationale**: The settings editor runs before the application is fully wired. We only need `ListModels()`, which requires minimal provider state. + +### 6. Embedding Provider field unification +**Decision**: The embedding form uses field key `emb_provider_id` mapped to `cfg.Embedding.Provider`. The state update handler also clears `cfg.Embedding.ProviderID` to empty. + +**Rationale**: The config previously had both `Provider` (display name) and `ProviderID` (used for lookups). They were always set to the same value, causing confusion. Unifying into `Provider` and clearing `ProviderID` on save is backward-compatible. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **Synchronous model fetch adds latency**: Up to 5s delay when opening forms with model fields. Acceptable because it only happens at form creation, not during navigation, and the fallback is text input. +- **Closure memory**: VisibleWhen closures capture field pointers and stay in memory for the form lifetime. Negligible because form lifetimes are short. +- **No cross-field re-fetch**: Changing the provider dropdown does not re-fetch models for the model field. The user must exit and re-enter the form. Acceptable for v1; async re-fetch can be added later. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-form-intelligence/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-form-intelligence/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..45a8a882 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-form-intelligence/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +## Why + +The settings TUI forms are functional but lack intelligence -- fields have no inline help, no input validation, model IDs must be typed manually, the embedding config has a redundant Provider/ProviderID split, and all fields are always visible regardless of context. Users must guess valid ranges, remember exact model names, and wade through irrelevant options. + +## What Changes + +Five improvements to settings form UX, all within `internal/cli/settings/` and `internal/cli/tuicore/`: + +1. **Inline descriptions** -- Every form field gets a human-readable `Description` string rendered below the focused field. +2. **Field validators** -- Numeric and range-sensitive fields get `Validate` functions with clear error messages (e.g. Temperature 0.0-2.0, port 1-65535, positive integers). +3. **Auto-fetch models** -- New `model_fetcher.go` queries provider `ListModels` API (5s timeout) and converts model text fields to select dropdowns. Supports OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, GitHub, Ollama. Falls back to text input on failure. +4. **Unify embedding provider** -- Merge `Embedding.Provider` and `Embedding.ProviderID` into single `Provider` field, clearing the deprecated `ProviderID` on save. +5. **Conditional field visibility** -- New `VisibleWhen func() bool` on Field struct. Channel tokens show only when the channel is enabled. Security PII fields show under interceptor enabled. Presidio fields nest under both interceptor + presidio enabled. P2P container fields show when container sandbox is enabled. KMS fields show based on backend type. + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `cli-settings`: Inline descriptions for ~40 fields, validators for numeric fields, auto-fetched model dropdowns (Agent, Observational Memory, Embedding, Librarian), conditional visibility for channel tokens / security PII / Presidio / P2P container / KMS backend fields +- `cli-tuicore`: `VisibleWhen` field on `Field` struct, `IsVisible()` method, `VisibleFields()` on FormModel, cursor clamping after visibility changes, description rendering in form View + +### Modified Capabilities +- `cli-settings`: Embedding form uses single `Provider` field (was Provider + ProviderID) +- `cli-tuicore`: FormModel cursor navigation operates on visible fields only; form View renders description below focused field + +## Impact + +- **New file**: `internal/cli/settings/model_fetcher.go` -- provider instantiation + model listing +- **Modified**: `internal/cli/settings/forms_impl.go` -- descriptions, validators, fetchModelOptions calls, VisibleWhen closures on ~15 fields +- **Modified**: `internal/cli/tuicore/field.go` -- Description field, VisibleWhen field, IsVisible() method +- **Modified**: `internal/cli/tuicore/form.go` -- VisibleFields(), cursor clamping, description rendering in View +- **Modified**: `internal/cli/tuicore/state_update.go` -- `emb_provider_id` case clears deprecated ProviderID diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-form-intelligence/specs/cli-settings/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-form-intelligence/specs/cli-settings/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0fd555f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-form-intelligence/specs/cli-settings/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Inline field descriptions +All settings form fields SHALL include a `Description` string providing human-readable guidance. The description SHALL be shown only when the field is focused. + +#### Scenario: Description displayed on focus +- **WHEN** the user navigates to a field with a Description +- **THEN** the form SHALL render the description text below that field + +#### Scenario: Description hidden when not focused +- **WHEN** the user moves focus away from a field +- **THEN** the description for that field SHALL no longer be rendered + +### Requirement: Field input validation +Numeric and range-sensitive fields SHALL have `Validate` functions that return clear error messages. + +#### Scenario: Temperature validation +- **WHEN** the user enters a value outside 0.0-2.0 for the Temperature field +- **THEN** the validator SHALL return "must be between 0.0 and 2.0" + +#### Scenario: Port validation +- **WHEN** the user enters a value outside 1-65535 for the Port field +- **THEN** the validator SHALL return "port out of range" + +#### Scenario: Positive integer validation +- **WHEN** the user enters a non-positive value for fields requiring positive integers (Max Read Size, Max History Turns, Knowledge Max Context, Max Concurrent Jobs, Max Concurrent Tasks, Max Concurrent Steps, Max Peers, Observation Threshold, Max Bulk Import, Import Concurrency) +- **THEN** the validator SHALL return "must be a positive integer" + +#### Scenario: Non-negative integer validation +- **WHEN** the user enters a negative value for fields allowing zero (Yield Time, Max Reflections in Context, Max Observations in Context, Inquiry Cooldown, Max Pending Inquiries, Approval Timeout, Embedding Dimensions, RAG Max Results) +- **THEN** the validator SHALL return "must be a non-negative integer" (with optional "(0 = unlimited)" suffix where applicable) + +#### Scenario: Float range validation +- **WHEN** the user enters a value outside 0.0-1.0 for Min Trust Score +- **THEN** the validator SHALL return "must be between 0.0 and 1.0" + +### Requirement: Auto-fetch model options from provider API +Form builders for Agent, Observational Memory, Embedding, and Librarian SHALL attempt to fetch available models from the configured provider API at form creation time. + +#### Scenario: Successful model fetch +- **WHEN** the provider API returns a list of models within the 5-second timeout +- **THEN** the model field SHALL be converted from InputText to InputSelect with the fetched models as options, and the current model SHALL always be included + +#### Scenario: Failed model fetch +- **WHEN** the provider API fails, times out, or returns empty +- **THEN** the model field SHALL remain as InputText with placeholder text + +#### Scenario: Agent form model fetch +- **WHEN** the Agent form is created and the configured provider has a valid API key +- **THEN** the Model ID field SHALL be populated with models from `fetchModelOptions(cfg.Agent.Provider, ...)` + +#### Scenario: Observational Memory model fetch with provider inheritance +- **WHEN** the Observational Memory form is created with an empty provider +- **THEN** the model fetch SHALL use the Agent provider as fallback + +#### Scenario: Librarian model fetch with provider inheritance +- **WHEN** the Librarian form is created with an empty provider +- **THEN** the model fetch SHALL use the Agent provider as fallback + +#### Scenario: Embedding model fetch +- **WHEN** the Embedding form is created with a non-empty provider +- **THEN** the Model field SHALL attempt to fetch models from the embedding provider + +### Requirement: Unified embedding provider field +The Embedding & RAG form SHALL use a single "Provider" field (key `emb_provider_id`) mapped to `cfg.Embedding.Provider`. The state update handler SHALL clear the deprecated `cfg.Embedding.ProviderID` field when saving. + +#### Scenario: Embedding form shows single provider field +- **WHEN** the user opens the Embedding & RAG form +- **THEN** the form SHALL display one "Provider" select field, not separate Provider and ProviderID fields + +#### Scenario: State update clears deprecated ProviderID +- **WHEN** the `emb_provider_id` field is saved via UpdateConfigFromForm +- **THEN** `cfg.Embedding.Provider` SHALL be set to the value AND `cfg.Embedding.ProviderID` SHALL be set to empty string + +### Requirement: Conditional field visibility in channel forms +Channel token fields SHALL be visible only when the parent channel is enabled. + +#### Scenario: Telegram token hidden when disabled +- **WHEN** the Telegram Enabled toggle is unchecked +- **THEN** the Telegram Bot Token field SHALL be hidden + +#### Scenario: Telegram token shown when enabled +- **WHEN** the user checks the Telegram Enabled toggle +- **THEN** the Telegram Bot Token field SHALL become visible + +#### Scenario: Discord token visibility +- **WHEN** the Discord Enabled toggle is toggled +- **THEN** the Discord Bot Token field visibility SHALL match the toggle state + +#### Scenario: Slack token visibility +- **WHEN** the Slack Enabled toggle is toggled +- **THEN** the Slack Bot Token and App Token fields visibility SHALL match the toggle state + +### Requirement: Conditional visibility in security form +Security sub-fields SHALL be visible only when their parent toggle is enabled. + +#### Scenario: PII fields hidden when interceptor disabled +- **WHEN** the Privacy Interceptor toggle is unchecked +- **THEN** all interceptor sub-fields (Redact PII, Approval Policy, Timeout, Notify Channel, Sensitive Tools, Exempt Tools, Disabled PII Patterns, Custom PII Patterns, Presidio) SHALL be hidden + +#### Scenario: Presidio detail fields nested under both interceptor and presidio +- **WHEN** the interceptor is enabled but Presidio is disabled +- **THEN** the Presidio URL and Presidio Language fields SHALL be hidden + +#### Scenario: Presidio fields visible when both enabled +- **WHEN** both the Privacy Interceptor and Presidio toggles are checked +- **THEN** the Presidio URL and Presidio Language fields SHALL be visible + +#### Scenario: Signer Key ID visibility based on provider +- **WHEN** the signer provider is "local" or "enclave" +- **THEN** the Key ID field SHALL be hidden + +#### Scenario: Signer RPC URL visibility +- **WHEN** the signer provider is "rpc" +- **THEN** the RPC URL field SHALL be visible + +### Requirement: Conditional visibility in P2P sandbox form +P2P container sandbox fields SHALL be visible only when the container sandbox is enabled. + +#### Scenario: Container fields hidden when container disabled +- **WHEN** the Container Sandbox Enabled toggle is unchecked +- **THEN** container-specific fields (Runtime, Image, Network Mode, Read-Only RootFS, CPU Quota, Pool Size, Pool Idle Timeout) SHALL be hidden + +### Requirement: Conditional visibility in KMS form +KMS backend-specific fields SHALL be visible based on the selected backend type. + +#### Scenario: Azure fields visible for azure-kv backend +- **WHEN** the KMS backend is "azure-kv" +- **THEN** the Azure Vault URL and Azure Key Version fields SHALL be visible + +#### Scenario: PKCS11 fields visible for pkcs11 backend +- **WHEN** the KMS backend is "pkcs11" +- **THEN** the PKCS11 Module Path, Slot ID, PIN, and Key Label fields SHALL be visible + +### Requirement: Model fetcher provider support +The `newProviderFromConfig` function SHALL support creating lightweight provider instances for: OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini/Google, Ollama (via OpenAI-compatible endpoint), and GitHub (via OpenAI-compatible endpoint). + +#### Scenario: Ollama default base URL +- **WHEN** creating an Ollama provider with empty BaseURL +- **THEN** the base URL SHALL default to "http://localhost:11434/v1" + +#### Scenario: GitHub default base URL +- **WHEN** creating a GitHub provider with empty BaseURL +- **THEN** the base URL SHALL default to "https://models.inference.ai.azure.com" + +#### Scenario: Provider without API key +- **WHEN** creating a non-Ollama provider with empty API key +- **THEN** `newProviderFromConfig` SHALL return nil diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-form-intelligence/specs/cli-tuicore/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-form-intelligence/specs/cli-tuicore/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..86a26f35 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-form-intelligence/specs/cli-tuicore/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Field Description property +The `Field` struct SHALL include a `Description string` property for inline help text. + +#### Scenario: Description stored on field +- **WHEN** a Field is created with a Description value +- **THEN** the Description SHALL be accessible on the field instance + +### Requirement: VisibleWhen conditional visibility +The `Field` struct SHALL include a `VisibleWhen func() bool` property. When non-nil, the field is shown only when the function returns true. When nil, the field is always visible. + +#### Scenario: VisibleWhen nil means always visible +- **WHEN** a Field has `VisibleWhen` set to nil +- **THEN** `IsVisible()` SHALL return true + +#### Scenario: VisibleWhen returns false hides field +- **WHEN** a Field has `VisibleWhen` returning false +- **THEN** `IsVisible()` SHALL return false and the field SHALL not appear in `VisibleFields()` + +#### Scenario: VisibleWhen dynamically responds to state +- **WHEN** a VisibleWhen closure captures a pointer to a parent field's Checked state +- **THEN** toggling the parent field SHALL immediately affect the child field's visibility on next `VisibleFields()` call + +### Requirement: IsVisible method on Field +The `Field` struct SHALL expose an `IsVisible() bool` method that returns true when `VisibleWhen` is nil, and the result of `VisibleWhen()` otherwise. + +### Requirement: VisibleFields on FormModel +`FormModel` SHALL expose a `VisibleFields() []*Field` method that returns only fields where `IsVisible()` returns true. + +#### Scenario: VisibleFields filters hidden fields +- **WHEN** a form has 5 fields and 2 have VisibleWhen returning false +- **THEN** VisibleFields() SHALL return 3 fields + +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: FormModel cursor navigation (MODIFIED) +The form cursor SHALL index into `VisibleFields()` instead of the full `Fields` slice. After any input event (including bool toggles that may change visibility), the cursor SHALL be clamped to `[0, len(visible)-1]`. + +#### Scenario: Cursor clamp after visibility change +- **WHEN** the user is on the last visible field and toggles a bool that hides fields below +- **THEN** the cursor SHALL be clamped so it does not exceed the new visible field count + +#### Scenario: Cursor re-evaluated after toggle +- **WHEN** the user toggles a bool field (space key) +- **THEN** the form SHALL re-evaluate `VisibleFields()` and clamp the cursor before processing further input + +### Requirement: FormModel View renders description (MODIFIED) +The form View SHALL render the `Description` of the currently focused field below that field's input widget, styled with `tui.FieldDescStyle`. + +#### Scenario: Focused field description displayed +- **WHEN** the form View is rendered and field at cursor has a non-empty Description +- **THEN** the view SHALL include a line with the description text below that field + +#### Scenario: No description for unfocused fields +- **WHEN** a field is not focused +- **THEN** its Description SHALL not be rendered in the View output + +### Requirement: Embedding ProviderID deprecation in state update (MODIFIED) +The `UpdateConfigFromForm` case for `emb_provider_id` SHALL set `cfg.Embedding.Provider` to the value AND clear `cfg.Embedding.ProviderID` to empty string. + +#### Scenario: emb_provider_id clears deprecated field +- **WHEN** UpdateConfigFromForm processes key "emb_provider_id" with value "openai" +- **THEN** `cfg.Embedding.Provider` SHALL be "openai" AND `cfg.Embedding.ProviderID` SHALL be "" diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-form-intelligence/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-form-intelligence/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..53d1a775 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-form-intelligence/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +## 1. Inline Field Descriptions + +- [x] 1.1 Add `Description string` field to `tuicore.Field` struct in field.go +- [x] 1.2 Render description below focused field in FormModel.View() in form.go +- [x] 1.3 Add descriptions to all Agent form fields in forms_impl.go +- [x] 1.4 Add descriptions to Server, Channels, Tools, Session form fields +- [x] 1.5 Add descriptions to Security form fields (interceptor, PII, Presidio, signer) +- [x] 1.6 Add descriptions to Knowledge, Skill, Observational Memory form fields +- [x] 1.7 Add descriptions to Embedding & RAG, Graph Store form fields +- [x] 1.8 Add descriptions to Multi-Agent, A2A, Payment form fields +- [x] 1.9 Add descriptions to Cron, Background, Workflow form fields +- [x] 1.10 Add descriptions to Librarian, P2P Network, P2P ZKP form fields +- [x] 1.11 Add descriptions to P2P Pricing, Owner Protection, Sandbox form fields +- [x] 1.12 Add descriptions to Security Keyring, DB Encryption, KMS form fields +- [x] 1.13 Add descriptions to OIDC Provider form fields + +## 2. Field Validators + +- [x] 2.1 Add Temperature validator (0.0-2.0 range) to Agent form +- [x] 2.2 Add port validator (1-65535) to Server form +- [x] 2.3 Add Max Read Size validator (positive integer) to Tools form +- [x] 2.4 Add Max History Turns validator (positive integer) to Session form +- [x] 2.5 Add Knowledge Max Context validator (positive integer) +- [x] 2.6 Add validators to Observational Memory numeric fields (positive/non-negative) +- [x] 2.7 Add Embedding Dimensions and RAG Max Results validators (non-negative) +- [x] 2.8 Add Graph Max Depth and Max Expansion validators (positive integer) +- [x] 2.9 Add Cron Max Jobs validator (positive integer) +- [x] 2.10 Add Background Yield Time (non-negative) and Max Tasks (positive) validators +- [x] 2.11 Add Workflow Max Steps validator (positive integer) +- [x] 2.12 Add P2P Max Peers validator (positive integer) +- [x] 2.13 Add P2P Min Trust Score validator (0.0-1.0 range) +- [x] 2.14 Add Librarian numeric field validators (threshold, cooldown, max inquiries) +- [x] 2.15 Add Skill Max Bulk Import and Import Concurrency validators (positive integer) +- [x] 2.16 Add Security Approval Timeout validator (non-negative integer) +- [x] 2.17 Add Payment Chain ID validator (integer) + +## 3. Auto-Fetch Model Options + +- [x] 3.1 Create `model_fetcher.go` with `newProviderFromConfig()` supporting OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, Ollama, GitHub +- [x] 3.2 Implement `fetchModelOptions()` with 5s timeout, sorted output, current model inclusion +- [x] 3.3 Wire model fetch into NewAgentForm for primary model field +- [x] 3.4 Wire model fetch into NewAgentForm for fallback model field +- [x] 3.5 Wire model fetch into NewObservationalMemoryForm with agent provider fallback +- [x] 3.6 Wire model fetch into NewEmbeddingForm for embedding model +- [x] 3.7 Wire model fetch into NewLibrarianForm with agent provider fallback + +## 4. Unify Embedding Provider + +- [x] 4.1 Update NewEmbeddingForm to use single `emb_provider_id` field mapped to `cfg.Embedding.Provider` +- [x] 4.2 Update `emb_provider_id` case in UpdateConfigFromForm to also clear `cfg.Embedding.ProviderID` + +## 5. Conditional Field Visibility + +- [x] 5.1 Add `VisibleWhen func() bool` field to `tuicore.Field` struct +- [x] 5.2 Add `IsVisible() bool` method to Field +- [x] 5.3 Add `VisibleFields() []*Field` method to FormModel +- [x] 5.4 Update FormModel.Update() to use VisibleFields() for cursor navigation +- [x] 5.5 Update FormModel.View() to iterate VisibleFields() instead of Fields +- [x] 5.6 Add cursor clamping after visibility changes in Update() +- [x] 5.7 Add VisibleWhen closures to Channel token fields (Telegram, Discord, Slack) +- [x] 5.8 Add VisibleWhen closures to Security interceptor sub-fields +- [x] 5.9 Add nested VisibleWhen for Presidio fields (interceptor AND presidio enabled) +- [x] 5.10 Add VisibleWhen to Signer RPC URL and Key ID fields based on provider value +- [x] 5.11 Add VisibleWhen to P2P Container sandbox fields +- [x] 5.12 Add VisibleWhen to KMS Azure and PKCS11 fields based on backend type + +## 6. Verification + +- [x] 6.1 Run `go build ./...` -- zero errors +- [x] 6.2 Run `go test ./...` -- all tests pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-menu-search/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-menu-search/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d1c6cc6f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-menu-search/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-27 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-menu-search/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-menu-search/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fa0d08ee --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-menu-search/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +## Context + +The settings menu in `internal/cli/settings/menu.go` originally stored all configuration categories in a flat `Categories []Category` slice on `MenuModel`. With 28+ categories, users had to scroll through the entire list without any visual grouping or search capability. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Group related categories under named sections for visual clarity +- Provide a keyboard-driven search feature to quickly find categories +- Highlight matching text in search results for discoverability +- Maintain backward compatibility — `allCategories()` still returns the full flat list for cursor navigation + +**Non-Goals:** +- Fuzzy matching (exact substring matching is sufficient for ~30 items) +- Persistent search history or favorites +- Collapsible/expandable sections + +## Decisions + +**Decision 1: Section-based grouping with 6 named sections** + +Categories are organized into: Core (4), Communication (4), AI & Knowledge (6), Infrastructure (4), P2P Network (5), Security (5), plus an untitled section for Save & Exit / Cancel. The grouping reflects the logical domain of each setting. + +Rationale: Mirrors the mental model of the system architecture. Users can visually scan section headers to find the right area. + +**Decision 2: `/` key activates search mode with `textinput.Model`** + +Pressing `/` in normal mode focuses a `textinput.Model` at the top of the menu. Typing filters categories in real-time. Esc cancels search and restores the full grouped view. Enter selects the highlighted filtered result. + +Rationale: `/` is a well-known convention (vim, GitHub, Slack). The `textinput.Model` from Bubbles provides cursor, styling, and input handling for free. + +**Decision 3: Search matches against title, description, and ID** + +`applyFilter()` converts both query and each field to lowercase, then uses `strings.Contains` for substring matching. Matching is case-insensitive. + +Alternative considered: Fuzzy matching via a scoring library. Rejected because with ~30 categories, exact substring search is fast and predictable. Users can type any part of the category name or description. + +**Decision 4: Amber/warning-colored highlight for matching substrings** + +`highlightMatch()` finds the first occurrence of the query in each text field and renders it with `tui.Warning` (amber) color and bold. Selected items additionally get underline on the match. Non-matching text uses dim or accent styling based on selection state. + +Rationale: Amber stands out from the default dim/accent palette without conflicting with error (red) or success (green) colors. + +**Decision 5: Cursor navigates a flat list derived from sections** + +`allCategories()` flattens all sections into a single `[]Category` slice. The cursor indexes into this flat list in normal mode, or into `filtered` in search mode. Section headers are not selectable — they are rendered as visual separators only. + +Rationale: Keeps cursor logic simple. No need for a two-level index (section + item). The global index maps 1:1 to the rendered rows. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Flat cursor with sections] The cursor skips over section headers, so the visual gap between items at section boundaries may feel slightly odd. Acceptable because headers are clearly styled differently. +- [First-match-only highlighting] `highlightMatch` highlights only the first occurrence of the query in each string. Acceptable because category titles/descriptions are short. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-menu-search/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-menu-search/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..efdb76d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-menu-search/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +## Why + +The `lango settings` menu lists 28+ configuration categories in a flat, unsorted list. As the number of settings categories has grown (Providers, Agent, Server, Channels, ... through Security KMS), users must scroll through the entire list to find the category they want. There is no way to quickly jump to a category by name, and the lack of visual grouping makes it hard to understand which categories are related. + +## What Changes + +- Restructure the menu from a flat `[]Category` list into grouped `[]Section` with 6 logical headings: Core, Communication, AI & Knowledge, Infrastructure, P2P Network, Security (plus an untitled section for Save & Exit / Cancel) +- Add a keyword search feature activated by pressing `/` that filters categories in real-time by matching against title, description, and ID +- Highlight matching substrings in search results with amber/warning color +- Render section headers with visual separators between groups + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +- `cli-settings`: Grouped section layout for the settings menu +- `cli-settings`: Keyword search with `/` activation, real-time filtering, and match highlighting + +### Modified Capabilities + +- `cli-settings`: Menu categories are now organized under `Section` groupings instead of a flat list + +## Impact + +- `internal/cli/settings/menu.go`: Major rewrite — added `Section` struct, `searchInput textinput.Model`, `filtered []Category`, `applyFilter()`, `highlightMatch()`, `renderGroupedView()`, `renderFilteredView()` methods diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-menu-search/specs/cli-settings/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-menu-search/specs/cli-settings/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..98effea2 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-menu-search/specs/cli-settings/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Grouped Section Layout +The settings menu SHALL organize categories into named sections. Each section SHALL have a title header rendered above its categories with a visual separator line between sections. + +The sections SHALL be, in order: +1. **Core** — Providers, Agent, Server, Session +2. **Communication** — Channels, Tools, Multi-Agent, A2A Protocol +3. **AI & Knowledge** — Knowledge, Skill, Observational Memory, Embedding & RAG, Graph Store, Librarian +4. **Infrastructure** — Payment, Cron Scheduler, Background Tasks, Workflow Engine +5. **P2P Network** — P2P Network, P2P ZKP, P2P Pricing, P2P Owner Protection, P2P Sandbox +6. **Security** — Security, Auth, Security Keyring, Security DB Encryption, Security KMS +7. *(untitled)* — Save & Exit, Cancel + +#### Scenario: Section headers displayed +- **WHEN** user views the settings menu in normal (non-search) mode +- **THEN** named section headers SHALL be rendered above each group of categories with separator lines between sections + +#### Scenario: Flat cursor across sections +- **WHEN** user navigates with arrow keys +- **THEN** the cursor SHALL move through all categories across sections as a flat list, skipping section headers + +### Requirement: Keyword Search +The settings menu SHALL support real-time keyword search to filter categories. + +#### Scenario: Activate search +- **WHEN** user presses `/` in normal mode +- **THEN** the menu SHALL enter search mode, display a focused text input with `/ ` prompt and "Type to search..." placeholder, and reset the cursor to 0 + +#### Scenario: Filter categories +- **WHEN** user types a search query +- **THEN** the menu SHALL filter categories by case-insensitive substring match against title, description, and ID, updating results in real-time + +#### Scenario: Empty search query +- **WHEN** the search input is empty or whitespace-only +- **THEN** all categories SHALL be displayed (no filtering) + +#### Scenario: No results +- **WHEN** the search query matches no categories +- **THEN** the menu SHALL display "No matching items" in muted italic text + +#### Scenario: Select from search results +- **WHEN** user presses Enter during search mode +- **THEN** the selected filtered category SHALL be activated, search mode SHALL exit, and the search input SHALL be cleared + +#### Scenario: Cancel search +- **WHEN** user presses Esc during search mode +- **THEN** search mode SHALL be cancelled, the filtered list SHALL be cleared, and the full grouped menu SHALL be restored + +#### Scenario: Navigate search results +- **WHEN** user presses up/down (or shift+tab/tab) during search mode +- **THEN** the cursor SHALL move within the filtered results list + +### Requirement: Search Match Highlighting +The settings menu SHALL highlight matching substrings in search results. + +#### Scenario: Highlight matching text +- **WHEN** categories are displayed during an active search with a non-empty query +- **THEN** the first matching substring in each category's title and description SHALL be rendered in amber/warning color with bold styling + +#### Scenario: Selected item highlight +- **WHEN** the cursor is on a filtered category during search +- **THEN** the matching substring SHALL additionally be underlined + +### Requirement: Search Help Bar +The help bar SHALL update based on the current mode. + +#### Scenario: Normal mode help bar +- **WHEN** the menu is in normal mode +- **THEN** the help bar SHALL display: Navigate, Select, Search (`/`), Back (`Esc`) + +#### Scenario: Search mode help bar +- **WHEN** the menu is in search mode +- **THEN** the help bar SHALL display: Navigate, Select, Cancel (`Esc`) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-menu-search/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-menu-search/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..96082b84 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-menu-search/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +## 1. Menu Restructuring + +- [x] 1.1 Add `Section` struct with `Title string` and `Categories []Category` +- [x] 1.2 Change `MenuModel.Sections` from `[]Category` to `[]Section` +- [x] 1.3 Populate 6 named sections (Core, Communication, AI & Knowledge, Infrastructure, P2P Network, Security) plus untitled Save/Cancel section in `NewMenuModel()` +- [x] 1.4 Add `allCategories()` method to flatten sections into a single `[]Category` slice +- [x] 1.5 Add `renderGroupedView()` to render section headers with separator lines + +## 2. Search Feature + +- [x] 2.1 Add `searching bool`, `searchInput textinput.Model`, `filtered []Category` fields to `MenuModel` +- [x] 2.2 Initialize `textinput.Model` in `NewMenuModel()` with `/ ` prompt, placeholder, and styling +- [x] 2.3 Add `/` key handler in normal mode to activate search (focus input, reset cursor) +- [x] 2.4 Add search-mode key handling: Esc cancels, Enter selects, up/down navigates, default forwards to text input +- [x] 2.5 Implement `applyFilter()` — case-insensitive substring match on title, desc, and ID +- [x] 2.6 Add `selectableItems()` helper to return filtered or full list based on mode +- [x] 2.7 Implement `renderFilteredView()` with "No matching items" empty state + +## 3. Search Highlighting + +- [x] 3.1 Implement `highlightMatch()` — finds first match, renders with `tui.Warning` bold, underline if selected +- [x] 3.2 Integrate highlighting into `renderItem()` when search query is active + +## 4. Help Bar and View + +- [x] 4.1 Update `View()` to show search bar (active input or dim hint) at top +- [x] 4.2 Update help footer to show Search(`/`) in normal mode, Cancel(`Esc`) in search mode +- [x] 4.3 Add `IsSearching()` and `AllCategories()` public accessors + +## 5. Verification + +- [x] 5.1 Run `go build ./...` — no compilation errors +- [x] 5.2 Run `go test ./internal/cli/settings/...` — all tests pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-p2p-security-forms/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-p2p-security-forms/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d1c6cc6f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-p2p-security-forms/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-27 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-p2p-security-forms/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-p2p-security-forms/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3a524bd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-p2p-security-forms/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +## Context + +The `lango settings` TUI editor follows a Bubble Tea pattern: menu categories -> form builders (`NewXForm()`) -> centralized config write-back (`UpdateConfigFromForm()` switch). All P2P and advanced security config types already exist in `internal/config/types.go` and are consumed by `internal/app/wiring.go`, but lacked TUI exposure. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Expose all P2P and advanced security settings through the existing TUI settings editor +- Follow established patterns for form builders, state update switch, and menu categories +- Use conditional field visibility for nested sub-sections (container sandbox, KMS backend-specific fields) +- Handle `*bool` config fields correctly with helper functions + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing config types or initialization logic +- Adding list management UIs for complex struct arrays (e.g., FirewallRules) +- Backend implementation of P2P or KMS features (already done) + +## Decisions + +### Split P2P into 5 sub-categories +P2PConfig has 6 nested sub-domains with 30+ fields. A single form would be unwieldy. Split into P2P Network (14 fields), ZKP (5), Pricing (3), Owner Protection (5), and Sandbox (11). + +### Separate security sub-categories +The existing Security form already has 15 fields. Adding Keyring (1), DB Encryption (2), and KMS (12) would create a 30-field form. Separate menu entries keep each form focused. + +### Conditional field visibility for container and KMS fields +Container sandbox fields (runtime, image, network, rootfs, CPU, pool) are only visible when Container Sandbox is enabled. KMS fields are conditionally visible based on selected backend (cloud vs PKCS#11 vs local). + +### Expand signer provider options in existing Security form +Adding `aws-kms`, `gcp-kms`, `azure-kv`, `pkcs11` to the existing signer provider dropdown avoids a redundant form. The KMS form's backend selector mirrors this for consistency. + +### Reuse existing type-mapping patterns +- `[]string` -> comma-separated text with `splitCSV()` (same as RAG Collections) +- `map[string]string` -> `key:value` comma-separated with `parseCustomPatterns()` (same as PII) +- `*bool` -> `derefBool(ptr, defaultVal)` / `boolPtr(val)` helpers (new, minimal) + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- Menu length increases from 21 to 29 items -- acceptable with `/` search and j/k scrolling +- FirewallRules not editable in TUI -- complex struct arrays deferred to future work +- `*bool` is new to the form system -- contained to 2 fields, well-tested diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-p2p-security-forms/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-p2p-security-forms/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..67b649a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-p2p-security-forms/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## Why + +The `lango settings` TUI editor covers 21 configuration categories but lacks P2P networking (5 sub-domains) and advanced security (keyring, DB encryption, KMS) settings. Users must hand-edit encrypted config JSON to configure these features, breaking the consistent TUI experience. + +## What Changes + +- Add 8 new menu categories to the settings TUI under "P2P Network" and "Security" sections +- Add form builders for each category with field types matching their config counterparts (bool, text, int, select, password) +- Add ~53 new config write-back case entries in `UpdateConfigFromForm()` +- Extend the Security form's signer provider dropdown with `aws-kms`, `gcp-kms`, `azure-kv`, `pkcs11` +- Handle `*bool` config fields (BlockConversations, ReadOnlyRootfs) with `derefBool`/`boolPtr` helpers +- Use conditional field visibility (`VisibleWhen`) for container sandbox and KMS backend-specific fields + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `settings-p2p`: TUI forms for P2P Network, ZKP, Pricing, Owner Protection, and Sandbox +- `settings-security-advanced`: TUI forms for Security Keyring, DB Encryption, and KMS + +### Modified Capabilities +- `cli-settings`: Menu expanded from 21 to 29 categories; signer provider options extended + +## Impact + +- `internal/cli/settings/menu.go` -- 2 new sections (P2P Network, Security) with 8 categories +- `internal/cli/settings/forms_impl.go` -- 8 new form builders + `derefBool`/`formatKeyValueMap` helpers +- `internal/cli/settings/editor.go` -- 8 new `case` routes in `handleMenuSelection()` +- `internal/cli/tuicore/state_update.go` -- ~53 new case entries + `boolPtr` helper +- `internal/cli/settings/forms_impl_test.go` -- tests for all new forms and helpers diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-p2p-security-forms/specs/cli-settings/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-p2p-security-forms/specs/cli-settings/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bcd99054 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-p2p-security-forms/specs/cli-settings/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Configuration Coverage +The settings editor SHALL support editing all configuration sections including P2P networking and advanced security: +21. **P2P Network** -- Enabled, listen addrs, bootstrap peers, relay, mDNS, max peers, handshake timeout, session token TTL, auto-approve, gossip interval, ZK handshake/attestation, signed challenge, min trust score +22. **P2P ZKP** -- Proof cache dir, proving scheme, SRS mode/path, max credential age +23. **P2P Pricing** -- Enabled, per query price, tool-specific prices +24. **P2P Owner Protection** -- Owner name/email/phone, extra terms, block conversations +25. **P2P Sandbox** -- Tool isolation (enabled, timeout, memory), container sandbox (runtime, image, network, rootfs, CPU, pool) +26. **Security Keyring** -- OS keyring enabled +27. **Security DB Encryption** -- SQLCipher enabled, cipher page size +28. **Security KMS** -- Region, key ID, endpoint, fallback, timeout, retries, Azure vault/version, PKCS#11 module/slot/PIN/key label + +#### Scenario: Menu categories +- **WHEN** user launches `lango settings` +- **THEN** the menu SHALL display all categories including P2P Network, P2P ZKP, P2P Pricing, P2P Owner Protection, P2P Sandbox, Security Keyring, Security DB Encryption, Security KMS, grouped under "P2P Network" and "Security" sections + +### Requirement: Security form signer provider options +The Security form's signer provider dropdown SHALL include options for all supported providers: local, rpc, enclave, aws-kms, gcp-kms, azure-kv, pkcs11. + +#### Scenario: KMS providers available in signer dropdown +- **WHEN** user opens the Security form +- **THEN** the signer provider dropdown SHALL include "aws-kms", "gcp-kms", "azure-kv", and "pkcs11" as options + +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P Network settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P Network" form with 14 fields covering core P2P networking: enabled, listen addresses, bootstrap peers, relay, mDNS, max peers, handshake timeout, session token TTL, auto-approve known peers, gossip interval, ZK handshake, ZK attestation, require signed challenge, and min trust score. + +#### Scenario: User enables P2P networking +- **WHEN** user navigates to "P2P Network" and sets Enabled to true +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.enabled` field SHALL be set to true upon save + +#### Scenario: User sets listen addresses +- **WHEN** user enters comma-separated multiaddrs in "Listen Addresses" +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.listenAddrs` SHALL contain each address as a separate array element + +### Requirement: P2P ZKP settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P ZKP" form with fields for proof cache directory, proving scheme (plonk/groth16), SRS mode (unsafe/file), SRS path, and max credential age. + +#### Scenario: User selects groth16 proving scheme +- **WHEN** user selects "groth16" from the proving scheme dropdown +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.zkp.provingScheme` SHALL be set to "groth16" + +### Requirement: P2P Pricing settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P Pricing" form with fields for enabled, price per query, and tool-specific prices (as key:value comma-separated text). + +#### Scenario: User sets tool prices +- **WHEN** user enters "exec:0.10,browser:0.50" in the Tool Prices field +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.pricing.toolPrices` SHALL be a map with keys "exec" and "browser" + +### Requirement: P2P Owner Protection settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P Owner Protection" form with fields for owner name, email, phone, extra terms, and block conversations. The block conversations field SHALL default to checked when the config value is nil. + +#### Scenario: User sets block conversations with nil default +- **WHEN** the config's `blockConversations` is nil +- **THEN** the form SHALL display the checkbox as checked (default true) + +#### Scenario: User unchecks block conversations +- **WHEN** user unchecks "Block Conversations" +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.ownerProtection.blockConversations` SHALL be a pointer to false + +### Requirement: P2P Sandbox settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P Sandbox" form with fields for tool isolation (enabled, timeout, max memory) and container sandbox (enabled, runtime, image, network mode, read-only rootfs, CPU quota, pool size, pool idle timeout). Container-specific fields SHALL only be visible when Container Sandbox is enabled. + +#### Scenario: User configures container sandbox +- **WHEN** user enables container sandbox and selects "docker" runtime +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.toolIsolation.container.enabled` SHALL be true and `runtime` SHALL be "docker" + +#### Scenario: Container read-only rootfs defaults to true +- **WHEN** the config's `readOnlyRootfs` is nil +- **THEN** the form SHALL display the checkbox as checked (default true) + +### Requirement: Security Keyring settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "Security Keyring" form with a single field for OS keyring enabled/disabled. + +#### Scenario: User enables keyring +- **WHEN** user checks "OS Keyring Enabled" +- **THEN** the config's `security.keyring.enabled` SHALL be set to true + +### Requirement: Security DB Encryption settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "Security DB Encryption" form with fields for SQLCipher encryption enabled and cipher page size. + +#### Scenario: User enables DB encryption +- **WHEN** user checks "SQLCipher Encryption" and sets page size to 4096 +- **THEN** the config SHALL have `security.dbEncryption.enabled` true and `cipherPageSize` 4096 + +#### Scenario: Cipher page size validation +- **WHEN** user enters 0 or a negative number for cipher page size +- **THEN** the form SHALL display a validation error "must be a positive integer" + +### Requirement: Security KMS settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "Security KMS" form with conditional field visibility based on the selected backend. Cloud KMS fields (region, endpoint) appear for aws-kms/gcp-kms/azure-kv. Azure-specific fields appear for azure-kv. PKCS#11 fields appear for pkcs11. Common fields (key ID, fallback, timeout, retries) appear for all non-local backends. + +#### Scenario: User configures AWS KMS +- **WHEN** user selects "aws-kms" and enters region and key ARN +- **THEN** the config's `security.kms.region` and `security.kms.keyId` SHALL contain the entered values + +#### Scenario: PKCS#11 PIN is password field +- **WHEN** the KMS form is displayed with pkcs11 backend selected +- **THEN** the PKCS#11 PIN field SHALL use InputPassword type to mask the value + +#### Scenario: Local backend hides KMS fields +- **WHEN** user selects "local" as the KMS backend +- **THEN** all KMS-specific fields SHALL be hidden diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-p2p-security-forms/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-p2p-security-forms/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..83d01bbe --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-p2p-security-forms/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +## 1. Menu & Routing + +- [x] 1.1 Add "P2P Network" section with 5 categories (p2p, p2p_zkp, p2p_pricing, p2p_owner, p2p_sandbox) to `NewMenuModel()` in `menu.go` +- [x] 1.2 Add "Security" section with 3 new categories (security_keyring, security_db, security_kms) alongside existing security/auth entries in `menu.go` +- [x] 1.3 Add 8 new `case` entries in `handleMenuSelection()` in `editor.go` + +## 2. Form Builders + +- [x] 2.1 Add `derefBool(ptr *bool, defaultVal bool)` helper for `*bool` config fields +- [x] 2.2 Add `formatKeyValueMap(m map[string]string)` helper for map-to-string conversion +- [x] 2.3 Add `NewP2PForm()` -- 14 fields (enabled, listen addrs, bootstrap peers, relay, mDNS, max peers, handshake timeout, session token TTL, auto-approve, gossip interval, ZK handshake, ZK attestation, signed challenge, min trust score) +- [x] 2.4 Add `NewP2PZKPForm()` -- 5 fields (proof cache dir, proving scheme, SRS mode, SRS path, max credential age) +- [x] 2.5 Add `NewP2PPricingForm()` -- 3 fields (enabled, per query price, tool prices) +- [x] 2.6 Add `NewP2POwnerProtectionForm()` -- 5 fields (owner name, email, phone, extra terms, block conversations) +- [x] 2.7 Add `NewP2PSandboxForm()` -- 11 fields with `VisibleWhen` for container sub-fields (tool isolation enabled/timeout/memory, container enabled/runtime/image/network/rootfs/CPU/pool size/pool idle timeout) +- [x] 2.8 Add `NewKeyringForm()` -- 1 field (OS keyring enabled) +- [x] 2.9 Add `NewDBEncryptionForm()` -- 2 fields (SQLCipher enabled, cipher page size) +- [x] 2.10 Add `NewKMSForm()` -- 12 fields with `VisibleWhen` for backend-specific fields (backend, region, key ID, endpoint, fallback, timeout, retries, Azure vault/version, PKCS#11 module/slot/PIN/key label) + +## 3. Config Write-back + +- [x] 3.1 Add `boolPtr(val bool) *bool` helper in `state_update.go` +- [x] 3.2 Add P2P Network case entries (~14) in `UpdateConfigFromForm()` +- [x] 3.3 Add P2P ZKP case entries (~5) in `UpdateConfigFromForm()` +- [x] 3.4 Add P2P Pricing case entries (~3) in `UpdateConfigFromForm()` +- [x] 3.5 Add P2P Owner Protection case entries (~5) in `UpdateConfigFromForm()` +- [x] 3.6 Add P2P Sandbox case entries (~11) in `UpdateConfigFromForm()` +- [x] 3.7 Add Security Keyring case entry in `UpdateConfigFromForm()` +- [x] 3.8 Add Security DB Encryption case entries (~2) in `UpdateConfigFromForm()` +- [x] 3.9 Add Security KMS case entries (~12) in `UpdateConfigFromForm()` + +## 4. Existing Form Update + +- [x] 4.1 Expand signer provider options in `NewSecurityForm()` to include aws-kms, gcp-kms, azure-kv, pkcs11 + +## 5. Tests + +- [x] 5.1 Add form field count and key tests for all 8 new forms +- [x] 5.2 Add menu category existence tests for all 8 new categories +- [x] 5.3 Add config round-trip tests for P2P, Sandbox *bool, and KMS fields +- [x] 5.4 Add `derefBool` helper test + +## 6. Verification + +- [x] 6.1 Run `go build ./...` -- no errors +- [x] 6.2 Run `go test ./internal/cli/settings/...` -- all pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-tui-polish/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-tui-polish/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d1c6cc6f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-tui-polish/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-27 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-tui-polish/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-tui-polish/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a94012d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-tui-polish/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +## Context + +The Settings TUI (`lango settings`) is a multi-step bubbletea application with five editor steps: Welcome, Menu, Form, ProvidersList, and AuthProvidersList. Before this change, each view rendered its own ad-hoc styles with no shared design language, no navigation breadcrumbs, and inconsistent help text. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Establish a centralized design token system (colors + reusable styles) in `internal/cli/tui/styles.go` +- Add breadcrumb navigation to all editor steps for spatial context +- Wrap list/menu views in bordered containers for visual grouping +- Provide a consistent help bar pattern across all interactive views + +**Non-Goals:** +- No changes to form rendering (forms use `tuicore.FormModel` which has its own styling) +- No changes to key bindings or navigation logic +- No changes to onboard wizard (separate TUI) + +## Decisions + +1. **Design tokens in `tui` package, not `tuicore`**: The `tui` package (`internal/cli/tui/`) is the shared visual layer; `tuicore` holds form/config state logic. Design tokens belong in `tui` because they are consumed by both settings and onboard views. + +2. **Breadcrumb function, not model**: `tui.Breadcrumb()` is a pure rendering function (segments in, styled string out) rather than a bubbletea model. It has no state and is called from `editor.View()`. This keeps it simple and composable. + +3. **HelpBar as composable functions**: `HelpEntry(key, label)` renders a single badge + label, `HelpBar(entries...)` joins them. This avoids a struct-based approach and lets each view compose its own relevant entries. + +4. **RoundedBorder for containers**: `lipgloss.RoundedBorder()` was chosen over `NormalBorder()` for a softer visual appearance consistent with the search bar style. Border color uses `tui.Muted` for non-focus containers, `tui.Primary` for the welcome box and search bar. + +5. **Color palette values**: Colors follow a Tailwind-inspired palette for familiarity. `Primary` (#7C3AED, purple) is the brand color. `Accent` (#04B575, green) is for selection/focus states. `Dim` (#626262) is for secondary text. This avoids the common terminal pitfall of relying on ANSI colors that vary wildly across terminal emulators. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Terminal compatibility] Hex colors may not render correctly on terminals with fewer than 256 colors. Mitigation: lipgloss automatically degrades to the closest available color. +- [Style consistency] Other TUI views (onboard, doctor) do not yet use the new design tokens. Mitigation: The tokens are available for incremental adoption; no breaking change required. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-tui-polish/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-tui-polish/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..53d432f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-tui-polish/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +## Why + +The Settings TUI was functional but lacked visual polish. Users had no spatial context when navigating deeply nested menus, key bindings were inconsistent across views, and the interface had no unifying design language. This made the settings editor feel disconnected from the rest of the Lango CLI. + +## What Changes + +- Add `tui.Breadcrumb()` function for hierarchical navigation context (e.g., "Settings > Agent Configuration") displayed dynamically per editor step +- Wrap menu body, welcome screen, and provider/auth lists in `lipgloss.RoundedBorder()` styled containers +- Introduce a design system token layer in `internal/cli/tui/styles.go`: color constants (`Primary`, `Muted`, `Foreground`, `Accent`, `Dim`, `Warning`) and reusable styles (`SectionHeaderStyle`, `SeparatorLineStyle`, `CursorStyle`, `SearchBarStyle`) +- Add `tui.HelpBar()` and `tui.HelpEntry()` for consistent keyboard shortcut legends across all views (welcome, menu, providers list, auth providers list) + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +- `tui-design-tokens`: Centralized color palette and reusable styles in `internal/cli/tui/styles.go` +- `tui-breadcrumbs`: Hierarchical navigation breadcrumbs for spatial orientation +- `tui-help-bars`: Consistent key legend bars using badge + label pattern + +### Modified Capabilities + +- `cli-settings`: Settings editor views updated to use breadcrumbs, styled containers, and help bars + +## Impact + +- **Files modified**: `internal/cli/tui/styles.go` (new design tokens), `internal/cli/settings/editor.go` (breadcrumbs + welcome box), `internal/cli/settings/menu.go` (container + help bars), `internal/cli/settings/providers_list.go` (container + help bars), `internal/cli/settings/auth_providers_list.go` (container + help bars) +- **No behavioral changes**: All modifications are purely visual. No config logic, data flow, or key bindings changed. +- **No new dependencies**: Uses existing `lipgloss` package already in the dependency tree. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-tui-polish/specs/cli-settings/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-tui-polish/specs/cli-settings/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b72ded66 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-tui-polish/specs/cli-settings/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Breadcrumb navigation in settings editor +The settings editor SHALL display a breadcrumb navigation header that reflects the current editor step. The breadcrumb SHALL use `tui.Breadcrumb()` with the following segments per step: +- **StepWelcome / StepMenu**: "Settings" +- **StepForm**: "Settings" > form title (from `activeForm.Title`) +- **StepProvidersList**: "Settings" > "Providers" +- **StepAuthProvidersList**: "Settings" > "Auth Providers" + +The last breadcrumb segment SHALL be rendered in `Primary` color with bold weight. Preceding segments SHALL be rendered in `Muted` color. Segments SHALL be separated by " > " in `Dim` color. + +#### Scenario: Breadcrumb at menu +- **WHEN** user is at StepMenu +- **THEN** the breadcrumb SHALL display "Settings" as a single segment + +#### Scenario: Breadcrumb at form +- **WHEN** user is editing the Agent form (StepForm) +- **THEN** the breadcrumb SHALL display "Settings > Agent Configuration" + +#### Scenario: Breadcrumb at providers list +- **WHEN** user is at StepProvidersList +- **THEN** the breadcrumb SHALL display "Settings > Providers" + +### Requirement: Styled containers for menu and list views +The settings menu body, providers list body, and auth providers list body SHALL each be wrapped in a `lipgloss.RoundedBorder()` container with `tui.Muted` border color and padding `(0, 1)`. The welcome screen SHALL be wrapped in a `lipgloss.RoundedBorder()` container with `tui.Primary` border color and padding `(1, 3)`. + +#### Scenario: Menu container +- **WHEN** user is at StepMenu +- **THEN** the menu items SHALL be rendered inside a rounded-border container + +#### Scenario: Welcome container +- **WHEN** user is at StepWelcome +- **THEN** the welcome message SHALL be rendered inside a primary-colored rounded-border box + +### Requirement: Help bars in all interactive views +Every interactive settings view SHALL display a help bar at the bottom using `tui.HelpBar()` with `tui.HelpEntry()` badges. The help bars SHALL contain: +- **Welcome**: Enter (Start), Esc (Quit) +- **Menu (normal)**: up/down (Navigate), Enter (Select), / (Search), Esc (Back) +- **Menu (searching)**: up/down (Navigate), Enter (Select), Esc (Cancel) +- **Providers list**: up/down (Navigate), Enter (Select), d (Delete), Esc (Back) +- **Auth providers list**: up/down (Navigate), Enter (Select), d (Delete), Esc (Back) + +#### Scenario: Menu help bar in normal mode +- **WHEN** user is at StepMenu in normal mode (not searching) +- **THEN** the help bar SHALL show Navigate, Select, Search, and Back entries + +#### Scenario: Menu help bar in search mode +- **WHEN** user is at StepMenu in search mode +- **THEN** the help bar SHALL show Navigate, Select, and Cancel entries + +### Requirement: Design system tokens in tui package +The `internal/cli/tui/styles.go` file SHALL export the following design tokens: +- **Colors**: `Primary` (#7C3AED), `Success` (#10B981), `Warning` (#F59E0B), `Error` (#EF4444), `Muted` (#6B7280), `Foreground` (#F9FAFB), `Background` (#1F2937), `Highlight` (#3B82F6), `Accent` (#04B575), `Dim` (#626262), `Separator` (#374151) +- **Styles**: `TitleStyle`, `SubtitleStyle`, `SuccessStyle`, `WarningStyle`, `ErrorStyle`, `MutedStyle`, `HighlightStyle`, `BoxStyle`, `ListItemStyle`, `SelectedItemStyle`, `SectionHeaderStyle`, `SeparatorLineStyle`, `CursorStyle`, `ActiveItemStyle`, `SearchBarStyle`, `FormTitleBarStyle`, `FieldDescStyle` +- **Functions**: `Breadcrumb(segments ...string)`, `HelpEntry(key, label string)`, `HelpBar(entries ...string)`, `KeyBadge(key string)`, `FormatPass(msg)`, `FormatWarn(msg)`, `FormatFail(msg)`, `FormatMuted(msg)` + +#### Scenario: Breadcrumb rendering +- **WHEN** `tui.Breadcrumb("Settings", "Agent")` is called +- **THEN** the result SHALL be "Settings" in muted color, " > " separator in dim color, and "Agent" in primary bold + +#### Scenario: HelpEntry rendering +- **WHEN** `tui.HelpEntry("Esc", "Back")` is called +- **THEN** the result SHALL be a key badge with "Esc" followed by "Back" label in dim color diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-tui-polish/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-tui-polish/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5ea2f974 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-27-settings-tui-polish/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +## 1. Design System Tokens (internal/cli/tui/styles.go) + +- [x] 1.1 Define color palette constants: Primary, Success, Warning, Error, Muted, Foreground, Background, Highlight, Accent, Dim, Separator +- [x] 1.2 Define reusable styles: TitleStyle, SubtitleStyle, SuccessStyle, WarningStyle, ErrorStyle, MutedStyle, HighlightStyle, BoxStyle, ListItemStyle, SelectedItemStyle +- [x] 1.3 Define menu-specific styles: SectionHeaderStyle, SeparatorLineStyle, CursorStyle, ActiveItemStyle, SearchBarStyle, FormTitleBarStyle, FieldDescStyle +- [x] 1.4 Implement Breadcrumb(segments ...string) function with muted prefix segments and primary bold last segment +- [x] 1.5 Implement KeyBadge(key string), HelpEntry(key, label string), and HelpBar(entries ...string) functions +- [x] 1.6 Implement FormatPass, FormatWarn, FormatFail, FormatMuted helper functions + +## 2. Breadcrumb Navigation (internal/cli/settings/editor.go) + +- [x] 2.1 Add dynamic breadcrumb header in Editor.View() for StepWelcome and StepMenu ("Settings") +- [x] 2.2 Add breadcrumb for StepForm using activeForm.Title ("Settings > {form title}") +- [x] 2.3 Add breadcrumb for StepProvidersList ("Settings > Providers") +- [x] 2.4 Add breadcrumb for StepAuthProvidersList ("Settings > Auth Providers") + +## 3. Styled Containers + +- [x] 3.1 Wrap welcome screen in RoundedBorder container with Primary border color (editor.go viewWelcome) +- [x] 3.2 Wrap menu body in RoundedBorder container with Muted border color (menu.go View) +- [x] 3.3 Wrap providers list body in RoundedBorder container with Muted border color (providers_list.go View) +- [x] 3.4 Wrap auth providers list body in RoundedBorder container with Muted border color (auth_providers_list.go View) + +## 4. Help Bars + +- [x] 4.1 Add HelpBar to welcome screen: Enter (Start), Esc (Quit) +- [x] 4.2 Add HelpBar to menu normal mode: Navigate, Select, Search, Back +- [x] 4.3 Add HelpBar to menu search mode: Navigate, Select, Cancel +- [x] 4.4 Add HelpBar to providers list: Navigate, Select, Delete, Back +- [x] 4.5 Add HelpBar to auth providers list: Navigate, Select, Delete, Back + +## 5. Verification + +- [x] 5.1 Run go build ./... to verify no build errors +- [x] 5.2 Run go test ./... to verify no test failures diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a12a9b8d --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +## Context + +macOS Data Protection Keychain with biometric ACL (`kSecAccessControlBiometryAny`) requires proper Apple Developer code signing with the `keychain-access-groups` entitlement. Ad-hoc signed binaries (produced by `go build`) cannot access this Keychain, resulting in OSStatus `-34018` (`errSecMissingEntitlement`). Both `BiometricProvider` and `OSProvider` use the same macOS Keychain with identical service/account keys (`lango` / `master-passphrase`), but `OSProvider` stores items without biometric ACL, so no entitlement is needed. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Detect `-34018` entitlement errors as a typed sentinel (`ErrEntitlement`) for programmatic matching +- Automatically fall back to plain OS Keychain when biometric storage fails due to missing entitlements +- Provide clear user messaging explaining why biometric storage is unavailable and how to fix it +- Support both read-path fallback (passphrase acquisition) and write-path fallback (bootstrap + CLI store) +- Add codesign infrastructure for release builds that need biometric protection + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing the security tier detection logic — `DetectSecureProvider` still returns biometric tier on macOS with Touch ID hardware +- Removing or weakening the security tier model — plain OS keyring is a graceful degradation, not a replacement +- Auto-detecting code signing status at startup + +## Decisions + +**1. Sentinel error via `errors.New` + `fmt.Errorf %w` wrapping** +- Rationale: Callers use `errors.Is(err, keyring.ErrEntitlement)` without type-asserting. Follows project error conventions (go-errors.md). Each call site wraps with its own context prefix (`keychain biometric get:`, etc.) +- Alternative: Custom error type with OSStatus field — rejected as over-engineered for a single status code. + +**2. FallbackProvider as explicit Options field, not automatic chain** +- Rationale: Keeps the priority chain transparent: secure provider → fallback provider → keyfile → interactive → stdin. The caller (bootstrap) decides whether to wire a fallback, preserving the principle that TierNone systems should NOT auto-use plain OS keyring. +- Alternative: Chain internally in Acquire() by detecting `ErrEntitlement` — rejected because it would require Acquire to know about OS keyring construction, violating separation of concerns. + +**3. macOS-only fallback guard (`runtime.GOOS == "darwin"`)** +- Rationale: Only macOS has the shared-Keychain property where `BiometricProvider` and `OSProvider` hit the same backend. On Linux, biometric and TPM are distinct backends, so fallback to OS keyring would not help. + +**4. Entitlements plist with `$(AppIdentifierPrefix)` variable** +- Rationale: Uses Apple's build-time variable expansion so the entitlement works with any team ID. Standard pattern for Keychain access groups. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Reduced security in fallback] Plain OS keyring items are readable by any process running as the same UID → Mitigation: Clear warning messages; biometric protection available via `make codesign`. The fallback is strictly better than no persistence (which forces keyfile or repeated interactive prompts). +- [Same service/account key collision] If a user switches between ad-hoc and codesigned binaries, the Keychain item may exist with or without biometric ACL → Mitigation: `BiometricProvider` always deletes existing items before writing (`SecItemDelete` in `keychain_set_biometric`), so the ACL is reset correctly on each store. +- [Codesign requires Apple Developer identity] `make codesign` needs `APPLE_IDENTITY` → Mitigation: Self-signed certificates can work for local use; documented in the make target help text. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..28d5d58f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +## Why + +Biometric passphrase storage on macOS fails with `-34018 (errSecMissingEntitlement)` for ad-hoc signed binaries built with `go build`. Users must re-enter the passphrase on every launch because the Data Protection Keychain with biometric ACL requires proper Apple Developer code signing. Since `BiometricProvider` and `OSProvider` share the same macOS Keychain with the same service/account key, falling back to `OSProvider` (no biometric ACL) allows passphrase persistence without code signing while still enabling biometric protection for properly signed release builds. + +## What Changes + +- Add `ErrEntitlement` sentinel error for `-34018` detection via `errors.Is()` +- Wrap OSStatus `-34018` as `ErrEntitlement` in `BiometricProvider.Get/Set/Delete` +- Add `FallbackProvider` field to `passphrase.Options` for plain OS keyring fallback on read +- Bootstrap detects entitlement errors on biometric store and falls back to `OSProvider` with user-facing guidance +- CLI `keyring store` command applies the same fallback logic +- Add `build/entitlements.plist` with Keychain access groups for release code signing +- Add `make codesign` target for signing binaries with biometric Keychain entitlements + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +(none) + +### Modified Capabilities + +- `os-keyring`: Add `ErrEntitlement` sentinel; `BiometricProvider` wraps `-34018` as `ErrEntitlement` +- `passphrase-acquisition`: Add `FallbackProvider` for plain OS keyring read fallback +- `bootstrap-lifecycle`: Entitlement-aware fallback storage with user messaging + +## Impact + +- `internal/keyring/keyring.go` — `ErrEntitlement` sentinel +- `internal/keyring/biometric_darwin.go` — `-34018` → `ErrEntitlement` wrapping in Get/Set/Delete +- `internal/security/passphrase/acquire.go` — `FallbackProvider` field + fallback read path +- `internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go` — fallback store logic + `FallbackProvider` wiring +- `internal/cli/security/keyring.go` — `keyring store` fallback +- `build/entitlements.plist` — NEW: macOS entitlements for Keychain access +- `Makefile` — `codesign` target diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/specs/bootstrap-lifecycle/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/specs/bootstrap-lifecycle/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b92bf319 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/specs/bootstrap-lifecycle/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Report biometric passphrase store outcome +When the bootstrap flow stores a passphrase in the secure keyring provider, it SHALL report the outcome to stderr. On entitlement error (`ErrEntitlement`), the system SHALL fall back to `OSProvider` (plain macOS Keychain without biometric ACL) and report the fallback status. On other failures, the message SHALL be `warning: store passphrase failed: `. On success, the message SHALL be `Passphrase stored successfully.`. + +#### Scenario: Biometric store succeeds +- **WHEN** `secureProvider.Set()` returns nil +- **THEN** stderr SHALL contain `Passphrase stored successfully.` + +#### Scenario: Biometric store fails with entitlement error +- **WHEN** `secureProvider.Set()` returns an error satisfying `errors.Is(err, keyring.ErrEntitlement)` +- **THEN** stderr SHALL contain `warning: biometric storage unavailable (binary not codesigned)` +- **AND** the system SHALL attempt `OSProvider.Set()` as fallback + +#### Scenario: Entitlement fallback to OSProvider succeeds +- **WHEN** biometric store fails with `ErrEntitlement` and `OSProvider.Set()` succeeds +- **THEN** stderr SHALL contain `Passphrase stored in macOS Keychain (without biometric protection).` +- **AND** stderr SHALL contain `For biometric protection, codesign the binary: make codesign` + +#### Scenario: Entitlement fallback to OSProvider fails +- **WHEN** biometric store fails with `ErrEntitlement` and `OSProvider.Set()` also fails +- **THEN** stderr SHALL contain `warning: fallback keychain store also failed: ` + +#### Scenario: Biometric store fails with non-entitlement error +- **WHEN** `secureProvider.Set()` returns an error NOT satisfying `errors.Is(err, keyring.ErrEntitlement)` +- **THEN** stderr SHALL contain `warning: store passphrase failed: ` + +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: FallbackProvider wiring for macOS +On macOS, when a secure hardware provider (biometric) is detected, bootstrap SHALL create an `OSProvider` as the `FallbackProvider` in passphrase acquisition options. This enables reading passphrase items stored without biometric ACL. + +#### Scenario: macOS with biometric provider +- **WHEN** bootstrap runs on macOS with a detected biometric provider +- **THEN** `passphrase.Acquire()` SHALL receive an `OSProvider` as `FallbackProvider` + +#### Scenario: Non-macOS or no secure provider +- **WHEN** bootstrap runs on Linux or with no secure provider +- **THEN** `FallbackProvider` SHALL be nil diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/specs/os-keyring/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/specs/os-keyring/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fbc621da --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/specs/os-keyring/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: ErrEntitlement sentinel for missing code signing +The keyring package SHALL export an `ErrEntitlement` sentinel error. `BiometricProvider.Get`, `Set`, and `Delete` SHALL wrap OSStatus `-34018` as `ErrEntitlement` using `fmt.Errorf %w`, allowing callers to match with `errors.Is(err, keyring.ErrEntitlement)`. + +#### Scenario: BiometricProvider.Set returns ErrEntitlement on -34018 +- **WHEN** `SecItemAdd` returns OSStatus `-34018` +- **THEN** the returned error SHALL satisfy `errors.Is(err, keyring.ErrEntitlement)` +- **AND** the error message SHALL contain `keychain biometric set:` + +#### Scenario: BiometricProvider.Get returns ErrEntitlement on -34018 +- **WHEN** `SecItemCopyMatching` returns OSStatus `-34018` +- **THEN** the returned error SHALL satisfy `errors.Is(err, keyring.ErrEntitlement)` +- **AND** the error message SHALL contain `keychain biometric get:` + +#### Scenario: BiometricProvider.Delete returns ErrEntitlement on -34018 +- **WHEN** `SecItemDelete` returns OSStatus `-34018` +- **THEN** the returned error SHALL satisfy `errors.Is(err, keyring.ErrEntitlement)` +- **AND** the error message SHALL contain `keychain biometric delete:` + +#### Scenario: Non-entitlement OSStatus errors unchanged +- **WHEN** a biometric operation returns an OSStatus other than `-34018` (e.g., `-25308`) +- **THEN** the error SHALL NOT satisfy `errors.Is(err, keyring.ErrEntitlement)` +- **AND** the error message SHALL contain the numeric code and `osStatusDescription` output diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/specs/passphrase-acquisition/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/specs/passphrase-acquisition/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..447308ad --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/specs/passphrase-acquisition/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: FallbackProvider for plain OS keyring read +The `Options` struct SHALL include a `FallbackProvider keyring.Provider` field. When set, `Acquire()` SHALL attempt to read from `FallbackProvider` after `KeyringProvider` fails and before trying keyfile. Non-`ErrNotFound` errors from `FallbackProvider` SHALL be logged to stderr as `warning: fallback keyring read failed: `. + +#### Scenario: Primary fails, fallback succeeds +- **WHEN** `KeyringProvider.Get()` returns `ErrNotFound` and `FallbackProvider.Get()` returns a passphrase +- **THEN** `Acquire()` SHALL return the passphrase with `SourceKeyring` + +#### Scenario: Primary fails, fallback also fails +- **WHEN** both `KeyringProvider.Get()` and `FallbackProvider.Get()` return `ErrNotFound` +- **THEN** `Acquire()` SHALL proceed to keyfile → interactive → stdin + +#### Scenario: Fallback provider is nil +- **WHEN** `FallbackProvider` is nil +- **THEN** the fallback step SHALL be skipped entirely + +#### Scenario: Fallback read error logged +- **WHEN** `FallbackProvider.Get()` returns a non-`ErrNotFound` error +- **THEN** stderr SHALL contain `warning: fallback keyring read failed: ` +- **AND** acquisition SHALL continue to keyfile diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0eb2e3cd --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-keychain-fallback/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +## 1. ErrEntitlement Sentinel + +- [x] 1.1 Add `ErrEntitlement` sentinel error to `internal/keyring/keyring.go` +- [x] 1.2 Wrap OSStatus `-34018` as `ErrEntitlement` in `BiometricProvider.Get` +- [x] 1.3 Wrap OSStatus `-34018` as `ErrEntitlement` in `BiometricProvider.Set` +- [x] 1.4 Wrap OSStatus `-34018` as `ErrEntitlement` in `BiometricProvider.Delete` + +## 2. Passphrase Acquisition Fallback + +- [x] 2.1 Add `FallbackProvider keyring.Provider` field to `passphrase.Options` +- [x] 2.2 Add fallback read path in `Acquire()` between primary keyring and keyfile + +## 3. Bootstrap Fallback Storage + +- [x] 3.1 Wire `OSProvider` as `FallbackProvider` on macOS when biometric is detected +- [x] 3.2 Detect `ErrEntitlement` on biometric store failure and fall back to `OSProvider.Set()` +- [x] 3.3 Emit user-facing messages: warning, fallback result, codesign guidance + +## 4. CLI Keyring Store Fallback + +- [x] 4.1 Add `ErrEntitlement` detection to `keyring store` command +- [x] 4.2 Fall back to `OSProvider.Set()` with user-facing messages + +## 5. Codesign Infrastructure + +- [x] 5.1 Create `build/entitlements.plist` with Keychain access groups +- [x] 5.2 Add `codesign` target to Makefile with `APPLE_IDENTITY` requirement + +## 6. Verification + +- [x] 6.1 Run `go build ./...` and confirm no compilation errors +- [x] 6.2 Run `go test ./internal/keyring/... ./internal/bootstrap/... ./internal/security/...` and confirm all pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-login-keychain-switch/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-login-keychain-switch/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-login-keychain-switch/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-login-keychain-switch/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-login-keychain-switch/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1cdf0640 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-login-keychain-switch/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +## Context + +The `BiometricProvider` currently targets the macOS Data Protection Keychain by using `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly` as the protection level in `SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags`. The Data Protection Keychain requires the binary to be signed with a `keychain-access-groups` entitlement, which means ad-hoc signed binaries from `go build` fail with OSStatus `-34018 (errSecMissingEntitlement)`. + +macOS provides an alternative: the login Keychain, which accepts `kSecAttrAccessControl` with biometric flags without requiring entitlements. By explicitly opting out of the Data Protection Keychain (`kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = false`) and using `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly` + `kSecAccessControlBiometryCurrentSet`, Touch ID protection is achieved without code signing requirements. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Make biometric keyring storage work with ad-hoc signed (`go build`) binaries +- Improve security by switching from `BiometryAny` to `BiometryCurrentSet` (invalidates items on fingerprint enrollment changes) +- Add a real Keychain probe in `keychain_biometric_available` to detect entitlement issues at detection time rather than at first use +- Keep codesign as an optional enhancement for Data Protection Keychain access in release builds + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing the Provider interface or adding new SecurityTier values +- Modifying TPMProvider behavior +- Re-introducing `go-keyring` dependency +- Changing the biometric provider's Go-level API + +## Decisions + +### Decision 1: Login Keychain via `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = false` + +All Keychain queries (set/get/has/delete) explicitly set `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = kCFBooleanFalse` to force operations to the login Keychain. + +**Rationale**: The login Keychain does not require `keychain-access-groups` entitlement. Biometric ACL (`kSecAttrAccessControl`) still enforces Touch ID authentication for reads. This is the simplest path to making ad-hoc binaries work. + +**Alternative considered**: Keeping Data Protection Keychain and documenting that codesign is required. Rejected because it creates a poor developer experience and blocks immediate use after `go build`. + +### Decision 2: `BiometryCurrentSet` instead of `BiometryAny` + +Changed from `kSecAccessControlBiometryAny` to `kSecAccessControlBiometryCurrentSet`. + +**Rationale**: `BiometryCurrentSet` invalidates stored items when the biometric enrollment changes (fingerprints added/removed). This prevents a scenario where an attacker adds their fingerprint and accesses previously stored secrets. Strictly more secure. + +### Decision 3: `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly` protection level + +Changed from `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly` to `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly`. + +**Rationale**: This requires a device passcode to be set, which is a prerequisite for biometric authentication anyway. Items are still excluded from backups (`ThisDeviceOnly`). The key difference is that if the user removes their passcode, the items become inaccessible — a desirable security property. + +### Decision 4: Real Keychain probe in availability check + +The `keychain_biometric_available` function now performs a real `SecItemAdd` + `SecItemDelete` probe instead of just checking `SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags`. + +**Rationale**: `SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags` succeeds even when the Keychain won't accept items (e.g., missing entitlements, passcode not set). The probe catches these issues at detection time, so `DetectSecureProvider` returns `(nil, TierNone)` instead of returning a provider that fails on first use. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **[Risk] Login Keychain items are not hardware-encrypted by Secure Enclave** → The Keychain file itself is still encrypted. Touch ID ACL still enforces biometric authentication. The practical security difference is minimal for passphrase storage. +- **[Risk] Device passcode not set** → `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly` will fail if no passcode is configured. The probe detects this, and error messages now mention this requirement. +- **[Risk] Fingerprint enrollment change invalidates stored passphrase** → This is intentional security behavior. Users will need to re-store the passphrase after changing fingerprints. Error messages should guide users. +- **[Trade-off] Probe adds ~10ms to startup** → Only runs once during `DetectSecureProvider`. Acceptable for a one-time detection. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-login-keychain-switch/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-login-keychain-switch/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..97e16a19 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-login-keychain-switch/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## Why + +The `BiometricProvider` targets the macOS Data Protection Keychain via `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly`, which requires `keychain-access-groups` entitlement. This means `go build` ad-hoc signed binaries fail with `-34018 (errSecMissingEntitlement)`. Switching to the login Keychain with `kSecAttrAccessControl` + `BiometryCurrentSet` provides Touch ID protection without entitlement requirements, making biometric storage work out of the box. + +## What Changes + +- Switch all Keychain queries from Data Protection Keychain to login Keychain (`kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = false`) +- Change access control from `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly` + `BiometryAny` to `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly` + `BiometryCurrentSet` +- Replace simple `SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags` availability check with a real Keychain probe (SecItemAdd + cleanup) for accurate detection +- Update error messages to mention device passcode requirement +- Update Makefile `codesign` target description from required to optional enhancement + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +(none) + +### Modified Capabilities +- `keyring-security-tiering`: BiometricProvider now targets login Keychain instead of Data Protection Keychain; access control changed to BiometryCurrentSet; entitlement no longer required for biometric tier + +## Impact + +- `internal/keyring/biometric_darwin.go` — All C functions updated (set/get/has/delete/available) +- `internal/keyring/keyring.go` — ErrEntitlement doc comment updated +- `internal/cli/security/keyring.go` — Error messages improved +- `internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go` — Error messages improved +- `Makefile` — codesign target description changed +- `build/entitlements.plist` — Retained for optional release builds diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-login-keychain-switch/specs/keyring-security-tiering/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-login-keychain-switch/specs/keyring-security-tiering/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0d746dcf --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-login-keychain-switch/specs/keyring-security-tiering/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: BiometricProvider uses macOS Keychain with Touch ID ACL +The system SHALL provide a `BiometricProvider` that stores secrets in the macOS login Keychain (NOT the Data Protection Keychain) using `kSecAccessControlBiometryCurrentSet` access control with `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly` protection. All Keychain queries SHALL set `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = kCFBooleanFalse` to explicitly target the login Keychain. This provider SHALL require Touch ID authentication for every read operation, and SHALL invalidate stored items when biometric enrollment changes. + +#### Scenario: Store and retrieve with biometric +- **WHEN** a secret is stored via `BiometricProvider.Set()` and later retrieved via `BiometricProvider.Get()` +- **THEN** the Set SHALL create a login Keychain item with `BiometryCurrentSet` ACL and `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = false`, and Get SHALL trigger Touch ID before returning the value + +#### Scenario: Biometric not available on non-Darwin platform +- **WHEN** `NewBiometricProvider()` is called on a non-Darwin or non-CGO platform +- **THEN** it SHALL return `ErrBiometricNotAvailable` + +#### Scenario: Ad-hoc signed binary works without entitlement +- **WHEN** a `go build` ad-hoc signed binary calls `BiometricProvider.Set()` or `BiometricProvider.Get()` +- **THEN** the operation SHALL succeed without requiring `keychain-access-groups` entitlement + +#### Scenario: Fingerprint enrollment change invalidates stored items +- **WHEN** a user changes their biometric enrollment (adds or removes fingerprints) after storing a secret +- **THEN** attempts to retrieve the secret SHALL fail because `BiometryCurrentSet` invalidates the access control + +#### Scenario: Device passcode not set +- **WHEN** the device does not have a passcode configured +- **THEN** `NewBiometricProvider()` SHALL return `ErrBiometricNotAvailable` because the Keychain probe will fail + +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: BiometricProvider availability probe uses real Keychain write +The `keychain_biometric_available` function SHALL verify biometric support by performing a real `SecItemAdd` probe to the login Keychain with biometric ACL, rather than only checking `SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags`. The probe item SHALL be cleaned up immediately after the test. + +#### Scenario: Probe succeeds on capable hardware +- **WHEN** `keychain_biometric_available()` is called on a macOS device with Touch ID and device passcode set +- **THEN** it SHALL add a probe item to the login Keychain, delete it, and return 1 + +#### Scenario: Probe fails without passcode +- **WHEN** `keychain_biometric_available()` is called on a macOS device without a passcode +- **THEN** the `SecItemAdd` SHALL fail and the function SHALL return 0 + +#### Scenario: Probe does not trigger Touch ID +- **WHEN** the probe item is added via `SecItemAdd` +- **THEN** it SHALL NOT trigger a Touch ID prompt because Keychain writes bypass ACL evaluation + +### Requirement: All Keychain queries target login Keychain explicitly +Every Keychain query dictionary (set, get, has, delete) SHALL include `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = kCFBooleanFalse` to ensure operations target the login Keychain and never fall through to the Data Protection Keychain. + +#### Scenario: Set targets login Keychain +- **WHEN** `keychain_set_biometric()` builds its query dictionaries +- **THEN** both the delete-existing and add-new dictionaries SHALL include `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = kCFBooleanFalse` + +#### Scenario: Get targets login Keychain +- **WHEN** `keychain_get_biometric()` builds its query dictionary +- **THEN** it SHALL include `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = kCFBooleanFalse` + +#### Scenario: Has targets login Keychain +- **WHEN** `keychain_has_biometric()` builds its query dictionary +- **THEN** it SHALL include `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = kCFBooleanFalse` + +#### Scenario: Delete targets login Keychain +- **WHEN** `keychain_delete_biometric()` builds its query dictionary +- **THEN** it SHALL include `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = kCFBooleanFalse` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-login-keychain-switch/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-login-keychain-switch/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0a8655e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-login-keychain-switch/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +## 1. Core Keychain C Functions + +- [x] 1.1 Update `keychain_set_biometric` to use `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly` + `kSecAccessControlBiometryCurrentSet` and add `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = false` to all query dictionaries +- [x] 1.2 Update `keychain_get_biometric` to add `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = false` +- [x] 1.3 Update `keychain_has_biometric` to add `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = false` +- [x] 1.4 Update `keychain_delete_biometric` to add `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = false` +- [x] 1.5 Replace `keychain_biometric_available` with real Keychain probe (SecItemAdd + cleanup) + +## 2. Go Layer Updates + +- [x] 2.1 Update `BiometricProvider` struct doc comment to reflect login Keychain and BiometryCurrentSet +- [x] 2.2 Update `Set` method doc comment +- [x] 2.3 Update `osStatusDescription` to add `-25291` (passcode not set) and improve `-25293` description +- [x] 2.4 Update `ErrEntitlement` doc comment in `keyring.go` + +## 3. Error Messages + +- [x] 3.1 Update `internal/cli/security/keyring.go` — add passcode requirement note to entitlement error +- [x] 3.2 Update `internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go` — add passcode requirement note to entitlement warning + +## 4. Build System + +- [x] 4.1 Update Makefile `codesign` target description from required to optional enhancement + +## 5. Verification + +- [x] 5.1 Run `go build ./...