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change_file_association.yml
File metadata and controls
119 lines (119 loc) · 4.45 KB
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asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: medium
creation_date: '2018-01-26'
data_metadata:
data_models:
- Endpoint
data_source:
- Endpoint Intel
providing_technologies:
- Carbon Black Response
- CrowdStrike Falcon
- Sysmon
- Tanium
- Ziften
description: This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows
file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine
changes to this area.
detect:
splunk:
correlation_rule:
notable:
nes_fields: dest, user, process_name, process
rule_description: The system $dest$ had an unusual change to a file association
rule_title: Suspicious File Association Change on $dest$
risk:
risk_object: dest
risk_object_type:
- system
risk_score: 40
schedule:
cron_schedule: 0 * * * *
earliest_time: -70m@m
latest_time: -10m@m
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as
lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name)
as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=Explorer.exe
AND Processes.process_name!=OpenWith.exe by Processes.process_id Processes.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| join [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path
count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*\\Explorer\\FileExts*
by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Registry")` |
table process_id dest registry_path]'
suppress:
suppress_fields: dest,user
suppress_period: 28800s
eli5: This search looks for changes made to the registry that control Windows file
associations. It is typical for users to change the file association to open certain
types of files with specific applications. However, when these changes are legitimately
performed, they are typically done via the processes explorer.exe or openwith.exe.
The search first executes the subsearch that looks at the Registry node, which specifies
setting a value in the registry and creates a table of process_id and dest. It then
uses those arguments to find out what process and parent process were responsible
for making those registry changes.
entities:
- dest
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes
from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry`
nodes.
id: 1b989a0e-0129-4446-a695-f193a5b746fc
investigations:
- id: fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41xf9
name: Get Registry Activities
type: splunk
- id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd76
name: Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint
type: splunk
- id: fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9
name: Get Parent Process Info
type: splunk
- id: fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d55
name: Get Risk Modifiers For User
type: splunk
- id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71
name: Get Process Info
type: splunk
- id: 3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7
name: Get Notable History
type: splunk
- id: f3fb4d1b-5f33-4b01-b541-c7af9534c242
name: Get Notable Info
type: splunk
- id: fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d65
name: Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint
type: splunk
- id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd74
name: Get User Information from Identity Table
type: splunk
known_false_positives: There may be other processes in your environment that users
may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are
finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions.
maintainers:
- company: Splunk
email: rvaldez@splunk.com
name: Rico Valdez
mappings:
cis20:
- CIS 3
- CIS 8
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
mitre_attack:
- Persistence
- Change Default File Association
nist:
- DE.CM
- PR.PT
- PR.IP
modification_date: '2018-01-26'
name: Suspicious Changes to File Associations
original_authors:
- company: Splunk
email: rvaldez@splunk.com
name: Rico Valdez
references: []
security_domain: endpoint
spec_version: 2
type: splunk
version: '2.0'