Improve security of the system

[keyctl]

There must be an unintentional vulnerability somewhere. We should try to break our own system before hand-in.

[RequestForCoffee]

If we find one already we can just sell it as a "backdoor". :)
It's not a bug, it's a feature

[Liblor]

@keyctl @RequestForCoffee @Miro-H

We should definitely look at our todos:

CertServer/Startup.cs:            // XXX: Implement better solution for DB password
CertServer/Startup.cs:            // XXX: Only run https server
CertServer/DataModifiers/CADBModifier.cs:        // XXX: Test if CRL signature is correct
CertServer/DataModifiers/CADBModifier.cs:                //XXX: add crlreason to pubCert DB
CertServer/Controllers/CRLController.cs:        // XXX: Return type?
CoreCA.Client/CoreCAClient.cs:        // TODO: consider centralizing the endpoint URLs (currently hardcoded per-method)
CoreCA.DataModel/CipherSuite.cs:        // TODO: consider replacing string Alg/HashAlg fields with enums
Vagrantfile:				# TODO: Adapt to put masters in DMZ and route their
vagrant_share/ansible/roles/mariadb/tasks/harden.yml:# XXX: Make reexecutable, check if not already hardnend, otherwise error:
vagrant_share/ansible/roles/mariadb/tasks/harden.yml:# TODO: Make sure, password isn't logged in some history
vagrant_share/ansible/roles/lynis/tasks/main.yml:# TODO Install the package directly from CISOFY.
vagrant_share/ansible/roles/init_db/tasks/legacy_db.yml:# XXX: maybe shred first
vagrant_share/ansible/roles/init_db/tasks/create_users.yml:# XXX: Refactor to work for X users
vagrant_share/ansible/roles/hardening/templates/etc/ssh/sshd_config.j2:# TODO Add ListenAddress option.
WebServer/Models/Cert/RequestNewCertDetails.cs:        // TODO: re-think arbitrary min-length
WebServer/Controllers/CertController.cs:        // TODO: Enable XSRF protection for HttpPost endpoints if not present by default
WebServer/Controllers/CertController.cs:        // TODO: Rate limit
WebServer/Controllers/CertController.cs:            // TODO: consider validating credentials here before making the request
WebServer/Controllers/AccountController.cs:                    // TODO: reevaluate arbitrary expiration
WebServer/Controllers/AccountController.cs:                // TODO: assess potential open redirect vulnerability
WebServer/Controllers/AccountController.cs:                    // TODO Revoke all certificates not matching the new information.
WebServer/Authentication/CertificateAuthenticationDBValidator.cs:                // TODO: properly check the certificate identity against config/Core CA server/etc.
WebServer/Authentication/CertificateAuthenticationDBValidator.cs:                // TODO: consider edge cases/alternatives (e.g. explicitly using a different field, fallback mechanism, etc)

[keyctl]

We should definitely look at our todos:

Every TODO we don't manage to implement has to be removed tomorrow.

[Miro-H]

@keyctl @RequestForCoffee @Miro-H

We should definitely look at our todos:

...

Most of the ones in the cert server are obsolete. I will clean that up tonight.

[Liblor]

I'd also implement a trivial version of: The user cannot change their personal information to the personal information of another user. Maybe just check if the email adress is already present in the DB

[Liblor]

Done in #72

[Miro-H]

I created the https://github.com/Liblor/applied_sec_lab/tree/cleanup-todos branch and removed all TODOs of the cert server. Maybe you can remove the other ones as well and then we merge it into the master?