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Merge branch 'master' into issue_823
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‎.gitignore‎

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -51,4 +51,4 @@ Gambit.app/*
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build_support/msw/gambit.wxs
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build_support/osx/Info.plist
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src/pygambit/catalog
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doc/catalog.csv
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doc/catalog_table.rst

‎build_support/catalog/update.py‎

Lines changed: 99 additions & 7 deletions
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@@ -1,13 +1,106 @@
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import argparse
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from pathlib import Path
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import pandas as pd
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import pygambit as gbt
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CATALOG_CSV = Path(__file__).parent.parent.parent / "doc" / "catalog.csv"
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CATALOG_RST_TABLE = Path(__file__).parent.parent.parent / "doc" / "catalog_table.rst"
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CATALOG_DIR = Path(__file__).parent.parent.parent / "catalog"
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MAKEFILE_AM = Path(__file__).parent.parent.parent / "Makefile.am"
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def _write_efg_table(df: pd.DataFrame, f):
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"""Write the EFG games list-table to file handle f."""
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f.write(".. list-table::\n")
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f.write(" :header-rows: 1\n")
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f.write(" :widths: 100\n")
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f.write(" :class: tight-table\n")
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f.write("\n")
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f.write(" * - **Extensive form games**\n")
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efg_df = df[df["Format"] == "efg"]
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for _, row in efg_df.iterrows():
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slug = row["Game"]
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title = str(row.get("Title", "")).strip()
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description = str(row.get("Description", "")).strip()
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# Skip any games which lack a description
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if description:
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# Main dropdown
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f.write(f" * - .. dropdown:: {title}\n")
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f.write(" :open:\n")
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f.write(" \n")
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for line in description.splitlines():
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f.write(f" {line}\n")
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f.write(" \n")
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f.write(" **Load in PyGambit:**\n")
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f.write(" \n")
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f.write(" .. code-block:: python\n")
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f.write(" \n")
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f.write(f' pygambit.catalog.load("{slug}")\n')
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f.write(" \n")
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# Download links (inside the dropdown)
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download_links = [row["Download"]]
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f.write(" **Download:**\n")
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f.write(" \n")
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f.write(f" {' '.join(download_links)}\n")
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f.write(" \n")
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# def _write_nfg_table(df: pd.DataFrame, f):
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# """Write the NFG games list-table to file handle f."""
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# f.write(".. list-table::\n")
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# f.write(" :header-rows: 1\n")
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# f.write(" :widths: 100\n")
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# f.write(" :class: tight-table\n")
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# f.write("\n")
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# f.write(" * - **Strategic form games**\n")
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# nfg_df = df[df["Format"] == "nfg"]
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# for _, row in nfg_df.iterrows():
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# slug = row["Game"]
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# # Title as plain text header
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# f.write(" * - \n")
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# f.write(" \n")
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# # Jupyter-execute block (no dropdown)
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# f.write(" .. jupyter-execute::\n")
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# f.write(" \n")
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# f.write(" import pygambit\n")
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# f.write(f' pygambit.catalog.load("{slug}")\n')
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# f.write(" \n")
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# # Download link (plain, no dropdown)
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# f.write(f" :download:`{slug}.nfg <../catalog/{slug}.nfg>`\n")
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# f.write(" \n")
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def generate_rst_table(df: pd.DataFrame, rst_path: Path):
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"""Generate RST output with two list-tables: one for EFG and one for NFG games."""
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with open(rst_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
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# TOC linking to both sections
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# f.write(".. contents::\n")
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# f.write(" :local:\n")
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# f.write(" :depth: 1\n")
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# f.write("\n")
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# EFG section
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# f.write("Extensive form games\n")
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# f.write("--------------------\n")
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# f.write("\n")
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_write_efg_table(df, f)
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# f.write("\n")
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# # NFG section
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# f.write("Strategic form games\n")
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# f.write("--------------------\n")
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# f.write("\n")
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# _write_nfg_table(df, f)
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def update_makefile():
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"""Update the Makefile.am with all games from the catalog."""
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@@ -60,15 +153,14 @@ def update_makefile():
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
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parser.add_argument("--build", action="store_true")
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args = parser.parse_args()
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# Create CSV used by RST docs page
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gbt.catalog.games().to_csv(CATALOG_CSV, index=False)
70-
print(f"Generated {CATALOG_CSV} for use in local docs build. DO NOT COMMIT.")
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# Update the Makefile.am with the current list of catalog files
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# Create RST list-table used by doc/catalog.rst
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df = gbt.catalog.games(include_descriptions=True)
162+
generate_rst_table(df, CATALOG_RST_TABLE)
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print(f"Generated {CATALOG_RST_TABLE} for use in local docs build. DO NOT COMMIT.")
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if args.build:
165+
# Update the Makefile.am with the current list of catalog files
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update_makefile()

