remove mentions about deterministic

Author: pythcoiner

bip-encrypted-backup.md

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ avoids the first problem but amplifies surveillance risk: anyone who gains these
 etc...  Even with encryption at the cloud provider, an attacker or a subpoena can
 compel access, and each extra copy multiplies the attack surface.
 
-These constraints lead to an acute need for an **encrypted, deterministic**, and
+These constraints lead to an acute need for an **encrypted**, and
 ideally compact backup format that:
 
 * can be **safely stored in multiple places**, including untrusted on-line services,  
@@ -105,8 +105,6 @@ parties (typically, a subset of the cosigners).
 * **Easy to implement**: it should not require any sophisticated tools.  
 * **Vendor-independent**: it should be easy to implement using any hardware signing
 device.  
-* **Deterministic**: the result of the backup is the same for the same payload. Not
-crucial, but a nice-to-have.
 
 ### Scope
 
@@ -127,14 +125,6 @@ interactive workflows.
 
 Note: in the followings sections, the operator ⊕ refers to the bitwise XOR.
 
-### Security considerations
-
-Deterministic encryption, by definition, cannot satisfy the standard [semantic
-security](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantic_security) property commonly used in
-cryptography; however, in our context, it is safe to assume that the adversary does
-not have access to plaintexts, and no other plaintext will be encrypted with the
-same secrets.
-
 ### Secret generation
 
 * Let `p_1`, `p_2`, .., `p_n` be the public keys in the descriptor/wallet policy, in