Curate other games from Selten 1975.

Author: tturocy

catalog/selten1975/fig1.efg

@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
 EFG 2 R "Selten's horse (Selten IJGT 1975, Figure 1)" { "Player 1" "Player 2" "Player 3" }
-"This is a three-player game presented in Selten [^Sel75], commonly referred
+"This is a three-player game presented in Selten [^Sel1975], commonly referred
 to as \"Selten's horse\" owing to the layout in which it can be drawn.
 It is the motivating example for his definition of (trembling-hand)
 perfect equilibrium, by showing a game that has an equilibrium which
 is \"unreasonable\", but which is not ruled out by subgame perfection because
 this game has no proper subgames.
 
-[^Sel75]: Selten, Reinhard (1975). A reexamination of the perfectness concept
+[^Sel1975]: Selten, Reinhard (1975). A reexamination of the perfectness concept
   for equilibrium points in extensive games.  International Journal of Game
   Theory 4(1): 25-55.
 "
 
-p "" 1 1 "(1,1)" { "R" "L" } 0
-p "" 2 1 "(2,1)" { "R" "L" } 0
+p "" 1 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
 t "" 1 "Outcome 1" { 1, 1, 1 }
-p "" 3 1 "(3,1)" { "R" "L" } 0
+p "" 3 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
 t "" 2 "Outcome 2" { 4, 4, 0 }
 t "" 3 "Outcome 3" { 0, 0, 1 }
-p "" 3 1 "(3,1)" { "R" "L" } 0
+p "" 3 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
 t "" 4 "Outcome 4" { 3, 2, 2 }
 t "" 5 "Outcome 5" { 0, 0, 0 }

catalog/selten1975/fig2.efg

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+EFG 2 R "Selten (IJGT 1975) Figure 2" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
+"This is a counterexample presented in [^Sel1975], to show that extensive and
+normal form concepts of perfectness do not coincide.  This game has one
+perfect equilibrium in the extensive from, but a distinct (pure) strategy
+equilibrium is also perfect in the normal form.
+
+[^Sel75]: Selten, Reinhard (1975). A reexamination of the perfectness concept
+  for equilibrium points in extensive games.  International Journal of Game
+  Theory 4(1): 25-55.
+"
+
+p "" 1 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
+t "" 1 "Outcome 1" { 1, 1 }
+p "" 2 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
+t "" 2 "Outcome 2" { 0, 2 }
+p "" 1 2 "" { "r" "l" } 0
+t "" 3 "Outcome 3" { 0, 3 }
+t "" 4 "Outcome 4" { 2, 0 }

catalog/selten1975/fig3.efg

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+EFG 2 R "Selten (IJGT 1975) Figure 3" { "Player 1" "Player 2" "Player 3" }
+"This is a counterexample presented in [^Sel1975], to show that extensive and
+normal form concepts of perfectness do not coincide.   Specifically, there
+are two equilibria which are perfect in the normal form but not perfect
+in the extensive form.
+
+[^Sel75]: Selten, Reinhard (1975). A reexamination of the perfectness concept
+  for equilibrium points in extensive games.  International Journal of Game
+  Theory 4(1): 25-55.
+"
+
+p "" 1 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
+p "" 3 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
+t "" 1 "Outcome 1" { 3, 0, 3 }
+t "" 2 "Outcome 2" { 0, 0, 0 }
+p "" 2 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
+p "" 1 2 "" { "R" "L" } 0
+p "" 3 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
+t "" 3 "Outcome 3" { 4, 4, 0 }
+t "" 4 "Outcome 4" { 0, 0, 5 }
+t "" 5 "Outcome 5" { 2, 0, 0 }
+t "" 6 "Outcome 6" { 1, 3, 0 }