` — verify compilation succeeds +- [x] 5.2 Run `go test ./internal/keyring/...` — verify all tests pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-memory-security/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-memory-security/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-memory-security/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-memory-security/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-memory-security/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..52788dea --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-memory-security/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +## Context + +The `BiometricProvider` in `internal/keyring/biometric_darwin.go` uses CGo to call +macOS Security framework APIs for Touch ID-protected Keychain access. The current +implementation correctly applies `kSecAccessControlBiometryAny` for access control but +does not zero sensitive plaintext buffers before freeing them. This leaves passphrase +data exposed in freed heap pages, vulnerable to memory dump or core dump analysis. + +Current data flow in `Get()`: +1. C `malloc` + `memcpy` from CFData → C heap buffer +2. `C.GoStringN` copies to Go heap → Go string (immutable) +3. `C.free` releases C buffer without zeroing + +Current data flow in `Set()`: +1. `C.CString(value)` allocates NUL-terminated C buffer +2. Passed to `keychain_set_biometric` +3. `C.free` releases without zeroing + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Zero all C heap buffers containing plaintext before freeing +- Zero intermediate Go `[]byte` copies before they become unreachable +- Use `volatile` pointer pattern to prevent compiler optimization of zeroing +- Update documentation to reflect hardware-backed keyring terminology + +**Non-Goals:** +- Converting Provider interface from `string` to `[]byte` (scope too large, touches all consumers) +- Adding `kSecAttrAccessGroup` (CLI binary has no bundle ID, making it ineffective) +- Using Secure Enclave directly (only supports EC keys, not symmetric passphrase storage) +- Eliminating the final Go `string` copy (Go strings are immutable by design) + +## Decisions + +### D1: Volatile-pointer zeroing in C (`secure_free`) + +**Choice**: Custom `secure_free(char *ptr, int len)` using `volatile char *` loop. + +**Alternatives considered**: +- `memset_s` (C11 Annex K): Not available on all macOS toolchains via CGo +- `explicit_bzero` (BSD): Not portable to CGo compilation context +- `SecureZeroMemory` (Windows): Platform-specific + +**Rationale**: The `volatile` cast is the most portable pattern and is recommended by +CERT C (MSC06-C). The compiler cannot optimize away writes through a `volatile` pointer. + +### D2: `[]byte` intermediate in Go `Get()` + +**Choice**: Use `C.GoBytes` → `string()` → zero the `[]byte`, instead of `C.GoStringN`. + +**Rationale**: `C.GoStringN` returns an immutable `string` that cannot be zeroed. +By going through `[]byte` first, we can zero the intermediate copy after extracting +the string. This reduces the window of plaintext exposure from two copies (C + Go string) +to one (Go string only, which is unavoidable without interface changes). + +### D3: `memset` before `free` in `Set()` + +**Choice**: Call `C.memset(ptr, 0, len+1)` before `C.free` on the `CString` buffer. + +**Rationale**: The `CString` buffer holds the plaintext passphrase in C heap. While the +passphrase is also present as a Go string (caller-side), zeroing the C copy removes one +attack surface. Using `memset` here is acceptable since the buffer is freed immediately +after in the same `defer` — no optimization window for the compiler to skip it. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **[Go string remains in memory]** → The final Go `string` returned from `Get()` cannot be + zeroed due to Go's immutable string semantics. Mitigation: this is a known Go limitation; + the C-side and `[]byte` zeroing still reduces attack surface significantly. +- **[volatile loop performance]** → Negligible; `secure_free` runs once per Keychain + access (user-interactive operation, not hot path). +- **[GC may copy []byte before zeroing]** → Possible but unlikely in practice for + short-lived buffers. Full mitigation would require `runtime.KeepAlive` or pinning, + which is overkill for this threat model. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-memory-security/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-memory-security/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..31fa535b --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-memory-security/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +## Why + +The BiometricProvider (Touch ID + Keychain) implementation stores and retrieves plaintext +passphrases through C/CGo interop but does not zero sensitive memory before freeing it. +This leaves plaintext passphrases lingering in freed heap pages, exposable via memory dumps +or core dumps. This is a HIGH severity gap against secure coding best practices. + +## What Changes + +- Add `secure_free()` C helper that zeroes memory via volatile pointer before calling `free()`, + preventing compiler optimization from eliding the wipe +- Change `Get()` to copy Keychain data into a Go `[]byte`, call `secure_free` on the C buffer, + then zero the Go `[]byte` after extracting the string +- Change `Set()` to zero the `C.CString` buffer via `memset` before freeing it +- Update `SourceKeyring` documentation comment to reflect hardware-backed keyring (Touch ID/TPM) + instead of generic OS keyring references + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +_(none — this is a hardening change to existing capability)_ + +### Modified Capabilities + +- `passphrase-acquisition`: Update SourceKeyring comment to reflect hardware keyring terminology +- `keyring-security-tiering`: Add memory zeroing requirements for C interop buffers in BiometricProvider + +## Impact + +- `internal/keyring/biometric_darwin.go` — C block and Go Get/Set methods +- `internal/security/passphrase/acquire.go` — SourceKeyring comment +- No API changes, no breaking changes, no new dependencies diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-memory-security/specs/keyring-security-tiering/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-memory-security/specs/keyring-security-tiering/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d7e069f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-memory-security/specs/keyring-security-tiering/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: BiometricProvider SHALL zero C heap buffers before freeing +The `BiometricProvider` SHALL zero all C heap buffers containing plaintext secrets before calling `free()`. Zeroing MUST use a volatile pointer pattern to prevent compiler optimization from eliding the memory wipe. + +#### Scenario: Get zeroes C buffer via secure_free +- **WHEN** `BiometricProvider.Get()` retrieves a secret from the Keychain +- **THEN** the C heap buffer SHALL be zeroed via `secure_free()` (volatile pointer loop + free) before control returns to Go + +#### Scenario: Set zeroes CString buffer before freeing +- **WHEN** `BiometricProvider.Set()` stores a secret in the Keychain +- **THEN** the `C.CString` buffer containing the plaintext value SHALL be zeroed with `memset` before `free` is called + +### Requirement: BiometricProvider SHALL zero intermediate Go byte slices +The `BiometricProvider.Get()` method SHALL copy Keychain data into a Go `[]byte` via `C.GoBytes`, extract the string, and then zero every byte of the `[]byte` slice before it becomes unreachable. + +#### Scenario: Get zeroes Go byte slice after string extraction +- **WHEN** `BiometricProvider.Get()` copies data from C heap to Go heap +- **THEN** it SHALL use `C.GoBytes` (not `C.GoStringN`), extract the string via `string(data)`, and zero the `[]byte` with a range loop + +### Requirement: secure_free C helper prevents compiler optimization +The C `secure_free` helper function SHALL cast the pointer to `volatile char *` before zeroing to prevent the compiler from optimizing away the memset as a dead store. + +#### Scenario: Volatile pointer prevents optimization +- **WHEN** `secure_free(ptr, len)` is called +- **THEN** it SHALL iterate through the buffer using a `volatile char *` pointer, set each byte to zero, and then call `free(ptr)` + +#### Scenario: Null pointer safety +- **WHEN** `secure_free(NULL, 0)` is called +- **THEN** it SHALL return without error (NULL guard) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-memory-security/specs/passphrase-acquisition/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-memory-security/specs/passphrase-acquisition/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..910df39a --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-memory-security/specs/passphrase-acquisition/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Passphrase acquisition priority chain +The system SHALL acquire a passphrase using the following priority: (1) hardware keyring (Touch ID / TPM), (2) keyfile at `~/.lango/keyfile`, (3) interactive terminal prompt, (4) stdin pipe. The system SHALL return an error if no source is available. + +#### Scenario: Keyring provider returns passphrase +- **WHEN** `Acquire()` is called with a non-nil `KeyringProvider` that returns a valid passphrase +- **THEN** the passphrase is returned with `SourceKeyring` and no further sources are tried + +#### Scenario: Keyfile exists with correct permissions +- **WHEN** a keyfile exists at the configured path with 0600 permissions +- **THEN** the passphrase is read from the file and `SourceKeyfile` is returned + +#### Scenario: Keyfile has wrong permissions +- **WHEN** a keyfile exists but does not have 0600 permissions +- **THEN** the keyfile is skipped and the next source is tried + +#### Scenario: Interactive terminal available +- **WHEN** no keyfile is available and stdin is a terminal +- **THEN** the user is prompted for a passphrase via hidden input and `SourceInteractive` is returned + +#### Scenario: New passphrase creation +- **WHEN** `AllowCreation` is true and interactive terminal is used +- **THEN** the user is prompted twice (entry + confirmation) and the passphrase must match + +#### Scenario: Stdin pipe +- **WHEN** no keyfile is available and stdin is a pipe (not a terminal) +- **THEN** one line is read from stdin and `SourceStdin` is returned + +#### Scenario: No source available +- **WHEN** no keyfile exists, stdin is not a terminal, and stdin pipe is empty +- **THEN** the system returns an error diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-memory-security/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-memory-security/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b4e85622 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-biometric-memory-security/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +## 1. C-Level Memory Security + +- [x] 1.1 Add `secure_free` C helper with volatile pointer zeroing to `biometric_darwin.go` +- [x] 1.2 Update `Get()` to use `C.GoBytes` + `C.secure_free` instead of `C.GoStringN` + `C.free` +- [x] 1.3 Add Go `[]byte` zeroing loop after string extraction in `Get()` + +## 2. Set() Buffer Zeroing + +- [x] 2.1 Replace `defer C.free(cValue)` with `defer` that calls `C.memset` + `C.free` in `Set()` + +## 3. Documentation + +- [x] 3.1 Update `SourceKeyring` comment in `passphrase/acquire.go` to "hardware keyring (Touch ID / TPM)" + +## 4. Verification + +- [x] 4.1 Run `go build ./...` — confirm no compilation errors +- [x] 4.2 Run `go test ./internal/keyring/...` — confirm all tests pass +- [x] 4.3 Run `go test ./internal/security/passphrase/...` — confirm all tests pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-brand-banner-screen-clear/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-brand-banner-screen-clear/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d1c6cc6f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-brand-banner-screen-clear/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-27 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-brand-banner-screen-clear/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-brand-banner-screen-clear/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7d338327 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-brand-banner-screen-clear/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +## Context + +The Lango CLI lacks visual brand identity. TUI commands (`lango settings`, `lango onboard`) launch without clearing previous terminal output, and there is no mascot or version information displayed. The `lango serve` command also starts without any visual banner. + +The `internal/cli/tui` package already provides shared styles (colors, typography) used across all TUI screens. The banner component extends this package with a reusable brand element. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Provide a reusable banner component in `internal/cli/tui` with squirrel mascot art +- Inject version/build/profile info via setter pattern (avoiding import cycles with `cmd/lango/main.go`) +- Clear screen on TUI launch for clean presentation +- Display serve banner before server startup log output + +**Non-Goals:** +- Animated or dynamic banner content +- Configurable mascot art or theming +- Banner display on non-TUI commands (e.g., `lango config list`) + +## Decisions + +**1. Setter pattern for version injection** +Version/BuildTime live only in `cmd/lango/main.go`. Rather than passing them through constructors or using build-tag globals, package-level setters (`SetVersionInfo`, `SetProfile`) keep the API simple and avoid import cycles. This is the same pattern used by logging packages. + +**2. `tea.ClearScreen` in Init()** +Bubbletea's `tea.ClearScreen` command is the idiomatic way to clear the terminal before rendering. Added to both `Editor.Init()` and `Wizard.Init()`. + +**3. `lipgloss.JoinHorizontal` for art layout** +The squirrel art and info text are joined side-by-side using lipgloss horizontal join, which handles ANSI-aware width calculation correctly. + +**4. Three banner variants** +- `Banner()` — raw banner (onboard wizard title) +- `BannerBox()` — banner wrapped in rounded border (settings welcome) +- `ServeBanner()` — banner with separator line (serve command stdout) + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Wide Unicode characters] → The squirrel art uses block characters that may render differently across terminal emulators. Mitigated by using widely-supported Unicode block elements. +- [Global state for version] → Package-level vars are set once at startup and read-only thereafter. No concurrency risk in practice. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-brand-banner-screen-clear/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-brand-banner-screen-clear/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c12d2972 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-brand-banner-screen-clear/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## Why + +TUI commands (`lango settings`, `lango onboard`) display without clearing previous CLI output, making the interface look cluttered. Additionally, there is no brand identity on launch — no mascot or version info — resulting in a bland first impression. `lango serve` also lacks a startup banner. + +## What Changes + +- Add a squirrel mascot ASCII art banner with version info and profile name +- Clear screen on TUI launch (`settings`, `onboard`) for a clean start +- Display serve banner before server startup +- Replace the plain welcome box in settings with the branded banner box +- Replace the plain title in onboard wizard with the branded banner + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `brand-banner`: Reusable banner component (squirrel mascot + version/profile info) with variants for TUI welcome, serve output, and boxed display + +### Modified Capabilities + +## Impact + +- `internal/cli/tui/banner.go` — New banner component with setter pattern for version injection +- `cmd/lango/main.go` — Version info injection + serve banner output +- `internal/cli/settings/editor.go` — Screen clear on Init, banner box in welcome view +- `internal/cli/onboard/wizard.go` — Screen clear on Init, banner in title area +- `internal/cli/settings/settings.go` — Profile name injection before TUI launch +- `internal/cli/onboard/onboard.go` — Profile name injection before TUI launch diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-brand-banner-screen-clear/specs/brand-banner/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-brand-banner-screen-clear/specs/brand-banner/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3b2b018c --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-brand-banner-screen-clear/specs/brand-banner/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Banner component provides squirrel mascot with version info +The `tui` package SHALL provide a `Banner()` function that returns a string containing the squirrel mascot ASCII art alongside version, tagline, and profile information arranged horizontally. + +#### Scenario: Banner displays version and profile +- **WHEN** `SetVersionInfo("0.4.0", "2026-01-01")` and `SetProfile("default")` are called before `Banner()` +- **THEN** the output SHALL contain "Lango v0.4.0", "Fast AI Agent in Go", and "profile: default" + +### Requirement: BannerBox wraps banner in rounded border +The `tui` package SHALL provide a `BannerBox()` function that wraps the banner in a rounded border box styled with the Primary color. + +#### Scenario: BannerBox has border characters +- **WHEN** `BannerBox()` is called +- **THEN** the output SHALL contain rounded border characters (e.g., "╭", "│") + +### Requirement: ServeBanner includes separator line +The `tui` package SHALL provide a `ServeBanner()` function that renders the banner followed by a horizontal separator line using the Separator color. + +#### Scenario: ServeBanner contains separator +- **WHEN** `ServeBanner()` is called +- **THEN** the output SHALL contain horizontal line characters ("─") + +### Requirement: TUI screens clear terminal on launch +The settings editor and onboard wizard SHALL return `tea.ClearScreen` from their `Init()` method to clear previous terminal output. + +#### Scenario: Settings editor clears screen +- **WHEN** the settings editor initializes +- **THEN** `Init()` SHALL return `tea.ClearScreen` + +#### Scenario: Onboard wizard clears screen +- **WHEN** the onboard wizard initializes +- **THEN** `Init()` SHALL return `tea.ClearScreen` + +### Requirement: Serve command prints banner before startup +The `lango serve` command SHALL print the serve banner to stdout after logging initialization and before starting the application. + +#### Scenario: Serve displays banner with profile +- **WHEN** `lango serve` is executed +- **THEN** the serve banner SHALL be printed with the active profile name + +### Requirement: Version injection via setter pattern +The banner component SHALL use package-level setter functions (`SetVersionInfo`, `SetProfile`) to receive version, build time, and profile information, avoiding import cycles with `cmd/lango/main.go`. + +#### Scenario: Version defaults before injection +- **WHEN** no setter is called +- **THEN** version SHALL default to "dev" and profile SHALL default to "default" diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-brand-banner-screen-clear/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-brand-banner-screen-clear/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..94d0bf01 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-brand-banner-screen-clear/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## 1. Banner Component + +- [x] 1.1 Create `internal/cli/tui/banner.go` with SetVersionInfo, SetProfile, squirrelFace, Banner, BannerBox, ServeBanner +- [x] 1.2 Create `internal/cli/tui/banner_test.go` with tests for all banner functions + +## 2. Version Injection + +- [x] 2.1 Import `tui` in `cmd/lango/main.go` and call `tui.SetVersionInfo(Version, BuildTime)` at startup +- [x] 2.2 Call `tui.SetProfile(profileName)` in `settings.go` runSettings before TUI launch +- [x] 2.3 Call `tui.SetProfile(profileName)` in `onboard.go` runOnboard before TUI launch + +## 3. Screen Clear + +- [x] 3.1 Change `Editor.Init()` to return `tea.ClearScreen` instead of nil +- [x] 3.2 Change `Wizard.Init()` to return `tea.ClearScreen` instead of nil + +## 4. Banner Integration + +- [x] 4.1 Replace `viewWelcome()` box in `editor.go` with `tui.BannerBox()` + description text +- [x] 4.2 Replace title in `wizard.go` View() with `tui.Banner()` + "Setup Wizard" subtitle +- [x] 4.3 Add `tui.ServeBanner()` output in `serveCmd()` after logging init + +## 5. Verification + +- [x] 5.1 Run `go build ./...` — build passes +- [x] 5.2 Run `go test ./internal/cli/tui/...` — all banner tests pass +- [x] 5.3 Run `go test ./internal/cli/...` — all CLI tests pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-cli-help-text-update/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-cli-help-text-update/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d1c6cc6f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-cli-help-text-update/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-27 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-cli-help-text-update/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-cli-help-text-update/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..89abd5b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-cli-help-text-update/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +## Context + +The `settings`, `doctor`, and `onboard` CLI commands have had significant feature additions but their `--help` Long descriptions still reflect the old state. This is a documentation-only change to cobra command Long fields — no behavioral or API changes. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Update `settings` help to list all 6 group sections with 28 categories and `/` search +- Update `doctor` help to list all 14 checks and mention `--fix`/`--json` flags +- Update `onboard` help to reflect GitHub provider, auto-fetch models, and approval policy + +**Non-Goals:** +- No changes to command behavior, flags, or runtime logic +- No new commands or subcommands +- No changes to Short descriptions (they remain accurate) + +## Decisions + +1. **Group-based listing for settings** — Present categories organized by their 6 UI groups rather than a flat list, matching the actual TUI structure users will see. +2. **Ordered check list for doctor** — List all 14 checks in the same order as `AllChecks()` for consistency with runtime output. +3. **Step-level detail for onboard** — Update each step's description to match the actual provider list, model auto-fetch, and approval policy features. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Drift risk] Help text can become stale again as features are added → Mitigated by including help text updates as part of the standard "update downstream artifacts" rule in CLAUDE.md. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-cli-help-text-update/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-cli-help-text-update/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6159ec42 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-cli-help-text-update/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +## Why + +The `settings`, `doctor`, and `onboard` commands have undergone significant feature additions (28 categories with 6 group sections and `/` search in settings, 14 checks in doctor, GitHub provider and auto-fetch models in onboard), but their `--help` text still reflects the old state, providing inaccurate information to users. + +## What Changes + +- Replace the `settings` Long description to list all 6 group sections (Core, Communication, AI & Knowledge, Infrastructure, P2P Network, Security) with their 28 categories, and mention `/` keyword search +- Replace the `doctor` Long description to list all 14 checks and mention `--fix` / `--json` flags +- Replace the `onboard` Long description to reflect GitHub provider support, auto-fetched models, and approval policy in step descriptions + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +- `cli-help-text`: Accurate and complete --help descriptions for settings, doctor, and onboard commands + +### Modified Capabilities + + +## Impact + +- `internal/cli/settings/settings.go` — Long description string replacement +- `internal/cli/doctor/doctor.go` — Long description string replacement +- `internal/cli/onboard/onboard.go` — Long description string replacement +- No API, dependency, or behavioral changes — documentation-only update diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-cli-help-text-update/specs/cli-help-text/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-cli-help-text-update/specs/cli-help-text/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a5946bf0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-cli-help-text-update/specs/cli-help-text/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Settings help lists all category groups +The `lango settings --help` output SHALL display all 6 group sections (Core, Communication, AI & Knowledge, Infrastructure, P2P Network, Security) with their constituent categories. + +#### Scenario: User views settings help +- **WHEN** user runs `lango settings --help` +- **THEN** the output lists Core (Providers, Agent, Server, Session), Communication (Channels, Tools, Multi-Agent, A2A Protocol), AI & Knowledge (Knowledge, Skill, Observational Memory, Embedding & RAG, Graph Store, Librarian), Infrastructure (Payment, Cron Scheduler, Background Tasks, Workflow Engine), P2P Network (P2P Network, P2P ZKP, P2P Pricing, P2P Owner Protection, P2P Sandbox), and Security (Security, Auth, Security Keyring, Security DB Encryption, Security KMS) + +### Requirement: Settings help mentions keyword search +The `lango settings --help` output SHALL mention the `/` key for keyword search across categories. + +#### Scenario: Search feature documented +- **WHEN** user runs `lango settings --help` +- **THEN** the output includes instruction to press `/` to search across all categories by keyword + +### Requirement: Doctor help lists all 14 checks +The `lango doctor --help` output SHALL list all 14 diagnostic checks performed. + +#### Scenario: User views doctor help +- **WHEN** user runs `lango doctor --help` +- **THEN** the output lists all 14 checks: configuration profile validity, AI provider configuration, API key security, channel token validation, session database, server port, security configuration, companion connectivity, observational memory, output scanning, embedding/RAG, graph store, multi-agent, and A2A protocol + +### Requirement: Doctor help documents fix and json flags +The `lango doctor --help` output SHALL describe the `--fix` and `--json` flags in the Long description. + +#### Scenario: Flags documented in description +- **WHEN** user runs `lango doctor --help` +- **THEN** the Long description includes usage guidance for `--fix` (automatic repair) and `--json` (machine-readable output) + +### Requirement: Onboard help reflects current provider list +The `lango onboard --help` output SHALL list all supported providers including GitHub in step 1. + +#### Scenario: GitHub provider listed +- **WHEN** user runs `lango onboard --help` +- **THEN** step 1 lists Anthropic, OpenAI, Gemini, Ollama, and GitHub as provider choices + +### Requirement: Onboard help reflects model auto-fetch +The `lango onboard --help` output SHALL mention that models are auto-fetched from the provider in step 2. + +#### Scenario: Auto-fetch mentioned +- **WHEN** user runs `lango onboard --help` +- **THEN** step 2 description includes that model selection uses auto-fetched models from the provider + +### Requirement: Onboard help reflects approval policy +The `lango onboard --help` output SHALL mention approval policy in step 4. + +#### Scenario: Approval policy mentioned +- **WHEN** user runs `lango onboard --help` +- **THEN** step 4 description includes approval policy alongside privacy interceptor and PII redaction diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-cli-help-text-update/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-cli-help-text-update/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..925fed0d --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-cli-help-text-update/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +## 1. Settings Help Update + +- [x] 1.1 Replace Long description in `internal/cli/settings/settings.go` with group-based category listing and `/` search mention + +## 2. Doctor Help Update + +- [x] 2.1 Replace Long description in `internal/cli/doctor/doctor.go` with all 14 checks and `--fix`/`--json` flag guidance + +## 3. Onboard Help Update + +- [x] 3.1 Replace Long description in `internal/cli/onboard/onboard.go` with GitHub provider, auto-fetch models, and approval policy + +## 4. Verification + +- [x] 4.1 Run `go build ./...` and `go test ./...` to verify no regressions +- [x] 4.2 Verify `lango settings --help`, `lango doctor --help`, and `lango onboard --help` output matches specs diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-codebase-structure-refactoring/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-codebase-structure-refactoring/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-codebase-structure-refactoring/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-codebase-structure-refactoring/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-codebase-structure-refactoring/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..002d453e --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-codebase-structure-refactoring/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +## Context + +The Lango project has grown significantly with security hardening (P0-P2), settings UI enhancements, P2P features, and automation systems. Four core files exceeded maintainable size thresholds: `tools.go` (2,709 lines), `wiring.go` (1,871 lines), `forms_impl.go` (1,790 lines), and `types.go` (943 lines). These files became difficult to navigate, prone to merge conflicts, and hard to review in PRs. + +The existing architecture is healthy — no circular dependencies, callback patterns work correctly, and the layer boundaries (Core → Application → UI) are well-maintained. The issue is purely structural: too many concerns packed into single files. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Reduce the largest files to under 600 lines each by splitting into domain-focused files +- Improve code navigability — developers can find code by domain (e.g., P2P tools in `tools_p2p.go`) +- Reduce merge conflicts when multiple developers work on different domains +- Maintain 100% API compatibility — no consumer changes required + +**Non-Goals:** +- Refactoring business logic or changing behavior +- Introducing new abstractions or interfaces +- Changing package boundaries or moving code between packages +- Splitting files that are already well-structured (handler.go, app.go, store.go, server.go) + +## Decisions + +### Decision 1: Same-package file splits only + +**Choice**: Move functions/types to new files within the same Go package. + +**Rationale**: Go packages are the compilation unit — files within a package share the same namespace. This means splitting files has zero impact on consumers, requires no import changes, and carries minimal risk. + +**Alternative considered**: Extracting sub-packages. Rejected because it would introduce new import paths, potentially create circular dependencies, and require API redesign. + +### Decision 2: Domain-based file naming convention + +**Choice**: Use `_.go` naming pattern (e.g., `tools_p2p.go`, `wiring_graph.go`, `types_security.go`). + +**Rationale**: Consistent naming makes files discoverable. The `` prefix groups related files in directory listings, and the `` suffix indicates the concern. + +**Alternative considered**: Flat naming (e.g., `p2p_tools.go`). Rejected because it breaks the visual grouping in file listings. + +### Decision 3: Keep orchestrator functions in the original file + +**Choice**: The original file retains orchestration/entry-point functions (e.g., `buildTools` stays in `tools.go`), while domain-specific builders move to new files. + +**Rationale**: Developers looking for the entry point naturally check the original file. Domain implementations are then one click away. + +### Decision 4: Two-phase incremental approach + +**Choice**: Phase 1 splits the three largest files (~6,370 lines), Phase 2 splits the config types (~943 lines). Each phase is independently deployable. + +**Rationale**: Smaller, verifiable batches reduce risk and enable incremental review. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **[Risk] Duplicate declarations during split** → Mitigated by removing moved code from the original file immediately after creating the new file, verified with `go build ./...` after each phase. +- **[Risk] Missing imports in new files** → Each new file must be analyzed for its specific import needs; verified by compilation. +- **[Trade-off] More files to navigate** → Accepted; domain-focused files are easier to find than scrolling through 2,700-line monoliths. IDE "Go to Definition" works regardless of file count. +- **[Trade-off] Some small files (~90-140 lines)** → Accepted; consistent domain grouping is more valuable than minimum file size thresholds. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-codebase-structure-refactoring/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-codebase-structure-refactoring/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..edb903d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-codebase-structure-refactoring/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## Why + +Core source files have grown too large as the project scaled (security hardening, settings UI, P2P features). Four files exceeded maintainable size (tools.go 2,709 lines, wiring.go 1,871 lines, forms_impl.go 1,790 lines, types.go 943 lines). Splitting them into domain-focused files within the same package improves navigability and reduces merge conflicts without any API changes. + +## What Changes + +- Split `internal/app/tools.go` (2,709 lines) into 9 domain-focused files (exec, filesystem, browser, meta, security, automation, p2p, data + orchestrator) +- Split `internal/app/wiring.go` (1,871 lines) into 9 domain-focused files (knowledge, memory, embedding, graph, payment, p2p, automation, librarian + core init) +- Split `internal/cli/settings/forms_impl.go` (1,790 lines) into 6 domain-focused files (knowledge, automation, security, p2p, agent + core forms) +- Split `internal/config/types.go` (943 lines) into 5 domain-focused files (security, knowledge, p2p, automation + root types) +- All splits are same-package file moves — zero API changes, zero import changes for consumers + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +- `codebase-structure`: File organization conventions and domain-based file splitting rules for the Lango codebase + +### Modified Capabilities + +_(none — this is a pure structural refactoring with no requirement changes)_ + +## Impact + +- **Code**: 4 large files reorganized into ~24 smaller domain-focused files across 3 packages (`internal/app`, `internal/cli/settings`, `internal/config`) +- **APIs**: No changes — all functions/types remain in the same package with the same signatures +- **Dependencies**: No new dependencies added or removed +- **Build**: `go build ./...` and `go test ./...` pass without changes +- **Risk**: Low — same-package file moves only, no behavioral changes diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-codebase-structure-refactoring/specs/codebase-structure/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-codebase-structure-refactoring/specs/codebase-structure/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5bbfc60d --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-codebase-structure-refactoring/specs/codebase-structure/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Domain-based file splitting for tools +The `internal/app/tools.go` file SHALL be split into domain-focused files within the same package. The orchestrator function `buildTools` and shared utilities SHALL remain in `tools.go`. Each domain builder function SHALL be placed in a file named `tools_.go`. + +#### Scenario: Tools file split into 9 files +- **WHEN** the refactoring is applied to `internal/app/tools.go` +- **THEN** the following files SHALL exist: `tools.go` (orchestrator + utilities), `tools_exec.go`, `tools_filesystem.go`, `tools_browser.go`, `tools_meta.go`, `tools_security.go`, `tools_automation.go`, `tools_p2p.go`, `tools_data.go` + +#### Scenario: No API changes after tools split +- **WHEN** any consumer imports `internal/app` +- **THEN** all previously available functions SHALL remain accessible with identical signatures + +### Requirement: Domain-based file splitting for wiring +The `internal/app/wiring.go` file SHALL be split into domain-focused files within the same package. Core initialization functions SHALL remain in `wiring.go`. Each domain's component struct and init function SHALL be placed in a file named `wiring_.go`. + +#### Scenario: Wiring file split into 9 files +- **WHEN** the refactoring is applied to `internal/app/wiring.go` +- **THEN** the following files SHALL exist: `wiring.go` (core init), `wiring_knowledge.go`, `wiring_memory.go`, `wiring_embedding.go`, `wiring_graph.go`, `wiring_payment.go`, `wiring_p2p.go`, `wiring_automation.go`, `wiring_librarian.go` + +#### Scenario: Component structs co-located with init functions +- **WHEN** a domain has a components struct (e.g., `graphComponents`) +- **THEN** the struct and its associated init function (e.g., `initGraphStore`) SHALL be in the same file + +### Requirement: Domain-based file splitting for settings forms +The `internal/cli/settings/forms_impl.go` file SHALL be split into domain-focused files within the same package. Core form constructors and shared helpers SHALL remain in `forms_impl.go`. Each domain's form constructors SHALL be placed in a file named `forms_.go`. + +#### Scenario: Forms file split into 6 files +- **WHEN** the refactoring is applied to `internal/cli/settings/forms_impl.go` +- **THEN** the following files SHALL exist: `forms_impl.go` (core forms + helpers), `forms_knowledge.go`, `forms_automation.go`, `forms_security.go`, `forms_p2p.go`, `forms_agent.go` + +#### Scenario: Shared helpers remain in the base file +- **WHEN** helper functions are used across multiple domain files +- **THEN** they SHALL remain in `forms_impl.go` (e.g., `derefBool`, `formatKeyValueMap`, `validatePort`) + +### Requirement: Domain-based file splitting for config types +The `internal/config/types.go` file SHALL be split into domain-focused files within the same package. Root config and core infrastructure types SHALL remain in `types.go`. Each domain's types SHALL be placed in a file named `types_.go`. + +#### Scenario: Types file split into 5 files +- **WHEN** the refactoring is applied to `internal/config/types.go` +- **THEN** the following files SHALL exist: `types.go` (root + core), `types_security.go`, `types_knowledge.go`, `types_p2p.go`, `types_automation.go` + +#### Scenario: Type methods co-located with types +- **WHEN** a type has associated methods (e.g., `ApprovalPolicy.String()`) +- **THEN** the methods SHALL be in the same file as the type definition + +### Requirement: Build and test integrity after refactoring +All code changes SHALL maintain full build and test compatibility. No compilation errors or test failures SHALL be introduced. + +#### Scenario: Clean build after each phase +- **WHEN** `go build ./...` is executed after any phase of the refactoring +- **THEN** the build SHALL complete with zero errors + +#### Scenario: All tests pass after each phase +- **WHEN** `go test ./...` is executed after any phase of the refactoring +- **THEN** all existing tests SHALL pass without modification + +### Requirement: File naming convention +All split files SHALL follow the `_.go` naming convention where `` is the original file's base name and `` is a kebab-case domain identifier. + +#### Scenario: Consistent naming across packages +- **WHEN** a file is split across any package +- **THEN** the new files SHALL use the pattern `_.go` (e.g., `tools_p2p.go`, `wiring_graph.go`, `types_security.go`, `forms_agent.go`) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-codebase-structure-refactoring/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-codebase-structure-refactoring/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1f1bb6a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-codebase-structure-refactoring/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +## 1. Phase 1A — Split internal/app/tools.go + +- [x] 1.1 Create `tools_exec.go` with `buildExecTools` +- [x] 1.2 Create `tools_filesystem.go` with `buildFilesystemTools` +- [x] 1.3 Create `tools_browser.go` with `buildBrowserTools` +- [x] 1.4 Create `tools_meta.go` with `buildMetaTools` +- [x] 1.5 Create `tools_security.go` with `buildCryptoTools`, `buildSecretsTools` +- [x] 1.6 Create `tools_automation.go` with `buildCronTools`, `buildBackgroundTools`, `buildWorkflowTools` +- [x] 1.7 Create `tools_p2p.go` with `buildP2PTools`, `buildP2PPaymentTool` +- [x] 1.8 Create `tools_data.go` with `buildGraphTools`, `buildRAGTools`, `buildMemoryAgentTools`, `buildPaymentTools`, `buildLibrarianTools` +- [x] 1.9 Remove moved functions from `tools.go` and clean up imports +- [x] 1.10 Verify `go build ./internal/app/...` passes + +## 2. Phase 1B — Split internal/app/wiring.go + +- [x] 2.1 Create `wiring_knowledge.go` with `knowledgeComponents`, `initKnowledge`, `initSkills`, `initConversationAnalysis`, adapter types +- [x] 2.2 Create `wiring_memory.go` with `memoryComponents`, `initMemory` +- [x] 2.3 Create `wiring_embedding.go` with `embeddingComponents`, `initEmbedding` +- [x] 2.4 Create `wiring_graph.go` with `graphComponents`, `initGraphStore`, `wireGraphCallbacks`, `initGraphRAG`, `ragServiceAdapter` +- [x] 2.5 Create `wiring_payment.go` with `paymentComponents`, `initPayment`, `x402Components`, `initX402` +- [x] 2.6 Create `wiring_p2p.go` with `p2pComponents`, `initP2P`, `payGateAdapter`, `initZKP` +- [x] 2.7 Create `wiring_automation.go` with `agentRunnerAdapter`, `initCron`, `initBackground`, `initWorkflow` +- [x] 2.8 Create `wiring_librarian.go` with `librarianComponents`, `initLibrarian` +- [x] 2.9 Remove moved functions/types from `wiring.go` and clean up imports +- [x] 2.10 Verify `go build ./internal/app/...` passes + +## 3. Phase 1C — Split internal/cli/settings/forms_impl.go + +- [x] 3.1 Create `forms_knowledge.go` with `NewKnowledgeForm`, `NewSkillForm`, `NewObservationalMemoryForm`, `NewEmbeddingForm`, `NewGraphForm`, `NewLibrarianForm` +- [x] 3.2 Create `forms_automation.go` with `NewCronForm`, `NewBackgroundForm`, `NewWorkflowForm` +- [x] 3.3 Create `forms_security.go` with `NewSecurityForm`, `NewDBEncryptionForm`, `NewKMSForm` +- [x] 3.4 Create `forms_p2p.go` with `NewP2PForm`, `NewP2PZKPForm`, `NewP2PPricingForm`, `NewP2POwnerProtectionForm`, `NewP2PSandboxForm` +- [x] 3.5 Create `forms_agent.go` with `NewMultiAgentForm`, `NewA2AForm`, `NewPaymentForm` +- [x] 3.6 Remove moved functions from `forms_impl.go` and clean up imports +- [x] 3.7 Verify `go build ./internal/cli/settings/...` passes + +## 4. Phase 2A — Split internal/config/types.go + +- [x] 4.1 Create `types_security.go` with security/auth domain types and methods +- [x] 4.2 Create `types_knowledge.go` with knowledge/embedding/RAG domain types and migration functions +- [x] 4.3 Create `types_p2p.go` with P2P/ZKP/firewall domain types +- [x] 4.4 Create `types_automation.go` with cron/background/workflow/payment/A2A domain types +- [x] 4.5 Remove moved types/functions from `types.go` and clean up imports +- [x] 4.6 Verify `go build ./internal/config/...` passes + +## 5. Final Verification + +- [x] 5.1 Run `go build ./...` — full project build passes +- [x] 5.2 Run `go test ./...` — all tests pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ea36a968 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +## Context + +The application's initialization, startup, and shutdown are managed through a monolithic `App` struct with 22+ fields, a 440-line `New()` function, and manual `if != nil` checks in `Start()`/`Stop()`. Cross-cutting concerns (learning observation, approval gating, browser recovery) are applied via order-dependent nested wrapping loops. The bootstrap process runs 7 sequential steps with ad-hoc `client.Close()` calls for error cleanup. Component communication uses 13+ setter-based callbacks that couple stores to wiring code. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Replace manual Start/Stop with priority-ordered lifecycle registry with rollback +- Replace nested tool wrapping with composable middleware chain +- Replace bootstrap's ad-hoc cleanup with phase-based pipeline +- Create module system foundation for future declarative initialization +- Create event bus foundation for future callback elimination + +**Non-Goals:** +- Migrate all existing `init*` functions to appinit modules (future PR) +- Migrate all callbacks to event bus (future PR, dual-mode) +- Change external API or CLI behavior +- Modify business logic + +## Decisions + +### D1: Lifecycle Registry with Priority Constants +**Decision**: Use numeric Priority constants (Infra=100, Core=200, Buffer=300, Network=400, Automation=500) with stable sort. +**Rationale**: Numeric priorities allow inserting new levels between existing ones without renaming. Stable sort preserves registration order within same priority. +**Alternative**: String-based priority or explicit dependency graph — rejected for simplicity. + +### D2: HTTP-style Middleware for Tools +**Decision**: `Middleware func(tool *agent.Tool, next HandlerFunc) HandlerFunc` with Chain/ChainAll. +**Rationale**: Proven pattern from net/http. First middleware = outermost, build from inside out. Middlewares can short-circuit (approval denial) or pass-through (learning observation). +**Alternative**: Decorator pattern with wrapping structs — rejected as less composable. + +### D3: Phase Pipeline with Cleanup Stack +**Decision**: Each Phase has optional Cleanup function. On failure, completed phases' Cleanups run in reverse. +**Rationale**: Directly models the resource acquisition/release pattern. No need for defer or context — explicit cleanup callbacks. +**Alternative**: Context-based cleanup (like Go's testing.Cleanup) — rejected to avoid context dependency in bootstrap. + +### D4: Module System with Topological Sort +**Decision**: Kahn's algorithm for dependency resolution via Provides/DependsOn string keys. +**Rationale**: Well-understood O(V+E) algorithm, produces clear error messages on cycles, naturally handles disabled modules. +**Alternative**: Explicit ordering (current approach) — this is what we're replacing. + +### D5: Synchronous Event Bus +**Decision**: Synchronous Publish with RWMutex. Generic SubscribeTyped[T] for type safety. +**Rationale**: Matches existing synchronous callback behavior. Async delivery would change semantics. Generics provide type safety without reflection. +**Alternative**: Channel-based async bus — rejected as it changes timing semantics of existing callbacks. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Risk] Registry adds indirection to startup/shutdown flow → Mitigated by clear logging in each component's Start/Stop +- [Risk] Middleware chain obscures tool wrapping order → Mitigated by explicit ordering in ChainAll call site +- [Risk] Event bus dual-mode migration period adds complexity → Mitigated by keeping old callbacks until all consumers migrate +- [Trade-off] Module system infrastructure added before migration — accepted as foundation for incremental adoption diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3350ab58 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +## Why + +The `App` struct has 22+ fields (God Object), `New()` is a 440-line sequential initializer (God Function), 13 `SetXxxCallback()` calls create ad-hoc wiring, tool wrapping has order-dependent 3-layer nesting, and bootstrap has no rollback on failure. These structural problems make adding new components error-prone and increase maintenance cost. + +## What Changes + +- Introduce `internal/lifecycle/` — Component interface with Registry for ordered startup, reverse shutdown, and rollback on failure +- Introduce `internal/toolchain/` — HTTP-style middleware chain for tool wrapping (learning, approval, browser recovery) +- Introduce `internal/bootstrap/pipeline.go` — Phase+Pipeline pattern with cleanup stack for bootstrap sequence +- Introduce `internal/appinit/` — Module interface with Builder and topological sort for declarative initialization +- Introduce `internal/eventbus/` — Typed synchronous event bus to replace 13+ SetXxxCallback() calls +- Refactor `App.Start()`/`Stop()` to delegate to lifecycle registry +- Refactor `bootstrap.Run()` from 230-line function to 3-line pipeline invocation +- Refactor tool wrapping from 3 nested loops to `ChainAll()` one-liner + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `lifecycle-registry`: Component lifecycle management with priority-ordered start, reverse stop, and failure rollback +- `tool-middleware`: Composable middleware chain for cross-cutting tool concerns (learning, approval, browser recovery) +- `bootstrap-pipeline`: Phase-based bootstrap with sequential execution and reverse-order cleanup on failure +- `appinit-modules`: Module interface with topological sort for declarative app initialization +- `event-bus`: Typed synchronous publish/subscribe bus for decoupled component communication + +### Modified Capabilities + +## Impact + +- `internal/app/app.go` — `New()`, `Start()`, `Stop()` refactored to use lifecycle registry and toolchain +- `internal/app/tools.go` — Wrapping functions delegate to toolchain package +- `internal/app/types.go` — Added `registry *lifecycle.Registry` field +- `internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go` — `Run()` replaced with pipeline invocation +- No breaking changes to external APIs or CLI +- No changes to existing tests (all pass) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/specs/appinit-modules/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/specs/appinit-modules/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..82720197 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/specs/appinit-modules/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Module interface +The system SHALL define a Module interface with Name(), Provides(), DependsOn(), Enabled(), and Init() methods for declarative initialization units. + +#### Scenario: Module declares dependencies +- **WHEN** a module's DependsOn() returns ["session_store"] +- **THEN** the builder SHALL ensure the session_store provider runs first + +### Requirement: Topological sort with cycle detection +TopoSort SHALL order modules so dependencies are initialized before dependents, and SHALL return an error if cycles are detected. + +#### Scenario: A depends on B depends on C +- **WHEN** modules A→B→C are sorted +- **THEN** order SHALL be C, B, A + +#### Scenario: Cycle detected +- **WHEN** A depends on B and B depends on A +- **THEN** TopoSort SHALL return an error naming the involved modules + +### Requirement: Disabled module exclusion +TopoSort SHALL exclude modules where Enabled() returns false, and SHALL ignore dependencies on keys provided only by disabled modules. + +#### Scenario: Disabled module skipped +- **WHEN** module B is disabled and A depends on B's key +- **THEN** A SHALL still be included (dependency treated as optional) + +### Requirement: Builder with resolver +The Builder SHALL execute modules in topological order and provide a Resolver that allows later modules to access values provided by earlier modules. + +#### Scenario: Resolver passes values between modules +- **WHEN** module A provides key "store" with value X +- **THEN** module B's Init can call resolver.Resolve("store") and receive X + +### Requirement: BuildResult aggregation +Build SHALL aggregate all module Tools and Components into a single BuildResult. + +#### Scenario: Two modules contribute tools +- **WHEN** module A provides 3 tools and module B provides 2 tools +- **THEN** BuildResult.Tools SHALL contain all 5 tools diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/specs/bootstrap-pipeline/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/specs/bootstrap-pipeline/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d79253cd --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/specs/bootstrap-pipeline/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Phase-based pipeline +The bootstrap system SHALL execute phases sequentially using a Pipeline with Phase structs containing Name, Run, and optional Cleanup functions. + +#### Scenario: All phases succeed +- **WHEN** all phases complete without error +- **THEN** Pipeline.Execute SHALL return the Result from State + +### Requirement: Reverse cleanup on failure +If a phase fails, the Pipeline SHALL call Cleanup functions of all previously completed phases in reverse order. + +#### Scenario: Phase 4 fails after phases 1-3 complete +- **WHEN** phase 4 returns an error +- **THEN** cleanup SHALL run for phases 3, 2, 1 in that order (if they have Cleanup functions) + +### Requirement: State passes data between phases +The Pipeline SHALL use a State struct to carry data between phases, including Options, Result, and intermediate values. + +#### Scenario: Database handle passes from open to security phase +- **WHEN** phaseOpenDatabase sets Client on State +- **THEN** phaseLoadSecurityState SHALL read Client from State + +### Requirement: Default bootstrap phases +The system SHALL provide DefaultPhases() returning the 7-phase bootstrap sequence: ensureDataDir, detectEncryption, acquirePassphrase, openDatabase, loadSecurityState, initCrypto, loadProfile. + +#### Scenario: Run uses default phases +- **WHEN** bootstrap.Run(opts) is called +- **THEN** it SHALL create a Pipeline with DefaultPhases and execute it diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/specs/event-bus/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/specs/event-bus/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a75b5395 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/specs/event-bus/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Event interface +The system SHALL define an Event interface with EventName() string for typed event identification. + +#### Scenario: Event returns its name +- **WHEN** a ContentSavedEvent is created +- **THEN** EventName() SHALL return "content.saved" + +### Requirement: Subscribe and publish +The Bus SHALL support Subscribe(eventName, handler) and Publish(event), calling all handlers registered for the event's name synchronously in registration order. + +#### Scenario: Multiple handlers receive event +- **WHEN** two handlers are subscribed to "turn.completed" and a TurnCompletedEvent is published +- **THEN** both handlers SHALL be called in registration order + +#### Scenario: No handlers registered +- **WHEN** an event is published with no subscribers +- **THEN** the event SHALL be silently ignored without error or panic + +### Requirement: Type-safe subscription +The system SHALL provide SubscribeTyped[T Event] for generic type-safe event handling without manual type assertions. + +#### Scenario: Typed handler receives correct type +- **WHEN** SubscribeTyped[TurnCompletedEvent] is used with a handler +- **THEN** the handler SHALL receive TurnCompletedEvent directly (not Event interface) + +### Requirement: Thread safety +The Bus SHALL be safe for concurrent Subscribe and Publish calls. + +#### Scenario: Concurrent publish and subscribe +- **WHEN** multiple goroutines publish and subscribe simultaneously +- **THEN** no data races SHALL occur (verified by -race flag) + +### Requirement: Content event types +The system SHALL define ContentSavedEvent, TriplesExtractedEvent, TurnCompletedEvent, ReputationChangedEvent, and MemoryGraphEvent as concrete Event implementations. + +#### Scenario: Each event has unique name +- **WHEN** all event types are instantiated +- **THEN** each SHALL have a unique EventName() value diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/specs/lifecycle-registry/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/specs/lifecycle-registry/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..91cb56ea --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/specs/lifecycle-registry/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Component lifecycle interface +The system SHALL provide a `Component` interface with `Name()`, `Start(ctx, wg)`, and `Stop(ctx)` methods for managing application component lifecycles. + +#### Scenario: Component implements interface +- **WHEN** a struct implements Name(), Start(context.Context, *sync.WaitGroup) error, and Stop(context.Context) error +- **THEN** it SHALL be usable as a lifecycle Component + +### Requirement: Priority-ordered startup +The Registry SHALL start components in ascending priority order (lower number = earlier start). + +#### Scenario: Components with different priorities start in order +- **WHEN** components are registered at PriorityInfra(100), PriorityBuffer(300), PriorityNetwork(400) +- **THEN** they SHALL start in order: Infra, Buffer, Network + +#### Scenario: Same-priority preserves registration order +- **WHEN** multiple components are registered at the same priority +- **THEN** they SHALL start in the order they were registered (stable sort) + +### Requirement: Reverse-order shutdown +The Registry SHALL stop started components in reverse startup order. + +#### Scenario: Reverse stop order +- **WHEN** StopAll is called after A, B, C started in that order +- **THEN** they SHALL stop in order: C, B, A + +### Requirement: Rollback on startup failure +If a component fails to start, the Registry SHALL stop all already-started components in reverse order. + +#### Scenario: Third component fails to start +- **WHEN** A and B start successfully, then C fails +- **THEN** B and A SHALL be stopped in that order, and StartAll SHALL return C's error + +### Requirement: Component adapters +The system SHALL provide adapters for common component signatures: SimpleComponent (Start(wg)/Stop()), FuncComponent (arbitrary functions), and ErrorComponent (Start(ctx) error/Stop()). + +#### Scenario: SimpleComponent wraps buffer-style components +- **WHEN** a buffer with Start(*sync.WaitGroup) and Stop() is wrapped in SimpleComponent +- **THEN** it SHALL be usable as a lifecycle Component diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/specs/tool-middleware/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/specs/tool-middleware/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..68df7b9e --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/specs/tool-middleware/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Middleware type +The system SHALL define a Middleware type as `func(tool *agent.Tool, next HandlerFunc) HandlerFunc` that wraps tool handlers. + +#### Scenario: Middleware wraps handler +- **WHEN** a middleware is applied to a tool +- **THEN** it SHALL receive the tool metadata and next handler, returning a new handler + +### Requirement: Chain applies middlewares in order +Chain SHALL apply middlewares so the first middleware is outermost (executed first). + +#### Scenario: Two middlewares chain correctly +- **WHEN** middleware A and B are chained with Chain(tool, A, B) +- **THEN** execution order SHALL be: A's pre-logic → B's pre-logic → original handler → B's post-logic → A's post-logic + +### Requirement: ChainAll applies to all tools +ChainAll SHALL apply the same middleware stack to every tool in the slice. + +#### Scenario: ChainAll wraps all tools +- **WHEN** ChainAll is called with 3 tools and 2 middlewares +- **THEN** all 3 tools SHALL have both middlewares applied + +### Requirement: WithLearning middleware +The WithLearning middleware SHALL call the learning observer after each tool execution with the tool name, params, result, and error. + +#### Scenario: Learning observes tool result +- **WHEN** a tool wrapped with WithLearning executes +- **THEN** observer.OnToolResult SHALL be called with session key, tool name, params, result, and error + +### Requirement: WithApproval middleware +The WithApproval middleware SHALL gate tool execution behind an approval flow based on configured policy. + +#### Scenario: Dangerous tool requires approval +- **WHEN** a tool with dangerous safety level is executed under "dangerous" policy +- **THEN** the approval provider SHALL be consulted before execution + +#### Scenario: Exempt tool bypasses approval +- **WHEN** a tool listed in ExemptTools is executed +- **THEN** execution SHALL proceed without approval + +### Requirement: WithBrowserRecovery middleware +The WithBrowserRecovery middleware SHALL recover from panics in browser tool handlers and retry once on ErrBrowserPanic. + +#### Scenario: Browser panic triggers retry +- **WHEN** a browser tool panics with ErrBrowserPanic +- **THEN** the session SHALL be closed and the handler retried once diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..27b09c6d --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-design-pattern-refactoring/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +## 1. Component Lifecycle Registry (Phase 0) + +- [x] 1.1 Create `internal/lifecycle/component.go` with Component interface, Priority constants, and ComponentEntry struct +- [x] 1.2 Create `internal/lifecycle/registry.go` with Registry (Register, StartAll with priority order, StopAll reverse, rollback on failure) +- [x] 1.3 Create `internal/lifecycle/adapter.go` with SimpleComponent, FuncComponent, and ErrorComponent adapters +- [x] 1.4 Create `internal/lifecycle/registry_test.go` with start order, reverse stop, rollback, empty registry, same-priority tests +- [x] 1.5 Create `internal/lifecycle/adapter_test.go` with tests for all adapter types +- [x] 1.6 Add `registry *lifecycle.Registry` field to App struct in `internal/app/types.go` +- [x] 1.7 Add `registerLifecycleComponents()` method and wire registry in `New()` in `internal/app/app.go` +- [x] 1.8 Refactor `App.Start()` to delegate to `registry.StartAll()` +- [x] 1.9 Refactor `App.Stop()` to delegate to `registry.StopAll()` + +## 2. Tool Middleware Chain (Phase 2) + +- [x] 2.1 Create `internal/toolchain/middleware.go` with Middleware type, Chain(), and ChainAll() functions +- [x] 2.2 Create `internal/toolchain/mw_learning.go` with WithLearning middleware +- [x] 2.3 Create `internal/toolchain/mw_approval.go` with WithApproval middleware (NeedsApproval, BuildApprovalSummary, Truncate) +- [x] 2.4 Create `internal/toolchain/mw_browser.go` with WithBrowserRecovery middleware +- [x] 2.5 Create `internal/toolchain/middleware_test.go` with chain order and composition tests +- [x] 2.6 Refactor `internal/app/tools.go` wrapping functions to delegate to toolchain package + +## 3. Bootstrap Phase Pipeline (Phase 3) + +- [x] 3.1 Create `internal/bootstrap/pipeline.go` with Phase struct, Pipeline, State, and Execute with reverse cleanup +- [x] 3.2 Create `internal/bootstrap/phases.go` with DefaultPhases() returning 7 bootstrap phases +- [x] 3.3 Create `internal/bootstrap/pipeline_test.go` with phase failure/rollback and state passing tests +- [x] 3.4 Refactor `bootstrap.Run()` from 230-line function to Pipeline.Execute() invocation (~3 lines) + +## 4. AppBuilder Module System (Phase 1) + +- [x] 4.1 Create `internal/appinit/module.go` with Module interface, Provides keys, Resolver interface, and ModuleResult +- [x] 4.2 Create `internal/appinit/topo_sort.go` with Kahn's algorithm topological sort and cycle detection +- [x] 4.3 Create `internal/appinit/builder.go` with Builder (AddModule/Build) and BuildResult aggregation +- [x] 4.4 Create `internal/appinit/topo_sort_test.go` with dependency ordering, cycle detection, and disabled module tests +- [x] 4.5 Create `internal/appinit/builder_test.go` with resolver passing, tool aggregation, and error propagation tests + +## 5. Event Bus (Phase 4) + +- [x] 5.1 Create `internal/eventbus/bus.go` with Bus (Subscribe/Publish), Event interface, and SubscribeTyped[T] generic helper +- [x] 5.2 Create `internal/eventbus/events.go` with ContentSavedEvent, TriplesExtractedEvent, TurnCompletedEvent, ReputationChangedEvent, MemoryGraphEvent +- [x] 5.3 Create `internal/eventbus/bus_test.go` with publish/subscribe order, multiple handlers, no-handler, and thread-safety tests + +## 6. Integration Verification + +- [x] 6.1 Verify `go build ./...` passes with all new packages +- [x] 6.2 Verify `go test ./...` passes for all new package tests +- [x] 6.3 Verify all existing tests in `internal/app/` continue to pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-doctor-false-errors/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-doctor-false-errors/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-doctor-false-errors/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-doctor-false-errors/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-doctor-false-errors/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cc5b1244 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-doctor-false-errors/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +## Context + +`lango doctor` reports false errors for two checks that have working runtime defaults: +1. **Graph Store**: `graph.databasePath` empty → StatusFail, but `wiring.go` creates a fallback path (`graph.db` next to session DB) +2. **Observational Memory**: `maxMessageTokenBudget` is 0 → StatusFail, but `DefaultConfig()` never initialized `ObservationalMemory` at all (despite struct comments claiming defaults of 1000/2000/8000) + +Additionally, `database.go` uses a stale `sessions.db` fallback path instead of the current `lango.db` convention established in the onboard wizard UX fix. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Eliminate false error reports from `lango doctor` for working configurations +- Add missing `ObservationalMemory` defaults to `DefaultConfig()` and viper +- Align database check fallback path with current `lango.db` convention + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing runtime wiring behavior (it already works correctly) +- Adding new doctor checks +- Changing the actual graph store fallback logic in wiring.go + +## Decisions + +1. **Add ObservationalMemory to DefaultConfig()** — The struct comments document defaults (1000/2000/8000/5/20/4000/5) but no code enforces them. Fix at the source by adding defaults to `DefaultConfig()` and registering viper defaults. This ensures the values are always populated regardless of config file contents. + +2. **Downgrade graph.databasePath check to warning** — Since `wiring.go:initGraphStore()` already handles empty `DatabasePath` by deriving a path from session DB location, this is not an error. Change to StatusWarn with an informational message explaining the fallback. + +3. **Fix database.go fallback path** — Simple find-and-replace: `sessions.db` → `lango.db` in the `resolveDatabasePath()` fallback. The `DefaultConfig()` already uses `lango.db`. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Reduced strictness] Users with genuinely misconfigured graph paths will see a warning instead of an error → Acceptable because the runtime handles it gracefully. +- [New defaults may override user intent] If a user explicitly sets `maxMessageTokenBudget: 0` intending to disable budget limits → Low risk since 0 was never a valid value (check always failed on it). diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-doctor-false-errors/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-doctor-false-errors/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..21027e43 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-doctor-false-errors/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## Why + +`lango doctor` reports false errors for configurations that have working runtime defaults. Graph Store reports error when `graph.databasePath` is empty (but wiring.go creates a fallback path automatically). Observational Memory reports error when `maxMessageTokenBudget` is 0 (but `DefaultConfig()` never initialized it). The database check also uses a stale `sessions.db` fallback instead of the current `lango.db` convention. These false errors confuse users who have a working setup. + +## What Changes + +- Add `ObservationalMemory` defaults to `DefaultConfig()` and viper defaults (messageTokenThreshold=1000, observationTokenThreshold=2000, maxMessageTokenBudget=8000, etc.) +- Downgrade Graph Store `databasePath` empty check from error to warning (runtime fallback exists in wiring.go) +- Fix database doctor check fallback path from `sessions.db` to `lango.db` +- Update test and spec references from `sessions.db` to `lango.db` + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +(none) + +### Modified Capabilities + +- `cli-doctor`: Downgrade graph store databasePath check from error to warning; fix database check fallback path from sessions.db to lango.db +- `config-system`: Add ObservationalMemory defaults to DefaultConfig() and viper SetDefault calls + +## Impact + +- `internal/config/loader.go` — DefaultConfig() and viper defaults +- `internal/cli/doctor/checks/graph_store.go` — severity change +- `internal/cli/doctor/checks/database.go` — fallback path fix +- `internal/cli/doctor/checks/checks_test.go` — test update +- `openspec/specs/server/spec.md` — spec reference update diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-doctor-false-errors/specs/cli-doctor/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-doctor-false-errors/specs/cli-doctor/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4fa850e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-doctor-false-errors/specs/cli-doctor/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Graph store health check +The doctor command SHALL include a GraphStoreCheck that validates graph store configuration. The check SHALL skip if graph.enabled is false. When enabled, it SHALL validate that backend is "bolt" and maxTraversalDepth and maxExpansionResults are positive. When databasePath is empty, the check SHALL return StatusWarn with a message indicating the path will default to graph.db next to the session database, instead of StatusFail. + +#### Scenario: Graph disabled +- **WHEN** doctor runs with graph.enabled=false +- **THEN** GraphStoreCheck returns StatusSkip + +#### Scenario: Graph databasePath empty +- **WHEN** doctor runs with graph.enabled=true and databasePath empty +- **THEN** GraphStoreCheck returns StatusWarn with message indicating the fallback path will be used + +#### Scenario: Graph misconfigured backend +- **WHEN** doctor runs with graph.enabled=true and backend is not "bolt" +- **THEN** GraphStoreCheck returns StatusFail with message about unsupported backend + +### Requirement: Session Database Check +The system SHALL verify that the session database is accessible. The fallback database path when no config is loaded SHALL be `~/.lango/lango.db`, matching the DefaultConfig convention. + +#### Scenario: Database file exists and is writable +- **WHEN** session.databasePath points to an accessible SQLite file +- **THEN** check passes with database path displayed + +#### Scenario: Database path not writable +- **WHEN** database path directory is not writable +- **THEN** check fails with permission error + +#### Scenario: No config loaded fallback path +- **WHEN** no configuration is loaded (cfg is nil or databasePath is empty) +- **THEN** the check SHALL use `~/.lango/lango.db` as the fallback path diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-doctor-false-errors/specs/config-system/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-doctor-false-errors/specs/config-system/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..65fbc237 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-doctor-false-errors/specs/config-system/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Default values +The configuration system SHALL apply sensible defaults for all non-credential fields. The minimum viable configuration SHALL require only: `agent.provider`, `providers..type`, `providers..apiKey`, and one channel's `enabled: true` + token. All other fields SHALL have defaults: +- `server.host`: `"localhost"` +- `server.port`: `18789` +- `server.httpEnabled`: `true` +- `server.wsEnabled`: `true` +- `session.databasePath`: `"~/.lango/lango.db"` +- `session.maxHistoryTurns`: `100` +- `logging.level`: `"info"` +- `logging.format`: `"console"` +- `agent.maxTokens`: `4096` +- `agent.temperature`: `0.7` +- `tools.exec.defaultTimeout`: `30s` +- `tools.exec.allowBackground`: `true` +- `tools.filesystem.maxReadSize`: `1048576` (1MB) +- `tools.browser.headless`: `true` +- `tools.browser.sessionTimeout`: `5m` +- `librarian.enabled`: `false` +- `librarian.observationThreshold`: `2` +- `librarian.inquiryCooldownTurns`: `3` +- `librarian.maxPendingInquiries`: `2` +- `librarian.autoSaveConfidence`: `"high"` +- `observationalMemory.enabled`: `false` +- `observationalMemory.messageTokenThreshold`: `1000` +- `observationalMemory.observationTokenThreshold`: `2000` +- `observationalMemory.maxMessageTokenBudget`: `8000` +- `observationalMemory.maxReflectionsInContext`: `5` +- `observationalMemory.maxObservationsInContext`: `20` +- `observationalMemory.memoryTokenBudget`: `4000` +- `observationalMemory.reflectionConsolidationThreshold`: `5` + +#### Scenario: Missing optional field +- **WHEN** a configuration field is not specified +- **THEN** the system SHALL use the default value listed above +- **THEN** no error or warning SHALL be emitted for missing optional fields + +#### Scenario: ObservationalMemory defaults applied +- **WHEN** the `observationalMemory` section is omitted from configuration +- **THEN** the system SHALL apply default values: enabled=false, messageTokenThreshold=1000, observationTokenThreshold=2000, maxMessageTokenBudget=8000, maxReflectionsInContext=5, maxObservationsInContext=20, memoryTokenBudget=4000, reflectionConsolidationThreshold=5 + +#### Scenario: Session database path defaults to lango.db +- **WHEN** `session.databasePath` is not specified in the configuration +- **THEN** the system SHALL default to `"~/.lango/lango.db"` +- **THEN** standalone CLI commands (doctor, memory list) SHALL open this path as fallback + +#### Scenario: Minimal configuration startup +- **WHEN** config contains only `agent.provider`, one provider entry with `type` and `apiKey`, and one channel with `enabled: true` and token +- **THEN** the application SHALL start successfully with all defaults applied diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-doctor-false-errors/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-doctor-false-errors/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..58c41ebe --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-doctor-false-errors/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +## 1. Config Defaults + +- [x] 1.1 Add ObservationalMemory defaults to DefaultConfig() in config/loader.go +- [x] 1.2 Register ObservationalMemory viper defaults in Load() function + +## 2. Doctor Check Fixes + +- [x] 2.1 Downgrade graph store databasePath empty check from StatusFail to StatusWarn in graph_store.go +- [x] 2.2 Fix database.go resolveDatabasePath fallback from sessions.db to lango.db + +## 3. Test & Spec Updates + +- [x] 3.1 Update checks_test.go database path reference from sessions.db to lango.db +- [x] 3.2 Update openspec/specs/server/spec.md sessions.db reference to lango.db diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-go-tpm-api-compat/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-go-tpm-api-compat/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-go-tpm-api-compat/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-go-tpm-api-compat/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-go-tpm-api-compat/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..61927ca6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-go-tpm-api-compat/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +## Context + +The project depends on `github.com/google/go-tpm` v0.9.8 for TPM2-based secret sealing in `internal/keyring/tpm_provider.go`. The go-tpm library introduced breaking API changes between versions: +- `TPMTSymDef` was split into `TPMTSymDef` (algorithm-only) and `TPMTSymDefObject` (full symmetric params) +- `tpm2.Marshal` changed from `([]byte, error)` to `[]byte` (panics on error) +- `tpm2.Unmarshal` changed from `(int, error)` with pointer arg to generic `Unmarshal[T]([]byte) (*T, error)` + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Fix all 5 compilation errors in `tpm_provider.go` to match go-tpm v0.9.8 API +- Unblock Docker builds + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing TPM sealing behavior or key templates +- Upgrading to a different go-tpm major version +- Adding new TPM functionality + +## Decisions + +1. **Use `TPMTSymDefObject` for SRK template** — The `TPMSECCParms.Symmetric` field requires `TPMTSymDefObject` in v0.9.8. This is the only correct type; no alternative. + +2. **Accept `Marshal` panic-on-error semantics** — v0.9.8's `Marshal` panics instead of returning errors. Since we only marshal well-typed TPM structures (`TPM2BPublic`, `TPM2BPrivate`), panics are not expected in practice. The `marshalSealedBlob` function signature changes from `error` return to direct assignment. + +3. **Use generic `Unmarshal[T]` with pointer dereference** — v0.9.8's generic signature returns `*T`. We dereference immediately into the existing variables to minimize diff and preserve the existing control flow. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Marshal panics] → Structures are always well-formed from TPM responses; panic risk is negligible. If needed, a `recover` wrapper could be added later. +- [API stability] → go-tpm is pre-1.0; future versions may break again. Pinning v0.9.8 in go.mod mitigates this. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-go-tpm-api-compat/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-go-tpm-api-compat/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f198acc7 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-go-tpm-api-compat/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +## Why + +Docker build fails because `internal/keyring/tpm_provider.go` uses outdated `go-tpm` API patterns incompatible with v0.9.8. Five compilation errors block the entire build pipeline. + +## What Changes + +- Fix `TPMTSymDef` → `TPMTSymDefObject` for the SRK template symmetric field +- Fix `tpm2.Marshal` calls to use single-return signature (v0.9.8 panics on error instead of returning it) +- Fix `tpm2.Unmarshal` calls to use generic function signature `Unmarshal[T](data []byte) (*T, error)` + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +_None — this is a bug fix for API compatibility._ + +### Modified Capabilities + +- `keyring-security-tiering`: TPM provider implementation updated to match go-tpm v0.9.8 API surface + +## Impact + +- `internal/keyring/tpm_provider.go` — 5 lines changed across 3 call patterns +- Docker builds unblocked (previously failed at compilation) +- No behavioral change — same TPM seal/unseal logic, just correct API usage diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-go-tpm-api-compat/specs/keyring-security-tiering/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-go-tpm-api-compat/specs/keyring-security-tiering/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f08eb769 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-go-tpm-api-compat/specs/keyring-security-tiering/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: TPMProvider seals secrets with TPM 2.0 + +The TPM provider SHALL use `TPMTSymDefObject` for the SRK template symmetric parameters. The provider SHALL use `tpm2.Marshal` with single-return signature and `tpm2.Unmarshal` with generic type parameter signature `Unmarshal[T]([]byte) (*T, error)` as required by go-tpm v0.9.8. + +#### Scenario: SRK template uses correct symmetric type +- **WHEN** the TPM provider creates a primary key with ECC P256 SRK template +- **THEN** the template's `Symmetric` field SHALL be of type `TPMTSymDefObject` + +#### Scenario: Marshal sealed blob without error return +- **WHEN** the TPM provider marshals `TPM2BPublic` and `TPM2BPrivate` to bytes +- **THEN** the system SHALL call `tpm2.Marshal` which returns `[]byte` directly + +#### Scenario: Unmarshal sealed blob with generic type parameter +- **WHEN** the TPM provider unmarshals bytes into `TPM2BPublic` or `TPM2BPrivate` +- **THEN** the system SHALL call `tpm2.Unmarshal[T](data)` returning `(*T, error)` and dereference the result diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-go-tpm-api-compat/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-go-tpm-api-compat/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..de7229b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-fix-go-tpm-api-compat/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +## 1. Fix Type Compatibility + +- [x] 1.1 Change `TPMTSymDef` to `TPMTSymDefObject` in srkTemplate() symmetric field (line 125) + +## 2. Fix Marshal API + +- [x] 2.1 Change `tpm2.Marshal(pub)` from two-return to single-return assignment in marshalSealedBlob +- [x] 2.2 Change `tpm2.Marshal(priv)` from two-return to single-return assignment in marshalSealedBlob + +## 3. Fix Unmarshal API + +- [x] 3.1 Change public unmarshal to generic `tpm2.Unmarshal[tpm2.TPM2BPublic](pubBytes)` with pointer dereference +- [x] 3.2 Change private unmarshal to generic `tpm2.Unmarshal[tpm2.TPM2BPrivate](privBytes)` with pointer dereference + +## 4. Verification + +- [x] 4.1 Run `GOOS=linux go build ./internal/keyring/...` and confirm zero errors +- [x] 4.2 Run `go build ./...` and confirm full project builds diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d1c6cc6f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-27 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cb9bda24 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +## Context + +The current bootstrap flow uses `go-keyring` (`OSProvider`) to store/retrieve the master passphrase. On macOS, this uses Keychain; on Linux, D-Bus secret-service. Both allow any process under the same UID to read the stored secret without user interaction, making the passphrase vulnerable to same-UID malicious processes. + +The keyring package lives at `internal/keyring/`, bootstrap at `internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go`, and CLI commands at `internal/cli/security/keyring.go`. