Obfuscation of PII parameters in KYC-match

[pai-achuth-bridge]

In a KYC-match flow involving Developer→ Aggregator → MNO, is there a recommended way to protect sensitive payload parameters (e.g., name, address) so that the aggregator or other intermediaries cannot view them in clear text? Has there been any discussion on introducing a standard & compliant mechanism for payload obfuscation/encryption in the CAMARA spec?

[HuubAppelboom]

In the Mobile Connect specifications, hashing is commonly used (without a salt) to achieve at least some form encryption. Please note that this can be reversed by rainbow tables, so its effect has its limitations.

For CAMARA we have opted for fuzzy name matching logic, to be able to provide a match score. This does not go well with hashing.

This issue may not only play with KYC Match, other information may be privacy sensitive as well (like location). It may be better to see whether a generic meachnism can be deviced for such an encryption, which would work for any api.

[ToshiWakayama-KDDI]

To be transferred to the new kyc-match repository, as agreed in 2025-09-30 meeting.