‎catalog/bagwell1995.efg‎

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@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
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EFG 2 R "Bagwell (GEB 1995) commitment and (un)observability" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
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"This is a Stackelberg-type game with imperfectly observed commitment, following the
3-
analysis of Bagwell [^Bag1995]. The outcomes and payoffs are the same as in Bagwell's
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analysis of `Bag1995 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Bag1995>`_. The outcomes and payoffs are the same as in Bagwell's
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model. This example sets the probability that the follower 'correctly' observes the
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leader's action as .99 (99/100). The key result is that the only pure-strategy
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equilibrium that survives if observability is imperfect is the one in which players
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choose the actions that would form an equilibrium if the game was a *simultaneous-move*
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game. There is an equilibrium in which the 'Stackelberg' action is played with high
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probability, but strictly less than one.
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[^Bag1995]: Bagwell, Kyle (1995) Commitment and observability in games.
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_Games and Economic Behavior_ 8: 271-280.
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"
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p "" 1 1 "" { "S" "C" } 0

‎catalog/myerson1991/fig2_1.efg‎

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EFG 2 R "A simple Poker game" { "Fred" "Alice" }
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"This is a simple game of one-card poker from Myerson [^Mye91], used as the
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"This is a simple game of one-card poker from `Mye91 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Mye91>`_, used as the
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introductory example for game models.
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55
Note that as specified in the text, the game has the slightly unusual feature
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that folding with the high (red) card results in the player winning rather than
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losing.
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9-
See also
10-
--------
11-
reiley2008/fig1
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See also `Rei2008 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Rei2008>`_
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Another one-card poker game where folding with the high card is a loss rather
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than a win.
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15-
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[^Mye1991]: Myerson, Roger B. (1991) Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict.
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Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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"
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c "" 1 "" { "Red" 1/2 "Black" 1/2 } 0

‎catalog/myerson1991/fig4_2.efg‎

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EFG 2 R "Myerson (1991) Figure 4.2" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
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"An example from Myerson [^Mye1991] which illustrates the distinction between
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"An example from `Mye91 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Mye91>`_ which illustrates the distinction between
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an equilibrium of an extensive form game and an equilibrium of its
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(multi)agent representation. The actions B1, Z1, and W2 form a
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behavior profile which is an equilibrium in the (multi)agent
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representation. However, it is not a Nash equilibrium of the extensive
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game, because Player 1 would prefer to switch from (B1, Z1) to
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(A1, Y1); the (multi)agent representation rules out such coordinated
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deviations across information sets.
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[^Mye1991]: Myerson, Roger B. (1991) Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict.
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Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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"
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p "" 1 1 "" { "A1" "B1" } 0