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Require hardware-backed user presence verification (Touch ID or TPM) before auto-unlocking from keyring +- Gracefully degrade: biometric > TPM > deny (no keyring auto-read) +- Maintain cross-platform compilation via build tags and stubs +- Keep existing keyfile and interactive prompt flows unchanged + +**Non-Goals:** +- Windows Hello biometric integration (future work) +- FIDO2/WebAuthn hardware key support +- Removing `go-keyring` / `OSProvider` entirely (still used by CLI commands) +- Encrypting the passphrase at rest beyond what the hardware backend provides + +## Decisions + +### 1. SecurityTier enum + factory function over config flag +**Decision**: Auto-detect available hardware at runtime via `DetectSecureProvider()`. +**Rationale**: Users shouldn't need to configure security tier manually. The factory probes biometric first, then TPM, then returns nil. This matches the principle of "secure by default." +**Alternative**: Config flag (`security.keyring.tier: biometric|tpm|none`) — rejected because it shifts security responsibility to the user and increases misconfiguration risk. + +### 2. CGO for macOS biometric via Security.framework +**Decision**: Use direct CGO calls to `SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags` with `kSecAccessControlBiometryAny`. +**Rationale**: The `go-keyring` library doesn't support biometric ACLs. `kSecAccessControlBiometryAny` ensures any process reading the item triggers Touch ID, which is the core defense against same-UID attacks. No Go-native alternative exists for this Keychain API. +**Alternative**: `osascript` Touch ID prompt — rejected because it's spoofable and doesn't bind to the Keychain item. + +### 3. TPM2 seal/unseal via go-tpm +**Decision**: Seal the passphrase under the TPM's Storage Root Key (SRK) and store the blob at `~/.lango/tpm/`. +**Rationale**: TPM-sealed data can only be unsealed by the same TPM chip, providing hardware binding. The SRK is deterministic (same template → same key), so no persistent handle is needed. +**Alternative**: `tpm2-tools` CLI — rejected to avoid external binary dependency. + +### 4. Build-tag isolation for platform-specific code +**Decision**: `biometric_darwin.go` (`darwin && cgo`), `tpm_provider.go` (`linux`), with corresponding stubs. +**Rationale**: Ensures clean cross-compilation. Stubs implement Provider interface methods returning sentinel errors, satisfying the type system without runtime code. + +### 5. Deny fallback (TierNone) disables keyring auto-read +**Decision**: When no secure hardware is detected, `secureProvider` is nil, effectively skipping keyring in `passphrase.Acquire`. +**Rationale**: Plain OS keyring without hardware protection is the exact vulnerability we're addressing. Denying it forces keyfile or interactive prompt, which are both user-initiated. + +### 6. SkipSecureDetection option for testing +**Decision**: Add `SkipSecureDetection bool` to `bootstrap.Options`. +**Rationale**: Tests running on macOS with Touch ID would otherwise trigger biometric prompts or find previously stored passphrases, causing flaky tests. This flag isolates test behavior from host hardware. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **[Risk] CGO dependency on macOS** → Only affects biometric provider; stub used when CGO disabled. Most macOS Go toolchains have CGO enabled by default. +- **[Risk] Touch ID prompt in non-interactive contexts (SSH, CI)** → `SecItemCopyMatching` returns error quickly when no UI is available; falls through to keyfile. +- **[Risk] TPM device permissions on Linux** → Requires `/dev/tpmrm0` access (typically `tss` group). Doctor command can check this. +- **[Risk] go-tpm API stability** → Using v0.9.x stable API; TPM provider behind build tag limits blast radius. +- **[Trade-off] Two keychain entries possible** → OSProvider and BiometricProvider may create separate entries with same service/account but different ACLs. Clear command cleans both. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4efa516d --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +## Why + +The current `go-keyring`-based keyring storage allows any process running under the same UID to read the master passphrase without any prompt. This exposes the passphrase to malicious processes. We need hardware-backed user presence verification (biometric/TPM) before allowing automatic keyring unlock, and deny keyring auto-read entirely on systems without secure hardware. + +## What Changes + +- Add `SecurityTier` enum and `DetectSecureProvider()` factory that probes for the highest available hardware-backed security backend (biometric > TPM > none) +- Add macOS Touch ID Keychain provider (`BiometricProvider`) using `kSecAccessControlBiometryAny` ACL via CGO +- Add Linux TPM 2.0 sealed-blob provider (`TPMProvider`) using `go-tpm` seal/unseal +- Provide build-tag stubs for cross-platform compilation +- Update bootstrap to use `DetectSecureProvider()` instead of plain `OSProvider` — keyring auto-read is disabled when no secure hardware is available (TierNone) +- Update CLI `keyring store/clear/status` commands to reflect security tier and gate store on secure provider availability +- Update `Status` struct with `SecurityTier` field + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `keyring-security-tiering`: Hardware-backed security tier detection, biometric (macOS Touch ID) and TPM 2.0 (Linux) keyring providers, deny-fallback for unsecured environments + +### Modified Capabilities +- `os-keyring`: `Status` struct gains `SecurityTier` field; `IsAvailable()` now reports detected tier +- `bootstrap-lifecycle`: Passphrase acquisition switches from plain OSProvider to `DetectSecureProvider()` with `SkipSecureDetection` option +- `passphrase-acquisition`: Keyring provider is now nil when no secure hardware is available (TierNone), effectively disabling keyring auto-read + +## Impact + +- **Code**: `internal/keyring/` (new files + modified), `internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go`, `internal/cli/security/keyring.go` +- **Dependencies**: `github.com/google/go-tpm` (new, Linux only via build tags) +- **Build**: CGO required on macOS for biometric provider; stubs used when CGO disabled +- **Tests**: Existing bootstrap tests need `SkipSecureDetection` to avoid Touch ID prompts in CI diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/specs/bootstrap-lifecycle/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/specs/bootstrap-lifecycle/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c32f3ffa --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/specs/bootstrap-lifecycle/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Bootstrap uses secure hardware provider for passphrase storage +The bootstrap process SHALL use `DetectSecureProvider()` to determine the keyring provider for passphrase acquisition. When no secure hardware is available (`TierNone`), the keyring provider SHALL be nil, disabling automatic keyring reads. + +#### Scenario: Biometric available during bootstrap +- **WHEN** bootstrap runs on macOS with Touch ID +- **THEN** the passphrase acquisition SHALL use `BiometricProvider` as the keyring provider + +#### Scenario: No secure hardware during bootstrap +- **WHEN** bootstrap runs on a system without biometric or TPM +- **THEN** the keyring provider SHALL be nil, and passphrase SHALL be acquired from keyfile or interactive prompt only + +#### Scenario: Interactive passphrase with secure storage offer +- **WHEN** the passphrase source is interactive and a secure provider is available +- **THEN** the system SHALL offer to store the passphrase in the secure backend with a confirmation prompt showing the tier label + +### Requirement: SkipSecureDetection option for testing +The `Options` struct SHALL include a `SkipSecureDetection` boolean. When true, secure hardware detection SHALL be skipped and the keyring provider SHALL be nil regardless of available hardware. + +#### Scenario: SkipSecureDetection in test +- **WHEN** `Run()` is called with `SkipSecureDetection: true` +- **THEN** the bootstrap SHALL not probe for biometric or TPM hardware diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/specs/keyring-security-tiering/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/specs/keyring-security-tiering/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fa911397 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/specs/keyring-security-tiering/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: SecurityTier enum represents hardware security levels +The system SHALL define a `SecurityTier` enum with values `TierNone` (0), `TierTPM` (1), and `TierBiometric` (2), ordered by security strength. + +#### Scenario: SecurityTier string representation +- **WHEN** `SecurityTier.String()` is called +- **THEN** it SHALL return `"none"`, `"tpm"`, or `"biometric"` respectively + +#### Scenario: Unknown tier defaults to none +- **WHEN** an unknown `SecurityTier` value calls `String()` +- **THEN** it SHALL return `"none"` + +### Requirement: DetectSecureProvider probes hardware backends +The system SHALL provide a `DetectSecureProvider()` function that returns the highest-tier available `(Provider, SecurityTier)` pair by probing biometric first, then TPM, then returning `(nil, TierNone)`. + +#### Scenario: macOS with Touch ID available +- **WHEN** `DetectSecureProvider()` is called on macOS with Touch ID hardware +- **THEN** it SHALL return a `BiometricProvider` and `TierBiometric` + +#### Scenario: Linux with TPM 2.0 device +- **WHEN** `DetectSecureProvider()` is called on Linux with accessible `/dev/tpmrm0` +- **THEN** it SHALL return a `TPMProvider` and `TierTPM` + +#### Scenario: No secure hardware available +- **WHEN** neither biometric nor TPM is available +- **THEN** it SHALL return `(nil, TierNone)` + +### Requirement: BiometricProvider uses macOS Keychain with Touch ID ACL +The system SHALL provide a `BiometricProvider` that stores secrets in macOS Keychain using `kSecAccessControlBiometryAny` access control. This provider SHALL require Touch ID authentication for every read operation. + +#### Scenario: Store and retrieve with biometric +- **WHEN** a secret is stored via `BiometricProvider.Set()` and later retrieved via `BiometricProvider.Get()` +- **THEN** the Set SHALL create a Keychain item with biometric ACL, and Get SHALL trigger Touch ID before returning the value + +#### Scenario: Biometric not available on non-Darwin platform +- **WHEN** `NewBiometricProvider()` is called on a non-Darwin or non-CGO platform +- **THEN** it SHALL return `ErrBiometricNotAvailable` + +### Requirement: TPMProvider seals secrets with TPM 2.0 +The system SHALL provide a `TPMProvider` that seals secrets under the TPM's Storage Root Key and stores the sealed blob at `~/.lango/tpm/_.sealed`. + +#### Scenario: Seal and unseal with TPM +- **WHEN** a secret is stored via `TPMProvider.Set()` and later retrieved via `TPMProvider.Get()` +- **THEN** Set SHALL seal the data with TPM2 and write the blob to disk, and Get SHALL unseal using the same TPM chip + +#### Scenario: TPM not available on non-Linux platform +- **WHEN** `NewTPMProvider()` is called on a non-Linux platform +- **THEN** it SHALL return `ErrTPMNotAvailable` + +#### Scenario: Delete removes sealed blob +- **WHEN** `TPMProvider.Delete()` is called for an existing sealed blob +- **THEN** it SHALL remove the sealed blob file from disk + +### Requirement: Error sentinels for hardware availability +The system SHALL define `ErrBiometricNotAvailable` and `ErrTPMNotAvailable` sentinel errors for callers to distinguish hardware unavailability from other failures. + +#### Scenario: Error sentinel messages +- **WHEN** error sentinels are checked +- **THEN** `ErrBiometricNotAvailable` SHALL contain "biometric authentication not available" and `ErrTPMNotAvailable` SHALL contain "TPM device not available" + +### Requirement: Build-tag stubs for cross-platform compilation +The system SHALL provide stub implementations with build tags (`!darwin || !cgo` for biometric, `!linux` for TPM) that implement the `Provider` interface and return the appropriate sentinel errors. + +#### Scenario: Stub methods satisfy Provider interface +- **WHEN** stub types are used on unsupported platforms +- **THEN** all `Get`, `Set`, `Delete` methods SHALL return the platform-specific sentinel error diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/specs/os-keyring/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/specs/os-keyring/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1685323b --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/specs/os-keyring/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Status struct describes keyring availability +The `Status` struct SHALL include a `SecurityTier` field indicating the detected hardware security tier alongside existing `Available`, `Backend`, and `Error` fields. + +#### Scenario: IsAvailable reports security tier +- **WHEN** `IsAvailable()` is called on a system with biometric hardware +- **THEN** the returned `Status` SHALL have `SecurityTier` set to `TierBiometric` + +#### Scenario: IsAvailable on system without secure hardware +- **WHEN** `IsAvailable()` is called on a system without biometric or TPM +- **THEN** the returned `Status` SHALL have `SecurityTier` set to `TierNone` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/specs/passphrase-acquisition/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/specs/passphrase-acquisition/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9b636ae2 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/specs/passphrase-acquisition/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Keyring provider is nil when no secure hardware is available +The passphrase acquisition flow SHALL receive a nil `KeyringProvider` when the bootstrap determines no secure hardware backend is available (`TierNone`). This effectively disables keyring auto-read, forcing keyfile or interactive/stdin acquisition. + +#### Scenario: Nil keyring provider skips keyring step +- **WHEN** `Acquire()` is called with `KeyringProvider` set to nil +- **THEN** the keyring step SHALL be skipped entirely, and acquisition SHALL proceed to keyfile or interactive prompt + +#### Scenario: Secure keyring provider attempts read +- **WHEN** `Acquire()` is called with a non-nil `KeyringProvider` (biometric or TPM) +- **THEN** it SHALL attempt to read the passphrase from the secure provider first diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6017becf --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-keyring-security-tiering/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +## 1. Keyring Package Core + +- [x] 1.1 Add `ErrBiometricNotAvailable` and `ErrTPMNotAvailable` sentinel errors to `internal/keyring/keyring.go` +- [x] 1.2 Add `SecurityTier` enum with `TierNone`, `TierTPM`, `TierBiometric` and `String()` method to `internal/keyring/keyring.go` +- [x] 1.3 Update `Status` struct with `SecurityTier` field in `internal/keyring/keyring.go` +- [x] 1.4 Create `internal/keyring/tier.go` with `DetectSecureProvider()` factory function + +## 2. Biometric Provider (macOS) + +- [x] 2.1 Create `internal/keyring/biometric_darwin.go` with CGO Touch ID Keychain implementation (kSecAccessControlBiometryAny) +- [x] 2.2 Create `internal/keyring/biometric_stub.go` with stub returning `ErrBiometricNotAvailable` + +## 3. TPM Provider (Linux) + +- [x] 3.1 Add `github.com/google/go-tpm` dependency to `go.mod` +- [x] 3.2 Create `internal/keyring/tpm_provider.go` with TPM2 seal/unseal implementation +- [x] 3.3 Create `internal/keyring/tpm_stub.go` with stub returning `ErrTPMNotAvailable` + +## 4. OS Keyring Update + +- [x] 4.1 Update `IsAvailable()` in `internal/keyring/os_keyring.go` to populate `SecurityTier` in Status + +## 5. Bootstrap Integration + +- [x] 5.1 Add `SkipSecureDetection` field to `bootstrap.Options` +- [x] 5.2 Replace `OSProvider` with `DetectSecureProvider()` in `bootstrap.Run()` +- [x] 5.3 Update store prompt to show tier label and only trigger when secure provider available +- [x] 5.4 Update existing bootstrap tests with `SkipSecureDetection: true` + +## 6. CLI Commands + +- [x] 6.1 Update `keyring store` to use `DetectSecureProvider()` and gate on secure provider availability +- [x] 6.2 Update `keyring clear` to clean all backends (OS keyring + secure provider + TPM blob files) +- [x] 6.3 Update `keyring status` to show security tier and per-backend passphrase status + +## 7. Tests + +- [x] 7.1 Create `internal/keyring/tier_test.go` with SecurityTier and DetectSecureProvider tests +- [x] 7.2 Verify `go build ./...` passes on macOS (biometric_darwin.go + tpm_stub.go) +- [x] 7.3 Verify `go test ./internal/keyring/...` and `go test ./internal/bootstrap/...` pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-onboarding-wizard-ux-improvements/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-onboarding-wizard-ux-improvements/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d1c6cc6f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-onboarding-wizard-ux-improvements/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-27 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-onboarding-wizard-ux-improvements/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-onboarding-wizard-ux-improvements/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0ea72b37 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-onboarding-wizard-ux-improvements/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +## Context + +The Settings editor and Onboarding wizard both use `tuicore.FormModel`/`tuicore.Field` to render configuration forms. The Settings editor was enhanced with inline descriptions, model auto-fetch from provider APIs, field validators, and conditional visibility (`VisibleWhen`). The Onboarding wizard still uses bare fields without these features, leading to inconsistent UX for identical settings. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Consistent field descriptions across Settings editor and Onboarding wizard for the same fields +- Model auto-fetch in Onboarding's Agent Step via reuse of the settings package's fetcher +- Input validation for Temperature (0.0–2.0) and Max Tokens (positive integer) in Onboarding +- Conditional visibility for Security Step sub-fields (PII redaction, approval policy hidden when interceptor disabled) +- "github" provider support in all provider option lists + +**Non-Goals:** +- Refactoring the form rendering engine or `tuicore` package +- Adding new onboarding steps or changing the wizard flow +- Changing Settings editor behavior beyond function exports and github option + +## Decisions + +1. **Export fetcher functions from settings package** — `FetchModelOptions` and `NewProviderFromConfig` are exported so `onboard` can import and call them directly. Alternative: duplicate the logic in onboard. Rejected because it violates DRY and would drift over time. + +2. **Graceful fallback for model auto-fetch** — If the provider API key is missing or fetch fails, the model field remains a text input with a placeholder suggestion. This matches the Settings editor pattern exactly. + +3. **Pointer capture for VisibleWhen** — The `interceptorEnabled` field pointer is captured in a closure for `VisibleWhen` on the PII and Policy fields. This is the same pattern used in the Settings editor's conditional fields. + +4. **Indented labels for conditional sub-fields** — PII and Policy labels are prefixed with two spaces (`" Redact PII"`, `" Approval Policy"`) to visually indicate hierarchy, matching Settings editor conventions. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Cross-package coupling] The onboard package now imports settings for `FetchModelOptions` → Acceptable because both packages are in the same CLI layer and share the same config types. +- [Network call during onboarding] Model auto-fetch makes a network request with 5s timeout → Mitigated by fallback to text input if it fails, same as Settings editor behavior. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-onboarding-wizard-ux-improvements/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-onboarding-wizard-ux-improvements/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4e5f02c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-onboarding-wizard-ux-improvements/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## Why + +The Settings editor (`internal/cli/settings/`) received major UX improvements — inline descriptions, model auto-fetch, field validation, and conditional visibility — but the Onboarding wizard (`internal/cli/onboard/`) uses the same `tuicore.FormModel`/`tuicore.Field` and was not updated. Users encounter inconsistent UX between the two entry points for the same fields. + +## What Changes + +- Export `FetchModelOptions` and `NewProviderFromConfig` from the settings package so the onboard package can reuse model auto-fetch logic +- Add `Description` to all onboard form fields (Provider, Agent, Channel, Security steps) matching Settings wording +- Add model auto-fetch to Agent Step's model field using `settings.FetchModelOptions()` +- Add Temperature validator (0.0–2.0 range) and strengthen Max Tokens validator (positive integer) +- Add `VisibleWhen` conditional visibility to Security Step sub-fields (PII, Policy hidden when interceptor disabled) +- Add "github" provider to all provider option lists (Provider Step, `buildProviderOptions` fallback, `suggestModel`) +- Add "github" to Settings `NewProviderForm` options for consistency +- Update call sites in `forms_impl.go` to use exported function names + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +### Modified Capabilities +- `cli-onboard`: Add field descriptions, model auto-fetch, validators, conditional visibility, and github provider support +- `cli-settings`: Export model fetcher functions for cross-package reuse; add github to provider form options + +## Impact + +- `internal/cli/settings/model_fetcher.go` — function exports (API change, non-breaking) +- `internal/cli/settings/forms_impl.go` — call site updates + github option +- `internal/cli/onboard/steps.go` — descriptions, auto-fetch, validators, conditional visibility, github +- `internal/cli/onboard/steps_test.go` — new tests for all improvements diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-onboarding-wizard-ux-improvements/specs/cli-onboard/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-onboarding-wizard-ux-improvements/specs/cli-onboard/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3fec3935 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-onboarding-wizard-ux-improvements/specs/cli-onboard/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Guided Wizard Flow +The onboard wizard SHALL guide users through 5 sequential steps: +1. **Provider Setup** — Provider type, name, API key, base URL +2. **Agent Config** — Provider selection, model, max tokens, temperature +3. **Channel Setup** — Channel selector (Telegram/Discord/Slack/Skip) then channel-specific form +4. **Security & Auth** — Privacy interceptor enabled, PII redaction, approval policy +5. **Test Configuration** — Validates configuration and displays results + +#### Scenario: Step 1 Provider Setup +- **WHEN** user starts the onboard wizard +- **THEN** the wizard SHALL display a form with fields: type (select), id (text), apikey (password), baseurl (text) +- **AND** type options SHALL be: anthropic, openai, gemini, ollama, github +- **AND** every field SHALL have a non-empty Description for inline help + +#### Scenario: Step 2 Agent Config +- **WHEN** user advances to Step 2 +- **THEN** the wizard SHALL display a form with fields: provider (select), model (text or select), maxtokens (int), temp (text) +- **AND** provider options SHALL be populated from config.Providers, with fallback list including github +- **AND** the model field SHALL attempt auto-fetch via `settings.FetchModelOptions()`; on success it becomes InputSelect, on failure it remains InputText with placeholder +- **AND** every field SHALL have a non-empty Description for inline help + +#### Scenario: Step 2 Temperature validation +- **WHEN** user enters a temperature value +- **THEN** the validator SHALL accept values between 0.0 and 2.0 inclusive +- **AND** SHALL reject non-numeric values and values outside the range + +#### Scenario: Step 2 Max Tokens validation +- **WHEN** user enters a max tokens value +- **THEN** the validator SHALL accept positive integers only +- **AND** SHALL reject zero, negative integers, and non-integer values + +#### Scenario: Step 3 Channel forms descriptions +- **WHEN** user selects any channel (Telegram, Discord, Slack) +- **THEN** every channel form field SHALL have a non-empty Description for inline help + +#### Scenario: Step 4 Security form with conditional visibility +- **WHEN** user advances to Step 4 +- **THEN** the wizard SHALL display interceptor_enabled (bool) with Description +- **AND** interceptor_pii and interceptor_policy SHALL have VisibleWhen tied to interceptor_enabled.Checked +- **AND** when interceptor is disabled, only interceptor_enabled SHALL be visible (1 field) +- **AND** when interceptor is enabled, all 3 fields SHALL be visible +- **AND** interceptor_pii label SHALL be " Redact PII" and interceptor_policy label SHALL be " Approval Policy" (indented) + +#### Scenario: GitHub provider suggestion +- **WHEN** the agent provider is "github" +- **THEN** suggestModel SHALL return "gpt-4o" diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-onboarding-wizard-ux-improvements/specs/cli-settings/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-onboarding-wizard-ux-improvements/specs/cli-settings/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cefd1fc7 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-onboarding-wizard-ux-improvements/specs/cli-settings/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Model Fetcher API +The settings package SHALL export `FetchModelOptions` and `NewProviderFromConfig` as public functions so other CLI packages (e.g., onboard) can reuse model auto-fetch logic. + +#### Scenario: Exported function availability +- **WHEN** another package imports the settings package +- **THEN** `settings.FetchModelOptions(providerID, cfg, currentModel)` SHALL be callable +- **AND** `settings.NewProviderFromConfig(id, pCfg)` SHALL be callable + +### Requirement: Configuration Coverage +The settings editor SHALL support editing all configuration sections. The `NewProviderForm` type options SHALL include "github" alongside openai, anthropic, gemini, and ollama. + +#### Scenario: Provider form includes github +- **WHEN** user opens the provider add/edit form +- **THEN** the Type select field options SHALL include "github" diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-onboarding-wizard-ux-improvements/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-onboarding-wizard-ux-improvements/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5efbf571 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-onboarding-wizard-ux-improvements/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +## 1. Settings Package — Export Functions + +- [x] 1.1 Rename `fetchModelOptions` → `FetchModelOptions` in `internal/cli/settings/model_fetcher.go` +- [x] 1.2 Rename `newProviderFromConfig` → `NewProviderFromConfig` in `internal/cli/settings/model_fetcher.go` +- [x] 1.3 Update all 5 call sites in `internal/cli/settings/forms_impl.go` to use `FetchModelOptions` +- [x] 1.4 Add "github" to `NewProviderForm` options in `internal/cli/settings/forms_impl.go` + +## 2. Onboard Steps — Descriptions + +- [x] 2.1 Add Description to all 4 Provider Step fields (type, id, apikey, baseurl) +- [x] 2.2 Add Description to all 4 Agent Step fields (provider, model, maxtokens, temp) +- [x] 2.3 Add Description to all Channel form fields (telegram_token, discord_token, slack_token, slack_app_token) +- [x] 2.4 Add Description to all 3 Security Step fields (interceptor_enabled, interceptor_pii, interceptor_policy) + +## 3. Onboard Steps — Model Auto-Fetch + +- [x] 3.1 Import `settings` package in `internal/cli/onboard/steps.go` +- [x] 3.2 Add `settings.FetchModelOptions()` call after model field in `NewAgentStepForm`, converting to InputSelect on success + +## 4. Onboard Steps — Validators + +- [x] 4.1 Add Temperature validator: `strconv.ParseFloat` + 0.0–2.0 range check +- [x] 4.2 Strengthen Max Tokens validator: add `v <= 0` positive check + +## 5. Onboard Steps — Conditional Visibility + +- [x] 5.1 Capture `interceptorEnabled` field pointer in `NewSecurityStepForm` +- [x] 5.2 Add `VisibleWhen` closures to interceptor_pii and interceptor_policy referencing `interceptorEnabled.Checked` +- [x] 5.3 Indent sub-field labels: `" Redact PII"`, `" Approval Policy"` + +## 6. Onboard Steps — GitHub Provider + +- [x] 6.1 Add "github" to `NewProviderStepForm` type options +- [x] 6.2 Add "github" to `buildProviderOptions` fallback list +- [x] 6.3 Add `case "github": return "gpt-4o"` to `suggestModel` + +## 7. Tests + +- [x] 7.1 Add `TestAllFormsHaveDescriptions` — verify all form fields have non-empty Description +- [x] 7.2 Add `TestProviderOptionsIncludeGitHub` — verify "github" in provider type options and fallback list +- [x] 7.3 Add `TestTemperatureValidator` — table test (0.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.1, -0.1, "abc") +- [x] 7.4 Add `TestMaxTokensValidator` — table test (4096, 1, 0, -1, "abc") +- [x] 7.5 Add `TestSecurityConditionalVisibility` — toggle interceptor and count visible fields +- [x] 7.6 Add `{give: "github", want: "gpt-4o"}` to `TestSuggestModel` table + +## 8. Verification + +- [x] 8.1 Run `go build ./...` — verify no build errors +- [x] 8.2 Run `go test ./internal/cli/onboard/...` — all tests pass +- [x] 8.3 Run `go test ./internal/cli/settings/...` — all tests pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-cli-skills-optimize-tools/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-cli-skills-optimize-tools/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-cli-skills-optimize-tools/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-cli-skills-optimize-tools/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-cli-skills-optimize-tools/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..06fa61a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-cli-skills-optimize-tools/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +## Context + +The lango agent embeds 42 default skills in `skills/` — each a SKILL.md that wraps a `lango ` CLI call. At runtime these skills are deployed to the user's skills directory and registered as agent tools. However, every `lango` subprocess requires passphrase authentication during bootstrap, which always fails in non-interactive agent mode. The agent then wastes cycles attempting these broken skills before falling back to equivalent built-in tools. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Eliminate all 42 CLI wrapper SKILL.md files that always fail in agent mode +- Preserve the embed infrastructure so future (non-CLI) skills can still be embedded +- Add prompt-level guidance ensuring agents prefer built-in tools over skills +- Add runtime guidance in the knowledge retriever's skill section + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing the skill system architecture or SkillProvider interface +- Modifying how user-created or imported skills work +- Removing the `EnsureDefaults()` mechanism (it still works, just has no default skills to deploy) + +## Decisions + +### D1: Delete skill directories, keep embed.go with placeholder +**Decision:** Delete all 42 `skills//` directories. Preserve `skills/embed.go` with its original `//go:embed **/SKILL.md` directive. Add `skills/.placeholder/SKILL.md` to satisfy the glob pattern. +**Rationale:** The `go:embed` pattern errors at build time if zero files match. A placeholder file is simpler than rewriting embed.go or switching to a runtime filesystem approach. This keeps the door open for future embedded skills with zero code changes. +**Alternative considered:** Rewrite embed.go to return an empty `fs.FS` — rejected because it removes the embed pipeline entirely, requiring more work to restore later. + +### D2: Multi-layer prompt guidance +**Decision:** Add tool priority notes at three levels: (1) `TOOL_USAGE.md` for detailed rules, (2) `AGENTS.md` for high-level directive, (3) `retriever.go` for runtime "Available Skills" section. +**Rationale:** LLM behavior is influenced by prompt reinforcement. A single mention may not reliably override the agent's tendency to try matching skills. Three layers (reference docs, identity prompt, runtime context) ensure consistent prioritization. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **[Risk] Existing user scripts reference default skill names** → Mitigation: Skills were always wrappers around CLI commands that already fail. No working functionality is lost. +- **[Risk] Placeholder SKILL.md appears as a loadable skill** → Mitigation: The `.placeholder` directory name with leading dot is conventionally hidden and the SKILL.md lacks valid frontmatter, so `FileSkillStore` parsing will skip it. +- **[Trade-off]** Removing defaults reduces out-of-box discoverability of CLI commands via skill listing. Acceptable because the CLI `--help` system provides this discovery path. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-cli-skills-optimize-tools/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-cli-skills-optimize-tools/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5181be00 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-cli-skills-optimize-tools/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +## Why + +The lango agent registers 42 embedded default skills (all `lango ` shell wrappers) as tools. These skills spawn `lango` CLI as a subprocess, which requires passphrase authentication and always fails in non-interactive agent mode. The agent attempts these failing skills before using equivalent built-in tools, wasting cycles and confusing error handling. + +## What Changes + +- **Remove all 42 lango CLI wrapper SKILL.md files** from `skills/` directory (agent-list, config-*, cron-*, graph-*, memory-*, p2p-*, secrets-*, security-*, serve, version, workflow-*, doctor) +- **Preserve embed.go logic** with a `.placeholder/SKILL.md` so future external skills can still be embedded +- **Add tool priority guidance** to `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md` — new "Tool Selection Priority" section instructing agents to prefer built-in tools over skills +- **Add tool selection note** to `prompts/AGENTS.md` — brief directive reinforcing built-in-first policy +- **Add runtime priority note** in `internal/knowledge/retriever.go` — "Available Skills" section now includes a disclaimer to prefer built-in tools + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +_(none)_ + +### Modified Capabilities + +- `agent-prompting`: Added tool selection priority guidance to TOOL_USAGE.md and AGENTS.md prompts +- `skill-system`: Removed all default embedded CLI wrapper skills; embed.go preserved with placeholder for future use + +## Impact + +- `skills/` — 42 subdirectories deleted, `.placeholder/SKILL.md` added +- `skills/embed.go` — unchanged (original go:embed logic preserved) +- `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md` — new "Tool Selection Priority" section prepended +- `prompts/AGENTS.md` — tool selection directive added before knowledge system description +- `internal/knowledge/retriever.go` — skills section in AssemblePrompt now includes priority note +- No API changes, no breaking changes, no dependency changes diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-cli-skills-optimize-tools/specs/agent-prompting/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-cli-skills-optimize-tools/specs/agent-prompting/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..96694570 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-cli-skills-optimize-tools/specs/agent-prompting/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Tool selection priority in prompts +The TOOL_USAGE.md prompt SHALL include a "Tool Selection Priority" section that instructs agents to always prefer built-in tools over skills. The section SHALL state that skills wrapping `lango` CLI commands will fail due to passphrase authentication requirements in agent mode. + +#### Scenario: Agent reads tool usage prompt +- **WHEN** the agent processes TOOL_USAGE.md during system prompt assembly +- **THEN** the prompt SHALL contain a "Tool Selection Priority" section before the "Exec Tool" section + +#### Scenario: Agent encounters a skill with built-in equivalent +- **WHEN** a skill provides functionality already available as a built-in tool +- **THEN** the prompt guidance SHALL direct the agent to use the built-in tool instead + +### Requirement: Tool selection directive in agent identity +The AGENTS.md prompt SHALL include a tool selection directive stating that built-in tools MUST be preferred over skills, and skills are extensions for specialized use cases only. + +#### Scenario: Agent reads identity prompt +- **WHEN** the agent processes AGENTS.md during system prompt assembly +- **THEN** the prompt SHALL contain a tool selection directive before the knowledge system description + +### Requirement: Runtime skill priority note +The `AssemblePrompt()` method in `ContextRetriever` SHALL prepend a note to the "Available Skills" section advising agents to prefer built-in tools over skills. + +#### Scenario: Skills section rendered with priority note +- **WHEN** the assembled prompt includes skill pattern items +- **THEN** the "Available Skills" section SHALL begin with a note stating to prefer built-in tools over skills diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-cli-skills-optimize-tools/specs/skill-system/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-cli-skills-optimize-tools/specs/skill-system/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..568bb964 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-cli-skills-optimize-tools/specs/skill-system/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Embedded Default Skills +The system SHALL embed default skill files via `//go:embed **/SKILL.md`. When no real skill SKILL.md files are present, a `.placeholder/SKILL.md` file SHALL exist to satisfy the embed glob pattern. The placeholder SHALL NOT contain valid YAML frontmatter and SHALL NOT be deployed as a usable skill. + +#### Scenario: Build with no real default skills +- **WHEN** `go build` is run with only `.placeholder/SKILL.md` in the skills directory +- **THEN** the build SHALL succeed without errors + +#### Scenario: Placeholder not deployed as skill +- **WHEN** `EnsureDefaults()` iterates over the embedded filesystem +- **THEN** the `.placeholder` directory SHALL be skipped or ignored because it lacks valid YAML frontmatter + +#### Scenario: Future skill addition +- **WHEN** a new `skills//SKILL.md` file with valid frontmatter is added +- **THEN** it SHALL be automatically included in the embedded filesystem and deployed via `EnsureDefaults()` + +## REMOVED Requirements + +### Requirement: 42 default CLI wrapper skills +**Reason**: All 42 default skills wrapped `lango` CLI commands that require passphrase authentication, making them non-functional in agent mode. Built-in tools provide equivalent functionality. +**Migration**: Use built-in tools (exec, filesystem, crypto, secrets, cron, background, workflow, p2p, browser) instead. For CLI-only features (config, doctor, settings), run commands directly in the user's terminal. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-cli-skills-optimize-tools/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-cli-skills-optimize-tools/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..399964b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-cli-skills-optimize-tools/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +## 1. Remove Default CLI Wrapper Skills + +- [x] 1.1 Delete all 42 `skills//` directories containing lango CLI wrapper SKILL.md files +- [x] 1.2 Create `skills/.placeholder/SKILL.md` without valid YAML frontmatter to satisfy `go:embed **/SKILL.md` pattern +- [x] 1.3 Verify `skills/embed.go` compiles with only the placeholder present + +## 2. Optimize Prompts for Tool Priority + +- [x] 2.1 Add "Tool Selection Priority" section to `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md` before the "Exec Tool" section +- [x] 2.2 Add tool selection directive to `prompts/AGENTS.md` before the knowledge system description +- [x] 2.3 Add priority note to "Available Skills" section in `internal/knowledge/retriever.go` AssemblePrompt method + +## 3. Verification + +- [x] 3.1 Run `go build ./...` and confirm build passes +- [x] 3.2 Run `go test ./...` and confirm all tests pass +- [x] 3.3 Verify `skills/` contains only `embed.go` and `.placeholder/` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-keyring-config-add-prompt/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-keyring-config-add-prompt/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d1c6cc6f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-keyring-config-add-prompt/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-27 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-keyring-config-add-prompt/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-keyring-config-add-prompt/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..42a28e4b --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-keyring-config-add-prompt/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +## Context + +The `security.keyring.enabled` config flag was introduced with OS keyring support but is never consulted at runtime — `bootstrap.go` uses `keyring.IsAvailable()` auto-detection exclusively. The flag adds unnecessary config surface (struct, defaults, TUI form, menu entry, state handler) without providing value. Additionally, users who enter a passphrase interactively must separately run `lango security keyring store` to persist it, which is a poor UX. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Remove `security.keyring.enabled` config flag and all associated UI/config plumbing +- Add an automatic keyring storage prompt in `bootstrap.go` after interactive passphrase entry +- Maintain backward compatibility — existing keyring CLI commands (`status`, `store`, `clear`) remain unchanged + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing the keyring Provider interface or availability detection logic +- Modifying the passphrase acquisition priority chain order +- Adding keyring support for non-interactive environments + +## Decisions + +1. **Remove config flag entirely rather than deprecate**: The flag was never functional (bootstrap ignores it). No deprecation cycle needed since removing it has zero runtime behavior change. + +2. **Prompt placement — after `passphrase.Acquire()`, before database open**: The passphrase is needed before the DB opens, and the prompt is a lightweight stdin read. Placing it here ensures the user sees the prompt at the natural point in the startup flow. + +3. **Use existing `prompt.Confirm()` for the prompt**: Reuses the `internal/cli/prompt` package which already handles terminal I/O consistently. + +4. **Non-fatal keyring store failure**: If `krProvider.Set()` fails, emit a stderr warning and continue. The passphrase was already acquired successfully so startup should not be blocked. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Config schema change] Users with `security.keyring.enabled` in their config.json will see an unknown field warning from Viper. → Viper silently ignores unknown keys by default, so no impact. +- [Prompt in non-interactive context] If stdin is redirected but `passphrase.Acquire()` somehow returns `SourceInteractive`. → This cannot happen because `Acquire()` only returns `SourceInteractive` when `term.IsTerminal(stdin)` is true, which guarantees `prompt.Confirm()` will also work. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-keyring-config-add-prompt/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-keyring-config-add-prompt/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7a0f95c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-keyring-config-add-prompt/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +## Why + +The `security.keyring.enabled` config flag is redundant — `keyring.IsAvailable()` already provides runtime auto-detection of OS keyring availability. Additionally, after interactive passphrase entry there is no UX prompt to store the passphrase in the keyring, forcing users to manually run `lango security keyring store`. + +## What Changes + +- **Remove** `security.keyring.enabled` config flag, `KeyringConfig` struct, all related defaults, TUI form, menu entry, and state update handler. +- **Add** an interactive prompt in `bootstrap.go` after `passphrase.Acquire()` that offers to store the passphrase in the OS keyring when the source is interactive and the keyring is available. + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +(none) + +### Modified Capabilities + +- `os-keyring`: Remove the `security.keyring.enabled` config flag (runtime auto-detection is sufficient) and add automatic keyring storage prompt after interactive passphrase entry. + +## Impact + +- `internal/config/types.go` — Remove `KeyringConfig` struct and `Keyring` field from `SecurityConfig` +- `internal/config/loader.go` — Remove keyring defaults +- `internal/cli/settings/` — Remove `NewKeyringForm()`, menu entry, editor case +- `internal/cli/tuicore/state_update.go` — Remove `keyring_enabled` case +- `internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go` — Add keyring storage prompt after interactive passphrase acquisition +- `config.json` — Remove `keyring` block from security section +- Tests updated to remove keyring form test and menu assertion diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-keyring-config-add-prompt/specs/os-keyring/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-keyring-config-add-prompt/specs/os-keyring/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..18605778 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-keyring-config-add-prompt/specs/os-keyring/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +## REMOVED Requirements + +### Requirement: Configuration +**Reason**: The `security.keyring.enabled` config flag is redundant — `keyring.IsAvailable()` runtime auto-detection is the sole mechanism used by bootstrap. The flag was never consulted at runtime. +**Migration**: Remove `security.keyring.enabled` from config files. No behavioral change — keyring availability was always determined by runtime detection. + +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Interactive keyring storage prompt +After a passphrase is acquired interactively (source is `SourceInteractive`) and an OS keyring provider is available, the system SHALL prompt the user to store the passphrase in the OS keyring for future automatic unlock. + +#### Scenario: First run with keyring available +- **WHEN** user enters passphrase interactively AND OS keyring is available +- **THEN** system prompts "OS keyring is available. Store passphrase for automatic unlock? [y/N]" + +#### Scenario: User accepts keyring storage +- **WHEN** user responds "y" to the keyring storage prompt +- **THEN** system stores the passphrase via `krProvider.Set(Service, KeyMasterPassphrase, pass)` + +#### Scenario: User declines keyring storage +- **WHEN** user responds "N" or presses Enter to the keyring storage prompt +- **THEN** system proceeds without storing and does not prompt again until next interactive entry + +#### Scenario: Keyring store failure +- **WHEN** user accepts but `krProvider.Set()` returns an error +- **THEN** system prints a warning to stderr and continues startup normally + +#### Scenario: Non-interactive passphrase source +- **WHEN** passphrase is acquired from keyring, keyfile, or stdin pipe +- **THEN** system SHALL NOT display the keyring storage prompt + +#### Scenario: Keyring unavailable +- **WHEN** OS keyring is not available (headless, CI, Docker) +- **THEN** system SHALL NOT display the keyring storage prompt + +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Configuration +The OS keyring integration SHALL NOT have a configuration flag. Keyring availability SHALL be determined solely by `keyring.IsAvailable()` runtime auto-detection. + +#### Scenario: Keyring availability on supported OS +- **WHEN** the application starts on a system with an OS keyring daemon +- **THEN** `IsAvailable()` returns `Status{Available: true}` and the keyring is used as the highest-priority passphrase source + +#### Scenario: Keyring unavailable in headless environment +- **WHEN** the application starts in a headless environment (CI, Docker, SSH) +- **THEN** `IsAvailable()` returns `Status{Available: false}` and the system silently falls back to keyfile or interactive prompt diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-keyring-config-add-prompt/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-keyring-config-add-prompt/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..857b6fc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-remove-keyring-config-add-prompt/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## 1. Remove KeyringConfig from config layer + +- [x] 1.1 Delete `KeyringConfig` struct and `Keyring` field from `SecurityConfig` in `internal/config/types.go` +- [x] 1.2 Remove `Keyring: KeyringConfig{Enabled: true}` default in `internal/config/loader.go` +- [x] 1.3 Remove `v.SetDefault("security.keyring.enabled", ...)` in `internal/config/loader.go` +- [x] 1.4 Remove `"keyring": {"enabled": true}` block from `config.json` + +## 2. Remove KeyringConfig from settings UI + +- [x] 2.1 Delete `NewKeyringForm()` function in `internal/cli/settings/forms_impl.go` +- [x] 2.2 Remove `security_keyring` menu entry in `internal/cli/settings/menu.go` +- [x] 2.3 Remove `case "security_keyring":` block in `internal/cli/settings/editor.go` +- [x] 2.4 Remove `case "keyring_enabled":` block in `internal/cli/tuicore/state_update.go` +- [x] 2.5 Remove "Security Keyring" from help text in `internal/cli/settings/settings.go` + +## 3. Add interactive keyring storage prompt + +- [x] 3.1 Add `prompt` package import to `internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go` +- [x] 3.2 Add keyring storage prompt after `passphrase.Acquire()` when source is `SourceInteractive` and keyring provider is available + +## 4. Update tests + +- [x] 4.1 Delete `TestNewKeyringForm_AllFields` in `internal/cli/settings/forms_impl_test.go` +- [x] 4.2 Remove `"security_keyring"` from `TestNewMenuModel_HasP2PCategories` want list + +## 5. Verify + +- [x] 5.1 Run `go build ./...` — no compile errors +- [x] 5.2 Run `go test ./internal/config/... ./internal/cli/settings/... ./internal/cli/tuicore/... ./internal/bootstrap/...` — all pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-session-expiry-auto-recovery/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-session-expiry-auto-recovery/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-session-expiry-auto-recovery/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-session-expiry-auto-recovery/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-session-expiry-auto-recovery/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..506a0b62 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-session-expiry-auto-recovery/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +## Context + +Channel adapters (Telegram/Slack/Discord) generate session keys like `telegram:123:456`. When the session TTL expires, `EntStore.Get()` returns `fmt.Errorf("session expired: %s", key)` — a plain string error. `SessionServiceAdapter.Get()` only checks for `ErrSessionNotFound` to trigger auto-creation, so expired errors pass through unhandled. Users see a permanent `session expired` error with no recovery path. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Expired sessions auto-recover transparently — users never see expiry errors +- Reuse existing patterns: sentinel errors, `Delete()`, `getOrCreate()` — no new interfaces +- Maintain concurrent safety via existing `getOrCreate()` retry logic + +**Non-Goals:** +- Session data migration or history preservation across expiry boundaries +- Changing TTL configuration or adding per-session TTL overrides +- Adding explicit "renew" or "extend" session operations + +## Decisions + +### Use sentinel error + errors.Is matching (not string matching) +Add `ErrSessionExpired` to the session error catalog and wrap it with `%w` in `EntStore.Get()`. This follows the established sentinel pattern (`ErrSessionNotFound`, `ErrDuplicateSession`) and enables type-safe matching via `errors.Is()`. + +**Alternative rejected**: Adding an `IsExpired()` method or using string matching. Sentinel errors are the established project pattern and integrate cleanly with Go's `errors.Is()`. + +### Delete-then-recreate (not in-place renewal) +On expiry, delete the stale session record first, then call `getOrCreate()` to create fresh. This avoids adding new Store interface methods and leverages the existing concurrent-safe `getOrCreate()` flow (handles `ErrDuplicateSession` retry). + +**Alternative rejected**: Adding `Renew(key)` to the Store interface. This would break all Store implementations and mock stores for a feature that delete+create achieves identically. + +### Log at Info level on auto-renewal +The expired→renewed transition is logged via `logger().Infow()` for operational visibility. This is not an error condition — it's expected lifecycle behavior. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Session history lost on expiry] → By design: TTL expiry means the session is stale, and preserving old history could confuse the AI context. Fresh start is the intended behavior. +- [Delete failure blocks recovery] → The delete error is propagated with context. This is correct: if the DB can't delete, it likely can't create either, and masking the error would cause silent failures. +- [Tiny race window between Delete and getOrCreate] → Another goroutine could create the session in this window. `getOrCreate()` handles this via `ErrDuplicateSession` retry, so it's safe. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-session-expiry-auto-recovery/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-session-expiry-auto-recovery/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..40379eee --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-session-expiry-auto-recovery/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## Why + +When a session TTL expires in channel adapters (Telegram/Slack/Discord), users receive a repeated `session expired: ` error with no recovery path. The root cause is that `EntStore.Get()` returns a plain string error on expiry, but `SessionServiceAdapter.Get()` only matches `ErrSessionNotFound` for auto-create — expired errors pass through unhandled, blocking the user permanently. + +## What Changes + +- Add `ErrSessionExpired` sentinel error to the session package for programmatic matching +- Wrap the TTL expiry error in `EntStore.Get()` with `ErrSessionExpired` using `%w` +- Add an expired-session branch in `SessionServiceAdapter.Get()` that deletes the stale session and auto-creates a fresh one +- Strengthen tests: sentinel error matching in TTL tests, mock store expiry simulation, auto-renew integration tests + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +### Modified Capabilities +- `sentinel-errors`: Add `ErrSessionExpired` sentinel for session TTL expiry +- `session-auto-create`: Extend auto-create logic to handle expired sessions via delete-and-recreate + +## Impact + +- `internal/session/errors.go` — new sentinel +- `internal/session/ent_store.go` — TTL error wrapping +- `internal/adk/session_service.go` — expired branch in Get() +- `internal/session/store_test.go` — TTL test strengthening +- `internal/adk/state_test.go` — mockStore expiry support +- `internal/adk/session_service_test.go` — auto-renew tests diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-session-expiry-auto-recovery/specs/sentinel-errors/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-session-expiry-auto-recovery/specs/sentinel-errors/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..12cfdde1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-session-expiry-auto-recovery/specs/sentinel-errors/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Session expiry sentinel error +The system SHALL define `ErrSessionExpired` in `session/errors.go` alongside existing session sentinel errors. + +#### Scenario: EntStore wraps TTL expiry with ErrSessionExpired +- **WHEN** `EntStore.Get()` finds a session whose `UpdatedAt` exceeds the configured TTL +- **THEN** it SHALL return an error wrapping `ErrSessionExpired` using `fmt.Errorf("get session %q: %w", key, ErrSessionExpired)` + +#### Scenario: ErrSessionExpired is matchable via errors.Is +- **WHEN** a caller receives a TTL expiry error from `EntStore.Get()` +- **THEN** `errors.Is(err, ErrSessionExpired)` SHALL return `true` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-session-expiry-auto-recovery/specs/session-auto-create/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-session-expiry-auto-recovery/specs/session-auto-create/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5682c5fa --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-session-expiry-auto-recovery/specs/session-auto-create/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Auto-renew expired sessions +The `SessionServiceAdapter.Get()` SHALL automatically delete an expired session and create a fresh replacement when the store returns `ErrSessionExpired`, so the user's current message is processed normally. + +#### Scenario: Expired Telegram session auto-renews +- **WHEN** `SessionServiceAdapter.Get()` receives `ErrSessionExpired` for session `telegram:123:456` +- **THEN** the system SHALL delete the expired session, create a new session with the same key, and return it successfully + +#### Scenario: Expired session delete failure propagates error +- **WHEN** `SessionServiceAdapter.Get()` receives `ErrSessionExpired` and the subsequent `Delete()` call fails +- **THEN** the system SHALL return the delete error wrapped with context, without attempting to create a new session + +#### Scenario: Concurrent expiry recovery is safe +- **WHEN** multiple goroutines detect the same expired session simultaneously +- **THEN** the `getOrCreate()` retry logic SHALL ensure all goroutines return a valid session without errors + +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Non-recoverable store errors propagated +The `SessionServiceAdapter.Get()` SHALL propagate store errors that are not "session not found" or "session expired" (e.g., database connection failures). + +#### Scenario: Database error during get +- **WHEN** the store returns an error other than "session not found" or "session expired" +- **THEN** the system SHALL propagate that error to the caller without attempting auto-creation or renewal diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-session-expiry-auto-recovery/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-session-expiry-auto-recovery/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d354b43d --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-session-expiry-auto-recovery/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +## 1. Sentinel Error + +- [x] 1.1 Add `ErrSessionExpired` to `internal/session/errors.go` + +## 2. Error Wrapping + +- [x] 2.1 Wrap TTL expiry in `EntStore.Get()` with `fmt.Errorf("get session %q: %w", key, ErrSessionExpired)` + +## 3. Auto-Recovery Logic + +- [x] 3.1 Add `ErrSessionExpired` branch in `SessionServiceAdapter.Get()` that deletes expired session and calls `getOrCreate()` + +## 4. Tests + +- [x] 4.1 Strengthen `TestEntStore_TTL` with `errors.Is(err, ErrSessionExpired)` assertion +- [x] 4.2 Add `TestEntStore_TTL_DeleteAndRecreate` for delete→recreate flow +- [x] 4.3 Add `expiredKeys` and `deleteErr` fields to `mockStore` in `state_test.go` +- [x] 4.4 Add `TestSessionServiceAdapter_Get_ExpiredSession_AutoRenews` test +- [x] 4.5 Add `TestSessionServiceAdapter_Get_ExpiredSession_DeleteFails` test + +## 5. Verification + +- [x] 5.1 Run `go build ./...` — no compilation errors +- [x] 5.2 Run `go test ./internal/session/... ./internal/adk/...` — all tests pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dadc71d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +## Context + +The TUI settings editor uses `InputSelect` (left/right arrow cycling) for model selection. With hardcoded 3 models this was adequate, but live API calls return 50-200+ models, making arrow cycling impractical. The form's Esc handling also conflicts with dropdown state. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Live model lists from Gemini and Anthropic APIs +- Searchable dropdown component for large option sets +- Correct Esc key layering (dropdown close → form exit) +- Embedding model filtering for embedding-specific fields + +**Non-Goals:** +- Caching API model lists across sessions +- Model metadata display (context window, pricing) +- Custom model input alongside search (text fallback remains when API fails) + +## Decisions + +1. **InputSearchSelect as new InputType**: Added to the existing `InputType` enum rather than creating a separate component. This keeps the form model unified and avoids a parallel rendering path. + +2. **Two-state Esc handling**: When `SelectOpen == true`, Esc closes the dropdown only. The editor checks `HasOpenDropdown()` before consuming Esc for form exit. This creates a natural 2-step exit: Esc → close dropdown, Esc → exit form. + +3. **Filter state on Field struct**: `FilteredOptions`, `SelectCursor`, `SelectOpen` live on `Field` rather than a separate model. This avoids cross-struct synchronization and keeps `FormModel.Update()` as the single control point. + +4. **Embedding filtering by name pattern**: Uses substring matching ("embed", "embedding") rather than API metadata. Provider APIs don't consistently expose model capability tags, so name-based heuristics with full-list fallback is pragmatic. + +5. **Graceful degradation**: If API calls fail or return empty, fields remain as `InputText` for manual entry. No user-visible errors for model fetch failures. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **API latency on form open**: Model fetching adds up to 5s (timeout) when opening settings forms. Mitigated by the existing `modelFetchTimeout` constant. +- **Embedding pattern matching**: May miss unusually named embedding models or include non-embedding models with "embed" in the name. Fallback to full list prevents data loss. +- **Dropdown max 8 visible items**: Fixed limit may be too small for browsing without typing. Chosen for terminal height compatibility. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7997e09c --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +## Why + +The TUI settings model selection has several usability issues: Gemini and Anthropic providers show only 3 hardcoded models (missing latest releases), arrow-key rapid navigation causes premature menu exit, and browsing hundreds of models via left/right arrows alone is impractical. Embedding model selection also lacks filtering for embedding-specific models. + +## What Changes + +- Replace hardcoded model lists in Gemini and Anthropic providers with live API calls (`Models.All()` and `Models.ListAutoPaging()`) +- Add `InputSearchSelect` TUI component: searchable dropdown with type-to-filter, up/down navigation, and Enter/Esc handling +- Fix Esc key bug where pressing Esc while a dropdown is open exits the entire form instead of just closing the dropdown +- Add `FetchEmbeddingModelOptions()` that filters model lists for embedding-capable models +- Convert all model selection fields (agent, fallback, embedding, observational memory, librarian) from `InputSelect` to `InputSearchSelect` + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `input-search-select`: Searchable dropdown select component for TUI forms with real-time filtering, keyboard navigation, and multi-state Esc handling + +### Modified Capabilities +- `provider-anthropic`: ListModels now calls the live API instead of returning hardcoded values +- `cli-tuicore`: New InputSearchSelect field type with FilteredOptions, SelectCursor, SelectOpen state management +- `cli-settings`: Model fields use InputSearchSelect; embedding model selection uses filtered model list + +## Impact + +- `internal/provider/gemini/gemini.go` — ListModels uses live API +- `internal/provider/anthropic/anthropic.go` — ListModels uses live API with pagination +- `internal/cli/tuicore/field.go` — New InputSearchSelect type and filter state +- `internal/cli/tuicore/form.go` — Dropdown open/close/navigate/filter logic and rendering +- `internal/cli/settings/editor.go` — Esc key passthrough for open dropdowns +- `internal/cli/settings/model_fetcher.go` — FetchEmbeddingModelOptions with pattern filtering +- `internal/cli/settings/forms_impl.go` — All model fields converted to InputSearchSelect diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/specs/cli-settings/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/specs/cli-settings/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..450be3a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/specs/cli-settings/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Model fields use searchable dropdown +All model selection fields in settings forms MUST use InputSearchSelect when models are fetched from API. + +#### Scenario: Agent model field with fetched models +- **WHEN** FetchModelOptions returns models for the agent provider +- **THEN** model field uses InputSearchSelect type + +#### Scenario: Embedding model field with filtered models +- **WHEN** embedding provider has models available +- **THEN** FetchEmbeddingModelOptions filters for embedding-pattern models +- **AND** falls back to full list if no embedding models match + +#### Scenario: Esc key with open dropdown in form +- **WHEN** user presses Esc while a search-select dropdown is open in StepForm +- **THEN** editor passes Esc to form (closes dropdown) instead of exiting the form diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/specs/cli-tuicore/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/specs/cli-tuicore/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..006c33eb --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/specs/cli-tuicore/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: InputSearchSelect field type in form model +The FormModel MUST support InputSearchSelect as a field type with dedicated state management. + +#### Scenario: Field initialization +- **WHEN** AddField is called with InputSearchSelect type +- **THEN** TextInput is initialized with search placeholder, FilteredOptions copies Options + +#### Scenario: HasOpenDropdown query +- **WHEN** any field has SelectOpen == true +- **THEN** HasOpenDropdown() returns true + +#### Scenario: Context-dependent help bar +- **WHEN** a dropdown is open +- **THEN** help bar shows dropdown-specific keys (↑↓ Navigate, Enter Select, Esc Close, Type Filter) +- **WHEN** no dropdown is open +- **THEN** help bar shows form-level keys including Enter Search diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/specs/input-search-select/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/specs/input-search-select/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..85245974 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/specs/input-search-select/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Searchable dropdown select field type +The TUI form system MUST support an `InputSearchSelect` field type that combines text input with a filterable dropdown list. + +#### Scenario: Opening the dropdown +- **WHEN** user presses Enter on a focused InputSearchSelect field +- **THEN** dropdown opens showing all options, text input clears for searching, cursor highlights current value + +#### Scenario: Filtering by typing +- **WHEN** user types characters while dropdown is open +- **THEN** options are filtered by case-insensitive substring match in real-time + +#### Scenario: Navigating the dropdown +- **WHEN** user presses Up/Down while dropdown is open +- **THEN** cursor moves within filtered options, clamped to list bounds + +#### Scenario: Selecting an option +- **WHEN** user presses Enter while dropdown is open with a highlighted option +- **THEN** the option is selected as the field value, dropdown closes + +#### Scenario: Closing without selecting +- **WHEN** user presses Esc while dropdown is open +- **THEN** dropdown closes, previous value is preserved, filter is reset + +#### Scenario: Tab navigation with open dropdown +- **WHEN** user presses Tab or Shift+Tab while dropdown is open +- **THEN** dropdown closes, value is preserved, focus moves to next/previous field + +#### Scenario: Dropdown display limits +- **WHEN** dropdown has more than 8 filtered options +- **THEN** only 8 are shown with scroll following cursor, remaining count shown as "... N more" diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/specs/provider-anthropic/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/specs/provider-anthropic/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d68bd8b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/specs/provider-anthropic/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Live model listing +The Anthropic provider's `ListModels()` MUST call the Anthropic Models API instead of returning hardcoded values. + +#### Scenario: Successful model listing +- **WHEN** ListModels is called with valid API credentials +- **THEN** returns all models from the API using paginated auto-paging with limit 1000 + +#### Scenario: Partial failure +- **WHEN** API returns some models before encountering an error +- **THEN** returns the successfully fetched models without error + +#### Scenario: Complete failure +- **WHEN** API call fails with no models retrieved +- **THEN** returns error with wrapped context diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d2eaaa12 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-02-28-tui-model-search-select/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +## 1. Provider API Integration + +- [x] 1.1 Replace hardcoded Gemini ListModels with `p.client.Models.All(ctx)`, strip "models/" prefix, map InputTokenLimit to ContextWindow +- [x] 1.2 Replace hardcoded Anthropic ListModels with `p.client.Models.ListAutoPaging(ctx, params)` with Limit 1000, graceful partial failure +- [x] 1.3 Update Anthropic test to skip when API key is not set (live API test) + +## 2. InputSearchSelect Component + +- [x] 2.1 Add `InputSearchSelect` constant to `InputType` enum in `field.go` +- [x] 2.2 Add `FilteredOptions`, `SelectCursor`, `SelectOpen` fields to `Field` struct +- [x] 2.3 Implement `applySearchFilter()` method with case-insensitive substring matching and cursor clamping +- [x] 2.4 Initialize TextInput and FilteredOptions in `AddField()` for InputSearchSelect type +- [x] 2.5 Add `HasOpenDropdown()` method to FormModel +- [x] 2.6 Implement dropdown open/close/navigate/select key handling in `Update()` (intercepts keys before form navigation when open) +- [x] 2.7 Implement dropdown rendering in `View()` with max 8 visible items, scroll, match count, "... N more" +- [x] 2.8 Add context-dependent help bar (dropdown keys vs form keys) + +## 3. Esc Key Bug Fix + +- [x] 3.1 Add `HasOpenDropdown()` check in `editor.go` StepForm Esc handler to pass Esc to form when dropdown is open + +## 4. Forms and Embedding Filter + +- [x] 4.1 Add `FetchEmbeddingModelOptions()` with "embed"/"embedding" pattern filtering and full-list fallback +- [x] 4.2 Convert agent model field to InputSearchSelect in `forms_impl.go` +- [x] 4.3 Convert fallback model field to InputSearchSelect +- [x] 4.4 Convert embedding model field to InputSearchSelect with FetchEmbeddingModelOptions +- [x] 4.5 Convert observational memory model field to InputSearchSelect +- [x] 4.6 Convert librarian model field to InputSearchSelect + +## 5. Tests + +- [x] 5.1 Add `form_test.go` with InputSearchSelect filter/select/Esc/Tab/cursor tests +- [x] 5.2 Add `model_fetcher_test.go` with embedding filter/fallback/current-model tests diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-dockerfile-version-ldflags/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-dockerfile-version-ldflags/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-dockerfile-version-ldflags/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-dockerfile-version-ldflags/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-dockerfile-version-ldflags/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..42b1f78b --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-dockerfile-version-ldflags/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +## Context + +The Makefile already injects `main.Version` and `main.BuildTime` via ldflags during local builds. The Dockerfile's `go build` uses only `-ldflags="-s -w"`, omitting version injection. Docker images always report `dev (built unknown)`. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Inject version and build time into Docker-built binaries via `ARG` + ldflags +- Maintain backward compatibility (default values match current behavior) + +**Non-Goals:** +- Automating CI/CD pipeline changes to pass build args +- Changing the Go source code or version display format +- Adding additional metadata (e.g., commit SHA, Go version) + +## Decisions + +1. **Use Docker `ARG` for build-time injection** — Standard Docker mechanism for parameterized builds. Alternatives like `.env` files or multi-stage variable passing add unnecessary complexity for two simple strings. + +2. **Default values `dev` / `unknown`** — Matches the Go source defaults in `cmd/lango/main.go`, ensuring identical behavior when no build args are provided. + +3. **Place ARGs in builder stage only** — ARGs are scoped to the build stage where they're used, not leaked to the runtime image. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Minimal risk] Build args are visible in `docker history` — Version/BuildTime are not secrets, so this is acceptable. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-dockerfile-version-ldflags/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-dockerfile-version-ldflags/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9f2b707d --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-dockerfile-version-ldflags/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +## Why + +The Makefile injects Version/BuildTime via `-X main.Version` / `-X main.BuildTime` ldflags, but the Dockerfile's `go build` command only uses `-ldflags="-s -w"`. This causes Docker-built images to always show `lango dev (built unknown)` when running `lango version`, losing traceability for containerized deployments. + +## What Changes + +- Add `ARG VERSION=dev` and `ARG BUILD_TIME=unknown` build arguments to `Dockerfile` +- Extend `go build -ldflags` to include `-X main.Version=${VERSION} -X main.BuildTime=${BUILD_TIME}` +- Docker builds can now inject version info via `--build-arg VERSION=... --build-arg BUILD_TIME=...` +- Default behavior (no build args) remains unchanged (`dev` / `unknown`) + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +- `docker-version-injection`: Build-time version and build timestamp injection for Docker images via ARG/ldflags + +### Modified Capabilities + +## Impact + +- **Dockerfile**: Lines 19-21 modified (ARG declarations + go build command) +- **CI/CD**: Docker build commands should be updated to pass `--build-arg VERSION=... --build-arg BUILD_TIME=...` +- **No code changes**: Only Dockerfile modification, no Go source changes required diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-dockerfile-version-ldflags/specs/docker-version-injection/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-dockerfile-version-ldflags/specs/docker-version-injection/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cbfe68f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-dockerfile-version-ldflags/specs/docker-version-injection/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Docker build accepts version build arguments +The Dockerfile SHALL declare `VERSION` and `BUILD_TIME` as `ARG` directives with default values `dev` and `unknown` respectively. + +#### Scenario: Build with explicit version arguments +- **WHEN** `docker build --build-arg VERSION=1.0.0 --build-arg BUILD_TIME=2026-03-01T00:00:00Z -t lango .` is executed +- **THEN** the resulting binary SHALL report `lango 1.0.0 (built 2026-03-01T00:00:00Z)` when running `lango version` + +#### Scenario: Build without version arguments +- **WHEN** `docker build -t lango .` is executed without `--build-arg` +- **THEN** the resulting binary SHALL report `lango dev (built unknown)` when running `lango version` + +### Requirement: Ldflags inject version into Go binary +The `go build` command in the Dockerfile SHALL include `-X main.Version=${VERSION}` and `-X main.BuildTime=${BUILD_TIME}` in the `-ldflags` string, matching the Makefile's injection pattern. + +#### Scenario: Ldflags format matches Makefile +- **WHEN** the Dockerfile's `go build` command is inspected +- **THEN** it SHALL contain `-X main.Version=${VERSION} -X main.BuildTime=${BUILD_TIME}` in the ldflags, alongside the existing `-s -w` flags diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-dockerfile-version-ldflags/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-dockerfile-version-ldflags/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..261e71c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-dockerfile-version-ldflags/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +## 1. Dockerfile Modification + +- [x] 1.1 Add `ARG VERSION=dev` and `ARG BUILD_TIME=unknown` before the `go build` command in the builder stage +- [x] 1.2 Update `go build -ldflags` to include `-X main.Version=${VERSION} -X main.BuildTime=${BUILD_TIME}` + +## 2. Verification + +- [x] 2.1 Build Docker image with explicit `--build-arg VERSION=1.0.0 --build-arg BUILD_TIME=2026-03-01` and verify `lango version` output +- [x] 2.2 Build Docker image without build args and verify default `dev`/`unknown` output diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..21e2b2c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +## Context + +Recent commits added security hardening (keyring, SQLCipher, Cloud KMS), P2P session/sandbox management, and lifecycle management. The documentation (README.md, docs/cli/index.md, docs/architecture/project-structure.md, docs/index.md) has not been updated to reflect these changes. Additionally, `internal/cli/bg/` exists with full command implementation but is not wired in `cmd/lango/main.go`. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Wire `lango bg` command so it appears in `lango --help` output +- Update all documentation to accurately reflect current CLI commands and package structure +- Correct skills count/description to match actual state (scaffold only, no built-in skills) + +**Non-Goals:** +- Implementing a gateway REST API for background tasks (bg commands use a stub provider) +- Adding new CLI functionality beyond wiring existing code +- Changing any internal package behavior + +## Decisions + +### bg command wiring uses a stub provider +The `background.Manager` is an in-memory component that only exists when the server is running. CLI commands cannot access it directly. The bg command is wired with a stub provider that returns an error directing users to `lango serve`. This matches the pattern used by other infrastructure commands. + +**Alternative considered**: Gateway REST API — too much scope for a documentation update change. + +### Documentation updates are additive +All changes add missing information rather than restructuring existing content. This minimizes diff size and review effort. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Risk] bg commands always error in standalone CLI mode → Users see clear error message directing them to start the server first. This is acceptable since the Manager is inherently server-scoped. +- [Risk] Documentation could drift again → Mitigated by the CLAUDE.md rule requiring downstream artifact updates with core code changes. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aa2fa8d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +## Why + +README, docs/cli, and docs/architecture documentation are out of sync with codebase after recent security hardening (keyring, SQLCipher, Cloud KMS), P2P session/sandbox features, and lifecycle management commits. Additionally, the `lango bg` CLI command exists in code but is not wired in main.go. + +## What Changes + +- Wire `lango bg` command in `cmd/lango/main.go` (stub provider since background.Manager is in-memory) +- Update README.md: Features (security expansion), CLI Commands (security keyring/db/kms, p2p session/sandbox, bg), Architecture (new packages), Skills description (removed built-in skills) +- Update docs/cli/index.md: Add security extension commands, P2P Network section, background task commands +- Update docs/index.md: Expand Security card description with keyring, SQLCipher, KMS +- Update docs/architecture/project-structure.md: Add lifecycle, keyring, sandbox, dbmigrate packages; update security and skills descriptions + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `bg-cli-wiring`: Wire the existing `lango bg` CLI commands (list/status/cancel/result) into main.go + +### Modified Capabilities +- `cli-reference`: Update CLI reference documentation to include all security, P2P, and background commands +- `project-docs`: Update README and architecture docs to reflect current package structure and removed skills + +## Impact + +- `cmd/lango/main.go` — new import and command registration +- `README.md` — Features, CLI Commands, Architecture sections +- `docs/cli/index.md` — Security, P2P, Automation tables +- `docs/index.md` — Security feature card +- `docs/architecture/project-structure.md` — package tables, skills description diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/specs/bg-cli-wiring/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/specs/bg-cli-wiring/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cbae3611 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/specs/bg-cli-wiring/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: bg command is registered in main.go +The `lango bg` command SHALL be registered in `cmd/lango/main.go` with GroupID "infra", using a stub manager provider that returns an error when invoked outside a running server. + +#### Scenario: bg command appears in help +- **WHEN** user runs `lango --help` +- **THEN** the `bg` command SHALL appear under the "Infrastructure" group + +#### Scenario: bg subcommand returns server-required error +- **WHEN** user runs `lango bg list` without a running server +- **THEN** the command SHALL return an error containing "bg commands require a running server" diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/specs/cli-reference/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/specs/cli-reference/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3b0a4825 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/specs/cli-reference/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Security extension commands documented in CLI reference +The docs/cli/index.md SHALL include keyring (store/clear/status), db-migrate, db-decrypt, and kms (status/test/keys) commands in the Security table. + +#### Scenario: Security table contains all 13 commands +- **WHEN** a user reads docs/cli/index.md Security section +- **THEN** the table SHALL list 13 security commands including the 8 new extension commands + +### Requirement: P2P Network section in CLI reference +The docs/cli/index.md SHALL include a P2P Network table with all 17 P2P commands (status, peers, connect, disconnect, firewall, discover, identity, reputation, pricing, session, sandbox). + +#### Scenario: P2P table exists between Payment and Automation +- **WHEN** a user reads docs/cli/index.md +- **THEN** a "P2P Network" section SHALL appear with 17 command entries + +### Requirement: Background task commands in CLI reference +The docs/cli/index.md Automation section SHALL include bg list, bg status, bg cancel, and bg result commands. + +#### Scenario: bg commands appear in Automation table +- **WHEN** a user reads the Automation section of docs/cli/index.md +- **THEN** 4 bg commands SHALL be listed after the workflow commands + +### Requirement: README CLI section includes all commands +The README.md CLI Commands section SHALL include security keyring/db/kms commands, p2p session/sandbox commands, and bg commands. + +#### Scenario: README CLI section is complete +- **WHEN** a user reads README.md CLI Commands section +- **THEN** all security extension, p2p session/sandbox, and bg commands SHALL be listed diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/specs/project-docs/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/specs/project-docs/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..19388ee5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/specs/project-docs/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: New packages documented in architecture +The README.md Architecture section and docs/architecture/project-structure.md SHALL include dbmigrate, lifecycle, keyring, and sandbox packages. + +#### Scenario: README architecture tree includes new packages +- **WHEN** a user reads README.md Architecture section +- **THEN** dbmigrate, lifecycle, keyring, sandbox, and cli/p2p packages SHALL appear in the tree + +#### Scenario: project-structure.md Infrastructure table includes new packages +- **WHEN** a user reads docs/architecture/project-structure.md Infrastructure section +- **THEN** lifecycle, keyring, sandbox, and dbmigrate packages SHALL have entries with descriptions + +### Requirement: Security package description updated +The docs/architecture/project-structure.md security package description SHALL mention KMS providers. + +#### Scenario: security row mentions KMS +- **WHEN** a user reads the security row in project-structure.md +- **THEN** the description SHALL include KMS providers (AWS, GCP, Azure, PKCS#11) + +### Requirement: Skills description corrected +The README.md and docs/architecture/project-structure.md SHALL NOT reference "30" or "38" embedded default skills, and SHALL explain that built-in skills were removed due to the passphrase security model. + +#### Scenario: README skills line is accurate +- **WHEN** a user reads the README.md Architecture section skills line +- **THEN** it SHALL describe the skill system as a scaffold with an explanation of why built-in skills were removed + +#### Scenario: project-structure.md skills section is accurate +- **WHEN** a user reads the skills section of project-structure.md +- **THEN** it SHALL explain that ~30 built-in skills were removed and the infrastructure remains functional for user-defined skills + +### Requirement: Security feature card updated in docs landing page +The docs/index.md Security card SHALL mention hardware keyring, SQLCipher, and Cloud KMS. + +#### Scenario: docs/index.md Security card is complete +- **WHEN** a user reads the Security card on docs/index.md +- **THEN** it SHALL mention hardware keyring (Touch ID / TPM), SQLCipher database encryption, and Cloud KMS integration + +### Requirement: README Features security line updated +The README.md Features section security line SHALL mention hardware keyring, SQLCipher, and Cloud KMS. + +#### Scenario: README security feature is complete +- **WHEN** a user reads the Features section of README.md +- **THEN** the Secure line SHALL include hardware keyring, SQLCipher DB encryption, and Cloud KMS diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fec5792f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-docs-cli-bg-wiring-update/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +## 1. Wire bg CLI Command + +- [x] 1.1 Add `background` and `clibg` imports to `cmd/lango/main.go` +- [x] 1.2 Register `lango bg` command with stub manager provider and GroupID "infra" +- [x] 1.3 Verify `go build ./...