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ARES-E Security & Compliance Posture

Security architecture, threat model, and regulatory compliance mapping for ARES-E. Aligned with ODNI ICD 503, NIST SP 800-53/800-171, DOE O 205.1C, and Navy CYBERSAFE.

1. Security Architecture Overview

ARES-E implements a defense-in-depth security posture across five domains:

Domain Control Implementation
Data Integrity SHA-256 hash-chained audit ledger ZeroTrustLedger with verify_chain()
Input Validation Strict-mode Pydantic V2 schemas ConfigDict(extra="forbid"), model_validator
Adversarial Defence Heuristic injection/poisoning detection 8 regex patterns + 7 keyword detectors
Privacy Protection ε-Differential privacy (Laplace mechanism) Configurable privacy budget per deployment
Access Control CORS middleware with configurable origins FastAPI CORSMiddleware; lock down in production

2. Threat Model

2.1 Threat Actors

Actor Capability ARES-E Mitigation
Adversarial AI Agent Submits manipulated payloads to influence grid dispatch or thermal control Pydantic strict validation rejects malformed payloads; PHIAK detects injection patterns
Data Poisoner Injects poisoned training data or adversarial signals AdversarialDetector scans all string fields; 7 poisoning keyword detectors
Insider Threat Attempts to modify audit trail post-evaluation SHA-256 hash chain; verify_chain() detects any tampering
Foreign Intelligence Attempts to exfiltrate infrastructure telemetry ε-Differential privacy ensures individual data points are statistically indistinguishable
Supply Chain Attack Compromised dependency introduces malicious code Open-source stack with pinned versions; no proprietary or foreign-origin dependencies

2.2 Attack Surface

Surface Risk Control
REST API ingress Malformed payload injection Pydantic V2 strict-mode; domain literal (`EWIS
Agent output signals Prompt injection / data poisoning PHIAK adversarial detection layer
Audit ledger Post-hoc tampering SHA-256 chain with genesis block; verify_chain()
Infrastructure telemetry Privacy breach Laplace noise calibrated to ε
Container runtime Container escape Minimal base image; no root execution; read-only volumes

3. Regulatory Compliance Mapping

3.1 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Federal Information Systems)

Control Family Control ARES-E Implementation
AC — Access Control AC-3 Access Enforcement CORS middleware; domain-literal validation restricts execution scope
AU — Audit & Accountability AU-2 Audit Events Every workflow evaluation logged to ZeroTrustLedger
AU-3 Content of Audit Records Ledger blocks include timestamp, job_id, domain, violations, vvuq_score
AU-10 Non-Repudiation SHA-256 hash chain provides cryptographic non-repudiation
IA — Identification & Auth IA-5 Authenticator Management API token / mTLS to be configured at AmSC deployment
SC — System & Comms Protection SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality HTTPS/TLS termination at Science DMZ ingress
SC-13 Cryptographic Protection SHA-256 (FIPS 180-4 compliant) for all audit hashing
SC-28 Protection of Information at Rest Ledger chain maintained in-memory; persistent storage encrypted at rest
SI — System & Info Integrity SI-3 Malicious Code Protection PHIAK adversarial detector; input validation
SI-4 Information System Monitoring Structured logging via Python logging; STIX export for SIEM
SI-10 Information Input Validation Pydantic V2 strict-mode with ConfigDict(extra="forbid")

3.2 NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 (CUI Protection)

Requirement ARES-E Control
3.1.1 Limit system access CORS origin restriction; API authentication layer
3.3.1 Create and retain audit records ZeroTrustLedger with STIX/TAXII export
3.3.2 Ensure actions are traceable SHA-256 chain links every evaluation to its predecessor
3.13.1 Monitor communications at boundaries FastAPI request/response logging; STIX indicators
3.14.6 Monitor organizational systems Health endpoint with ledger integrity check

3.3 ODNI ICD 503 (Intelligence Community)

Requirement ARES-E Control
Confidentiality of intelligence data ε-Differential privacy; no PII/PHI in evaluation payloads
Integrity of analytical products Deterministic physics validation; VVUQ scoring
Non-disclosure compliance All outputs marked with STIX/TAXII labels; no external API calls
Whistleblower protection Code is open-source; audit trail is immutable and exportable

3.4 Navy CYBERSAFE / NAVSEA

Requirement ARES-E Control
System safety assessment VVUQ framework with acceptance thresholds
Hazard analysis Physics violation detection with absolute disqualification
Configuration management Git version control; semantic versioning; Docker image tagging
Test and evaluation 45 automated tests; acceptance test matrix in milestone delivery

3.5 DOE Orders

Order Requirement ARES-E Control
DOE O 205.1C Dept. of Energy Cybersecurity Program STIX/TAXII export; Zero-Trust ledger; NIST 800-53 alignment
DOE O 142.3B Unclassified Foreign National Access No foreign-national-specific data processing; air-gapped operation
DOE O 485.1 Foreign Ownership interests 100% open-source U.S.-developed stack

4. Research, Technology & Economic Security (RTES)

Per OT Agreement Section V:

RTES Requirement ARES-E Compliance
No Foreign Entity participation All development performed in U.S.; no foreign entity dependencies
No FCOC components Open-source stack: PyTorch (Meta, U.S.), FastAPI (U.S.), NumPy (U.S.), NetworkX (U.S.)
No Entity of Concern (42 USC 18912) No participation by listed entities
No Malign Foreign Talent All contributors certified per covered-individual requirements
100% U.S. performance All work performed in United States
Export control compliance No ITAR/EAR controlled components; standard ML/web stack
Conflict of interest policy Organizational CoI addressed per Article 5.7

5. Incident Response

5.1 Detection

  • Automated: PHIAK adversarial detection on every payload; verify_chain() on health check.
  • Manual: STIX/TAXII bundle export for SIEM ingestion and SOC analyst review.

5.2 Response

  1. Adversarial payload detected → workflow marked FAILED; alert logged to ledger.
  2. Chain integrity failure → health endpoint reports ledger_intact: false; operations halted.
  3. Privacy breach suspected → review Laplace mechanism ε configuration; audit telemetry outputs.

5.3 Reporting

All incidents reported through:

  • ZeroTrustLedger audit trail (immutable, exportable)
  • STIX/TAXII 2.1 bundles for DOE threat-intelligence sharing
  • DOE IG Hotline for fraud, waste, and abuse (https://www.energy.gov/ig/ig-hotline)

6. Supply Chain Security

Component Origin License Vulnerability Monitoring
Python 3.11+ PSF (U.S.) PSF License CVE monitoring via pip audit
FastAPI Sebastián Ramírez (U.S.) MIT GitHub Dependabot
Pydantic V2 Samuel Colvin (U.K./U.S.) MIT GitHub Dependabot
PyTorch Meta AI (U.S.) BSD-3 PyTorch security advisories
NetworkX NetworkX Developers (U.S.) BSD-3 GitHub Dependabot
NumPy NumPy Developers (U.S.) BSD-3 GitHub Dependabot
hashlib Python stdlib PSF Python security releases

All dependencies are pinned in pyproject.toml to prevent supply-chain drift.