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The implementation of L-alert in code #2

@zsxpdsyz

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@zsxpdsyz

Hello authors:

I have read your paper and code, but I have some questions about the consistency between the description of L-alert in the text and its implementation in the code.

In the article, l-alert is described as being triggered if secret information can propagate to architectural registers. However, in the code implementation, as I understand it, the code aims to prove that in this design, either a misprediction must have occurred, or the instruction corresponding to root_id was killed, or the sequence of instructions committed by the ROB (i.e., the sequence of valid signals) is equal. This seems to not use architectural registers as a security property.

prove:
at t+O: (!(mispred_happened_1 && mispred_happened_2) && (!root_id_killed && !root_id_already_killed) && (ROB_commit_array_1[commit_index] != ROB_commit_array_2[commit_index])) == 1'b0;

Best regards

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