` succeeds + +## 2. Update README.md + +- [x] 2.1 Update Features section security line with keyring, SQLCipher, Cloud KMS +- [x] 2.2 Add security keyring/db-migrate/db-decrypt/kms commands to CLI Commands section +- [x] 2.3 Add p2p session and sandbox commands to CLI Commands section +- [x] 2.4 Add bg commands to CLI Commands section +- [x] 2.5 Add dbmigrate, lifecycle, keyring, sandbox, cli/p2p packages to Architecture tree +- [x] 2.6 Update cli/security description to include new subcommands +- [x] 2.7 Correct skills description (remove "38 embedded", add removal explanation) +- [x] 2.8 Update Skill System description in detailed features section + +## 3. Update docs/cli/index.md + +- [x] 3.1 Add 8 security extension commands to Security table +- [x] 3.2 Add P2P Network section with 17 commands between Payment and Automation +- [x] 3.3 Add 4 bg commands to Automation section + +## 4. Update docs/index.md + +- [x] 4.1 Update Security card description with keyring, SQLCipher, Cloud KMS + +## 5. Update docs/architecture/project-structure.md + +- [x] 5.1 Update cli/security row to include all subcommands +- [x] 5.2 Add cli/p2p row with all P2P commands +- [x] 5.3 Add lifecycle, keyring, sandbox, dbmigrate rows to Infrastructure table +- [x] 5.4 Update security row to mention KMS providers +- [x] 5.5 Update Top-Level Layout skills line (remove "30") +- [x] 5.6 Update skills section description (removal explanation) + +## 6. Verification + +- [x] 6.1 `go build ./...` passes +- [x] 6.2 `go test ./...` passes diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-data-race-conditions/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-data-race-conditions/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-data-race-conditions/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-data-race-conditions/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-data-race-conditions/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cba8b400 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-data-race-conditions/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +## Context + +Three packages fail under Go's `-race` detector due to unsynchronized concurrent access to shared memory: +1. **Slack mock**: handler goroutine appends to `PostMessages`/`UpdateMessages` slices while test goroutine reads them +2. **Telegram mock**: handler goroutine appends to `SentMessages`/`RequestCalls` slices while test goroutine reads them +3. **Exec background**: os/exec goroutine writes to `bytes.Buffer` while `GetBackgroundStatus()` reads via `String()` + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Eliminate all data races detected by `-race` in the 3 affected packages +- Maintain backward-compatible API for `BackgroundProcess.Output` (same `String()` method) +- Keep fixes minimal and localized + +**Non-Goals:** +- Refactoring test structure beyond what's needed for race safety +- Adding `-race` to CI pipeline (separate concern) +- Fixing potential races in other packages + +## Decisions + +### D1: Mutex per mock type (test code) +Add `sync.Mutex` directly to mock structs rather than using channels or atomic operations. +**Rationale**: Mutexes are the idiomatic Go pattern for protecting shared slices. Channels would overcomplicate simple append/read synchronization. Helper methods (`getPostMessages()`, etc.) return copies to prevent holding locks during assertions. + +### D2: syncBuffer wrapper (production code) +Introduce a `syncBuffer` type that wraps `bytes.Buffer` with `sync.Mutex`, implementing `io.Writer` and `String()`. +**Rationale**: The buffer is used as `cmd.Stdout`/`cmd.Stderr` (requiring `io.Writer`) and read via `String()`. A thin wrapper keeps the change minimal. Alternatives considered: +- `sync.RWMutex`: unnecessary since writes are frequent and reads are infrequent +- External `io.Writer` with lock: would require changing `BackgroundProcess` API +- `bytes.Buffer` with external lock: callers would need to know about the lock + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Minimal lock contention] → Background process output is written frequently but read rarely; mutex overhead is negligible +- [Type change on exported field] → `BackgroundProcess.Output` changes from `*bytes.Buffer` to `*syncBuffer`; no external consumers exist (internal package) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-data-race-conditions/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-data-race-conditions/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34a54b5e --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-data-race-conditions/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +## Why + +CI tests fail with `-race` flag due to unsynchronized concurrent access to shared slices and buffers in 3 packages: slack channel mock, telegram channel mock, and exec background process output buffer. + +## What Changes + +- Add `sync.Mutex` to `MockClient` in slack tests to protect `PostMessages`/`UpdateMessages` slice access +- Add `sync.Mutex` to `MockBotAPI` in telegram tests to protect `SentMessages`/`RequestCalls` slice access +- Introduce `syncBuffer` type in `internal/tools/exec/exec.go` wrapping `bytes.Buffer` with `sync.Mutex` for thread-safe background process output +- Add thread-safe helper methods (`getPostMessages`, `getUpdateMessages`, `getSentMessages`, `getRequestCalls`) to mock types + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +### Modified Capabilities + +- `tool-exec`: `BackgroundProcess.Output` type changes from `*bytes.Buffer` to `*syncBuffer` for thread-safe concurrent read/write +- `test-coverage`: Add mutex synchronization to channel mock types to eliminate data races under `-race` flag + +## Impact + +- `internal/channels/slack/slack_test.go` — test-only mock changes +- `internal/channels/telegram/telegram_test.go` — test-only mock changes +- `internal/tools/exec/exec.go` — production code: new `syncBuffer` type, `BackgroundProcess.Output` type change +- `internal/supervisor/supervisor.go` — no code change needed (uses `Output.String()` which is now thread-safe) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-data-race-conditions/specs/test-coverage/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-data-race-conditions/specs/test-coverage/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f7c2cf06 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-data-race-conditions/specs/test-coverage/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Channel mock thread safety +Channel test mock types SHALL use mutex synchronization to protect shared slices from concurrent access by handler goroutines and test assertions. + +#### Scenario: Slack mock concurrent access +- **WHEN** a slack handler goroutine appends to PostMessages/UpdateMessages while the test goroutine reads them +- **THEN** access SHALL be serialized via mutex to prevent data races + +#### Scenario: Telegram mock concurrent access +- **WHEN** a telegram handler goroutine appends to SentMessages/RequestCalls while the test goroutine reads them +- **THEN** access SHALL be serialized via mutex to prevent data races + +#### Scenario: Safe mock data retrieval +- **WHEN** test code reads mock recorded calls +- **THEN** helper methods SHALL return defensive copies of the underlying slices diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-data-race-conditions/specs/tool-exec/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-data-race-conditions/specs/tool-exec/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fd0bab4b --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-data-race-conditions/specs/tool-exec/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Background process management +The system SHALL support running commands in the background with process tracking. Background process output SHALL be thread-safe for concurrent read/write access. + +#### Scenario: Background execution +- **WHEN** a command is started in background mode +- **THEN** a session ID SHALL be returned for later status checks + +#### Scenario: Background process status +- **WHEN** status is requested for a background process +- **THEN** current output and execution state SHALL be returned + +#### Scenario: Concurrent output access +- **WHEN** a background process is writing output while status is being read +- **THEN** the output buffer SHALL be safely accessible without data races diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-data-race-conditions/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-data-race-conditions/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c814dd8b --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-data-race-conditions/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## 1. Slack Mock Thread Safety + +- [x] 1.1 Add `sync.Mutex` field to `MockClient` struct in `internal/channels/slack/slack_test.go` +- [x] 1.2 Add mutex Lock/Unlock in `PostMessage()` and `UpdateMessage()` around slice appends +- [x] 1.3 Add `getPostMessages()` and `getUpdateMessages()` helper methods returning defensive copies +- [x] 1.4 Replace direct field access in `TestSlackChannel` and `TestSlackThinkingPlaceholder` with helper methods + +## 2. Telegram Mock Thread Safety + +- [x] 2.1 Add `sync.Mutex` field to `MockBotAPI` struct in `internal/channels/telegram/telegram_test.go` +- [x] 2.2 Add mutex Lock/Unlock in `Send()` and `Request()` around slice appends +- [x] 2.3 Add `getSentMessages()` and `getRequestCalls()` helper methods returning defensive copies +- [x] 2.4 Replace direct field access in `TestTelegramChannel` and `TestTelegramTypingIndicator` with helper methods + +## 3. Background Process Output Thread Safety + +- [x] 3.1 Add `syncBuffer` type to `internal/tools/exec/exec.go` wrapping `bytes.Buffer` with `sync.Mutex` +- [x] 3.2 Implement `Write(p []byte) (int, error)` and `String() string` on `syncBuffer` +- [x] 3.3 Change `BackgroundProcess.Output` type from `*bytes.Buffer` to `*syncBuffer` +- [x] 3.4 Update `StartBackground()` to create `*syncBuffer` instead of `*bytes.Buffer` + +## 4. Verification + +- [x] 4.1 Run `go test -race ./internal/channels/slack/...` — pass with no races +- [x] 4.2 Run `go test -race ./internal/channels/telegram/...` — pass with no races +- [x] 4.3 Run `go test -race ./internal/supervisor/...` — pass with no races +- [x] 4.4 Run `go build ./...` and `go test ./...` — all pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-golangci-lint-issues/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-golangci-lint-issues/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-golangci-lint-issues/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-golangci-lint-issues/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-golangci-lint-issues/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ecce9bc7 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-golangci-lint-issues/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +## Context + +The project had no `.golangci.yml` configuration, causing golangci-lint v2.4.0 to run with default settings. This included linting ent auto-generated code and flagging standard patterns (defer Close, fmt.Fprint* return values) as errors. 90 issues blocked CI. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Zero golangci-lint issues in CI +- Establish `.golangci.yml` v2 config as project standard +- Fix all legitimate code quality issues (unchecked errors, unused code, dead assignments) + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing any runtime behavior or public APIs +- Adding new linters beyond the `standard` default set +- Refactoring code beyond what's needed to fix lint issues + +## Decisions + +1. **golangci-lint v2 format** — Use `version: "2"` config format with `default: standard` linter set. This matches the CI runner version and provides a good baseline without being overly strict. + +2. **`generated: strict` exclusion** — Exclude all files with `// Code generated` headers (ent). This eliminates ~30 false positives from auto-generated code without maintaining manual exclusion lists. + +3. **`std-error-handling` preset** — Suppress errcheck for standard patterns (`defer .Close()`, `fmt.Fprint*`, `io.Writer.Write`). These are universally accepted patterns where error handling adds noise without value. + +4. **Test file errcheck exclusion** — Disable errcheck in `_test.go` files. Test helpers commonly ignore errors for brevity, and enforcing this in tests adds noise. + +5. **`writeJSON` helper in p2p_routes.go** — Rather than adding `_ =` to 12 `json.Encode` calls, extract a helper that properly handles the error. This is the one case where a helper reduces repetition meaningfully. + +6. **`_ =` for intentionally ignored errors** — Use explicit `_ =` assignment for errors that are intentionally ignored (rollback in error paths, send-error helpers). This documents intent clearly. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Risk] Future ent schema changes might generate code that triggers new lint rules → Mitigation: `generated: strict` handles this automatically via the `// Code generated` header +- [Trade-off] `std-error-handling` preset may suppress some legitimate error checks → Acceptable: the suppressed patterns (defer Close, fmt.Fprint) have extremely low error probability in practice diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-golangci-lint-issues/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-golangci-lint-issues/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1048a859 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-golangci-lint-issues/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## Why + +golangci-lint v2.4.0 CI 실행 시 90개 이슈(errcheck:50, staticcheck:28, unused:11, ineffassign:1)가 발생하여 CI가 통과하지 못했다. `.golangci.yml` 설정 파일이 없어 기본 설정으로 실행되었고, ent 자동생성 코드도 lint 대상에 포함되어 불필요한 이슈가 대량 보고되었다. + +## What Changes + +- Add `.golangci.yml` v2 configuration with `generated: strict` exclusion and `std-error-handling` preset +- Fix ~50 errcheck violations: unchecked `defer Close()`, `json.Encode`, `tx.Rollback`, `fmt.Scanln`, etc. +- Fix ~28 staticcheck issues: QF1012 (WriteString+Sprintf→Fprintf), S1009 (redundant nil check), S1011 (append spread), SA1012 (nil context), SA9003 (empty branches), QF1003 (if/else→switch), ST1005 (error string case), S1017 (redundant HasSuffix before TrimSuffix) +- Remove 11 unused declarations: functions, struct fields, variables, imports +- Fix 1 ineffassign: dead assignment removal + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `lint-configuration`: golangci-lint v2 configuration (`.golangci.yml`) with generated code exclusion and standard presets + +### Modified Capabilities + +(No spec-level behavior changes - all modifications are code quality improvements that don't alter functionality) + +## Impact + +- 20+ files modified across `internal/`, `cmd/lango/` +- No API or behavioral changes - purely code quality improvements +- CI pipeline will pass cleanly with zero lint issues +- New `.golangci.yml` establishes project-wide linting standards diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-golangci-lint-issues/specs/lint-configuration/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-golangci-lint-issues/specs/lint-configuration/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..49fbcba0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-golangci-lint-issues/specs/lint-configuration/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: golangci-lint v2 configuration +The project SHALL have a `.golangci.yml` configuration file using version 2 format with the `standard` default linter set. + +#### Scenario: Generated code exclusion +- **WHEN** golangci-lint runs on the project +- **THEN** files with `// Code generated` headers (ent auto-generated code) SHALL be excluded via `generated: strict` + +#### Scenario: Standard error handling preset +- **WHEN** golangci-lint evaluates error handling patterns +- **THEN** standard patterns (defer Close, fmt.Fprint return values) SHALL be suppressed via `std-error-handling` preset + +#### Scenario: Test file errcheck exclusion +- **WHEN** golangci-lint evaluates test files (`_test.go`) +- **THEN** errcheck linter SHALL be disabled for those files + +### Requirement: Zero lint issues in CI +The project SHALL pass golangci-lint with zero issues on every CI run. + +#### Scenario: Clean lint run +- **WHEN** `golangci-lint run` executes on the codebase +- **THEN** the exit code SHALL be 0 with zero reported issues + +### Requirement: Explicit error handling for intentionally ignored errors +All intentionally ignored error return values SHALL use explicit `_ =` assignment to document intent. + +#### Scenario: Defer close pattern +- **WHEN** an HTTP response body is closed in a defer +- **THEN** the pattern `defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()` SHALL be used + +#### Scenario: Rollback in error paths +- **WHEN** a database transaction rollback is called in an error/defer path +- **THEN** the pattern `_ = tx.Rollback()` SHALL be used diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-golangci-lint-issues/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-golangci-lint-issues/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9417f009 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-golangci-lint-issues/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +## 1. Configuration + +- [x] 1.1 Create `.golangci.yml` with v2 format, `default: standard`, `generated: strict`, `std-error-handling` preset, test errcheck exclusion + +## 2. errcheck Fixes + +- [x] 2.1 Fix `defer resp.Body.Close()` in `internal/agent/pii_presidio.go` (2 locations) +- [x] 2.2 Add `writeJSON` helper in `internal/app/p2p_routes.go` and replace 12 `json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(...)` calls +- [x] 2.3 Fix `sendError()` unchecked errors in discord, slack, telegram channel adapters +- [x] 2.4 Fix `tx.Rollback()` in `internal/session/ent_store.go` and `internal/embedding/sqlite_vec.go` +- [x] 2.5 Fix `Process.Signal/Kill` in `internal/tools/exec/exec.go` +- [x] 2.6 Fix `os.Rename` rollback in `internal/dbmigrate/migrate.go` +- [x] 2.7 Fix `defer logging.Sync()`, `defer resp.Body.Close()`, `fmt.Scanln` in `cmd/lango/main.go` +- [x] 2.8 Fix remaining errcheck: `app.go`, `cli/p2p/p2p.go`, `cli/payment/send.go`, `cli/security/secrets.go`, `gateway/auth.go`, `gateway/server.go` + +## 3. staticcheck Fixes + +- [x] 3.1 Fix QF1012 (WriteString+Sprintf→Fprintf) across all files: `adk/context_model.go`, `cron/delivery.go`, `knowledge/retriever.go`, `graph/rag.go`, `workflow/engine.go`, `orchestration/tools.go`, `librarian/inquiry_processor.go`, `librarian/observation_analyzer.go`, `skill/parser.go` +- [x] 3.2 Fix S1009 (redundant nil check) in `skill/parser.go`, `skill/registry.go` +- [x] 3.3 Fix S1011 (append spread) in `workflow/parser.go` +- [x] 3.4 Fix SA1012 (nil context) in `x402/handler.go` +- [x] 3.5 Fix SA9003 (empty branches) in `adk/model.go`, `gateway/middleware_test.go`, `payment/service.go` +- [x] 3.6 Fix QF1003 (if/else→switch) in `adk/model.go`, `provider/anthropic/anthropic.go` +- [x] 3.7 Fix QF1008 (embedded field selector) in `adk/session_service.go`, `adk/state_test.go` +- [x] 3.8 Fix S1017 (redundant HasSuffix) in `learning/parse.go`, `librarian/parse.go` +- [x] 3.9 Fix ST1023 (type in declaration) in `app/wiring.go` +- [x] 3.10 Fix S1000 (select single case) in `channels/slack/slack_test.go` +- [x] 3.11 Fix ST1005 (error string case) in `security/azure_kv_provider_stub.go` +- [x] 3.12 Fix SA4006 (unused assignment) in `cli/settings/auth_providers_list.go`, `cli/settings/providers_list.go` +- [x] 3.13 Fix QF1002 (switch rewrite) in `skill/importer_test.go` +- [x] 3.14 Add `//nolint:staticcheck` for SA1019 deprecated field usage in `cli/settings/forms_impl_test.go`, `cli/tuicore/state_update.go`, `p2p/node.go` + +## 4. Unused Code Removal + +- [x] 4.1 Remove `executor` field and `adka2a` import from `internal/a2a/server.go` +- [x] 4.2 Remove `fakeAgent` type from `internal/a2a/server_test.go` +- [x] 4.3 Remove `wrapWithLearning()`, `wrapWithApproval()` from `internal/app/tools.go` +- [x] 4.4 Remove `wg sync.WaitGroup` field from `internal/channels/discord/discord.go` +- [x] 4.5 Remove `logger` variable from `internal/cli/security/migrate.go` +- [x] 4.6 Remove `toGraphTriples()` from `internal/librarian/proactive_buffer.go` +- [x] 4.7 Remove `logger` variable from `internal/session/ent_store.go` + +## 5. ineffassign Fix + +- [x] 5.1 Remove dead `message` assignment in `internal/cli/doctor/checks/security.go` + +## 6. Verification + +- [x] 6.1 Verify `go build ./...` passes +- [x] 6.2 Verify `go test ./...` passes +- [x] 6.3 Verify `golangci-lint run` reports 0 issues diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-placeholder-skill-warn/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-placeholder-skill-warn/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-placeholder-skill-warn/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-placeholder-skill-warn/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-placeholder-skill-warn/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..33ac7ce6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-placeholder-skill-warn/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +## Context + +The `skills/.placeholder/SKILL.md` file exists to satisfy `go:embed **/SKILL.md` when no real skill files are present. Currently, `EnsureDefaults()` deploys this file to the user directory and `ListActive()` attempts to parse it, producing a WARN log on every startup. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Eliminate the spurious WARN log by filtering hidden directories (starting with `.`) in both `ListActive()` and `EnsureDefaults()` +- Align code behavior with the existing spec requirement ("placeholder SHALL NOT be deployed as a usable skill") + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing the `.placeholder` file itself or the embed pattern +- Adding a general-purpose directory filter mechanism + +## Decisions + +**Filter by hidden directory convention (`.` prefix) rather than hardcoding `.placeholder`** +- Rationale: The `.` prefix convention is a well-understood Unix pattern for hidden/internal entries. Filtering by prefix is forward-compatible — any future build-only artifacts can use the same convention without code changes. Hardcoding `.placeholder` would be brittle and not generalizable. + +**Filter at both `ListActive()` and `EnsureDefaults()`** +- Rationale: Defense in depth. Even if one filter is bypassed (e.g., manual file copy), the other prevents the invalid entry from surfacing. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Risk: User creates a skill starting with `.`] → Mitigated: dot-prefixed directories are conventionally hidden/internal; no legitimate skill name should start with `.`. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-placeholder-skill-warn/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-placeholder-skill-warn/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5c5472e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-placeholder-skill-warn/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +## Why + +The `.placeholder` directory under `skills/` exists solely to satisfy the `go:embed **/SKILL.md` pattern at build time. However, `EnsureDefaults()` deploys it to `~/.lango/skills/.placeholder/` and `ListActive()` then attempts to parse it, producing a WARN log on every app startup: `skip invalid skill {"dir": ".placeholder", "error": "missing frontmatter delimiter (---)"}`. The spec (`skill-system/spec.md`) already states "placeholder SHALL NOT be deployed as a usable skill", but the code does not enforce this. + +## What Changes + +- **`ListActive()`**: Skip directories whose name starts with `.` (hidden directories), preventing `.placeholder` from being parsed. +- **`EnsureDefaults()`**: Skip embedded skill paths whose directory name starts with `.`, preventing `.placeholder/SKILL.md` from being deployed to the user's skills directory. + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +(none) + +### Modified Capabilities + +- `skill-system`: Add requirement that hidden directories (names starting with `.`) are excluded from listing and deployment. + +## Impact + +- **Code**: `internal/skill/file_store.go` — `ListActive()` and `EnsureDefaults()` methods. +- **Behavior**: The spurious WARN log on every startup is eliminated. No user-visible skills are affected since hidden directories are not valid skill names. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-placeholder-skill-warn/specs/skill-system/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-placeholder-skill-warn/specs/skill-system/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..190025ce --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-placeholder-skill-warn/specs/skill-system/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Embedded Default Skills +The system SHALL embed default skill files via `//go:embed **/SKILL.md`. When no real skill SKILL.md files are present, a `.placeholder/SKILL.md` file SHALL exist to satisfy the embed glob pattern. The placeholder SHALL NOT contain valid YAML frontmatter and SHALL NOT be deployed as a usable skill. `EnsureDefaults()` SHALL skip any embedded path whose directory name starts with `.` (hidden directories). + +#### Scenario: Build with no real default skills +- **WHEN** `go build` is run with only `.placeholder/SKILL.md` in the skills directory +- **THEN** the build SHALL succeed without errors + +#### Scenario: Placeholder not deployed as skill +- **WHEN** `EnsureDefaults()` iterates over the embedded filesystem +- **THEN** entries whose directory name starts with `.` SHALL be skipped entirely +- **AND** no files from `.placeholder/` SHALL be written to the user's skills directory + +#### Scenario: Future skill addition +- **WHEN** a new `skills//SKILL.md` file with valid frontmatter is added +- **THEN** it SHALL be automatically included in the embedded filesystem and deployed via `EnsureDefaults()` + +#### Scenario: Existing skills preserved +- **WHEN** `EnsureDefaults()` is called and a skill directory already exists +- **THEN** that skill SHALL NOT be overwritten + +### Requirement: File-Based Skill Storage +The system SHALL store skills as `//SKILL.md` files with YAML frontmatter containing name, description, type, status, and optional parameters. `ListActive()` SHALL skip hidden directories (names starting with `.`) when scanning. + +#### Scenario: Save a new skill +- **WHEN** a skill entry is saved via `FileSkillStore.Save()` +- **THEN** the system SHALL create `//SKILL.md` with YAML frontmatter and markdown body + +#### Scenario: Load active skills +- **WHEN** `FileSkillStore.ListActive()` is called +- **THEN** all skills with `status: active` in their frontmatter SHALL be returned +- **AND** directories whose name starts with `.` SHALL be skipped without logging a warning + +#### Scenario: Hidden directory ignored +- **WHEN** `FileSkillStore.ListActive()` encounters a directory starting with `.` +- **THEN** it SHALL skip the directory silently without attempting to parse its contents + +#### Scenario: Delete a skill +- **WHEN** `FileSkillStore.Delete()` is called with a skill name +- **THEN** the entire `//` directory SHALL be removed + +#### Scenario: SaveResource writes file to correct path +- **WHEN** `SaveResource` is called with skillName="my-skill" and relPath="scripts/run.sh" +- **THEN** the file SHALL be written to `/my-skill/scripts/run.sh` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-placeholder-skill-warn/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-placeholder-skill-warn/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..44f33021 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-fix-placeholder-skill-warn/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +## 1. Core Fix + +- [x] 1.1 Add `strings` import to `internal/skill/file_store.go` +- [x] 1.2 Update `ListActive()` to skip directories starting with `.` +- [x] 1.3 Update `EnsureDefaults()` to skip embedded paths whose directory name starts with `.` + +## 2. Verification + +- [x] 2.1 Run `go build ./...` and confirm no build errors +- [x] 2.2 Run `go test ./internal/skill/...` and confirm all tests pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..550b57d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +## Context + +Lango currently uses a Makefile for local builds (`make build`, `make build-all`) with no CI/CD pipeline for releases. The project requires CGO (`CGO_ENABLED=1`) for SQLite, sqlite-vec, and macOS Keychain dependencies, making standard GoReleaser cross-compilation impossible. Only a docs deployment workflow (`docs.yml`) exists in GitHub Actions. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Automate multi-platform binary releases on tag push (linux/darwin × amd64/arm64) +- Produce standard and extended (KMS) build variants per platform +- Generate SHA256 checksums and conventional-commit-based changelogs +- Provide CI validation (build, test, lint) on PRs and main branch pushes +- Enable local release testing via Makefile targets + +**Non-Goals:** +- Docker image builds (existing `Dockerfile` and `docker-build` target remain separate) +- Homebrew tap formula publishing (future iteration) +- Windows support (no CGO toolchain readily available) +- Code signing for macOS binaries in CI (existing `make codesign` remains manual) + +## Decisions + +### 1. Native Runner Matrix + Split/Merge Strategy + +**Decision**: Use GitHub Actions native runners per platform instead of cross-compilation. + +**Rationale**: CGO requires platform-native C toolchains. Cross-compilation with CGO needs complex toolchain setup (musl-cross, osxcross) that is fragile and hard to maintain. Native runners build natively with zero toolchain complexity. + +**Alternatives considered**: +- Cross-compilation with Docker + osxcross: complex setup, Apple SDK licensing concerns +- Zig as C cross-compiler: experimental GoReleaser support, not production-ready + +**Implementation**: GoReleaser `--split` in matrix jobs → `--merge` in final release job. + +### 2. Two Build Variants (Standard + Extended) + +**Decision**: Ship two binaries per platform — standard (default stubs) and extended (`-tags kms_all`). + +**Rationale**: Most users don't need AWS/GCP/Azure/PKCS11 KMS. Separating keeps the standard binary smaller and avoids pulling in cloud SDK dependencies at runtime. + +### 3. GoReleaser v2 Schema + +**Decision**: Use `version: 2` schema for `.goreleaser.yaml`. + +**Rationale**: v2 is the current stable schema with better split/merge support and the configuration format that will be maintained going forward. + +### 4. Linux Dependencies via apt-get + +**Decision**: Install `libsqlite3-dev` via apt-get on Linux runners only. + +**Rationale**: macOS runners ship with system SQLite framework. Linux runners need the development headers explicitly. Keeping dependencies minimal reduces build time. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **[Runner availability]** → ARM64 runners (`ubuntu-24.04-arm`, `macos-14`) are newer GitHub Actions offerings. If unavailable, builds fail gracefully; releases can be re-triggered after runner availability is restored. +- **[Build time]** → 4 parallel matrix jobs × 2 build variants = 8 builds total. Each job runs independently so wall-clock time equals the slowest single build (~5 min). Total compute time is higher but acceptable for release frequency. +- **[No Windows support]** → CGO on Windows CI is complex (MSYS2, MinGW). Excluded for now; can be added later with a dedicated Windows runner + toolchain step. +- **[Artifact size]** → Split/merge produces 8 tar.gz archives + checksums. GitHub Releases handles this well; no concern for storage limits. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d0bcc499 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +## Why + +The project currently relies on manual Makefile-based builds with no automated release pipeline. Creating multi-platform releases requires running builds on each platform individually. GoReleaser with GitHub Actions automates multi-platform binary builds, GitHub Release creation, and changelog generation on tag push, reducing release friction from hours of manual work to a single `git tag && git push`. + +## What Changes + +- Add `.goreleaser.yaml` with two build variants: standard (default) and extended (`-tags kms_all`) +- Add `release.yml` GitHub Actions workflow using native runner matrix + `--split`/`--merge` strategy for CGO-dependent cross-platform builds (linux/darwin × amd64/arm64) +- Add `ci.yml` GitHub Actions workflow for PR/push validation (build, test, vet, lint, goreleaser check) +- Add `release-dry` and `release-check` Makefile targets for local testing +- Add `dist/` to `.gitignore` + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities +- `goreleaser-release`: GoReleaser configuration for multi-platform binary builds with standard/extended variants, SHA256 checksums, and conventional commit changelog +- `release-workflow`: GitHub Actions release pipeline using native runner matrix with split/merge strategy for CGO cross-compilation +- `ci-workflow`: GitHub Actions CI pipeline for automated build, test, lint, and config validation on PR/push + +### Modified Capabilities + +## Impact + +- **New files**: `.goreleaser.yaml`, `.github/workflows/release.yml`, `.github/workflows/ci.yml` +- **Modified files**: `Makefile` (new targets), `.gitignore` (dist/ exclusion) +- **Dependencies**: GoReleaser v2 (installed via GitHub Action), golangci-lint (via GitHub Action) +- **Systems**: GitHub Actions runners (ubuntu-latest, ubuntu-24.04-arm, macos-13, macos-14) +- **Secrets**: `GITHUB_TOKEN` (automatically provided by GitHub Actions) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/specs/ci-workflow/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/specs/ci-workflow/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..beda337f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/specs/ci-workflow/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: CI workflow triggers +The system SHALL provide a GitHub Actions workflow at `.github/workflows/ci.yml` that triggers on push to `main` and pull requests targeting `main`. + +#### Scenario: PR trigger +- **WHEN** a pull request is opened targeting `main` +- **THEN** the CI workflow SHALL start automatically + +#### Scenario: Main branch push trigger +- **WHEN** a commit is pushed to `main` +- **THEN** the CI workflow SHALL start automatically + +### Requirement: Multi-platform test job +The test job SHALL run on both Linux (`ubuntu-latest`) and macOS (`macos-14`) runners with CGO enabled. + +#### Scenario: Test matrix execution +- **WHEN** the test job starts +- **THEN** it SHALL run `go build ./...`, `go test -race -cover ./...`, and `go vet ./...` on both platforms + +### Requirement: Linux test dependencies +The test job SHALL install `libsqlite3-dev` on Linux runners. + +#### Scenario: Linux CI dependencies +- **WHEN** the test job runs on Linux +- **THEN** it SHALL install `libsqlite3-dev` via apt-get before building + +### Requirement: Lint job +The CI workflow SHALL include a lint job running `golangci-lint` on Linux using the official `golangci-lint-action`. + +#### Scenario: Lint execution +- **WHEN** the lint job runs +- **THEN** it SHALL execute golangci-lint with the latest version + +### Requirement: GoReleaser config validation job +The CI workflow SHALL include a job that validates `.goreleaser.yaml` by running `goreleaser check`. + +#### Scenario: Config validation +- **WHEN** the goreleaser-check job runs +- **THEN** it SHALL execute `goreleaser check` and fail if the configuration is invalid + +### Requirement: Read-only permissions +The CI workflow SHALL request only `contents: read` permission. + +#### Scenario: CI permission scope +- **WHEN** the CI workflow runs +- **THEN** it SHALL operate with `contents: read` permission only (no write access) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/specs/goreleaser-release/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/specs/goreleaser-release/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ec41b001 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/specs/goreleaser-release/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: GoReleaser v2 configuration +The system SHALL provide a `.goreleaser.yaml` configuration file using GoReleaser v2 schema (`version: 2`) at the project root. + +#### Scenario: Configuration schema version +- **WHEN** GoReleaser parses `.goreleaser.yaml` +- **THEN** the configuration SHALL use `version: 2` schema + +### Requirement: Standard build variant +The system SHALL define a build named `lango` that compiles `./cmd/lango` with `CGO_ENABLED=1` for linux and darwin on amd64 and arm64 architectures, with ldflags injecting version and build time. + +#### Scenario: Standard build targets +- **WHEN** GoReleaser executes the `lango` build +- **THEN** it SHALL produce binaries for linux/amd64, linux/arm64, darwin/amd64, darwin/arm64 with `-X main.Version` and `-X main.BuildTime` ldflags + +### Requirement: Extended build variant +The system SHALL define a build named `lango-extended` that compiles `./cmd/lango` with `CGO_ENABLED=1` and build tag `kms_all` for the same platform matrix as the standard build. + +#### Scenario: Extended build includes KMS tags +- **WHEN** GoReleaser executes the `lango-extended` build +- **THEN** it SHALL compile with `-tags kms_all` producing binaries with AWS/GCP/Azure/PKCS11 KMS support + +### Requirement: Archive naming convention +The system SHALL produce tar.gz archives with naming pattern `lango_{{.Version}}_{{.Os}}_{{.Arch}}` for standard and `lango-extended_{{.Version}}_{{.Os}}_{{.Arch}}` for extended builds. + +#### Scenario: Standard archive name +- **WHEN** building version v0.3.0 for linux/amd64 +- **THEN** the standard archive SHALL be named `lango_0.3.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz` + +#### Scenario: Extended archive name +- **WHEN** building version v0.3.0 for darwin/arm64 +- **THEN** the extended archive SHALL be named `lango-extended_0.3.0_darwin_arm64.tar.gz` + +### Requirement: SHA256 checksums +The system SHALL generate a `checksums.txt` file containing SHA256 hashes for all release artifacts. + +#### Scenario: Checksum file generation +- **WHEN** GoReleaser completes all archive builds +- **THEN** it SHALL produce a `checksums.txt` file using SHA256 algorithm + +### Requirement: Conventional commit changelog +The system SHALL generate a changelog grouped by conventional commit types: Features (`feat:`), Bug Fixes (`fix:`), Refactoring (`refactor:`), Documentation (`docs:`), and Others. + +#### Scenario: Changelog grouping +- **WHEN** GoReleaser generates the changelog +- **THEN** commits SHALL be sorted ascending and grouped by prefix, with `test:`, `chore:`, and `ci:` commits excluded + +### Requirement: Release configuration +The system SHALL create GitHub Releases with prerelease auto-detection and non-draft mode, using name template `{{.ProjectName}} v{{.Version}}`. + +#### Scenario: Prerelease detection +- **WHEN** a tag like `v0.3.0-rc.1` is pushed +- **THEN** the GitHub Release SHALL be marked as prerelease automatically + +#### Scenario: Stable release +- **WHEN** a tag like `v0.3.0` is pushed +- **THEN** the GitHub Release SHALL be created as a stable release (not draft, not prerelease) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/specs/release-workflow/spec.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/specs/release-workflow/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fc719bc0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/specs/release-workflow/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Tag-triggered release workflow +The system SHALL provide a GitHub Actions workflow at `.github/workflows/release.yml` that triggers on push of tags matching `v*`. + +#### Scenario: Workflow trigger +- **WHEN** a tag `v0.3.0` is pushed to the repository +- **THEN** the release workflow SHALL start automatically + +#### Scenario: Non-tag push ignored +- **WHEN** a commit is pushed to `main` without a tag +- **THEN** the release workflow SHALL NOT trigger + +### Requirement: Native runner matrix build +The build job SHALL use a strategy matrix with 4 native runners: `ubuntu-latest` (linux/amd64), `ubuntu-24.04-arm` (linux/arm64), `macos-13` (darwin/amd64), `macos-14` (darwin/arm64). + +#### Scenario: Matrix runner assignment +- **WHEN** the build job starts +- **THEN** it SHALL spawn 4 parallel jobs, one per runner in the matrix + +### Requirement: Linux dependency installation +The workflow SHALL install `libsqlite3-dev` on Linux runners before building. + +#### Scenario: Linux build dependencies +- **WHEN** the build job runs on a Linux runner +- **THEN** it SHALL run `apt-get install -y libsqlite3-dev` before GoReleaser + +#### Scenario: macOS skips dependency install +- **WHEN** the build job runs on a macOS runner +- **THEN** it SHALL NOT run apt-get (macOS uses system frameworks) + +### Requirement: Split build execution +Each matrix runner SHALL execute `goreleaser build --split --clean` to produce binaries only for its native platform. + +#### Scenario: Split build produces platform-specific artifacts +- **WHEN** `goreleaser build --split` runs on `macos-14` +- **THEN** it SHALL produce darwin/arm64 binaries only and upload them as artifacts + +### Requirement: Merge and release job +A separate `release` job SHALL download all build artifacts, merge them into `dist/`, and run `goreleaser continue --merge` to create the GitHub Release. + +#### Scenario: Artifact merge and release creation +- **WHEN** all 4 build jobs complete successfully +- **THEN** the release job SHALL download artifacts with `merge-multiple: true`, run `goreleaser continue --merge`, and create a GitHub Release with all 8 archives + checksums + +### Requirement: Write permissions for release +The workflow SHALL request `contents: write` permission for creating GitHub Releases. + +#### Scenario: Permission scope +- **WHEN** the release workflow runs +- **THEN** it SHALL have `contents: write` permission to create releases and upload assets diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e9951742 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-goreleaser-cicd-pipeline/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +## 1. GoReleaser Configuration + +- [x] 1.1 Create `.goreleaser.yaml` with v2 schema, standard build (`lango`) and extended build (`lango-extended`) targeting linux/darwin × amd64/arm64 +- [x] 1.2 Configure archive naming: `lango_{{.Version}}_{{.Os}}_{{.Arch}}` (standard) and `lango-extended_{{.Version}}_{{.Os}}_{{.Arch}}` (extended) as tar.gz +- [x] 1.3 Configure SHA256 checksum generation (`checksums.txt`) +- [x] 1.4 Configure conventional commit changelog with feat/fix/refactor/docs grouping and test/chore/ci exclusion +- [x] 1.5 Configure release settings: prerelease auto, draft false, name template + +## 2. Release Workflow + +- [x] 2.1 Create `.github/workflows/release.yml` with `push tags: v*` trigger and `contents: write` permission +- [x] 2.2 Configure build job matrix with 4 native runners (ubuntu-latest, ubuntu-24.04-arm, macos-13, macos-14) +- [x] 2.3 Add conditional Linux dependency installation (`libsqlite3-dev`) +- [x] 2.4 Configure `goreleaser build --split --clean` in build job with artifact upload +- [x] 2.5 Configure release job: download artifacts with `merge-multiple: true`, run `goreleaser continue --merge` + +## 3. CI Workflow + +- [x] 3.1 Create `.github/workflows/ci.yml` with push/PR triggers on `main` and `contents: read` permission +- [x] 3.2 Configure test job matrix (ubuntu-latest + macos-14) with build, test -race -cover, and vet +- [x] 3.3 Add lint job with `golangci-lint-action` +- [x] 3.4 Add goreleaser-check job validating `.goreleaser.yaml` + +## 4. Local Development Support + +- [x] 4.1 Add `release-dry` Makefile target (`goreleaser build --single-target --snapshot --clean`) +- [x] 4.2 Add `release-check` Makefile target (`goreleaser check`) +- [x] 4.3 Add `dist/` to `.gitignore` diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-tpm-lint-fix-ci-warning/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-tpm-lint-fix-ci-warning/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-tpm-lint-fix-ci-warning/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-tpm-lint-fix-ci-warning/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-tpm-lint-fix-ci-warning/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f31e3c8d --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-tpm-lint-fix-ci-warning/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +## Context + +CI runs golangci-lint on Ubuntu where `//go:build linux` files are compiled. `tpm_provider.go` has 6 lint issues (3 errcheck for ignored `flush.Execute()` returns in deferred cleanup, 3 SA1019 for deprecated `transport.OpenTPM` with no replacement API). These are invisible on macOS builds but block CI. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Fix all 6 lint issues in `tpm_provider.go` without behavioral changes +- Make CI lint non-blocking so platform-specific lint edge cases don't stall development + +**Non-Goals:** +- Replacing the deprecated `transport.OpenTPM` API (no alternative exists yet) +- Refactoring TPM provider logic + +## Decisions + +1. **Use `_ =` for errcheck on deferred flush** — Flush errors in deferred cleanup are best-effort; the primary operation has already succeeded or failed. Explicit `_ =` signals intentional discard. + +2. **Use `//nolint:staticcheck` for deprecated API** — `transport.OpenTPM` has no replacement in the go-tpm library. Suppressing with a comment documenting the reason is the standard approach. + +3. **`continue-on-error: true` for CI lint job** — Lint failures become yellow warnings instead of red blockers. This preserves visibility while preventing development velocity issues from cross-platform lint discrepancies. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Lint regressions may go unnoticed] → Team reviews yellow warnings in PR checks; lint issues still appear in CI output. +- [Deprecated API accumulates tech debt] → Comment documents the reason; revisit when go-tpm provides a replacement. diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-tpm-lint-fix-ci-warning/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-tpm-lint-fix-ci-warning/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..749d98c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-tpm-lint-fix-ci-warning/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +## Why + +CI (Ubuntu) lint fails on `tpm_provider.go` (`//go:build linux`) due to 6 lint issues (3 errcheck, 3 SA1019) that are invisible on macOS. These block PRs despite the core code being correct. Additionally, lint failures should be warnings rather than blockers to prevent development velocity issues from platform-specific lint edge cases. + +## What Changes + +- Fix 3 errcheck violations: explicitly ignore `flush.Execute(t)` return values with `_ =` in deferred cleanup +- Suppress 3 SA1019 (deprecated `transport.OpenTPM`) with `//nolint:staticcheck` — no alternative API exists yet +- Convert CI lint job to non-blocking (warning) via `continue-on-error: true` + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +_None — this is a lint fix and CI configuration change._ + +### Modified Capabilities + +_None — no spec-level behavior changes._ + +## Impact + +- `internal/keyring/tpm_provider.go`: 6 lint annotations added (no behavioral change) +- `.github/workflows/ci.yml`: lint job becomes non-blocking (yellow warning instead of red failure) diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-tpm-lint-fix-ci-warning/specs/no-spec-changes.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-tpm-lint-fix-ci-warning/specs/no-spec-changes.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d2fec66b --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-tpm-lint-fix-ci-warning/specs/no-spec-changes.md @@ -0,0 +1 @@ + diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-tpm-lint-fix-ci-warning/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-tpm-lint-fix-ci-warning/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a038f726 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-tpm-lint-fix-ci-warning/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +## 1. Fix tpm_provider.go Lint Issues + +- [x] 1.1 Add `_ =` to 3 deferred `flush.Execute(t)` calls (L174, L219, L236) to fix errcheck +- [x] 1.2 Add `//nolint:staticcheck` comment above 3 `transport.OpenTPM()` calls (L34, L162, L207) to suppress SA1019 + +## 2. CI Configuration + +- [x] 2.1 Add `continue-on-error: true` to lint job in `.github/workflows/ci.yml` + +## 3. Verification + +- [x] 3.1 Run `go build ./...` to confirm no build regressions +- [x] 3.2 Run `go test ./internal/keyring/...` to confirm tests pass diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-ttl-test-flaky-ci/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-ttl-test-flaky-ci/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-ttl-test-flaky-ci/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-ttl-test-flaky-ci/design.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-ttl-test-flaky-ci/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..22fa8a8a --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-ttl-test-flaky-ci/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +## Context + +The session TTL tests (`TestEntStore_TTL`, `TestEntStore_TTL_DeleteAndRecreate`) use a 1ms TTL with a 5ms sleep. On Ubuntu CI with `-race` detector overhead, the window between `Create()` and `Get()` after session recreation exceeds 1ms, causing spurious `ErrSessionExpired` failures. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Eliminate flaky TTL test failures on Ubuntu CI with `-race` flag +- Maintain meaningful TTL expiration testing + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing TTL logic or production code +- Adding new test cases + +## Decisions + +**Decision: Use 50ms TTL with 100ms sleep** +- 50ms gives ample headroom for `Create` → `Get` (typically < 1ms even on slow CI) +- 100ms sleep provides 2x margin over TTL for reliable expiration +- Alternative considered: `time.AfterFunc` or polling — rejected as over-engineering for a simple timing fix +- Alternative considered: `t.Skip` on CI — rejected as it hides real test coverage + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- [Slightly slower tests] → Adds ~190ms total across both tests; negligible impact on test suite duration diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-ttl-test-flaky-ci/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-ttl-test-flaky-ci/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fc93621c --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-ttl-test-flaky-ci/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +## Why + +`TestEntStore_TTL_DeleteAndRecreate` fails on Ubuntu CI but passes on macOS. The test uses a 1ms TTL, which is too short for CI environments with `-race` detector overhead. The session expires between `Create()` and `Get()`, causing `ErrSessionExpired`. + +## What Changes + +- Increase TTL from `1ms` to `50ms` in `TestEntStore_TTL` and `TestEntStore_TTL_DeleteAndRecreate` +- Increase corresponding sleep durations from `5ms` to `100ms` (2x margin for reliable expiration) + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +(none) + +### Modified Capabilities + +(none — this is a test-only timing fix with no spec-level behavior changes) + +## Impact + +- `internal/session/store_test.go`: Two test functions updated with wider timing margins +- No production code changes +- CI reliability improved on Ubuntu runners with `-race` flag diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-ttl-test-flaky-ci/specs/.gitkeep b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-ttl-test-flaky-ci/specs/.gitkeep new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e69de29b diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-ttl-test-flaky-ci/specs/no-changes.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-ttl-test-flaky-ci/specs/no-changes.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..850dee98 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-ttl-test-flaky-ci/specs/no-changes.md @@ -0,0 +1 @@ + diff --git a/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-ttl-test-flaky-ci/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-ttl-test-flaky-ci/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f739f610 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/archive/2026-03-01-ttl-test-flaky-ci/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +## 1. Fix TTL Test Timing + +- [x] 1.1 Update `TestEntStore_TTL` TTL from `1ms` to `50ms` and sleep from `5ms` to `100ms` +- [x] 1.2 Update `TestEntStore_TTL_DeleteAndRecreate` TTL from `1ms` to `50ms` and sleep from `5ms` to `100ms` + +## 2. Verification + +- [x] 2.1 Run `CGO_ENABLED=1 go test -race -count=10 ./internal/session/` to confirm no flakiness diff --git a/openspec/changes/remove-os-keyring-provider/.openspec.yaml b/openspec/changes/remove-os-keyring-provider/.openspec.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b5b231 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/remove-os-keyring-provider/.openspec.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +schema: spec-driven +created: 2026-02-28 diff --git a/openspec/changes/remove-os-keyring-provider/design.md b/openspec/changes/remove-os-keyring-provider/design.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..16efa716 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/remove-os-keyring-provider/design.md @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +## Context + +The project currently uses `github.com/zalando/go-keyring` to provide an `OSProvider` that wraps the OS-native keyring (macOS Keychain, Linux secret-service, Windows DPAPI). This provider is used as a fallback when hardware-backed providers (BiometricProvider, TPMProvider) are unavailable or fail with entitlement errors. However, plain OS keyring storage is vulnerable to same-UID attacks — any process running as the same user can read stored secrets without additional authentication. + +The hardware-backed providers (`BiometricProvider` via CGO + Apple Security.framework, `TPMProvider` via google/go-tpm) do not use `go-keyring` at all. They are the only consumers that provide meaningful security guarantees. + +## Goals / Non-Goals + +**Goals:** +- Remove the `go-keyring` dependency and all code that uses it (`OSProvider`, `IsAvailable`, `Status`) +- Simplify the passphrase acquisition chain to: hardware keyring → keyfile → interactive → stdin +- Remove fallback-to-OSProvider logic in bootstrap and CLI +- Update specs, docs, and README to reflect hardware-only keyring support + +**Non-Goals:** +- Changing BiometricProvider or TPMProvider behavior +- Removing the `keyring` CLI subcommands (they remain, but only work with hardware backends) +- Adding new passphrase storage mechanisms + +## Decisions + +### Decision 1: Remove OSProvider entirely rather than deprecate +**Choice**: Delete `os_keyring.go` and all references in a single change. +**Rationale**: OSProvider has no users outside the fallback paths. A deprecation cycle adds complexity for a provider that is actively harmful to security. Clean removal is simpler. +**Alternative considered**: Soft-deprecate with a warning log → rejected because it still leaves the insecure path available. + +### Decision 2: Entitlement error → warning instead of OSProvider fallback +**Choice**: When biometric store fails with `ErrEntitlement`, emit a warning and suggest `make codesign` instead of falling back to plain Keychain. +**Rationale**: Falling back to plain Keychain defeats the purpose of hardware-backed security. Users who cannot codesign can use keyfile or interactive prompt. + +### Decision 3: Keep `keyring` CLI commands +**Choice**: Retain `keyring store/clear/status` commands but restrict to hardware backends only. +**Rationale**: The commands are still useful for Touch ID and TPM users. Removing them would break existing workflows for users with proper hardware. + +### Decision 4: Remove `security.keyring.enabled` config +**Choice**: Remove the config key entirely. +**Rationale**: Hardware keyring detection is automatic via `DetectSecureProvider()`. A config toggle for something that's auto-detected adds confusion. + +## Risks / Trade-offs + +- **[Users with passphrase in plain OS keyring]** → They will need to re-store using `keyring store` (which now requires hardware), or switch to keyfile/interactive. This is intentional — plain OS keyring was insecure. +- **[macOS users without codesigning]** → They lose the automatic Keychain fallback. Mitigation: clear warning message with `make codesign` tip, plus keyfile/interactive still works. +- **[Windows users]** → Windows had no hardware-backed provider (no TPM provider implemented). They were already using the insecure OSProvider. Now they must use keyfile/interactive. This is a security improvement. diff --git a/openspec/changes/remove-os-keyring-provider/proposal.md b/openspec/changes/remove-os-keyring-provider/proposal.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5823141c --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/remove-os-keyring-provider/proposal.md @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +## Why + +The `go-keyring` (zalando) dependency provides plain OS keyring access (macOS Keychain, Linux secret-service, Windows DPAPI) which is vulnerable to same-UID attacks. Any process running as the same user can read stored secrets without authentication. Hardware-backed backends (Touch ID via Secure Enclave, TPM 2.0) are immune to this class of attack and are the only keyring backends worth supporting. Removing `go-keyring` reduces attack surface and dependency count. + +## What Changes + +- **BREAKING**: Remove `OSProvider` struct and `NewOSProvider()` constructor from `internal/keyring/` +- **BREAKING**: Remove `IsAvailable()` function and `Status` struct from `internal/keyring/` +- **BREAKING**: Remove `FallbackProvider` field from `passphrase.Options` +- Remove OSProvider fallback logic from bootstrap passphrase store flow +- Remove OS keyring probe/clear/status logic from CLI `keyring` subcommands +- Remove `github.com/zalando/go-keyring` from `go.mod` +- Remove `security.keyring.enabled` config reference from README +- Delete `openspec/specs/os-keyring/` spec directory +- Delete `openspec/changes/diag-biometric-keychain-error-logging/` change directory +- Update all docs to reflect hardware-only keyring support + +**Kept intact:** +- `BiometricProvider` (pure CGO + Apple Security.framework) +- `TPMProvider` (google/go-tpm) +- `DetectSecureProvider()`, `SecurityTier`, `Provider` interface, `KeyChecker` interface + +## Capabilities + +### New Capabilities + +(none) + +### Modified Capabilities + +- `passphrase-acquisition`: Remove `FallbackProvider` requirement; acquisition chain is now hardware keyring → keyfile → interactive → stdin +- `bootstrap-lifecycle`: Remove OSProvider fallback wiring and entitlement-to-OSProvider fallback in passphrase store flow + +## Impact + +- **Code**: `internal/keyring/os_keyring.go` deleted; `internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go`, `internal/security/passphrase/acquire.go`, `internal/cli/security/keyring.go` modified +- **Dependencies**: `github.com/zalando/go-keyring v0.2.6` removed from go.mod/go.sum +- **Config**: `security.keyring.enabled` setting removed +- **CLI**: `keyring store/clear/status` commands remain but only work with hardware backends +- **Docs**: `docs/security/encryption.md`, `docs/security/index.md`, `docs/cli/security.md`, `README.md` updated +- **Specs**: `openspec/specs/os-keyring/` deleted, `passphrase-acquisition` and `bootstrap-lifecycle` specs updated diff --git a/openspec/changes/remove-os-keyring-provider/specs/bootstrap-lifecycle/spec.md b/openspec/changes/remove-os-keyring-provider/specs/bootstrap-lifecycle/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..89b13dd3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/remove-os-keyring-provider/specs/bootstrap-lifecycle/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +## REMOVED Requirements + +### Requirement: FallbackProvider wiring for macOS +**Reason**: The OSProvider fallback was used to read passphrase items stored without biometric ACL in the macOS Keychain. Since the plain OS keyring (go-keyring) has been removed due to same-UID attack vulnerability, this wiring is no longer needed. +**Migration**: Bootstrap no longer creates or passes a FallbackProvider. Passphrase acquisition falls through from hardware keyring to keyfile → interactive → stdin. + +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Report biometric passphrase store outcome +When the bootstrap flow stores a passphrase in the secure keyring provider, it SHALL report the outcome to stderr. On entitlement error (`ErrEntitlement`), the system SHALL warn the user and suggest codesigning instead of falling back to OSProvider. On other failures, the message SHALL be `warning: store passphrase failed: `. On success, the message SHALL be `Passphrase saved. Next launch will load it automatically.`. + +#### Scenario: Biometric store succeeds +- **WHEN** `secureProvider.Set()` returns nil +- **THEN** stderr SHALL contain `Passphrase saved. Next launch will load it automatically.` + +#### Scenario: Biometric store fails with entitlement error +- **WHEN** `secureProvider.Set()` returns an error satisfying `errors.Is(err, keyring.ErrEntitlement)` +- **THEN** stderr SHALL contain `warning: biometric storage unavailable (binary not codesigned)` +- **AND** stderr SHALL contain a codesign tip + +#### Scenario: Biometric store fails with non-entitlement error +- **WHEN** `secureProvider.Set()` returns an error NOT satisfying `errors.Is(err, keyring.ErrEntitlement)` +- **THEN** stderr SHALL contain `warning: store passphrase failed: ` diff --git a/openspec/changes/remove-os-keyring-provider/specs/passphrase-acquisition/spec.md b/openspec/changes/remove-os-keyring-provider/specs/passphrase-acquisition/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3c0c1747 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/remove-os-keyring-provider/specs/passphrase-acquisition/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +## REMOVED Requirements + +### Requirement: FallbackProvider for plain OS keyring read +**Reason**: The `FallbackProvider` field existed solely to support reading from the plain OS keyring (go-keyring) when the biometric provider failed. Plain OS keyring is vulnerable to same-UID attacks and has been removed. +**Migration**: Passphrase acquisition now falls through from hardware keyring directly to keyfile → interactive → stdin. Users with passphrase stored in plain OS keyring must re-store using hardware backend (`keyring store`) or switch to keyfile/interactive prompt. + +## MODIFIED Requirements + +### Requirement: Passphrase acquisition priority chain +The system SHALL acquire a passphrase using the following priority: (1) hardware keyring (Touch ID / TPM, when available), (2) keyfile at `~/.lango/keyfile`, (3) interactive terminal prompt, (4) stdin pipe. The system SHALL return an error if no source is available. + +#### Scenario: Keyfile exists with correct permissions +- **WHEN** a keyfile exists at the configured path with 0600 permissions +- **THEN** the passphrase is read from the file and `SourceKeyfile` is returned + +#### Scenario: Keyfile has wrong permissions +- **WHEN** a keyfile exists but does not have 0600 permissions +- **THEN** the keyfile is skipped and the next source is tried + +#### Scenario: Interactive terminal available +- **WHEN** no keyfile is available and stdin is a terminal +- **THEN** the user is prompted for a passphrase via hidden input and `SourceInteractive` is returned + +#### Scenario: New passphrase creation +- **WHEN** `AllowCreation` is true and interactive terminal is used +- **THEN** the user is prompted twice (entry + confirmation) and the passphrase must match + +#### Scenario: Stdin pipe +- **WHEN** no keyfile is available and stdin is a pipe (not a terminal) +- **THEN** one line is read from stdin and `SourceStdin` is returned + +#### Scenario: No source available +- **WHEN** no keyfile exists, stdin is not a terminal, and stdin pipe is empty +- **THEN** the system returns an error diff --git a/openspec/changes/remove-os-keyring-provider/tasks.md b/openspec/changes/remove-os-keyring-provider/tasks.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5d6ef9f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/changes/remove-os-keyring-provider/tasks.md @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +## 1. Remove OSProvider and go-keyring + +- [x] 1.1 Delete `internal/keyring/os_keyring.go` (OSProvider, NewOSProvider, IsAvailable, Status, backendName) +- [x] 1.2 Remove `Status` struct from `internal/keyring/keyring.go` +- [x] 1.3 Remove `OSProvider` interface compliance check from `internal/keyring/keyring_test.go` + +## 2. Update Bootstrap + +- [x] 2.1 Remove `"runtime"` import from `internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go` +- [x] 2.2 Remove OSProvider fallback provider creation and FallbackProvider wiring +- [x] 2.3 Replace entitlement-to-OSProvider fallback with warning + codesign tip + +## 3. Update Passphrase Acquisition + +- [x] 3.1 Remove `FallbackProvider` field from `passphrase.Options` struct +- [x] 3.2 Remove step 1b (fallback keyring read) from `Acquire()` + +## 4. Update CLI Keyring Commands + +- [x] 4.1 Remove `"runtime"` import from `internal/cli/security/keyring.go` +- [x] 4.2 `keyring store`: Replace OSProvider duplicate check with HasKey on secure provider; remove entitlement fallback +- [x] 4.3 `keyring clear`: Remove OS keyring delete section; keep secure provider delete and TPM blob cleanup +- [x] 4.4 `keyring status`: Remove IsAvailable probe and OS keyring passphrase check; use hardware-only status + +## 5. Dependency Cleanup + +- [x] 5.1 Run `go mod tidy` to remove `github.com/zalando/go-keyring` from go.mod/go.sum +- [x] 5.2 Verify `go build ./...` succeeds +- [x] 5.3 Verify `go test ./internal/keyring/... ./internal/security/passphrase/... ./internal/cli/security/... ./internal/bootstrap/...` passes + +## 6. OpenSpec and Documentation + +- [x] 6.1 Delete `openspec/specs/os-keyring/` directory +- [x] 6.2 Delete `openspec/changes/diag-biometric-keychain-error-logging/` directory +- [x] 6.3 Update `openspec/specs/passphrase-acquisition/spec.md` — remove FallbackProvider requirement +- [x] 6.4 Update `openspec/specs/bootstrap-lifecycle/spec.md` — remove FallbackProvider wiring and OSProvider fallback requirements +- [x] 6.5 Update `docs/security/encryption.md` — replace OS Keyring section with Hardware Keyring, remove keyring.enabled config +- [x] 6.6 Update `docs/security/index.md` — rename OS Keyring to Hardware Keyring +- [x] 6.7 Update `docs/cli/security.md` — rewrite keyring command docs for hardware-only +- [x] 6.8 Update `README.md` — remove `security.keyring.enabled` row, update OS Keyring section diff --git a/openspec/security-roadmap.md b/openspec/security-roadmap.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8eb5e7da --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/security-roadmap.md @@ -0,0 +1,294 @@ +# P2P Security Hardening Roadmap + +## Context + +The P2P node key (`~/.lango/p2p/node.key`) is stored as plaintext binary protected only by file permissions (`0600`). Meanwhile, wallet keys are properly encrypted in `SecretsStore` (AES-256-GCM), creating an **architectural inconsistency**. Additionally, handshake signature verification is incomplete, session invalidation is absent, and tool execution lacks process isolation. + +This roadmap addresses security hardening in three phases: P0 (immediate) → P1 (medium-term) → P2 (long-term). + +--- + +## Current Security Posture + +| Area | Grade | Notes | +|------|-------|-------| +| Crypto primitives | **A** | AES-256-GCM, PBKDF2 100K iter, HMAC-SHA256 | +| Wallet key management | **A-** | Encrypted storage + memory zeroing | +| P2P authentication | **A** | Signed challenge, nonce replay protection, timestamp validation, dual protocol versioning | +| P2P node key management | **A** | Encrypted via SecretsStore (P0-1) | +| ZK proofs | **B+** | Full test suite, timestamp freshness, capability binding fix, structured attestation, SRS file support | +| Session management | **A-** | TTL + explicit invalidation + security events (P1-6) | +| Response sanitization | **A-** | Owner Shield + sensitive field removal | +| Execution isolation | **A-** | Subprocess + Container sandbox with Docker (P1-5, P2-8) | +| DB encryption | **A** | SQLCipher transparent encryption (P2-7) | +| OS Keyring | **A** | macOS/Linux/Windows keyring integration (P1-4) | +| HSM/Cloud KMS | **A** | AWS/GCP/Azure/PKCS#11 with build-tag isolation (P2-9) | + +--- + +## P0: Critical (Immediate) + +### P0-1: Migrate P2P Node Key to SecretsStore ✅ COMPLETED + +**Problem:** `internal/p2p/node.go:200-245` stores Ed25519 private key as plain binary at `~/.lango/p2p/node.key` with only `0600` permissions. This is inconsistent with wallet keys which are encrypted in `SecretsStore`. + +**Files to modify:** +- `internal/p2p/node.go` — Refactor `loadOrGenerateKey(keyDir, secrets)` to use SecretsStore +- `internal/app/wiring.go` — Add `*security.SecretsStore` parameter to `initP2P` +- `internal/cli/p2p/p2p.go` — Build SecretsStore in `initP2PDeps` and pass to `NewNode` +- `internal/cli/p2p/identity.go` — Replace `keyDir` output with `keyStorage` info + +**Design:** +1. Change signature: `loadOrGenerateKey(keyDir string, secrets *security.SecretsStore)` +2. Priority: SecretsStore → Legacy file → Generate new key +3. Auto-migration: When legacy `node.key` found, store in SecretsStore then delete plaintext file +4. Fallback: When `secrets == nil`, retain file-based storage for backward compatibility +5. Apply `zeroBytes()` pattern for immediate memory cleanup (from `internal/wallet/local_wallet.go:153`) +6. Migration failure: warn log only, don't block startup (retry on next restart) + +**Reuse:** `SecretsStore.Store()/Get()` (`internal/security/secrets_store.go`), `zeroBytes()` pattern (`internal/wallet/local_wallet.go:153`) + +**Key constant:** `nodeKeySecret = "p2p.node.privatekey"` in SecretsStore + +### P0-2: Complete Handshake Signature Verification ✅ COMPLETED + +**Problem:** `internal/p2p/handshake/handshake.go:293-300` accepts any non-empty signature as valid. + +**Current vulnerable code:** +```go +if len(resp.Signature) > 0 { + // For now, we accept signatures as valid if they are non-empty. + // Full ECDSA recovery verification will be added in integration. + return nil +} +``` + +**Files to modify:** +- `internal/p2p/handshake/handshake.go:293-300` — Replace stub with real verification + +**Design:** +1. Hash message: `ethcrypto.Keccak256(nonce)` (matches wallet `SignMessage` pattern) +2. Recover public key: `ethcrypto.SigToPub(hash, signature)` (secp256k1 ECDSA recovery) +3. Compare: `ethcrypto.CompressPubkey(recovered)` vs `resp.PublicKey` +4. Replace nonce comparison with `hmac.Equal()` (constant-time) to prevent timing attacks +5. Validate signature length == 65 bytes (R32 + S32 + V1) + +**Imports to add:** `ethcrypto "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"`, `"bytes"`, `"crypto/hmac"` + +**Reuse:** `go-ethereum/crypto` (already used by wallet) + +### P0-3: Clean Up KeyDir Config Exposure ✅ COMPLETED + +**Files to modify:** +- `internal/config/types.go` — Add `omitempty` to `KeyDir`, mark as deprecated +- `internal/config/loader.go` — Add `nodeKeyName` default value + +--- + +## P1: Medium-term + +### P1-4: OS Keyring Integration ✅ COMPLETED + +**Rationale:** Master passphrase currently acquired from keyfile (disk plaintext) or interactive input. OS keyring (macOS Keychain / Linux secret-service / Windows DPAPI) provides hardware-backed protection without leaving keyfiles on disk. + +**Files to create/modify:** +- New: `internal/keyring/keyring.go`, `internal/keyring/os_keyring.go` +- `internal/passphrase/acquire.go` — Add keyring source (priority: keyring → keyfile → interactive → stdin) +- `internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go` — Keyring integration +- `internal/config/types.go` — Add `KeyringConfig` + +**Design:** +- Library: `github.com/zalando/go-keyring` (cross-platform) +- Service name: `"lango"`, Key: `"master-passphrase"` +- No `CryptoProvider` interface changes needed +- CLI: `lango security keyring store/clear/status` +- Graceful fallback when keyring daemon unavailable (Linux CI environments) + +**Dependencies:** None (independent) +**Complexity:** Medium (2-3 days) +**Risk:** Low — existing paths (keyfile/interactive) retained as fallback + +### P1-5: Tool Execution Process Isolation ✅ COMPLETED + +**Rationale:** `handler.go:236` executes `h.executor(ctx, toolName, params)` in-process. Malicious tool invoked by remote peer can access process memory (passphrases, private keys, session tokens). + +**Files to create/modify:** +- New: `internal/sandbox/executor.go`, `internal/sandbox/subprocess.go` +- `internal/p2p/protocol/handler.go` — Route remote peer requests through `SubprocessExecutor` +- `internal/config/types.go` — Add `ToolIsolationConfig` + +**Design:** +- `Executor` interface: `InProcessExecutor` (local) + `SubprocessExecutor` (remote peer) +- JSON stdin/stdout communication protocol +- `context.WithTimeout` + `cmd.Process.Kill()` for forced termination +- Resource limits Phase 1: timeout only; Phase 2: rlimit (Linux) +- Config: `p2p.toolIsolation.enabled`, `timeoutPerTool`, `maxMemoryMb` + +**Dependencies:** None (but prerequisite for P2-8) +**Complexity:** High (4-5 days) +**Risk:** Medium — subprocess overhead (tens of ms latency) + +### P1-6: Session Explicit Invalidation ✅ COMPLETED + +**Rationale:** `SessionStore` (`internal/p2p/handshake/session.go`) only supports TTL-based expiration. No explicit logout, security-event-based revocation, or session listing. + +**Files to create/modify:** +- `internal/p2p/handshake/session.go` — Add `Invalidate()`, `InvalidateAll()`, `InvalidateByCondition()` +- New: `internal/p2p/handshake/security_events.go` — Auto-invalidation event handler +- `internal/p2p/protocol/handler.go` — Enhanced session validation, consecutive failure tracking +- `internal/p2p/reputation/store.go` — Reputation drop → session invalidation callback + +**Design:** +- `InvalidationReason` type: `logout`, `reputation_drop`, `repeated_failures`, `manual_revoke`, `security_event` +- Auto-invalidate when reputation drops below `minTrustScore` +- Auto-invalidate after N consecutive tool execution failures +- CLI: `lango p2p session revoke/list/revoke-all` + +**Dependencies:** None (independent) +**Complexity:** Medium (2-3 days) +**Risk:** Low — additive feature, existing TTL mechanism unaffected + +--- + +## P2: Long-term + +### P2-7: SQLCipher DB Transparent Encryption ✅ COMPLETED (2026-02-25) + +**Status:** Implemented. Kept `mattn/go-sqlite3` driver (sqlite-vec compatibility) with PRAGMA-based SQLCipher encryption. System `libsqlcipher-dev` required at build time. + +**Implementation:** +- `internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go` — Restructured: detect encryption → acquire passphrase first → `PRAGMA key` + `PRAGMA cipher_page_size` after `sql.Open` +- `internal/dbmigrate/migrate.go` — `MigrateToEncrypted()`, `DecryptToPlaintext()`, `IsEncrypted()`, `secureDeleteFile()` +- `internal/cli/security/db_migrate.go` — `lango security db-migrate`, `lango security db-decrypt` with `--force` +- `internal/cli/security/status.go` — DB encryption status display +- `internal/config/types.go` — `DBEncryptionConfig{Enabled, CipherPageSize}` +- Config: `security.dbEncryption.{enabled,cipherPageSize}` +- Spec: `openspec/specs/db-encryption/spec.md` + +### P2-8: Container-based Tool Execution Sandbox ✅ COMPLETED (2026-02-25) + +**Status:** Implemented. Docker Go SDK-based container isolation with NativeRuntime fallback. + +**Implementation:** +- `internal/sandbox/container_runtime.go` — `ContainerRuntime` interface, error types +- `internal/sandbox/docker_runtime.go` — Docker SDK implementation (full lifecycle, OOM detection, label-based cleanup) +- `internal/sandbox/native_runtime.go` — SubprocessExecutor wrapper as fallback +- `internal/sandbox/gvisor_runtime.go` — Stub (future implementation) +- `internal/sandbox/container_executor.go` — Runtime probe chain (Docker → gVisor → Native) +- `internal/sandbox/container_pool.go` — Optional pre-warmed container pool +- `internal/cli/p2p/sandbox.go` — `lango p2p sandbox status|test|cleanup` +- `internal/app/app.go` — Container sandbox wiring with subprocess fallback +- `build/sandbox/Dockerfile` — Minimal sandbox image +- Config: `p2p.toolIsolation.container.{enabled,runtime,image,networkMode,readOnlyRootfs,cpuQuotaUs,poolSize,poolIdleTimeout}` +- Spec: `openspec/specs/container-sandbox/spec.md` + +### P2-9: HSM / Cloud KMS Integration ✅ COMPLETED (2026-02-25) + +**Status:** Implemented. Build-tag based isolation ensures Cloud SDK dependencies are only included when explicitly opted in. Four KMS backends available: AWS KMS, GCP KMS, Azure Key Vault, PKCS#11. + +**Implementation:** +- `internal/security/kms_factory.go` — `NewKMSProvider()` factory dispatching to 4 backends +- `internal/security/kms_retry.go` — Exponential backoff with transient error detection +- `internal/security/kms_checker.go` — `KMSHealthChecker` implementing `ConnectionChecker` with 30s probe cache +- `internal/security/errors.go` — KMS sentinel errors (`ErrKMSUnavailable`, `ErrKMSAccessDenied`, `ErrKMSThrottled`, etc.) + `KMSError` type + `IsTransient()` helper +- `internal/security/aws_kms_provider.go` — AWS SDK v2 implementation (ECDSA_SHA_256 signing, SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT encrypt/decrypt) +- `internal/security/gcp_kms_provider.go` — GCP Cloud KMS implementation (AsymmetricSign SHA-256, symmetric encrypt/decrypt) +- `internal/security/azure_kv_provider.go` — Azure Key Vault implementation (ES256 signing, RSA-OAEP encrypt/decrypt) +- `internal/security/pkcs11_provider.go` — PKCS#11 HSM implementation (CKM_ECDSA signing, CKM_AES_GCM encrypt/decrypt with IV prepend) +- `internal/security/*_stub.go` — Stub files for uncompiled providers (4 files) +- `internal/security/kms_all.go` — Build tag grouping (`kms_all`) +- `internal/config/types.go` — `KMSConfig`, `AzureKVConfig`, `PKCS11Config` structs +- `internal/config/loader.go` — KMS defaults + config validation for each provider +- `internal/app/wiring.go` — `initSecurity()` KMS case with `CompositeCryptoProvider` fallback +- `internal/cli/security/kms.go` — `lango security kms status|test|keys` +- `internal/cli/security/status.go` — KMS fields in status output +- Build tags: `kms_aws`, `kms_gcp`, `kms_azure`, `kms_pkcs11`, `kms_all` +- Config: `security.signer.provider: "aws-kms"|"gcp-kms"|"azure-kv"|"pkcs11"`, `security.kms.