Merge branch 'master' into tutorial/732

Author: edwardchalstrey1

Makefile.am

@@ -131,9 +131,6 @@ EXTRA_DIST = \
 	contrib/games/coord4.efg \
 	contrib/games/cross.efg \
 	contrib/games/cs.efg \
-	contrib/games/e01.efg \
-	contrib/games/e02.efg \
-	contrib/games/e03.efg \
 	contrib/games/e04.efg \
 	contrib/games/e05.efg \
 	contrib/games/e06.efg \
@@ -210,8 +207,6 @@ EXTRA_DIST = \
 	contrib/games/csg4.nfg \
 	contrib/games/deg1.nfg \
 	contrib/games/deg2.nfg \
-	contrib/games/e01.nfg \
-	contrib/games/e02.nfg \
 	contrib/games/e04.nfg \
 	contrib/games/e07.nfg \
 	contrib/games/g1.nfg \
@@ -237,10 +232,10 @@ EXTRA_DIST = \
 	contrib/games/yamamoto.nfg \
 	contrib/games/zero.nfg \
 	src/README.rst \
-	catalog/2smp.efg \
-	catalog/2x2x2.nfg \
-	catalog/myerson/fig_4_2.efg \
-	catalog/pd.nfg
+	catalog/myerson1991/fig4_2.efg \
+	catalog/selten1975/fig1.efg \
+	catalog/selten1975/fig2.efg \
+	catalog/selten1975/fig3.efg
 
 core_SOURCES = \
     src/core/core.h \

catalog/myerson/fig_4_2.efg

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+EFG 2 R "Myerson (1991) Figure 4.2" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
+"An example from Myerson [^Mye1991] which illustrates the distinction between
+an equilibrium of an extensive form game and an equilibrium of its
+(multi)agent representation.  The actions B1, Z1, and W2 form a
+behavior profile which is an equilibrium in the (multi)agent
+representation.  However, it is not a Nash equilibrium of the extensive
+game, because Player 1 would prefer to switch from (B1, Z1) to
+(A1, Y1); the (multi)agent representation rules out such coordinated
+deviations across information sets.
+
+[^Mye1991]: Myerson, Roger B. (1991)  Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict.
+  Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
+"
+
+p "" 1 1 "" { "A1" "B1" } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "W2" "X2" } 0
+p "" 1 2 "" { "Y1" "Z1" } 0
+t "" 1 "" { 3, 0 }
+t "" 2 "" { 0, 0 }
+p "" 1 2 "" { "Y1" "Z1" } 0
+t "" 3 "" { 2, 3 }
+t "" 4 "" { 4, 1 }
+p "" 2 1 "" { "W2" "X2" } 0
+t "" 5 "" { 2, 3 }
+t "" 6 "" { 3, 2 }

catalog/myerson1991/fig4_2.efg

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+EFG 2 R "Selten's horse (Selten IJGT 1975, Figure 1)" { "Player 1" "Player 2" "Player 3" }
+"This is a three-player game presented in Selten [^Sel1975], commonly referred
+to as \"Selten's horse\" owing to the layout in which it can be drawn.
+It is the motivating example for his definition of (trembling-hand)
+perfect equilibrium, by showing a game that has an equilibrium which
+is \"unreasonable\", but which is not ruled out by subgame perfection because
+this game has no proper subgames.
+
+[^Sel1975]: Selten, Reinhard (1975). A reexamination of the perfectness concept
+  for equilibrium points in extensive games.  International Journal of Game
+  Theory 4(1): 25-55.
+"
+
+p "" 1 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
+t "" 1 "Outcome 1" { 1, 1, 1 }
+p "" 3 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
+t "" 2 "Outcome 2" { 4, 4, 0 }
+t "" 3 "Outcome 3" { 0, 0, 1 }
+p "" 3 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
+t "" 4 "Outcome 4" { 3, 2, 2 }
+t "" 5 "Outcome 5" { 0, 0, 0 }

catalog/selten1975/fig1.efg

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+EFG 2 R "Selten (IJGT 1975) Figure 2" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
+"This is a counterexample presented in [^Sel1975], to show that extensive and
+normal form concepts of perfectness do not coincide.  This game has one
+perfect equilibrium in the extensive from, but a distinct (pure) strategy
+equilibrium is also perfect in the normal form.
+
+[^Sel75]: Selten, Reinhard (1975). A reexamination of the perfectness concept
+  for equilibrium points in extensive games.  International Journal of Game
+  Theory 4(1): 25-55.
+"
+
+p "" 1 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
+t "" 1 "Outcome 1" { 1, 1 }
+p "" 2 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
+t "" 2 "Outcome 2" { 0, 2 }
+p "" 1 2 "" { "r" "l" } 0
+t "" 3 "Outcome 3" { 0, 3 }
+t "" 4 "Outcome 4" { 2, 0 }

catalog/selten1975/fig2.efg

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+EFG 2 R "Selten (IJGT 1975) Figure 3" { "Player 1" "Player 2" "Player 3" }
+"This is a counterexample presented in [^Sel1975], to show that extensive and
+normal form concepts of perfectness do not coincide.   Specifically, there
+are two equilibria which are perfect in the normal form but not perfect
+in the extensive form.
+
+[^Sel75]: Selten, Reinhard (1975). A reexamination of the perfectness concept
+  for equilibrium points in extensive games.  International Journal of Game
+  Theory 4(1): 25-55.
+"
+
+p "" 1 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
+p "" 3 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
+t "" 1 "Outcome 1" { 3, 0, 3 }
+t "" 2 "Outcome 2" { 0, 0, 0 }
+p "" 2 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
+p "" 1 2 "" { "R" "L" } 0
+p "" 3 1 "" { "R" "L" } 0
+t "" 3 "Outcome 3" { 4, 4, 0 }
+t "" 4 "Outcome 4" { 0, 0, 5 }
+t "" 5 "Outcome 5" { 2, 0, 0 }
+t "" 6 "Outcome 6" { 1, 3, 0 }