Provide citation details and explanations for examples from Spence textbook.

Author: tturocy

catalog/watson2013/exercise29_6.efg

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+EFG 2 R "Princess Bride signaling game (from Watson)" { "Wesley" "Prince" }
+"This game is Exercise 29.6 from Watson [^Wat13], based on a scene from
+the Rob Reiner film, _The Princess Bride_:
+
+Wesley (the protagonist) confronts the evil prince Humperdinck.  Wesley
+is one of two types: weak or strong.  Wesley knows whether he is weak or
+strong, but the prince only knows that he is weak with probability 1/2 and
+strong with probability 1/2.  Wesley is lying in a bed in the prince's
+castle when the prince enters the room.  Wesley decides whether to get out
+of bed or stay in bed.  The prince observes Wesley's action but does not
+observe Wesley's type.  The prince then decides whether to fight or
+surrender to Wesley.  The payoffs are such that the prince prefers to fight
+only with the weak Wesley, because otherwise the prince is an inferior
+swordsman.  Also, the weak Wesley must pay a cost to get out of bed.
+
+In the game in this file, the cost the weak Wesley pays to get out of bed
+is set to 2.
+
+[^Wat13]: Watson, Joel.  (2013)  Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory,
+   third edition.  W. W. Norton & Company.
+"
+
+c "" 1 "" { "Strong" 1/2 "Weak" 1/2 } 0
+p "" 1 1 "" { "Up" "Stay" } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "Surrender" "Fight" } 0
+t "" 1 "Outcome1" { 1, 0 }
+t "" 2 "Outcome2" { 0, -2 }
+p "" 2 2 "" { "Surrender" "Fight" } 0
+t "" 3 "Outcome3" { 1, 0 }
+t "" 4 "Outcome4" { 0, -2 }
+p "" 1 2 "" { "Up" "Stay" } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "Surrender" "Fight" } 0
+t "" 5 "Outcome5" { -1, 0 }
+t "" 6 "Outcome6" { -3, 1 }
+p "" 2 2 "" { "Surrender" "Fight" } 0
+t "" 7 "Outcome7" { 1, 0 }
+t "" 8 "Outcome8" { -1, 1 }

contrib/games/spence.efg catalog/watson2013/fig29_1.efgcontrib/games/spence.efg renamed to catalog/watson2013/fig29_1.efg

@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
 EFG 2 R "Job-market signaling game (version from Watson)" { "You" "Firm" }
-""
+"This is a version of Spence's classic model of education being a job-market
+signal, as presented in Figure 29.1 of Watson [^Wat13].
+
+[^Wat13]: Watson, Joel.  (2013)  Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory,
+   third edition.  W. W. Norton & Company.
+"
 
 c "" 1 "" { "High" 1/3 "Low" 2/3 } 0
 p "" 1 1 "" { "E" "N" } 0

contrib/games/pbride.efg

@@ -46,22 +46,10 @@ Sample games
   games. Games and Economic Behavior 79:
   223-232. <http:dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.003>`_
 
-:download:`pbride.efg <../contrib/games/pbride.efg>`
-  A signaling game from
-  `Joel Watson's Strategy textbook
-  <http://books.wwnorton.com/books/detail.aspx?ID=4294969499>`_,
-  modeling the confrontation in The Princess Bride between Humperdinck
-  and Roberts in the bedchamber.
-
 :download:`poker.efg <../contrib/games/poker.efg>`
   A simple game of one-card poker introduced in
   `Myerson, Roger (1991) Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict.
   <http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674341166>`_.
   A bit unusually for poker, the "fold" action by a player with a
   strong hand counts for a win for that player, so folding is only
   weakly rather than strictly dominated in this case.
-
-:download:`spence.efg <../contrib/games/spence.efg>`
-  A version of Spence's classic job-market signaling game. This version
-  comes from `Joel Watson's Strategy textbook
-  <http://books.wwnorton.com/books/detail.aspx?ID=4294969499>`_.