*` + +### P2-10: Signed Challenge & Nonce Replay Protection ✅ COMPLETED (2026-02-25) + +**Status:** Implemented. Challenges now carry ECDSA signature over canonical payload (nonce || timestamp || senderDID). Dual protocol versioning (v1.0 legacy + v1.1 signed). + +**Implementation:** +- `internal/p2p/handshake/handshake.go` — Challenge struct extended with PublicKey/Signature; Initiate() signs challenges; HandleIncoming() validates timestamp, nonce replay, and signature +- `internal/p2p/handshake/nonce_cache.go` — TTL-based nonce deduplication with periodic cleanup goroutine +- Protocol versioning: `ProtocolID="/lango/handshake/1.0.0"` (legacy), `ProtocolIDv11="/lango/handshake/1.1.0"` (signed) +- Config: `p2p.requireSignedChallenge` (default: false for backward compat) +- Timestamp window: 5 min past + 30s future grace + +### P2-11: ZK Circuit Hardening ✅ COMPLETED (2026-02-25) + +**Status:** Implemented. Full test coverage for all 4 circuits, attestation timestamp freshness, capability binding fix, structured attestation data, SRS production path. + +**Implementation:** +- `internal/zkp/circuits/circuits_test.go` — 15 test cases across 4 circuits (gnark test framework, BN254 curve, both plonk and groth16) +- `internal/zkp/zkp_test.go` — 6 ProverService integration tests (compile, prove, verify, tamper detection, idempotent compile, uncompiled error) +- `internal/zkp/circuits/attestation.go` — MinTimestamp/MaxTimestamp public inputs with range assertions +- `internal/zkp/circuits/capability.go` — AgentTestBinding public field properly constrained (was discarded) +- `internal/zkp/zkp.go` — SRS file loading support (SRSMode "unsafe"|"file") +- `internal/p2p/protocol/messages.go` — AttestationData struct with proof, public inputs, circuit ID, scheme +- `internal/p2p/firewall/firewall.go` — AttestationResult struct, ZKAttestFunc returns structured data +- `internal/p2p/protocol/handler.go` — Constructs AttestationData in both tool invoke paths +- `internal/p2p/protocol/remote_agent.go` — ZKAttestVerifyFunc callback for attestation verification +- Config: `p2p.zkp.srsMode`, `p2p.zkp.srsPath`, `p2p.zkp.maxCredentialAge` + +### P2-12: Credential Revocation ✅ COMPLETED (2026-02-25) + +**Status:** Implemented. Gossip discovery now checks credential max age and revoked DIDs. + +**Implementation:** +- `internal/p2p/discovery/gossip.go` — revokedDIDs map, RevokeDID()/IsRevoked() methods, maxCredentialAge validation, SetMaxCredentialAge() setter +- Credential rejection: expired (ExpiresAt), stale (IssuedAt + maxCredentialAge), revoked (IsRevoked) + +--- + +## P3: Future (post-hardening) + +| Item | Area | Description | +|------|------|-------------| +| P3-1 | Authentication | Mutual TLS certificate pinning for bootstrap peers | +| P3-2 | ZK Proofs | Recursive proof composition (aggregate multiple attestations) | +| P3-3 | ZK Proofs | Production SRS ceremony (replace unsafe KZG setup) | +| P3-4 | Credentials | DID credential rotation protocol | +| P3-5 | Credentials | Verifiable Credential (W3C VC) integration | +| P3-6 | Monitoring | Security audit logging with tamper-evident storage | +| P3-7 | Network | Tor/I2P transport layer support | + +--- + +## Dependency Graph & Execution Order + +``` +P0-1 (Node key SecretsStore) ──┐ +P0-2 (Signature verification) ├── Immediate (1 week) +P0-3 (KeyDir cleanup) ──┘ + +P1-4 (OS Keyring) ────────── Independent ──→ P2-7 synergy +P1-5 (Process isolation) ───── Independent ──→ P2-8 prerequisite +P1-6 (Session invalidation) ── Independent + (All P1 parallelizable, 2-3 weeks) + +P2-7 (SQLCipher) ────────── After P1-4 +P2-8 (Container) ────────── After P1-5 +P2-9 (HSM/KMS) ────────── Independent +P2-10 (Signed Challenge) ──── After P0-2 +P2-11 (ZK Hardening) ─────── Independent +P2-12 (Credential Revocation) Independent + (P2: completed) + +P3-1..P3-7 ────────────────── Future +``` + +## Risk Matrix + +| Item | Impact | Complexity | Failure Risk | Compat Risk | Overall | +|------|--------|-----------|-------------|-------------|---------| +| P0-1 Node key migration | High | Medium | Low | Low | **Low** | +| P0-2 Signature verification | High | Low | Low | Low | **Low** | +| P0-3 KeyDir cleanup | Low | Low | Low | Low | **Low** | +| P1-4 OS Keyring | Medium | Medium | Low | Low | **Low** | +| P1-5 Process isolation | High | High | Medium | Low | **Medium** | +| P1-6 Session invalidation | Medium | Medium | Low | Low | **Low** | +| P2-7 SQLCipher | High | High | Medium | Medium | **Medium-High** | +| P2-8 Container sandbox | High | Very High | High | Low | **High** | +| P2-9 HSM/Cloud KMS | High | Very High | Medium | Low | **Medium** | diff --git a/openspec/specs/a2a-protocol/spec.md b/openspec/specs/a2a-protocol/spec.md index 24d78a18..9b880eb2 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/a2a-protocol/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/a2a-protocol/spec.md @@ -3,6 +3,16 @@ ### Requirement: Agent Card endpoint The system SHALL serve an Agent Card at `GET /.well-known/agent.json` when A2A is enabled, containing the agent's name, description, URL, and skills. +The `AgentCard` struct SHALL be extended with the following optional P2P fields in addition to its existing `name`, `description`, `url`, and `skills` fields: + +- `did` (`string`, omitempty): The agent's decentralized identifier in `did:lango:` format, populated when P2P is enabled. +- `multiaddrs` (`[]string`, omitempty): The list of libp2p multiaddresses the agent is reachable at over the P2P network. +- `capabilities` (`[]string`, omitempty): A list of capability identifiers the agent advertises for P2P capability-based discovery. +- `pricing` (`*PricingInfo`, omitempty): Optional pricing structure containing `currency`, `perQuery`, `perMinute`, and `toolPrices` map. Currency SHALL be `"USDC"`. +- `zkCredentials` (`[]ZKCredential`, omitempty): Optional list of ZK-attested capability credentials, each containing `capabilityId`, `proof` (bytes), `issuedAt`, and `expiresAt`. + +When P2P is disabled, all P2P extension fields SHALL be omitted from the JSON output (via `omitempty`). The HTTP endpoint behavior, path, and content-type SHALL remain unchanged. + #### Scenario: Agent card served - **WHEN** a GET request is made to `/.well-known/agent.json` - **THEN** the response SHALL be JSON with `name`, `description`, `url`, and `skills` fields @@ -11,6 +21,48 @@ The system SHALL serve an Agent Card at `GET /.well-known/agent.json` when A2A i - **WHEN** the agent has sub-agents (multi-agent mode) - **THEN** each sub-agent SHALL appear as a skill in the Agent Card +#### Scenario: Agent card includes P2P fields when P2P enabled +- **WHEN** `GET /.well-known/agent.json` is called and P2P is enabled with a DID and multiaddrs configured +- **THEN** the response JSON SHALL include `did`, `multiaddrs`, and `capabilities` fields with their configured values + +#### Scenario: P2P fields absent when P2P disabled +- **WHEN** `GET /.well-known/agent.json` is called and P2P is disabled +- **THEN** the response JSON SHALL NOT contain `did`, `multiaddrs`, `capabilities`, `pricing`, or `zkCredentials` fields + +#### Scenario: SetP2PInfo populates card fields +- **WHEN** `Server.SetP2PInfo(did, multiaddrs, capabilities)` is called on an A2A server +- **THEN** subsequent calls to `GET /.well-known/agent.json` SHALL return the provided DID, multiaddrs, and capabilities + +#### Scenario: Pricing info serialized correctly +- **WHEN** `Server.SetPricing(&PricingInfo{Currency: "USDC", PerQuery: "0.01"})` is called +- **THEN** the agent card JSON SHALL contain `"pricing": {"currency": "USDC", "perQuery": "0.01"}` + +#### Scenario: ZK credentials included in agent card +- **WHEN** `AgentCard.ZKCredentials` contains a credential with a non-expired `ExpiresAt` +- **THEN** the credential SHALL appear in the JSON output with all fields present + +--- + +### Requirement: Agent Card Served Without Authentication + +The `GET /.well-known/agent.json` endpoint SHALL remain publicly accessible without any authentication requirement. P2P extension fields in the card (DID, multiaddrs) are intentionally public information used for peer discovery and SHALL be served to any requester. + +#### Scenario: Unauthenticated request receives full agent card +- **WHEN** an unauthenticated HTTP GET is made to `/.well-known/agent.json` +- **THEN** the server SHALL respond with HTTP 200 and the full agent card JSON including any P2P extension fields + +--- + +### Requirement: GossipCard Mirrors AgentCard P2P Fields + +The `GossipCard` type used for GossipSub propagation SHALL carry the same P2P-related fields as the `AgentCard` extension: `name`, `description`, `did`, `multiaddrs`, `capabilities`, `pricing`, `zkCredentials`, `peerId`, and `timestamp`. The `GossipCard` is separate from `AgentCard` but SHALL be structurally consistent with the P2P extension fields to enable seamless conversion between the two representations. + +#### Scenario: GossipCard fields match AgentCard P2P fields +- **WHEN** a `GossipCard` is constructed from an `AgentCard` with P2P fields set +- **THEN** all P2P extension fields (`did`, `multiaddrs`, `capabilities`, `pricing`, `zkCredentials`) SHALL be preserved in the `GossipCard` + +--- + ### Requirement: A2A server route mounting The A2A server SHALL mount its routes on the gateway's chi.Router when `a2a.enabled` and `agent.multiAgent` are both true. diff --git a/openspec/specs/agent-prompting/spec.md b/openspec/specs/agent-prompting/spec.md index 657d0465..7e22f6d8 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/agent-prompting/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/agent-prompting/spec.md @@ -24,3 +24,28 @@ The SAFETY.md prompt SHALL enumerate specific PII categories (email, phone numbe - **WHEN** the agent processes SAFETY.md prompt during system prompt assembly - **THEN** the agent understands it protects 13 builtin PII pattern categories - **THEN** the agent can accurately inform users about PII protection coverage including Presidio + +### Requirement: Tool selection priority in prompts +The TOOL_USAGE.md prompt SHALL include a "Tool Selection Priority" section that instructs agents to always prefer built-in tools over skills. The section SHALL state that skills wrapping `lango` CLI commands will fail due to passphrase authentication requirements in agent mode. + +#### Scenario: Agent reads tool usage prompt +- **WHEN** the agent processes TOOL_USAGE.md during system prompt assembly +- **THEN** the prompt SHALL contain a "Tool Selection Priority" section before the "Exec Tool" section + +#### Scenario: Agent encounters a skill with built-in equivalent +- **WHEN** a skill provides functionality already available as a built-in tool +- **THEN** the prompt guidance SHALL direct the agent to use the built-in tool instead + +### Requirement: Tool selection directive in agent identity +The AGENTS.md prompt SHALL include a tool selection directive stating that built-in tools MUST be preferred over skills, and skills are extensions for specialized use cases only. + +#### Scenario: Agent reads identity prompt +- **WHEN** the agent processes AGENTS.md during system prompt assembly +- **THEN** the prompt SHALL contain a tool selection directive before the knowledge system description + +### Requirement: Runtime skill priority note +The `AssemblePrompt()` method in `ContextRetriever` SHALL prepend a note to the "Available Skills" section advising agents to prefer built-in tools over skills. + +#### Scenario: Skills section rendered with priority note +- **WHEN** the assembled prompt includes skill pattern items +- **THEN** the "Available Skills" section SHALL begin with a note stating to prefer built-in tools over skills diff --git a/openspec/specs/agent-self-correction/spec.md b/openspec/specs/agent-self-correction/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..38313443 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/agent-self-correction/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Learning-based error correction on agent failure +The system SHALL support an optional `ErrorFixProvider` that returns known fixes for tool errors. When set and the initial agent run fails, the agent SHALL attempt one retry with the suggested fix. + +#### Scenario: Error fix provider configured and fix available +- **WHEN** `WithErrorFixProvider` has been called with a non-nil provider +- **AND** the initial run fails with an error +- **AND** the provider returns a fix with `ok == true` +- **THEN** the agent SHALL retry with a correction message containing the original error and suggested fix + +#### Scenario: Retry succeeds +- **WHEN** the retry with a learned fix succeeds +- **THEN** the agent SHALL return the retry response as the final result + +#### Scenario: Retry fails +- **WHEN** the retry with a learned fix also fails +- **THEN** the agent SHALL log a warning and continue with the original error handling path + +#### Scenario: No fix available +- **WHEN** the provider returns `ok == false` for the error +- **THEN** the agent SHALL proceed with normal error handling without retrying + +#### Scenario: No error fix provider configured +- **WHEN** `WithErrorFixProvider` has not been called +- **THEN** the agent SHALL skip the self-correction path entirely + +### Requirement: ErrorFixProvider interface +The `ErrorFixProvider` interface SHALL define `GetFixForError(ctx, toolName, err) (string, bool)` that returns a fix suggestion and whether one was found. + +#### Scenario: Interface compliance with learning.Engine +- **WHEN** `learning.Engine` implements `GetFixForError` +- **THEN** it SHALL satisfy the `ErrorFixProvider` interface diff --git a/openspec/specs/agent-turn-limit/spec.md b/openspec/specs/agent-turn-limit/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b0cab508 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/agent-turn-limit/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Maximum turn limit per agent run +The system SHALL enforce a configurable maximum number of tool-calling turns per `Agent.Run()` invocation. The default limit SHALL be 25 turns. + +#### Scenario: Turn limit reached +- **WHEN** the number of events containing function calls exceeds the configured maximum +- **THEN** the system SHALL stop iterating, log a warning with session ID and turn counts, and yield an error `"agent exceeded maximum turn limit (%d)"` + +#### Scenario: Normal completion within limit +- **WHEN** the agent completes its work within the turn limit +- **THEN** all events SHALL be yielded normally with no interruption + +#### Scenario: Custom turn limit via WithMaxTurns +- **WHEN** `WithMaxTurns(n)` is called with a positive value +- **THEN** the agent SHALL use `n` as the maximum turn limit instead of the default 25 + +#### Scenario: Zero or negative turn limit falls back to default +- **WHEN** `WithMaxTurns(0)` or `WithMaxTurns(-1)` is called +- **THEN** the agent SHALL use the default limit of 25 + +### Requirement: Function call detection in events +The system SHALL count only events that contain at least one `FunctionCall` part as tool-calling turns. + +#### Scenario: Event with function call parts +- **WHEN** an event's Content contains one or more parts with a non-nil `FunctionCall` +- **THEN** it SHALL be counted as a tool-calling turn + +#### Scenario: Event without function calls +- **WHEN** an event contains only text parts or no parts +- **THEN** it SHALL NOT be counted as a tool-calling turn diff --git a/openspec/specs/appinit-modules/spec.md b/openspec/specs/appinit-modules/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..64fffbde --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/appinit-modules/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +## Purpose + +Module interface with topological sort for declarative app initialization. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: Module interface +The system SHALL define a Module interface with Name(), Provides(), DependsOn(), Enabled(), and Init() methods for declarative initialization units. + +#### Scenario: Module declares dependencies +- **WHEN** a module's DependsOn() returns ["session_store"] +- **THEN** the builder SHALL ensure the session_store provider runs first + +### Requirement: Topological sort with cycle detection +TopoSort SHALL order modules so dependencies are initialized before dependents, and SHALL return an error if cycles are detected. + +#### Scenario: A depends on B depends on C +- **WHEN** modules A->B->C are sorted +- **THEN** order SHALL be C, B, A + +#### Scenario: Cycle detected +- **WHEN** A depends on B and B depends on A +- **THEN** TopoSort SHALL return an error naming the involved modules + +### Requirement: Disabled module exclusion +TopoSort SHALL exclude modules where Enabled() returns false, and SHALL ignore dependencies on keys provided only by disabled modules. + +#### Scenario: Disabled module skipped +- **WHEN** module B is disabled and A depends on B's key +- **THEN** A SHALL still be included (dependency treated as optional) + +### Requirement: Builder with resolver +The Builder SHALL execute modules in topological order and provide a Resolver that allows later modules to access values provided by earlier modules. + +#### Scenario: Resolver passes values between modules +- **WHEN** module A provides key "store" with value X +- **THEN** module B's Init can call resolver.Resolve("store") and receive X + +### Requirement: BuildResult aggregation +Build SHALL aggregate all module Tools and Components into a single BuildResult. + +#### Scenario: Two modules contribute tools +- **WHEN** module A provides 3 tools and module B provides 2 tools +- **THEN** BuildResult.Tools SHALL contain all 5 tools diff --git a/openspec/specs/approval-policy/spec.md b/openspec/specs/approval-policy/spec.md index c518f098..e26ced0b 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/approval-policy/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/approval-policy/spec.md @@ -1,9 +1,7 @@ ## Purpose The Approval Policy capability provides a policy-based approval system with four modes (dangerous, all, configured, none) that replaces the legacy boolean approval gate. It includes exempt tool overrides, automatic legacy config migration, and a decision function that combines policy, SafetyLevel, and explicit tool lists. - ## Requirements - ### Requirement: ApprovalPolicy type The system SHALL define an `ApprovalPolicy` string type with four constants: `"dangerous"` (default), `"all"`, `"configured"`, and `"none"`. @@ -127,3 +125,56 @@ The README Security configuration table SHALL include `security.interceptor.appr #### Scenario: README table entries - **WHEN** a user reads the README Security section - **THEN** the table SHALL list `approvalPolicy` (string, default "dangerous") and `exemptTools` ([]string) as configuration options + +### Requirement: P2P approval fallback isolation +The CompositeProvider SHALL provide a dedicated P2P fallback slot (`p2pFallback`) that is used exclusively for approval requests with session keys prefixed with `"p2p:"`. P2P sessions MUST never be routed to the TTY fallback slot, preventing HeadlessProvider from auto-approving remote peer requests. + +#### Scenario: P2P session with no P2P fallback configured +- **WHEN** a P2P approval request (session key `"p2p:..."`) is received and no P2P fallback is set +- **THEN** the provider SHALL return an error stating "headless auto-approve is not allowed for remote peers" + +#### Scenario: P2P session routes to dedicated fallback +- **WHEN** a P2P approval request is received and a P2P fallback provider is configured +- **THEN** the request SHALL be routed to the P2P fallback provider, not the TTY fallback + +#### Scenario: Non-P2P session still uses TTY fallback +- **WHEN** a non-P2P approval request (session key without `"p2p:"` prefix) is received +- **THEN** the request SHALL be routed to the TTY fallback as before + +#### Scenario: HeadlessProvider as TTY fallback with P2P request +- **WHEN** HeadlessProvider is configured as TTY fallback and a P2P approval request arrives +- **THEN** HeadlessProvider SHALL NOT be called; the request SHALL use the P2P fallback or be denied + +### Requirement: P2P approval wiring +When P2P is enabled, the application SHALL configure `TTYProvider` as the P2P fallback on `CompositeProvider`. This ensures P2P approval requests are always routed to an interactive provider, regardless of whether HeadlessProvider is configured as the TTY fallback. + +#### Scenario: P2P enabled wiring +- **WHEN** the application initializes with `cfg.P2P.Enabled = true` +- **THEN** `composite.SetP2PFallback(&approval.TTYProvider{})` SHALL be called + +### Requirement: Amount-based auto-approve for payment tools +wrapWithApproval SHALL accept an optional SpendingLimiter parameter (nil allowed). When non-nil and the tool is a payment tool (`p2p_pay` or `payment_send`), it SHALL check the amount parameter against `IsAutoApprovable` before requesting interactive approval. + +#### Scenario: Auto-approve small payment +- **WHEN** tool is `p2p_pay` with amount "0.05" AND limiter.IsAutoApprovable returns true +- **THEN** the tool SHALL execute without interactive approval + +#### Scenario: Require approval for large payment +- **WHEN** tool is `p2p_pay` with amount "5.00" AND limiter.IsAutoApprovable returns false +- **THEN** the tool SHALL request interactive approval via the approval provider + +#### Scenario: No limiter provided +- **WHEN** limiter is nil +- **THEN** wrapWithApproval SHALL behave as before (no amount-based auto-approve) + +#### Scenario: Non-payment tool unaffected +- **WHEN** tool is `exec` AND limiter is non-nil +- **THEN** wrapWithApproval SHALL ignore the limiter and follow normal approval policy + +### Requirement: P2P payment approval summary +buildApprovalSummary SHALL return a human-readable summary for `p2p_pay` tool invocations including amount, peer DID (truncated), and memo. + +#### Scenario: p2p_pay approval summary +- **WHEN** buildApprovalSummary is called with toolName "p2p_pay" and params containing amount, peer_did, and memo +- **THEN** it SHALL return a string containing the amount, truncated peer DID, and memo + diff --git a/openspec/specs/async-buffer/spec.md b/openspec/specs/async-buffer/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8bfcf057 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/async-buffer/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +# Spec: Generic Async Buffer + +## Overview +Generic async buffer package (`internal/asyncbuf/`) providing two reusable buffer types that replace 5 duplicate implementations across the codebase. + +## Requirements + +### R1: BatchBuffer[T] — Batch-Oriented Async Processing +The system must provide a generic `BatchBuffer[T]` that: +- Accepts items via non-blocking `Enqueue(T)` +- Collects items into batches up to a configurable `BatchSize` +- Flushes batches on a configurable `BatchTimeout` timer +- Processes batches via a user-provided `ProcessBatchFunc[T]` +- Tracks dropped items when the queue is full (`DroppedCount()`) +- Drains remaining items on `Stop()` before returning +- Follows `Start(wg *sync.WaitGroup)` / `Stop()` lifecycle + +#### Scenarios +- **Normal batch flush**: Items accumulate until `BatchSize` is reached, then flush. +- **Timeout flush**: Partial batch flushes after `BatchTimeout` with no new items. +- **Queue full**: `Enqueue` drops silently and increments drop counter. +- **Graceful shutdown**: `Stop()` processes remaining queued items before returning. + +### R2: TriggerBuffer[T] — Per-Item Async Processing +The system must provide a generic `TriggerBuffer[T]` that: +- Accepts items via non-blocking `Enqueue(T)` +- Processes each item individually via `ProcessFunc[T]` +- Drains remaining items on `Stop()` before returning +- Follows `Start(wg *sync.WaitGroup)` / `Stop()` lifecycle + +#### Scenarios +- **Normal processing**: Each enqueued item processed one-at-a-time. +- **Queue full**: `Enqueue` drops silently (non-blocking). +- **Graceful shutdown**: `Stop()` processes remaining queued items before returning. + +### R3: Backward-Compatible Migration +All 5 existing buffers must be migrated to thin wrappers around asyncbuf types with zero public API changes: +- `embedding.EmbeddingBuffer` wraps `BatchBuffer[EmbedRequest]` +- `graph.GraphBuffer` wraps `BatchBuffer[GraphRequest]` +- `memory.Buffer` wraps `TriggerBuffer[string]` +- `learning.AnalysisBuffer` wraps `TriggerBuffer[AnalysisRequest]` +- `librarian.ProactiveBuffer` wraps `TriggerBuffer[string]` + +## Dependencies +- `sync`, `sync/atomic`, `time` (stdlib) +- `go.uber.org/zap` (logging) +- No imports from application packages (leaf dependency) diff --git a/openspec/specs/automation-agent-tools/spec.md b/openspec/specs/automation-agent-tools/spec.md index 195b5f8d..030d229c 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/automation-agent-tools/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/automation-agent-tools/spec.md @@ -92,8 +92,36 @@ The automation prompt section SHALL inform the agent that delivery channel param - **THEN** the workflow section SHALL include a note that deliver_to in YAML is optional and auto-detected ### Requirement: Exec prohibition in automation prompt -The automation prompt section SHALL include an explicit instruction prohibiting the use of exec to run lango automation CLI commands. +The automation prompt section SHALL include an explicit instruction prohibiting the use of exec to run ANY lango CLI command, not only automation subcommands. The prohibition SHALL list all known subcommands (cron, bg, workflow, graph, memory, p2p, security, payment, config, doctor, and others) and explain that every lango CLI invocation requires passphrase authentication during bootstrap and will fail in non-interactive subprocess contexts. -#### Scenario: Prompt includes exec prohibition +#### Scenario: Prompt includes comprehensive exec prohibition - **WHEN** any automation feature (cron, background, or workflow) is enabled -- **THEN** the automation prompt section SHALL contain text instructing the agent to NEVER use exec to run "lango cron", "lango bg", or "lango workflow" commands, with explanation that spawning a new lango process requires passphrase authentication +- **THEN** the automation prompt section SHALL contain text instructing the agent to NEVER use exec to run ANY "lango" CLI command, covering all subcommands including but not limited to cron, bg, workflow, graph, memory, p2p, security, payment, config, and doctor +- **AND** the prohibition SHALL explain that spawning a new lango process requires passphrase authentication and will fail in non-interactive mode +- **AND** the prohibition SHALL instruct the agent to ask the user to run commands directly in their terminal when no built-in tool equivalent exists + +### Requirement: Comprehensive CLI exec guard +The `blockLangoExec()` function SHALL block ALL `lango` CLI invocations attempted through `exec` or `exec_bg` tools, using a two-phase approach: (1) specific subcommand guards with per-command tool alternative messages, and (2) a catch-all guard for any remaining `lango` prefix. + +#### Scenario: Block subcommand with in-process equivalent +- **WHEN** the agent attempts to exec a `lango` subcommand that has in-process tool equivalents (graph, memory, p2p, security, payment, cron, bg, workflow) +- **THEN** the system SHALL return a blocked message listing the specific built-in tools to use instead + +#### Scenario: Block subcommand without in-process equivalent +- **WHEN** the agent attempts to exec a `lango` subcommand that has no in-process equivalent (config, doctor, settings, serve, onboard, agent) +- **THEN** the system SHALL return a blocked message explaining that passphrase authentication is required and the user should run the command directly in their terminal + +#### Scenario: Allow non-lango commands +- **WHEN** the agent attempts to exec a command that does not start with `lango ` or equal `lango` +- **THEN** the system SHALL allow the command to proceed (return empty string) + +#### Scenario: Case-insensitive matching +- **WHEN** the agent attempts to exec a lango command in any case (e.g., `LANGO SECURITY DB-MIGRATE`) +- **THEN** the system SHALL still block and return the appropriate guidance message + +### Requirement: Exec tool prompt safety rules +The `TOOL_USAGE.md` prompt SHALL include an explicit top-level rule under the Exec Tool section warning against using exec to run any `lango` CLI command. The rule SHALL list specific subcommands as examples and explain the passphrase failure mechanism. The rule SHALL also instruct the agent to inform the user and ask them to run commands directly when no built-in tool equivalent exists. + +#### Scenario: TOOL_USAGE.md contains exec safety rule +- **WHEN** the agent's tool usage prompt is loaded +- **THEN** the first bullet point under "### Exec Tool" SHALL warn against running any lango CLI command via exec diff --git a/openspec/specs/bg-cli-wiring/spec.md b/openspec/specs/bg-cli-wiring/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cbae3611 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/bg-cli-wiring/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: bg command is registered in main.go +The `lango bg` command SHALL be registered in `cmd/lango/main.go` with GroupID "infra", using a stub manager provider that returns an error when invoked outside a running server. + +#### Scenario: bg command appears in help +- **WHEN** user runs `lango --help` +- **THEN** the `bg` command SHALL appear under the "Infrastructure" group + +#### Scenario: bg subcommand returns server-required error +- **WHEN** user runs `lango bg list` without a running server +- **THEN** the command SHALL return an error containing "bg commands require a running server" diff --git a/openspec/specs/blockchain-wallet/spec.md b/openspec/specs/blockchain-wallet/spec.md index 402a2300..295957a0 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/blockchain-wallet/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/blockchain-wallet/spec.md @@ -1,7 +1,20 @@ ## ADDED Requirements ### Requirement: Wallet provider interface -The system SHALL define a `WalletProvider` interface with methods: `Address`, `Balance`, `SignTransaction`, `SignMessage`. All implementations MUST ensure private keys are never returned to callers. +The system SHALL define a `WalletProvider` interface with methods: `Address`, `Balance`, `SignTransaction`, `SignMessage`, and `PublicKey`. All implementations MUST ensure private keys are never returned to callers. + +The pre-existing `WalletProvider` methods SHALL remain unchanged in signature and semantics: + +- `Address(ctx context.Context) (string, error)` — returns the wallet's checksummed Ethereum address +- `Balance(ctx context.Context) (*big.Int, error)` — returns native token balance in wei +- `SignTransaction(ctx context.Context, rawTx []byte) ([]byte, error)` — signs a raw transaction +- `SignMessage(ctx context.Context, message []byte) ([]byte, error)` — signs an arbitrary message + +The `PublicKey(ctx context.Context) ([]byte, error)` method SHALL return the compressed secp256k1 public key bytes (33 bytes) corresponding to the wallet's private key. The private key MUST NOT be exposed by this or any other method. The returned public key SHALL be deterministic: repeated calls with the same wallet MUST return the same bytes. + +`PublicKey` is required for P2P identity derivation: the DID system calls `WalletProvider.PublicKey()` to derive `did:lango:` and the corresponding libp2p peer ID. P2P is gated on `payment.enabled`; therefore `PublicKey` is only called when a wallet is present. + +Adding `PublicKey` to the interface constitutes a breaking change for any external implementations. Internal implementations (`LocalWallet`, `RPCWallet`, `CompositeWallet`) MUST all implement `PublicKey` before the interface change is merged. #### Scenario: Get wallet address - **WHEN** `Address(ctx)` is called on any WalletProvider implementation @@ -11,6 +24,34 @@ The system SHALL define a `WalletProvider` interface with methods: `Address`, `B - **WHEN** `SignTransaction(ctx, rawTx)` is called with a transaction hash - **THEN** a secp256k1 signature is returned and the private key bytes are zeroed immediately after +#### Scenario: PublicKey returns 33-byte compressed public key +- **WHEN** `WalletProvider.PublicKey(ctx)` is called on a wallet initialized with an ECDSA keypair +- **THEN** the method SHALL return a 33-byte slice (compressed secp256k1 format, prefix `0x02` or `0x03`) + +#### Scenario: PublicKey is deterministic +- **WHEN** `WalletProvider.PublicKey(ctx)` is called multiple times on the same wallet +- **THEN** all calls SHALL return identical byte slices + +#### Scenario: PublicKey never exposes private key +- **WHEN** `WalletProvider.PublicKey(ctx)` is called +- **THEN** the returned bytes SHALL contain only the public key; the private key bytes SHALL NOT appear in any return value or log output + +#### Scenario: All WalletProvider implementations satisfy interface +- **WHEN** the codebase is compiled +- **THEN** all types that implemented the previous `WalletProvider` interface (`LocalWallet`, `RPCWallet`, `CompositeWallet`) SHALL implement `PublicKey` and satisfy the updated interface at compile time + +#### Scenario: PublicKey error propagates to DID derivation +- **WHEN** `WalletProvider.PublicKey(ctx)` returns an error (e.g., wallet not initialized, RPC failure) +- **THEN** `WalletDIDProvider.DID(ctx)` SHALL return a wrapped error containing "get wallet public key" and SHALL NOT cache a nil result + +#### Scenario: Existing wallet methods continue to function +- **WHEN** `WalletProvider.Address(ctx)` is called on any implementation after the interface extension +- **THEN** the method SHALL return the same result as before the change (no regression) + +#### Scenario: Compile-time interface compliance check +- **WHEN** the package containing `LocalWallet` is compiled +- **THEN** the compile-time assertion `var _ WalletProvider = (*LocalWallet)(nil)` SHALL succeed without error + ### Requirement: Local wallet with encrypted key storage The system SHALL implement a `LocalWallet` that loads its private key from `SecretsStore` under key `wallet.privatekey`, signs using go-ethereum crypto, and zeroes key bytes immediately after each operation. @@ -20,7 +61,7 @@ The system SHALL implement a `LocalWallet` that loads its private key from `Secr #### Scenario: Local wallet derives address - **WHEN** `Address` is called on LocalWallet -- **THEN** the address is derived from the stored private key via publicKey → keccak256 +- **THEN** the address is derived from the stored private key via publicKey -> keccak256 ### Requirement: RPC wallet for companion delegation The system SHALL implement an `RPCWallet` that delegates signing to a companion app via WebSocket RPC, using correlation IDs and 30-second timeout, mirroring the `security.RPCProvider` pattern. @@ -58,3 +99,37 @@ The system SHALL provide a `CreateWallet` function in the wallet package that ge #### Scenario: Private key is zeroed after storage - **WHEN** a new wallet is created successfully - **THEN** the raw private key bytes are zeroed in memory immediately after being written to SecretsStore + +### Requirement: SpendingLimiter auto-approve threshold +SpendingLimiter interface SHALL include `IsAutoApprovable(ctx context.Context, amount *big.Int) (bool, error)` for threshold-based auto-approval decisions. EntSpendingLimiter SHALL implement this method using the `autoApproveBelow` field. + +#### Scenario: IsAutoApprovable returns true for amount below threshold +- **WHEN** autoApproveBelow is "0.10" and amount is 0.05 USDC and daily limit is not exceeded +- **THEN** IsAutoApprovable SHALL return (true, nil) + +#### Scenario: IsAutoApprovable returns false for amount above threshold +- **WHEN** autoApproveBelow is "0.10" and amount is 0.50 USDC +- **THEN** IsAutoApprovable SHALL return (false, nil) + +#### Scenario: IsAutoApprovable returns false when threshold is zero +- **WHEN** autoApproveBelow is "0" or empty +- **THEN** IsAutoApprovable SHALL return (false, nil) regardless of amount + +#### Scenario: IsAutoApprovable returns error when daily limit exceeded +- **WHEN** amount is below threshold but daily spending limit would be exceeded +- **THEN** IsAutoApprovable SHALL return (false, error) with the limit error + +### Requirement: EntSpendingLimiter autoApproveBelow parameter +NewEntSpendingLimiter SHALL accept an `autoApproveBelow` string parameter (4th argument) representing the USDC amount threshold for auto-approval. Empty string or "0" SHALL disable auto-approval. + +#### Scenario: Valid autoApproveBelow value +- **WHEN** NewEntSpendingLimiter is called with autoApproveBelow "0.10" +- **THEN** the limiter SHALL store the parsed threshold as 100000 (smallest USDC units) + +#### Scenario: Empty autoApproveBelow disables auto-approval +- **WHEN** NewEntSpendingLimiter is called with autoApproveBelow "" +- **THEN** the limiter SHALL set autoApproveBelow to 0 (disabled) + +#### Scenario: Invalid autoApproveBelow returns error +- **WHEN** NewEntSpendingLimiter is called with autoApproveBelow "invalid" +- **THEN** NewEntSpendingLimiter SHALL return an error diff --git a/openspec/specs/bootstrap-lifecycle/spec.md b/openspec/specs/bootstrap-lifecycle/spec.md index fa8f9b2b..c47a721c 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/bootstrap-lifecycle/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/bootstrap-lifecycle/spec.md @@ -48,6 +48,44 @@ The system SHALL ensure `~/.lango/` exists with 0700 permissions during bootstra - **WHEN** `~/.lango/` does not exist - **THEN** the directory is created with 0700 permissions +### Requirement: Bootstrap uses secure hardware provider for passphrase storage +The bootstrap process SHALL use `DetectSecureProvider()` to determine the keyring provider for passphrase acquisition. When no secure hardware is available (`TierNone`), the keyring provider SHALL be nil, disabling automatic keyring reads. + +#### Scenario: Biometric available during bootstrap +- **WHEN** bootstrap runs on macOS with Touch ID +- **THEN** the passphrase acquisition SHALL use `BiometricProvider` as the keyring provider + +#### Scenario: No secure hardware during bootstrap +- **WHEN** bootstrap runs on a system without biometric or TPM +- **THEN** the keyring provider SHALL be nil, and passphrase SHALL be acquired from keyfile or interactive prompt only + +#### Scenario: Interactive passphrase with secure storage offer +- **WHEN** the passphrase source is interactive and a secure provider is available +- **THEN** the system SHALL offer to store the passphrase in the secure backend with a confirmation prompt showing the tier label + +### Requirement: Report biometric passphrase store outcome +When the bootstrap flow stores a passphrase in the secure keyring provider, it SHALL report the outcome to stderr. On entitlement error (`ErrEntitlement`), the system SHALL warn the user and suggest codesigning. On other failures, the message SHALL be `warning: store passphrase failed: `. On success, the message SHALL be `Passphrase saved. Next launch will load it automatically.`. + +#### Scenario: Biometric store succeeds +- **WHEN** `secureProvider.Set()` returns nil +- **THEN** stderr SHALL contain `Passphrase saved. Next launch will load it automatically.` + +#### Scenario: Biometric store fails with entitlement error +- **WHEN** `secureProvider.Set()` returns an error satisfying `errors.Is(err, keyring.ErrEntitlement)` +- **THEN** stderr SHALL contain `warning: biometric storage unavailable (binary not codesigned)` +- **AND** stderr SHALL contain a codesign tip + +#### Scenario: Biometric store fails with non-entitlement error +- **WHEN** `secureProvider.Set()` returns an error NOT satisfying `errors.Is(err, keyring.ErrEntitlement)` +- **THEN** stderr SHALL contain `warning: store passphrase failed: ` + +### Requirement: SkipSecureDetection option for testing +The `Options` struct SHALL include a `SkipSecureDetection` boolean. When true, secure hardware detection SHALL be skipped and the keyring provider SHALL be nil regardless of available hardware. + +#### Scenario: SkipSecureDetection in test +- **WHEN** `Run()` is called with `SkipSecureDetection: true` +- **THEN** the bootstrap SHALL not probe for biometric or TPM hardware + ### Requirement: Ephemeral keyfile shredding after crypto initialization The system SHALL shred the passphrase keyfile after successful crypto initialization and checksum verification when the passphrase source is keyfile and `KeepKeyfile` is false (default). Shred failure SHALL emit a warning to stderr but SHALL NOT prevent bootstrap from completing. diff --git a/openspec/specs/bootstrap-pipeline/spec.md b/openspec/specs/bootstrap-pipeline/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fbf5ea77 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/bootstrap-pipeline/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +## Purpose + +Phase-based bootstrap with sequential execution and reverse-order cleanup on failure. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: Phase-based pipeline +The bootstrap system SHALL execute phases sequentially using a Pipeline with Phase structs containing Name, Run, and optional Cleanup functions. + +#### Scenario: All phases succeed +- **WHEN** all phases complete without error +- **THEN** Pipeline.Execute SHALL return the Result from State + +### Requirement: Reverse cleanup on failure +If a phase fails, the Pipeline SHALL call Cleanup functions of all previously completed phases in reverse order. + +#### Scenario: Phase 4 fails after phases 1-3 complete +- **WHEN** phase 4 returns an error +- **THEN** cleanup SHALL run for phases 3, 2, 1 in that order (if they have Cleanup functions) + +### Requirement: State passes data between phases +The Pipeline SHALL use a State struct to carry data between phases, including Options, Result, and intermediate values. + +#### Scenario: Database handle passes from open to security phase +- **WHEN** phaseOpenDatabase sets Client on State +- **THEN** phaseLoadSecurityState SHALL read Client from State + +### Requirement: Default bootstrap phases +The system SHALL provide DefaultPhases() returning the 7-phase bootstrap sequence: ensureDataDir, detectEncryption, acquirePassphrase, openDatabase, loadSecurityState, initCrypto, loadProfile. + +#### Scenario: Run uses default phases +- **WHEN** bootstrap.Run(opts) is called +- **THEN** it SHALL create a Pipeline with DefaultPhases and execute it diff --git a/openspec/specs/brand-banner/spec.md b/openspec/specs/brand-banner/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fc24db13 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/brand-banner/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +## Purpose + +Brand banner component providing the Lango squirrel mascot, version info, and profile display across CLI/TUI surfaces (settings welcome, onboard wizard, serve startup). + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: Banner component provides squirrel mascot with version info +The `tui` package SHALL provide a `Banner()` function that returns a string containing the squirrel mascot ASCII art alongside version, tagline, and profile information arranged horizontally. + +#### Scenario: Banner displays version and profile +- **WHEN** `SetVersionInfo("0.4.0", "2026-01-01")` and `SetProfile("default")` are called before `Banner()` +- **THEN** the output SHALL contain "Lango v0.4.0", "Fast AI Agent in Go", and "profile: default" + +### Requirement: BannerBox wraps banner in rounded border +The `tui` package SHALL provide a `BannerBox()` function that wraps the banner in a rounded border box styled with the Primary color. + +#### Scenario: BannerBox has border characters +- **WHEN** `BannerBox()` is called +- **THEN** the output SHALL contain rounded border characters (e.g., "╭", "│") + +### Requirement: ServeBanner includes separator line +The `tui` package SHALL provide a `ServeBanner()` function that renders the banner followed by a horizontal separator line using the Separator color. + +#### Scenario: ServeBanner contains separator +- **WHEN** `ServeBanner()` is called +- **THEN** the output SHALL contain horizontal line characters ("─") + +### Requirement: TUI screens clear terminal on launch +The settings editor and onboard wizard SHALL return `tea.ClearScreen` from their `Init()` method to clear previous terminal output. + +#### Scenario: Settings editor clears screen +- **WHEN** the settings editor initializes +- **THEN** `Init()` SHALL return `tea.ClearScreen` + +#### Scenario: Onboard wizard clears screen +- **WHEN** the onboard wizard initializes +- **THEN** `Init()` SHALL return `tea.ClearScreen` + +### Requirement: Serve command prints banner before startup +The `lango serve` command SHALL print the serve banner to stdout after logging initialization and before starting the application. + +#### Scenario: Serve displays banner with profile +- **WHEN** `lango serve` is executed +- **THEN** the serve banner SHALL be printed with the active profile name + +### Requirement: Version injection via setter pattern +The banner component SHALL use package-level setter functions (`SetVersionInfo`, `SetProfile`) to receive version, build time, and profile information, avoiding import cycles with `cmd/lango/main.go`. + +#### Scenario: Version defaults before injection +- **WHEN** no setter is called +- **THEN** version SHALL default to "dev" and profile SHALL default to "default" diff --git a/openspec/specs/ci-workflow/spec.md b/openspec/specs/ci-workflow/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ddaef3cd --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/ci-workflow/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +# CI Workflow + +## Purpose + +Defines the GitHub Actions CI pipeline for automated build, test, lint, and GoReleaser config validation on pull requests and pushes to main. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: CI workflow triggers +The system SHALL provide a GitHub Actions workflow at `.github/workflows/ci.yml` that triggers on push to `main` and pull requests targeting `main`. + +#### Scenario: PR trigger +- **WHEN** a pull request is opened targeting `main` +- **THEN** the CI workflow SHALL start automatically + +#### Scenario: Main branch push trigger +- **WHEN** a commit is pushed to `main` +- **THEN** the CI workflow SHALL start automatically + +### Requirement: Multi-platform test job +The test job SHALL run on both Linux (`ubuntu-latest`) and macOS (`macos-14`) runners with CGO enabled. + +#### Scenario: Test matrix execution +- **WHEN** the test job starts +- **THEN** it SHALL run `go build ./...`, `go test -race -cover ./...`, and `go vet ./...` on both platforms + +### Requirement: Linux test dependencies +The test job SHALL install `libsqlite3-dev` on Linux runners. + +#### Scenario: Linux CI dependencies +- **WHEN** the test job runs on Linux +- **THEN** it SHALL install `libsqlite3-dev` via apt-get before building + +### Requirement: Lint job +The CI workflow SHALL include a lint job running `golangci-lint` on Linux using the official `golangci-lint-action`. + +#### Scenario: Lint execution +- **WHEN** the lint job runs +- **THEN** it SHALL execute golangci-lint with the latest version + +### Requirement: GoReleaser config validation job +The CI workflow SHALL include a job that validates `.goreleaser.yaml` by running `goreleaser check`. + +#### Scenario: Config validation +- **WHEN** the goreleaser-check job runs +- **THEN** it SHALL execute `goreleaser check` and fail if the configuration is invalid + +### Requirement: Read-only permissions +The CI workflow SHALL request only `contents: read` permission. + +#### Scenario: CI permission scope +- **WHEN** the CI workflow runs +- **THEN** it SHALL operate with `contents: read` permission only (no write access) diff --git a/openspec/specs/cli-agent-inspection/spec.md b/openspec/specs/cli-agent-inspection/spec.md index bc14444e..fdafa635 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/cli-agent-inspection/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/cli-agent-inspection/spec.md @@ -15,6 +15,21 @@ The system SHALL provide a `lango agent status` command that displays agent mode - **WHEN** user runs `lango agent status` with multiAgent=true and A2A enabled - **THEN** system displays mode as "multi-agent" with A2A base URL and agent name +### Requirement: Performance fields in agent status +`lango agent status` SHALL display MaxTurns, ErrorCorrectionEnabled, and MaxDelegationRounds (multi-agent only) with their effective values (config or default). + +#### Scenario: Default values displayed +- **WHEN** user runs `lango agent status` with no performance config +- **THEN** output SHALL show Max Turns: 25, Error Correction: true + +#### Scenario: Multi-agent delegation rounds +- **WHEN** user runs `lango agent status` with `agent.multiAgent: true` +- **THEN** output SHALL include Delegation Rounds field + +#### Scenario: JSON output includes new fields +- **WHEN** user runs `lango agent status --json` +- **THEN** JSON output SHALL include `max_turns`, `error_correction_enabled`, and `max_delegation_rounds` fields + ### Requirement: Agent list command The system SHALL provide a `lango agent list` command that lists all local sub-agents and remote A2A agents. The command SHALL support `--json` and `--check` flags. diff --git a/openspec/specs/cli-command-groups/spec.md b/openspec/specs/cli-command-groups/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..be25aa63 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/cli-command-groups/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +# Spec: CLI Command Groups + +## Overview +Improve CLI discoverability by organizing `lango --help` output into logical groups and adding cross-references between related configuration commands. + +## Requirements + +### R1: Command Grouping +The root command must define four Cobra groups and assign every subcommand to one: + +| Group ID | Title | Commands | +|----------|-------|----------| +| `core` | Core: | serve, version, health | +| `config` | Configuration: | config, settings, onboard, doctor | +| `data` | Data & AI: | memory, graph, agent | +| `infra` | Infrastructure: | security, p2p, cron, workflow, payment | + +#### Scenarios +- **lango --help**: Commands appear grouped under their titles instead of flat alphabetical list. + +### R2: Cross-References (See Also) +Each configuration-related command must include a "See Also" section in its `Long` description: +- `config` → settings, onboard, doctor +- `settings` → config, onboard, doctor +- `onboard` → settings, config, doctor +- `doctor` → settings, config, onboard + +#### Scenarios +- **lango config --help**: Shows "See Also" section with settings, onboard, doctor references. +- **lango doctor --help**: Shows "See Also" section with settings, config, onboard references. + +## Constraints +- No behavioral changes — only `--help` output affected +- All existing commands continue to work identically diff --git a/openspec/specs/cli-doctor/spec.md b/openspec/specs/cli-doctor/spec.md index c24169d6..c24e411d 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/cli-doctor/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/cli-doctor/spec.md @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ The system SHALL verify that enabled channel tokens are configured. - **THEN** check fails with specific channel and missing token field ### Requirement: Session Database Check -The system SHALL verify that the session database is accessible. +The system SHALL verify that the session database is accessible. The fallback database path when no config is loaded SHALL be `~/.lango/lango.db`, matching the DefaultConfig convention. #### Scenario: Database file exists and is writable - **WHEN** session.databasePath points to an accessible SQLite file @@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ The system SHALL verify that the session database is accessible. - **WHEN** database path directory is not writable - **THEN** check fails with permission error +#### Scenario: No config loaded fallback path +- **WHEN** no configuration is loaded (cfg is nil or databasePath is empty) +- **THEN** the check SHALL use `~/.lango/lango.db` as the fallback path + ### Requirement: Server Port Check The system SHALL verify that the configured server port is available. @@ -263,15 +267,19 @@ The embedding doctor check SHALL use `Config.ResolveEmbeddingProvider()` for val - **THEN** the check SHALL skip with "not configured" message ### Requirement: Graph store health check -The doctor command SHALL include a GraphStoreCheck that validates graph store configuration. The check SHALL skip if graph.enabled is false. When enabled, it SHALL validate that backend is "bolt", databasePath is set, and maxTraversalDepth and maxExpansionResults are positive. +The doctor command SHALL include a GraphStoreCheck that validates graph store configuration. The check SHALL skip if graph.enabled is false. When enabled, it SHALL validate that backend is "bolt" and maxTraversalDepth and maxExpansionResults are positive. When databasePath is empty, the check SHALL return StatusWarn with a message indicating the path will default to graph.db next to the session database, instead of StatusFail. #### Scenario: Graph disabled - **WHEN** doctor runs with graph.enabled=false - **THEN** GraphStoreCheck returns StatusSkip -#### Scenario: Graph misconfigured +#### Scenario: Graph databasePath empty - **WHEN** doctor runs with graph.enabled=true and databasePath empty -- **THEN** GraphStoreCheck returns StatusFail with message about missing path +- **THEN** GraphStoreCheck returns StatusWarn with message indicating the fallback path will be used + +#### Scenario: Graph misconfigured backend +- **WHEN** doctor runs with graph.enabled=true and backend is not "bolt" +- **THEN** GraphStoreCheck returns StatusFail with message about unsupported backend ### Requirement: Multi-agent health check The doctor command SHALL include a MultiAgentCheck that validates multi-agent configuration. The check SHALL skip if agent.multiAgent is false. When enabled, it SHALL validate that agent.provider is set. diff --git a/openspec/specs/cli-help-text/spec.md b/openspec/specs/cli-help-text/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1eef25c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/cli-help-text/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +## Purpose + +Defines requirements for accurate and complete `--help` text across Lango CLI commands (settings, doctor, onboard). + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: Settings help lists all category groups +The `lango settings --help` output SHALL display all 6 group sections (Core, Communication, AI & Knowledge, Infrastructure, P2P Network, Security) with their constituent categories. + +#### Scenario: User views settings help +- **WHEN** user runs `lango settings --help` +- **THEN** the output lists Core (Providers, Agent, Server, Session), Communication (Channels, Tools, Multi-Agent, A2A Protocol), AI & Knowledge (Knowledge, Skill, Observational Memory, Embedding & RAG, Graph Store, Librarian), Infrastructure (Payment, Cron Scheduler, Background Tasks, Workflow Engine), P2P Network (P2P Network, P2P ZKP, P2P Pricing, P2P Owner Protection, P2P Sandbox), and Security (Security, Auth, Security Keyring, Security DB Encryption, Security KMS) + +### Requirement: Settings help mentions keyword search +The `lango settings --help` output SHALL mention the `/` key for keyword search across categories. + +#### Scenario: Search feature documented +- **WHEN** user runs `lango settings --help` +- **THEN** the output includes instruction to press `/` to search across all categories by keyword + +### Requirement: Doctor help lists all 14 checks +The `lango doctor --help` output SHALL list all 14 diagnostic checks performed. + +#### Scenario: User views doctor help +- **WHEN** user runs `lango doctor --help` +- **THEN** the output lists all 14 checks: configuration profile validity, AI provider configuration, API key security, channel token validation, session database, server port, security configuration, companion connectivity, observational memory, output scanning, embedding/RAG, graph store, multi-agent, and A2A protocol + +### Requirement: Doctor help documents fix and json flags +The `lango doctor --help` output SHALL describe the `--fix` and `--json` flags in the Long description. + +#### Scenario: Flags documented in description +- **WHEN** user runs `lango doctor --help` +- **THEN** the Long description includes usage guidance for `--fix` (automatic repair) and `--json` (machine-readable output) + +### Requirement: Onboard help reflects current provider list +The `lango onboard --help` output SHALL list all supported providers including GitHub in step 1. + +#### Scenario: GitHub provider listed +- **WHEN** user runs `lango onboard --help` +- **THEN** step 1 lists Anthropic, OpenAI, Gemini, Ollama, and GitHub as provider choices + +### Requirement: Onboard help reflects model auto-fetch +The `lango onboard --help` output SHALL mention that models are auto-fetched from the provider in step 2. + +#### Scenario: Auto-fetch mentioned +- **WHEN** user runs `lango onboard --help` +- **THEN** step 2 description includes that model selection uses auto-fetched models from the provider + +### Requirement: Onboard help reflects approval policy +The `lango onboard --help` output SHALL mention approval policy in step 4. + +#### Scenario: Approval policy mentioned +- **WHEN** user runs `lango onboard --help` +- **THEN** step 4 description includes approval policy alongside privacy interceptor and PII redaction diff --git a/openspec/specs/cli-onboard/spec.md b/openspec/specs/cli-onboard/spec.md index 4222541b..b7eb25d7 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/cli-onboard/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/cli-onboard/spec.md @@ -16,12 +16,15 @@ The onboard wizard SHALL guide users through 5 sequential steps: #### Scenario: Step 1 Provider Setup - **WHEN** user starts the onboard wizard - **THEN** the wizard SHALL display a form with fields: type (select), id (text), apikey (password), baseurl (text) -- **AND** type options SHALL be: anthropic, openai, gemini, ollama +- **AND** type options SHALL be: anthropic, openai, gemini, ollama, github +- **AND** every field SHALL have a non-empty Description for inline help #### Scenario: Step 2 Agent Config - **WHEN** user advances to Step 2 -- **THEN** the wizard SHALL display a form with fields: provider (select), model (text), maxtokens (int), temp (text) -- **AND** provider options SHALL be populated from config.Providers +- **THEN** the wizard SHALL display a form with fields: provider (select), model (text or select), maxtokens (int), temp (text) +- **AND** provider options SHALL be populated from config.Providers, with fallback list including github +- **AND** the model field SHALL attempt auto-fetch via `settings.FetchModelOptions()`; on success it becomes InputSelect, on failure it remains InputText with placeholder +- **AND** every field SHALL have a non-empty Description for inline help #### Scenario: Step 3 Channel Selector - **WHEN** user advances to Step 3 @@ -37,11 +40,33 @@ The onboard wizard SHALL guide users through 5 sequential steps: - **WHEN** user selects Slack from the channel selector - **THEN** the form SHALL display slack_token and slack_app_token password fields -#### Scenario: Step 4 Security form +#### Scenario: Step 2 Temperature validation +- **WHEN** user enters a temperature value +- **THEN** the validator SHALL accept values between 0.0 and 2.0 inclusive +- **AND** SHALL reject non-numeric values and values outside the range + +#### Scenario: Step 2 Max Tokens validation +- **WHEN** user enters a max tokens value +- **THEN** the validator SHALL accept positive integers only +- **AND** SHALL reject zero, negative integers, and non-integer values + +#### Scenario: Step 3 Channel forms descriptions +- **WHEN** user selects any channel (Telegram, Discord, Slack) +- **THEN** every channel form field SHALL have a non-empty Description for inline help + +#### Scenario: Step 4 Security form with conditional visibility - **WHEN** user advances to Step 4 -- **THEN** the wizard SHALL display a form with fields: interceptor_enabled (bool), interceptor_pii (bool), interceptor_policy (select) +- **THEN** the wizard SHALL display interceptor_enabled (bool) with Description +- **AND** interceptor_pii and interceptor_policy SHALL have VisibleWhen tied to interceptor_enabled.Checked +- **AND** when interceptor is disabled, only interceptor_enabled SHALL be visible (1 field) +- **AND** when interceptor is enabled, all 3 fields SHALL be visible +- **AND** interceptor_pii label SHALL be " Redact PII" and interceptor_policy label SHALL be " Approval Policy" (indented) - **AND** policy options SHALL be: dangerous, all, configured, none +#### Scenario: GitHub provider suggestion +- **WHEN** the agent provider is "github" +- **THEN** suggestModel SHALL return "gpt-4o" + #### Scenario: Step 5 Test Results - **WHEN** user advances to Step 5 - **THEN** the wizard SHALL run 5 configuration validation checks: diff --git a/openspec/specs/cli-p2p-management/spec.md b/openspec/specs/cli-p2p-management/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..058fe0b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/cli-p2p-management/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P CLI command group +The system SHALL provide a `lango p2p` command group with subcommands for P2P network management, wired into `cmd/lango/main.go` using the bootstrap Result loader pattern. + +#### Scenario: Root command shows help +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p` +- **THEN** system displays help text listing all available P2P subcommands + +### Requirement: P2P status command +The system SHALL provide `lango p2p status [--json]` that displays node peer ID, listen addresses, connected peer count, max peers, mDNS status, relay status, and ZK handshake status. + +#### Scenario: Status in text format +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p status` +- **THEN** system prints peer ID, listen addrs, connected peers count, and feature flags in human-readable format + +#### Scenario: Status in JSON format +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p status --json` +- **THEN** system outputs a JSON object with fields: peerId, listenAddrs, connectedPeers, maxPeers, mdns, relay, zkHandshake + +### Requirement: P2P peers command +The system SHALL provide `lango p2p peers [--json]` that lists all connected peers with peer ID and remote multiaddrs using tabwriter output. + +#### Scenario: No connected peers +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p peers` with no connected peers +- **THEN** system prints "No connected peers." + +#### Scenario: Connected peers in table format +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p peers` with connected peers +- **THEN** system prints a table with PEER ID and ADDRESS columns + +### Requirement: P2P connect command +The system SHALL provide `lango p2p connect ` that parses the multiaddr, extracts peer info, and connects to the peer via the libp2p host. + +#### Scenario: Successful connection +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p connect /ip4/1.2.3.4/tcp/9000/p2p/QmPeerId` +- **THEN** system connects and prints "Connected to peer QmPeerId" + +#### Scenario: Invalid multiaddr +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p connect invalid-addr` +- **THEN** system returns an error "parse multiaddr: ..." + +### Requirement: P2P disconnect command +The system SHALL provide `lango p2p disconnect ` that closes the connection to the specified peer. + +#### Scenario: Successful disconnection +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p disconnect QmPeerId` +- **THEN** system closes the peer connection and prints "Disconnected from peer QmPeerId" + +### Requirement: P2P firewall command group +The system SHALL provide `lango p2p firewall [list|add|remove]` subcommands for managing knowledge firewall ACL rules. + +#### Scenario: Firewall list shows config rules +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p firewall list` +- **THEN** system displays configured firewall rules in a table with PEER DID, ACTION, TOOLS, and RATE LIMIT columns + +#### Scenario: Firewall add prints runtime-only notice +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p firewall add --peer-did "did:lango:02abc" --action allow` +- **THEN** system prints the rule details and a notice to persist via configuration + +### Requirement: P2P discover command +The system SHALL provide `lango p2p discover [--tag ] [--json]` that creates a GossipService and searches for agents by capability. + +#### Scenario: Discover with tag filter +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p discover --tag research` +- **THEN** system displays agents matching the "research" capability in a table with NAME, DID, CAPABILITIES, and PEER ID columns + +### Requirement: P2P identity command +The system SHALL provide `lango p2p identity [--json]` that displays the local peer ID, key directory, and listen addresses. + +#### Scenario: Identity in text format +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p identity` +- **THEN** system prints peer ID, key directory path, and listen addresses + +### Requirement: P2P disabled error +All P2P CLI commands SHALL return a clear error when `p2p.enabled` is false. + +#### Scenario: P2P not enabled +- **WHEN** user runs any `lango p2p` subcommand with P2P disabled +- **THEN** system returns error "P2P networking is not enabled (set p2p.enabled = true)" diff --git a/openspec/specs/cli-reference/spec.md b/openspec/specs/cli-reference/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3b0a4825 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/cli-reference/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Security extension commands documented in CLI reference +The docs/cli/index.md SHALL include keyring (store/clear/status), db-migrate, db-decrypt, and kms (status/test/keys) commands in the Security table. + +#### Scenario: Security table contains all 13 commands +- **WHEN** a user reads docs/cli/index.md Security section +- **THEN** the table SHALL list 13 security commands including the 8 new extension commands + +### Requirement: P2P Network section in CLI reference +The docs/cli/index.md SHALL include a P2P Network table with all 17 P2P commands (status, peers, connect, disconnect, firewall, discover, identity, reputation, pricing, session, sandbox). + +#### Scenario: P2P table exists between Payment and Automation +- **WHEN** a user reads docs/cli/index.md +- **THEN** a "P2P Network" section SHALL appear with 17 command entries + +### Requirement: Background task commands in CLI reference +The docs/cli/index.md Automation section SHALL include bg list, bg status, bg cancel, and bg result commands. + +#### Scenario: bg commands appear in Automation table +- **WHEN** a user reads the Automation section of docs/cli/index.md +- **THEN** 4 bg commands SHALL be listed after the workflow commands + +### Requirement: README CLI section includes all commands +The README.md CLI Commands section SHALL include security keyring/db/kms commands, p2p session/sandbox commands, and bg commands. + +#### Scenario: README CLI section is complete +- **WHEN** a user reads README.md CLI Commands section +- **THEN** all security extension, p2p session/sandbox, and bg commands SHALL be listed diff --git a/openspec/specs/cli-secrets-management/spec.md b/openspec/specs/cli-secrets-management/spec.md index 3896f2fa..2b08f14c 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/cli-secrets-management/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/cli-secrets-management/spec.md @@ -16,15 +16,23 @@ The system SHALL provide a `lango security secrets list` command that displays m - **THEN** the command outputs a JSON array of secret metadata objects ### Requirement: Secrets set command -The system SHALL provide a `lango security secrets set ` command that stores an encrypted secret. The command SHALL require an interactive terminal and prompt for the secret value using hidden input. The name SHALL be a positional argument. +The system SHALL provide a `lango security secrets set ` command that stores an encrypted secret value either interactively (via passphrase prompt) or non-interactively (via `--value-hex` flag). When `--value-hex` is provided, the command SHALL hex-decode the input (stripping an optional `0x` prefix) and store the raw bytes. When `--value-hex` is not provided, the command SHALL require an interactive terminal and prompt for the value. The name SHALL be a positional argument. -#### Scenario: Store a secret -- **WHEN** user runs `lango security secrets set api-key` in an interactive terminal +#### Scenario: Interactive secret storage +- **WHEN** user runs `lango security secrets set api-key` in an interactive terminal without `--value-hex` - **THEN** the command prompts for the secret value with hidden input, encrypts it, stores it, and displays a success message -#### Scenario: Non-interactive terminal -- **WHEN** user runs `lango security secrets set api-key` in a non-interactive terminal -- **THEN** the command exits with an error indicating an interactive terminal is required +#### Scenario: Non-interactive hex secret storage +- **WHEN** user runs `lango security secrets set wallet.privatekey --value-hex 0xac0974...` in a non-interactive environment +- **THEN** the command SHALL hex-decode the value (stripping `0x` prefix), store the raw bytes encrypted, and print success + +#### Scenario: Non-interactive without value-hex flag +- **WHEN** user runs `lango security secrets set api-key` in a non-interactive terminal without `--value-hex` +- **THEN** the command exits with an error suggesting `--value-hex` for non-interactive use + +#### Scenario: Invalid hex value +- **WHEN** user runs `lango security secrets set mykey --value-hex "not-hex"` +- **THEN** the command SHALL return a hex decode error #### Scenario: Update existing secret - **WHEN** user runs `lango security secrets set api-key` for a name that already exists diff --git a/openspec/specs/cli-settings/spec.md b/openspec/specs/cli-settings/spec.md index 94a018f9..9942f15a 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/cli-settings/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/cli-settings/spec.md @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ The settings editor SHALL support editing all configuration sections: 4. **Channels** — Telegram, Discord, Slack enable/disable + tokens 5. **Tools** — Exec timeout, Browser, Filesystem limits 6. **Session** — TTL, Max history turns -7. **Security** — Interceptor (PII, policy, timeout, tools), Signer (provider, RPC, KeyID) +7. **Security** — Interceptor (PII, policy, timeout, tools), Signer (provider incl. aws-kms/gcp-kms/azure-kv/pkcs11, RPC, KeyID) 8. **Auth** — OIDC provider management (add, edit, delete) 9. **Knowledge** — Enabled, max context per layer, auto approve skills, max skills per day 10. **Skill** — Enabled, skills directory @@ -26,13 +26,25 @@ The settings editor SHALL support editing all configuration sections: 18. **Background Tasks** — Enabled, yield time, max concurrent tasks 19. **Workflow Engine** — Enabled, max concurrent steps, default timeout, state directory 20. **Librarian** — Enabled, observation threshold, inquiry cooldown, max inquiries, auto-save confidence, provider, model +21. **P2P Network** — Enabled, listen addrs, bootstrap peers, relay, mDNS, max peers, handshake timeout, session token TTL, auto-approve, gossip interval, ZK handshake/attestation, signed challenge, min trust score +22. **P2P ZKP** — Proof cache dir, proving scheme, SRS mode/path, max credential age +23. **P2P Pricing** — Enabled, per query price, tool-specific prices +24. **P2P Owner Protection** — Owner name/email/phone, extra terms, block conversations +25. **P2P Sandbox** — Tool isolation (enabled, timeout, memory), container sandbox (runtime, image, network, rootfs, CPU, pool) +26. **Security Keyring** — OS keyring enabled +27. **Security DB Encryption** — SQLCipher enabled, cipher page size +28. **Security KMS** — Region, key ID, endpoint, fallback, timeout, retries, Azure vault/version, PKCS#11 module/slot/PIN/key label #### Scenario: Menu categories - **WHEN** user launches `lango settings` -- **THEN** the menu SHALL display categories in order: Providers, Agent, Server, Channels, Tools, Session, Security, Auth, Knowledge, Skill, Observational Memory, Embedding & RAG, Graph Store, Multi-Agent, A2A Protocol, Payment, Cron Scheduler, Background Tasks, Workflow Engine, Librarian, Save & Exit, Cancel +- **THEN** the menu SHALL display all categories including P2P Network, P2P ZKP, P2P Pricing, P2P Owner Protection, P2P Sandbox, Security Keyring, Security DB Encryption, Security KMS, grouped under "P2P Network" and "Security" sections in order: Providers, Agent, Server, Channels, Tools, Session, Security, Auth, Knowledge, Skill, Observational Memory, Embedding & RAG, Graph Store, Multi-Agent, A2A Protocol, Payment, Cron Scheduler, Background Tasks, Workflow Engine, Librarian, P2P Network, P2P ZKP, P2P Pricing, P2P Owner Protection, P2P Sandbox, Security Keyring, Security DB Encryption, Security KMS, Save & Exit, Cancel + +#### Scenario: Provider form includes github +- **WHEN** user opens the provider add/edit form +- **THEN** the Type select field options SHALL include "github" alongside openai, anthropic, gemini, and ollama ### Requirement: User Interface -The settings editor SHALL provide menu-based navigation with categories, free navigation between categories, and shared `tuicore.FormModel` for all forms. Provider and OIDC provider list views SHALL support managing collections. +The settings editor SHALL provide menu-based navigation with categories, free navigation between categories, and shared `tuicore.FormModel` for all forms. Provider and OIDC provider list views SHALL support managing collections. Pressing Esc at StepMenu SHALL navigate back to StepWelcome instead of quitting the TUI. The help bar at StepMenu SHALL display "Back" for the Esc key. #### Scenario: Launch settings - **WHEN** user runs `lango settings` @@ -42,6 +54,26 @@ The settings editor SHALL provide menu-based navigation with categories, free na - **WHEN** user selects "Save & Exit" from the menu - **THEN** the configuration SHALL be saved as an encrypted profile +#### Scenario: Esc at Welcome screen quits +- **WHEN** user presses Esc at the Welcome screen (StepWelcome) +- **THEN** the TUI SHALL quit + +#### Scenario: Esc at Menu navigates back to Welcome +- **WHEN** user presses Esc at the settings menu (StepMenu) while not in search mode +- **THEN** the editor SHALL navigate back to StepWelcome without quitting + +#### Scenario: Esc at Menu during search cancels search +- **WHEN** user presses Esc at the settings menu while search mode is active +- **THEN** the search SHALL be cancelled and the menu SHALL remain at StepMenu + +#### Scenario: Ctrl+C always quits +- **WHEN** user presses Ctrl+C at any step +- **THEN** the TUI SHALL quit immediately with Cancelled flag set + +#### Scenario: Menu help bar shows Back for Esc +- **WHEN** the settings menu is displayed in normal mode (not searching) +- **THEN** the help bar SHALL display "Back" as the label for the Esc key + ### Requirement: Skill configuration form The settings editor SHALL provide a Skill configuration form with the following fields: - **Enabled** (`skill_enabled`) — Boolean toggle for enabling the file-based skill system @@ -176,3 +208,388 @@ The ConfigState.UpdateConfigFromForm SHALL map the new PII form keys to their co #### Scenario: Update Presidio enabled - **WHEN** form field "presidio_enabled" is checked - **THEN** config Presidio.Enabled SHALL be true + +### Requirement: Security form signer provider options +The Security form's signer provider dropdown SHALL include options for all supported providers: local, rpc, enclave, aws-kms, gcp-kms, azure-kv, pkcs11. + +#### Scenario: KMS providers available in signer dropdown +- **WHEN** user opens the Security form +- **THEN** the signer provider dropdown SHALL include "aws-kms", "gcp-kms", "azure-kv", and "pkcs11" as options + +### Requirement: P2P Network settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P Network" form with 14 fields covering core P2P networking: enabled, listen addresses, bootstrap peers, relay, mDNS, max peers, handshake timeout, session token TTL, auto-approve known peers, gossip interval, ZK handshake, ZK attestation, require signed challenge, and min trust score. + +#### Scenario: User enables P2P networking +- **WHEN** user navigates to "P2P Network" and sets Enabled to true +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.enabled` field SHALL be set to true upon save + +#### Scenario: User sets listen addresses +- **WHEN** user enters comma-separated multiaddrs in "Listen Addresses" +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.listenAddrs` SHALL contain each address as a separate array element + +### Requirement: P2P ZKP settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P ZKP" form with fields for proof cache directory, proving scheme (plonk/groth16), SRS mode (unsafe/file), SRS path, and max credential age. + +#### Scenario: User selects groth16 proving scheme +- **WHEN** user selects "groth16" from the proving scheme dropdown +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.zkp.provingScheme` SHALL be set to "groth16" + +### Requirement: P2P Pricing settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P Pricing" form with fields for enabled, price per query, and tool-specific prices (as key:value comma-separated text). + +#### Scenario: User sets tool prices +- **WHEN** user enters "exec:0.10,browser:0.50" in the Tool Prices field +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.pricing.toolPrices` SHALL be a map with keys "exec" and "browser" + +### Requirement: P2P Owner Protection settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P Owner Protection" form with fields for owner name, email, phone, extra terms, and block conversations. The block conversations field SHALL default to checked when the config value is nil. + +#### Scenario: User sets block conversations with nil default +- **WHEN** the config's `blockConversations` is nil +- **THEN** the form SHALL display the checkbox as checked (default true) + +#### Scenario: User unchecks block conversations +- **WHEN** user unchecks "Block Conversations" +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.ownerProtection.blockConversations` SHALL be a pointer to false + +### Requirement: P2P Sandbox settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P Sandbox" form with fields for tool isolation (enabled, timeout, max memory) and container sandbox (enabled, runtime, image, network mode, read-only rootfs, CPU quota, pool size, pool idle timeout). Container-specific fields SHALL only be visible when Container Sandbox is enabled. + +#### Scenario: User configures container sandbox +- **WHEN** user enables container sandbox and selects "docker" runtime +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.toolIsolation.container.enabled` SHALL be true and `runtime` SHALL be "docker" + +#### Scenario: Container read-only rootfs defaults to true +- **WHEN** the config's `readOnlyRootfs` is nil +- **THEN** the form SHALL display the checkbox as checked (default true) + +### Requirement: Security Keyring settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "Security Keyring" form with a single field for OS keyring enabled/disabled. + +#### Scenario: User enables keyring +- **WHEN** user checks "OS Keyring Enabled" +- **THEN** the config's `security.keyring.enabled` SHALL be set to true + +### Requirement: Security DB Encryption settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "Security DB Encryption" form with fields for SQLCipher encryption enabled and cipher page size. + +#### Scenario: User enables DB encryption +- **WHEN** user checks "SQLCipher Encryption" and sets page size to 4096 +- **THEN** the config SHALL have `security.dbEncryption.enabled` true and `cipherPageSize` 4096 + +#### Scenario: Cipher page size validation +- **WHEN** user enters 0 or a negative number for cipher page size +- **THEN** the form SHALL display a validation error "must be a positive integer" + +### Requirement: Security KMS settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "Security KMS" form with conditional field visibility based on the selected backend. Cloud KMS fields (region, endpoint) appear for aws-kms/gcp-kms/azure-kv. Azure-specific fields appear for azure-kv. PKCS#11 fields appear for pkcs11. Common fields (key ID, fallback, timeout, retries) appear for all non-local backends. + +#### Scenario: User configures AWS KMS +- **WHEN** user selects "aws-kms" and enters region and key ARN +- **THEN** the config's `security.kms.region` and `security.kms.keyId` SHALL contain the entered values + +#### Scenario: PKCS#11 PIN is password field +- **WHEN** the KMS form is displayed with pkcs11 backend selected +- **THEN** the PKCS#11 PIN field SHALL use InputPassword type to mask the value + +#### Scenario: Local backend hides KMS fields +- **WHEN** user selects "local" as the KMS backend +- **THEN** all KMS-specific fields SHALL be hidden + +### Requirement: Grouped Section Layout +The settings menu SHALL organize categories into named sections. Each section SHALL have a title header rendered above its categories with a visual separator line between sections. + +The sections SHALL be, in order: +1. **Core** — Providers, Agent, Server, Session +2. **Communication** — Channels, Tools, Multi-Agent, A2A Protocol +3. **AI & Knowledge** — Knowledge, Skill, Observational Memory, Embedding & RAG, Graph Store, Librarian +4. **Infrastructure** — Payment, Cron Scheduler, Background Tasks, Workflow Engine +5. **P2P Network** — P2P Network, P2P ZKP, P2P Pricing, P2P Owner Protection, P2P Sandbox +6. **Security** — Security, Auth, Security Keyring, Security DB Encryption, Security KMS +7. *(untitled)* — Save & Exit, Cancel + +#### Scenario: Section headers displayed +- **WHEN** user views the settings menu in normal (non-search) mode +- **THEN** named section headers SHALL be rendered above each group of categories with separator lines between sections + +#### Scenario: Flat cursor across sections +- **WHEN** user navigates with arrow keys +- **THEN** the cursor SHALL move through all categories across sections as a flat list, skipping section headers + +### Requirement: Keyword Search +The settings menu SHALL support real-time keyword search to filter categories. + +#### Scenario: Activate search +- **WHEN** user presses `/` in normal mode +- **THEN** the menu SHALL enter search mode, display a focused text input with `/ ` prompt and "Type to search..." placeholder, and reset the cursor to 0 + +#### Scenario: Filter categories +- **WHEN** user types a search query +- **THEN** the menu SHALL filter categories by case-insensitive substring match against title, description, and ID, updating results in real-time + +#### Scenario: Empty search query +- **WHEN** the search input is empty or whitespace-only +- **THEN** all categories SHALL be displayed (no filtering) + +#### Scenario: No results +- **WHEN** the search query matches no categories +- **THEN** the menu SHALL display "No matching items" in muted italic text + +#### Scenario: Select from search results +- **WHEN** user presses Enter during search mode +- **THEN** the selected filtered category SHALL be activated, search mode SHALL exit, and the search input SHALL be cleared + +#### Scenario: Cancel search +- **WHEN** user presses Esc during search mode +- **THEN** search mode SHALL be cancelled, the filtered list SHALL be cleared, and the full grouped menu SHALL be restored + +#### Scenario: Navigate search results +- **WHEN** user presses up/down (or shift+tab/tab) during search mode +- **THEN** the cursor SHALL move within the filtered results list + +### Requirement: Search Match Highlighting +The settings menu SHALL highlight matching substrings in search results. + +#### Scenario: Highlight matching text +- **WHEN** categories are displayed during an active search with a non-empty query +- **THEN** the first matching substring in each category's title and description SHALL be rendered in amber/warning color with bold styling + +#### Scenario: Selected item highlight +- **WHEN** the cursor is on a filtered category during search +- **THEN** the matching substring SHALL additionally be underlined + +### Requirement: Search Help Bar +The help bar SHALL update based on the current mode. + +#### Scenario: Normal mode help bar +- **WHEN** the menu is in normal mode +- **THEN** the help bar SHALL display: Navigate, Select, Search (`/`), Back (`Esc`) + +#### Scenario: Search mode help bar +- **WHEN** the menu is in search mode +- **THEN** the help bar SHALL display: Navigate, Select, Cancel (`Esc`) + +### Requirement: Breadcrumb navigation in settings editor +The settings editor SHALL display a breadcrumb navigation header that reflects the current editor step. The breadcrumb SHALL use `tui.Breadcrumb()` with the following segments per step: +- **StepWelcome / StepMenu**: "Settings" +- **StepForm**: "Settings" > form title (from `activeForm.Title`) +- **StepProvidersList**: "Settings" > "Providers" +- **StepAuthProvidersList**: "Settings" > "Auth Providers" + +The last breadcrumb segment SHALL be rendered in `Primary` color with bold weight. Preceding segments SHALL be rendered in `Muted` color. Segments SHALL be separated by " > " in `Dim` color. + +#### Scenario: Breadcrumb at menu +- **WHEN** user is at StepMenu +- **THEN** the breadcrumb SHALL display "Settings" as a single segment + +#### Scenario: Breadcrumb at form +- **WHEN** user is editing the Agent form (StepForm) +- **THEN** the breadcrumb SHALL display "Settings > Agent Configuration" + +#### Scenario: Breadcrumb at providers list +- **WHEN** user is at StepProvidersList +- **THEN** the breadcrumb SHALL display "Settings > Providers" + +### Requirement: Styled containers for menu and list views +The settings menu body, providers list body, and auth providers list body SHALL each be wrapped in a `lipgloss.RoundedBorder()` container with `tui.Muted` border color and padding `(0, 1)`. The welcome screen SHALL be wrapped in a `lipgloss.RoundedBorder()` container with `tui.Primary` border color and padding `(1, 3)`. + +#### Scenario: Menu container +- **WHEN** user is at StepMenu +- **THEN** the menu items SHALL be rendered inside a rounded-border container + +#### Scenario: Welcome container +- **WHEN** user is at StepWelcome +- **THEN** the welcome message SHALL be rendered inside a primary-colored rounded-border box + +### Requirement: Help bars in all interactive views +Every interactive settings view SHALL display a help bar at the bottom using `tui.HelpBar()` with `tui.HelpEntry()` badges. The help bars SHALL contain: +- **Welcome**: Enter (Start), Esc (Quit) +- **Menu (normal)**: up/down (Navigate), Enter (Select), / (Search), Esc (Back) +- **Menu (searching)**: up/down (Navigate), Enter (Select), Esc (Cancel) +- **Providers list**: up/down (Navigate), Enter (Select), d (Delete), Esc (Back) +- **Auth providers list**: up/down (Navigate), Enter (Select), d (Delete), Esc (Back) + +#### Scenario: Menu help bar in normal mode +- **WHEN** user is at StepMenu in normal mode (not searching) +- **THEN** the help bar SHALL show Navigate, Select, Search, and Back entries + +#### Scenario: Menu help bar in search mode +- **WHEN** user is at StepMenu in search mode +- **THEN** the help bar SHALL show Navigate, Select, and Cancel entries + +### Requirement: Design system tokens in tui package +The `internal/cli/tui/styles.go` file SHALL export the following design tokens: +- **Colors**: `Primary` (#7C3AED), `Success` (#10B981), `Warning` (#F59E0B), `Error` (#EF4444), `Muted` (#6B7280), `Foreground` (#F9FAFB), `Background` (#1F2937), `Highlight` (#3B82F6), `Accent` (#04B575), `Dim` (#626262), `Separator` (#374151) +- **Styles**: `TitleStyle`, `SubtitleStyle`, `SuccessStyle`, `WarningStyle`, `ErrorStyle`, `MutedStyle`, `HighlightStyle`, `BoxStyle`, `ListItemStyle`, `SelectedItemStyle`, `SectionHeaderStyle`, `SeparatorLineStyle`, `CursorStyle`, `ActiveItemStyle`, `SearchBarStyle`, `FormTitleBarStyle`, `FieldDescStyle` +- **Functions**: `Breadcrumb(segments ...string)`, `HelpEntry(key, label string)`, `HelpBar(entries ...string)`, `KeyBadge(key string)`, `FormatPass(msg)`, `FormatWarn(msg)`, `FormatFail(msg)`, `FormatMuted(msg)` + +#### Scenario: Breadcrumb rendering +- **WHEN** `tui.Breadcrumb("Settings", "Agent")` is called +- **THEN** the result SHALL be "Settings" in muted color, " > " separator in dim color, and "Agent" in primary bold + +#### Scenario: HelpEntry rendering +- **WHEN** `tui.HelpEntry("Esc", "Back")` is called +- **THEN** the result SHALL be a key badge with "Esc" followed by "Back" label in dim color + +### Requirement: Inline field descriptions +All settings form fields SHALL include a `Description` string providing human-readable guidance. The description SHALL be shown only when the field is focused. + +#### Scenario: Description displayed on focus +- **WHEN** the user navigates to a field with a Description +- **THEN** the form SHALL render the description text below that field + +#### Scenario: Description hidden when not focused +- **WHEN** the user moves focus away from a field +- **THEN** the description for that field SHALL no longer be rendered + +### Requirement: Field input validation +Numeric and range-sensitive fields SHALL have `Validate` functions that return clear error messages. + +#### Scenario: Temperature validation +- **WHEN** the user enters a value outside 0.0-2.0 for the Temperature field +- **THEN** the validator SHALL return "must be between 0.0 and 2.0" + +#### Scenario: Port validation +- **WHEN** the user enters a value outside 1-65535 for the Port field +- **THEN** the validator SHALL return "port out of range" + +#### Scenario: Positive integer validation +- **WHEN** the user enters a non-positive value for fields requiring positive integers (Max Read Size, Max History Turns, Knowledge Max Context, Max Concurrent Jobs, Max Concurrent Tasks, Max Concurrent Steps, Max Peers, Observation Threshold, Max Bulk Import, Import Concurrency) +- **THEN** the validator SHALL return "must be a positive integer" + +#### Scenario: Non-negative integer validation +- **WHEN** the user enters a negative value for fields allowing zero (Yield Time, Max Reflections in Context, Max Observations in Context, Inquiry Cooldown, Max Pending Inquiries, Approval Timeout, Embedding Dimensions, RAG Max Results) +- **THEN** the validator SHALL return "must be a non-negative integer" (with optional "(0 = unlimited)" suffix where applicable) + +#### Scenario: Float range validation +- **WHEN** the user enters a value outside 0.0-1.0 for Min Trust Score +- **THEN** the validator SHALL return "must be between 0.0 and 1.0" + +### Requirement: Auto-fetch model options from provider API +Form builders for Agent, Observational Memory, Embedding, and Librarian SHALL attempt to fetch available models from the configured provider API at form creation time. + +#### Scenario: Successful model fetch +- **WHEN** the provider API returns a list of models within the 15-second timeout +- **THEN** the model field SHALL be converted from InputText to InputSearchSelect with the fetched models as options, and the current model SHALL always be included + +#### Scenario: Failed model fetch with error feedback +- **WHEN** the provider API fails, times out, or returns empty +- **THEN** the model field SHALL remain as InputText and the description SHALL show the failure reason + +#### Scenario: Embedding model field with filtered models +- **WHEN** the Embedding form fetches models +- **THEN** FetchEmbeddingModelOptions SHALL filter for embedding-pattern models ("embed", "embedding") and fall back to full list if no matches + +#### Scenario: Esc key with open dropdown in form +- **WHEN** user presses Esc while a search-select dropdown is open in StepForm +- **THEN** editor passes Esc to form (closes dropdown) instead of exiting the form + +#### Scenario: Agent form model fetch +- **WHEN** the Agent form is created and the configured provider has a valid API key +- **THEN** the Model ID field SHALL be populated with models from `FetchModelOptions(cfg.Agent.Provider, ...)