Merge branch 'master' into catalog/744

Author: edwardchalstrey1

.github/workflows/lint.yml

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v6
       - name: Run clang-format style check for C/C++
-        uses: jidicula/clang-format-action@v4.17.0
+        uses: jidicula/clang-format-action@v4.18.0
         with:
           clang-format-version: '17'
           check-path: 'src'

ChangeLog

@@ -1,9 +1,14 @@
 # Changelog
 
-## [16.6.0] - unreleased
+## [16.6.0] - 2026-03-24
 
 ### Changed
+- Gambit has a refreshed branding and logo which is reflected in this release!
 - `Game.comment` has been renamed to `Game.description`
+- With behaviour profiles that reach some information sets with probability zero, beliefs, action
+  values, and infoset values are not well-defined.  These functions now return a
+  `std::optional` in C++ and type or `None` in Python, where nulls indicate these quantities
+  are not defined.  (#446)
 
 ### Added
 - Implement linear-time algorithm to find all root nodes of proper subgames, using an adaptation of
@@ -20,10 +25,6 @@
   root node is a member of an absent-minded infoset.  (#584)
 - Removed spurious warning in graphical interface when loading file as a command-line argument
   (or also by clicking on a file in MSW, as that uses the command-line mechanism).  (#801)
-
-## [16.5.1] - unreleased
-
-### Fixed
 - `Game.reveal` raised a null pointer access exception or dumped core in some cases (#749)
 
 ## [16.5.0] - 2026-01-05

MANIFEST.in

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-recursive-include src/core *.cc *.h *.imp
+recursive-include src/core *.cc *.h
 recursive-include src/games *.cc *.h *.imp
-recursive-include src/solvers *.c *.cc *.h *.imp
+recursive-include src/solvers *.cc *.h *.imp
 recursive-include catalog *
 include src/gambit.h
 include src/pygambit/*.pxd

Makefile.am

@@ -406,9 +406,6 @@ gambit_enumpoly_SOURCES = \
     src/solvers/enumpoly/polypartial.imp \
 	src/solvers/enumpoly/polysolver.cc \
 	src/solvers/enumpoly/polysolver.h \
-	src/solvers/enumpoly/polyfeasible.h \
-	src/solvers/enumpoly/behavextend.cc \
-	src/solvers/enumpoly/behavextend.h \
 	src/solvers/enumpoly/efgpoly.cc \
 	src/solvers/enumpoly/nfgpoly.cc \
 	src/solvers/enumpoly/enumpoly.h \

build_support/GAMBIT_VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-16.5.0
+16.6.0

catalog/__init__.py

@@ -43,11 +43,6 @@ def load(slug: str) -> gbt.Game:
             with as_file(resource_path) as path:
                 return reader(str(path))
 
-    # Try loading from family games
-    fg = family_games()
-    if slug in fg:
-        return fg[slug]
-
     # Raise error if game does not exist
     raise FileNotFoundError(f"No catalog entry called {slug}")
 
@@ -175,16 +170,6 @@ def append_record(
                 if check_filters(game):
                     append_record(slug, game)
 
-    # Add all the games from families
-    for slug, game in family_games().items():
-        # Throw an error if there's a slug collision between family games and file-based games
-        if slug in [r["Game"] for r in records]:
-            raise ValueError(
-                f"Slug collision: {slug} is present in both file-based and family games."
-            )
-        if check_filters(game):
-            append_record(slug, game)
-
     if include_descriptions:
         return pd.DataFrame.from_records(
             records, columns=["Game", "Title", "Description", "Download", "Format"]

catalog/bagwell1995.efg

@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
 EFG 2 R "Bagwell (GEB 1995) commitment and (un)observability" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
 "This is a Stackelberg-type game with imperfectly observed commitment, following the
-analysis of Bagwell [Bag1995]_.  The outcomes and payoffs are the same as in Bagwell's
+analysis of `Bag1995 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Bag1995>`_.  The outcomes and payoffs are the same as in Bagwell's
 model.  This example sets the probability that the follower 'correctly' observes the
 leader's action as .99 (99/100).  The key result is that the only pure-strategy
 equilibrium that survives if observability is imperfect is the one in which players
 choose the actions that would form an equilibrium if the game was a *simultaneous-move*
 game.  There is an equilibrium in which the 'Stackelberg' action is played with high
 probability, but strictly less than one.
-
-[Bag1995]_: Bagwell, Kyle (1995)  Commitment and observability in games.
-    Games and Economic Behavior 8: 271-280.
 "
 
 p "" 1 1 "" { "S" "C" } 0

catalog/myerson1991/fig2_1.efg

@@ -1,20 +1,14 @@
 EFG 2 R "A simple Poker game" { "Fred" "Alice" }
-"This is a simple game of one-card poker from Myerson [Mye91]_, used as the
+"This is a simple game of one-card poker from `Mye91 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Mye91>`_, used as the
 introductory example for game models.
 
 Note that as specified in the text, the game has the slightly unusual feature
 that folding with the high (red) card results in the player winning rather than
 losing.
 
-See also
---------
-reiley2008/fig1
+See also `Rei2008 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Rei2008>`_
    Another one-card poker game where folding with the high card is a loss rather
    than a win.
-
-
-[Mye91]_: Myerson, Roger B. (1991)  Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict.
-  Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
 "
 
 c "" 1 "" { "Red" 1/2 "Black" 1/2 } 0

catalog/myerson1991/fig4_2.efg

@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
 EFG 2 R "Myerson (1991) Figure 4.2" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
-"An example from Myerson [Mye91]_ which illustrates the distinction between
+"An example from `Mye91 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Mye91>`_ which illustrates the distinction between
 an equilibrium of an extensive form game and an equilibrium of its
 (multi)agent representation.  The actions B1, Z1, and W2 form a
 behavior profile which is an equilibrium in the (multi)agent
 representation.  However, it is not a Nash equilibrium of the extensive
 game, because Player 1 would prefer to switch from (B1, Z1) to
 (A1, Y1); the (multi)agent representation rules out such coordinated
 deviations across information sets.
-
-[Mye91]_: Myerson, Roger B. (1991)  Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict.
-  Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
 "
 
 p "" 1 1 "" { "A1" "B1" } 0

catalog/reiley2008/fig1.efg

@@ -1,14 +1,8 @@
 EFG 2 R "Stripped-down poker (Reiley et al 2008)" { "Professor" "Student" }
-"This is a one-card poker game used in [Rei2008]_ as a teaching exercise.
+"This is a one-card poker game used in `Rei2008 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Rei2008>`_ as a teaching exercise.
 
-See also
---------
-myerson1991/fig2_1
+See also `Mye91 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Mye91>`_
     Another one-card poker game with slightly different rules.
-
-[Rei2008]_: Reiley, David H., Urbancic, Michael B, and Walker, Mark. (2008)
-    Stripped-Down Poker: A Classroom Game with Signaling and Bluffing.
-    The Journal of Economic Education 4: 323-341.
 "
 
 c "" 1 "" { "King" 1/2 "Queen" 1/2 } 0