‎catalog/reiley2008/fig1.efg‎

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EFG 2 R "Stripped-down poker (Reiley et al 2008)" { "Professor" "Student" }
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"This is a one-card poker game used in [^Rei2008] as a teaching exercise.
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"This is a one-card poker game used in `Rei2008 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Rei2008>`_ as a teaching exercise.
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4-
See also
5-
--------
6-
myerson1991/fig2_1
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See also `Mye91 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Mye91>`_
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Another one-card poker game with slightly different rules.
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[^Rei2008]: Reiley, David H., Urbancic, Michael B, and Walker, Mark. (2008)
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Stripped-Down Poker: A Classroom Game with Signaling and Bluffing.
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_The Journal of Economic Education_ 4: 323-341.
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"
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c "" 1 "" { "King" 1/2 "Queen" 1/2 } 0

‎catalog/selten1975/fig1.efg‎

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EFG 2 R "Selten's horse (Selten IJGT 1975, Figure 1)" { "Player 1" "Player 2" "Player 3" }
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"This is a three-player game presented in Selten [^Sel1975], commonly referred
2+
"This is a three-player game presented in `Sel75 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Sel75>`_, commonly referred
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to as \"Selten's horse\" owing to the layout in which it can be drawn.
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It is the motivating example for his definition of (trembling-hand)
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perfect equilibrium, by showing a game that has an equilibrium which
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is \"unreasonable\", but which is not ruled out by subgame perfection because
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this game has no proper subgames.
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9-
[^Sel1975]: Selten, Reinhard (1975). A reexamination of the perfectness concept
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for equilibrium points in extensive games. International Journal of Game
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Theory 4(1): 25-55.
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"
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p "" 1 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0

‎catalog/selten1975/fig2.efg‎

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EFG 2 R "Selten (IJGT 1975) Figure 2" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
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"This is a counterexample presented in [^Sel1975], to show that extensive and
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"This is a counterexample presented in `Sel75 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Sel75>`_, to show that extensive and
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normal form concepts of perfectness do not coincide. This game has one
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perfect equilibrium in the extensive from, but a distinct (pure) strategy
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equilibrium is also perfect in the normal form.
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[^Sel75]: Selten, Reinhard (1975). A reexamination of the perfectness concept
8-
for equilibrium points in extensive games. International Journal of Game
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Theory 4(1): 25-55.
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"
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p "" 1 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0

‎catalog/selten1975/fig3.efg‎

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EFG 2 R "Selten (IJGT 1975) Figure 3" { "Player 1" "Player 2" "Player 3" }
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"This is a counterexample presented in [^Sel1975], to show that extensive and
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"This is a counterexample presented in `Sel75 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Sel75>`_, to show that extensive and
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normal form concepts of perfectness do not coincide. Specifically, there
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are two equilibria which are perfect in the normal form but not perfect
55
in the extensive form.
6-
7-
[^Sel75]: Selten, Reinhard (1975). A reexamination of the perfectness concept
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for equilibrium points in extensive games. International Journal of Game
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Theory 4(1): 25-55.
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"
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p "" 1 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0

‎catalog/watson2013/exercise29_6.efg‎

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EFG 2 R "Princess Bride signaling game (from Watson)" { "Wesley" "Prince" }
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"This game is Exercise 29.6 from Watson [^Wat13], based on a scene from
3-
the Rob Reiner film, _The Princess Bride_:
2+
"This game is Exercise 29.6 from Watson `Wat13 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Wat13>`_, based on a scene from
3+
the Rob Reiner film, The Princess Bride:
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Wesley (the protagonist) confronts the evil prince Humperdinck. Wesley
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is one of two types: weak or strong. Wesley knows whether he is weak or
@@ -15,9 +15,6 @@ swordsman. Also, the weak Wesley must pay a cost to get out of bed.
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1616
In the game in this file, the cost the weak Wesley pays to get out of bed
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is set to 2.
18-
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[^Wat13]: Watson, Joel. (2013) Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory,
20-
third edition. W. W. Norton & Company.
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"
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c "" 1 "" { "Strong" 1/2 "Weak" 1/2 } 0

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