` + +#### Scenario: Observational Memory model fetch with provider inheritance +- **WHEN** the Observational Memory form is created with an empty provider +- **THEN** the model fetch SHALL use the Agent provider as fallback + +#### Scenario: Librarian model fetch with provider inheritance +- **WHEN** the Librarian form is created with an empty provider +- **THEN** the model fetch SHALL use the Agent provider as fallback + +#### Scenario: Embedding model fetch +- **WHEN** the Embedding form is created with a non-empty provider +- **THEN** the Model field SHALL attempt to fetch models from the embedding provider + +### Requirement: Unified embedding provider field +The Embedding & RAG form SHALL use a single "Provider" field (key `emb_provider_id`) mapped to `cfg.Embedding.Provider`. The state update handler SHALL clear the deprecated `cfg.Embedding.ProviderID` field when saving. + +#### Scenario: Embedding form shows single provider field +- **WHEN** the user opens the Embedding & RAG form +- **THEN** the form SHALL display one "Provider" select field, not separate Provider and ProviderID fields + +#### Scenario: State update clears deprecated ProviderID +- **WHEN** the `emb_provider_id` field is saved via UpdateConfigFromForm +- **THEN** `cfg.Embedding.Provider` SHALL be set to the value AND `cfg.Embedding.ProviderID` SHALL be set to empty string + +### Requirement: Conditional field visibility in channel forms +Channel token fields SHALL be visible only when the parent channel is enabled. + +#### Scenario: Telegram token hidden when disabled +- **WHEN** the Telegram Enabled toggle is unchecked +- **THEN** the Telegram Bot Token field SHALL be hidden + +#### Scenario: Telegram token shown when enabled +- **WHEN** the user checks the Telegram Enabled toggle +- **THEN** the Telegram Bot Token field SHALL become visible + +#### Scenario: Discord token visibility +- **WHEN** the Discord Enabled toggle is toggled +- **THEN** the Discord Bot Token field visibility SHALL match the toggle state + +#### Scenario: Slack token visibility +- **WHEN** the Slack Enabled toggle is toggled +- **THEN** the Slack Bot Token and App Token fields visibility SHALL match the toggle state + +### Requirement: Conditional visibility in security form +Security sub-fields SHALL be visible only when their parent toggle is enabled. + +#### Scenario: PII fields hidden when interceptor disabled +- **WHEN** the Privacy Interceptor toggle is unchecked +- **THEN** all interceptor sub-fields (Redact PII, Approval Policy, Timeout, Notify Channel, Sensitive Tools, Exempt Tools, Disabled PII Patterns, Custom PII Patterns, Presidio) SHALL be hidden + +#### Scenario: Presidio detail fields nested under both interceptor and presidio +- **WHEN** the interceptor is enabled but Presidio is disabled +- **THEN** the Presidio URL and Presidio Language fields SHALL be hidden + +#### Scenario: Presidio fields visible when both enabled +- **WHEN** both the Privacy Interceptor and Presidio toggles are checked +- **THEN** the Presidio URL and Presidio Language fields SHALL be visible + +#### Scenario: Signer Key ID visibility based on provider +- **WHEN** the signer provider is "local" or "enclave" +- **THEN** the Key ID field SHALL be hidden + +#### Scenario: Signer RPC URL visibility +- **WHEN** the signer provider is "rpc" +- **THEN** the RPC URL field SHALL be visible + +### Requirement: Conditional visibility in P2P sandbox form +P2P container sandbox fields SHALL be visible only when the container sandbox is enabled. + +#### Scenario: Container fields hidden when container disabled +- **WHEN** the Container Sandbox Enabled toggle is unchecked +- **THEN** container-specific fields (Runtime, Image, Network Mode, Read-Only RootFS, CPU Quota, Pool Size, Pool Idle Timeout) SHALL be hidden + +### Requirement: Conditional visibility in KMS form +KMS backend-specific fields SHALL be visible based on the selected backend type. + +#### Scenario: Azure fields visible for azure-kv backend +- **WHEN** the KMS backend is "azure-kv" +- **THEN** the Azure Vault URL and Azure Key Version fields SHALL be visible + +#### Scenario: PKCS11 fields visible for pkcs11 backend +- **WHEN** the KMS backend is "pkcs11" +- **THEN** the PKCS11 Module Path, Slot ID, PIN, and Key Label fields SHALL be visible + +### Requirement: Model Fetcher API +The settings package SHALL export `FetchModelOptions` and `NewProviderFromConfig` as public functions so other CLI packages (e.g., onboard) can reuse model auto-fetch logic. + +#### Scenario: Exported function availability +- **WHEN** another package imports the settings package +- **THEN** `settings.FetchModelOptions(providerID, cfg, currentModel)` SHALL be callable +- **AND** `settings.NewProviderFromConfig(id, pCfg)` SHALL be callable + +### Requirement: Model fetcher provider support +The `NewProviderFromConfig` function SHALL support creating lightweight provider instances for: OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini/Google, Ollama (via OpenAI-compatible endpoint), and GitHub (via OpenAI-compatible endpoint). + +#### Scenario: Ollama default base URL +- **WHEN** creating an Ollama provider with empty BaseURL +- **THEN** the base URL SHALL default to "http://localhost:11434/v1" + +#### Scenario: GitHub default base URL +- **WHEN** creating a GitHub provider with empty BaseURL +- **THEN** the base URL SHALL default to "https://models.inference.ai.azure.com" + +#### Scenario: Provider without API key +- **WHEN** creating a non-Ollama provider with empty API key +- **THEN** `NewProviderFromConfig` SHALL return nil diff --git a/openspec/specs/cli-tuicore/spec.md b/openspec/specs/cli-tuicore/spec.md index f11280ec..8a62c4c2 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/cli-tuicore/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/cli-tuicore/spec.md @@ -25,6 +25,28 @@ The form model SHALL: - Render with title, field labels, and help footer - Call OnCancel on Esc +### FormModel cursor navigation +The form cursor SHALL index into `VisibleFields()` instead of the full `Fields` slice. After any input event (including bool toggles that may change visibility), the cursor SHALL be clamped to `[0, len(visible)-1]`. + +#### Scenario: Cursor clamp after visibility change +- **WHEN** the user is on the last visible field and toggles a bool that hides fields below +- **THEN** the cursor SHALL be clamped so it does not exceed the new visible field count + +#### Scenario: Cursor re-evaluated after toggle +- **WHEN** the user toggles a bool field (space key) +- **THEN** the form SHALL re-evaluate `VisibleFields()` and clamp the cursor before processing further input + +### FormModel View renders description +The form View SHALL render the `Description` of the currently focused field below that field's input widget, styled with `tui.FieldDescStyle`. + +#### Scenario: Focused field description displayed +- **WHEN** the form View is rendered and field at cursor has a non-empty Description +- **THEN** the view SHALL include a line with the description text below that field + +#### Scenario: No description for unfocused fields +- **WHEN** a field is not focused +- **THEN** its Description SHALL not be rendered in the View output + ### ConfigState The config state SHALL: - Hold current `*config.Config` and dirty field tracking @@ -72,3 +94,59 @@ The `UpdateConfigFromForm` method SHALL map the following field keys to config p #### Scenario: Apply workflow form values - **WHEN** a form containing workflow fields is processed by `UpdateConfigFromForm` - **THEN** the values SHALL be written to the corresponding `config.Workflow` fields + +### Field Description property +The `Field` struct SHALL include a `Description string` property for inline help text. + +#### Scenario: Description stored on field +- **WHEN** a Field is created with a Description value +- **THEN** the Description SHALL be accessible on the field instance + +### VisibleWhen conditional visibility +The `Field` struct SHALL include a `VisibleWhen func() bool` property. When non-nil, the field is shown only when the function returns true. When nil, the field is always visible. + +#### Scenario: VisibleWhen nil means always visible +- **WHEN** a Field has `VisibleWhen` set to nil +- **THEN** `IsVisible()` SHALL return true + +#### Scenario: VisibleWhen returns false hides field +- **WHEN** a Field has `VisibleWhen` returning false +- **THEN** `IsVisible()` SHALL return false and the field SHALL not appear in `VisibleFields()` + +#### Scenario: VisibleWhen dynamically responds to state +- **WHEN** a VisibleWhen closure captures a pointer to a parent field's Checked state +- **THEN** toggling the parent field SHALL immediately affect the child field's visibility on next `VisibleFields()` call + +### IsVisible method on Field +The `Field` struct SHALL expose an `IsVisible() bool` method that returns true when `VisibleWhen` is nil, and the result of `VisibleWhen()` otherwise. + +### VisibleFields on FormModel +`FormModel` SHALL expose a `VisibleFields() []*Field` method that returns only fields where `IsVisible()` returns true. + +#### Scenario: VisibleFields filters hidden fields +- **WHEN** a form has 5 fields and 2 have VisibleWhen returning false +- **THEN** VisibleFields() SHALL return 3 fields + +### Requirement: InputSearchSelect field type in form model +The FormModel MUST support InputSearchSelect as a field type with dedicated state management. + +#### Scenario: Field initialization +- **WHEN** AddField is called with InputSearchSelect type +- **THEN** TextInput is initialized with search placeholder, FilteredOptions copies Options + +#### Scenario: HasOpenDropdown query +- **WHEN** any field has SelectOpen == true +- **THEN** HasOpenDropdown() returns true + +#### Scenario: Context-dependent help bar +- **WHEN** a dropdown is open +- **THEN** help bar shows dropdown-specific keys (↑↓ Navigate, Enter Select, Esc Close, Type Filter) +- **WHEN** no dropdown is open +- **THEN** help bar shows form-level keys including Enter Search + +### Embedding ProviderID deprecation in state update +The `UpdateConfigFromForm` case for `emb_provider_id` SHALL set `cfg.Embedding.Provider` to the value AND clear `cfg.Embedding.ProviderID` to empty string. + +#### Scenario: emb_provider_id clears deprecated field +- **WHEN** UpdateConfigFromForm processes key "emb_provider_id" with value "openai" +- **THEN** `cfg.Embedding.Provider` SHALL be "openai" AND `cfg.Embedding.ProviderID` SHALL be "" diff --git a/openspec/specs/cloud-kms/spec.md b/openspec/specs/cloud-kms/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fe6a6514 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/cloud-kms/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +## Purpose + +Cloud KMS and HSM backend integration for the CryptoProvider interface. Provides build-tag-isolated implementations for AWS KMS, GCP KMS, Azure Key Vault, and PKCS#11, with retry logic, health checking, and CLI management. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: KMS Provider Factory +The system SHALL provide a `NewKMSProvider(providerName, kmsConfig)` factory that dispatches to the correct KMS backend based on provider name. Supported names: `aws-kms`, `gcp-kms`, `azure-kv`, `pkcs11`. + +#### Scenario: Valid provider name +- **WHEN** `NewKMSProvider("aws-kms", validConfig)` is called with a compiled build tag +- **THEN** the factory returns an initialized `CryptoProvider` and nil error + +#### Scenario: Unknown provider name +- **WHEN** `NewKMSProvider("unknown", config)` is called +- **THEN** the factory returns an error containing the unknown name and lists supported providers + +#### Scenario: Provider not compiled +- **WHEN** `NewKMSProvider("aws-kms", config)` is called without the `kms_aws` build tag +- **THEN** the stub returns an error indicating the provider was not compiled and which build tag is needed + +### Requirement: Build Tag Isolation +Each KMS provider SHALL be gated behind build tags. The default build (no tags) SHALL compile successfully using stub files that return descriptive errors. Build tags: `kms_aws`, `kms_gcp`, `kms_azure`, `kms_pkcs11`, `kms_all`. + +#### Scenario: Default build without tags +- **WHEN** `go build ./...` is run without any KMS build tags +- **THEN** the project compiles successfully using stub implementations + +#### Scenario: Build with kms_all tag +- **WHEN** `go build -tags kms_all ./...` is run +- **THEN** all four KMS providers are compiled into the binary + +### Requirement: Transient Error Retry +KMS operations SHALL be retried with exponential backoff (100ms base, doubled each attempt) for transient errors. Only errors classified as `ErrKMSUnavailable` or `ErrKMSThrottled` SHALL be retried. + +#### Scenario: Transient error succeeds on retry +- **WHEN** a KMS operation returns `ErrKMSThrottled` on the first attempt +- **AND** succeeds on the second attempt +- **THEN** the operation returns success + +#### Scenario: Non-transient error not retried +- **WHEN** a KMS operation returns `ErrKMSAccessDenied` +- **THEN** the error is returned immediately without retry + +#### Scenario: Retries exhausted +- **WHEN** a KMS operation returns transient errors for all configured retry attempts +- **THEN** the last error is returned + +### Requirement: KMS Health Checker +The system SHALL provide a `KMSHealthChecker` implementing `ConnectionChecker` that probes KMS availability via encrypt/decrypt roundtrip. Results SHALL be cached for 30 seconds. + +#### Scenario: KMS reachable +- **WHEN** the health checker probes and the roundtrip succeeds +- **THEN** `IsConnected()` returns true + +#### Scenario: KMS unreachable with cache +- **WHEN** the last probe failed less than 30 seconds ago +- **THEN** `IsConnected()` returns the cached false result without re-probing + +### Requirement: KMS Error Classification +Each KMS provider SHALL classify cloud-specific errors into sentinel error types: `ErrKMSUnavailable`, `ErrKMSAccessDenied`, `ErrKMSKeyDisabled`, `ErrKMSThrottled`, `ErrKMSInvalidKey`. Errors SHALL be wrapped in `KMSError` with Provider, Op, KeyID context. + +#### Scenario: AWS access denied +- **WHEN** AWS KMS returns `AccessDeniedException` +- **THEN** the error wraps `ErrKMSAccessDenied` and includes provider="aws", operation, and key ID + +#### Scenario: GCP throttled +- **WHEN** GCP KMS returns gRPC `ResourceExhausted` status +- **THEN** the error wraps `ErrKMSThrottled` + +### Requirement: AWS KMS Provider +The AWS KMS provider SHALL implement `CryptoProvider` using `aws-sdk-go-v2/service/kms`. Sign uses `ECDSA_SHA_256` with `MessageType: RAW`. Encrypt/Decrypt use `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT`. Authentication uses SDK default credential chain. + +#### Scenario: Encrypt and decrypt roundtrip +- **WHEN** data is encrypted with `Encrypt()` then decrypted with `Decrypt()` +- **THEN** the original plaintext is recovered + +#### Scenario: Key alias resolution +- **WHEN** `keyID` is "local" or "default" +- **THEN** the configured default key ID is used + +### Requirement: GCP KMS Provider +The GCP KMS provider SHALL implement `CryptoProvider` using `cloud.google.com/go/kms/apiv1`. Sign uses `AsymmetricSign` with SHA-256 digest. Encrypt/Decrypt use symmetric operations. Authentication uses Application Default Credentials. + +#### Scenario: Sign with SHA-256 digest +- **WHEN** `Sign()` is called with a payload +- **THEN** the payload is SHA-256 hashed before sending to GCP AsymmetricSign + +### Requirement: Azure Key Vault Provider +The Azure KV provider SHALL implement `CryptoProvider` using `azkeys`. Sign uses ES256. Encrypt/Decrypt use RSA-OAEP. Authentication uses `DefaultAzureCredential`. + +#### Scenario: Missing vault URL rejected +- **WHEN** `newAzureKVProvider()` is called with empty `VaultURL` +- **THEN** an error is returned indicating vault URL is required + +### Requirement: PKCS#11 Provider +The PKCS#11 provider SHALL implement `CryptoProvider` using `miekg/pkcs11`. Sign uses `CKM_ECDSA`. Encrypt/Decrypt use `CKM_AES_GCM` with 12-byte IV prepended to ciphertext. PIN is read from `LANGO_PKCS11_PIN` env var with config fallback. + +#### Scenario: PIN from environment variable +- **WHEN** `LANGO_PKCS11_PIN` environment variable is set +- **THEN** it takes priority over the config pin value + +#### Scenario: Session cleanup on Close +- **WHEN** `Close()` is called on the PKCS#11 provider +- **THEN** the session is logged out, closed, and the module is finalized + +### Requirement: KMS Fallback to Local +When `security.kms.fallbackToLocal` is true, the system SHALL wrap the KMS provider in `CompositeCryptoProvider` with the local crypto provider as fallback and `KMSHealthChecker` as the connection checker. + +#### Scenario: KMS unavailable with fallback enabled +- **WHEN** the KMS provider is unreachable and `fallbackToLocal` is true +- **THEN** operations transparently fall back to the local crypto provider + +### Requirement: KMS CLI Commands +The system SHALL provide `lango security kms status`, `lango security kms test`, and `lango security kms keys` CLI commands. + +#### Scenario: KMS status display +- **WHEN** `lango security kms status` is run with a KMS provider configured +- **THEN** the output shows provider type, key ID, region, fallback status, and connection status + +#### Scenario: KMS roundtrip test +- **WHEN** `lango security kms test` is run +- **THEN** the system performs an encrypt/decrypt roundtrip and reports success or failure + +#### Scenario: KMS keys listing +- **WHEN** `lango security kms keys` is run +- **THEN** all keys from KeyRegistry are displayed with ID, name, type, and remote key ID + +### Requirement: KMS Config Structure +The system SHALL define `KMSConfig` with fields: Region, KeyID, Endpoint, FallbackToLocal, TimeoutPerOperation, MaxRetries, Azure (AzureKVConfig), PKCS11 (PKCS11Config). Defaults: FallbackToLocal=true, TimeoutPerOperation=5s, MaxRetries=3. + +#### Scenario: Default config values +- **WHEN** no KMS config is provided +- **THEN** FallbackToLocal is true, TimeoutPerOperation is 5 seconds, MaxRetries is 3 diff --git a/openspec/specs/codebase-structure/spec.md b/openspec/specs/codebase-structure/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c708d37d --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/codebase-structure/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +# Codebase Structure + +## Purpose + +Defines file organization conventions and domain-based file splitting rules for the Lango codebase. Ensures large files are split into navigable, domain-focused units within the same Go package without API changes. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: Domain-based file splitting for tools +The `internal/app/tools.go` file SHALL be split into domain-focused files within the same package. The orchestrator function `buildTools` and shared utilities SHALL remain in `tools.go`. Each domain builder function SHALL be placed in a file named `tools_.go`. + +#### Scenario: Tools file split into 9 files +- **WHEN** the refactoring is applied to `internal/app/tools.go` +- **THEN** the following files SHALL exist: `tools.go` (orchestrator + utilities), `tools_exec.go`, `tools_filesystem.go`, `tools_browser.go`, `tools_meta.go`, `tools_security.go`, `tools_automation.go`, `tools_p2p.go`, `tools_data.go` + +#### Scenario: No API changes after tools split +- **WHEN** any consumer imports `internal/app` +- **THEN** all previously available functions SHALL remain accessible with identical signatures + +### Requirement: Domain-based file splitting for wiring +The `internal/app/wiring.go` file SHALL be split into domain-focused files within the same package. Core initialization functions SHALL remain in `wiring.go`. Each domain's component struct and init function SHALL be placed in a file named `wiring_.go`. + +#### Scenario: Wiring file split into 9 files +- **WHEN** the refactoring is applied to `internal/app/wiring.go` +- **THEN** the following files SHALL exist: `wiring.go` (core init), `wiring_knowledge.go`, `wiring_memory.go`, `wiring_embedding.go`, `wiring_graph.go`, `wiring_payment.go`, `wiring_p2p.go`, `wiring_automation.go`, `wiring_librarian.go` + +#### Scenario: Component structs co-located with init functions +- **WHEN** a domain has a components struct (e.g., `graphComponents`) +- **THEN** the struct and its associated init function (e.g., `initGraphStore`) SHALL be in the same file + +### Requirement: Domain-based file splitting for settings forms +The `internal/cli/settings/forms_impl.go` file SHALL be split into domain-focused files within the same package. Core form constructors and shared helpers SHALL remain in `forms_impl.go`. Each domain's form constructors SHALL be placed in a file named `forms_.go`. + +#### Scenario: Forms file split into 6 files +- **WHEN** the refactoring is applied to `internal/cli/settings/forms_impl.go` +- **THEN** the following files SHALL exist: `forms_impl.go` (core forms + helpers), `forms_knowledge.go`, `forms_automation.go`, `forms_security.go`, `forms_p2p.go`, `forms_agent.go` + +#### Scenario: Shared helpers remain in the base file +- **WHEN** helper functions are used across multiple domain files +- **THEN** they SHALL remain in `forms_impl.go` (e.g., `derefBool`, `formatKeyValueMap`, `validatePort`) + +### Requirement: Domain-based file splitting for config types +The `internal/config/types.go` file SHALL be split into domain-focused files within the same package. Root config and core infrastructure types SHALL remain in `types.go`. Each domain's types SHALL be placed in a file named `types_.go`. + +#### Scenario: Types file split into 5 files +- **WHEN** the refactoring is applied to `internal/config/types.go` +- **THEN** the following files SHALL exist: `types.go` (root + core), `types_security.go`, `types_knowledge.go`, `types_p2p.go`, `types_automation.go` + +#### Scenario: Type methods co-located with types +- **WHEN** a type has associated methods (e.g., `ApprovalPolicy.String()`) +- **THEN** the methods SHALL be in the same file as the type definition + +### Requirement: Build and test integrity after refactoring +All code changes SHALL maintain full build and test compatibility. No compilation errors or test failures SHALL be introduced. + +#### Scenario: Clean build after each phase +- **WHEN** `go build ./...` is executed after any phase of the refactoring +- **THEN** the build SHALL complete with zero errors + +#### Scenario: All tests pass after each phase +- **WHEN** `go test ./...` is executed after any phase of the refactoring +- **THEN** all existing tests SHALL pass without modification + +### Requirement: File naming convention +All split files SHALL follow the `_.go` naming convention where `` is the original file's base name and `` is a kebab-case domain identifier. + +#### Scenario: Consistent naming across packages +- **WHEN** a file is split across any package +- **THEN** the new files SHALL use the pattern `_.go` (e.g., `tools_p2p.go`, `wiring_graph.go`, `types_security.go`, `forms_agent.go`) diff --git a/openspec/specs/config-system/spec.md b/openspec/specs/config-system/spec.md index ea8f22cf..0a221681 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/config-system/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/config-system/spec.md @@ -68,6 +68,14 @@ The configuration system SHALL apply sensible defaults for all non-credential fi - `librarian.inquiryCooldownTurns`: `3` - `librarian.maxPendingInquiries`: `2` - `librarian.autoSaveConfidence`: `"high"` +- `observationalMemory.enabled`: `false` +- `observationalMemory.messageTokenThreshold`: `1000` +- `observationalMemory.observationTokenThreshold`: `2000` +- `observationalMemory.maxMessageTokenBudget`: `8000` +- `observationalMemory.maxReflectionsInContext`: `5` +- `observationalMemory.maxObservationsInContext`: `20` +- `observationalMemory.memoryTokenBudget`: `4000` +- `observationalMemory.reflectionConsolidationThreshold`: `5` #### Scenario: Missing optional field - **WHEN** a configuration field is not specified @@ -87,6 +95,10 @@ The configuration system SHALL apply sensible defaults for all non-credential fi - **WHEN** the `librarian` section is omitted from configuration - **THEN** the system SHALL apply default values: enabled=false, observationThreshold=2, inquiryCooldownTurns=3, maxPendingInquiries=2, autoSaveConfidence="high" +#### Scenario: ObservationalMemory defaults applied +- **WHEN** the `observationalMemory` section is omitted from configuration +- **THEN** the system SHALL apply default values: enabled=false, messageTokenThreshold=1000, observationTokenThreshold=2000, maxMessageTokenBudget=8000, maxReflectionsInContext=5, maxObservationsInContext=20, memoryTokenBudget=4000, reflectionConsolidationThreshold=5 + ### Requirement: Runtime configuration updates The system SHALL support reloading configuration without full restart. diff --git a/openspec/specs/config-types/spec.md b/openspec/specs/config-types/spec.md index b16b2874..2343b7cf 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/config-types/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/config-types/spec.md @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -## MODIFIED Requirements +## Requirements ### Requirement: ProviderConfig type strengthening The `ProviderConfig.Type` field SHALL use `types.ProviderType` instead of raw `string`. @@ -10,3 +10,17 @@ The `ProviderConfig.Type` field SHALL use `types.ProviderType` instead of raw `s #### Scenario: Provider validation - **WHEN** a `ProviderConfig` is created with an unknown provider type - **THEN** `config.Type.Valid()` SHALL return `false` + +### Requirement: AgentConfig fields +`AgentConfig` SHALL include `MaxTurns int`, `ErrorCorrectionEnabled *bool`, and `MaxDelegationRounds int` fields with mapstructure/json tags. + +#### Scenario: Zero-value defaults +- **WHEN** config omits `maxTurns`, `errorCorrectionEnabled`, and `maxDelegationRounds` +- **THEN** the zero values (0, nil, 0) SHALL be interpreted as defaults (25, true, 10) by the wiring layer + +### Requirement: ObservationalMemoryConfig fields +`ObservationalMemoryConfig` SHALL include `MemoryTokenBudget int` and `ReflectionConsolidationThreshold int` fields with mapstructure/json tags. + +#### Scenario: Zero-value defaults +- **WHEN** config omits `memoryTokenBudget` and `reflectionConsolidationThreshold` +- **THEN** the zero values SHALL be interpreted as defaults (4000, 5) by the wiring layer diff --git a/openspec/specs/container-sandbox/spec.md b/openspec/specs/container-sandbox/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b5c4e728 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/container-sandbox/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Container sandbox configuration +The system MUST support a `p2p.toolIsolation.container` configuration block with `enabled`, `runtime`, `image`, `networkMode`, `readOnlyRootfs`, `cpuQuotaUs`, `poolSize`, and `poolIdleTimeout` fields. + +#### Scenario: Default configuration +- **WHEN** no container config is specified +- **THEN** defaults are: `runtime: "auto"`, `image: "lango-sandbox:latest"`, `networkMode: "none"`, `readOnlyRootfs: true`, `poolSize: 0`, `poolIdleTimeout: 5m` + +### Requirement: ContainerRuntime interface +The system MUST define a `ContainerRuntime` interface with `Run(ctx, ContainerConfig)`, `Cleanup(ctx, id)`, `IsAvailable(ctx)`, and `Name()` methods. + +### Requirement: Error types +The system MUST define sentinel errors: `ErrRuntimeUnavailable`, `ErrContainerTimeout`, `ErrContainerOOM`. + +#### Scenario: OOM kill +- **WHEN** a container exits with code 137 (SIGKILL) +- **THEN** `ErrContainerOOM` is returned + +#### Scenario: Timeout +- **WHEN** container execution exceeds the configured timeout +- **THEN** `ErrContainerTimeout` is returned + +### Requirement: DockerRuntime +The system MUST implement `ContainerRuntime` using Docker Go SDK with container create, attach, start, stdin write, stdout read, wait, and force-remove lifecycle. + +#### Scenario: Container creation +- **WHEN** `Run` is called +- **THEN** a container is created with the configured image, `--sandbox-worker` command, labels `lango.sandbox=true` and `lango.tool=`, resource limits, network mode, read-only rootfs, and tmpfs `/tmp` + +#### Scenario: Docker unavailable +- **WHEN** `IsAvailable()` is called and Docker daemon is not reachable +- **THEN** returns `false` + +#### Scenario: Orphan cleanup +- **WHEN** `Cleanup` is called +- **THEN** all containers with label `lango.sandbox=true` are force-removed + +### Requirement: NativeRuntime fallback +The system MUST provide a `NativeRuntime` that wraps `SubprocessExecutor` as a `ContainerRuntime` implementation. It MUST always report `IsAvailable() = true`. + +### Requirement: GVisorRuntime stub +The system MUST provide a `GVisorRuntime` stub that always reports `IsAvailable() = false` and returns `ErrRuntimeUnavailable` on `Run`. + +### Requirement: ContainerExecutor runtime probe +`NewContainerExecutor` MUST probe runtimes in order: Docker → gVisor → Native. The first available runtime is used. + +#### Scenario: Auto mode with Docker available +- **WHEN** runtime is "auto" and Docker is available +- **THEN** Docker runtime is selected + +#### Scenario: Auto mode without Docker +- **WHEN** runtime is "auto" and Docker is unavailable +- **THEN** Native runtime is selected as fallback + +#### Scenario: Explicit runtime requested but unavailable +- **WHEN** runtime is "docker" but Docker is unavailable +- **THEN** an error wrapping `ErrRuntimeUnavailable` is returned + +### Requirement: Protocol version +`ExecutionRequest` MUST include an optional `version` field (default 0) for forward compatibility. + +### Requirement: App wiring +When `p2p.toolIsolation.container.enabled` is true, the app MUST attempt to create a `ContainerExecutor`. On failure, it MUST fall back to `SubprocessExecutor` with a warning log. + +### Requirement: Container pool +When `poolSize > 0`, the system MUST maintain a pool of pre-warmed containers with `Acquire`/`Release` lifecycle and idle timeout cleanup. + +### Requirement: CLI sandbox commands +The system MUST provide `lango p2p sandbox status`, `lango p2p sandbox test`, and `lango p2p sandbox cleanup` commands. + +#### Scenario: Sandbox status +- **WHEN** `lango p2p sandbox status` is run +- **THEN** it displays tool isolation config, container mode status, active runtime name, and pool info + +#### Scenario: Sandbox test +- **WHEN** `lango p2p sandbox test` is run +- **THEN** it executes an echo tool through the sandbox and reports success/failure + +#### Scenario: Sandbox cleanup +- **WHEN** `lango p2p sandbox cleanup` is run +- **THEN** orphaned containers with label `lango.sandbox=true` are removed + +### Requirement: Sandbox Docker image +A `build/sandbox/Dockerfile` MUST define a minimal Debian-based image with the lango binary, running as non-root `sandbox` user with `--sandbox-worker` entrypoint. diff --git a/openspec/specs/db-encryption/spec.md b/openspec/specs/db-encryption/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c24a3f4d --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/db-encryption/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: DB encryption configuration +The system MUST support a `security.dbEncryption` configuration with `enabled` (bool) and `cipherPageSize` (int, default 4096) fields. + +#### Scenario: Default configuration +- **WHEN** no dbEncryption config is specified +- **THEN** `enabled` defaults to `false` and `cipherPageSize` defaults to `4096` + +### Requirement: Encrypted DB detection +The system MUST detect whether a database file is encrypted by inspecting the first 16 bytes of the file header. Standard SQLite files start with "SQLite format 3\0"; encrypted files do not. + +#### Scenario: Plaintext DB detection +- **WHEN** the DB file starts with "SQLite format 3" +- **THEN** `IsDBEncrypted()` returns `false` + +#### Scenario: Encrypted DB detection +- **WHEN** the DB file does not start with "SQLite format 3" +- **THEN** `IsDBEncrypted()` returns `true` + +#### Scenario: Non-existent DB +- **WHEN** the DB file does not exist +- **THEN** `IsDBEncrypted()` returns `false` + +### Requirement: Bootstrap with encrypted DB +The bootstrap sequence MUST acquire the passphrase BEFORE opening the database when encryption is detected or enabled. The passphrase is passed as `PRAGMA key` followed by `PRAGMA cipher_page_size`. + +#### Scenario: Opening encrypted DB +- **WHEN** the DB is encrypted or `dbEncryption.enabled` is true +- **THEN** the passphrase is acquired first, and `PRAGMA key` + `PRAGMA cipher_page_size` are executed after `sql.Open` + +#### Scenario: Opening plaintext DB +- **WHEN** the DB is not encrypted and `dbEncryption.enabled` is false +- **THEN** the database opens without any encryption PRAGMAs + +### Requirement: Plaintext to encrypted migration +`MigrateToEncrypted(dbPath, passphrase, cipherPageSize)` MUST convert a plaintext SQLite DB to SQLCipher format using `ATTACH DATABASE ... KEY` + `sqlcipher_export()`. + +#### Scenario: Successful migration +- **WHEN** the source DB is plaintext and passphrase is non-empty +- **THEN** an encrypted copy is created, verified, atomically swapped, and the plaintext backup is securely deleted + +#### Scenario: Already encrypted +- **WHEN** the source DB is already encrypted +- **THEN** the function returns an error without modifying the file + +#### Scenario: Empty passphrase +- **WHEN** passphrase is empty +- **THEN** the function returns an error + +### Requirement: Encrypted to plaintext decryption +`DecryptToPlaintext(dbPath, passphrase, cipherPageSize)` MUST convert a SQLCipher-encrypted DB back to plaintext using reverse `sqlcipher_export()`. + +#### Scenario: Successful decryption +- **WHEN** the source DB is encrypted and correct passphrase is provided +- **THEN** a plaintext copy is created, verified, atomically swapped, and the encrypted backup is securely deleted + +#### Scenario: Not encrypted +- **WHEN** the source DB is not encrypted +- **THEN** the function returns an error + +### Requirement: CLI db-migrate command +`lango security db-migrate` MUST encrypt the application database. It requires interactive confirmation unless `--force` is used. + +#### Scenario: Interactive migration +- **WHEN** the user runs `lango security db-migrate` in an interactive terminal +- **THEN** a confirmation prompt is shown before proceeding + +#### Scenario: Non-interactive with --force +- **WHEN** the user runs `lango security db-migrate --force` +- **THEN** migration proceeds without confirmation + +### Requirement: CLI db-decrypt command +`lango security db-decrypt` MUST decrypt the application database back to plaintext. Same confirmation behavior as db-migrate. + +### Requirement: Security status display +`lango security status` MUST display the DB encryption state as one of: "encrypted (active)", "enabled (pending migration)", or "disabled (plaintext)". + +#### Scenario: Encrypted DB +- **WHEN** the DB file is encrypted +- **THEN** status shows "encrypted (active)" + +#### Scenario: Config enabled, DB plaintext +- **WHEN** `dbEncryption.enabled` is true but DB is not encrypted +- **THEN** status shows "enabled (pending migration)" + +#### Scenario: Config disabled +- **WHEN** `dbEncryption.enabled` is false and DB is not encrypted +- **THEN** status shows "disabled (plaintext)" + +### Requirement: Secure file deletion +Plaintext backup files MUST be overwritten with zeros before removal to prevent recovery from disk. diff --git a/openspec/specs/docker-version-injection/spec.md b/openspec/specs/docker-version-injection/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f6ae32ef --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/docker-version-injection/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +## Purpose + +Build-time version and build timestamp injection for Docker images, ensuring `lango version` reports accurate version information in containerized deployments. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: Docker build accepts version build arguments +The Dockerfile SHALL declare `VERSION` and `BUILD_TIME` as `ARG` directives with default values `dev` and `unknown` respectively. + +#### Scenario: Build with explicit version arguments +- **WHEN** `docker build --build-arg VERSION=1.0.0 --build-arg BUILD_TIME=2026-03-01T00:00:00Z -t lango .` is executed +- **THEN** the resulting binary SHALL report `lango 1.0.0 (built 2026-03-01T00:00:00Z)` when running `lango version` + +#### Scenario: Build without version arguments +- **WHEN** `docker build -t lango .` is executed without `--build-arg` +- **THEN** the resulting binary SHALL report `lango dev (built unknown)` when running `lango version` + +### Requirement: Ldflags inject version into Go binary +The `go build` command in the Dockerfile SHALL include `-X main.Version=${VERSION}` and `-X main.BuildTime=${BUILD_TIME}` in the `-ldflags` string, matching the Makefile's injection pattern. + +#### Scenario: Ldflags format matches Makefile +- **WHEN** the Dockerfile's `go build` command is inspected +- **THEN** it SHALL contain `-X main.Version=${VERSION} -X main.BuildTime=${BUILD_TIME}` in the ldflags, alongside the existing `-s -w` flags diff --git a/openspec/specs/docs-config-format/spec.md b/openspec/specs/docs-config-format/spec.md index 456ef27e..bfca5f02 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/docs-config-format/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/docs-config-format/spec.md @@ -22,3 +22,14 @@ Documentation SHALL NOT contain references to `config.yaml` or suggest creating #### Scenario: No config.yaml references - **WHEN** a user searches documentation for `config.yaml` - **THEN** zero matches SHALL be found in config-related documentation + +### Requirement: Configuration reference includes P2P section +The docs/configuration.md SHALL include a P2P Network section with JSON example, settings table covering all P2PConfig and ZKPConfig fields, and a firewall rule entry sub-table. + +#### Scenario: P2P config section present +- **WHEN** the configuration reference documentation is opened +- **THEN** it contains a "P2P Network" section between Payment and Cron with experimental warning badge + +#### Scenario: P2P config table complete +- **WHEN** the P2P Network configuration table is read +- **THEN** it includes entries for: p2p.enabled, p2p.listenAddrs, p2p.bootstrapPeers, p2p.keyDir, p2p.enableRelay, p2p.enableMdns, p2p.maxPeers, p2p.handshakeTimeout, p2p.sessionTokenTtl, p2p.autoApproveKnownPeers, p2p.firewallRules, p2p.gossipInterval, p2p.zkHandshake, p2p.zkAttestation, p2p.zkp.proofCacheDir, p2p.zkp.provingScheme diff --git a/openspec/specs/docs-only/spec.md b/openspec/specs/docs-only/spec.md index 986485c1..f6a01372 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/docs-only/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/docs-only/spec.md @@ -71,3 +71,90 @@ README.md SHALL include a WebSocket Events subsection documenting `agent.thinkin #### Scenario: Backward compatibility noted - **WHEN** a user reads the WebSocket Events section - **THEN** there is a note that clients not handling `agent.chunk` will still receive the full response in the RPC result + +### Requirement: Documentation accuracy + +Documentation, prompts, and CLI help text SHALL accurately reflect all implemented features including P2P REST API endpoints, CLI flags, and example projects. + +#### Scenario: P2P REST API documented +- **WHEN** a user reads the HTTP API documentation +- **THEN** the P2P REST endpoints (`/api/p2p/status`, `/api/p2p/peers`, `/api/p2p/identity`) SHALL be documented with request/response examples + +#### Scenario: Secrets --value-hex documented +- **WHEN** a user reads the secrets set CLI documentation +- **THEN** the `--value-hex` flag SHALL be documented with non-interactive usage examples + +#### Scenario: P2P trading example discoverable +- **WHEN** a user reads the README +- **THEN** the `examples/p2p-trading/` directory SHALL be referenced in an Examples section + +### Requirement: Approval Pipeline documentation in P2P feature docs +The `docs/features/p2p-network.md` file SHALL include an "Approval Pipeline" section describing the three-stage inbound gate (Firewall ACL → Owner Approval → Tool Execution) with a Mermaid flowchart diagram and auto-approval shortcut rules table. + +#### Scenario: Approval Pipeline section present +- **WHEN** a user reads `docs/features/p2p-network.md` +- **THEN** there SHALL be an "Approval Pipeline" section between Knowledge Firewall and Discovery with a Mermaid diagram and descriptions of all three stages + +### Requirement: Auto-Approval for Small Amounts in Paid Value Exchange docs +The Paid Value Exchange section in `docs/features/p2p-network.md` SHALL include an "Auto-Approval for Small Amounts" subsection describing the three conditions checked by `IsAutoApprovable`: threshold, maxPerTx, and maxDaily. + +#### Scenario: Auto-approval subsection present +- **WHEN** a user reads the Paid Value Exchange section +- **THEN** there SHALL be a subsection documenting the three auto-approval conditions and fallback to interactive approval + +### Requirement: Reputation and Pricing endpoints in REST API tables +All REST API documentation (p2p-network.md, http-api.md, README.md, examples/p2p-trading/README.md) SHALL list `GET /api/p2p/reputation` and `GET /api/p2p/pricing` with curl examples and JSON response samples. + +#### Scenario: Endpoints in p2p-network.md +- **WHEN** a user reads the REST API table in `docs/features/p2p-network.md` +- **THEN** reputation and pricing endpoints SHALL be listed with curl examples + +#### Scenario: Endpoints in http-api.md +- **WHEN** a user reads `docs/gateway/http-api.md` +- **THEN** there SHALL be full endpoint sections for reputation and pricing with query parameters, JSON response examples, and curl commands + +### Requirement: Reputation and Pricing CLI commands documented +The CLI command listings in `docs/features/p2p-network.md` and `README.md` SHALL include `lango p2p reputation` and `lango p2p pricing` commands. + +#### Scenario: CLI commands in feature docs +- **WHEN** a user reads the CLI Commands section of `docs/features/p2p-network.md` +- **THEN** reputation and pricing commands SHALL be listed + +### Requirement: README P2P config fields complete +The README.md P2P configuration reference table SHALL include `p2p.autoApproveKnownPeers`, `p2p.minTrustScore`, `p2p.pricing.enabled`, and `p2p.pricing.perQuery` fields. + +#### Scenario: Missing config fields added +- **WHEN** a user reads the P2P Network section of the Configuration Reference in README.md +- **THEN** all four fields SHALL be present with correct types, defaults, and descriptions + +### Requirement: Tool usage prompts reflect approval behavior +The `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md` file SHALL describe auto-approval behavior for `p2p_pay`, the remote owner's approval pipeline for `p2p_query`, and inbound tool invocation gates. + +#### Scenario: p2p_pay auto-approval documented +- **WHEN** a user reads the `p2p_pay` description +- **THEN** it SHALL mention that payments below `autoApproveBelow` are auto-approved + +#### Scenario: Inbound invocation gates documented +- **WHEN** a user reads the P2P Networking Tool section +- **THEN** there SHALL be a description of the three-stage inbound gate + +### Requirement: USDC docs cross-reference P2P auto-approval +The `docs/payments/usdc.md` file SHALL include a P2P integration note explaining that `autoApproveBelow` applies to both outbound payments and inbound paid tool approval. + +#### Scenario: P2P integration note present +- **WHEN** a user reads `docs/payments/usdc.md` +- **THEN** there SHALL be a note after the config table linking to the P2P approval pipeline + +### Requirement: P2P trading example documents configuration highlights +The `examples/p2p-trading/README.md` SHALL include a "Configuration Highlights" section with a table of key approval and payment settings used in the example. + +#### Scenario: Configuration highlights section present +- **WHEN** a user reads the example README +- **THEN** there SHALL be a Configuration Highlights section with autoApproveBelow, autoApproveKnownPeers, pricing settings, and a production warning + +### Requirement: test-p2p Makefile target +The root `Makefile` SHALL include a `test-p2p` target that runs `go test -v -race ./internal/p2p/... ./internal/wallet/...` and SHALL be listed in the `.PHONY` declaration. + +#### Scenario: test-p2p target runs successfully +- **WHEN** a user runs `make test-p2p` +- **THEN** P2P and wallet tests SHALL execute with race detector enabled diff --git a/openspec/specs/embedded-prompt-files/spec.md b/openspec/specs/embedded-prompt-files/spec.md index 72180fea..1f1e8f42 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/embedded-prompt-files/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/embedded-prompt-files/spec.md @@ -28,11 +28,11 @@ The system SHALL embed all default prompt `.md` files into the binary at build t - **AND** the system SHALL NOT panic or return an error ### Requirement: AGENTS.md covers agent identity -The `AGENTS.md` file SHALL define the agent's identity including name, role, eight tool categories (exec, filesystem, browser, crypto, secrets, cron, background, workflow), 6-layer knowledge system awareness, observational memory awareness, multi-channel awareness, and response principles. +The `AGENTS.md` file SHALL define the agent's identity including name, role, ten tool categories (exec, filesystem, browser, crypto, secrets, cron, background, workflow, skills, P2P network), 6-layer knowledge system awareness, observational memory awareness, multi-channel awareness, and response principles. #### Scenario: Identity prompt contains tool categories - **WHEN** the identity section is rendered -- **THEN** it SHALL mention exec, filesystem, browser, crypto, secrets, cron, background, and workflow tools +- **THEN** it SHALL mention exec, filesystem, browser, crypto, secrets, cron, background, workflow, skills, and P2P network tools #### Scenario: Identity prompt contains knowledge system - **WHEN** the identity section is rendered diff --git a/openspec/specs/enum-validation/spec.md b/openspec/specs/enum-validation/spec.md index 6cbe14ca..9b65f405 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/enum-validation/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/enum-validation/spec.md @@ -49,3 +49,63 @@ The system SHALL convert untyped string constants to typed enums with `Valid()`/ #### Scenario: skill.SkillStatus and SkillType typed enums - **WHEN** `skill/types.go` defines status and type constants - **THEN** they SHALL be typed enums with `Valid()` and `Values()` + +### Requirement: ResponseStatus enum type +The system SHALL define `ResponseStatus` as a typed string enum in `protocol/messages.go` with constants `ResponseStatusOK`, `ResponseStatusError`, `ResponseStatusDenied`, `ResponseStatusPaymentRequired` and a `Valid()` method. + +#### Scenario: Response.Status uses typed enum +- **WHEN** the protocol handler constructs a `Response` +- **THEN** it SHALL set `Status` using `ResponseStatus` constants, never raw strings + +#### Scenario: JSON wire format preserved +- **WHEN** a `Response` with `ResponseStatus` is serialized to JSON +- **THEN** the `status` field SHALL contain the plain string value (e.g., `"ok"`) + +### Requirement: ACLAction enum type +The system SHALL define `ACLAction` as a typed string enum in `firewall/firewall.go` with constants `ACLActionAllow`, `ACLActionDeny` and a `Valid()` method. + +#### Scenario: ACLRule.Action uses typed enum +- **WHEN** an `ACLRule` is constructed +- **THEN** the `Action` field SHALL be `ACLAction` type, not raw string + +### Requirement: WildcardAll constant +The system SHALL define `WildcardAll = "*"` in `firewall/firewall.go`. + +#### Scenario: Wildcard comparisons use constant +- **WHEN** firewall code checks for wildcard peer or tool patterns +- **THEN** it SHALL compare against `WildcardAll`, not the literal `"*"` + +### Requirement: ProofScheme enum type +The system SHALL define `ProofScheme` as a typed string enum in `zkp/zkp.go` with constants `SchemePlonk`, `SchemeGroth16` and a `Valid()` method. + +#### Scenario: ZKP config and proof use typed scheme +- **WHEN** `Config.Scheme`, `ProverService.scheme`, or `Proof.Scheme` stores a proving scheme +- **THEN** it SHALL use the `ProofScheme` type + +### Requirement: SRSMode enum type +The system SHALL define `SRSMode` as a typed string enum in `zkp/zkp.go` with constants `SRSModeUnsafe`, `SRSModeFile` and a `Valid()` method. + +#### Scenario: ZKP config uses typed SRS mode +- **WHEN** `Config.SRSMode` or `ProverService.srsMode` stores the SRS mode +- **THEN** it SHALL use the `SRSMode` type + +### Requirement: KMSProviderName enum type +The system SHALL define `KMSProviderName` as a typed string enum in `security/kms_factory.go` with constants `KMSProviderAWS`, `KMSProviderGCP`, `KMSProviderAzure`, `KMSProviderPKCS11` and a `Valid()` method. + +#### Scenario: NewKMSProvider accepts typed name +- **WHEN** `NewKMSProvider` is called +- **THEN** the `providerName` parameter SHALL be `KMSProviderName` type + +### Requirement: ChainID type and constants +The system SHALL define `ChainID` as a typed `int64` in `wallet/wallet.go` with constants `ChainEthereumMainnet` (1), `ChainBase` (8453), `ChainBaseSepolia` (84532), `ChainSepolia` (11155111). + +#### Scenario: NetworkName uses typed constants +- **WHEN** `NetworkName()` switches on a chain ID +- **THEN** it SHALL compare against `ChainID` constants + +### Requirement: CurrencyUSDC constant +The system SHALL define `CurrencyUSDC = "USDC"` in `wallet/wallet.go`. + +#### Scenario: All USDC references use constant +- **WHEN** any package references the USDC currency ticker +- **THEN** it SHALL use `wallet.CurrencyUSDC` instead of the string literal `"USDC"` diff --git a/openspec/specs/event-bus/spec.md b/openspec/specs/event-bus/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d54c5b6b --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/event-bus/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +## Purpose + +Typed synchronous publish/subscribe bus for decoupled component communication. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: Event interface +The system SHALL define an Event interface with EventName() string for typed event identification. + +#### Scenario: Event returns its name +- **WHEN** a ContentSavedEvent is created +- **THEN** EventName() SHALL return "content.saved" + +### Requirement: Subscribe and publish +The Bus SHALL support Subscribe(eventName, handler) and Publish(event), calling all handlers registered for the event's name synchronously in registration order. + +#### Scenario: Multiple handlers receive event +- **WHEN** two handlers are subscribed to "turn.completed" and a TurnCompletedEvent is published +- **THEN** both handlers SHALL be called in registration order + +#### Scenario: No handlers registered +- **WHEN** an event is published with no subscribers +- **THEN** the event SHALL be silently ignored without error or panic + +### Requirement: Type-safe subscription +The system SHALL provide SubscribeTyped[T Event] for generic type-safe event handling without manual type assertions. + +#### Scenario: Typed handler receives correct type +- **WHEN** SubscribeTyped[TurnCompletedEvent] is used with a handler +- **THEN** the handler SHALL receive TurnCompletedEvent directly (not Event interface) + +### Requirement: Thread safety +The Bus SHALL be safe for concurrent Subscribe and Publish calls. + +#### Scenario: Concurrent publish and subscribe +- **WHEN** multiple goroutines publish and subscribe simultaneously +- **THEN** no data races SHALL occur (verified by -race flag) + +### Requirement: Content event types +The system SHALL define ContentSavedEvent, TriplesExtractedEvent, TurnCompletedEvent, ReputationChangedEvent, and MemoryGraphEvent as concrete Event implementations. + +#### Scenario: Each event has unique name +- **WHEN** all event types are instantiated +- **THEN** each SHALL have a unique EventName() value diff --git a/openspec/specs/goreleaser-release/spec.md b/openspec/specs/goreleaser-release/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..25b5722d --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/goreleaser-release/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +# GoReleaser Release Configuration + +## Purpose + +Defines the GoReleaser configuration for multi-platform binary builds with standard and extended (KMS) variants, SHA256 checksums, conventional commit changelog, and GitHub Release settings. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: GoReleaser v2 configuration +The system SHALL provide a `.goreleaser.yaml` configuration file using GoReleaser v2 schema (`version: 2`) at the project root. + +#### Scenario: Configuration schema version +- **WHEN** GoReleaser parses `.goreleaser.yaml` +- **THEN** the configuration SHALL use `version: 2` schema + +### Requirement: Standard build variant +The system SHALL define a build named `lango` that compiles `./cmd/lango` with `CGO_ENABLED=1` for linux and darwin on amd64 and arm64 architectures, with ldflags injecting version and build time. + +#### Scenario: Standard build targets +- **WHEN** GoReleaser executes the `lango` build +- **THEN** it SHALL produce binaries for linux/amd64, linux/arm64, darwin/amd64, darwin/arm64 with `-X main.Version` and `-X main.BuildTime` ldflags + +### Requirement: Extended build variant +The system SHALL define a build named `lango-extended` that compiles `./cmd/lango` with `CGO_ENABLED=1` and build tag `kms_all` for the same platform matrix as the standard build. + +#### Scenario: Extended build includes KMS tags +- **WHEN** GoReleaser executes the `lango-extended` build +- **THEN** it SHALL compile with `-tags kms_all` producing binaries with AWS/GCP/Azure/PKCS11 KMS support + +### Requirement: Archive naming convention +The system SHALL produce tar.gz archives with naming pattern `lango_{{.Version}}_{{.Os}}_{{.Arch}}` for standard and `lango-extended_{{.Version}}_{{.Os}}_{{.Arch}}` for extended builds. + +#### Scenario: Standard archive name +- **WHEN** building version v0.3.0 for linux/amd64 +- **THEN** the standard archive SHALL be named `lango_0.3.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz` + +#### Scenario: Extended archive name +- **WHEN** building version v0.3.0 for darwin/arm64 +- **THEN** the extended archive SHALL be named `lango-extended_0.3.0_darwin_arm64.tar.gz` + +### Requirement: SHA256 checksums +The system SHALL generate a `checksums.txt` file containing SHA256 hashes for all release artifacts. + +#### Scenario: Checksum file generation +- **WHEN** GoReleaser completes all archive builds +- **THEN** it SHALL produce a `checksums.txt` file using SHA256 algorithm + +### Requirement: Conventional commit changelog +The system SHALL generate a changelog grouped by conventional commit types: Features (`feat:`), Bug Fixes (`fix:`), Refactoring (`refactor:`), Documentation (`docs:`), and Others. + +#### Scenario: Changelog grouping +- **WHEN** GoReleaser generates the changelog +- **THEN** commits SHALL be sorted ascending and grouped by prefix, with `test:`, `chore:`, and `ci:` commits excluded + +### Requirement: Release configuration +The system SHALL create GitHub Releases with prerelease auto-detection and non-draft mode, using name template `{{.ProjectName}} v{{.Version}}`. + +#### Scenario: Prerelease detection +- **WHEN** a tag like `v0.3.0-rc.1` is pushed +- **THEN** the GitHub Release SHALL be marked as prerelease automatically + +#### Scenario: Stable release +- **WHEN** a tag like `v0.3.0` is pushed +- **THEN** the GitHub Release SHALL be created as a stable release (not draft, not prerelease) diff --git a/openspec/specs/input-search-select/spec.md b/openspec/specs/input-search-select/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..85245974 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/input-search-select/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Searchable dropdown select field type +The TUI form system MUST support an `InputSearchSelect` field type that combines text input with a filterable dropdown list. + +#### Scenario: Opening the dropdown +- **WHEN** user presses Enter on a focused InputSearchSelect field +- **THEN** dropdown opens showing all options, text input clears for searching, cursor highlights current value + +#### Scenario: Filtering by typing +- **WHEN** user types characters while dropdown is open +- **THEN** options are filtered by case-insensitive substring match in real-time + +#### Scenario: Navigating the dropdown +- **WHEN** user presses Up/Down while dropdown is open +- **THEN** cursor moves within filtered options, clamped to list bounds + +#### Scenario: Selecting an option +- **WHEN** user presses Enter while dropdown is open with a highlighted option +- **THEN** the option is selected as the field value, dropdown closes + +#### Scenario: Closing without selecting +- **WHEN** user presses Esc while dropdown is open +- **THEN** dropdown closes, previous value is preserved, filter is reset + +#### Scenario: Tab navigation with open dropdown +- **WHEN** user presses Tab or Shift+Tab while dropdown is open +- **THEN** dropdown closes, value is preserved, focus moves to next/previous field + +#### Scenario: Dropdown display limits +- **WHEN** dropdown has more than 8 filtered options +- **THEN** only 8 are shown with scroll following cursor, remaining count shown as "... N more" diff --git a/openspec/specs/key-registry/spec.md b/openspec/specs/key-registry/spec.md index de80400f..91827c63 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/key-registry/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/key-registry/spec.md @@ -38,3 +38,12 @@ The system SHALL support a default key for operations without explicit keyId. #### Scenario: No keys available - **WHEN** an operation is requested but no keys are registered - **THEN** the system returns an error "no encryption keys available" + +### Requirement: KMS Key Registration in Wiring +When a KMS provider is initialized, the system SHALL register the KMS key in KeyRegistry with the cloud key ARN/ID as `RemoteKeyID` and name `kms-default`. + +#### Scenario: KMS provider wiring registers key +- **WHEN** `initSecurity()` initializes a KMS provider (aws-kms, gcp-kms, azure-kv, pkcs11) +- **THEN** a key named `kms-default` SHALL be registered in KeyRegistry +- **AND** its RemoteKeyID SHALL be set to `security.kms.keyId` +- **AND** its type SHALL be `encryption` diff --git a/openspec/specs/keyring-security-tiering/spec.md b/openspec/specs/keyring-security-tiering/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d2c5315f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/keyring-security-tiering/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +# Keyring Security Tiering + +## Purpose + +Hardware-backed security tier detection with biometric (macOS Touch ID) and TPM 2.0 (Linux) keyring providers, plus deny-fallback for environments without secure hardware. Prevents same-UID passphrase exposure by requiring user presence verification before keyring auto-unlock. +## Requirements +### Requirement: SecurityTier enum represents hardware security levels +The system SHALL define a `SecurityTier` enum with values `TierNone` (0), `TierTPM` (1), and `TierBiometric` (2), ordered by security strength. + +#### Scenario: SecurityTier string representation +- **WHEN** `SecurityTier.String()` is called +- **THEN** it SHALL return `"none"`, `"tpm"`, or `"biometric"` respectively + +#### Scenario: Unknown tier defaults to none +- **WHEN** an unknown `SecurityTier` value calls `String()` +- **THEN** it SHALL return `"none"` + +### Requirement: DetectSecureProvider probes hardware backends +The system SHALL provide a `DetectSecureProvider()` function that returns the highest-tier available `(Provider, SecurityTier)` pair by probing biometric first, then TPM, then returning `(nil, TierNone)`. + +#### Scenario: macOS with Touch ID available +- **WHEN** `DetectSecureProvider()` is called on macOS with Touch ID hardware +- **THEN** it SHALL return a `BiometricProvider` and `TierBiometric` + +#### Scenario: Linux with TPM 2.0 device +- **WHEN** `DetectSecureProvider()` is called on Linux with accessible `/dev/tpmrm0` +- **THEN** it SHALL return a `TPMProvider` and `TierTPM` + +#### Scenario: No secure hardware available +- **WHEN** neither biometric nor TPM is available +- **THEN** it SHALL return `(nil, TierNone)` + +### Requirement: BiometricProvider uses macOS Keychain with Touch ID ACL +The system SHALL provide a `BiometricProvider` that stores secrets in the macOS login Keychain (NOT the Data Protection Keychain) using `kSecAccessControlBiometryCurrentSet` access control with `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly` protection. All Keychain queries SHALL set `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = kCFBooleanFalse` to explicitly target the login Keychain. This provider SHALL require Touch ID authentication for every read operation, and SHALL invalidate stored items when biometric enrollment changes. + +#### Scenario: Store and retrieve with biometric +- **WHEN** a secret is stored via `BiometricProvider.Set()` and later retrieved via `BiometricProvider.Get()` +- **THEN** the Set SHALL create a login Keychain item with `BiometryCurrentSet` ACL and `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = false`, and Get SHALL trigger Touch ID before returning the value + +#### Scenario: Biometric not available on non-Darwin platform +- **WHEN** `NewBiometricProvider()` is called on a non-Darwin or non-CGO platform +- **THEN** it SHALL return `ErrBiometricNotAvailable` + +#### Scenario: Ad-hoc signed binary works without entitlement +- **WHEN** a `go build` ad-hoc signed binary calls `BiometricProvider.Set()` or `BiometricProvider.Get()` +- **THEN** the operation SHALL succeed without requiring `keychain-access-groups` entitlement + +#### Scenario: Fingerprint enrollment change invalidates stored items +- **WHEN** a user changes their biometric enrollment (adds or removes fingerprints) after storing a secret +- **THEN** attempts to retrieve the secret SHALL fail because `BiometryCurrentSet` invalidates the access control + +#### Scenario: Device passcode not set +- **WHEN** the device does not have a passcode configured +- **THEN** `NewBiometricProvider()` SHALL return `ErrBiometricNotAvailable` because the Keychain probe will fail + +### Requirement: TPMProvider seals secrets with TPM 2.0 + +The TPM provider SHALL use `TPMTSymDefObject` for the SRK template symmetric parameters. The provider SHALL use `tpm2.Marshal` with single-return signature and `tpm2.Unmarshal` with generic type parameter signature `Unmarshal[T]([]byte) (*T, error)` as required by go-tpm v0.9.8. + +#### Scenario: SRK template uses correct symmetric type +- **WHEN** the TPM provider creates a primary key with ECC P256 SRK template +- **THEN** the template's `Symmetric` field SHALL be of type `TPMTSymDefObject` + +#### Scenario: Marshal sealed blob without error return +- **WHEN** the TPM provider marshals `TPM2BPublic` and `TPM2BPrivate` to bytes +- **THEN** the system SHALL call `tpm2.Marshal` which returns `[]byte` directly + +#### Scenario: Unmarshal sealed blob with generic type parameter +- **WHEN** the TPM provider unmarshals bytes into `TPM2BPublic` or `TPM2BPrivate` +- **THEN** the system SHALL call `tpm2.Unmarshal[T](data)` returning `(*T, error)` and dereference the result + +### Requirement: Error sentinels for hardware availability +The system SHALL define `ErrBiometricNotAvailable` and `ErrTPMNotAvailable` sentinel errors for callers to distinguish hardware unavailability from other failures. + +#### Scenario: Error sentinel messages +- **WHEN** error sentinels are checked +- **THEN** `ErrBiometricNotAvailable` SHALL contain "biometric authentication not available" and `ErrTPMNotAvailable` SHALL contain "TPM device not available" + +### Requirement: Build-tag stubs for cross-platform compilation +The system SHALL provide stub implementations with build tags (`!darwin || !cgo` for biometric, `!linux` for TPM) that implement the `Provider` interface and return the appropriate sentinel errors. + +#### Scenario: Stub methods satisfy Provider interface +- **WHEN** stub types are used on unsupported platforms +- **THEN** all `Get`, `Set`, `Delete` methods SHALL return the platform-specific sentinel error + +### Requirement: BiometricProvider SHALL zero C heap buffers before freeing +The `BiometricProvider` SHALL zero all C heap buffers containing plaintext secrets before calling `free()`. Zeroing MUST use a volatile pointer pattern to prevent compiler optimization from eliding the memory wipe. + +#### Scenario: Get zeroes C buffer via secure_free +- **WHEN** `BiometricProvider.Get()` retrieves a secret from the Keychain +- **THEN** the C heap buffer SHALL be zeroed via `secure_free()` (volatile pointer loop + free) before control returns to Go + +#### Scenario: Set zeroes CString buffer before freeing +- **WHEN** `BiometricProvider.Set()` stores a secret in the Keychain +- **THEN** the `C.CString` buffer containing the plaintext value SHALL be zeroed with `memset` before `free` is called + +### Requirement: BiometricProvider SHALL zero intermediate Go byte slices +The `BiometricProvider.Get()` method SHALL copy Keychain data into a Go `[]byte` via `C.GoBytes`, extract the string, and then zero every byte of the `[]byte` slice before it becomes unreachable. + +#### Scenario: Get zeroes Go byte slice after string extraction +- **WHEN** `BiometricProvider.Get()` copies data from C heap to Go heap +- **THEN** it SHALL use `C.GoBytes` (not `C.GoStringN`), extract the string via `string(data)`, and zero the `[]byte` with a range loop + +### Requirement: secure_free C helper prevents compiler optimization +The C `secure_free` helper function SHALL cast the pointer to `volatile char *` before zeroing to prevent the compiler from optimizing away the memset as a dead store. + +#### Scenario: Volatile pointer prevents optimization +- **WHEN** `secure_free(ptr, len)` is called +- **THEN** it SHALL iterate through the buffer using a `volatile char *` pointer, set each byte to zero, and then call `free(ptr)` + +#### Scenario: Null pointer safety +- **WHEN** `secure_free(NULL, 0)` is called +- **THEN** it SHALL return without error (NULL guard) + +### Requirement: BiometricProvider availability probe uses real Keychain write +The `keychain_biometric_available` function SHALL verify biometric support by performing a real `SecItemAdd` probe to the login Keychain with biometric ACL, rather than only checking `SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags`. The probe item SHALL be cleaned up immediately after the test. + +#### Scenario: Probe succeeds on capable hardware +- **WHEN** `keychain_biometric_available()` is called on a macOS device with Touch ID and device passcode set +- **THEN** it SHALL add a probe item to the login Keychain, delete it, and return 1 + +#### Scenario: Probe fails without passcode +- **WHEN** `keychain_biometric_available()` is called on a macOS device without a passcode +- **THEN** the `SecItemAdd` SHALL fail and the function SHALL return 0 + +#### Scenario: Probe does not trigger Touch ID +- **WHEN** the probe item is added via `SecItemAdd` +- **THEN** it SHALL NOT trigger a Touch ID prompt because Keychain writes bypass ACL evaluation + +### Requirement: All Keychain queries target login Keychain explicitly +Every Keychain query dictionary (set, get, has, delete) SHALL include `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = kCFBooleanFalse` to ensure operations target the login Keychain and never fall through to the Data Protection Keychain. + +#### Scenario: Set targets login Keychain +- **WHEN** `keychain_set_biometric()` builds its query dictionaries +- **THEN** both the delete-existing and add-new dictionaries SHALL include `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = kCFBooleanFalse` + +#### Scenario: Get targets login Keychain +- **WHEN** `keychain_get_biometric()` builds its query dictionary +- **THEN** it SHALL include `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = kCFBooleanFalse` + +#### Scenario: Has targets login Keychain +- **WHEN** `keychain_has_biometric()` builds its query dictionary +- **THEN** it SHALL include `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = kCFBooleanFalse` + +#### Scenario: Delete targets login Keychain +- **WHEN** `keychain_delete_biometric()` builds its query dictionary +- **THEN** it SHALL include `kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain = kCFBooleanFalse` + diff --git a/openspec/specs/knowledge-store/spec.md b/openspec/specs/knowledge-store/spec.md index 66210e7d..19a04e2a 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/knowledge-store/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/knowledge-store/spec.md @@ -17,7 +17,22 @@ The `knowledge.KnowledgeEntry` struct SHALL use `entknowledge.Category` (Ent-gen #### Scenario: Tool parameter boundary - **WHEN** the `save_knowledge` tool receives a category string from tool parameters -- **THEN** the string SHALL be cast at the boundary: `Category: entknowledge.Category(category)` +- **THEN** the string SHALL be validated via `entknowledge.CategoryValidator()` at the boundary before use + +### Requirement: Category Mapping +The system SHALL map LLM analysis type strings to valid `entknowledge.Category` enum values. The `mapCategory()` and `mapKnowledgeCategory()` functions SHALL return `(Category, error)` and SHALL return an error for any unrecognized type string instead of silently defaulting. Valid types SHALL include: `preference`, `fact`, `rule`, `definition`, `pattern`, `correction`. + +#### Scenario: Valid type mapping +- **WHEN** a recognized type string (preference, fact, rule, definition, pattern, correction) is passed to `mapCategory()` or `mapKnowledgeCategory()` +- **THEN** the corresponding `entknowledge.Category` value SHALL be returned with a nil error + +#### Scenario: Unrecognized type rejection +- **WHEN** an unrecognized type string is passed to `mapCategory()` or `mapKnowledgeCategory()` +- **THEN** an empty category and a non-nil error containing `"unrecognized knowledge type"` SHALL be returned + +#### Scenario: Case sensitivity +- **WHEN** a type string with incorrect casing (e.g., `"FACT"`, `"Preference"`) is passed +- **THEN** the function SHALL return an error (types are case-sensitive) #### Scenario: Metadata map boundary - **WHEN** a knowledge entry category is placed into a `map[string]string` metadata map diff --git a/openspec/specs/learning-engine/spec.md b/openspec/specs/learning-engine/spec.md index f2777fd4..b0aa93df 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/learning-engine/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/learning-engine/spec.md @@ -7,12 +7,12 @@ The system SHALL observe every tool execution result to detect error patterns an - **WHEN** `OnToolResult` is called with a non-nil error - **THEN** the system SHALL extract the error pattern, categorize it, and store a learning entry -#### Scenario: Tool execution success +#### Scenario: Tool execution success — scoped confidence boost - **WHEN** `OnToolResult` is called with a nil error -- **THEN** the system SHALL search for related learnings by tool name and boost their confidence +- **THEN** the system SHALL search for related learnings using the trigger `"tool:"` and boost confidence ONLY for learnings whose trigger exactly matches #### Scenario: Skip duplicate high-confidence learnings -- **WHEN** an error occurs and a matching learning with confidence > 0.5 already exists +- **WHEN** an error occurs and a matching learning with confidence > 0.7 already exists - **THEN** the system SHALL skip creating a new learning entry #### Scenario: Error save failure logging @@ -57,6 +57,21 @@ The system SHALL summarize tool parameters before storing them in learnings. - **WHEN** a parameter value is an array - **THEN** the system SHALL replace it with a count summary (e.g., "[5 items]") +### Requirement: Auto-apply confidence threshold +The system SHALL use a confidence threshold of 0.7 (previously 0.5) for both `GetFixForError` and `handleError` skip-duplicate logic. + +#### Scenario: GetFixForError returns fix above threshold +- **WHEN** a learning entity exists with confidence > 0.7 and a non-empty fix +- **THEN** `GetFixForError` SHALL return the fix with `ok == true` + +#### Scenario: GetFixForError ignores low-confidence fix +- **WHEN** a learning entity exists with confidence <= 0.7 +- **THEN** `GetFixForError` SHALL return `ok == false` + +#### Scenario: Error handling skips known high-confidence learnings +- **WHEN** an error occurs and a matching learning has confidence > 0.7 +- **THEN** `handleError` SHALL log the known fix and skip creating a new entry + ### Requirement: Confidence propagation uses float64 math The system SHALL apply fractional confidence boosts when propagating success across similar learnings. BoostLearningConfidence SHALL accept a `confidenceBoost float64` parameter; when > 0, it adds the value directly to confidence and clamps to [0.1, 1.0]. When 0, existing success/occurrence ratio calculation is used. diff --git a/openspec/specs/lifecycle-registry/spec.md b/openspec/specs/lifecycle-registry/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dd9c09d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/lifecycle-registry/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +## Purpose + +Component lifecycle management with priority-ordered startup, reverse-order shutdown, and automatic rollback on failure. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: Component lifecycle interface +The system SHALL provide a `Component` interface with `Name()`, `Start(ctx, wg)`, and `Stop(ctx)` methods for managing application component lifecycles. + +#### Scenario: Component implements interface +- **WHEN** a struct implements Name(), Start(context.Context, *sync.WaitGroup) error, and Stop(context.Context) error +- **THEN** it SHALL be usable as a lifecycle Component + +### Requirement: Priority-ordered startup +The Registry SHALL start components in ascending priority order (lower number = earlier start). + +#### Scenario: Components with different priorities start in order +- **WHEN** components are registered at PriorityInfra(100), PriorityBuffer(300), PriorityNetwork(400) +- **THEN** they SHALL start in order: Infra, Buffer, Network + +#### Scenario: Same-priority preserves registration order +- **WHEN** multiple components are registered at the same priority +- **THEN** they SHALL start in the order they were registered (stable sort) + +### Requirement: Reverse-order shutdown +The Registry SHALL stop started components in reverse startup order. + +#### Scenario: Reverse stop order +- **WHEN** StopAll is called after A, B, C started in that order +- **THEN** they SHALL stop in order: C, B, A + +### Requirement: Rollback on startup failure +If a component fails to start, the Registry SHALL stop all already-started components in reverse order. + +#### Scenario: Third component fails to start +- **WHEN** A and B start successfully, then C fails +- **THEN** B and A SHALL be stopped in that order, and StartAll SHALL return C's error + +### Requirement: Component adapters +The system SHALL provide adapters for common component signatures: SimpleComponent (Start(wg)/Stop()), FuncComponent (arbitrary functions), and ErrorComponent (Start(ctx) error/Stop()). + +#### Scenario: SimpleComponent wraps buffer-style components +- **WHEN** a buffer with Start(*sync.WaitGroup) and Stop() is wrapped in SimpleComponent +- **THEN** it SHALL be usable as a lifecycle Component diff --git a/openspec/specs/lint-configuration/spec.md b/openspec/specs/lint-configuration/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b124cd95 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/lint-configuration/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +## Purpose + +Defines linting standards and configuration for the Lango project using golangci-lint v2. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: golangci-lint v2 configuration +The project SHALL have a `.golangci.yml` configuration file using version 2 format with the `standard` default linter set. + +#### Scenario: Generated code exclusion +- **WHEN** golangci-lint runs on the project +- **THEN** files with `// Code generated` headers (ent auto-generated code) SHALL be excluded via `generated: strict` + +#### Scenario: Standard error handling preset +- **WHEN** golangci-lint evaluates error handling patterns +- **THEN** standard patterns (defer Close, fmt.Fprint return values) SHALL be suppressed via `std-error-handling` preset + +#### Scenario: Test file errcheck exclusion +- **WHEN** golangci-lint evaluates test files (`_test.go`) +- **THEN** errcheck linter SHALL be disabled for those files + +### Requirement: Zero lint issues in CI +The project SHALL pass golangci-lint with zero issues on every CI run. + +#### Scenario: Clean lint run +- **WHEN** `golangci-lint run` executes on the codebase +- **THEN** the exit code SHALL be 0 with zero reported issues + +### Requirement: Explicit error handling for intentionally ignored errors +All intentionally ignored error return values SHALL use explicit `_ =` assignment to document intent. + +#### Scenario: Defer close pattern +- **WHEN** an HTTP response body is closed in a defer +- **THEN** the pattern `defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()` SHALL be used + +#### Scenario: Rollback in error paths +- **WHEN** a database transaction rollback is called in an error/defer path +- **THEN** the pattern `_ = tx.Rollback()` SHALL be used diff --git a/openspec/specs/meta-tools/spec.md b/openspec/specs/meta-tools/spec.md index 5af93fdf..f35e24f4 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/meta-tools/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/meta-tools/spec.md @@ -5,10 +5,19 @@ The system SHALL provide agent-facing tools for managing the knowledge base. #### Scenario: save_knowledge tool - **WHEN** the agent invokes `save_knowledge` with key, category, content, and optional tags/source -- **THEN** the system SHALL persist the knowledge entry via the Store +- **THEN** the system SHALL validate the category using `entknowledge.CategoryValidator()` before persisting +- **AND** persist the knowledge entry via the Store - **AND** create an audit log entry with action "knowledge_save" - **AND** return a success status with the key +#### Scenario: save_knowledge with invalid category +- **WHEN** the agent invokes `save_knowledge` with an unrecognized category +- **THEN** the system SHALL return an error indicating the invalid category without saving + +#### Scenario: save_knowledge tool schema includes all categories +- **WHEN** the tool parameters are inspected +- **THEN** the `category` enum SHALL include all six valid values: rule, definition, preference, fact, pattern, correction + #### Scenario: search_knowledge tool - **WHEN** the agent invokes `search_knowledge` with a query and optional category - **THEN** the system SHALL search knowledge entries via the Store diff --git a/openspec/specs/mkdocs-documentation-site/spec.md b/openspec/specs/mkdocs-documentation-site/spec.md index 8089abed..4f6a6944 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/mkdocs-documentation-site/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/mkdocs-documentation-site/spec.md @@ -50,12 +50,23 @@ The documentation SHALL have dedicated pages for: AI Providers, Channels, Knowle - **THEN** each feature SHALL have its own page with configuration reference and usage examples ### Requirement: CLI reference documentation -The documentation SHALL include a complete CLI reference organized by command category: Core, Config Management, Agent & Memory, Security, Payment, and Automation commands. +The documentation SHALL include a complete CLI reference organized by command category: Core, Config Management, Agent & Memory, Security, Payment, P2P, and Automation commands. #### Scenario: CLI commands documented - **WHEN** a user looks up a CLI command - **THEN** they SHALL find syntax, flags, and usage examples +### Requirement: Navigation includes P2P pages +The mkdocs.yml navigation SHALL include "P2P Network: features/p2p-network.md" in the Features section and "P2P Commands: cli/p2p.md" in the CLI Reference section. + +#### Scenario: P2P feature in nav +- **WHEN** the mkdocs site is built +- **THEN** the Features navigation section includes a "P2P Network" entry after "A2A Protocol" + +#### Scenario: P2P CLI in nav +- **WHEN** the mkdocs site is built +- **THEN** the CLI Reference navigation section includes a "P2P Commands" entry after "Payment Commands" + ### Requirement: Configuration reference The documentation SHALL include a complete configuration reference page listing all configuration keys with type, default value, and description, organized by category. diff --git a/openspec/specs/model-aware-token-budget/spec.md b/openspec/specs/model-aware-token-budget/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f3335e5f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/model-aware-token-budget/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Model-family-aware token budgeting +The system SHALL provide a `ModelTokenBudget(modelName)` function that returns an appropriate history token budget based on the model family's context window size. + +#### Scenario: Claude models +- **WHEN** the model name contains "claude" (case-insensitive) +- **THEN** the budget SHALL be 100,000 tokens (~50% of 200K context) + +#### Scenario: Gemini models +- **WHEN** the model name contains "gemini" (case-insensitive) +- **THEN** the budget SHALL be 200,000 tokens (~20% of 1M context) + +#### Scenario: GPT-4o and GPT-4-turbo models +- **WHEN** the model name contains "gpt-4o" or "gpt-4-turbo" (case-insensitive) +- **THEN** the budget SHALL be 64,000 tokens (~50% of 128K context) + +#### Scenario: GPT-4 base models +- **WHEN** the model name contains "gpt-4" but not "gpt-4o" or "gpt-4-turbo" +- **THEN** the budget SHALL be 32,000 tokens + +#### Scenario: GPT-3.5 models +- **WHEN** the model name contains "gpt-3.5" (case-insensitive) +- **THEN** the budget SHALL be 8,000 tokens (~50% of 16K context) + +#### Scenario: Unknown model fallback +- **WHEN** the model name does not match any known family +- **THEN** the budget SHALL be the DefaultTokenBudget (32,000 tokens) + +### Requirement: Token budget propagation through session service +The `SessionServiceAdapter` SHALL propagate a configured token budget to all `SessionAdapter` instances it creates, which in turn pass it to `EventsAdapter` for history truncation. + +#### Scenario: WithTokenBudget sets budget on adapter +- **WHEN** `WithTokenBudget(budget)` is called on the session service +- **THEN** all subsequently created sessions SHALL use that budget for history truncation + +### Requirement: Lazy caching of truncated history and events +The `EventsAdapter` SHALL lazily compute and cache truncated history and converted events using `sync.Once` for O(1) repeated access. + +#### Scenario: Multiple calls to truncatedHistory +- **WHEN** `truncatedHistory()` is called multiple times +- **THEN** the token-budget truncation SHALL execute only once; subsequent calls return the cached result + +#### Scenario: Multiple calls to At +- **WHEN** `At(i)` is called for different indices +- **THEN** the full event list SHALL be built once on first `At()` call and cached for subsequent calls + +#### Scenario: Out-of-bounds At access +- **WHEN** `At(i)` is called with `i < 0` or `i >= len(events)` +- **THEN** the method SHALL return nil diff --git a/openspec/specs/multi-agent-orchestration/spec.md b/openspec/specs/multi-agent-orchestration/spec.md index ed6bdc43..7f92ddd4 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/multi-agent-orchestration/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/multi-agent-orchestration/spec.md @@ -199,7 +199,22 @@ The `Config` struct SHALL include a `MaxDelegationRounds` field. The orchestrato #### Scenario: Default max rounds - **WHEN** `MaxDelegationRounds` is zero or unset -- **THEN** the default limit of 5 rounds SHALL be used in the orchestrator prompt +- **THEN** the default limit of 10 rounds SHALL be used in the orchestrator prompt + +### Requirement: Round budget guidance in orchestrator prompt +The orchestrator instruction SHALL include round-budget management guidance that helps the LLM self-regulate delegation efficiency. + +#### Scenario: Budget guidance included in prompt +- **WHEN** the orchestrator instruction is built +- **THEN** it SHALL contain guidance categorizing tasks by round cost: simple (1-2), medium (3-5), complex (6-10) + +#### Scenario: Prompt includes consolidation advice +- **WHEN** the orchestrator is running low on rounds +- **THEN** the prompt SHALL advise consolidating partial results and providing the best possible answer + +#### Scenario: Delegation rules formatting +- **WHEN** the orchestrator instruction is built +- **THEN** the "Maximum N delegation rounds" text SHALL appear as part of the round budget section, not the delegation rules section ### Requirement: Dynamic Orchestrator Instruction The orchestrator instruction SHALL be dynamically generated to list only the sub-agents that were actually created, rather than hardcoding all agent names. diff --git a/openspec/specs/observational-memory/spec.md b/openspec/specs/observational-memory/spec.md index e8e30eb5..59d91e84 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/observational-memory/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/observational-memory/spec.md @@ -180,6 +180,40 @@ The ObservationalMemoryConfig SHALL support `MaxReflectionsInContext` (default: - **WHEN** maxReflectionsInContext is set to 3 and maxObservationsInContext is set to 10 - **THEN** only the 3 most recent reflections and 10 most recent observations SHALL be injected into context +### Requirement: Memory token budgeting in context assembly +The `ContextAwareModelAdapter` SHALL enforce a token budget when assembling the memory section into the system prompt. Reflections SHALL be included first (higher information density), then observations fill the remaining budget. + +#### Scenario: Default memory token budget +- **WHEN** no explicit budget is configured via `WithMemoryTokenBudget` +- **THEN** the default budget SHALL be 4000 tokens + +#### Scenario: Reflections exceed budget +- **WHEN** reflections alone exceed the token budget +- **THEN** the system SHALL include reflections up to the budget limit and skip all observations + +#### Scenario: Budget shared between reflections and observations +- **WHEN** reflections use part of the budget +- **THEN** observations SHALL fill the remaining budget, stopping when the next observation would exceed it + +#### Scenario: Custom budget via WithMemoryTokenBudget +- **WHEN** `WithMemoryTokenBudget(budget)` is called with a positive value +- **THEN** the adapter SHALL use that budget instead of the default 4000 + +### Requirement: Auto meta-reflection on accumulation +The `memory.Buffer` SHALL automatically trigger meta-reflection when the number of reflections in a session exceeds a configurable consolidation threshold. + +#### Scenario: Default consolidation threshold +- **WHEN** no explicit threshold is configured +- **THEN** the default threshold SHALL be 5 reflections + +#### Scenario: Meta-reflection triggered +- **WHEN** `process()` completes and the session has >= threshold reflections +- **THEN** `ReflectOnReflections` SHALL be called to consolidate them + +#### Scenario: Meta-reflection failure is non-fatal +- **WHEN** `ReflectOnReflections` returns an error +- **THEN** the system SHALL log the error and continue normal operation + ### Requirement: Buffer drops logged at warn level with counters EmbeddingBuffer and GraphBuffer SHALL log dropped requests at warn level (not debug) and track drop counts via atomic counters accessible through a DroppedCount() method. diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-agent-prompts/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-agent-prompts/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..17dd1bf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-agent-prompts/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P tool category in agent identity +The AGENTS.md prompt SHALL include P2P Network as the 10th tool category describing peer connectivity, firewall ACL management, remote agent querying, capability-based discovery, and peer payments with Noise encryption and DID identity verification. + +#### Scenario: Agent identity includes P2P +- **WHEN** the agent system prompt is built +- **THEN** the identity section references "ten tool categories" and includes a P2P Network bullet + +### Requirement: P2P tool usage guidelines +The TOOL_USAGE.md prompt SHALL include a "P2P Networking Tool" section documenting all P2P tools: p2p_status, p2p_connect, p2p_disconnect, p2p_peers, p2p_query, p2p_discover, p2p_firewall_rules, p2p_firewall_add, p2p_firewall_remove, p2p_pay. + +#### Scenario: Tool usage includes P2P section +- **WHEN** the agent system prompt is built +- **THEN** the tool usage section includes P2P Networking Tool guidelines with session token and firewall deny behavior notes + +### Requirement: Vault agent P2P role +The vault agent IDENTITY.md SHALL include P2P peer management and firewall rule management as part of its responsibilities. + +#### Scenario: Vault identity covers P2P +- **WHEN** the vault sub-agent prompt is built +- **THEN** the identity mentions P2P networking alongside crypto, secrets, and payment operations + +### Requirement: Agent prompts include paid value exchange +The agent prompt files SHALL describe paid value exchange capabilities including pricing query, reputation checking, and owner shield protection. + +#### Scenario: AGENTS.md describes paid P2P features +- **WHEN** agent loads AGENTS.md system prompt +- **THEN** P2P Network description includes pricing query, reputation tracking, owner shield, and USDC Payment Gate + +#### Scenario: TOOL_USAGE.md documents new tools +- **WHEN** agent loads TOOL_USAGE.md +- **THEN** P2P section includes `p2p_price_query`, `p2p_reputation` tool descriptions and paid tool workflow guidance + +#### Scenario: Vault IDENTITY.md includes new capabilities +- **WHEN** vault agent loads IDENTITY.md +- **THEN** role description includes reputation and pricing management, and REST API list includes `/api/p2p/reputation` and `/api/p2p/pricing` diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-discovery/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-discovery/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..eaf04a91 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-discovery/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: GossipSub Agent Card Propagation + +The `GossipService` SHALL join the GossipSub topic `/lango/agentcard/1.0.0` and periodically publish the local `GossipCard` at the configured interval. The card SHALL be published immediately on service start. Own messages SHALL be discarded (filtered by comparing `msg.ReceivedFrom` to `host.ID()`). The publisher and subscriber SHALL run in separate goroutines tracked by a `sync.WaitGroup`. + +#### Scenario: Card published immediately on start +- **WHEN** `GossipService.Start(wg)` is called +- **THEN** the local agent card SHALL be published to the topic within the first tick cycle (immediately) + +#### Scenario: Card published periodically +- **WHEN** `GossipService.Start` is called with `Interval=30s` +- **THEN** the card SHALL be re-published every 30 seconds with an updated `Timestamp` + +#### Scenario: Own messages ignored +- **WHEN** the GossipSub subscription delivers a message whose `ReceivedFrom` equals the local host ID +- **THEN** the `subscribeLoop` SHALL discard the message without updating the peer map + +#### Scenario: Nil local card skips publication +- **WHEN** `GossipService` is initialized with a nil `LocalCard` +- **THEN** `publishCard` SHALL return immediately without encoding or publishing + +--- + +### Requirement: ZK Credential Verification on Received Cards + +When a `GossipCard` is received containing `ZKCredentials`, the `GossipService` SHALL verify each non-expired credential using the configured `ZKCredentialVerifier`. If any credential fails verification, the entire card MUST be discarded. Expired credentials SHALL be skipped (logged at debug level) and SHALL NOT cause the card to be discarded. + +#### Scenario: Card with valid ZK credentials stored +- **WHEN** a received `GossipCard` has one ZK credential that passes `ZKCredentialVerifier` +- **THEN** the card SHALL be stored in the peer map under its DID + +#### Scenario: Card with invalid ZK credential discarded +- **WHEN** a received `GossipCard` has a ZK credential for which the `ZKCredentialVerifier` returns `(false, nil)` or an error +- **THEN** the card SHALL NOT be stored and the discardal SHALL be logged as a warning + +#### Scenario: Card with expired credential not discarded for that credential +- **WHEN** a received `GossipCard` has a ZK credential whose `ExpiresAt` is before `time.Now()` +- **THEN** that credential SHALL be skipped (debug log) and the card SHALL still be accepted if all other credentials are valid + +--- + +### Requirement: Peer Card Deduplication by Timestamp + +The `GossipService` SHALL update the peer map only when the incoming card's `Timestamp` is strictly after the stored card's `Timestamp`. If the incoming card is older or equal in timestamp, it SHALL be silently discarded. Cards with an empty `DID` field MUST be discarded unconditionally. + +#### Scenario: Newer card replaces older card +- **WHEN** a card with a newer `Timestamp` arrives for an already-known DID +- **THEN** the peer map SHALL be updated with the new card + +#### Scenario: Older card not stored +- **WHEN** a card with a `Timestamp` older than the stored card arrives for the same DID +- **THEN** the peer map SHALL retain the existing card + +#### Scenario: Card with empty DID discarded +- **WHEN** a received `GossipCard` has `DID: ""` +- **THEN** `handleMessage` SHALL return immediately without storing the card + +--- + +### Requirement: Capability and DID Lookup on Known Peers + +`GossipService.FindByCapability` SHALL return all stored `GossipCard` entries that list the requested capability string in their `Capabilities` slice. `GossipService.FindByDID` SHALL return the stored card for an exact DID match, or nil if not found. `GossipService.KnownPeers` SHALL return a snapshot of all stored cards. + +#### Scenario: Capability search returns matching peers +- **WHEN** `FindByCapability("code_execution")` is called and two peers advertise that capability +- **THEN** both cards SHALL be returned + +#### Scenario: DID lookup returns exact match +- **WHEN** `FindByDID("did:lango:abc")` is called and the DID is in the peer map +- **THEN** the corresponding `GossipCard` SHALL be returned + +#### Scenario: DID lookup returns nil for unknown DID +- **WHEN** `FindByDID("did:lango:unknown")` is called +- **THEN** nil SHALL be returned + +--- + +### Requirement: DHT Agent Advertisement + +The `AdService` SHALL publish the local `AgentAd` to the Kademlia DHT under the key `/lango/agentad/` using `dht.PutValue`. `AdService.Discover` SHALL filter stored `AgentAd` entries by tag match (any tag matches). `AdService.StoreAd` SHALL verify ZK credentials before storing and MUST reject ads with empty DIDs. + +#### Scenario: Agent ad published to DHT +- **WHEN** `AdService.Advertise(ctx)` is called +- **THEN** the local `AgentAd` SHALL be JSON-marshaled and stored in the DHT under `/lango/agentad/` + +#### Scenario: Discovery by tag returns matching ads +- **WHEN** `AdService.Discover(ctx, []string{"researcher"})` is called and one stored ad has tag `"researcher"` +- **THEN** only that ad SHALL be returned + +#### Scenario: Discover with no tags returns all ads +- **WHEN** `AdService.Discover(ctx, nil)` is called +- **THEN** all stored ads SHALL be returned + +#### Scenario: Ad with invalid ZK credential rejected on store +- **WHEN** `StoreAd` is called with an ad containing a ZK credential that fails verification +- **THEN** `StoreAd` SHALL return an error and SHALL NOT store the ad + +#### Scenario: Ad with empty DID rejected +- **WHEN** `StoreAd` is called with an ad where `DID == ""` +- **THEN** `StoreAd` SHALL return an error containing "agent ad missing DID" diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-documentation/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-documentation/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bbfaba1f --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-documentation/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P feature documentation +The system SHALL provide docs/features/p2p-network.md covering: overview, identity (DID scheme), handshake flow, knowledge firewall (ACL rules, response sanitization, ZK attestation), discovery (GossipSub, agent card structure), ZK circuits, configuration, and CLI commands. + +#### Scenario: Feature doc exists with all sections +- **WHEN** the P2P feature documentation is opened +- **THEN** it contains sections for Overview, Identity, Handshake, Knowledge Firewall, Discovery, ZK Circuits, Configuration, and CLI Commands + +### Requirement: P2P CLI reference documentation +The system SHALL provide docs/cli/p2p.md with usage, flags, arguments, and examples for all P2P commands: status, peers, connect, disconnect, firewall (list/add/remove), discover, and identity. + +#### Scenario: CLI doc covers all commands +- **WHEN** the P2P CLI reference is opened +- **THEN** each P2P subcommand has its own section with usage syntax, flag table, and example output + +### Requirement: README P2P sections +The README.md SHALL include P2P in the features list, CLI commands section, configuration reference table, and architecture tree. + +#### Scenario: README features include P2P +- **WHEN** the README is opened +- **THEN** the Features section includes a P2P Network bullet point + +#### Scenario: README CLI includes P2P commands +- **WHEN** the README CLI commands section is read +- **THEN** it lists all 9 P2P CLI commands (status, peers, connect, disconnect, firewall list/add/remove, discover, identity) + +### Requirement: Features index P2P card +The docs/features/index.md SHALL include a P2P Network card in the grid layout with experimental badge and a row in the Feature Status table. + +#### Scenario: Feature index includes P2P card +- **WHEN** the features index page is rendered +- **THEN** a P2P Network card appears with experimental badge linking to p2p-network.md + +### Requirement: A2A protocol HTTP vs P2P comparison +The docs/features/a2a-protocol.md SHALL include a comparison section distinguishing A2A-over-HTTP from A2A-over-P2P across transport, discovery, identity, auth, firewall, and use case dimensions. + +#### Scenario: A2A doc includes comparison table +- **WHEN** the A2A protocol documentation is opened +- **THEN** it contains an "A2A-over-HTTP vs A2A-over-P2P" section with a comparison table + +### Requirement: P2P feature documentation includes paid value exchange +The P2P documentation SHALL include sections for Paid Value Exchange, Reputation System, and Owner Shield. + +#### Scenario: p2p-network.md has Paid Value Exchange section +- **WHEN** user reads `docs/features/p2p-network.md` +- **THEN** document includes Payment Gate flow, USDC Registry description, and pricing config example + +#### Scenario: p2p-network.md has Reputation System section +- **WHEN** user reads `docs/features/p2p-network.md` +- **THEN** document includes trust score formula, exchange tracking description, and querying methods (CLI/tool/API) + +#### Scenario: p2p-network.md has Owner Shield section +- **WHEN** user reads `docs/features/p2p-network.md` +- **THEN** document includes PII protection description and config example + +#### Scenario: configuration.md has pricing and protection config +- **WHEN** user reads `docs/configuration.md` +- **THEN** P2P section includes 9 new config fields for pricing, ownerProtection, and minTrustScore + +#### Scenario: cli/p2p.md has new command references +- **WHEN** user reads `docs/cli/p2p.md` +- **THEN** document includes `reputation` and `pricing` command references with flags and examples diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-firewall/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-firewall/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2668376b --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-firewall/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Default Deny-All ACL Policy + +The `Firewall` SHALL enforce a deny-all default policy on all incoming P2P queries. A query from a peer SHALL be denied unless at least one ACL rule with `action="allow"` matches both the peer DID and tool name. An explicit `action="deny"` rule that matches SHALL immediately reject the query, overriding any prior allow. Rules SHALL be evaluated in insertion order. + +#### Scenario: Query allowed by explicit rule +- **WHEN** an ACL rule `{PeerDID: "did:lango:abc", Action: "allow", Tools: ["search"]}` exists and `FilterQuery("did:lango:abc", "search")` is called +- **THEN** `FilterQuery` SHALL return nil (allowed) + +#### Scenario: Query denied when no matching allow rule +- **WHEN** no ACL rule exists for the requesting peer DID and tool combination +- **THEN** `FilterQuery` SHALL return an error containing "no matching allow rule" + +#### Scenario: Explicit deny rule overrides allow +- **WHEN** both an allow rule and a deny rule match the same peer DID and tool +- **THEN** the deny rule SHALL cause `FilterQuery` to return an error containing "query denied by firewall rule" + +#### Scenario: Wildcard peer DID matches all peers +- **WHEN** an ACL rule has `PeerDID: "*"` and `Action: "allow"` with `Tools: ["*"]` +- **THEN** `FilterQuery` SHALL return nil for any peer DID and any tool name + +--- + +### Requirement: Per-Peer Rate Limiting + +The `Firewall` SHALL enforce per-peer rate limits using a token-bucket rate limiter keyed by peer DID. When an ACL rule specifies `RateLimit > 0`, a limiter SHALL be created allowing at most `RateLimit` requests per minute. A wildcard rate limiter on `PeerDID="*"` SHALL apply globally to all peers. Rate limit checks MUST occur before ACL evaluation. + +#### Scenario: Rate limit exceeded returns error +- **WHEN** a peer DID's rate limiter has no remaining tokens +- **THEN** `FilterQuery` SHALL return an error containing "rate limit exceeded" + +#### Scenario: Global wildcard rate limit applied +- **WHEN** a rule with `PeerDID="*"` and `RateLimit=60` exists and 61 requests arrive in one minute +- **THEN** the 61st request SHALL be denied with "global rate limit exceeded" + +#### Scenario: Peer without rate limit rule is not throttled +- **WHEN** no rate limit rule exists for a peer DID +- **THEN** the peer SHALL not be rate-limited regardless of request frequency + +--- + +### Requirement: Tool Name Pattern Matching + +ACL rule `Tools` fields SHALL support exact matches, prefix wildcard matching (e.g. `"search*"` matches `"search_web"` and `"search_local"`), and a bare `"*"` to match all tool names. An empty `Tools` slice SHALL match all tool names. + +#### Scenario: Exact tool name match +- **WHEN** a rule has `Tools: ["search_web"]` and `FilterQuery` is called with tool `"search_web"` +- **THEN** the rule SHALL match + +#### Scenario: Wildcard suffix tool match +- **WHEN** a rule has `Tools: ["search*"]` and `FilterQuery` is called with tool `"search_local"` +- **THEN** the rule SHALL match + +#### Scenario: Non-matching tool name +- **WHEN** a rule has `Tools: ["search"]` and `FilterQuery` is called with tool `"payment_send"` +- **THEN** the rule SHALL NOT match + +--- + +### Requirement: Response Sanitization + +`Firewall.SanitizeResponse` SHALL remove all fields from a response map whose names match sensitive key patterns (case-insensitive): `db_path`, `file_path`, `internal_id`, `_internal`, and any field containing `password`, `secret`, `private_key`, or `token`. String values containing absolute file paths of 3 or more path segments SHALL have the path replaced with `[path-redacted]`. Nested maps SHALL be sanitized recursively. + +#### Scenario: Sensitive key removed from response +- **WHEN** `SanitizeResponse` is called on `{"result": "ok", "private_key": "0xdeadbeef"}` +- **THEN** the returned map SHALL contain `"result"` but SHALL NOT contain `"private_key"` + +#### Scenario: File path in string value redacted +- **WHEN** a response string value contains `/home/user/.lango/data/bolt.db` +- **THEN** `SanitizeResponse` SHALL replace it with `[path-redacted]` + +#### Scenario: Nested sensitive fields removed +- **WHEN** `SanitizeResponse` is called on `{"data": {"token": "abc123", "value": 42}}` +- **THEN** the nested `"token"` field SHALL be removed and `"value"` SHALL be preserved + +--- + +### Requirement: ZK Attestation for Responses + +`Firewall.AttestResponse` SHALL call the configured `ZKAttestFunc` with the SHA-256 hash of the response and the SHA-256 hash of the agent's DID, returning the serialized ZK attestation proof. If no `ZKAttestFunc` is configured, the method SHALL return `(nil, nil)`. + +#### Scenario: Attestation proof generated when function configured +- **WHEN** `SetZKAttestFunc` has been called with a non-nil function and `AttestResponse` is called +- **THEN** `AttestResponse` SHALL invoke the function and return the resulting proof bytes + +#### Scenario: No attestation when function not configured +- **WHEN** `SetZKAttestFunc` has not been called and `AttestResponse` is called +- **THEN** `AttestResponse` SHALL return `(nil, nil)` without error + +--- + +### Requirement: Validate overly permissive ACL rules +The firewall SHALL provide a `ValidateRule()` function that rejects allow rules with wildcard peer (`"*"`) combined with wildcard tools (empty list or containing `"*"`). Deny rules SHALL always pass validation. + +#### Scenario: Wildcard peer with empty tools (allow) +- **WHEN** `ValidateRule` is called with `{PeerDID: "*", Action: "allow", Tools: []}` +- **THEN** it SHALL return an error "overly permissive rule: allow all peers with all tools is prohibited" + +#### Scenario: Wildcard peer with wildcard tool (allow) +- **WHEN** `ValidateRule` is called with `{PeerDID: "*", Action: "allow", Tools: ["*"]}` +- **THEN** it SHALL return an error + +#### Scenario: Wildcard peer with specific tools (allow) +- **WHEN** `ValidateRule` is called with `{PeerDID: "*", Action: "allow", Tools: ["echo"]}` +- **THEN** it SHALL return nil (allowed) + +#### Scenario: Specific peer with wildcard tools (allow) +- **WHEN** `ValidateRule` is called with `{PeerDID: "did:key:abc", Action: "allow", Tools: ["*"]}` +- **THEN** it SHALL return nil (allowed) + +#### Scenario: Wildcard deny rule +- **WHEN** `ValidateRule` is called with `{PeerDID: "*", Action: "deny", Tools: ["*"]}` +- **THEN** it SHALL return nil (deny rules always safe) + +### Requirement: Dynamic Rule Management + +`Firewall.AddRule` SHALL validate the rule using `ValidateRule()` before adding it. If validation fails, it SHALL return the error without adding the rule. On success, it SHALL append the ACL rule, create a rate limiter if `RateLimit > 0`, and return nil. `Firewall.RemoveRule` SHALL remove all rules matching the given peer DID and delete the associated rate limiter. `Firewall.Rules` SHALL return a copy of the current rule slice to prevent external mutation. + +#### Scenario: AddRule rejects overly permissive rule +- **WHEN** `AddRule` is called with a wildcard allow-all rule +- **THEN** it SHALL return an error and NOT add the rule to the firewall + +#### Scenario: AddRule accepts valid rule +- **WHEN** `AddRule` is called with a specific peer allow rule +- **THEN** it SHALL add the rule and return nil + +#### Scenario: Rule added at runtime takes immediate effect +- **WHEN** `AddRule` is called with an allow rule for a peer DID +- **THEN** subsequent `FilterQuery` calls for that peer DID SHALL be evaluated against the new rule + +#### Scenario: Rules returns independent copy +- **WHEN** the caller modifies the slice returned by `Firewall.Rules()` +- **THEN** the internal rule list SHALL NOT be affected + +### Requirement: Initial rules backward compatibility +When constructing a Firewall with `New()`, overly permissive initial rules SHALL be loaded with a warning log (not rejected). This preserves backward compatibility with existing configurations while alerting operators. + +#### Scenario: Overly permissive initial rule +- **WHEN** `New()` is called with a wildcard allow-all rule in the initial rules slice +- **THEN** the rule SHALL be loaded (backward compat) and a warning SHALL be logged diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-handshake/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-handshake/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7fddc44b --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-handshake/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: Challenge-Response Mutual Authentication + +The `Handshaker` SHALL implement a three-message challenge-response protocol over libp2p streams using protocol ID `/lango/handshake/1.0.0`. The initiator SHALL send a `Challenge` containing a 32-byte cryptographically random nonce, a Unix timestamp, and the sender's DID. The responder SHALL reply with a `ChallengeResponse` containing the echoed nonce, the responder's DID, the responder's compressed public key, and either a ZK proof or an ECDSA signature. The initiator SHALL send a `SessionAck` containing the session token and expiry on successful verification. + +#### Scenario: Successful handshake with ECDSA signature +- **WHEN** `Handshaker.Initiate` is called with `ZKEnabled=false` and the remote peer completes the challenge-response +- **THEN** `Initiate` SHALL return a valid `*Session` with `ZKVerified=false` and the remote DID populated + +#### Scenario: Successful handshake with ZK proof +- **WHEN** `Handshaker.Initiate` is called with `ZKEnabled=true` and the remote peer returns a ZK proof +- **THEN** `Initiate` SHALL call the `ZKVerifierFunc`, and if valid, return a `*Session` with `ZKVerified=true` + +#### Scenario: ZK proof verification failure rejects handshake +- **WHEN** the `ZKVerifierFunc` returns `false` for the received ZK proof +- **THEN** `Handshaker.Initiate` SHALL return an error containing "ZK proof invalid" + +#### Scenario: Nonce mismatch rejects response +- **WHEN** the `ChallengeResponse` nonce differs from the nonce in the `Challenge` +- **THEN** `verifyResponse` SHALL return an error containing "nonce mismatch" using constant-time comparison (`hmac.Equal`) + +#### Scenario: Valid ECDSA signature accepted +- **WHEN** a challenge response contains a 65-byte ECDSA signature that recovers to a public key matching `resp.PublicKey` +- **THEN** the verifier SHALL accept the response as authenticated + +#### Scenario: Invalid signature rejected (public key mismatch) +- **WHEN** a challenge response contains a signature that recovers to a public key NOT matching `resp.PublicKey` +- **THEN** the verifier SHALL reject the response with "signature public key mismatch" error + +#### Scenario: Wrong signature length rejected +- **WHEN** a challenge response contains a signature that is not exactly 65 bytes +- **THEN** the verifier SHALL reject the response with "invalid signature length" error + +#### Scenario: Corrupted signature rejected +- **WHEN** a challenge response contains a 65-byte signature that cannot be recovered to a valid public key +- **THEN** the verifier SHALL reject the response with an error + +#### Scenario: Response with neither proof nor signature rejected +- **WHEN** the `ChallengeResponse` has empty `ZKProof` and empty `Signature` +- **THEN** `verifyResponse` SHALL return an error containing "no proof or signature in response" + +#### Scenario: Handshake timeout enforced +- **WHEN** the remote peer does not respond within `cfg.Timeout` duration +- **THEN** `Handshaker.Initiate` SHALL return a context deadline exceeded error + +--- + +### Requirement: Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) Approval on Incoming Handshake + +When a peer initiates an incoming handshake, the `Handshaker.HandleIncoming` method MUST invoke the `ApprovalFunc` before sending a response. If the user denies approval, the handshake SHALL be rejected with an error containing "handshake denied by user". Known peers with an active unexpired session MAY be auto-approved if `AutoApproveKnown=true`. + +#### Scenario: New peer requires user approval +- **WHEN** `HandleIncoming` is called and no existing session exists for the sender's DID +- **THEN** `ApprovalFunc` SHALL be called with a `PendingHandshake` containing the peer ID, DID, remote address, and timestamp + +#### Scenario: User denies incoming handshake +- **WHEN** the `ApprovalFunc` returns `(false, nil)` +- **THEN** `HandleIncoming` SHALL return an error containing "handshake denied by user" and SHALL NOT send a response + +#### Scenario: Known peer with AutoApproveKnown skips approval +- **WHEN** `HandleIncoming` is called, `AutoApproveKnown=true`, and a valid session already exists for the sender's DID +- **THEN** `ApprovalFunc` SHALL NOT be called and the handshake SHALL proceed directly to response generation + +#### Scenario: ApprovalFunc error propagates +- **WHEN** `ApprovalFunc` returns a non-nil error +- **THEN** `HandleIncoming` SHALL return a wrapped error and SHALL NOT proceed with the handshake + +--- + +### Requirement: ZK Proof Fallback to Signature + +When `ZKEnabled=true` but the `ZKProverFunc` returns an error, `HandleIncoming` SHALL fall back to ECDSA wallet signature. The fallback MUST be logged as a warning. The response SHALL contain the signature in the `Signature` field with `ZKProof` empty. + +#### Scenario: ZK prover failure triggers signature fallback +- **WHEN** `ZKProverFunc` returns an error during `HandleIncoming` +- **THEN** the handler SHALL log a warning, call `wallet.SignMessage` with the challenge nonce, and set `resp.Signature` + +#### Scenario: Signature fallback failure rejects handshake +- **WHEN** `ZKProverFunc` fails AND `wallet.SignMessage` also returns an error +- **THEN** `HandleIncoming` SHALL return a wrapped error containing "sign challenge" + +--- + +### Requirement: Constant-time nonce comparison +The handshake verifier SHALL use `hmac.Equal()` for nonce comparison to prevent timing side-channel attacks. + +#### Scenario: Nonce mismatch detected securely +- **WHEN** the response nonce does not match the challenge nonce +- **THEN** the verifier SHALL reject the response with "nonce mismatch" error using constant-time comparison + +--- + +### Requirement: Signature verification +The handshake verifier SHALL perform full ECDSA secp256k1 signature verification by recovering the public key from the signature using `ethcrypto.SigToPub()` and comparing it with the claimed public key via `ethcrypto.CompressPubkey()`, instead of accepting any non-empty signature. + +#### Scenario: Valid signature accepted +- **WHEN** a challenge response contains a 65-byte ECDSA signature that recovers to a public key matching `resp.PublicKey` +- **THEN** the verifier SHALL accept the response as authenticated + +#### Scenario: Invalid signature rejected +- **WHEN** a challenge response contains a signature that recovers to a public key NOT matching `resp.PublicKey` +- **THEN** the verifier SHALL reject the response with "signature public key mismatch" error + +#### Scenario: Wrong signature length rejected +- **WHEN** a challenge response contains a signature that is not exactly 65 bytes +- **THEN** the verifier SHALL reject the response with "invalid signature length" error + +#### Scenario: Corrupted signature rejected +- **WHEN** a challenge response contains a 65-byte signature that cannot be recovered to a valid public key +- **THEN** the verifier SHALL reject the response with an error + +#### Scenario: No proof or signature rejected +- **WHEN** a challenge response contains neither a ZK proof nor a signature +- **THEN** the verifier SHALL reject the response with "no proof or signature in response" error + +--- + +### Requirement: Session Store with TTL Eviction + +The `SessionStore` SHALL store authenticated peer sessions keyed by peer DID. Session tokens SHALL be generated as HMAC-SHA256 over random bytes and the peer DID using a 32-byte randomly generated HMAC key created at store initialization. Sessions SHALL have a configurable TTL. Expired sessions SHALL be evicted lazily on access and proactively via `Cleanup()`. + +#### Scenario: Session created with correct fields +- **WHEN** `SessionStore.Create("did:lango:abc", true)` is called +- **THEN** a `Session` SHALL be stored with `PeerDID="did:lango:abc"`, `ZKVerified=true`, a non-empty `Token`, and `ExpiresAt = now + TTL` + +#### Scenario: Valid session token validates successfully +- **WHEN** `SessionStore.Validate(peerDID, token)` is called with the correct peerDID and token from an unexpired session +- **THEN** `Validate` SHALL return `true` + +#### Scenario: Expired session returns false on validation +- **WHEN** `SessionStore.Validate` is called and the session's `ExpiresAt` is in the past +- **THEN** `Validate` SHALL return `false` and SHALL remove the session from the store + +#### Scenario: Session cleanup removes all expired entries +- **WHEN** `SessionStore.Cleanup()` is called +- **THEN** all sessions where `ExpiresAt` is before `time.Now()` SHALL be deleted and the count of removed sessions SHALL be returned diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-identity/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-identity/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d024ceaa --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-identity/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: DID Derivation from Wallet Public Key + +The `WalletDIDProvider` SHALL derive a decentralized identifier (DID) deterministically from the compressed secp256k1 public key returned by `WalletProvider.PublicKey()`. The DID format SHALL be `did:lango:`. The derived DID SHALL be cached after the first derivation; subsequent calls to `DID()` SHALL return the cached value without calling the wallet again. + +#### Scenario: DID derived on first call +- **WHEN** `WalletDIDProvider.DID(ctx)` is called for the first time +- **THEN** the provider SHALL call `wallet.PublicKey(ctx)`, construct a DID with prefix `did:lango:`, encode the public key as lowercase hex, and cache the result + +#### Scenario: DID returned from cache on subsequent calls +- **WHEN** `WalletDIDProvider.DID(ctx)` is called after a successful first call +- **THEN** the provider SHALL return the cached DID without calling `wallet.PublicKey` again + +#### Scenario: Wallet public key error propagates +- **WHEN** `wallet.PublicKey(ctx)` returns an error +- **THEN** `WalletDIDProvider.DID(ctx)` SHALL return a nil DID and a wrapped error; the cache SHALL NOT be populated + +--- + +### Requirement: Peer ID Derivation from secp256k1 Public Key + +The system SHALL derive a libp2p `peer.ID` from a compressed secp256k1 public key by unmarshaling it via `crypto.UnmarshalSecp256k1PublicKey` and calling `peer.IDFromPublicKey`. The derived `peer.ID` SHALL be embedded in the `DID` struct. This mapping SHALL be deterministic: the same public key always produces the same peer ID. + +#### Scenario: Valid compressed public key produces peer ID +- **WHEN** `DIDFromPublicKey` is called with a valid 33-byte compressed secp256k1 public key +- **THEN** a `DID` struct SHALL be returned with a non-empty `PeerID` field derived from the key + +#### Scenario: Empty public key rejected +- **WHEN** `DIDFromPublicKey` is called with an empty byte slice +- **THEN** the function SHALL return an error containing "empty public key" + +#### Scenario: Invalid public key bytes rejected +- **WHEN** `DIDFromPublicKey` is called with malformed bytes that are not a valid secp256k1 point +- **THEN** the function SHALL return an error from `crypto.UnmarshalSecp256k1PublicKey` + +--- + +### Requirement: DID Verification Against Peer ID + +The `WalletDIDProvider.VerifyDID` method SHALL re-derive the `peer.ID` from the public key embedded in a `DID` struct and compare it to the claimed `peer.ID`. If they do not match, the method MUST return an error describing the mismatch. A nil DID MUST return an error. + +#### Scenario: Valid DID matches peer ID +- **WHEN** `VerifyDID` is called with a DID whose public key was used to derive the provided peer ID +- **THEN** `VerifyDID` SHALL return nil (no error) + +#### Scenario: DID public key does not match claimed peer ID +- **WHEN** `VerifyDID` is called with a DID whose public key produces a different peer ID than the one provided +- **THEN** `VerifyDID` SHALL return an error containing "peer ID mismatch" + +#### Scenario: Nil DID rejected +- **WHEN** `VerifyDID` is called with a nil `DID` pointer +- **THEN** `VerifyDID` SHALL return an error containing "nil DID" + +--- + +### Requirement: DID Parsing from String + +`ParseDID` SHALL parse a DID string in `did:lango:` format. It MUST validate the `did:lango:` prefix, decode the hex-encoded public key, and derive the peer ID. Any malformed input SHALL result in an error. + +#### Scenario: Valid DID string parsed +- **WHEN** `ParseDID("did:lango:")` is called +- **THEN** the function SHALL return a `DID` struct with the correct `ID`, `PublicKey`, and `PeerID` fields + +#### Scenario: Missing prefix rejected +- **WHEN** `ParseDID` is called with a string that does not start with `did:lango:` +- **THEN** the function SHALL return an error containing "invalid DID scheme" + +#### Scenario: Empty key portion rejected +- **WHEN** `ParseDID("did:lango:")` is called with an empty hex key +- **THEN** the function SHALL return an error containing "empty public key in DID" + +#### Scenario: Non-hex key portion rejected +- **WHEN** `ParseDID("did:lango:gg00ff")` is called with invalid hex characters +- **THEN** the function SHALL return an error from hex decoding + +--- + +### Requirement: Identity command output +The `lango p2p identity` command SHALL display `keyStorage` information (either "secrets-store" or "file") instead of the raw `keyDir` filesystem path. + +#### Scenario: Identity with encrypted storage +- **WHEN** the user runs `lango p2p identity` and SecretsStore is available +- **THEN** the output SHALL show `Key Storage: secrets-store` instead of a directory path + +#### Scenario: Identity with file storage +- **WHEN** the user runs `lango p2p identity` and SecretsStore is not available +- **THEN** the output SHALL show `Key Storage: file` + +#### Scenario: JSON output reflects key storage +- **WHEN** the user runs `lango p2p identity --json` +- **THEN** the JSON SHALL contain `"keyStorage": "secrets-store"` or `"keyStorage": "file"` instead of `"keyDir"` diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-networking/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-networking/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..734c00ac --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-networking/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: libp2p Node Lifecycle + +The P2P `Node` SHALL encapsulate a libp2p host with an Ed25519 identity key. When `*security.SecretsStore` is provided, the key SHALL be stored encrypted in SecretsStore under `p2p.node.privatekey`. When SecretsStore is nil, the key SHALL be persisted at `{keyDir}/node.key` for backward compatibility. The node key SHALL be loaded on startup (priority: SecretsStore → legacy file → generate new), ensuring peer identity survives restarts. The node MUST use Noise protocol encryption on all connections. + +#### Scenario: Node key persists across restarts +- **WHEN** a `Node` is created and a node key exists (in SecretsStore or as `node.key`) +- **THEN** the node SHALL load the existing key and present the same peer ID as the previous instance + +#### Scenario: Node key generated on first start +- **WHEN** a `Node` is created and no node key exists +- **THEN** the node SHALL generate a new Ed25519 keypair, persist it (to SecretsStore if available, else to `node.key` with `0600`), and use it as the peer identity + +#### Scenario: Node creation with invalid keyDir +- **WHEN** `NewNode` is called with a `keyDir` path that cannot be created and SecretsStore is nil +- **THEN** `NewNode` SHALL return an error and SHALL NOT start any host or network listener + +--- + +### Requirement: Node constructor accepts SecretsStore +`NewNode()` SHALL accept an optional `*security.SecretsStore` parameter for encrypted node key management. When nil, file-based storage is used. + +#### Scenario: Node created with SecretsStore +- **WHEN** `NewNode(cfg, logger, secrets)` is called with a non-nil SecretsStore +- **THEN** the node SHALL use SecretsStore for key storage + +#### Scenario: Node created without SecretsStore +- **WHEN** `NewNode(cfg, logger, nil)` is called +- **THEN** the node SHALL fall back to file-based key storage in `cfg.KeyDir` + +--- + +### Requirement: Kademlia DHT Bootstrap + +The `Node.Start` method SHALL initialize a Kademlia DHT in `ModeAutoServer` and call `Bootstrap` to enter the DHT routing table. The node SHALL attempt to connect to each configured bootstrap peer concurrently using goroutines bounded by the caller-provided `sync.WaitGroup`. Bootstrap peer connection failures MUST be logged as warnings and SHALL NOT prevent the node from starting. + +#### Scenario: Successful DHT bootstrap with bootstrap peers +- **WHEN** `Node.Start` is called with one or more valid bootstrap peer multiaddrs +- **THEN** the node SHALL connect to each bootstrap peer and log "connected to bootstrap peer" + +#### Scenario: Invalid bootstrap peer address +- **WHEN** a configured bootstrap peer address is not a valid multiaddr +- **THEN** the node SHALL log a warning with the invalid address and SHALL continue starting with the remaining peers + +#### Scenario: DHT bootstrap failure +- **WHEN** `dht.Bootstrap` returns an error +- **THEN** `Node.Start` SHALL call the context cancel function, close the DHT, and return a wrapped error + +--- + +### Requirement: mDNS LAN Discovery + +When `cfg.EnableMDNS` is true, the `Node.Start` method SHALL start an mDNS service using the libp2p `mdns.NewMdnsService`. The mDNS notifee SHALL automatically connect to discovered LAN peers. The node's own peer ID SHALL be excluded from connection attempts. mDNS startup failures MUST be logged as warnings and SHALL NOT prevent the node from completing startup. + +#### Scenario: mDNS peer discovery and auto-connect +- **WHEN** a peer on the same LAN broadcasts its presence via mDNS +- **THEN** the local node SHALL call `host.Connect` with the discovered peer info and log "mDNS peer discovered" + +#### Scenario: mDNS discovers own peer ID +- **WHEN** the mDNS service receives a discovery event for the local node's own peer ID +- **THEN** the notifee SHALL silently ignore the event and SHALL NOT attempt to connect to itself + +--- + +### Requirement: Connection Manager Watermarks + +The `Node` SHALL create a `connmgr.ConnManager` with `maxPeers` as the high watermark and `maxPeers * 80 / 100` as the low watermark. The connection manager MUST trim excess connections when the high watermark is reached, pruning down to the low watermark. + +#### Scenario: Connections pruned at high watermark +- **WHEN** the number of connected peers reaches `cfg.MaxPeers` +- **THEN** the connection manager SHALL trim the least-recently-used connections until the peer count reaches the low watermark + +#### Scenario: Zero maxPeers rejected +- **WHEN** `connmgr.NewConnManager` is called with a zero or negative high watermark +- **THEN** `NewNode` SHALL return an error from the connection manager initialization + +--- + +### Requirement: Graceful Shutdown + +`Node.Stop` SHALL cancel the internal context, close the mDNS service (if started), close the DHT, and close the libp2p host in that order. Any error from DHT or host close SHALL be returned. mDNS close errors MUST be logged as warnings and SHALL NOT prevent further shutdown steps. + +#### Scenario: Clean stop sequence +- **WHEN** `Node.Stop` is called on a running node +- **THEN** the node SHALL cancel its context, close mDNS, close the DHT, close the host, and log "P2P node stopped" + +#### Scenario: Stop on partially initialized node +- **WHEN** `Node.Stop` is called on a node where `Start` was not called +- **THEN** `Node.Stop` SHALL return nil without panicking (nil checks on `cancel`, `mdnsSvc`, and `dht`) + +--- + +### Requirement: Protocol Stream Handler Registration + +The `Node.SetStreamHandler` method SHALL register a `network.StreamHandler` for the given protocol ID on the underlying libp2p host. The `Node.Host()` method SHALL expose the underlying `host.Host` for direct protocol registration by sub-packages. + +#### Scenario: Stream handler registration +- **WHEN** `Node.SetStreamHandler("/lango/a2a/1.0.0", handler)` is called +- **THEN** all incoming streams with protocol `/lango/a2a/1.0.0` SHALL be dispatched to `handler` diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-node-key-encryption/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-node-key-encryption/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9d4fe9af --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-node-key-encryption/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +## Purpose + +Encrypted storage of P2P Ed25519 node keys using SecretsStore (AES-256-GCM), with auto-migration from legacy plaintext files and backward-compatible fallback. + +--- + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P node key encrypted storage +The system SHALL store P2P Ed25519 node keys in `SecretsStore` (AES-256-GCM) under the key name `p2p.node.privatekey` instead of as plaintext files. + +#### Scenario: New node key generation with SecretsStore available +- **WHEN** a P2P node starts for the first time and `SecretsStore` is available +- **THEN** the system SHALL generate an Ed25519 key, store it encrypted in SecretsStore under `p2p.node.privatekey`, and NOT create a plaintext `node.key` file + +#### Scenario: Existing key loaded from SecretsStore +- **WHEN** a P2P node starts and SecretsStore contains `p2p.node.privatekey` +- **THEN** the system SHALL load and decrypt the key from SecretsStore without checking the filesystem + +--- + +### Requirement: Legacy key auto-migration +The system SHALL automatically migrate plaintext `node.key` files to SecretsStore when both a legacy file exists and SecretsStore is available. + +#### Scenario: Auto-migration of legacy node key +- **WHEN** a P2P node starts, SecretsStore is available, SecretsStore does NOT contain `p2p.node.privatekey`, and a plaintext `node.key` file exists +- **THEN** the system SHALL store the key in SecretsStore, delete the plaintext file, and log an info message confirming migration + +#### Scenario: Migration failure is non-fatal +- **WHEN** migration to SecretsStore fails (e.g., DB locked) +- **THEN** the system SHALL log a warning, continue using the legacy file, and retry migration on next startup + +--- + +### Requirement: Fallback to file-based storage +The system SHALL fall back to file-based key storage when `SecretsStore` is nil (not available). + +#### Scenario: New key without SecretsStore +- **WHEN** a P2P node starts for the first time and `SecretsStore` is nil +- **THEN** the system SHALL generate an Ed25519 key and write it to `keyDir/node.key` with `0600` permissions + +#### Scenario: Existing key loaded from file without SecretsStore +- **WHEN** a P2P node starts, `SecretsStore` is nil, and `keyDir/node.key` exists +- **THEN** the system SHALL load the key from the file + +--- + +### Requirement: Key material memory cleanup +The system SHALL zero all key material byte slices from memory immediately after use using the `zeroBytes()` pattern. + +#### Scenario: Key bytes zeroed after load +- **WHEN** node key bytes are loaded from SecretsStore or file +- **THEN** the raw byte slice SHALL be overwritten with zeros via `defer zeroBytes(data)` before the function returns diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-owner-shield/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-owner-shield/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5956b6a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-owner-shield/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +## Purpose + +Hard-block privacy layer that prevents owner PII from being leaked through P2P responses, regardless of payment amount. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: PII Redaction +The system SHALL redact owner personal information from all P2P responses. + +#### Scenario: Owner name in response +- **WHEN** a P2P response contains the configured owner name +- **THEN** the system replaces it with "[owner-data-redacted]" + +#### Scenario: Email pattern in response +- **WHEN** a P2P response contains an email address matching the configured owner email or general email patterns +- **THEN** the system replaces it with "[owner-data-redacted]" + +#### Scenario: Phone pattern in response +- **WHEN** a P2P response contains a phone number matching the configured owner phone or general phone patterns +- **THEN** the system replaces it with "[owner-data-redacted]" + +### Requirement: Conversation Blocking +The system SHALL block conversation history fields from P2P responses by default. + +#### Scenario: Conversation data in response +- **WHEN** a P2P response contains keys like "conversation", "message_history", "chat_log", "session_history", or "chat_history" +- **THEN** the system replaces the value with "[owner-data-redacted]" + +#### Scenario: Conversation blocking disabled +- **WHEN** blockConversations is explicitly set to false +- **THEN** conversation fields are not redacted + +### Requirement: Recursive Scanning +The system SHALL recursively scan nested maps and slices for owner data. + +#### Scenario: Nested PII +- **WHEN** owner data appears in a deeply nested map within the response +- **THEN** the system detects and redacts it diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-payment-gate/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-payment-gate/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dea9f2a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-payment-gate/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +## Purpose + +Payment gate that sits between the P2P firewall and tool executor, enforcing USDC payment requirements for paid tool invocations using EIP-3009 pre-signed authorizations. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: Price Query +The system SHALL allow remote peers to query tool pricing before invocation. + +#### Scenario: Free tool query +- **WHEN** a peer queries the price of a tool with no configured price +- **THEN** the system returns isFree=true + +#### Scenario: Paid tool query +- **WHEN** a peer queries the price of a tool with configured pricing +- **THEN** the system returns a PriceQuote containing toolName, price, currency, USDC contract, chainId, sellerAddr, and quoteExpiry + +### Requirement: Payment Verification +The system SHALL verify EIP-3009 payment authorizations before executing paid tools. + +#### Scenario: Valid authorization +- **WHEN** a paid tool invocation includes a valid EIP-3009 authorization with correct recipient, sufficient amount, and unexpired deadline +- **THEN** the system returns StatusVerified and proceeds with tool execution + +#### Scenario: Missing authorization +- **WHEN** a paid tool invocation does not include paymentAuth +- **THEN** the system returns StatusPaymentRequired with a PriceQuote + +#### Scenario: Insufficient payment +- **WHEN** the authorization value is less than the tool price +- **THEN** the system returns StatusInvalid with reason "insufficient payment" + +#### Scenario: Expired authorization +- **WHEN** the authorization's validBefore is in the past +- **THEN** the system returns StatusInvalid with reason "payment authorization expired" + +### Requirement: Canonical USDC Verification +The system SHALL verify that the USDC contract address matches the canonical address for the chain. + +#### Scenario: Non-canonical contract +- **WHEN** the configured USDC contract does not match the canonical address for the chain +- **THEN** the system returns StatusInvalid with reason indicating non-canonical USDC contract diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-payment/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-payment/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4fd22390 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-payment/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: p2p_pay Tool for Peer-to-Peer USDC Payment + +The system SHALL expose a `p2p_pay` agent tool (safety level: `Dangerous`) that sends a USDC payment on the Base blockchain to a connected peer identified by their DID. The tool SHALL require `peer_did` and `amount` parameters and MAY accept an optional `memo`. The tool SHALL NOT be available if the payment service is not initialized. + +#### Scenario: Successful payment to connected peer +- **WHEN** `p2p_pay` is called with a valid `peer_did` and `amount` for a peer with an active session +- **THEN** the tool SHALL submit a USDC transfer and return a receipt containing `txHash`, `from`, `to`, `peerDID`, `amount`, `currency`, `chainId`, `memo`, and `timestamp` + +#### Scenario: Payment rejected when no active session +- **WHEN** `p2p_pay` is called with a `peer_did` for which no active session exists in the `SessionStore` +- **THEN** the tool SHALL return an error containing "no active session for peer" and SHALL NOT submit any transaction + +#### Scenario: Missing required parameters rejected +- **WHEN** `p2p_pay` is called without `peer_did` or without `amount` +- **THEN** the tool SHALL return an error containing "peer_did and amount are required" + +#### Scenario: Tool unavailable without payment service +- **WHEN** the application is initialized with `payment.enabled=false` +- **THEN** `buildP2PPaymentTool` SHALL return nil and `p2p_pay` SHALL NOT be registered with the agent + +--- + +### Requirement: Recipient Address Derivation from DID + +The `p2p_pay` tool SHALL derive the recipient's Ethereum wallet address from their DID by parsing the DID using `identity.ParseDID`, extracting the 33-byte compressed secp256k1 public key, and using the first 20 bytes as the Ethereum address (formatted as `0x`). An invalid or unparseable DID MUST cause the tool to return an error before any payment is attempted. + +#### Scenario: Valid DID yields deterministic Ethereum address +- **WHEN** `p2p_pay` is called with `peer_did="did:lango:<33-byte-pubkey-hex>"` +- **THEN** the payment SHALL be sent to `0x` as the `To` address + +#### Scenario: Unparseable DID returns error +- **WHEN** `p2p_pay` is called with `peer_did="invalid"` (no `did:lango:` prefix) +- **THEN** the tool SHALL return an error containing "parse peer DID" + +--- + +### Requirement: P2P Requirement for Payment Feature + +The P2P subsystem SHALL require `payment.enabled=true` at configuration validation time. If a user configures `p2p.enabled=true` without `payment.enabled=true`, the configuration loader MUST reject the configuration with an error containing "p2p requires payment.enabled (wallet needed for identity)". This enforces that a wallet is always present for DID derivation when P2P is active. + +#### Scenario: P2P with payment enabled accepted +- **WHEN** the configuration has `p2p.enabled=true` and `payment.enabled=true` +- **THEN** configuration validation SHALL succeed + +#### Scenario: P2P without payment rejected +- **WHEN** the configuration has `p2p.enabled=true` and `payment.enabled=false` +- **THEN** configuration validation SHALL return an error containing "p2p requires payment.enabled" + +--- + +### Requirement: Default Payment Memo + +When the `memo` parameter is not provided or is an empty string, the `p2p_pay` tool SHALL use `"P2P payment"` as the default memo value in the `PaymentRequest.Purpose` field. + +#### Scenario: Empty memo defaults to "P2P payment" +- **WHEN** `p2p_pay` is called without a `memo` parameter +- **THEN** the `PaymentRequest.Purpose` field SHALL be `"P2P payment"` + +#### Scenario: Provided memo is used as-is +- **WHEN** `p2p_pay` is called with `memo="service fee for code review"` +- **THEN** the `PaymentRequest.Purpose` field SHALL be `"service fee for code review"` + +--- + +### Requirement: Spending Limit Enforcement on P2P Payments + +P2P payments SHALL be subject to the same `SpendingLimiter` constraints as all other USDC transfers. The `payment.Service.Send` method SHALL check per-transaction and daily spending limits before submitting the transaction. If the payment would exceed any limit, `Send` SHALL return an error and no transaction SHALL be submitted. + +#### Scenario: Payment within limits succeeds +- **WHEN** the requested amount is within both per-transaction and daily remaining limits +- **THEN** the payment SHALL be submitted and a receipt returned + +#### Scenario: Payment exceeding per-transaction limit rejected +- **WHEN** the requested amount exceeds `maxPerTx` +- **THEN** `payment.Service.Send` SHALL return an error containing "exceeds per-transaction limit" and `p2p_pay` SHALL propagate it diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-pricing-cli/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-pricing-cli/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3b3c67db --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-pricing-cli/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +## Purpose + +CLI subcommand and REST endpoint for querying P2P tool pricing configuration. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: CLI pricing command +The system SHALL provide a `lango p2p pricing` CLI command that displays P2P tool pricing configuration. + +#### Scenario: Show all pricing +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p pricing` +- **THEN** system displays enabled status, default per-query price, and tool-specific price overrides in table format + +#### Scenario: Show pricing for specific tool +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p pricing --tool "knowledge_search"` +- **THEN** system displays the price for that specific tool (or default per-query price if no override) + +#### Scenario: Show pricing as JSON +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p pricing --json` +- **THEN** system outputs full pricing config as JSON to stdout + +### Requirement: CLI pricing registered as subcommand +The `pricing` command SHALL be registered as a subcommand of `lango p2p` in `internal/cli/p2p/p2p.go`. + +#### Scenario: Help shows pricing command +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p --help` +- **THEN** output lists `pricing` as an available subcommand diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-protocol/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-protocol/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e6e84af7 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-protocol/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: A2A-over-P2P Message Protocol + +The system SHALL implement A2A message exchange over libp2p streams using protocol ID `/lango/a2a/1.0.0`. All messages SHALL be JSON-encoded. Each `Request` SHALL carry a `type` field (`tool_invoke`, `capability_query`, or `agent_card`), a `sessionToken`, a UUID `requestId`, and an optional `payload` map. Each `Response` SHALL carry the matching `requestId`, a `status` field (`"ok"`, `"error"`, or `"denied"`), an optional `result` map, an optional `error` string, an optional `attestationProof` byte slice, and a `timestamp`. + +#### Scenario: Tool invoke request routed to executor +- **WHEN** an incoming stream delivers a `Request` with `type="tool_invoke"` and `payload.toolName="search"` +- **THEN** the `Handler` SHALL call the registered `ToolExecutor` with the tool name and params map + +#### Scenario: Agent card request served +- **WHEN** an incoming stream delivers a `Request` with `type="agent_card"` +- **THEN** the `Handler` SHALL call the `CardProvider` function and return its result with `status="ok"` + +#### Scenario: Capability query returns agent card +- **WHEN** an incoming stream delivers a `Request` with `type="capability_query"` +- **THEN** the `Handler` SHALL return the agent card contents with `status="ok"` as a capability listing + +#### Scenario: Unknown request type returns error +- **WHEN** an incoming stream delivers a `Request` with an unrecognized `type` value +- **THEN** the `Handler` SHALL return a `Response` with `status="error"` and an error describing the unknown type + +--- + +### Requirement: Session Token Validation on Every Request + +The `Handler` SHALL validate the session token on every incoming request before dispatching to the type-specific handler. Token validation SHALL iterate over all active sessions in the `SessionStore` and check for a matching token using `SessionStore.Validate`. If no session matches, the handler MUST return a `Response` with `status="denied"` and `error="invalid or expired session token"`. + +#### Scenario: Valid session token grants access +- **WHEN** a `Request` arrives with a `sessionToken` that matches an active non-expired session +- **THEN** the handler SHALL resolve the peer DID and proceed with the request + +#### Scenario: Invalid session token denied +- **WHEN** a `Request` arrives with a `sessionToken` that does not match any active session +- **THEN** the handler SHALL return `{"status": "denied", "error": "invalid or expired session token"}` + +#### Scenario: Expired session token denied +- **WHEN** a `Request` arrives with a token from a session whose `ExpiresAt` is in the past +- **THEN** the handler SHALL return `{"status": "denied"}` and the expired session SHALL be removed from the store + +--- + +### Requirement: Firewall Enforcement on Tool Invocations + +The `Handler.handleToolInvoke` method MUST call `Firewall.FilterQuery(peerDID, toolName)` before executing any tool. A non-nil error from the firewall SHALL cause the handler to return a `Response` with `status="denied"`. The tool executor SHALL NOT be called if the firewall rejects the query. + +#### Scenario: Firewall blocks unauthorized tool +- **WHEN** a peer requests a tool that is not in its allow list +- **THEN** `handleToolInvoke` SHALL return `{"status": "denied"}` without calling the `ToolExecutor` + +#### Scenario: Missing toolName in payload +- **WHEN** a `tool_invoke` request arrives with no `toolName` field in the payload +- **THEN** the handler SHALL return `{"status": "error", "error": "missing toolName in payload"}` + +--- + +### Requirement: Response Sanitization and ZK Attestation on Tool Results + +After successful tool execution, the `Handler` SHALL pass the result through `Firewall.SanitizeResponse` to remove sensitive fields. If a `ZKAttestFunc` is configured on the firewall, the handler SHALL compute a SHA-256 hash of the sanitized result and the local agent DID and include the resulting attestation proof in `Response.AttestationProof`. + +#### Scenario: Tool result sanitized before returning +- **WHEN** a tool returns a result containing a sensitive field (e.g., `"token": "secret"`) +- **THEN** the `Response.Result` SHALL have the sensitive field removed + +#### Scenario: ZK attestation included when available +- **WHEN** the firewall has a `ZKAttestFunc` configured and a tool invocation succeeds +- **THEN** `Response.AttestationProof` SHALL contain a non-empty byte slice + +--- + +### Requirement: P2PRemoteAgent Adapter + +The `P2PRemoteAgent` SHALL implement a remote agent adapter that wraps a peer ID and session token to send requests over P2P streams. `InvokeTool` SHALL open a new libp2p stream to the peer's ID using protocol `/lango/a2a/1.0.0`, encode the tool invoke request, and decode the response. Non-"ok" responses MUST return an error using the `Response.Error` field. `QueryCapabilities` and `FetchAgentCard` SHALL use the same stream-open-encode-decode pattern. + +#### Scenario: InvokeTool sends request and returns result +- **WHEN** `P2PRemoteAgent.InvokeTool(ctx, "search", params)` is called +- **THEN** a new stream to the target peer SHALL be opened, a `tool_invoke` request encoded, and the `Response.Result` returned on `status="ok"` + +#### Scenario: Remote error response propagated +- **WHEN** the remote `Handler` returns `{"status": "error", "error": "tool not found"}` +- **THEN** `InvokeTool` SHALL return an error containing "tool not found" + +#### Scenario: Stream open failure returns error +- **WHEN** `host.NewStream` fails (e.g., peer unreachable) +- **THEN** `InvokeTool` SHALL return a wrapped error containing "open stream to" + +#### Scenario: ZK attestation proof logged on receipt +- **WHEN** `InvokeTool` receives a `Response` with a non-empty `AttestationProof` +- **THEN** the adapter SHALL log "response has ZK attestation" at debug level + +--- + +### Requirement: ToolApprovalFunc callback type +The protocol package SHALL define a `ToolApprovalFunc` callback type with signature `func(ctx context.Context, peerDID, toolName string, params map[string]interface{}) (bool, error)` that asks the local owner for approval before executing a remote tool invocation. + +#### Scenario: Approval function defined +- **WHEN** the protocol package is compiled +- **THEN** ToolApprovalFunc type SHALL be available for use by callers + +### Requirement: Tool invocation approval check +The protocol handler SHALL deny tool invocation requests when no approval handler (`approvalFn`) is configured. The handler MUST return a response with status "denied" and error message "no approval handler configured for remote tool invocation". This applies to both free (`tool_invoke`) and paid (`tool_invoke_paid`) request types. + +#### Scenario: No approval handler configured for tool_invoke +- **WHEN** a remote peer sends a `tool_invoke` request and `approvalFn` is nil +- **THEN** the handler SHALL return status "denied" with error "no approval handler configured for remote tool invocation" + +#### Scenario: No approval handler configured for tool_invoke_paid +- **WHEN** a remote peer sends a `tool_invoke_paid` request and `approvalFn` is nil +- **THEN** the handler SHALL return status "denied" with error "no approval handler configured for remote tool invocation" + +#### Scenario: Approval handler configured and approves +- **WHEN** a remote peer sends a `tool_invoke` request and `approvalFn` returns (true, nil) +- **THEN** the handler SHALL proceed to execute the tool and return status "ok" + +#### Scenario: Approval handler configured and denies +- **WHEN** a remote peer sends a `tool_invoke` request and `approvalFn` returns (false, nil) +- **THEN** the handler SHALL return status "denied" with error "tool invocation denied by owner" + +#### Scenario: Approval handler returns error +- **WHEN** a remote peer sends a `tool_invoke` request and `approvalFn` returns an error +- **THEN** the handler SHALL return status "error" with the approval error message + +### Requirement: Handler owner approval for paid tool invocations +Handler.handleToolInvokePaid SHALL check the approvalFn callback after payment verification and before tool execution. If `approvalFn` is nil, the handler SHALL return "denied" with error "no approval handler configured for remote tool invocation". + +#### Scenario: Approval granted for paid tool +- **WHEN** a remote peer invokes a paid tool with valid payment AND approvalFn returns true +- **THEN** the tool SHALL execute normally + +#### Scenario: Approval denied for paid tool +- **WHEN** a remote peer invokes a paid tool with valid payment AND approvalFn returns false +- **THEN** the handler SHALL return status "denied" with error "tool invocation denied by owner" + +### Requirement: SetApprovalFunc setter +Handler SHALL expose a `SetApprovalFunc(fn ToolApprovalFunc)` method to set the owner approval callback. + +#### Scenario: SetApprovalFunc wires callback +- **WHEN** SetApprovalFunc is called with a non-nil function +- **THEN** subsequent tool invocations SHALL use the provided function for approval checks diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-reputation-cli/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-reputation-cli/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8e2aee07 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-reputation-cli/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +## Purpose + +CLI subcommand and REST endpoint for querying peer reputation details and trust scores from the local database. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: CLI reputation command +The system SHALL provide a `lango p2p reputation` CLI command that queries peer reputation details from the local database. + +#### Scenario: Query reputation for known peer +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p reputation --peer-did "did:lango:abc123"` +- **THEN** system displays trust score, successful exchanges, failed exchanges, timeout count, first seen date, and last interaction date in table format + +#### Scenario: Query reputation with JSON output +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p reputation --peer-did "did:lango:abc123" --json` +- **THEN** system outputs full PeerDetails as JSON to stdout + +#### Scenario: Query reputation for unknown peer +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p reputation --peer-did "did:lango:unknown"` +- **THEN** system displays "No reputation record found" message + +#### Scenario: Missing peer-did flag +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p reputation` without `--peer-did` +- **THEN** system returns an error stating `--peer-did is required` + +### Requirement: CLI reputation registered as subcommand +The `reputation` command SHALL be registered as a subcommand of `lango p2p` in `internal/cli/p2p/p2p.go`. + +#### Scenario: Help shows reputation command +- **WHEN** user runs `lango p2p --help` +- **THEN** output lists `reputation` as an available subcommand diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-reputation/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-reputation/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4028cf24 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-reputation/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +## Purpose + +Per-peer DID trust scoring system that tracks exchange outcomes and integrates with the firewall to reject untrusted peers. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: Trust Score Calculation +The system SHALL calculate peer trust scores based on exchange outcomes. + +#### Scenario: Successful exchange +- **WHEN** a successful exchange is recorded for a peer +- **THEN** the peer's trust score increases + +#### Scenario: Failed exchange +- **WHEN** a failed exchange is recorded for a peer +- **THEN** the peer's trust score decreases (failures weigh 2x) + +#### Scenario: Timeout +- **WHEN** a timeout is recorded for a peer +- **THEN** the peer's trust score decreases (timeouts weigh 1.5x) + +### Requirement: New Peer Handling +The system SHALL give new peers the benefit of the doubt. + +#### Scenario: Unknown peer +- **WHEN** a peer has no reputation record +- **THEN** the peer is considered trusted (benefit of doubt) + +### Requirement: Firewall Integration +The system SHALL integrate with the P2P firewall to reject untrusted peers. + +#### Scenario: Peer below threshold +- **WHEN** a peer's trust score is above 0 but below the minimum threshold +- **THEN** the firewall rejects their requests + +#### Scenario: Peer above threshold +- **WHEN** a peer's trust score meets or exceeds the minimum threshold +- **THEN** the firewall allows their requests + +### Requirement: Persistence +The system SHALL persist reputation data in the database using Ent ORM. + +### Requirement: Reputation data retrieval +The reputation Store SHALL provide a `GetDetails(ctx, peerDID)` method that returns full `PeerDetails` including PeerDID, TrustScore, SuccessfulExchanges, FailedExchanges, TimeoutCount, FirstSeen, and LastInteraction. + +#### Scenario: Get details for known peer +- **WHEN** `GetDetails` is called with a peerDID that has a reputation record +- **THEN** system returns a `PeerDetails` struct populated from the ent PeerReputation entity + +#### Scenario: Get details for unknown peer +- **WHEN** `GetDetails` is called with a peerDID that has no reputation record +- **THEN** system returns nil, nil (no error) + +#### Scenario: Database error +- **WHEN** `GetDetails` is called and the database query fails +- **THEN** system returns nil and a wrapped error diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-rest-api/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-rest-api/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c0371dcd --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-rest-api/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +## Purpose + +P2P REST API endpoints on the gateway that expose the running P2P node's status, connected peers, and DID identity without creating ephemeral libp2p nodes. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P status endpoint +The gateway SHALL expose `GET /api/p2p/status` that returns the local node's peer ID, listen addresses, and connected peer count as JSON. + +#### Scenario: Query P2P status when node is running +- **WHEN** a client sends `GET /api/p2p/status` to the gateway +- **THEN** the response SHALL be HTTP 200 with JSON containing `peerId` (string), `listenAddrs` (string array), and `connectedPeers` (integer) + +### Requirement: P2P peers endpoint +The gateway SHALL expose `GET /api/p2p/peers` that returns a list of currently connected peers with their IDs and multiaddresses. + +#### Scenario: Query connected peers +- **WHEN** a client sends `GET /api/p2p/peers` to the gateway +- **THEN** the response SHALL be HTTP 200 with JSON containing `peers` (array of objects with `peerId` and `addrs` fields) and `count` (integer) + +### Requirement: P2P identity endpoint +The gateway SHALL expose `GET /api/p2p/identity` that returns the local DID string derived from the wallet. + +#### Scenario: Query identity with wallet configured +- **WHEN** a client sends `GET /api/p2p/identity` and the identity provider is available +- **THEN** the response SHALL be HTTP 200 with JSON containing `did` (string starting with `did:lango:`) and `peerId` (string) + +#### Scenario: Query identity without identity provider +- **WHEN** a client sends `GET /api/p2p/identity` and the identity provider is nil +- **THEN** the response SHALL be HTTP 200 with JSON containing `did` as null and `peerId` (string) + +### Requirement: P2P reputation endpoint +The gateway SHALL expose `GET /api/p2p/reputation` that returns peer reputation details. + +#### Scenario: GET /api/p2p/reputation with valid peer_did +- **WHEN** client sends `GET /api/p2p/reputation?peer_did=did:lango:abc123` +- **THEN** server returns JSON with full PeerDetails (peerDid, trustScore, successfulExchanges, failedExchanges, timeoutCount, firstSeen, lastInteraction) + +#### Scenario: GET /api/p2p/reputation without peer_did +- **WHEN** client sends `GET /api/p2p/reputation` without peer_did query parameter +- **THEN** server returns 400 with error message "peer_did query parameter is required" + +#### Scenario: GET /api/p2p/reputation for unknown peer +- **WHEN** client sends `GET /api/p2p/reputation?peer_did=did:lango:unknown` +- **THEN** server returns JSON with trustScore 0.0 and "no reputation record found" message + +### Requirement: P2P pricing endpoint +The gateway SHALL expose `GET /api/p2p/pricing` that returns P2P tool pricing configuration. + +#### Scenario: GET /api/p2p/pricing without tool filter +- **WHEN** client sends `GET /api/p2p/pricing` +- **THEN** server returns JSON with enabled status, perQuery default price, toolPrices map, and currency + +#### Scenario: GET /api/p2p/pricing with tool filter +- **WHEN** client sends `GET /api/p2p/pricing?tool=knowledge_search` +- **THEN** server returns JSON with tool name, specific price (or default), and currency + +### Requirement: P2P routes registration +The P2P REST endpoints SHALL be registered on the gateway router only when P2P components are initialized (i.e., `p2pComponents` is non-nil). + +#### Scenario: P2P disabled +- **WHEN** P2P is disabled in configuration +- **THEN** no `/api/p2p/*` routes SHALL be registered on the gateway diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-signed-challenge/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-signed-challenge/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fb0249a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-signed-challenge/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +# Signed Challenge Protocol Spec + +## Overview + +Extends the P2P handshake protocol to sign Challenge messages, preventing initiator identity spoofing. + +## Protocol + +### v1.0 (Legacy) +- Protocol ID: `/lango/handshake/1.0.0` +- Challenge: `{nonce, timestamp, senderDID}` +- No signature, no timestamp validation, no nonce replay protection + +### v1.1 (Signed) +- Protocol ID: `/lango/handshake/1.1.0` +- Challenge: `{nonce, timestamp, senderDID, publicKey, signature}` +- Signature: ECDSA over `Keccak256(nonce || bigEndian(timestamp, 8) || utf8(senderDID))` +- Verification: `SigToPub(payload, signature)` → compare `CompressPubkey(recovered)` vs `publicKey` + +### Challenge Validation (HandleIncoming) +1. Timestamp validation: reject if > 5 min old or > 30s in future +2. Nonce replay: NonceCache.CheckAndRecord() — reject duplicates +3. Signature verification (if present): ECDSA recovery + public key comparison +4. If signature absent: check `requireSignedChallenge` config → reject or allow legacy + +### NonceCache +- Data structure: `map[[32]byte]time.Time` with `sync.Mutex` +- TTL: 2 × handshake timeout (default 60s) +- Periodic cleanup via `time.Ticker` goroutine (interval = TTL/2) +- Start/Stop lifecycle + +## Configuration + +| Key | Type | Default | Description | +|-----|------|---------|-------------| +| `p2p.requireSignedChallenge` | bool | false | Reject unsigned challenges | + +## Backward Compatibility + +- Both v1.0 and v1.1 stream handlers registered on host +- Initiate() always signs (falls back gracefully if wallet unavailable) +- HandleIncoming() accepts both signed and unsigned (unless requireSignedChallenge=true) diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-skills/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-skills/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f9b7ba56 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-skills/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P embedded skills +The system SHALL provide 8 embedded skills for P2P operations, each using `type: script` with `status: active` and mapping to a `lango p2p` CLI command. + +#### Scenario: All P2P skills present +- **WHEN** the skills directory is scanned +- **THEN** the following skill directories exist with valid SKILL.md files: p2p-status, p2p-peers, p2p-connect, p2p-disconnect, p2p-discover, p2p-identity, p2p-firewall-list, p2p-firewall-add + +### Requirement: Skill format consistency +Each P2P skill SKILL.md SHALL follow the existing skill format with YAML frontmatter (name, description, type, status) and a shell code block with the corresponding CLI command. + +#### Scenario: Skill file structure +- **WHEN** any P2P SKILL.md file is parsed +- **THEN** it contains valid YAML frontmatter with `type: script` and `status: active`, and a shell code block executing `lango p2p ` + +### Requirement: P2P paid value exchange skills +The skills directory SHALL include skill definitions for P2P reputation, pricing, and owner shield operations. + +#### Scenario: p2p-reputation skill exists +- **WHEN** system loads skills from `skills/` directory +- **THEN** `skills/p2p-reputation/SKILL.md` exists with type `script`, status `active`, and command `lango p2p reputation --peer-did "$PEER_DID"` + +#### Scenario: p2p-pricing skill exists +- **WHEN** system loads skills from `skills/` directory +- **THEN** `skills/p2p-pricing/SKILL.md` exists with type `script`, status `active`, and command `lango p2p pricing` + +#### Scenario: p2p-owner-shield skill exists +- **WHEN** system loads skills from `skills/` directory +- **THEN** `skills/p2p-owner-shield/SKILL.md` exists with type `script`, status `active`, and command `lango p2p status --json | jq '.ownerShield'` diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-trading-example/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-trading-example/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0951fd9a --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-trading-example/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +## Purpose + +Docker Compose integration example that proves 3 Lango agents can discover each other via P2P mDNS, establish DID identity, and transact USDC on a local Ethereum chain. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: Docker Compose multi-agent environment +The `examples/p2p-trading/` directory SHALL contain a Docker Compose configuration that starts a local Ethereum node (Anvil), deploys a MockUSDC contract, and launches 3 Lango agents (Alice, Bob, Charlie) with P2P and payment enabled. + +#### Scenario: All services start successfully +- **WHEN** `docker compose up -d` is run in the example directory +- **THEN** Anvil SHALL be healthy on port 8545, the setup service SHALL deploy MockUSDC and fund agents, and all 3 agents SHALL respond to `/health` within 90 seconds + +### Requirement: MockUSDC contract +The `contracts/MockUSDC.sol` SHALL implement a minimal ERC-20 with `mint()`, `transfer()`, `transferFrom()`, `approve()`, `balanceOf()`, and `allowance()` functions with 6 decimals. + +#### Scenario: Initial token distribution +- **WHEN** the setup script completes +- **THEN** each agent address SHALL have 1000 USDC (1000000000 smallest units) + +### Requirement: P2P discovery between agents +The 3 agents SHALL discover each other via mDNS on the Docker bridge network within 15 seconds of startup. + +#### Scenario: Peer discovery +- **WHEN** all agents have been running for 15 seconds +- **THEN** each agent's `GET /api/p2p/peers` SHALL report at least 2 connected peers + +### Requirement: Extended Docker entrypoint +The `docker-entrypoint-p2p.sh` SHALL wait for the USDC contract address from the setup sidecar, substitute it into the config, import the config, and inject the wallet private key via `--value-hex` flag. + +#### Scenario: Agent startup with key injection +- **WHEN** the agent container starts with AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY environment variable +- **THEN** the entrypoint SHALL store the private key via `lango security secrets set wallet.privatekey --value-hex` before starting the server + +### Requirement: Integration test script +The `scripts/test-p2p-trading.sh` SHALL verify health, P2P status, peer discovery, DID identity, USDC balances, and a payment transfer via REST API and on-chain queries. + +#### Scenario: End-to-end payment verification +- **WHEN** the test script executes a 1.00 USDC payment from Alice to Bob +- **THEN** Bob's on-chain USDC balance SHALL increase by 1000000 (1.00 USDC with 6 decimals) + +### Requirement: Example configs include paid value exchange settings +The P2P trading example configs SHALL include pricing, owner protection, and minimum trust score settings. + +#### Scenario: Alice config has pricing enabled +- **WHEN** user reads `examples/p2p-trading/configs/alice.json` +- **THEN** P2P section includes `pricing` object with enabled=true, perQuery="0.10", and toolPrices map + +#### Scenario: Alice config has owner protection +- **WHEN** user reads `examples/p2p-trading/configs/alice.json` +- **THEN** P2P section includes `ownerProtection` object with ownerName="Alice" and blockConversations=true + +#### Scenario: All configs have minTrustScore +- **WHEN** user reads any of alice.json, bob.json, or charlie.json +- **THEN** P2P section includes `minTrustScore: 0.3` + +#### Scenario: Each agent has correct ownerName +- **WHEN** user reads bob.json +- **THEN** ownerProtection.ownerName is "Bob" +- **WHEN** user reads charlie.json +- **THEN** ownerProtection.ownerName is "Charlie" diff --git a/openspec/specs/p2p-value-exchange-tools/spec.md b/openspec/specs/p2p-value-exchange-tools/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d6cdc666 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/p2p-value-exchange-tools/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +## Purpose + +Agent tools for price query and reputation check in paid P2P value exchange workflows. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: p2p_price_query agent tool +The system SHALL provide a `p2p_price_query` agent tool with SafetyLevel Safe that queries remote peer pricing. + +#### Scenario: Query price for a tool +- **WHEN** agent invokes `p2p_price_query` with `peer_did` and `tool_name` +- **THEN** system looks up active session, creates RemoteAgent, calls QueryPrice, and returns PriceQuoteResult with toolName, price, currency, isFree + +#### Scenario: No active session +- **WHEN** agent invokes `p2p_price_query` with a peer_did that has no active session +- **THEN** system returns error "no active session for peer — connect first" + +### Requirement: p2p_reputation agent tool +The system SHALL provide a `p2p_reputation` agent tool with SafetyLevel Safe that checks peer trust scores. + +#### Scenario: Check reputation for known peer +- **WHEN** agent invokes `p2p_reputation` with `peer_did` for a peer with reputation data +- **THEN** system returns trustScore, isTrusted, successfulExchanges, failedExchanges, timeoutCount, firstSeen, lastInteraction + +#### Scenario: Check reputation for new peer +- **WHEN** agent invokes `p2p_reputation` with `peer_did` for a peer with no reputation record +- **THEN** system returns score 0.0, isTrusted true, and "new peer" message + +#### Scenario: Reputation system unavailable +- **WHEN** agent invokes `p2p_reputation` but reputation store is nil (no database) +- **THEN** system returns error "reputation system not available" diff --git a/openspec/specs/package-consolidation/spec.md b/openspec/specs/package-consolidation/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e70ace57 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/package-consolidation/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +# Spec: Package Consolidation + +## Overview +Merge three underused packages into their logical parent packages to improve codebase clarity. + +## Requirements + +### R1: ctxutil → types +- Move `Detach()` function and `detachedCtx` type from `internal/ctxutil/` to `internal/types/context.go` +- Move tests to `internal/types/context_test.go` +- Update all importers to use new path +- Delete `internal/ctxutil/` directory + +#### Scenarios +- **Background task**: `types.DetachContext(ctx)` preserves `Value()` but detaches from cancellation. +- **No import cycle**: `types` package has no upstream dependencies. + +### R2: passphrase → security/passphrase +- Move all files from `internal/passphrase/` to `internal/security/passphrase/` +- Package name remains `passphrase` +- Update all importers (bootstrap.go, bootstrap_test.go) +- Delete `internal/passphrase/` directory + +#### Scenarios +- **Passphrase acquisition**: Priority order (keyring → keyfile → interactive → stdin) unchanged. +- **Keyfile operations**: Read/Write/Shred/ValidatePermissions unchanged. + +### R3: zkp → p2p/zkp +- Move all files from `internal/zkp/` to `internal/p2p/zkp/` (including `circuits/` subdirectory) +- Package names remain `zkp` and `circuits` +- Update all importers (wiring.go, internal cross-references) +- Delete `internal/zkp/` directory + +#### Scenarios +- **ZKP proving/verifying**: `ProverService` functionality unchanged. +- **Circuit compilation**: All 4 circuits (ownership, attestation, capability, balance) work identically. + +## Constraints +- Zero functional changes — only import paths change +- No import cycles introduced +- All existing tests must pass without modification diff --git a/openspec/specs/passphrase-acquisition/spec.md b/openspec/specs/passphrase-acquisition/spec.md index 248f7733..d94d4417 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/passphrase-acquisition/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/passphrase-acquisition/spec.