Merge branch 'catalog/758' into catalog/744

Author: edwardchalstrey1

catalog/bagwell1995.efg

@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
 EFG 2 R "Bagwell (GEB 1995) commitment and (un)observability" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
 "This is a Stackelberg-type game with imperfectly observed commitment, following the
-analysis of Bagwell [^Bag1995].  The outcomes and payoffs are the same as in Bagwell's
+analysis of Bagwell [Bag1995]_.  The outcomes and payoffs are the same as in Bagwell's
 model.  This example sets the probability that the follower 'correctly' observes the
 leader's action as .99 (99/100).  The key result is that the only pure-strategy
 equilibrium that survives if observability is imperfect is the one in which players
 choose the actions that would form an equilibrium if the game was a *simultaneous-move*
 game.  There is an equilibrium in which the 'Stackelberg' action is played with high
 probability, but strictly less than one.
 
-[^Bag1995]: Bagwell, Kyle (1995)  Commitment and observability in games.
+[Bag1995]_: Bagwell, Kyle (1995)  Commitment and observability in games.
     _Games and Economic Behavior_ 8: 271-280.
 "