This document tracks the implementation status of all security features in SecAI_OS.
Last updated: 2026-03-10
| Feature | Status | Milestone | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Threat model, dataflow, invariants | Implemented | M0 | Formal threat model in docs/threat-model.md |
| Bootable OS, encrypted vault, GPU drivers | Implemented | M1 | Fedora Silverblue 42 (uBlue) base, LUKS2 vault |
| Trusted Registry, hash pinning, cosign | Implemented | M2 | Go registry service on :8470, cosign signature verification |
| 7-stage quarantine pipeline | Implemented | M3 | Python quarantine watcher, multi-stage scanning |
| Tool Firewall, default-deny policy | Implemented | M4 | Go tool-firewall service on :8475, default-deny egress |
| Online Airlock, sanitization | Implemented | M5 | Go airlock service on :8490, disabled by default (privacy risk) |
| Systemd sandboxing, kernel hardening, nftables | Implemented | M6 | Systemd unit hardening, sysctl tuning, nftables rules |
| CI/CD, Go/Python tests, shellcheck | Implemented | M7 | GitHub Actions ci.yml, 26 Go tests, 595+ Python tests |
| Image/video generation, diffusion worker | Implemented | M8 | Diffusion worker for image generation workloads |
| Multi-GPU support (NVIDIA/AMD/Intel/Apple) | Implemented | M9 | CUDA, ROCm/HIP, XPU/Vulkan, Metal/MPS backends |
| Tor-routed search, SearXNG, PII stripping | Implemented | M10 | Search mediator with Tor routing and PII redaction |
| VM support, OVA/QCOW2 builds | Implemented | M11 | VirtualBox, VMware, KVM/QEMU, Proxmox support |
| Model integrity monitoring | Implemented | M12 | Hash-based model file integrity checks |
| Tamper-evident audit logs | Implemented | M13 | Hash-chained audit logs with periodic verification |
| Local passphrase auth | Implemented | M14 | Scrypt hashing with rate limiting |
| Vault auto-lock | Implemented | M15 | Idle detection watchdog with UI controls |
| Seccomp-BPF + Landlock process isolation | Implemented | M16 | Seccomp-BPF syscall filtering, Landlock filesystem restrictions |
| Secure Boot + TPM2 measured boot | Implemented | M17 | MOK signing, TPM2 vault sealing, measured boot chain |
| Memory protection (swap/zswap/core dumps/mlock/TEE) | Implemented | M18 | Swap encryption, zswap hardening, core dump prevention, mlock, TEE detection |
| Traffic analysis protection | Implemented | M19 | Padding, timing jitter, dummy traffic for anonymity |
| Privacy-preserving query obfuscation for search | Implemented | M20 | Decoy queries, k-anonymity, timing randomization, query padding |
| Clipboard isolation | Implemented | M21 | Clipboard access controls and sanitization |
| Canary/tripwire system | Implemented | M22 | Canary tokens and filesystem tripwires |
| Emergency wipe (3-level panic) | Implemented | M23 | Three escalation levels for emergency data destruction |
| Update verification + auto-rollback | Implemented | M24 | Signed update verification with automatic rollback on failure |
| UI polish + security hardening | Implemented | M25 | Flask UI hardening, CSP headers, input validation |
| Fail-closed pipeline, service auth, CSRF, supply chain pinning | Implemented | M26 | Fail-closed on error, inter-service auth, CSRF protection, dependency pinning |
| Enhanced scanners, provenance manifests, fs-verity | Implemented | M27 | Extended scanner coverage, provenance tracking, fs-verity integrity |
| Weight distribution fingerprinting | Implemented | M28 | Statistical fingerprinting of model weight distributions |
| Garak LLM vulnerability scanner | Implemented | M29 | Garak integration for LLM vulnerability scanning |
| gguf-guard deep GGUF integrity scanner | Implemented | M30 | Deep GGUF file format integrity and safety scanning |
| Agent Mode (Phase 1: safe local autopilot) | Implemented | M31 | Policy-bound agent with deny-by-default policy engine, capability tokens, hard budgets, storage gateway, workspace ID abstraction, Unix socket IPC (UI→Agent), 93 tests across 11 classes |
| Feature | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| OPA/Rego policy engine | Planned (high priority) | Declarative policy management — elevated priority now that Agent Mode introduces risk-tier approvals, workspace scope rules, sensitivity enforcement, and outbound gating |
| Agent Mode Phase 2: Explainability | Planned | Detailed explanations for quarantine/registry/airlock decisions, per-workspace permissions, audit views |
| Agent Mode Phase 3: Online-assisted | Planned | Airlock-mediated outbound, search mediation, redaction flows, approval UX for online steps |
| Agent Mode Phase 4: Stronger isolation | Planned | Adversarial testing, signed releases, additional sandboxing profiles, policy bypass regression tests |
| SBOMs for releases | Planned | Software Bill of Materials for each release artifact |
| Signed release artifacts with provenance attestation | Planned | SLSA-compatible provenance for release binaries and images |
| Hardware security module (HSM) support | Planned | External HSM integration for key management |