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ ## Requirements ### Requirement: Passphrase acquisition priority chain -The system SHALL acquire a passphrase using the following priority: (1) keyfile at `~/.lango/keyfile`, (2) interactive terminal prompt, (3) stdin pipe. The system SHALL return an error if no source is available. +The system SHALL acquire a passphrase using the following priority: (1) hardware keyring (Touch ID / TPM), (2) keyfile at `~/.lango/keyfile`, (3) interactive terminal prompt, (4) stdin pipe. The system SHALL return an error if no source is available. #### Scenario: Keyfile exists with correct permissions - **WHEN** a keyfile exists at the configured path with 0600 permissions @@ -27,6 +27,30 @@ The system SHALL acquire a passphrase using the following priority: (1) keyfile - **WHEN** no keyfile exists, stdin is not a terminal, and stdin pipe is empty - **THEN** the system returns an error +### Requirement: Log keyring read errors to stderr +When `passphrase.Acquire()` attempts to read from the OS keyring and receives an error other than `ErrNotFound`, it SHALL write a warning to stderr in the format: `warning: keyring read failed: `. The function SHALL still fall through to the next passphrase source (keyfile, interactive, stdin). + +#### Scenario: Keyring returns non-NotFound error +- **WHEN** `KeyringProvider.Get()` returns an error that is not `ErrNotFound` +- **THEN** stderr SHALL contain `warning: keyring read failed: ` +- **AND** acquisition SHALL continue to the next source + +#### Scenario: Keyring returns ErrNotFound +- **WHEN** `KeyringProvider.Get()` returns `ErrNotFound` +- **THEN** no warning SHALL be written to stderr +- **AND** acquisition SHALL continue to the next source + +### Requirement: Keyring provider is nil when no secure hardware is available +The passphrase acquisition flow SHALL receive a nil `KeyringProvider` when the bootstrap determines no secure hardware backend is available (`TierNone`). This effectively disables keyring auto-read, forcing keyfile or interactive/stdin acquisition. + +#### Scenario: Nil keyring provider skips keyring step +- **WHEN** `Acquire()` is called with `KeyringProvider` set to nil +- **THEN** the keyring step SHALL be skipped entirely, and acquisition SHALL proceed to keyfile or interactive prompt + +#### Scenario: Secure keyring provider attempts read +- **WHEN** `Acquire()` is called with a non-nil `KeyringProvider` (biometric or TPM) +- **THEN** it SHALL attempt to read the passphrase from the secure provider first + ### Requirement: Keyfile management The system SHALL read, write, and securely shred keyfiles with strict 0600 permission enforcement. diff --git a/openspec/specs/persistent-approval-grant/spec.md b/openspec/specs/persistent-approval-grant/spec.md index 25d8afae..ecfa3b79 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/persistent-approval-grant/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/persistent-approval-grant/spec.md @@ -39,3 +39,43 @@ The system SHALL allow concurrent `Grant`, `IsGranted`, `Revoke`, and `RevokeSes #### Scenario: Concurrent grant and check - **WHEN** 100 goroutines concurrently call `Grant` and `IsGranted` - **THEN** no data race SHALL occur and the final state SHALL be consistent + +### Requirement: Grant TTL expiration +GrantStore SHALL support an optional time-to-live (TTL) for grants. When TTL is set to a positive duration, `IsGranted()` MUST check whether the grant has expired (current time minus `grantedAt` exceeds TTL). A TTL of zero MUST preserve backward-compatible behavior (no expiration). + +#### Scenario: Grant within TTL +- **WHEN** a grant was created 5 minutes ago and TTL is 10 minutes +- **THEN** `IsGranted()` SHALL return true + +#### Scenario: Grant expired past TTL +- **WHEN** a grant was created 11 minutes ago and TTL is 10 minutes +- **THEN** `IsGranted()` SHALL return false + +#### Scenario: TTL zero means no expiry +- **WHEN** TTL is zero (default) and a grant was created 100 hours ago +- **THEN** `IsGranted()` SHALL return true + +### Requirement: Clean expired grants +GrantStore SHALL provide a `CleanExpired()` method that removes all grants whose `grantedAt` timestamp exceeds the configured TTL. The method SHALL return the count of removed entries. When TTL is zero, `CleanExpired()` SHALL be a no-op returning zero. + +#### Scenario: Clean expired entries +- **WHEN** `CleanExpired()` is called with TTL of 5 minutes and 2 of 3 grants are older than 5 minutes +- **THEN** the method SHALL remove the 2 expired grants and return 2 + +#### Scenario: Clean with zero TTL +- **WHEN** `CleanExpired()` is called with TTL of zero +- **THEN** the method SHALL remove nothing and return 0 + +### Requirement: P2P grant TTL default +When P2P is enabled, the application SHALL set the GrantStore TTL to 1 hour. This limits the window of implicit trust from P2P approval grants. + +#### Scenario: P2P enabled sets 1-hour TTL +- **WHEN** the application initializes with `cfg.P2P.Enabled = true` +- **THEN** `grantStore.SetTTL(time.Hour)` SHALL be called + +### Requirement: Double-approval prevention via grant recording +When the P2P approval function approves a tool invocation, the system SHALL record a grant for `"p2p:"+peerDID` and the tool name. This prevents the tool's internal `wrapWithApproval` from prompting a second time. + +#### Scenario: Approved P2P tool records grant +- **WHEN** the P2P approval function approves tool "echo" for peer "did:key:abc" +- **THEN** a grant SHALL be recorded with session key `"p2p:did:key:abc"` and tool name `"echo"` diff --git a/openspec/specs/proactive-librarian/spec.md b/openspec/specs/proactive-librarian/spec.md index 21c6e087..f22b83b6 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/proactive-librarian/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/proactive-librarian/spec.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ The system SHALL provide a `LibrarianConfig` struct with fields: Enabled (bool), - **THEN** defaults are applied: ObservationThreshold=2, InquiryCooldownTurns=3, MaxPendingInquiries=2, AutoSaveConfidence="high" ### Requirement: Observation Analyzer -The system SHALL analyze conversation observations via LLM to extract knowledge (with type, category, content, confidence, key) and detect knowledge gaps (with topic, question, context, priority). The analyzer SHALL output a structured AnalysisOutput containing extractions and gaps arrays. +The system SHALL analyze conversation observations via LLM to extract knowledge (with type, category, content, confidence, key) and detect knowledge gaps (with topic, question, context, priority). The analyzer SHALL output a structured AnalysisOutput containing extractions and gaps arrays. The observation analyzer prompt SHALL list all valid extraction types including `pattern` and `correction` in addition to `preference`, `fact`, `rule`, `definition`. #### Scenario: Successful analysis - **WHEN** observations are passed to the analyzer @@ -37,8 +37,12 @@ The system SHALL analyze conversation observations via LLM to extract knowledge - **WHEN** zero observations are provided - **THEN** an empty AnalysisOutput is returned without LLM call +#### Scenario: Prompt includes all types +- **WHEN** the observation analyzer generates its LLM prompt +- **THEN** the type field description SHALL include `preference|fact|rule|definition|pattern|correction` + ### Requirement: Inquiry Processor -The system SHALL detect user answers to pending inquiries by analyzing recent messages via LLM. When a match is detected with high or medium confidence, the system SHALL save the answer as structured knowledge and resolve the inquiry. +The system SHALL detect user answers to pending inquiries by analyzing recent messages via LLM. When a match is detected with high or medium confidence, the system SHALL validate the category via `mapCategory()` before saving the answer as structured knowledge and resolve the inquiry. Raw casting of LLM-provided category strings to `entknowledge.Category` SHALL NOT be used. #### Scenario: Answer detected - **WHEN** a recent message matches a pending inquiry with high confidence @@ -48,6 +52,14 @@ The system SHALL detect user answers to pending inquiries by analyzing recent me - **WHEN** no pending inquiries exist for the session - **THEN** the processor returns immediately without LLM call +#### Scenario: Valid inquiry answer category +- **WHEN** an inquiry answer match contains a recognized category +- **THEN** the knowledge SHALL be saved and the inquiry resolved + +#### Scenario: Invalid inquiry answer category +- **WHEN** an inquiry answer match contains an unrecognized category +- **THEN** the knowledge save SHALL be skipped with a warning log, but the inquiry SHALL still be resolved + ### Requirement: Proactive Buffer The system SHALL provide an async ProactiveBuffer with Start/Trigger/Stop lifecycle. On each trigger, the buffer SHALL: (1) process pending inquiry answers, (2) analyze observations if threshold is met, (3) auto-save high-confidence extractions, (4) create inquiries from gaps respecting cooldown and max-pending limits. @@ -86,7 +98,7 @@ The system SHALL expose two new agent tools: `librarian_pending_inquiries` (list - **THEN** the inquiry is dismissed and confirmation is returned ### Requirement: Auto-save Knowledge from Extractions -The system SHALL automatically save knowledge extractions that meet the configured auto-save confidence threshold. High-confidence extractions are saved without user confirmation. Optional graph triples (subject/predicate/object) SHALL be forwarded via the graph callback if available. +The system SHALL automatically save knowledge extractions that meet the configured auto-save confidence threshold. The extraction pipeline SHALL validate the type of each extraction before saving. High-confidence extractions with valid types are saved without user confirmation. When an extraction has an unrecognized type, the system SHALL log a warning and skip that extraction without affecting other extractions in the batch. Optional graph triples (subject/predicate/object) SHALL be forwarded via the graph callback if available. #### Scenario: High confidence auto-save - **WHEN** an extraction has confidence "high" and AutoSaveConfidence is "high" @@ -95,3 +107,11 @@ The system SHALL automatically save knowledge extractions that meet the configur #### Scenario: Below threshold extraction - **WHEN** an extraction has confidence "medium" and AutoSaveConfidence is "high" - **THEN** the extraction is NOT auto-saved + +#### Scenario: Valid extraction type saved +- **WHEN** an extraction with a recognized type (preference, fact, rule, definition, pattern, correction) meets the auto-save confidence threshold +- **THEN** the knowledge entry SHALL be saved with the correct category + +#### Scenario: Unknown extraction type skipped +- **WHEN** an extraction with an unrecognized type is encountered +- **THEN** the system SHALL log a warning with the key and type, skip that extraction, and continue processing remaining extractions diff --git a/openspec/specs/project-docs/spec.md b/openspec/specs/project-docs/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..19388ee5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/project-docs/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: New packages documented in architecture +The README.md Architecture section and docs/architecture/project-structure.md SHALL include dbmigrate, lifecycle, keyring, and sandbox packages. + +#### Scenario: README architecture tree includes new packages +- **WHEN** a user reads README.md Architecture section +- **THEN** dbmigrate, lifecycle, keyring, sandbox, and cli/p2p packages SHALL appear in the tree + +#### Scenario: project-structure.md Infrastructure table includes new packages +- **WHEN** a user reads docs/architecture/project-structure.md Infrastructure section +- **THEN** lifecycle, keyring, sandbox, and dbmigrate packages SHALL have entries with descriptions + +### Requirement: Security package description updated +The docs/architecture/project-structure.md security package description SHALL mention KMS providers. + +#### Scenario: security row mentions KMS +- **WHEN** a user reads the security row in project-structure.md +- **THEN** the description SHALL include KMS providers (AWS, GCP, Azure, PKCS#11) + +### Requirement: Skills description corrected +The README.md and docs/architecture/project-structure.md SHALL NOT reference "30" or "38" embedded default skills, and SHALL explain that built-in skills were removed due to the passphrase security model. + +#### Scenario: README skills line is accurate +- **WHEN** a user reads the README.md Architecture section skills line +- **THEN** it SHALL describe the skill system as a scaffold with an explanation of why built-in skills were removed + +#### Scenario: project-structure.md skills section is accurate +- **WHEN** a user reads the skills section of project-structure.md +- **THEN** it SHALL explain that ~30 built-in skills were removed and the infrastructure remains functional for user-defined skills + +### Requirement: Security feature card updated in docs landing page +The docs/index.md Security card SHALL mention hardware keyring, SQLCipher, and Cloud KMS. + +#### Scenario: docs/index.md Security card is complete +- **WHEN** a user reads the Security card on docs/index.md +- **THEN** it SHALL mention hardware keyring (Touch ID / TPM), SQLCipher database encryption, and Cloud KMS integration + +### Requirement: README Features security line updated +The README.md Features section security line SHALL mention hardware keyring, SQLCipher, and Cloud KMS. + +#### Scenario: README security feature is complete +- **WHEN** a user reads the Features section of README.md +- **THEN** the Secure line SHALL include hardware keyring, SQLCipher DB encryption, and Cloud KMS diff --git a/openspec/specs/provider-anthropic/spec.md b/openspec/specs/provider-anthropic/spec.md index 2f5522d4..a3162b16 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/provider-anthropic/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/provider-anthropic/spec.md @@ -67,3 +67,18 @@ The Anthropic provider constructor SHALL accept an `id` string parameter and use #### Scenario: Default ID registration - **WHEN** `NewProvider("anthropic", "sk-ant-xxx")` is called - **THEN** the returned provider's `ID()` method SHALL return `"anthropic"` + +### Requirement: Live model listing +The Anthropic provider's `ListModels()` MUST call the Anthropic Models API instead of returning hardcoded values. + +#### Scenario: Successful model listing +- **WHEN** ListModels is called with valid API credentials +- **THEN** returns all models from the API using paginated auto-paging with limit 1000 + +#### Scenario: Partial failure +- **WHEN** API returns some models before encountering an error +- **THEN** returns the successfully fetched models without error + +#### Scenario: Complete failure +- **WHEN** API call fails with no models retrieved +- **THEN** returns error with wrapped context diff --git a/openspec/specs/release-workflow/spec.md b/openspec/specs/release-workflow/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a5e525ef --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/release-workflow/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +# Release Workflow + +## Purpose + +Defines the GitHub Actions release pipeline that uses a native runner matrix with split/merge strategy for CGO-dependent cross-platform binary builds on tag push. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: Tag-triggered release workflow +The system SHALL provide a GitHub Actions workflow at `.github/workflows/release.yml` that triggers on push of tags matching `v*`. + +#### Scenario: Workflow trigger +- **WHEN** a tag `v0.3.0` is pushed to the repository +- **THEN** the release workflow SHALL start automatically + +#### Scenario: Non-tag push ignored +- **WHEN** a commit is pushed to `main` without a tag +- **THEN** the release workflow SHALL NOT trigger + +### Requirement: Native runner matrix build +The build job SHALL use a strategy matrix with 4 native runners: `ubuntu-latest` (linux/amd64), `ubuntu-24.04-arm` (linux/arm64), `macos-13` (darwin/amd64), `macos-14` (darwin/arm64). + +#### Scenario: Matrix runner assignment +- **WHEN** the build job starts +- **THEN** it SHALL spawn 4 parallel jobs, one per runner in the matrix + +### Requirement: Linux dependency installation +The workflow SHALL install `libsqlite3-dev` on Linux runners before building. + +#### Scenario: Linux build dependencies +- **WHEN** the build job runs on a Linux runner +- **THEN** it SHALL run `apt-get install -y libsqlite3-dev` before GoReleaser + +#### Scenario: macOS skips dependency install +- **WHEN** the build job runs on a macOS runner +- **THEN** it SHALL NOT run apt-get (macOS uses system frameworks) + +### Requirement: Split build execution +Each matrix runner SHALL execute `goreleaser build --split --clean` to produce binaries only for its native platform. + +#### Scenario: Split build produces platform-specific artifacts +- **WHEN** `goreleaser build --split` runs on `macos-14` +- **THEN** it SHALL produce darwin/arm64 binaries only and upload them as artifacts + +### Requirement: Merge and release job +A separate `release` job SHALL download all build artifacts, merge them into `dist/`, and run `goreleaser continue --merge` to create the GitHub Release. + +#### Scenario: Artifact merge and release creation +- **WHEN** all 4 build jobs complete successfully +- **THEN** the release job SHALL download artifacts with `merge-multiple: true`, run `goreleaser continue --merge`, and create a GitHub Release with all 8 archives + checksums + +### Requirement: Write permissions for release +The workflow SHALL request `contents: write` permission for creating GitHub Releases. + +#### Scenario: Permission scope +- **WHEN** the release workflow runs +- **THEN** it SHALL have `contents: write` permission to create releases and upload assets diff --git a/openspec/specs/secure-signer/spec.md b/openspec/specs/secure-signer/spec.md index 497c8fb8..4152b065 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/secure-signer/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/secure-signer/spec.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ The system SHALL provide a local encryption fallback when companion app is unava - **THEN** system exits with error "LocalCryptoProvider requires interactive terminal. Use RPCProvider with Companion for headless environments." ### Requirement: Composite Provider Strategy -The system SHALL use a composite provider that tries companion first, then falls back to local. +The system SHALL use a composite provider that tries the primary provider first, then falls back to local. The primary provider MAY be a companion (RPC), Cloud KMS, or PKCS#11 backend. #### Scenario: Companion available - **WHEN** companion is connected @@ -48,3 +48,26 @@ The system SHALL use a composite provider that tries companion first, then falls - **AND** no companion is connected - **THEN** the system SHALL log error "Docker environment requires RPC Provider. Please connect Companion app." - **AND** SHALL NOT attempt to use LocalCryptoProvider + +#### Scenario: KMS primary with local fallback +- **WHEN** a KMS provider is configured as `security.signer.provider` +- **AND** `security.kms.fallbackToLocal` is true +- **THEN** the system SHALL wrap KMS in CompositeCryptoProvider with local as fallback and KMSHealthChecker as ConnectionChecker + +### Requirement: KMS Provider Configuration Validation +The config validator SHALL accept `aws-kms`, `gcp-kms`, `azure-kv`, and `pkcs11` as valid values for `security.signer.provider`. Provider-specific fields SHALL be validated when the corresponding provider is selected. + +#### Scenario: AWS KMS requires keyId +- **WHEN** `security.signer.provider` is `aws-kms` +- **AND** `security.kms.keyId` is empty +- **THEN** config validation SHALL fail with a descriptive error + +#### Scenario: Azure KV requires vaultUrl and keyId +- **WHEN** `security.signer.provider` is `azure-kv` +- **AND** `security.kms.azure.vaultUrl` is empty +- **THEN** config validation SHALL fail with a descriptive error + +#### Scenario: PKCS#11 requires modulePath +- **WHEN** `security.signer.provider` is `pkcs11` +- **AND** `security.kms.pkcs11.modulePath` is empty +- **THEN** config validation SHALL fail with a descriptive error diff --git a/openspec/specs/security-docs-sync/spec.md b/openspec/specs/security-docs-sync/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ab58de31 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/security-docs-sync/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +## Purpose + +Documentation synchronization for P0-P2 security hardening features. Ensures all CLI docs, feature docs, README, agent prompts, and security roadmap accurately reflect the implemented security capabilities. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: CLI security docs include OS Keyring commands +The `docs/cli/security.md` file SHALL document `lango security keyring store`, `keyring clear` (with `--force`), and `keyring status` (with `--json`) commands with output examples matching the actual CLI implementation. + +#### Scenario: Keyring commands documented +- **WHEN** a user reads `docs/cli/security.md` +- **THEN** they find complete documentation for `keyring store`, `keyring clear`, and `keyring status` with flags, examples, and JSON output fields + +### Requirement: CLI security docs include DB encryption commands +The `docs/cli/security.md` file SHALL document `lango security db-migrate` and `lango security db-decrypt` commands with `--force` flag and output examples. + +#### Scenario: DB encryption commands documented +- **WHEN** a user reads `docs/cli/security.md` +- **THEN** they find complete documentation for `db-migrate` and `db-decrypt` with flags and examples + +### Requirement: CLI security docs include KMS commands +The `docs/cli/security.md` file SHALL document `lango security kms status` (with `--json`), `kms test`, and `kms keys` (with `--json`) commands with output examples. + +#### Scenario: KMS commands documented +- **WHEN** a user reads `docs/cli/security.md` +- **THEN** they find complete documentation for `kms status`, `kms test`, and `kms keys` with JSON output fields + +### Requirement: CLI security status output includes new fields +The `docs/cli/security.md` status example SHALL include `DB Encryption`, `KMS Provider`, `KMS Key ID`, and `KMS Fallback` fields matching `status.go` output. + +#### Scenario: Updated status output documented +- **WHEN** a user reads the `security status` example +- **THEN** they see all fields including `db_encryption`, `kms_provider`, `kms_key_id`, `kms_fallback` in the JSON fields table + +### Requirement: CLI P2P docs include session management commands +The `docs/cli/p2p.md` file SHALL document `lango p2p session list` (with `--json`), `session revoke` (with `--peer-did`), and `session revoke-all` commands. + +#### Scenario: Session commands documented +- **WHEN** a user reads `docs/cli/p2p.md` +- **THEN** they find complete documentation for session list, revoke, and revoke-all + +### Requirement: CLI P2P docs include sandbox commands +The `docs/cli/p2p.md` file SHALL document `lango p2p sandbox status`, `sandbox test`, and `sandbox cleanup` commands with output examples. + +#### Scenario: Sandbox commands documented +- **WHEN** a user reads `docs/cli/p2p.md` +- **THEN** they find complete documentation for sandbox status, test, and cleanup + +### Requirement: Feature docs cover signed handshake protocol +The `docs/features/p2p-network.md` SHALL document the signed challenge protocol (v1.0/v1.1), ECDSA signature, timestamp validation, and nonce replay protection. + +#### Scenario: Signed handshake documented +- **WHEN** a user reads the Handshake section +- **THEN** they understand protocol versioning, signed challenges, and `requireSignedChallenge` config + +### Requirement: Feature docs cover session management +The `docs/features/p2p-network.md` SHALL include a Session Management section with invalidation reasons and SecurityEventHandler. + +#### Scenario: Session management documented +- **WHEN** a user reads P2P feature docs +- **THEN** they find session invalidation reasons, auto-revocation triggers, and CLI commands + +### Requirement: Feature docs cover tool sandbox +The `docs/features/p2p-network.md` SHALL include a Tool Execution Sandbox section with isolation modes, runtime probe chain, and container pool. + +#### Scenario: Tool sandbox documented +- **WHEN** a user reads P2P feature docs +- **THEN** they find subprocess/container modes, runtime probe chain, and configuration + +### Requirement: Feature docs cover credential revocation +The `docs/features/p2p-network.md` SHALL include a Credential Revocation section with RevokeDID, IsRevoked, and maxCredentialAge. + +#### Scenario: Credential revocation documented +- **WHEN** a user reads P2P feature docs +- **THEN** they find revocation mechanisms and credential validation checks + +### Requirement: Security index includes new layers +The `docs/security/index.md` SHALL list OS Keyring, Database Encryption, Cloud KMS/HSM, P2P Session Management, P2P Tool Sandbox, and P2P Auth Hardening in the Security Layers table. + +#### Scenario: Security layers table updated +- **WHEN** a user reads the security index +- **THEN** they see all 10 security layers including the 6 new ones + +### Requirement: Encryption docs cover Cloud KMS +The `docs/security/encryption.md` SHALL include a Cloud KMS Mode section with all 4 backends, build tags, CompositeCryptoProvider, and configuration examples. + +#### Scenario: Cloud KMS documented +- **WHEN** a user reads encryption docs +- **THEN** they find all 4 KMS backends with configuration examples + +### Requirement: README config table includes new keys +The `README.md` configuration table SHALL include all P2P security, tool isolation, ZKP, keyring, DB encryption, and KMS config keys matching `mapstructure` tags. + +#### Scenario: Config table complete +- **WHEN** a user reads the README config table +- **THEN** they find 27+ new config rows covering all P0-P2 security features + +### Requirement: Agent prompts include P2P security awareness +The `prompts/AGENTS.md` and `prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md` SHALL include references to signed challenges, session management, sandbox, KMS, and credential revocation. + +#### Scenario: Agent prompts updated +- **WHEN** the LLM agent loads prompts +- **THEN** it has awareness of all P0-P2 security features + +### Requirement: Security roadmap P0/P1 items marked complete +The `openspec/security-roadmap.md` SHALL have `✅ COMPLETED` markers on all P0 and P1 section headers. + +#### Scenario: Roadmap completion markers +- **WHEN** a user reads the security roadmap +- **THEN** all P0 (P0-1, P0-2, P0-3) and P1 (P1-4, P1-5, P1-6) items show completion markers diff --git a/openspec/specs/sentinel-errors/spec.md b/openspec/specs/sentinel-errors/spec.md index a42ee910..0c891ce5 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/sentinel-errors/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/sentinel-errors/spec.md @@ -45,3 +45,47 @@ The system SHALL define `RPCError` struct with `Code int` and `Message string` f #### Scenario: Structured RPC errors - **WHEN** `gateway/server.go` creates RPC error responses - **THEN** it SHALL use the named `RPCError` type instead of anonymous structs + +### Requirement: Protocol sentinel errors +The system SHALL define sentinel errors in `protocol/messages.go` for common P2P protocol error conditions: `ErrMissingToolName`, `ErrAgentCardUnavailable`, `ErrNoApprovalHandler`, `ErrDeniedByOwner`, `ErrExecutorNotConfigured`, `ErrInvalidSession`, `ErrInvalidPaymentAuth`. + +#### Scenario: Handler uses sentinel errors +- **WHEN** the protocol handler encounters a known error condition (missing tool name, no card, no approval handler, denied by owner, no executor, invalid session, invalid payment) +- **THEN** it SHALL use the sentinel error's `.Error()` message in the response Error field + +#### Scenario: Sentinel errors are matchable +- **WHEN** a caller receives a protocol error +- **THEN** it SHALL be able to use `errors.Is()` to match against the sentinel errors + +### Requirement: Firewall sentinel errors +The system SHALL define sentinel errors in `firewall/firewall.go`: `ErrRateLimitExceeded`, `ErrGlobalRateLimitExceeded`, `ErrQueryDenied`, `ErrNoMatchingAllowRule`. + +#### Scenario: Rate limit errors wrap sentinel +- **WHEN** a peer exceeds the rate limit +- **THEN** `FilterQuery` SHALL return an error wrapping `ErrRateLimitExceeded` with `%w` + +#### Scenario: ACL deny errors wrap sentinel +- **WHEN** a firewall deny rule matches +- **THEN** `FilterQuery` SHALL return an error wrapping `ErrQueryDenied` + +#### Scenario: No matching allow rule wraps sentinel +- **WHEN** no allow rule matches and default-deny applies +- **THEN** `FilterQuery` SHALL return an error wrapping `ErrNoMatchingAllowRule` + +### Requirement: ZKP unsupported scheme error +The system SHALL define `ErrUnsupportedScheme` in `zkp/zkp.go`. + +#### Scenario: Unknown scheme returns sentinel +- **WHEN** a ZKP operation encounters an unknown proving scheme +- **THEN** it SHALL return an error wrapping `ErrUnsupportedScheme` + +### Requirement: Session expiry sentinel error +The system SHALL define `ErrSessionExpired` in `session/errors.go` alongside existing session sentinel errors. + +#### Scenario: EntStore wraps TTL expiry with ErrSessionExpired +- **WHEN** `EntStore.Get()` finds a session whose `UpdatedAt` exceeds the configured TTL +- **THEN** it SHALL return an error wrapping `ErrSessionExpired` using `fmt.Errorf("get session %q: %w", key, ErrSessionExpired)` + +#### Scenario: ErrSessionExpired is matchable via errors.Is +- **WHEN** a caller receives a TTL expiry error from `EntStore.Get()` +- **THEN** `errors.Is(err, ErrSessionExpired)` SHALL return `true` diff --git a/openspec/specs/server/spec.md b/openspec/specs/server/spec.md index e09f2948..474250b8 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/server/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/server/spec.md @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ The application SHALL prioritize the passphrase from environment variables over The application SHALL verify that configuration paths using `~` are correctly expanded to the user's home directory. #### Scenario: Tilde Expansion -- **GIVEN** `databasePath` is configured as `~/.lango/sessions.db` +- **GIVEN** `databasePath` is configured as `~/.lango/lango.db` - **WHEN** the application initializes storage - **THEN** it expands `~` to the current user's home directory - **AND** successfully locates the file/directory diff --git a/openspec/specs/session-auto-create/spec.md b/openspec/specs/session-auto-create/spec.md index 9413af31..2300b8f7 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/session-auto-create/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/session-auto-create/spec.md @@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ The `SessionServiceAdapter.Get()` SHALL return existing sessions without creatin - **THEN** the system SHALL return the existing session with its conversation history intact ### Requirement: Non-recoverable store errors propagated -The `SessionServiceAdapter.Get()` SHALL propagate store errors that are not "session not found" (e.g., database connection failures). +The `SessionServiceAdapter.Get()` SHALL propagate store errors that are not "session not found" or "session expired" (e.g., database connection failures). #### Scenario: Database error during get -- **WHEN** the store returns an error other than "session not found" -- **THEN** the system SHALL propagate that error to the caller without attempting auto-creation +- **WHEN** the store returns an error other than "session not found" or "session expired" +- **THEN** the system SHALL propagate that error to the caller without attempting auto-creation or renewal ### Requirement: Concurrent auto-create safety The `SessionServiceAdapter.Get()` SHALL handle concurrent auto-creation attempts for the same session key without returning errors. When multiple goroutines simultaneously detect a missing session and attempt creation, at most one SHALL succeed in creating it, and the others SHALL retrieve the already-created session. @@ -45,3 +45,18 @@ The `SessionServiceAdapter.Get()` SHALL handle concurrent auto-creation attempts #### Scenario: Create fails with non-constraint error - **WHEN** `SessionServiceAdapter.getOrCreate()` attempts to create a session and the store returns an error that is not a UNIQUE constraint violation - **THEN** the method SHALL propagate the error to the caller + +### Requirement: Auto-renew expired sessions +The `SessionServiceAdapter.Get()` SHALL automatically delete an expired session and create a fresh replacement when the store returns `ErrSessionExpired`, so the user's current message is processed normally. + +#### Scenario: Expired Telegram session auto-renews +- **WHEN** `SessionServiceAdapter.Get()` receives `ErrSessionExpired` for session `telegram:123:456` +- **THEN** the system SHALL delete the expired session, create a new session with the same key, and return it successfully + +#### Scenario: Expired session delete failure propagates error +- **WHEN** `SessionServiceAdapter.Get()` receives `ErrSessionExpired` and the subsequent `Delete()` call fails +- **THEN** the system SHALL return the delete error wrapped with context, without attempting to create a new session + +#### Scenario: Concurrent expiry recovery is safe +- **WHEN** multiple goroutines detect the same expired session simultaneously +- **THEN** the `getOrCreate()` retry logic SHALL ensure all goroutines return a valid session without errors diff --git a/openspec/specs/session-invalidation/spec.md b/openspec/specs/session-invalidation/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8e5e0eed --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/session-invalidation/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +# Session Explicit Invalidation + +## Overview + +Extends the TTL-only `SessionStore` with explicit invalidation, auto-invalidation on security events, and CLI management. + +## Invalidation Reasons + +| Reason | Trigger | +|--------|---------| +| `logout` | User logout | +| `reputation_drop` | Peer trust score falls below threshold | +| `repeated_failures` | Consecutive tool execution failures (default: 5) | +| `manual_revoke` | CLI `lango p2p session revoke` | +| `security_event` | Generic security event | + +## SessionStore Enhancements + +### New Methods + +- `Invalidate(peerDID, reason)` — marks session invalidated, removes from active map, records history, fires callback +- `InvalidateAll(reason)` — invalidates all active sessions +- `InvalidateByCondition(reason, predicate)` — conditional invalidation +- `InvalidationHistory()` — returns invalidation records +- `SetInvalidationCallback(fn)` — registers callback for invalidation events + +### Updated Behavior + +`Validate()` now returns `false` for sessions with `Invalidated == true`. + +## SecurityEventHandler + +Automatic session invalidation based on security events: + +- **Consecutive failures**: Tracks per-peer failure count. Auto-invalidates at configurable threshold (default 5). Success resets the counter. +- **Reputation drops**: Listens via `reputation.Store.SetOnChangeCallback()`. Invalidates when score falls below `cfg.P2P.MinTrustScore`. + +## Protocol Handler Integration + +`SecurityEventTracker` interface on `handler.go`: +- `RecordToolSuccess(peerDID)` called after successful tool execution +- `RecordToolFailure(peerDID)` called after failed tool execution + +## CLI Commands + +- `lango p2p session list [--json]` — show active sessions +- `lango p2p session revoke --peer-did ` — revoke specific session +- `lango p2p session revoke-all` — revoke all sessions diff --git a/openspec/specs/settings-p2p/spec.md b/openspec/specs/settings-p2p/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5038ba7c --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/settings-p2p/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +## Purpose + +Define the TUI settings forms for P2P networking configuration: core network settings, ZKP, pricing, owner protection, and tool isolation sandbox. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: P2P Network settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P Network" menu category with a form exposing core P2P configuration fields: enabled, listen addresses, bootstrap peers, relay, mDNS, max peers, handshake timeout, session token TTL, auto-approve known peers, gossip interval, ZK handshake, ZK attestation, require signed challenge, and min trust score. + +#### Scenario: User enables P2P networking +- **WHEN** user navigates to "P2P Network" and sets Enabled to true +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.enabled` field SHALL be set to true upon save + +#### Scenario: User sets listen addresses +- **WHEN** user enters comma-separated multiaddrs in "Listen Addresses" +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.listenAddrs` SHALL contain each address as a separate array element + +### Requirement: P2P ZKP settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P ZKP" menu category with fields for proof cache directory, proving scheme (plonk/groth16), SRS mode (unsafe/file), SRS path, and max credential age. + +#### Scenario: User selects groth16 proving scheme +- **WHEN** user selects "groth16" from the proving scheme dropdown +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.zkp.provingScheme` SHALL be set to "groth16" + +### Requirement: P2P Pricing settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P Pricing" menu category with fields for enabled, price per query, and tool-specific prices (as key:value comma-separated text). + +#### Scenario: User sets tool prices +- **WHEN** user enters "exec:0.10,browser:0.50" in the Tool Prices field +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.pricing.toolPrices` SHALL be a map with keys "exec" and "browser" and respective values + +### Requirement: P2P Owner Protection settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P Owner Protection" menu category with fields for owner name, email, phone, extra terms, and block conversations. + +#### Scenario: User sets block conversations with nil default +- **WHEN** the config's `blockConversations` is nil +- **THEN** the form SHALL display the checkbox as checked (default true) + +#### Scenario: User unchecks block conversations +- **WHEN** user unchecks "Block Conversations" +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.ownerProtection.blockConversations` SHALL be a pointer to false + +### Requirement: P2P Sandbox settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "P2P Sandbox" menu category with fields for tool isolation (enabled, timeout, max memory) and container sandbox (enabled, runtime, image, network mode, read-only rootfs, CPU quota, pool size, pool idle timeout). + +#### Scenario: User configures container sandbox +- **WHEN** user enables container sandbox and selects "docker" runtime +- **THEN** the config's `p2p.toolIsolation.container.enabled` SHALL be true and `runtime` SHALL be "docker" + +#### Scenario: Container read-only rootfs defaults to true +- **WHEN** the config's `readOnlyRootfs` is nil +- **THEN** the form SHALL display the checkbox as checked (default true) diff --git a/openspec/specs/settings-security-advanced/spec.md b/openspec/specs/settings-security-advanced/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3bc1ef6c --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/settings-security-advanced/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +## Purpose + +Define the TUI settings forms for advanced security configuration: OS keyring, SQLCipher DB encryption, and Cloud KMS / HSM backends. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: Security Keyring settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "Security Keyring" menu category with a single field for OS keyring enabled/disabled. + +#### Scenario: User enables keyring +- **WHEN** user checks "OS Keyring Enabled" +- **THEN** the config's `security.keyring.enabled` SHALL be set to true + +### Requirement: Security DB Encryption settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "Security DB Encryption" menu category with fields for SQLCipher encryption enabled and cipher page size. + +#### Scenario: User enables DB encryption +- **WHEN** user checks "SQLCipher Encryption" and sets page size to 4096 +- **THEN** the config's `security.dbEncryption.enabled` SHALL be true and `cipherPageSize` SHALL be 4096 + +#### Scenario: Cipher page size validation +- **WHEN** user enters 0 or a negative number for cipher page size +- **THEN** the form SHALL display a validation error "must be a positive integer" + +### Requirement: Security KMS settings form +The settings TUI SHALL provide a "Security KMS" menu category with fields for region, key ID, endpoint, fallback to local, timeout, max retries, Azure vault URL, Azure key version, PKCS#11 module path, slot ID, PIN (password field), and key label. + +#### Scenario: User configures AWS KMS +- **WHEN** user enters region "us-east-1" and a key ARN +- **THEN** the config's `security.kms.region` and `security.kms.keyId` SHALL contain the entered values + +#### Scenario: PKCS#11 PIN is password field +- **WHEN** the KMS form is displayed +- **THEN** the PKCS#11 PIN field SHALL use InputPassword type to mask the value diff --git a/openspec/specs/skill-system/spec.md b/openspec/specs/skill-system/spec.md index 8ebf2881..4acf2cb6 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/skill-system/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/skill-system/spec.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ ## ADDED Requirements ### Requirement: File-Based Skill Storage -The system SHALL store skills as `//SKILL.md` files with YAML frontmatter containing name, description, type, status, and optional parameters. +The system SHALL store skills as `//SKILL.md` files with YAML frontmatter containing name, description, type, status, and optional parameters. `ListActive()` SHALL skip hidden directories (names starting with `.`) when scanning. #### Scenario: Save a new skill - **WHEN** a skill entry is saved via `FileSkillStore.Save()` @@ -10,6 +10,11 @@ The system SHALL store skills as `//SKILL.md` files with YAML frontma #### Scenario: Load active skills - **WHEN** `FileSkillStore.ListActive()` is called - **THEN** all skills with `status: active` in their frontmatter SHALL be returned +- **AND** directories whose name starts with `.` SHALL be skipped without logging a warning + +#### Scenario: Hidden directory ignored +- **WHEN** `FileSkillStore.ListActive()` encounters a directory starting with `.` +- **THEN** it SHALL skip the directory silently without attempting to parse its contents #### Scenario: Delete a skill - **WHEN** `FileSkillStore.Delete()` is called with a skill name @@ -31,11 +36,20 @@ The system SHALL parse SKILL.md files with YAML frontmatter delimited by `---` l - **THEN** an error SHALL be returned ### Requirement: Embedded Default Skills -The system SHALL embed 30 default CLI skill files via `//go:embed` and deploy them to the user's skills directory on first run. +The system SHALL embed default skill files via `//go:embed **/SKILL.md`. When no real skill SKILL.md files are present, a `.placeholder/SKILL.md` file SHALL exist to satisfy the embed glob pattern. The placeholder SHALL NOT contain valid YAML frontmatter and SHALL NOT be deployed as a usable skill. `EnsureDefaults()` SHALL skip any embedded path whose directory name starts with `.` (hidden directories). + +#### Scenario: Build with no real default skills +- **WHEN** `go build` is run with only `.placeholder/SKILL.md` in the skills directory +- **THEN** the build SHALL succeed without errors + +#### Scenario: Placeholder not deployed as skill +- **WHEN** `EnsureDefaults()` iterates over the embedded filesystem +- **THEN** entries whose directory name starts with `.` SHALL be skipped entirely +- **AND** no files from `.placeholder/` SHALL be written to the user's skills directory -#### Scenario: First-run deployment -- **WHEN** `EnsureDefaults()` is called and a skill directory does not exist -- **THEN** the default skill SHALL be copied from the embedded filesystem to `//SKILL.md` +#### Scenario: Future skill addition +- **WHEN** a new `skills//SKILL.md` file with valid frontmatter is added +- **THEN** it SHALL be automatically included in the embedded filesystem and deployed via `EnsureDefaults()` #### Scenario: Existing skills preserved - **WHEN** `EnsureDefaults()` is called and a skill directory already exists diff --git a/openspec/specs/test-coverage/spec.md b/openspec/specs/test-coverage/spec.md index 2814be12..24f977a6 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/test-coverage/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/test-coverage/spec.md @@ -57,3 +57,11 @@ Existing test files must be expanded with additional scenarios. - Anthropic provider: ListModels returns expected model list - OpenAI provider: ListModels returns error for unavailable server - App: creation fails gracefully with no providers or invalid provider type + +### REQ-6: Channel Mock Thread Safety +Channel test mock types SHALL use mutex synchronization to protect shared slices from concurrent access by handler goroutines and test assertions. + +**Scenarios:** +- Slack mock concurrent access: serialized via mutex when handler goroutine appends to PostMessages/UpdateMessages while test goroutine reads +- Telegram mock concurrent access: serialized via mutex when handler goroutine appends to SentMessages/RequestCalls while test goroutine reads +- Safe mock data retrieval: helper methods return defensive copies of underlying slices diff --git a/openspec/specs/tool-exec/spec.md b/openspec/specs/tool-exec/spec.md index e3bd8c29..6972f716 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/tool-exec/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/tool-exec/spec.md @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ The system SHALL support pseudo-terminal (PTY) mode for interactive commands. - **THEN** the codes SHALL be preserved for rendering or stripped as configured ### Requirement: Background process management -The system SHALL support running commands in the background with process tracking. +The system SHALL support running commands in the background with process tracking. Background process output SHALL be thread-safe for concurrent read/write access. #### Scenario: Background execution - **WHEN** a command is started in background mode @@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ The system SHALL support running commands in the background with process trackin - **WHEN** status is requested for a background process - **THEN** current output and execution state SHALL be returned +#### Scenario: Concurrent output access +- **WHEN** a background process is writing output while status is being read +- **THEN** the output buffer SHALL be safely accessible without data races + ### Requirement: Working directory control The system SHALL execute commands in a specified working directory. diff --git a/openspec/specs/tool-middleware/spec.md b/openspec/specs/tool-middleware/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..008a4adc --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/tool-middleware/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +## Purpose + +Composable middleware chain for cross-cutting tool concerns (learning observation, approval gating, browser recovery). + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: Middleware type +The system SHALL define a Middleware type as `func(tool *agent.Tool, next HandlerFunc) HandlerFunc` that wraps tool handlers. + +#### Scenario: Middleware wraps handler +- **WHEN** a middleware is applied to a tool +- **THEN** it SHALL receive the tool metadata and next handler, returning a new handler + +### Requirement: Chain applies middlewares in order +Chain SHALL apply middlewares so the first middleware is outermost (executed first). + +#### Scenario: Two middlewares chain correctly +- **WHEN** middleware A and B are chained with Chain(tool, A, B) +- **THEN** execution order SHALL be: A's pre-logic -> B's pre-logic -> original handler -> B's post-logic -> A's post-logic + +### Requirement: ChainAll applies to all tools +ChainAll SHALL apply the same middleware stack to every tool in the slice. + +#### Scenario: ChainAll wraps all tools +- **WHEN** ChainAll is called with 3 tools and 2 middlewares +- **THEN** all 3 tools SHALL have both middlewares applied + +### Requirement: WithLearning middleware +The WithLearning middleware SHALL call the learning observer after each tool execution with the tool name, params, result, and error. + +#### Scenario: Learning observes tool result +- **WHEN** a tool wrapped with WithLearning executes +- **THEN** observer.OnToolResult SHALL be called with session key, tool name, params, result, and error + +### Requirement: WithApproval middleware +The WithApproval middleware SHALL gate tool execution behind an approval flow based on configured policy. + +#### Scenario: Dangerous tool requires approval +- **WHEN** a tool with dangerous safety level is executed under "dangerous" policy +- **THEN** the approval provider SHALL be consulted before execution + +#### Scenario: Exempt tool bypasses approval +- **WHEN** a tool listed in ExemptTools is executed +- **THEN** execution SHALL proceed without approval + +### Requirement: WithBrowserRecovery middleware +The WithBrowserRecovery middleware SHALL recover from panics in browser tool handlers and retry once on ErrBrowserPanic. + +#### Scenario: Browser panic triggers retry +- **WHEN** a browser tool panics with ErrBrowserPanic +- **THEN** the session SHALL be closed and the handler retried once diff --git a/openspec/specs/tool-safety-level/spec.md b/openspec/specs/tool-safety-level/spec.md index d7de62f9..5305fbe7 100644 --- a/openspec/specs/tool-safety-level/spec.md +++ b/openspec/specs/tool-safety-level/spec.md @@ -69,6 +69,21 @@ The system SHALL preserve the SafetyLevel field when wrapping tools with `wrapWi - **WHEN** a tool with SafetyLevelDangerous is wrapped with wrapWithLearning - **THEN** the resulting tool SHALL have SafetyLevelDangerous +### Requirement: P2P auto-approve respects SafetyLevel +The P2P approval function SHALL check the tool's SafetyLevel before applying price-based auto-approval. Dangerous tools (SafetyLevel == Dangerous or unknown/zero) MUST always go through explicit approval, regardless of price. Tools not found in the tool index SHALL be treated as dangerous. + +#### Scenario: Dangerous tool bypasses auto-approve +- **WHEN** a P2P remote peer invokes a tool with SafetyLevel "dangerous" and the price is within auto-approve limits +- **THEN** the system SHALL NOT auto-approve and SHALL route to the composite approval provider + +#### Scenario: Unknown tool treated as dangerous +- **WHEN** a P2P remote peer invokes a tool not found in the tool index +- **THEN** the system SHALL NOT auto-approve and SHALL route to the composite approval provider + +#### Scenario: Safe tool within price limit auto-approves +- **WHEN** a P2P remote peer invokes a tool with SafetyLevel "safe" and the price is within auto-approve limits +- **THEN** the system SHALL auto-approve and record a grant + ### Requirement: Tool approval summary for payment_send The `buildApprovalSummary` function SHALL include a case for `payment_send` that formats the summary as "Send {amount} USDC to {to} ({purpose})". diff --git a/openspec/specs/tool-sandbox/spec.md b/openspec/specs/tool-sandbox/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9b123210 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/tool-sandbox/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +# Tool Execution Process Isolation + +## Overview + +Subprocess-based isolation for remote P2P tool invocations. Prevents remote peers from accessing process memory containing passphrases, private keys, and session tokens. + +## Interface + +```go +// Executor runs tool invocations in isolation. +type Executor interface { + Execute(ctx context.Context, toolName string, params map[string]interface{}) (map[string]interface{}, error) +} +``` + +## Implementations + +### InProcessExecutor + +Wraps an existing `ToolExecutor` function for trusted local tool calls. No isolation—direct delegation. + +### SubprocessExecutor + +Launches a child process using the same binary with `--sandbox-worker` flag. Communication via JSON over stdin/stdout. + +**Protocol:** +- stdin → `ExecutionRequest{ToolName, Params}` +- stdout ← `ExecutionResult{Output, Error}` + +**Security measures:** +- Clean environment: only `PATH` and `HOME` +- `exec.CommandContext` with configurable timeout +- Explicit `cmd.Process.Kill()` on deadline exceeded + +## Configuration + +```yaml +p2p: + toolIsolation: + enabled: false # default (opt-in) + timeoutPerTool: 30s + maxMemoryMB: 256 +``` + +## Wiring + +- `handler.SetSandboxExecutor()` follows existing setter pattern +- When `sandboxExec` is set, `handleToolInvoke`/`handleToolInvokePaid` use it instead of `h.executor` +- Fallback to in-process execution when sandbox is nil + +## Future (P2-8) + +Phase 2 will add rlimit/cgroup/container-based resource limits on top of this subprocess foundation. diff --git a/openspec/specs/usdc-registry/spec.md b/openspec/specs/usdc-registry/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4877fda3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/usdc-registry/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +## Purpose + +Canonical USDC contract address registry for preventing fake token attacks in P2P payments. + +## Requirements + +### Requirement: Canonical Address Lookup +The system SHALL provide canonical USDC contract addresses for supported chains. + +#### Scenario: Supported chain +- **WHEN** looking up the USDC address for Ethereum Mainnet (chain 1) +- **THEN** the system returns the canonical Circle USDC address + +#### Scenario: Unsupported chain +- **WHEN** looking up the USDC address for an unsupported chain ID +- **THEN** the system returns an error + +### Requirement: Address Verification +The system SHALL verify that a given address matches the canonical USDC address for a chain. + +#### Scenario: Matching address +- **WHEN** checking if an address matches the canonical USDC for a chain +- **THEN** the system returns true for exact matches (case-insensitive) + +#### Scenario: Non-matching address +- **WHEN** checking if a different address is canonical for a chain +- **THEN** the system returns false + +### Requirement: On-Chain Verification +The system SHALL support on-chain verification of USDC contracts by checking symbol and decimals. diff --git a/openspec/specs/zk-hardening/spec.md b/openspec/specs/zk-hardening/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1baa28db --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/zk-hardening/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +# ZK Proof Hardening Spec + +## Overview + +Hardens all four ZK circuits with proper testing, timestamp freshness, capability binding, structured attestation data, and production SRS support. + +## Circuit Changes + +### ResponseAttestationCircuit +- **Added public inputs**: `MinTimestamp`, `MaxTimestamp` +- **New constraints**: `MinTimestamp <= Timestamp <= MaxTimestamp` +- Ensures attestation proofs cannot be replayed outside the freshness window + +### AgentCapabilityCircuit +- **Added public input**: `AgentTestBinding` (MiMC(TestHash, AgentDIDHash)) +- **Fixed constraint**: `api.AssertIsEqual(hAgent.Sum(), c.AgentTestBinding)` (was `_ = hAgent.Sum()`) +- Makes the agent-test binding verifiable externally + +### WalletOwnershipCircuit & BalanceRangeCircuit +- No structural changes, test coverage added + +## Test Coverage + +### Circuit Tests (circuits_test.go) +- 15 test cases across 4 circuits +- Framework: gnark `test.NewAssert(t)` with `test.WithCurves(ecc.BN254)` +- Both plonk and groth16 proving systems tested automatically +- MiMC hash computation via native `bn254/fr/mimc` package + +### ProverService Tests (zkp_test.go) +- 6 integration tests: compile, prove, verify (valid/invalid), idempotent compile, uncompiled error +- Both plonk and groth16 schemes tested + +## AttestationData Wire Format + +```go +type AttestationData struct { + Proof []byte `json:"proof"` + PublicInputs []byte `json:"publicInputs"` + CircuitID string `json:"circuitId"` + Scheme string `json:"scheme"` +} +``` + +### Firewall Integration +- `AttestationResult` struct in firewall package (avoids circular imports) +- `ZKAttestFunc` returns `*AttestationResult` instead of `[]byte` +- `AttestResponse()` returns structured data + +### Remote Agent Verification +- `ZKAttestVerifyFunc` callback type for attestation verification +- `P2PRemoteAgent.SetAttestVerifier()` setter +- Verification logged in `InvokeTool()` response handling + +### Backward Compatibility +- `Response.AttestationProof []byte` field retained (deprecated) +- New `Response.Attestation *AttestationData` field added +- Handler sets both fields for backward compat + +## SRS Production Path + +| Config Key | Type | Default | Description | +|------------|------|---------|-------------| +| `p2p.zkp.srsMode` | string | "unsafe" | SRS generation: "unsafe" or "file" | +| `p2p.zkp.srsPath` | string | "" | Path to SRS file | +| `p2p.zkp.maxCredentialAge` | string | "24h" | Max credential age | + +## Credential Revocation + +- `GossipService.revokedDIDs map[string]time.Time` +- `RevokeDID(did)` / `IsRevoked(did) bool` +- `SetMaxCredentialAge(d time.Duration)` +- Credential rejection: expired (ExpiresAt), stale (IssuedAt + maxCredentialAge), revoked (IsRevoked) diff --git a/openspec/specs/zkp-core/spec.md b/openspec/specs/zkp-core/spec.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..54f7041d --- /dev/null +++ b/openspec/specs/zkp-core/spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +## ADDED Requirements + +### Requirement: ProverService Lifecycle and Scheme Selection + +The `ProverService` SHALL support two proving schemes: `"plonk"` (default) and `"groth16"`. The scheme SHALL be set at construction time via `Config.Scheme` and SHALL NOT change after construction. If `Config.Scheme` is empty, the service SHALL default to `"plonk"`. The service SHALL create and maintain a cache directory at `{CacheDir}` (defaulting to `~/.lango/zkp/cache`) with permissions `0700`. An unsupported scheme name MUST cause `Compile` and `Prove` to return an error. + +#### Scenario: Default scheme is plonk +- **WHEN** `NewProverService` is called with an empty `Config.Scheme` +- **THEN** `ProverService.Scheme()` SHALL return `"plonk"` + +#### Scenario: Unsupported scheme rejected at compile time +- **WHEN** a `ProverService` is created with `Scheme: "snark"` and `Compile` is called +- **THEN** `Compile` SHALL return an error containing "unsupported proving scheme" + +#### Scenario: Cache directory created on initialization +- **WHEN** `NewProverService` is called with a non-existent `CacheDir` +- **THEN** the directory SHALL be created with permissions `0700` + +--- + +### Requirement: Circuit Compilation and Idempotency + +`ProverService.Compile` SHALL compile the given `frontend.Circuit` using the BN254 scalar field and the configured scheme's constraint system builder (`scs.NewBuilder` for PlonK, `r1cs.NewBuilder` for Groth16). A SRS SHALL be generated for PlonK using `unsafekzg.NewSRS`. Proving and verifying keys SHALL be derived via `plonk.Setup` or `groth16.Setup`. If a circuit with the given `circuitID` is already compiled, `Compile` SHALL return nil without recompiling. + +#### Scenario: Circuit compiled and cached on first call +- **WHEN** `Compile("ownership", &WalletOwnershipCircuit{})` is called for the first time +- **THEN** the circuit SHALL be compiled, keys generated, and stored in the compiled map under `"ownership"` + +#### Scenario: Second compile call is a no-op +- **WHEN** `Compile("ownership", ...)` is called after a successful first compilation +- **THEN** `Compile` SHALL return nil immediately without recompiling + +#### Scenario: Compilation error returns wrapped error +- **WHEN** `frontend.Compile` fails for the given circuit +- **THEN** `Compile` SHALL return an error containing `compile circuit "ownership"` + +--- + +### Requirement: Proof Generation + +`ProverService.Prove` SHALL create a full witness and public witness from the circuit assignment, generate a proof using the compiled proving key, serialize the proof to bytes, and return a `Proof` struct containing `Data`, `PublicInputs`, `CircuitID`, and `Scheme`. The circuit MUST be compiled before `Prove` can be called. + +#### Scenario: Proof generated for compiled circuit +- **WHEN** `Prove(ctx, "ownership", assignment)` is called on a compiled circuit +- **THEN** the returned `Proof` SHALL have non-empty `Data`, the correct `CircuitID="ownership"`, and `Scheme` matching the service scheme + +#### Scenario: Uncompiled circuit returns error +- **WHEN** `Prove(ctx, "missing", assignment)` is called for a circuit ID that was never compiled +- **THEN** `Prove` SHALL return an error containing `circuit "missing" not compiled` + +#### Scenario: Invalid assignment returns witness error +- **WHEN** `Prove` is called with an assignment that is inconsistent with the circuit constraints +- **THEN** `Prove` SHALL return an error from the proving step + +--- + +### Requirement: Proof Verification + +`ProverService.Verify` SHALL deserialize the proof bytes, reconstruct the public witness from the provided circuit (public inputs only), and call `plonk.Verify` or `groth16.Verify` against the compiled verifying key. A cryptographically invalid proof SHALL return `(false, nil)`. An empty or nil proof SHALL return `(false, error)`. + +#### Scenario: Valid proof verifies successfully +- **WHEN** `Verify(ctx, proof, circuit)` is called with a proof generated by `Prove` for the same circuit +- **THEN** `Verify` SHALL return `(true, nil)` + +#### Scenario: Tampered proof returns false +- **WHEN** `Verify` is called with a `Proof.Data` that has been modified after generation +- **THEN** `Verify` SHALL return `(false, nil)` (cryptographic failure, not a Go error) + +#### Scenario: Empty proof data returns error +- **WHEN** `Verify` is called with a `Proof` where `Data` is nil or empty +- **THEN** `Verify` SHALL return `(false, error)` containing "empty proof" + +--- + +### Requirement: WalletOwnershipCircuit (Circuit ID: "ownership") + +The `WalletOwnershipCircuit` SHALL prove knowledge of a `Response` such that `MiMC(Response, Challenge) == PublicKeyHash`. Public inputs are `PublicKeyHash` and `Challenge`. The private witness is `Response`. This circuit is used during handshake to prove control of the DID private key without revealing it. + +#### Scenario: Valid witness satisfies circuit +- **WHEN** `Define` is called with a `Response` such that `MiMC(Response, Challenge) == PublicKeyHash` +- **THEN** the circuit constraints SHALL be satisfied (no assertion failure) + +#### Scenario: Invalid witness fails circuit +- **WHEN** `Define` is called with a `Response` that does not satisfy the MiMC equation +- **THEN** the constraint `api.AssertIsEqual(computed, c.PublicKeyHash)` SHALL fail + +--- + +### Requirement: BalanceRangeCircuit (Circuit ID: "balance_range") + +The `BalanceRangeCircuit` SHALL prove that a private `Balance` is greater than or equal to a public `Threshold`, without revealing the actual balance value. The constraint is `AssertIsLessOrEqual(Threshold, Balance)`. This circuit is used to prove USDC balance sufficiency for payment-gated capabilities. + +#### Scenario: Balance at threshold satisfies circuit +- **WHEN** `Balance == Threshold` +- **THEN** the circuit SHALL be satisfied + +#### Scenario: Balance below threshold fails circuit +- **WHEN** `Balance < Threshold` +- **THEN** `AssertIsLessOrEqual` SHALL fail + +--- + +### Requirement: ResponseAttestationCircuit (Circuit ID: "attestation") + +The `ResponseAttestationCircuit` SHALL prove that an agent produced a specific response from specific source data without revealing the source data or agent key. Constraints: `MiMC(AgentKeyProof) == AgentDIDHash` AND `MiMC(SourceDataHash, AgentKeyProof, Timestamp) == ResponseHash`. Public inputs are `ResponseHash`, `AgentDIDHash`, and `Timestamp`. Private witnesses are `SourceDataHash` and `AgentKeyProof`. + +#### Scenario: Valid attestation witness satisfies both constraints +- **WHEN** all MiMC equations hold for the given witness +- **THEN** both `AssertIsEqual` constraints SHALL pass + +#### Scenario: Wrong agent key fails DID hash check +- **WHEN** `MiMC(AgentKeyProof) != AgentDIDHash` +- **THEN** the first `AssertIsEqual` SHALL fail + +--- + +### Requirement: AgentCapabilityCircuit (Circuit ID: "capability") + +The `AgentCapabilityCircuit` SHALL prove that an agent has a capability with an `ActualScore >= MinScore` and that `MiMC(TestHash, ActualScore) == CapabilityHash`, without revealing `ActualScore` or `TestHash`. Public inputs are `CapabilityHash`, `AgentDIDHash`, and `MinScore`. Private witnesses are `ActualScore` and `TestHash`. + +#### Scenario: Score above minimum satisfies circuit +- **WHEN** `ActualScore >= MinScore` and `MiMC(TestHash, ActualScore) == CapabilityHash` +- **THEN** both constraints SHALL be satisfied + +#### Scenario: Score below minimum fails circuit +- **WHEN** `ActualScore < MinScore` +- **THEN** `AssertIsLessOrEqual(MinScore, ActualScore)` SHALL fail diff --git a/prompts/AGENTS.md b/prompts/AGENTS.md index 6c631599..57a365ba 100644 --- a/prompts/AGENTS.md +++ b/prompts/AGENTS.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ You are Lango, a production-grade AI assistant built for developers and teams. -You have access to nine tool categories: +You have access to ten tool categories: - **Exec**: Run shell commands synchronously or in the background, with timeout control and environment variable filtering. Commands may contain reference tokens (`{{secret:name}}`, `{{decrypt:id}}`) that resolve at execution time — you never see the resolved values. - **Filesystem**: Read, list, write, edit, copy, mkdir, and delete files. Write operations are atomic (temp file + rename). Path traversal is blocked. @@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ You have access to nine tool categories: - **Background**: Submit async agent tasks that run independently with concurrency control. Monitor task status and retrieve results on completion. - **Workflow**: Execute multi-step DAG-based workflow pipelines defined in YAML. Steps run in parallel when dependencies allow, with results flowing between steps via template variables. - **Skills**: Create, import, and manage reusable skill patterns. Import from GitHub repos or URLs — automatically uses git clone when available, falls back to HTTP API. Skills stored in `~/.lango/skills/`. +- **P2P Network**: Connect to remote peers, manage firewall ACL rules, query remote agents, discover agents by capability, send peer payments, query pricing for paid tool invocations, check peer reputation and trust scores, and enforce owner data protection via Owner Shield. All P2P connections use Noise encryption with DID-based identity verification and signed challenge authentication (ECDSA over nonce||timestamp||DID) with nonce replay protection. Session management supports explicit invalidation and security-event-based auto-revocation. Remote tool invocations run in a sandbox (subprocess or container isolation). ZK attestation includes timestamp freshness constraints. Cloud KMS (AWS, GCP, Azure, PKCS#11) is supported for signing and encryption. Paid value exchange is supported via USDC Payment Gate with configurable per-tool pricing. + +**Tool selection**: Always use built-in tools first. Skills are extensions for specialized use cases only — never use a skill when a built-in tool provides equivalent functionality. You are augmented with a layered knowledge system: diff --git a/prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md b/prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md index 8ac5ea81..933e545c 100644 --- a/prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md +++ b/prompts/TOOL_USAGE.md @@ -1,4 +1,12 @@ +### Tool Selection Priority +- **Always prefer built-in tools over skills.** Built-in tools run in-process, are production-hardened, and never require external authentication. +- Skills are user-defined extensions for specialized workflows that have no built-in equivalent. +- Before invoking any skill, first check if a built-in tool already provides the same functionality. +- Skills that wrap `lango` CLI commands will fail — the CLI requires passphrase authentication that is unavailable in agent mode. + ### Exec Tool +- **NEVER use exec to run `lango` CLI commands** (e.g., `lango security`, `lango memory`, `lango graph`, `lango p2p`, `lango config`, `lango cron`, `lango bg`, `lango workflow`, `lango payment`, `lango serve`, `lango doctor`, etc.). Every `lango` command requires passphrase authentication during bootstrap and **will fail** when spawned as a non-interactive subprocess. Use the built-in tools instead — they run in-process and do not require authentication. +- If you need functionality that has no built-in tool equivalent (e.g., `lango config`, `lango doctor`, `lango settings`), inform the user and ask them to run the command directly in their terminal. - Prefer read-only commands first (`cat`, `ls`, `grep`, `ps`) before modifying anything. - Set appropriate timeouts for long-running commands. Default is 30 seconds. - Use background execution (`exec_bg`) for processes that run indefinitely (servers, watchers). Monitor with `exec_status`, stop with `exec_stop`. @@ -81,4 +89,29 @@ ### Error Handling - When a tool call fails, report the error clearly: what was attempted, what went wrong, and what alternatives exist. - Do not retry the same failing command without changing something. Diagnose the issue first. -- If a tool is unavailable or disabled, suggest alternative approaches using other available tools. \ No newline at end of file +- If a tool is unavailable or disabled, suggest alternative approaches using other available tools. + +### P2P Networking Tool +- The gateway also exposes read-only REST endpoints for P2P node state: `GET /api/p2p/status`, `GET /api/p2p/peers`, `GET /api/p2p/identity`. These query the running server's persistent node and are useful for monitoring, health checks, and external integrations. The agent tools below provide the same data plus write operations (connect, disconnect, firewall management). +- `p2p_status` shows the node's peer ID, listen addresses, connected peer count, and feature flags (mDNS, relay, ZK handshake). Use this to verify the node is running before other P2P operations. +- `p2p_connect` initiates a handshake with a remote peer. Requires a full multiaddr (e.g. `/ip4/1.2.3.4/tcp/9000/p2p/QmPeerID`). The handshake includes DID-based identity verification. +- `p2p_disconnect` closes the connection to a specific peer by peer ID. +- `p2p_peers` lists all currently connected peers with their peer IDs and multiaddrs. +- `p2p_query` sends an inference-only query to a remote agent. The query is subject to the remote peer's three-stage approval pipeline: (1) firewall ACL, (2) reputation check against `minTrustScore`, and (3) owner approval. If denied at any stage, do not retry without the remote peer changing their configuration. +- `p2p_discover` searches for agents by capability tag via GossipSub. Results include agent name, DID, capabilities, and peer ID. Connect to bootstrap peers first if no agents appear. +- `p2p_firewall_rules` lists current firewall ACL rules. Default policy is deny-all. +- `p2p_firewall_add` adds a new firewall rule. Specify `peer_did` ("*" for all), `action` (allow/deny), `tools` (patterns), and optional `rate_limit`. +- `p2p_firewall_remove` removes all rules matching a given peer DID. +- `p2p_pay` sends a USDC payment to a connected peer by DID. Payments below the `autoApproveBelow` threshold are auto-approved without user confirmation; larger amounts require explicit approval. +- `p2p_price_query` queries the pricing for a specific tool on a remote peer before invoking it. Use this to check costs before committing to a paid tool call. +- `p2p_reputation` checks a peer's trust score and exchange history (successes, failures, timeouts). Always check reputation for unfamiliar peers before sending payments or invoking expensive tools. +- **Paid tool workflow**: (1) `p2p_discover` to find peers, (2) `p2p_reputation` to verify trust, (3) `p2p_price_query` to check cost, (4) `p2p_pay` to send payment (auto-approved if below threshold), (5) `p2p_query` to invoke the tool (subject to remote owner's approval pipeline). +- **Inbound tool invocations** from remote peers pass through a three-stage gate on the local node: (1) firewall ACL check, (2) reputation score verification against `minTrustScore`, and (3) owner approval (auto-approved for paid tools below `autoApproveBelow`, otherwise interactive confirmation). +- REST API also exposes `GET /api/p2p/reputation?peer_did=` and `GET /api/p2p/pricing?tool=` for external integrations. +- Session tokens are per-peer with configurable TTL. When a session token expires, reconnect to the peer. +- If a firewall deny response is received, do not retry the same query without changing the firewall rules. +- **Session management**: Active sessions can be listed, individually revoked, or bulk-revoked. Sessions are automatically invalidated when a peer's reputation drops below `minTrustScore` or after repeated tool execution failures. Use `p2p_status` to monitor session count. +- **Sandbox awareness**: When `p2p.toolIsolation.enabled` is true, all inbound remote tool invocations from peers execute in a sandbox (subprocess or Docker container). This is transparent to the agent — tool calls work the same way, but with process-level isolation. +- **Signed challenges**: Protocol v1.1 uses ECDSA-signed challenges. When `p2p.requireSignedChallenge` is true, only peers supporting v1.1 can connect. Legacy v1.0 peers will be rejected. +- **KMS latency**: When a Cloud KMS provider is configured (`aws-kms`, `gcp-kms`, `azure-kv`, `pkcs11`), cryptographic operations incur network roundtrip latency. The system retries transient errors automatically with exponential backoff. If KMS is unreachable and `kms.fallbackToLocal` is enabled, operations fall back to local mode. +- **Credential revocation**: Revoked DIDs are tracked in the gossip discovery layer. Use `maxCredentialAge` to enforce credential freshness — stale credentials are rejected even if not explicitly revoked. Gossip refresh propagates revocations across the network. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/prompts/agents/vault/IDENTITY.md b/prompts/agents/vault/IDENTITY.md index 2f757b3a..52172db2 100644 --- a/prompts/agents/vault/IDENTITY.md +++ b/prompts/agents/vault/IDENTITY.md @@ -1,16 +1,16 @@ ## What You Do -You handle security-sensitive operations: encrypt/decrypt data, manage secrets and passwords, sign/verify, and process blockchain payments (USDC on Base). +You handle security-sensitive operations: encrypt/decrypt data, manage secrets and passwords, sign/verify, process blockchain payments (USDC on Base), manage P2P peer connections and firewall rules, query peer reputation and trust scores, and manage P2P pricing configuration. ## Input Format -A security operation to perform with required parameters (data to encrypt, secret to store/retrieve, payment details). +A security operation to perform with required parameters (data to encrypt, secret to store/retrieve, payment details, P2P peer info). ## Output Format -Return operation results: encrypted/decrypted data, confirmation of secret storage, payment transaction hash/status. +Return operation results: encrypted/decrypted data, confirmation of secret storage, payment transaction hash/status, P2P connection status and peer info. P2P node state is also available via REST API (`GET /api/p2p/status`, `/api/p2p/peers`, `/api/p2p/identity`, `/api/p2p/reputation`, `/api/p2p/pricing`) on the running gateway. ## Constraints -- Only perform cryptographic, secret management, and payment operations. +- Only perform cryptographic, secret management, payment, and P2P networking operations. - Never execute shell commands, browse the web, or manage files. - Never search knowledge bases or manage memory. - Handle sensitive data carefully — never log secrets or private keys in plain text. - If a task does not match your capabilities, REJECT it by responding: - "[REJECT] This task requires . I handle: encryption, secret management, blockchain payments." + "[REJECT] This task requires . I handle: encryption, secret management, blockchain payments, P2P networking." diff --git a/skills/.placeholder/SKILL.md b/skills/.placeholder/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d6d905a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/.placeholder/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +# Placeholder +This file exists so that the `go:embed **/SKILL.md` directive compiles +even when no real skills are present. Do not delete. diff --git a/skills/agent-list/SKILL.md b/skills/agent-list/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index fe38a131..00000000 --- a/skills/agent-list/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: agent-list -description: List available sub-agents and their capabilities -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango agent list -``` diff --git a/skills/agent-status/SKILL.md b/skills/agent-status/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index aa6de9f5..00000000 --- a/skills/agent-status/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: agent-status -description: Show agent runtime status and configuration -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango agent status -``` diff --git a/skills/config-create/SKILL.md b/skills/config-create/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 4d366031..00000000 --- a/skills/config-create/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: config-create -description: Create a new configuration profile interactively -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango config create -``` diff --git a/skills/config-delete/SKILL.md b/skills/config-delete/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 59f3d2c4..00000000 --- a/skills/config-delete/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: config-delete -description: Delete a configuration profile -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango config delete -``` diff --git a/skills/config-list/SKILL.md b/skills/config-list/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 9349250b..00000000 --- a/skills/config-list/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: config-list -description: List all available configuration profiles -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango config list -``` diff --git a/skills/config-use/SKILL.md b/skills/config-use/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index c3808384..00000000 --- a/skills/config-use/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: config-use -description: Switch to a different configuration profile -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango config use -``` diff --git a/skills/config-validate/SKILL.md b/skills/config-validate/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 0b4648a1..00000000 --- a/skills/config-validate/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: config-validate -description: Validate the current configuration for errors -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango config validate -``` diff --git a/skills/cron-add/SKILL.md b/skills/cron-add/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 8a797391..00000000 --- a/skills/cron-add/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: cron-add -description: Add a new scheduled cron job -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango cron add -``` diff --git a/skills/cron-delete/SKILL.md b/skills/cron-delete/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 58d7c095..00000000 --- a/skills/cron-delete/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: cron-delete -description: Delete a cron job by name -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango cron delete -``` diff --git a/skills/cron-history/SKILL.md b/skills/cron-history/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 12e6860e..00000000 --- a/skills/cron-history/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: cron-history -description: Show execution history for cron jobs -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango cron history -``` diff --git a/skills/cron-list/SKILL.md b/skills/cron-list/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index a035d3b7..00000000 --- a/skills/cron-list/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: cron-list -description: List all registered cron jobs -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango cron list -``` diff --git a/skills/cron-pause/SKILL.md b/skills/cron-pause/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 7b9b419b..00000000 --- a/skills/cron-pause/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: cron-pause -description: Pause a running cron job -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango cron pause -``` diff --git a/skills/cron-resume/SKILL.md b/skills/cron-resume/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index a4304c19..00000000 --- a/skills/cron-resume/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: cron-resume -description: Resume a paused cron job -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango cron resume -``` diff --git a/skills/doctor/SKILL.md b/skills/doctor/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 4f3bc0a2..00000000 --- a/skills/doctor/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: doctor -description: Run system diagnostics and check dependencies -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango doctor -``` diff --git a/skills/graph-clear/SKILL.md b/skills/graph-clear/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index caf6da52..00000000 --- a/skills/graph-clear/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: graph-clear -description: Clear all data from the knowledge graph -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango graph clear -``` diff --git a/skills/graph-query/SKILL.md b/skills/graph-query/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index d70bc85a..00000000 --- a/skills/graph-query/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: graph-query -description: Query the knowledge graph by subject or object -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango graph query -``` diff --git a/skills/graph-stats/SKILL.md b/skills/graph-stats/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 2c9a4737..00000000 --- a/skills/graph-stats/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: graph-stats -description: Show detailed knowledge graph statistics -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango graph stats -``` diff --git a/skills/graph-status/SKILL.md b/skills/graph-status/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 907618ba..00000000 --- a/skills/graph-status/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: graph-status -description: Show knowledge graph store status and statistics -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango graph status -``` diff --git a/skills/memory-clear/SKILL.md b/skills/memory-clear/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 7e8f71c9..00000000 --- a/skills/memory-clear/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: memory-clear -description: Clear observational memory for a session -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango memory clear -``` diff --git a/skills/memory-list/SKILL.md b/skills/memory-list/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 4d85ee92..00000000 --- a/skills/memory-list/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: memory-list -description: List observations and reflections for current session -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango memory list -``` diff --git a/skills/memory-status/SKILL.md b/skills/memory-status/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 4c5bb3e8..00000000 --- a/skills/memory-status/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: memory-status -description: Show observational memory system status -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango memory status -``` diff --git a/skills/secrets-list/SKILL.md b/skills/secrets-list/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 906aab2a..00000000 --- a/skills/secrets-list/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: secrets-list -description: List stored secrets (metadata only, no values) -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango security secrets list -``` diff --git a/skills/security-status/SKILL.md b/skills/security-status/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 05781bf9..00000000 --- a/skills/security-status/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: security-status -description: Show security system status including encryption and key info -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango security status -``` diff --git a/skills/serve/SKILL.md b/skills/serve/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index de4c9a5f..00000000 --- a/skills/serve/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: serve -description: Start the lango server with configured channels and gateway -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango serve -``` diff --git a/skills/version/SKILL.md b/skills/version/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 568c2660..00000000 --- a/skills/version/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: version -description: Show lango version information -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango version -``` diff --git a/skills/workflow-cancel/SKILL.md b/skills/workflow-cancel/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 49688c06..00000000 --- a/skills/workflow-cancel/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: workflow-cancel -description: Cancel a running workflow instance -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango workflow cancel -``` diff --git a/skills/workflow-history/SKILL.md b/skills/workflow-history/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index c1271779..00000000 --- a/skills/workflow-history/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: workflow-history -description: Show execution history for workflows -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango workflow history -``` diff --git a/skills/workflow-list/SKILL.md b/skills/workflow-list/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 29391abc..00000000 --- a/skills/workflow-list/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: workflow-list -description: List running and completed workflow instances -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango workflow list -``` diff --git a/skills/workflow-run/SKILL.md b/skills/workflow-run/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index c44b6af7..00000000 --- a/skills/workflow-run/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: workflow-run -description: Execute a workflow from a YAML definition file -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango workflow run -``` diff --git a/skills/workflow-status/SKILL.md b/skills/workflow-status/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 9f6691a7..00000000 --- a/skills/workflow-status/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: workflow-status -description: Show detailed status for a workflow instance -type: script -status: active ---- - -```sh -lango workflow status -```